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SECTION I.

THE ATTACK FROM THE WINDWARD UPON THE REAR OF THE ENEMY.

156. Suppose a fleet of ten, twenty, or more ships, extended in line of battle at F, (Plate XVII. fig. 1.), endeavouring to avoid a close engagement, but, at the same time, keeping under an easy sail, with the intention of receiving the usual attack from another fleet of equal number, three or four miles to windward, at B, failing in any form; but let it be in three lines or divisions: It is required, by what method shall B make the attack on F with advantage?

The improbability, or rather impossibility, of attacking and carrying the enemy's whole line of ships having already been demonstrated (Vid. Nos. 32. 38.), the next consideration will be, How many ships may be attacked and carried with advantage? Let it be supposed that the three sternmost ships only, and not exceeding the fourth, are possible to be carried; let a sufficient strength, A, be sent down to force an attack upon these three ships, disposed and
and supported according to the judgement of the Admiral, while, in the mean time, he should keep to windward with the rest of his fleet, formed into such divisions as might best enable him to attend to the motions of the enemy, and the effect of his attack; being himself so far disengaged from action, as to be able to make his observations, and give his orders, with some degree of tranquillity.

157. By placing the fleet B in the division (as in Plate XVII, fig. 2.), means only that the attacking fleet shall be so disposed, and so connected together, as to be able to give the support and attention that may be required to any ship, or any part of the fleet, and in preference to a long extended line of six or seven miles in length (No. 25.), where it must be impracticable to give the necessary support to such ships as may be disabled.

SECTION II.

ATTACK UPON THE ENEMY'S THREE STERNMOST SHIPS MORE PARTICULARLY.

158. Though the number of ships contained in each squadron may, by many, be thought a proper rule for determining the number of the ships to be attacked, yet, as there will be next to a certainty of carrying three, we would choose to keep by

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* Vid. Section IV. No. 15.
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by that number. Wherefore, although it may afterwards be found proper to give other opinions, and to enter into a fuller discussion of the choice, and the best arrangement of the particular ships defined for the approaching, and making this attack, it is necessary here to carry on the following demonstration upon the supposition of three ships being the number proper to be attempted.

159. It will be evident, however, that the headmost, or swiftest failing ships of B may get close along-side of the sternmost of the enemy F, even though the ships of F should, in general, be faster than those of B; an opinion which, for argument’s sake alone, shall be for once admitted. But it will not, therefore, be admitted, that every individual ship of a great fleet, or even of the number 15, as in the figure, will be able to out-fall every individual ship of a numerous British fleet, or even of the number 15, as in the plan. Therefore, there will be a necessity that the swiftest ships of B must come up along-side of the sternmost and dullest failing ships of the enemy F; while, at the same time, F (by an attempt of out-failing B) must be thrown into the disorder of a downright flight: Therefore, of course, it must be admitted, that, if the enemy F continues going off in line of battle, and endeavouring to avoid a close engagement, it will be impossible to prevent the fleet making the attack from entering into the position of figure 2.

160. By this position, then, it is evident, that these three ships at I, will be in the power of the Admiral of B. For, by keeping
so many ships to windward, he will be enabled to send down fresh ships from time to time, either for the support, or to supply the station of any of those that may be disabled in making the attack, while it may be imagined, that the three ships in question, by being disabled, or being deprived of the wind, now taken out of their falls by the ships to windward, will be prevented from following their friends.

161. From hence the enemy ahead must either abandon his three sternmost ships, or he must double back to support them, which must be done either by tacking or by wearing. But let it be first examined what is naturally to be done by tacking, and for the greater satisfaction, let every possible case that can happen be examined separately.

SECTION III.

THE ENEMY'S ATTEMPT TO SUPPORT HIS THREE STERN-MOST SHIPS BY TACKING HIS FLEET.

