CHAPTER XXIX

THE POSTWAR KOREAN PROBLEM

I. KOREA UNDER JAPAN

The triangular struggle between China, Russia, and Japan for control of Korea had been resolved decisively in favor of Japan as a consequence of the Russo-Japanese war, which set the stage for the annexation of Korea in 1910. Between 1910 and the outbreak of World War II Japan had exercised its power in its colony with an eye to the interest of the metropolitan country. Korea had been developed economically to serve the interests and meet the needs of Japan and the Japanese with only incidental concern for the interests and needs of the Korean people. The Koreans were exploited economically and kept in a position of political subjection. They were not permitted to secure experience in governmental administration, nor were they permitted participation in the management of the economy of the country. With a view to securing acquiescence in Japanese rule, a policy designed to bring about a loss of the Korean people’s cultural identity was also instituted. The Japanese language was substituted for the Korean wherever possible. The Korean literature was suppressed, as were Korean publications. Japanese in Korea were favored, as against Koreans, in the educational system, with the Japanese 2 per cent of the population being given half the funds allotted for elementary education. The emphasis in the schools was directed toward making the Koreans good and loyal subjects of Japan through cultural indoctrination. On the economic side, the policy was enforced of expropriation and sale, mostly to Japanese settlers, of a large part of the public lands which had been of common use to the people. In addition, much of the best privately owned property came into Japanese hands through forced sales, in consequence of which people whose lands had been taken migrated to Manchuria and beyond.

In the 1930’s, as military planning for the exploitation of Manchurian resources became possible, Korea began to be developed in relation to the Japanese position in Manchuria, as well as in direct relationship to the developing war economy of Japan itself. Emphasis began to be put on the development of hydroelectric power, on mineral exploitation, and on the creation of plant capacity in Korea itself for the processing of the mineral resources of the country. Thus the northern Korean area south of the Yalu River was given importance in relation to Manchuria as well as assuming
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a new importance in the Korean economy. This development was accentuated during World War II.

The policies followed by Japan in its Korean colony naturally provoked hostility and resistance, as was revealed in 1919, when the Koreans engaged in widespread passive resistance and at the same time appealed to the Paris Peace Conference for relief. This revolt was ruthlessly suppressed by Japan. Suppression was followed by conciliation in the form of some immediate modifications in the policies being followed, but not to the point of making it possible for a Korean nationalist leadership to maintain itself within the colony. Those who were leaders of the revolt in 1919 enlarged the number of Koreans in exile, furnishing political leadership to those who had emigrated for economic reasons. The emigré Koreans were to be found in numbers in Manchuria and China, in the Russian Far East, and in the United States. Overseas Koreans were viewed by Japan as its nationals and, as circumstances permitted, utilized as such. Those in exile who sought to exercise leadership in the direction of independence were, of course, severely circumscribed in their contacts with the people in Korea. Thus at the time of the outbreak of World War II, Japan’s position in Korea seemed secured against the possibilities of domestic revolt. That war, however, revived and stimulated Korean nationalism by holding out the prospect, if Japan should be defeated, of the reestablishment of independence. This prospect was described formally as an Allied war objective in the Cairo Declaration of December 1, 1943, subscribed to by Britain, China, and the United States. The objective, as then defined, was accepted subsequently (at the Yalta Conference) by the Soviet Union. It was, however, a commitment to establish a free and independent Korea “in due course” rather than immediately upon the Japanese surrender since, as Secretary of State James F. Byrnes put it, “there was some question whether the (Korean) people were sufficiently trained to assume the responsibilities of government immediately.”

By the time of the Japanese surrender, aside from the Koreans themselves, only the United States and the U.S.S.R. were in a position effectively to give meaning to the policy of Korean independence “in due course.” They seemed then to be prepared initially to establish a four-power “trustee” supervision of the government of an otherwise independent Korea for such a limited period of time as was required to bring about the orderly creation of a new government, to which complete responsibility could be transferred. But they also agreed on a division of the country into two zones for the military purpose of effecting quickly the surrender of the Japanese forces and the repatriation both of troops and of civilian Japanese. This military decision, apparently taken without agreement to ensure that it would have

1 James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (1947), p. 221.
no political consequences, “provided that Japanese troops north of the 38th parallel should surrender to the Soviet forces and that those south of the 38th parallel should surrender to United States forces.” Thus northern Korea came into Russian and southern Korea into American military occupation immediately at the end of the war.

2. TWO ZONES MAINTAINED

Whatever the initial intentions of the two occupying states, this division of Korea was continued for political purposes after the military reasons for its institution had ceased to exist. The Soviet and American commands found it impossible to reach an agreement on the conditions even of local intercourse between the two zones. The broader question was consequently taken up at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers (December, 1945). The agreement then concluded provided for the establishment of a provisional Korean democratic government for the entire country. This provisional government was to be brought into being by a Joint Commission, to be set up on the basis of recommendations made to the Four Powers by the United States and Soviet commands in Korea, “in consultation with Korean democratic parties and social organizations.” The Joint Commission and the provisional government, after its institution, were then to submit proposals to the Four Powers, on the basis of which “a Four Power trusteeship agreement for a period of up to five years” would be worked out.

The attempt made in January and February, 1946, in a joint conference of the two commands to agree on the administrative and economic unification of the two zones, through a modification of the barriers which had been erected, proved unsuccessful. Similarly, attempts during 1946 of the Joint Commission which was established in March, 1946, to agree on the conditions of consultation with Korean parties, and on the terms of institution of a provisional government for all of Korea, were a failure. There had been a widespread adverse reaction by all of the Korean parties, except the Communist, to the idea of trusteeship as formulated at Moscow, since the general Korean demand was for independence. The Soviet members of the Joint Commission held that only those parties should be consulted which had shown a willingness to accept fully and freely the Moscow decisions. The American members were not willing to accept this view, which would have restricted consultation to the Communist minority of the Korean people. The same impasse was reached when the Joint Commission resumed its sessions in May, 1947. After the Soviet government had rejected an American proposal of August 26, 1947, which was accepted by Britain and China, that “the four powers adhering to the Moscow Agree-

* Korea, 1945-1948, Dept. of State, Pub. 3305, Far Eastern Series No. 28, p. 3.
ment meet to consider how that agreement may be speedily carried out," the United States took the question of Korean independence to the United Nations, bringing it before the second regular session of the General Assembly. At that time, through its representatives on the Joint Commission, and subsequently in the General Assembly, the Soviet government proposed the simultaneous withdrawal of the military forces of the occupying powers, thus letting the Koreans organize their own government without outside assistance. This proposal was not acceptable to the United States, which apparently felt that such action would lead to an extension from the northern zone of Communist, and thus Soviet, control over the southern zone. It was also rejected by the General Assembly.

3. THE SOVIET ZONE

The Soviet authorities had moved much more rapidly and effectively than had the Americans to organize their zone.

The Japanese administration, including Korean collaborators, was promptly ousted and in its place was established a newly organized hierarchy of "Peoples' Committees" composed of Korean laborers, farmers and political organizers, with top control exercised by the Russian command. On February 9, 1946, a Provisional Peoples' Committee for North Korea was established as the central governing organ, and the various political parties (Communist, Democratic and Independence) were united in a single New People's Party. An all-Korean "Cabinet" was formed, headed by Kim Il-sung, a well-known Korean revolutionist and Communist. No military government administration was established by the Russians, although the Soviet command and the political officers attached to it maintained a close watch over their Korean proteges. 3

Elections were held in the Soviet zone in November, 1946. These resulted "in a sweeping endorsement of candidates chosen by the single party." Thus the Russians had rapidly created a Korean mechanism of government which, it could be anticipated, would readily respond to their direction, even after the withdrawal of their military forces.

The Russians also quickly dispossessed the Japanese of title to land, distributing their holdings among Koreans. The same policy of redistribution was followed with respect to the larger Korean holdings. Similarly, they sought to revive the industrial production of their area, under Korean rather than Japanese auspices. All of this, as well as the actions taken in the field of government, had the effect of emphasizing Russian occupation as bringing about liberation from the Japanese. It was consequently only as the significance of one-party rule, with a controlled press and a denial of freedom of expression, became evident that the Soviet liberation of their zone seemed to the Korean people less beneficial than the American. This

in turn tended to restore an initial antagonism created by the behavior of the Russian force of a quarter of a million men. There was not only the requisitioning of food and other supplies for this large army but also considerable looting by the troops.

4. THE AMERICAN ZONE

In the American zone liberation from the Japanese proceeded more slowly than in the Russian, and without the same immediate appearance of transfer of authority to the Koreans themselves on a democratic basis. The Japanese administration was maintained during the first months of liberation, although it was subordinated to the American military command under General John R. Hodge. During January, 1946, authority was transferred to the United States Military Government, under which Koreans came to participate progressively during 1946 in the administrative side of the government. Those upon whom reliance was immediately placed by the Americans were the wealthier Koreans, and especially those who could speak English or Japanese. In this group were included, as time went on, those who, in exile, had professed to speak in the name of the Korean people, and who were brought back from exile in China and the United States to play leading roles in the establishment “in due course” of an independent Korea. While control of policy was retained by Military Government officials, an advisory Council was formed in February, 1946. The method of its constitution, however, gave it such a conservative tone that the leading liberals refused to participate. It was replaced in November by an Interim Legislative Assembly, half of whose members were selected by a system of indirect elections, the other half being appointed by the Military Government.

Before election day the Communist Party and other leftist elements attacked the election plans and called upon the Korean people to oppose them. South Korea was swept by pre-election strikes, riots, and open rebellion. . . . Leftist elements accused the military government of suppressing all but conservative activity in a reign of terror, while the American command announced that the agitation was a communist plot. A sweeping conservative victory took place at the polls in the midst of this confusion, but even the middle-of-the-road Korean leaders declared the elections to have been fraudulent. 

One of the reasons for the confusion was the rapidity with which the way had been opened to the organization of the many political parties which, with freedom of expression and of organization such as the Americans introduced into a country accustomed only to repression, sprang up wholesale around individual leaders. The disorderly and terroristic methods used by the leaders and parties of the right as well as the left were partly the result

* Ibid., p. 7.
of inexperience with democratic methods and partly a carry-over from past experience under a repressive régime. Under the circumstances, responsibility rested with the Military Government rather than with the Koreans, since it alone had the power to enforce more regular procedures. In any case, the outcome was to associate the anti-Communist and conservative Koreans with government in the southern zone while the reverse was occurring in the north. Internal differences consequently helped to reënforce that division which had been instituted first for military reasons and then maintained because of the growing inability of the Russians and the Americans to agree on the conditions of unification.

5. THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA ESTABLISHED

It was in the face of this division and disagreement that the United States took the Korean question to the United Nations General Assembly. That body, by resolution of November 14, 1947, held that elected representatives of the Korean people should take part in the consideration of the question. To ensure that those representatives should be “in fact duly elected by the Korean people and not mere appointees by military authorities in Korea,” a United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea was established “to be present in Korea, with right to travel, observe and consult throughout Korea.” The resolution was adopted over the objections of the Soviet Union whose representatives, however, abstained from voting. Because of the Soviet attitude, the Temporary Commission was not admitted to the northern zone in Korea. It was decided, however, to go ahead with the elections in those parts of Korea where the Commission could observe them. Elections were consequently held in the American zone on May 10, 1948. The Commission “Having satisfied itself that the electoral procedures which it recommended had on the whole been correctly applied,” in its resolution of June 25 recorded “its opinion that the results of 10 May 1948 are a valid expression of the free will of the electorate in those parts of Korea which were accessible to the Commission and in which the inhabitants constituted approximately two-thirds of the people of all Korea.”[5] Those thus elected made up the first Congress of the Republic of Korea, with which the Temporary Commission then carried on consultations with a view to bringing into being a Korean government to which authority could be transferred by the military régimes of the occupying powers. A constitution was adopted on July 12. This constitution provided for a division of the powers of government among: a President, with wide executive powers, in the exercise of which, so far as policy matters were concerned, he had the advice of a Council of State; a National Assembly, to exercise the legisla-

tive power, subject to a suspensive Presidential veto; a Supreme Court, and lower courts to be constituted by law, to exercise the judicial power, and with "jurisdiction to decide finally whether administrative orders and regulations, and dispositions, are consistent with the Constitution and the law"; and executive departments "appointed by the President from among the Ministers. The Prime Minister (appointed by the President with the consent of the National Assembly) shall, under the orders of the President, control and supervise the heads of the departments; he shall take charge of administrative affairs not assigned to any particular department.

In addition, the constitution contained a chapter setting forth the rights and duties of citizens, a chapter on economy, one on finance, and one on local autonomous organizations. Provision was made for amendment of the constitution by two-thirds majority of the National Assembly, on proposal of the President or one-third of the members of the Assembly. In addition to its legislative powers, the Assembly, whose members were to serve for four-year terms (except that the first, essentially constituent, National Assembly was to continue for a period of two years before new elections would be held), exercised a measure of power over the President by virtue of its constitutional right to elect the President and Vice-President for four-year terms, and to remove them by impeachment proceedings.

The National Assembly selected Dr. Syngman Rhee as the first President of the Republic and, under his guidance, proceeded to set up the new government. Negotiations were begun in August, 1948, between it and the American military authorities to transfer governmental functions. This was viewed as appropriate since the American authorities, pending consideration by the General Assembly of the United Nations, found the new government "entitled to be regarded as the Government of Korea, envisaged by the General Assembly Resolution of November 14, 1947."

The General Assembly, after consideration of the Report of its Temporary Commission, accepted the Commission's conclusions. Consequently it declared, in the Resolution adopted on December 12, 1948,

that there has been established a lawful government (the Government of the Republic of Korea), having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the Temporary Commission was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority of the people of all Korea reside; that this government is based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which were observed by the Temporary Mixed Commission; and that this is the only such Government in Korea. 6

Following this action, the United States, China, the Philippines, Britain, and other countries following American leadership in the United Nations,

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extended *de jure* recognition to the new government as that of the Republic of Korea. ¹

Since the overtures made to the Koreans in the Soviet zone to elect representatives to the National Assembly and thus actually unite the peninsula under the one government were rejected, the country continued to be divided. The new constitution, however, was designed to prevent the perpetuation of this division, since it described the territories of the Democratic Republic as the Korean peninsula and its accessory islands. ² The actual authority of the government of the Republic, nevertheless, extended only over upwards of 20 million of the total population of about 30 million, and over an area of 37,055 square miles, in contrast with the 48,191 square miles of the Russian zone.

6. NORTH KOREA

In their zone the Russians had devolved authority by 1948 on a "Peoples' government unified under the control of a Korean Communist Party, which in turn took its direction from the Russians. The authority of this régime was supported by an army with an estimated strength, as of 1947, of 120,000 to 150,000 men, ³ trained, equipped, and indoctrinated by the Russians. This force was sufficient to impose the decisions of the North Korean government on the people in the northern zone. It was also estimated to be strong enough to deal single-handed with the Republic of Korea, if the latter were left to its own resources, since the organized military power of the Republic was represented by a constabulary force of some 26,000 men in 1947. Thus, as measured by a military yardstick, North Korea, without the assistance of the U.S.S.R., was stronger than the Republic of Korea, without the military support of the United States. If the two parts of the country were left to their own devices in seeking unification, which all Koreans desired, it could be more readily imposed from the north than from the south. Consequently the U.S.S.R. could propose the evacuation of all foreign troops from Korea without fear of loss of its own influence in Korea, as an alternative to the American proposal to leave the solution to the United Nations. Simultaneous evacuation, as of 1947, was unacceptable to the United States because it would change the power situation in Korea in favor of the Russians. Nevertheless, without agreement, the Soviet government announced on September 20, 1948, that its troops would all be withdrawn from Korea by January 1, 1949. The United States followed suit six months later, except for personnel left to operate the airport in Seoul and for a

¹ The Soviet group of states, however, continued to support the northern régime after this time.

² Furthermore, a proportionate number of seats in the Assembly (100) was set aside to be filled whenever "free" elections should be held in the northern zone.

³ Some estimates of the size of the North Korean army ran as high as 500,000 men.
Military Advisory Group, with an authorized strength of 500 officers and men, which was established for the purpose of training a Korean constabulary and army. This undertaking had been carried to the point where, by June, 1950, it was asserted that the South Korean army had the capability of defense of the Republic against attack from the north, although without sufficient power to enable the country to be unified from the south by military means. If this were the case, it could be assumed that unification would not take place except as a result of negotiation and that that would be confined to agreements on conditions of application of the United Nations formula of supervised elections. Unless the negotiations were so confined, even assuming relative equality of defensive capacity, the advantage in negotiation would tend to rest with the North Korean régime, since it was organized as a single-party régime facing no effective domestic opposition. The South Korean regime and the parties supporting it had to face serious opposition and probable differences of opinion as to the conditions of political and economic unification. These political differences, which could be exploited in their own interest by the Communists in direct negotiation, had prevented the development of a complete consensus in support of the new Republican government. Thus its authority had, by 1950, not been as completely consolidated in the south as had that of the "Peoples’" government in the north.