162. (Plate XVII. fig. 3.) First let us suppose, that the enemy at F has continued to protract his course in line of battle, upon the same tack, and that the headmost ship H, with the three next astern of her, have tacked to windward, and that the whole remaining ships intend to tack the same way, but in succession (as in fig. 3.),
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is it not evident, that F has then left his three sternmost ships, as I, in the power of the ships at A; that he must also leave exposed his fourth and fifth ship G to another attack from another division of the British at C, which will also be on equal terms as with his three sternmost at I; and, lastly, if he prosecutes his intention of supporting his three ships, he will be obliged to begin a disadvantageous attack upon the Admiral, with the main body of the fleet lying ready to receive him.

* 163. (Plate XVII. fig. 4.) The consequence of all which will be, that he will not only lose his three sternmost ships, but, in all probability, the fourth and fifth also, as at G in fig. 4., and will be forced to begin an attack, and close, and mix, ship with ship, on equal terms; a situation which he, at all times, with the greatest anxiety, hath avoided, and we, with equal anxiety, have always courted.

164. (Plate XVII. fig. 5.) Again, suppose that his three sternmost ships have been attacked, and that he shall order his fleet to tack all at one time, as in fig. 5. The consequences will then be, that this movement having required some time, and some length of course, will have produced a considerable distance between his main body and his three ships; or, in other words, that they have been deserted; for it will not be in their power to tack with the rest of their friends.

165. He must also, in bringing his ships heads round, expose the ships nearest his enemy to be raked by a dreadful cannonade.
166. (Plate XVIII. fig. 6.) He must also run the risk of having his fleet thrown into a general disorder, by many of his ships missing flags, wearing, and running to leeward, as in fig. 6. Lastly, upon a supposition that his ships have all tacked, and none of them missed flags, still he must, of necessity, begin the attack, mix ships, and come to a close engagement, as in the former case.

SECTION IV.

THE ENEMY’S ATTEMPT TO SUPPORT HIS THREE STEERNMOST SHIPS, BY WEARING HIS FLEET.

167. Having shewn the consequences of an attempt to windward, let us also examine what may be expected from an attempt to leeward. Suppose the two fleets in the same position as in Plate XVII. fig. 2.; that is, the main body of the enemy extended in line of battle to leeward, his three sternmost ships entangled with the fleet B, whose Admiral, with the main body, keeps to windward, to observe, with a rigid attention, the motions of the enemy.

168. (Plate XVIII. fig. 7.) At the same time, suppose that the Admiral F has ordered his sternmost ship G to wear, and afterwards
afterwards the whole line, and that he is now running upon a
contrary tack to leeward, as at H, wishing to support or bring off
his three ships.

From inspection, it will be evident, that this attempt may
be more dangerous than the attempt to windward; for it will
expose a number of his ships to a raking fire while in the act
of wearing, and the squadron, by getting so far to leeward, will
be unable to give the proper support to the three ships.

It will open a gap for the fleet of B (who will immediately
wear also, and follow him) to break in, as at A, and cut off the
three ships, without hope of recovery.

And, if F shall still persist in the endeavour to recover his three
ships, he will be obliged to begin the attack, under all the usual
disadvantages.

169. (Plate XVIII. fig. 8.) Again, upon another supposi-
tion, that the headmost ship of the enemy H, with the four or
five next astern, have wore, and are running upon a contrary
tack, wishing, as before, to support or bring off the three ships,
the rest of the fleet intending to wear also, and follow in succe-
sion, is it not evident that this movement, being more unleavan-
like, will be worse than the last?.

It will expose an additional number of ships, particularly the
last two, as at G, and will, at the same time, make an opening
for the main body of B's fleet to fall in and cut off the three ships,
as in the former case.
170. (Plate XVIII, fig. 9.) Again, should the enemy F wear and bear away with his whole ships at once and the same time, as in fig. 9., it is evident that this movement must have the consequence of a downright flight, with the certainty of losing the three ships.

171. Lastly, upon the supposition that such an attack has been made, and that the three ships are entangled, it generally follows, that, though the wind may be blowing a fresh gale at the beginning of the battle, yet it often falls away so much from the effect of a violent cannonade, that it may be impossible for the headmost ships of F's fleet to give the least assistance to his ships deterred in his rear.

172. From what has been said, it will appear, that a fleet B, keeping connected in a body to windward, may come up with, and entangle the three sternmost ships of an enemy F, extended in line of battle, and going off to leeward, and, at the same time, be able to overawe the remaining main body of their fleet; and that, having forced the position, as in plan 2d, the whole consequences, as already described, must follow; that is, F must submit to the loss of three ships.

What has been hitherto said proceeds upon a supposition, that the fleet F has kept on his course till the fleet B has come up with his rear; let it then be examined what other attempts the enemy F can make to avoid coming to close engagement upon equal terms.
SECTION V.

THE ENEMY ENDEAVOURING TO AVOID THE ATTACK UPON HIS REAR, BY WEARING, AND PASSING ON CONTRARY TACKS TO LEEWARD.

173. (Plate XVIII. fig. 10.) Suppose a fleet of ships of the enemy standing on the larboard tack to leeward, and going off as before at F, and a fleet of ships in a collected state or position to windward, as at B, fig. 10.

174. (Plate XIX. fig. 11. and 12.) And suppose that the enemy F, perceiving the fleet B pointing an attack against his rear, as in fig. 11.; and that, in place of keeping on his course upon the same tack, he should wear, and endeavour to pass on contrary tacks to leeward, (for it will not be admitted that he can get to windward, see plan 12.), What will then be the effect?

175. Is it not evident, that the headmost ships of F must be forced to leeward by the fleet B obstructing his line of direction, or the line of his course? They must be forced to begin an attack at any distance B' may choose.
176. (Plate XIX. fig. 13.) That they may receive such damage as will stop their way: That their way being stopped, will of course be an obstruction to the next after; or, that these subsequent ships, to prevent this stop, must bear away to leeward of their crippled ships, as at G, which will not only prevent these ships from damaging the headmost ships of B, but will give time and opportunity to B to bring down his windward ships to fall in, either ahead or after, that is, to the right or left, of his headmost ships A, and oppose ship for ship of the enemy upon equal terms. Vide fig. 13. plate 19.

177. But, should none of the headmost ships of the squadron F be crippled; that is, should F pass B without reach of cannon-shot, which undoubtedly he will do, still, while bearing away, he may be forced to suffer a distant cannonade, ship with ship, on equal terms.

178. (Plate XIX. fig. 14.) Whether he wears and gets back upon his former tack, as at G, in fig. 14.

179. Or continues to run before the wind, as at P, in fig. 15.

180. (Plate XX. fig. 16.) But, if F persists to pass on a contrary tack to leeward, and without reach of cannon-shot, is it not evident, that B must some time or other come up with the rear of F, whether B shall, at any time, be abreast of his centre, as in fig. 16?
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181. Or of his rear, (as in fig. 17. plate XX.)

182. Or whether F puts right before the wind, (as in fig. 18. plate XX.)

Or runs off, ship by ship, as he best can, (as in fig. 19. plate XX.)


SECTIO N VI.

THE EFFECT AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE WIND SHIFTING DURING THE ATTACK FROM THE WINDWARD, CONSIDERED; IN WHICH SHALL BE ENDEAVOURED TO BE COMPREHENDED EVERY CASE, AS WELL POSSIBLE, AS WHAT MAY BE PROBABLE.

183. So far the attack has proceeded with the wind fixed in one and the same quarter. To make the demonstration the more complete, it will be necessary to inquire, What might be the effect produced by a change of wind, should that take place during the action? For this purpose, let the opponent fleets be placed in some one of the preceding positions, representing the attack upon the three hermmost ships of the enemy (as in fig. 20. Plate XXI. Vol. No. 158. Plate XVII. fig. 2.)