The Korean Republic, furthermore, had not yet become a going concern economically. The southern area, in the years from 1945 to 1950, had received some $376 million from the United States for civilian relief and an additional $120 million of Economic Co-operation Administration (E.C.A.) aid. The latter had been used to increase coal production necessary for industrial development as well as for fuel purposes; to finance power projects; and to increase agricultural productivity. Much, however, remained to be done before the Republic would be in a sound economic position. And further internal development was dependent on continuing foreign economic assistance.

The internal political conflicts growing out of personal rivalries for power, however, lessened enthusiasm in the United States for the régime which it had sponsored. Consequently the Congress of the United States first rejected the administration's proposal of a second installment of E.C.A. aid for Korea, and then approved an aid bill of $60 million, 30 million less than had been requested. Thus as the United States terminated its military occupation in Korea, it began to show a reluctance to continue to discharge economic responsibilities.

In some respects the American reactions to the situation in Korea were a reflection of the reaction to the failure of the Kuomintang government
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to maintain itself against the Communists in China. At any rate, in the
general reorientation of policy put under way in 1949, the outer perimeter
of American military defense was defined on January 12, 1950, in terms ap-
parently excluding Korea. The new Republic, consequently, seemed to be
left to find its own security in the event of an attempt by the North Korea
government to extend its authority southward by military means, except
as the South Koreans were able to rely on United Nations action to main-
tain peace and security and to prevent aggression. The United Nations,
however, had not yet shown its willingness nor demonstrated its ability to
act to maintain peace and security.

7. THE KOREAN WAR

During 1948 and 1949 there had been recurrent incidents in the form of
attack and counter-attack across the parallel separating North from South
Korea. These probing operations revealed the North Korean troops to be
well-trained and well-equipped. "Their direction and equipment were
mainly derived from the Soviet Union, and Soviet officers were reported
in 1948 and 1949, to be in control down into the lowest echelons." 10 These
border pressures were intensified in the spring of 1950. Fearing attack the
South Korean government requested further American military assistance.
Because of the verbal bellicosity of the Syngman Rhee government, it was
apparently felt in Washington that that government was actually seeking
to augment its own power so as to enable it to overcome mounting internal
opposition and even possibly itself to undertake unification by military
means. As it turned out, of course, this view was incorrect. The feared
attack in force across the 38th parallel was actually launched on June 25,
1950.

The first phase of the war, in which the defensive capabilities of South
Korea were tested, revealed clearly the soundness of the conclusion stated
above that the North Koreans possessed a decisive military superiority over
South Korea. By June 30, although given initial American air and naval
support, South Korean resistance was collapsing. At this point President
Truman authorized the use of American ground forces in Korea, and the
air force was authorized to bomb North Korean targets. These actions were
undertaken in implementation of the Security Council Resolution of June
25.

When, on the evening of June 24, the American Ambassador at Seoul
reported the invasion of South Korea, the United States immediately took
the question to the United Nations, requesting a meeting of the Security
Council the next day. At this meeting a "cease-fire" resolution proposed by

the United States was adopted by a vote of 9–0, with the U.S.S.R. ¹¹ absent and Yugoslavia abstaining. Under this Resolution the North Korean authorities were called upon (1) to cease hostilities immediately and (2) to withdraw their armed forces to the 38th parallel. The United Nations Commission on Korea was requested to observe the withdrawal and to keep the Security Council informed on the execution of this Resolution. And, at the same time, the Security Council called upon members of the United Nations "to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities." ¹² Instead of retiring to the parallel in compliance with this Resolution, the North Koreans extended operations with a view to presenting the United States and the United Nations with the accomplished fact of unification of Korea under the authority of the northern government.


In the fulfillment of its obligations as a member of the United Nations, consequently, the United States found itself, by its own decision, and as the result of its own initiatives, back in the position in relation to Korea from which it had asserted its intention to withdraw at the end of 1949. While such states as Britain, Canada, the Philippines, and Turkey contributed to the United Nations force in Korea, the main forces, as well as the command, came from the United States until after the reorganization, reequipment, and expansion of the Republic of Korea (ROK) military forces was accomplished under American direction and with American assistance. It was the United States which also assumed the largest share of the burden of non-military economic assistance. Thus it became somewhat difficult for the United States to distinguish between the war as its own affair, and the war as a United Nations operation, from the point of view of determination of purposes and objectives as well as the appropriate means of realizing them.

¹¹ The U.S.S.R. had refused to participate in the sessions of the Security Council because of the continued filling of China's seat by the delegate appointed by the National government rather than by a Chinese Communist government representative. Russian participation was resumed only in August.

¹² From United States Policy in the Korean Crisis, Dept. of State, Office of Public Affairs (1950), Pub. 3912, Far Eastern Series No. 34.
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The Soviet Union had not accepted the original United Nations decisions as to the method of establishing unity. Relationships were such that the conclusion is warranted that there was a Russian responsibility for the refusal of the North Korean régime to permit the holding of U.N. supervised elections in North Korea. Those relationships, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, support the conclusion that the North Korean attack across the 38th parallel, if not instigated by the Soviet Union, was not disapproved by it. And, as was made clear officially subsequently, if the Soviet Union had attended the June and July meetings of the Security Council its representative would not have concurred in the resolutions proposed by the United States, and consequently no decisions could have been taken. No further decisions, in fact, were taken by the Security Council after the Soviet Union resumed its seat in August. By that time the Russians had taken the position, on the merits, that "the events taking place in Korea were provoked by an attack by forces of the South Korean authorities on border regions of North Korea." Therefore the North Korean attack was defensive and could not properly be viewed as an act of aggression. As to the Security Council resolutions, the Russians held them to be invalid because passed without concurring votes of the Soviet Union and China, since in the latter case, the National government representative, Dr. Tingfu F. Tsiang, had "no legal right to represent China." Thus the view of the Soviet Union was that "the said resolution(s) of the Security Council on the Korean question has no legal force." The Soviet Union consequently viewed itself as "legally free to give such assistance to North Korea as it saw fit." 18

On this question of legality, the position taken by the United States was that abstention from attendance at Security Council meetings was in itself a violation of the Charter. In any case its legal effect was similar to that of abstention in the voting. This had occurred in the past and had not been construed by the Russians themselves as a non-concurring vote and thus a veto.

This American view prevailed among the members of the United Nations, except for the members of the Soviet bloc, and action was planned and executed within the framework of the resolutions of June 27 and July 7. Since, however, the resumption of his seat by the Soviet representative made it certain that there would be no further action taken by the Security Council, the problem was transferred from that organ to the General Assembly when it convened on September 19.

By that time the military position had begun to be reversed. With the

18 These views were expressed and elaborated in notes to the United States and to the Secretary-General of the U.N. For texts, see U.S. Policy in the Korean Crisis, Doc. 44; U.N. Doc. S/1517, 1596.
apparent possibility of a victory over the North Korean forces, consequently, the General Assembly, in its Resolution of October 7, 1950, extended the objective from that of repelling aggression to that of accomplishment of the original purpose of establishment of a unified Korean state. Thus it recommended:

(A) That all appropriate steps be taken to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea.

(B) That all constituent acts be taken, including the holding of elections, under the auspices of the United Nations, for the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government in the sovereign state of Korea.

(C) That all sections and representative bodies of the population of Korea, South and North, be invited to cooperate with the organs of the United Nations in the restoration of peace, in the holding of elections and in the establishment of a unified government. . . .

(D) That United Nations forces should not remain in Korea otherwise than so far as necessary for achieving the objectives specified at (A) and (B) above;

(E) That all measures be taken to accomplish the economic rehabilitation of Korea. 14

This formulation was a restatement of the objectives of the United States, consistently advanced after 1947. It had been then accepted, except by the Soviet Union and its affiliates, as United Nations policy. The objective had not been attained by the time of its reaffirmation by the General Assembly because military means would have had to be employed to attain the ends sought. The way had been apparently opened to the use of military means for purposes of unification because of prior use of force by the North Koreans and the development of sufficient counter-force not merely to repel aggression but to dispossess the aggressor régime from control of its territories.