S
In which the fleet desirous of making the attack is represented in four divisions, as at B B B, A.

F, The fleet desirous of avoiding the attack, and abandoning his three sternmost ships at G.

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CASE I.

THE WIND SHIFTING BY DEGREES, AND COMING AFT.

184. In the commencement of the attack, let us suppose the wind, from being in the north at N, on the first onset, that it shall come more and more after and by the western quarter to K. Then it is evident, by the disposition of the two fleets, that the fleet F, by such change, will have acquired no advantage whatever; on the contrary, it will thereby be thrown just so much the farther to leeward.

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CASE II.

THE WIND SHIFTING AND COMING BY DEGREES ROUND AHEAD.

185. Again, if the wind, by taking an opposite course, shall shift ahead, and shall come round by the eastern quarter to L (Plate XXI. fig. 21.), neither will F have it in his power to avail himself of this, providing the fleet B, in continuing carefully to attend
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attend his motions, and, affected by the impulse of the veering wind, shall stretch his fleet to leeward of him, but, at the same time, to windward of the ships at O O, should F endeavour, by bearing round-up, to rejoin his own ships that are engaged in the rear at G.

186. (Plate XXI. fig. 22.) Representing both fleets on the starboard tack, shows, at the same time, that F has not thereby acquired any advantage.

CASE III.

OF THE EFFECT, SUPPOSING THE WIND TO VEER CONTINUEDLY ROUND AHEAD.

187. Again, upon the supposition that F, by this last change, has now gained the wind (Vide Plate XXII. fig. 23.), it will not be denied that, in this case, he may maintain it, and that it may be possible for him to make a circular course R R R R to windward of B, keeping the wind, as it may be disposed to veer round, by the eastern quarter, from the north at N to the south at S, or to the west at K, or even round to the north at N, from whence it set out; but, as he can be attended all the while by the fleet B, who will cut him off to leeward, he never will be able to recover his three ships at G.
CASE IV.

THE WIND, IN ONE INSTANT, SHIFTING IN DIRECT OPPOSITION.

188. Lastly, if the wind, in changing, shall, in one instant, shift in direct opposition to where it was when the attack began, that is, from the north at N to the south at S (Vide Plate XXII. fig. 24.), then, and in that case, before one can judge whether such change shall be favourable for F or not, it will be necessary that the relative situation of the two fleets should be determined such as it was when the change took place. For example:

189. If the headmost ships of the fleet F, that is, if his van and centre shall have separated at any considerable distance from his rear, as per Plate XXIII. fig. 24.

190. Or if, in the farther prosecution of this mode of attack, it shall have advanced to the position represented in fig. 25.;* it is evident, in both cases, that F, though, by this change, he shall have got to windward, yet, notwithstanding, he will not be able to avail himself of this seeming advantage, the fleet B having it still in their power to cut him off from his three ships.

191. On the other hand, if this instantaneous change of wind, in direct opposition, shall have taken place more early in the action,

* Vide Plate XVIII. fig. 7. No. 168.
tion, that is, when the positions of the two fleets shall be such as represented in fig. 26. Plate XXIII. viz.

The fleet B in the position of four divisions B B B B and A, and the enemy in the positions F and G.

Then F, who before was to leeward, by this instantaneous change of wind from the north (at N) to the south (at S), having now got to windward of every division of the fleet B, is it not evident, that it may be practicable for him to carry assistance to his three ships (at G) in the rear, and, perhaps, even to cut off some one of B's ships (at A), if they do not, with all convenient speed, bear away (as at C C), to put themselves under the protection of their friends (B) to leeward?

192. But whether he (F) shall attempt to effect this manœuvre, by wearing his ships in the line (as at H H), or, what seems most eligible, by making his ships tack (as at I I), as it is to be presumed that his three ships, which have been some time engaged, must be considerably crippled, and not able to make sufficient sail, while endeavouring to bring them off; it will be difficult for him to prevent being drawn into a general and close engagement, which, by the supposition, he has all along endeavoured to avoid.