This General Assembly Resolution, then, was taken to be an authorization for the United Nations Command in Korea to enlarge the area of military operations to the northern frontier of Korea at the Yalu River if that proved necessary to attain the objectives set forth in the October 7 Resolution. At the time of its adoption South Korean forces had already crossed the 38th parallel. Other United Nations forces had been halted below the parallel, pending an answer to General MacArthur's demand for the surrender of the North Korean forces. Following the communication of the terms of the October 7 Resolution, United States forces crossed the parallel. There was then reason to believe that the United Nations forces had the ability to crush North Korean resistance in the northern part of the peninsula.

At this point decisions were taken as if there had not earlier been created

14 See U. N. Doc. A/1435, for full text.
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under United Nations auspices, and recognized by the United States, the Republic of Korea, but rather only a South Korean régime. The United Nations Interim Committee on Korea, with the support of the United States, took the position that the government of the Republic of Korea could not extend its civil authority north of the parallel in the wake of its advancing armies. Its plan to extend its administrative and governmental authority beyond the parallel consequently could not be put into effect. Civil authority as well as the military command was to be exercised by the United Nations through the Unified Command. Since this position was supported by the United States it had to be accepted, albeit reluctantly and under pressure, by the South Korean government.

8. THE CHINESE INTERVENTION

Political action in the field, at the United Nations, and in Washington was conditioned by the military situation. This situation began to change as the United Nations forces moved north toward the Yalu River. Chinese "volunteers" in increasing numbers were identified in the ranks of the North Korean armies. In a special report from General MacArthur of November 4, attention was called to the "continued employment of Chinese Communist forces in Korea and the hostile attitude assumed by such forces. . . ." By November 24, when a United Nations offensive designed to drive the enemy forces beyond the Yalu was launched, it was known that there were at least 48,000 Chinese troops on the Korean side of the frontier. It was also known that there were heavy concentrations of Chinese Communist troops along the Yalu in Manchuria. The known facts raised a serious question as to the intentions of Communist China with respect to the Korean War.

The internal situation in China had made it impossible for that country to play the active part in shaping postwar international policy toward Korea that China's position would have justified. As of mid-summer, 1950, when the North Korean attack was launched, the principal concern of the Peking government was the consolidation of its authority throughout China and the elimination of the National government from the area remaining under its control. Peking was, consequently, in the spring of 1950, apparently concentrating its forces opposite Formosa (Taiwan) for purposes of invasion of the island. At this time the defense of Formosa was accepted as the sole responsibility of the National government, since the United States was not only uncommitted to its defense but had indicated that the military resources of the National government would not be supplemented by American military forces. As put by President Truman in January, 1950, 18

The United States has no predatory designs on Formosa or on any other Chinese territory. . . . Nor does it have any intention of utilizing its armed forces to interfere in the present situation. The United States will not pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China.

Similarly, the United States will not provide military aid or advice to Chinese forces on Formosa. . . . The United States Government proposes to continue under existing legislative authority the present ECA program of economic assistance.

The North Korean attack on South Korea produced a double reaction from Washington. United States policy in relation to the war situation in Korea, as set forth above, was developed and applied through the United Nations. At the same time, with a view to the confinement of hostilities to Korea, the United States unilaterally declared the neutralization of Formosa for the period of military operations in Korea. The National government was requested to refrain from engaging in air and sea operations directed against the mainland, and the Communists were debarred from invasion of Formosa. The Seventh Fleet was ordered to enforce this request and prohibition. This in effect reversed the policy defined at the beginning of 1950 since it committed the United States itself (a) to action to prevent invasion and (b) to the support of the National government in the maintenance of its position on Formosa. Whereas, in application of the earlier policy, military aid to the National government beyond that already given under authorization of the China Aid Act of 1948 and the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 had been suspended, following a review of policy by the Joint Chiefs-of-Staff in July 1950 military aid began to be resumed. A Military Assistance Advisory Group was constituted and entered upon its duties early in 1951. Under its advice and with assistance in the form of equipment from the United States, the National Government made steady progress in transforming its forces on Formosa from the ill-disciplined horde evacuated from the mainland into a military force capable of defending the island from Communist attack. The odds which had been strongly in favor of Communist success if an invasion had been attempted in (the spring of) 1950 had been reversed by 1953 when it could be reasonably concluded that the Nationalists were capable of a successful defense of Formosa. In this reversal the shift in American policy brought about by the North Korean attack on the Republic of Korea played a large part. 18

This American interdiction of Communist attack on Formosa also brought about a redeployment of the Chinese Communist armies from opposite Formosa to Manchuria, making them available for use there, as it proved, for purposes of intervention in Korea. This possibility had been suggested by India when it abstained from voting on the October 7

Resolution of the General Assembly. Furthermore Chou En-lai, Premier and Foreign Minister of the People's Government of China, had warned over the radio that "China will not stand idly by and see North Korea invaded."

The attempt was made to avoid Chinese intervention by reassurances such as that given in a proposed Security Council resolution of November 10 (sponsored by Cuba, Ecuador, France, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States, but vetoed by the U.S.S.R.), which affirmed that it is the policy of the United Nations to hold the Chinese frontier with Korea inviolate and fully to protect legitimate Chinese and Korean interests in the frontier zone.17

With this reassurance it seems to have been concluded that the Peking regime would be willing to negotiate a settlement designed to safeguard the legitimate interests of China in North Korea rather than hazard participation in the war beyond that represented by the presence of Chinese "volunteer" troops in the North Korean armies. This view seemed to be confirmed when a delegation from Peking appeared at Lake Success in response to an invitation to the Chinese People's Government, ostensibly to take part in a general discussion of the Korean question, "including United States aggression" in Asia. It proved to be the case, however, that the delegation came not to negotiate but to denounce the United States and to reiterate the Chinese position that peace could only come as a result of the end of American "aggression" through withdrawal of its forces from Korea.

Meanwhile the United Nations offensive, launched November 24, had been contained by the Chinese armies which had been moved across the Yalu into Korea, and by the end of the month the United Nations forces had been driven back to the 38th parallel. After a short pause at the parallel during which the Chinese forces were further increased and strengthened, the Chinese Communist armies in their turn, in January, 1951, launched a major offensive south of the parallel. After initial successes this Chinese offensive was soon contained, and the United Nations undertook limited counter-offensives which, by April, 1951, again brought its forces to and beyond the 38th parallel.

At the point of Communist China's intervention in the Korean War there was a reversion, on the United Nations side, to the original "cease-fire" objective. The initiative directed toward this end was taken by a newly formed Asian-Arab bloc which concerted its action under the leadership of India. At the end of November this bloc advanced proposals which the

16 At this time India warned the General Assembly, apparently on the basis of its reports from Peking, that the authorization of troop movements north of the parallel might draw Communist China into the struggle.
United States accepted, but which the Chinese government, after an apparent initial acceptance, finally rejected as a basis for the negotiation of a settlement. These proposals involved: (1) the ordering of an immediate "cessation of all acts of armed force in Korea"; (2) the establishment of a "demilitarized area across Korea of approximately twenty miles in depth with the southern limit following generally the line of the 38th parallel"; (3) supervision of the cease-fire by a United Nations commission to ensure withdrawal of forces along lines indicated and to ensure against reënforcement designed to change the military situation; (4) exchange of "prisoners of war" on a one-for-one basis, pending final settlement of the Korean question. On the latter issue, the American position was stated to be that of "our clear understanding and also that of the twelve Asian sponsors, that once a cease-fire arrangement has been achieved, the negotiations for a settlement shall be proceeded with at once." 18

From this time, as the tide of war ebbed and flowed, attempts were made at the United Nations to find a political solution to the problems posed by the Chinese intervention in Korea. While there was consistently shown by the United States—possibly because of its United Nations commitments and connections—a willingness to negotiate, following a cease-fire, the Chinese, and the Russians in support of them, showed an unwillingness to even discuss proposals for a cease-fire except as there was prior acceptance of their terms of settlement of other Far Eastern political issues as well as that posed by the situation in Korea.

The American willingness to negotiate a cease-fire after the Chinese intervention was due to the fear that a military victory in Korea might lead to the general war which Washington had steadily sought to avoid. This was viewed as a real possibility if, to bring the Korean War to a decisive conclusion, military operations had to be undertaken against China in Manchuria or China proper. The United States did finally persuade the General Assembly (February 1, 1951) to adopt a resolution finding Communist China to be guilty of aggression as a result of its intervention in Korea. But it was apparent throughout that there would be strong opposition to any actions which would enlarge the theater of military operations beyond Korea. This attitude of opposition was shown, for example, as there began to be requests from Tokyo for authority to bomb Chinese bases in Manchuria.