193. A farther prosecution of demonstrations, which are likely to lead us on to the attack from the leeward, we think proper to decline for the present. It is a new subject, and, of itself, re-
quires a separate discussion. We will therefore proceed to bring into view those other accidents only which more immediately can affect the attack from the windward; not that such can be attended with consequences much different from what have already been treated of, but, the ideas once being started, and having great apparent importance, it becomes necessary to give them a full investigation.

SECTION VII.

OF PARTIAL BREEZES OF WIND.

194. When the fleet in pursuit shall be favoured with a breeze of wind, while the fleet desirous of avoiding the attack shall be becalmed;

(Plate XXI. fig. 20.) Is it not self-evident, how unfavourable this must be for the enemy F? He will thereby be the more easily overtaken in the pursuit; and, should the attack be begun upon his three ships, they will with the greater certainty be ruined.

195. When the fleet desirous of avoiding the attack shall be favoured with the breeze, while the fleet in pursuit shall be becalmed.

It being evident, that the enemy (F) will have it in his power to make his escape with his whole fleet, if this partial breeze in his favour
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Your shall take place before the attack has begun, we shall pass on to the opposite case.

When the attack upon the three ships shall have commenced before this partial breeze in favour of F, the fleet pursued, has taken place.

196. (Plate XXI. fig. 20.) The variety of positions in which the two fleets may be affected is so great, and the consequences which can be supposed attendant on this case so numerous, it will not be attempted to give a separate discussion of each. The reader, however, by applying his own ideas upon the subject to the plans before him * will be able to supply this for himself. In the mean time, as it is imagined nothing in such investigation will be found that can materially affect the general issue, and since no breeze whatever can favour the fleet F, so as to enable it to sail round and round the fleet B, (the fleet B all the while supposed to be lying becalmed), it will not be too much to say, that this partial breeze in favour of the fleet F, taking place after the attack began, although it may facilitate the escape of his van and centre, will not avail him much in the recovery of the three ships in his rear, perhaps not in any case as yet exhibited, excepting in this one, where the wind; in one instant, had shifted in direct opposition, No. 191.

When the attack shall have commenced before the partial breeze in favour of F, the fleet pursued, has taken place, supposing the wind in one instant to have shifted in direct opposition.

197.

* Comprehended in Plates 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23.
197. That, even in this case, No. 191. (Plate XXIII. fig. 26.), the same breeze which would favour F in the attempt to bring off his three ships, would, at the same time, favour the escape of the ships of B at A, as formerly described. That this partial breeze would require to be of considerable duration, otherwise F, in thus attempting to bring off his three ships, crippled as they will be, must hazard a general engagement, in like manner as already described, No. 192.

SECTION VIII.

OF WINDS BLOWING IN CONTRARY DIRECTIONS.

198. In supposing, at any place, the existence of two distinct streams of wind actually blowing in opposite directions, the one from the north (for example), the other from the south, or from any two other opposite points of the compass; at that place also must be supposed an intermediate space, a line of separation between the two streams, parallel to both, and to be often distinguished by a sort of calm upon the surface of the water, occasioned by the eddy winds partaking of the effect of the adjacent and contrary streams.

199. That the requisite examples may the more easily be exhibited, suppose Plate XXIV. to represent a space at sea, in which two,
two distinct streams of wind are discovered blowing from opposite directions, the wind N N on the left side of the plate blowing down the page from the north, and the wind S S on the right blowing up the page from the south, and let Y Y be the line of separation between the two streams; under which description also, let Plate XXV. be comprehended, and let the usual characters serve to distinguish the different parts, viz.

B, the fleet in pursuit;
F, the fleet pursued;
O, the three ships attacked;
A, the four ships making the attack.

200. Now, whether ships shall be going large (as in fig. 1.), or close haul'd (as in fig. 2.), or running with the wind on the beam (as in fig. 3.), still their encounter with the line of separation Y Y will be similar, and to the same effect; and in no other direction whatever can fleets encounter this accident of contrary winds, than what can be comprehended under their three cases.

The letters K L and M (fig. 1. 2. and 3.) represent the corresponding cases, when fleets coming from an opposite direction shall encounter, in like manner, such contrary streams of wind.

OF FLEETS ENCOUNTERING CONTRARY STREAMS OF WIND, BEFORE THE ATTACK SHALL BE BEGUN.

201. For example, after the two opponent fleets have been manœuvring for some time in the same stream of wind, and have
assumed positions as before described, No. 156., or as B and F, (fig. 4, plate 24.) Let us suppose F the farthest ahead, that he has perceived the wind as changing to a direct contrary direction, and, from having had his ships on a larboard tack, as when at II, that he has got, or must be getting, his starboard tacks aboard, as at F F; or, in other words, that he has passed from one stream of wind, and has got into another, and contrary stream—is it not evident, if the fleet B shall stand on and follow, and shall get into this new stream of wind, the same with his enemy F, that he will be to leeward (as in fig. 5.), and, of course, that the mode of his attack must be changed? (Vid. No. 192.)

202. Again, on the other hand, suppose B, in declining to stand on, shall continue in the northern stream of wind, as in fig. 6.)—will it not be possible for him, by putting before the wind, as at C, to recover a position A to windward of F, to soon as ever he shall choose to pass from the one stream of wind to the other?

CASES AFTER THE ATTACK SHALL BE BEGUN.

203. Plate XXV. fig. 7. represents the attack already begun *, and continuing in the northern stream, while F, abandoning his three ships, has got into the southern stream with his van and centre.

204.

* Plate XVII. fig. 2. and 3. Nos. 156. 157. 158. 159.
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204. (Fig. 8.) The attack continued in the northern stream, and B, with his whole fleet, dropping down the wind together, evidently will have the advantage of getting to the southward equally with F, the enemy, notwithstanding the efforts of F to get to windward in the opposite stream.

205. The fleet B in another view (fig. 9.) is represented as aware of the accident before him, and having pushed ahead with his van and centre, will be prepared to support his attack of the three ships, whether he shall continue in the northern stream, as at C, or shall pass into the contrary stream, as at D, (fig. 10.)

206. (Fig. 11.) Again, on the other hand, should the fleet B, in continuing the attack, stand on, as at B B B, and, without precaution, shall have followed, and got into the same stream of wind with the enemy F; then F, of consequence, being to windward, will immediately have it in his power to carry assistance to his three ships, but whether by wearing his other ships in the line, as at H H, or by tacking, as at I I, will still be exposed to the hazard of a general engagement, as before described, No. 192.

207. From all which it follows, that a collected and connected fleet of ships to windward will, on every occasion, be able to make an advantageous attack upon a fleet of ships to leeward, and wishing to avoid a close engagement; and that the attacked fleet, lying at such disadvantage as no manœuvring whatever can compensate, must be worsted.
SECTION IX.

OTHER OPINIONS HOW THIS ATTACK FROM THE WINDWARD SHOULD BE CONDUCTED.

208. Many eminent seamen, however much they may be convinced that an attack made upon the rear of an enemy’s fleet will have a much better chance of success than in the case of an attack upon the whole line, or even on the van, as hitherto practised, have still different opinions how this attack should be conducted. These, as given to me, it is proper should be laid before the reader, although they are not what I would approve of.

209. (Plate XXVI. fig. 1.) First, if it is supposed that the attack shall be made by the greater part of the force of B’s fleet, coming right before the wind, upon the six sternmost ships of an enemy’s; is it not evident, that the ships of B, by making the attack in this manner, must be exposed, without a possibility of return, to as many broadsides from each of these six ships of F as can be got ready during a course of two miles? Hence, as the said ships of B will assuredly be disabled, before they will have it in their power to hurt the enemy, this disadvantage should determine the impropriety of this mode.
210. (Plate XXVI. fig. 2.) Suppose again, that some part of the force chosen to make the attack shall be sent to leeward (as at A), as well as to windward of the three ships determined to be attacked, (as at C.)