9. THE ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS

As increasing military pressure was applied to the Chinese forces in Korea, along with some economic pressures in the late winter and early spring of 1951, the Communist attitude toward negotiations began to

change. The Russians proposed in the Security Council the institution of negotiations (a) to bring about a cease-fire and (b) to determine the conditions of armistice in the Korean War. The purpose, as now seems clear, was, through the institution of negotiations, to slow down the limited United Nations offensive then under way, and if possible to secure the time necessary to reestablish at least a firm defensive position in Korea. Thus the purpose was essentially a war purpose rather than that of seeking a settlement by political means. General MacArthur had already (March 23) declared himself ready to discuss armistice terms with the Chinese Commander. This offer was rejected by the Chinese Communists on March 29. On June 24, however, the Soviet Foreign Minister said that the U.S.S.R. felt that a cease-fire could be negotiated. Thereupon the new United Nations Commander-in-Chief, General Ridgway, 19 by radio, invited the Chinese and North Korean Commanders to discuss the conditions of armistice. Delegations from the two sides met at Kaesong 20 on July 8, where discussions were held until an agreement had been reached, July 26, on a five point agenda for further discussions. The site of the truce talks was subsequently (October 24) shifted from Kaesong to Panmunjom where the negotiations were intermittently carried on from 1951 through much of 1953 without any substantial agreement being reached on the terms and conditions of armistice. During this period the war itself was continued but without the United Nations forces, which during this time had the power to do so, carrying operations much beyond the 38th parallel.

The principal obstacles to agreement revealed in the Panmunjom discussions were differences over (1) the method of considering the political questions at issue; (2) the rights of the two sides to take actions, after an armistice agreement, which would affect the military status quo in the event of resumption of hostilities; and (3) the question of repatriation of prisoners of war. It was because of disagreement on the prisoner-of-war question that negotiations had been finally suspended in October, 1952.

Following the death of Stalin the Soviet government proposed resumption of the negotiations. A change in the attitude of the Soviet government from that shown in negotiations on the prisoner-of-war question within the U.N. enabled the negotiators at Panmunjom to conclude an agreement on April 11, 1953, providing for repatriation of sick and wounded prisoners of war “in accordance with provisions of article 109 of the Geneva Convention relative to prisoners of war.” On June 8 an agreement on the conditions of exchange of other prisoners of war was concluded on lines earlier pro-

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19 General MacArthur had been relieved of his commands and recalled to the United States on April 11 because of differences of opinion on policy and on his functions between the General and the administration in Washington.

20 For a detailed treatment of the armistice negotiations, see William H. Vatcher, Jr., *Pannmunjom* (Prager, 1958).
posed by the Indian delegation when the conditions of termination of the
Korean War were brought under consideration in the General Assembly.
The Indian proposals had previously been rejected by the Soviet Union
after China had taken the position that they were unacceptable to it. The
difference over the prisoner-of-war issue was whether or not prisoners on
either side should be compulsorily repatriated if they did not desire repatria-
tion. The American position had been defined by President Truman when
he said (May 7, 1952): "We will not buy an armistice by turning over
human beings for slaughter or slavery." The Chinese and Russian position
was that repatriation was required under the terms of the Geneva Con-
vention, which they insisted should be followed in this respect although
they had failed to observe its terms in other respects.

The agreement of June 8 provided that

Within two months after the armistice agreement becomes effective, both sides
shall, without offering any hindrance, directly repatriate and hand over in
groups all of those prisoners in its custody who insist on repatriation to the side
to which they belonged at the time of capture. . . .

Both sides agree to hand over all those remaining prisoners of war who are
not directly repatriated to the United Nations Repatriation Commission for
disposition. 21

The Korean government did not wait for the conclusion of an armistice
agreement or the setting up of the proposed repatriation machinery but
proceeded unilaterally to release North Korean prisoners of war in its
custody without repatriating them. This caused the Communists to raise
a question of good faith in the execution of agreements, and also one of the
willingness and ability of the United Nations Command to exercise control
over the actions of the Korean government. It was only after reassurances
were given on these questions that the Communists were willing to resume
negotiations looking toward an armistice.

The above-mentioned action of the Korean government pointed up one
of the continuing anomalies in the Korean situation. The United States and
the United Nations had come to the assistance of the government which
had been accepted as the Government of the Republic and the "sole" gov-
ernment in the entire peninsula. And yet, from the time of the North
Korean attack, the government of the Republic was subordinated to the
American government and the United Nations Command as if it were a
ward of the supporting states, some of whom were not in sympathy with
it. Even in the United States any attempt on the part of the South Korean
government, even within its own territory south of the parallel, to act as
if it were what it had been officially recognized as being—the government

21 For text see American Journal of International Law, Supplement, Documents, pp. 180–
186.
of an independent state—was viewed as unwarranted and presumptuous.

These attitudes were shown throughout the Panmunjom negotiations themselves. Whereas the Chinese spoke almost invariably through the North Korean members of their delegation, it was invariably the American who, instead of a representative of the South Korean government, not only headed the delegation but spoke for it. Thus the United States negotiated with the unrecognized North Koreans instead of the latter facing their real opposite numbers, the South Koreans. If the Chinese had seen fit to displace the North Koreans as the spokesmen for their side it might have been more appropriate for the United States to make the direct confrontation. As it was, however, even the outward appearance of the subordination of the Korean government was maintained, it being apparently put in a position, with respect to a war fought on Korean territory and with respect to the future disposition of authority in Korea, of inability to participate effectively in the determination of the attitude of its United Nations allies with respect to the solution of the Korean question or the termination of the war.

The attitude of President Syngman Rhee throughout was one of determination not to accept any settlement which would preclude or make impossible of early attainment the objective of unification of Korea under his government. Thus he was willing to have the armistice negotiations resumed only if it were understood that a time limit of three months would be set within which they would be satisfactorily concluded, the war to be resumed if no satisfactory agreement had been reached within that period. To him the indefinite protraction of negotiations served no useful purpose. Satisfactory armistice terms, in President Rhee's view, would provide for the immediate withdrawal of all United Nations and Chinese forces, with, however, the United States guaranteeing Korean security. Since the North Korean armies had been virtually destroyed in earlier military operations, ROK's augmented and battle-hardened forces would be able to extend the authority of the Republic over the northern zone if left uncontrolled by the presence of the United Nations forces.

The Eisenhower administration, which succeeded that of President Truman in 1952, was firmly committed to ending hostilities in Korea through the conclusion of an armistice that at least would prevent extension of Communist control below the 38th parallel. Conclusion of an armistice was thus its primary and immediate objective, to which unification of Korea was made distinctly secondary. But, for an armistice to be effective, it would have to be accepted and implemented, no matter how reluctantly, by Korea as well as the United States. Thus the United States, to attain its objective, had to overcome, by persuasion, the reluctance of President Rhee, to agree to the armistice provisions which were acceptable to the United
States. As a result of discussions between President Rhee and Assistant Secretary of State Robertson, it was agreed on June 25 that the two governments would collaborate in the carrying on of armistice negotiations without further obstruction on the part of the South Korean government, and Secretary of State Dulles stated that Rhee had given the United States written assurances that he would not obstruct implementation of the armistice agreement. Nevertheless on July 24, three days before the signature of the agreement, the Korean President raised objections to some of its provisions, including the time limit stipulated for the holding of a conference to consider the political issues involved. At the same time he made it clear that South Korea reserved the right to resume hostilities if the proposed political conference failed to reach a satisfactory agreement on the Korean question.

The armistice agreement was signed on July 27, 1953, by the several parties involved, except for the South Korean representative. It remained in force from that date in spite of dissatisfaction with the execution of some of its provisions, especially in connection with post-armistice supervision of application of its military provisions designed to maintain the power status quo in the two zones as of the time of signature of the armistice. The Neutral Nations' Supervisory Committee failed to behave neutrally or to give adequate supervision, especially in the north.

10. THE GENEVA POLITICAL CONFERENCE

The recommendation in the armistice agreement for the holding of a political conference brought the Korean question back into the United Nations for consideration of the composition and terms of reference of such a conference. This also involved agreement between the United Nations and Communist China and the U.S.S.R. As defined in the discussions, the United States' position was that the two belligerent sides should take part in an across-the-table discussion while the other side, and the so-called neutralist states, wanted a round-table discussion in which non-belligerent states might participate without alignment on one side or the other.