But the danger supposed, of shot passing over the enemy's ships, and striking those of friends, may be an objection to this mode.

211. (Plate XXVI. fig. 3.) Others have been of opinion, that the headmost ship A, chosen to make the attack, shall come close up along side of the sternmost of the enemy, and, having delivered her fire, shall push along the line as far as possible, which may be supposed to be the sixth ship of the enemy F; and, as it is evident that this first ship A may have received six broadsides, that is, a broadside from every one of the six enemy's ships, during her course in passing them, it has been thought possible that the other five ships C C C C C, by following close after her, may attain their stations, each abreast of her opposite, without having received a greater number of broadsides than they have had it in their power to return; and, therefore, that by this mode the number of ships to be attacked will be determined; for as many ships as the leading ship shall be able to reach, as many ships will the attacking fleet be able to carry.

212. (Plate XXVI. fig. 4.) A fourth mode of attack, which seems to be composed from a medium taken from the last. Let it be supposed, as in the former cases, that the fleet B has been brought
brought up to action in a collected manner, but subdivided only
to far as the service may require (as formerly stated in fig. 2.),
and that the leeward division A shall be more particularly de
dined for the immediate attack, while, at the same time, the body of
the fleet, keeping to windward, shall be supposed attentive to give
the necessary support where required.

Then let it be supposed, that the headmost ship C, making the
attack, having been soon crippled, shall not have been able to push
farther than the third or fourth ship of the enemy's line:

Is it not easy to conceive, say they, that some one, or more,
of the ships to windward, attentive to support and supply her place,
may bear down on the fourth ship of the enemy, under cover of
the smoke, throw in her fire, and push on to the fifth or sixth
ship, as at D, or, perhaps, farther; and that so far as this freth
ship D, or a second fresh ship E, may be able to push, so many
ships of the enemy may be expected to be carried?

For, whatever ships of the enemy can be got abreast of, at a
proper distance, may be disabled, and therefore commanded, by the
numerous fresh ships kept to windward for this purpose.

213. In all the different attacks upon the rear, it has, by some,
been thought a great object, if practicable, to throw a raking fire
into the rear of an enemy's line of battle, by ships detached for
that purpose, as at O. For if shot, as has been said, can take ef-
fect at a distance of two miles, from this position it will surely
reach the sixth ship, if the enemy's line shall be formed at two
cables length asunder; and, if formed at one cable's length asun-
der, it will reach, and may cripple the twelfth ship.
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SECTION X.

CONCLUSION, WITH GENERAL OBSERVATIONS.

In the preceding Narrative and Demonstrations, we think it is shown,

214. 1. That British seamen, from the nature, as well as the greater extent of the navigation upon our coasts, must, of necessity, be superior, both in skill and intrepidity, as well as in number, to those of other nations.

215. 2. That deficiency in point of failing, upon many occasions, evidently has not been the cause of these late miscarriages; but, if it has really been the cause of miscarriage in others, is it not high time to set about such reformation in our dock-yards as may recover an equality in a point so important? Even supposing this to be true, why should we uniformly attempt getting up with the enemy’s van, with a view to carry their whole fleet, instead of contenting ourselves with a certainty of cutting off a few of their dullest failing vessels in the rear?

216. 3. That the mode of running down the wind in a line, each ship directing her course upon her opposite, and pointing the
the attack upon the van, with a view of stopping it, in preference to an attack upon the rear, has proceeded from an idea of carrying every ship in the enemy's fleet; but this mode has evidently given the enemy an opportunity of disabling our ships, and preventing us from coming close alongside of them.