These discussions produced no agreement on the questions at issue. However, at a conference held at Berlin in January and February of 1954, the Foreign Ministers of the United States, Britain, France, and the U.S.S.R., "considering that the establishment, by peaceful means, of a united and independent Korea would be an important factor in reducing international tension and restoring peace in other parts of Asia," decided to invite representatives of the Chinese People's Republic, the Republic of Korea, the People's Democratic Republic of Korea, "and other countries whose armed forces participated in the hostilities in Korea" to meet with representatives of the four sponsoring states at Geneva on April 26, 1954, to seek
THE POSTWAR KOREAN PROBLEM

a solution of the Korean question. Since, by this time, there was a struggle, similar to that begun with the invasion of South Korea four years earlier, going on in Indo-China, the purpose of the conference was extended to include Indo-China.

The Geneva Conference, in its turn, failed to produce an agreed solution of the Korean problem viewed as that of unification. The breakdown came over the question of the method of unification through the holding of supervised elections. South Korea took the position that all that was necessary was to complete the implementation of the original United Nations resolution through holding United Nations supervised elections in North Korea, so that the seats in the Parliament which had been reserved since 1947 for representatives from North Korea could be filled. The Communist proposal for holding of elections in South Korea as well was viewed as unnecessary since such elections had just been held there, as prescribed by the terms of the constitution of the Republic. The Communist proposal was held to be unacceptable in any case because it rejected outside supervision. Instead of United Nations supervision the Communists proposed joint supervision by the North and South Korean governments. This would, of course, give status as an accepted government to the North Korean régime, putting it on a footing of equality with the government of the Republic, which had been accepted by the non-Communist members of the United Nations as the sole recognized government in the peninsula.

The Rhee government was persuaded to agree to a compromise viewed as equitable by the United States. This provided for the holding of United Nations supervised elections throughout the entire country, instead of only in the north. Since, however, the Communist side refused to accept this compromise because of unwillingness to accept United Nations supervision, and to withdraw Chinese troops from Korea unless all United Nations troops were simultaneously withdrawn, the Geneva Conference was unable to find an acceptable solution to the Korean problem. The Rhee government continued to be able to exercise authority only within the territorial limits defined in the armistice agreement. It was unable to get support or approval from the United States to undertake a resumption of the war to bring about unification by military means, although President Rhee did announce, on August 15, 1955, that his government no longer recognized the restraining force of the armistice. Rhee had earlier, on the occasion of his visit to the United States after the Geneva Conference (July, 1954), made clear his view that the armistice should be ended and Korea unified by force. Secretary of State Dulles made it equally clear that the United States would not support a policy of military unification, although it continued to favor creation of a "unified, democratic and independent Korea." This objective was also reiterated from time to time
at the United Nations when the topic of Korea would be reached on the agenda of the General Assembly.

The 1955 denunciation of the armistice produced no adverse reactions since it occurred after repeated complaints of truce violations in North Korea, with respect to which the Neutral Nations' Supervisory Commission could give no satisfaction. The unwillingness or inability of the Commission to function in North Korea led Syngman Rhee to demand withdrawal of its personnel from South Korea, where it had been permitted to function, by August 13. This was followed by the August 15 announcement with respect to the armistice itself. That the Rhee complaint with respect to the Commission was not without merit was indicated in the grounds assigned by the United Nations Command for its "provisional" suspension within its jurisdiction on May 31, 1956, of the functions of the Neutral Nations' Supervisory Commission.

II. INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS

As suggested above, some of the difficulties confronting the Korean government grew out of its relationship with the United States, which seemed not to have full confidence in the state and government that the United States had been largely instrumental in bringing into being. From the start, the Korean Republic had been largely dominated by Syngman Rhee, who was elected as President by the Assembly in August, 1948. He was re-elected President (this time, following an amendment of the constitution) by direct popular vote on August 5, 1952. He was subsequently (1956) re-elected for a third term, polling 5,046,437 votes as contrasted to the 2,163,808 votes cast for the opposing candidate. Thus Dr. Rhee headed the government of the Republic from the time of its establishment. This record of re-election, however, does not warrant the conclusion that the Korean government operated completely harmoniously under the direction of the President. He was initially elected by an Assembly which, under the new constitution, would choose his successor. The membership of the Assembly was divided into numerous parties whose leaders had different points of view and conflicting interests. The Parliamentary interest as a whole, furthermore, was opposed to the effective concentration of too great power in the hands of the President. Broad executive powers were vested in the President, but constitutionally they were to be exercised through the medium of a Prime Minister and other Ministers appointed by and responsible to the President. Until the actual lines of authority were firmly established in action, there was certain to be a struggle for power.

The first years of the new Republic were in fact marked by internal controversy. This was increased rather than lessened by the attempt made by the President to establish himself in a position of personal power and
by the attempts of members of his Cabinet to enlarge their own personal followings both in and out of the Assembly.

It was, however, in the relations of the President and the Assembly that the edges of controversy were sharpest, since the struggle for supremacy was institutional as well as personal. The Assembly elected the President and had to confirm appointments to the Cabinet. This gave it the right constitutionally to pass judgment on the use made of power by the President, at least in the selection of his successor and in giving or withholding approval of his nominees in the filling of vacancies as they occurred. As the time for election of a President in 1952 approached, and as it appeared that the President might not be able readily to secure reelection by the Assembly, he sought to change the method of election to that of direct vote of the people. He consequently employed his full powers of persuasion and coercion to bring about an amendment of the constitution so as to provide for direct election of the President and the Vice-President. It was thus by direct election rather than on account of Parliamentary support that he was enabled to succeed himself in 1952 and again in 1956.

In accomplishing his purpose, both in obtaining the amendment of the constitution and in securing reelection, President Rhee used a variety of means of pressure as well as persuasion, not confining his actions within the strict bounds of legality nor of the democratic methodology. Aside from that, however, he was able to extend the limits of his authority as chief executive because of the division of the membership of the Assembly into numerous parties, and thus the fragmentation of the opposition.

At the time of establishment of the Republic, political life was organized on a multi-party basis. By the time of the 1956 elections essentially a two-party system had assumed form so that the Liberal Party under Syngman Rhee faced an opposition party formed out of the combination of the Democratic Party, organized in 1955, and the Progressive Party established shortly before the elections. President Rhee’s very impressive majority in the election for the presidency may be explained in large part by the death during the campaign of Mr. Shin Ik Hi, the Democratic Party candidate. In spite of vigorous support given him in the campaign, Rhee’s running mate was defeated by 200,000 votes by the Democratic Party’s candidate for the Vice-Presidency. The Liberal Party, however, retained its majority in the Assembly. Consequently it may properly be concluded that the election results in 1956 constituted personal triumphs for President Rhee and for the Democratic Party’s Vice-Presidential candidate rather than a decisive party victory for either the Liberals or the Democrats. From the point of view of politics, otherwise, it indicated a consolidation of forces within a majority and minority party framework, and thus some reduction of the play of personal politics. At any rate the 1956 election was rated a
success by the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, which noted that 94.4 per cent of the registered voters went to the polls. The Commission's conclusion was "that the election represented another example of the encouraging progress of representative government in the Republic of Korea."

The Assembly elections held in May, 1958, indicated further consolidation of the move toward a two-party system. As reported immediately following the voting, while the Liberals remained in the majority with 119 seats, the Democrats increased their representation from 46 in the previous Assembly of 203, to 72 in the new Assembly, which had in addition 21 members elected as independents and 1 representative of the Unification Party. This increase in the representation of the Democratic Party to more than one-third of the Assembly was significant because it gave the party the power to block constitutional amendments. The Liberals wanted to amend the constitution to provide for Assembly election of a successor in the event of the death of Syngman Rhee, to replace the existing constitutional provision for succession of the Vice-President. The question of change would not have been raised if the Liberal candidate had been elected Vice-President in 1956, since he was President Rhee's choice as his own successor if Rhee did not outlive his term of office.

During this first decade of the life of the Republic the Rhee government faced economic problems impossible of solution by its own means. The continued hope of unification retarded the origination of economic plans based on the territories within the control of the republican government. This was understandable under the circumstances, since certainly the problem of economic reconstruction would have been much easier to solve if the resources of the northern and southern zones could have been integrated for use. As it was, more than half the territories of the Republic, about 80 per cent of its mineral resources, the developed water-power sites, and the heavy industry, were outside the area of control of the government of the Republic, both before and after the armistice. What it had within its control was some 70 per cent of the agricultural land and, as time went on, close to three-fourths of the total population of the peninsula. Even without the added burden and distractions of the war, the Republic as constituted would have had to rely on assistance from the outside to maintain itself and reconstruct its economy.

For the purpose of assisting Korea, the United Nations established the Korean Reconstruction Agency in December, 1950. Since its work was expected to include all of Korea, the Agency program was not intended to be inaugurated until six months after a truce. Actually it began its work in

23 The President was, in 1958, 83 years old.
South Korea alone, and before the truce had been concluded, under an authorization in June, 1952. Its first program included expenditures of about $7 million for school classrooms, $11 million worth of grain to combat food shortages, and $8.5 million worth of fertilizer to increase farm production. After the armistice a full-scale long-term program was undertaken, directed toward industrial production, the restoration of the fishing industry, and the improvement of agriculture through irrigation projects. Altogether the Agency, which finished its work in June, 1958, in six years spent $140 millions on some 4,800 projects in South Korea. The largest contribution to this total expenditure was made by the United States ($92,960,000). Other contributors included: Britain, $28,000,000; Canada, $7,392,000; Australia, $3,612,000; Italy, $2,016,000; Norway, $1,708,000; and the Netherlands, $1,036,000. The other thirty participants contributed the balance.

Beyond this, the United States extended direct aid to Korea, both before and after the armistice, for economic reconstruction as well as for military purposes. This was essential in view of the fact that the Republic was able to meet only an estimated (1955) 57 per cent of its minimum needs from its own resources. This left, by a conservative American estimate, a deficit in 1955 after the payment on all accounts, by the United States, of $700 million in aid payments. Nevertheless Korea made progress in the execution of an ambitious reconstruction program launched in 1955 and aimed in the direction of self-sufficiency, a difficult goal to reach as long as the peninsula remained divided. The launching of this program was significant as an attempt on the part of the Rhee government to assert its independence in planning the economic reconstruction of the country while as largely dependent as it continued to be on American assistance. This assertion of independence led to recurrent differences with the United States on such questions as the exchange rate and whether or not consumers goods should be imported from Japan.

The latter issue was part of the larger question of relations between the Republic of Korea and Japan. Just released from exploitation as a Japanese colony, the Korean government showed a natural reluctance to engage in any relations with Japan except on its own terms. Shortly after the establishment of the Republic, for example, it proclaimed a "Rhee line" which substantially enlarged the accepted area of marginal waters. This was a direct attack on the Japanese fishing industry. The action was probably suggested by the drawing of the "MacArthur Line" which was designed to prevent the revival of the Japanese high-seas fishing industry. Whatever the reason, however, the attempt to prevent the Japanese from fishing on the high seas in the Korean off-shore area resulted in charges and counter-charges of misbehavior. These and other disputes had pre-
vented agreement on the conditions of establishment of normal diplomatic relations between Japan and Korea during the first decade of existence of the Republic.

REFERENCES FOR FURTHER STUDY

CHAPTER XXX

POST-SURRENDER JAPAN

Loss of the Pacific war brought Japan back territorially to its original status. The Kuriles and southern Sakhalin were taken by Russia. Korea, to become "independent in due course," was divided between the U.S.S.R. and the United States for occupation purposes. Formosa had been re-claimed by China. The islands of the Pacific, which had been mandated to Japan after World War I, had been transferred to the United States as a strategic trusteeship under the United Nations. The loss of the war had thus reduced Japan to the four original islands (Honshu, Shikoku, Kyushu, Hokkaido) making up the Japanese state at the time of the Restoration, together with the smaller adjacent islands. But on the home islands there were living, by 1958, over 90 million Japanese, as against the 30 millions of 1867. This was a result of the natural increase of population over the century, together with the repatriation of Japanese from the lost territories of the Empire and from the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity sphere. This meant that a serious problem of livelihood was presented to the Japanese people. This problem could be solved only through the re-establishment of the foreign trade through which raw materials could be imported to be processed for sale on the world market. But Japan's expansionist policy, ending in the disasters of the war, had created the conditions and the attitudes which prevented an automatic move along this line toward a solution of the problem. The immediate incentives for the victors were in the opposite direction. And, by means of occupation, following "unconditional" surrender, they were in control of the destinies of Japan.

I. OCCUPATION POLICY AND ORGANIZATION

The surrender terms were laid down in the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945, accepted by Japan with the understanding that Allied policy did not involve rejection of the Imperial family as an instrument of rule. Occupation policy was defined first by the United States in the paper "United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan" which was approved by the President on September 6, 1945. This established the lines of policy for occupation authorities until its substantial reaffirmation by the Far Eastern Commission in the policy decision of June 19, 1947, in the "Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan." The purposes of the occupation, as thus defined, were (1) to bring about the complete demobilization and repatriation of Japan's military, naval, and air forces, to remove
its disarmament, together with the demilitarization of the country and the punishment of those found guilty of war crimes; (2) to encourage its democratization; and (3) to destroy the existing economic basis of Japanese military strength and not permit it to revive, but to permit the revival of Japanese economic life so as to enable the peaceful requirements of the people and the nation to be met.  

The instruments of surrender were signed by General MacArthur as the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers and by “representatives of the United Nations which had fought in the Pacific” on the Battleship Missouri on September 2, 1945. On September 6, General MacArthur was designated as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for the occupation of Japan. Thus it became his responsibility to act so as to realize the purposes initially set forth as American policy objectives. An American character was given to the occupation by reason of the fact that the force initially occupying Japan was American, as well as by the designation of an American as the Supreme Allied Commander, and in consequence of the initial formulation by the United States government of Allied objectives. Before surrender, however, “the United States suggested that there be created an international body to help formulate future policy in Japan and to assist in planning the organization which would be required to make sure that the Japanese fulfilled their obligations.”  

British as well as Soviet objections to the purely advisory commission which the United States had in mind led finally to the creation, on the basis of agreements reached at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers (on December 27, 1945), of the Far East Commission (F.E.C.), with a membership of representatives of eleven, shortly increased to thirteen, states, to sit in Washington, and of an Allied Council for Japan, of representatives of the four major Pacific Powers (the U.S.S.R., China, Britain and the Commonwealths, and the United States), to sit in Tokyo. This organization modified, but did not fundamentally change the American character of the occupation. The real authority continued in the hands of SCAP (Supreme Command Allied Powers).

This Allied authority was erected over, but not in displacement of the Japanese government. The latter was continued as the instrument through which, under SCAP guidance and direction, the purposes of the occupation were to be realized. Anticipating this situation, the pre-surrender government established a Central Liaison Office through which contact between the Japanese government and the occupation authorities could be channeled. Acceptance of this channel of communication meant in

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1 The text of the U. S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan, together with other relevant documents from the Cairo Conference to mid-1946, is in Dept of State, Occupation of Japan: Policy and Progress, Far Eastern Series No. 17.

2 Ibid. p. 7.
effect that occupation views, directives, and orders filtered to the Japanese
government through an agency which represented a carry-over of traditional Japan into the new order the creation of which SCAP was in-
structed to “encourage.” There was this same carry-over through the
Cabinet itself, since the personnel of the successive post-surrender govern-
ments was drawn largely from the prewar bureaucracy or party leader-
ship. This had to be anticipated and accepted, in the absence of an internal
revolution.

An important exception to the above statement should, however, be
noted. The implementation of one element of American and Allied policy
made it difficult, if not impossible, for the military leadership of prewar
days to be drawn upon for purposes of government. This was also true
with respect to those elements of Japanese society held to have responsibility,
with the military, for the development of the expansionist and war
policies followed by Japan in the decade from 1931 to 1941. An Interna-
tional Tribunal was set up in Tokyo to carry out the provision of
the Potsdam Proclamation that “stern justice shall be meted out to all
war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prison-
ers” and also including those who had formulated aggressive war policies.
The Emperor was exempted from trial as a war criminal, since it had
been decided to utilize him in the effectuation of Allied policy. But among
those tried and punished were: the Premier at the outset of the Pacific
War, General Hideki Tojo; Marquis Koichi Kido, Lord Keeper of the
Privy Seal; former Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka; and Kiichiro
Hiranuma, ex-President of the Privy Council. These trials were extended
over the years 1946-1948, the sentences finally imposed being executed
in December of 1948. The war-crimes trials were supplemented by
“purges,” designed to take from directive positions in government first,
and subsequently in industry, those who had had any important relation-
ship to the formulation of Japan’s war policies. To carry out SCAP direc-
tives, the Japanese government issued the first set of purge ordinances
January 4, 1946. A year later, by ordinances of January 4 and 14, 1947, the
scope of the purge was substantially widened. Thus, even though in their
application the purge ordinances were somewhat manipulated for pur-
poses of domestic politics, and although the machinery set up for exami-
nation of those coming under the ordinances operated in the direction
of leniency, many of the experienced political and industrial leaders of
prewar days were made immediately ineligible for post-surrender leader-
ship except by indirectness.3

3 “By mid-1947 some 2,200 persons, all outstanding wartime business leaders, had been
purged under this program.” Jerome Cohen, Japan’s Economy in War and Reconstruction,
p. 432. This was in addition to a larger number of political purges, but measured against the
million and a half who came under the ordinance, it is a small number.
2. DEMILITARIZATION AND DISARMAMENT

On the side of the military, SCAP proceeded vigorously to carry out the policy of demobilization and repatriation of the Japanese armed forces and that of disarmament. This activity included, for purposes of demilitarization, the formal elimination of the General Staff organizations; prohibition of the para-military organizations into which it was feared that the military might readily retire, and from which they might emerge to re-establish their position after the termination of the occupation; and the elimination of the War and Marine Departments from the structure of government. In effect, the latter were temporarily continued as civilian demobilization boards until that task had been accomplished. These changes, in themselves, would have had the effect of solving, by elimination, the perplexing prewar political problem of military manipulation of domestic and foreign policy through the right of access to the Emperor which the Chiefs of Staff and the Ministers of War and Marine possessed. In the new constitution, provision was made against the revival of militarism through the renunciation both of war and of force as a means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish this aim “land, sea and air forces, as well as other military potential, will never be maintained.” This, together with the elimination from the constitution of all references to a separate military prerogative of the Emperor, was designed to perpetuate the immediate solution of the problem of military control of policy.

3. DEMOCRATIZATION

Beyond this, a number of steps were taken in the direction of reform which, in total, were intended to result in the democratization of Japan. One of these steps was the substitution of a new constitution for the Meiji Constitution of 1889. Aside from the changes noted above, the constitution which became effective on May 3, 1947, substituted for the principle of Imperial supremacy, on which the Meiji Constitution was founded, that of the supremacy of the Diet as “the highest organ of state power” and “the sole law-making organ of the State.” (Art. 41.) Under it the Emperor became “the symbol of the State and of the unity of the people, deriving his position from the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power.” (Art 1.) Chapters IV, V, and VII provided for the parliamentary system of government, with a purely civilian Cabinet responsible ultimately to the House of Representatives, and with the Diet having the financial-control powers which it had been granted only in restricted form under the Meiji Constitution. Even Imperial Household...
affairs were brought under Diet control, by provision of law. The Privy Council was done away with, and an elective House of Councillors was substituted for the House of Peers of the Meiji Constitution. The House of Councillors was given what was in effect a suspensive veto in legislation and in this and other ways subordinated to the House of Representatives. An independent judiciary was constitutionally established, and the electorate was given the power of recall, although not of appointment, of judges. Following the American precedent, the Supreme Court, as the court of last resort, was given specifically the “power to determine the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or official act.” (Art 81.) 

And, in the thirty-one articles of Chapter III of the new Constitution, detailed provision was made, substantially along the lines of American evolution, for the protection of the individual against the improper exercise of state powers. In this bill of rights, it should be noted, the emphasis was placed upon the individual rather than the group or the institution in the attempt to institute a reversal of the traditional point of emphasis in such Asian countries as Japan.

Closely connected with constitutional reform was the change made in the relationship of State, or Shrine, Shinto to the temporal order. The first step in this direction was taken with the issuance of an Imperial Rescript, probably in anticipation of SCAP guidance, on January 1, 1946, in which the Emperor formally divested the Imperial Institution of its divine, or spiritual, origin and attributes and placed his right to rule on the basis of leadership of the nation. SCAP itself directed the abolition of State Shinto, placing responsibility for the voluntary maintenance of shrines on the people. At the same time, sect Shinto was denied the financial support of the state. These actions put the Imperial Institution on an exclusively temporal foundation, thus making it more nearly possible to deal with it on a constitutional and democratic basis. They did not, however, displace the Emperor from his symbolic position as head of the state, and as one to whom his people were attached by inherited ties of personal allegiance. This symbolic position was, as previously noted, written into the constitution.

These and other changes to be considered were made by conservative Japanese governments under, or in anticipation of, direction or guidance from SCAP which, in the first eighteen months of the occupation, went beyond the negative action of forcing removal of impediments to democracy represented by such things as the prewar “thought control” laws, and beyond mere “encouragement” of democratic tendencies. The character of the governments through which SCAP had to act, and whose authority it upheld, gave assurance against the institution of any really radical reform by the Japanese themselves. Thus SCAP, under American and Far Eastern
Commission directives, blocked out the program of reform itself in terms of its judgment as to how democratization might be accomplished, and sought the implementation of its reform program through Japanese some of whose inclinations and interests were against reform.

Since the Meiji Constitution had provided for an elective House of Representatives, elections were not a postwar innovation in Japan. The initial effect of occupation policy, consequently, was to enable life to be reconstructed along prewar lines. Thus elections were held in the spring of 1946, before the creation of the new constitutional order. The second postwar elections—the first under the new constitution—were held in the spring of 1947. Elections were again held in 1949. Since the new constitution gave the franchise to women, in this and subsequent elections the electorate was based upon the principle of universal suffrage. In all the elections held during the period of the occupation, as well as after the conclusion of a peace treaty in 1952, the tendency shown was essentially conservative, the conservative Liberal-Democratic Party securing an absolute majority in the House of Representatives in the 1949 elections.

The occupation emphasis on democratization resulted in the revival of party activity immediately after the surrender. The destruction of the older parties, attempted in and after 1940, through consolidation into the Imperial Rule Assistance Association and the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, had not been complete, nor had sufficient time elapsed to eliminate prewar political associations and relationships. Thus the revival of parties took place along lines which reproduced the Seiyukai and the Minsaito under the misleading new names of Liberal and Progressive parties, with a leadership of party politicians and bureaucratic politicians carried over from prewar days. A third party, the Social Democratic Party, under the leadership of Katayama, a prewar labor lawyer and politician, competed with the Liberals (who by 1949 had become the Liberal-Democratic Party) and the Progressives (shortly calling themselves the Democratic Party) for control of the Diet. The Social Democrats themselves were divided into a right wing, similar in purposes to the Liberals and Democrats, and a left wing which inclined toward positions taken by the Communists.

The first post-surrender elections, held under the auspices of an inadequately reconstructed government and before it was possible to solidify and organize any new democratic tendencies, gave a Diet majority to the conservative Liberal and Progressive parties, and led to the installation of a Cabinet headed by Yoshida Shigeru, who succeeded to the Liberal party leadership when, shortly after the elections, its first President, Hatoyama, was purged under SCAP orders. This government continued until after the elections of 1947. These elections gave a party composition
in the House of Representatives of: 143 Social Democrats; 133 Liberals; and 126 Democrats, with the remainder of the 466 members classified as independents or distributed among minor parties. On this basis, the House designated Katayama (Social Democratic leader) as Premier. His Cabinet was based upon a coalition of the Social Democratic, the Democratic, and the People’s Coöperative parties. The failure or inability of the Katayama government to develop and carry vigorously into effect a program of economic readjustment produced sufficient dissatisfaction with it so that it resigned (February, 1948) and was replaced by a Cabinet headed by the Democratic party leader, Ashida Hitoshi. Scandals involving his government, leading finally to Ashida’s indictment for perjury, brought about its overthrow (October, 1948) and his replacement as Premier by Yoshida, even though at the time the first Yoshida government was being investigated on the charge of improper use of and accounting for party funds. Even under these circumstances, the elections of January, 1949, gave the Liberals (renamed the Liberal-Democrats) an absolute majority in the Diet.

The scandals involving the rightist parties were the consequence of the methods used by the parties in financing their activities. In the prewar politics of Japan close working relations had been maintained between the industrial and financial capitalists and the political parties. In return for financial support, the parties served as intermediaries between the bureaucracy and government, on the one side, and the managers of the Japanese economy (landlords and Zaibatsu) on the other. Since this older relationship had been disturbed, although not completely displaced, by the economic reforms instituted under SCAP direction, without, however, elimination of the parties’ need for large sums for election and other purposes, the parties had established working relations with contractors and others who wanted to undertake and profit from the rebuilding of Japan. It was the open revelation of this relation which constituted the “scandals.” The success in the 1949 elections of the parties which had most effectively exploited this relationship, however, indicated that the system was one generally accepted, whether or not approved.

Another approach to democratization was represented by the program of decentralization. This was designed to lessen control of prefectural and local government by the bureaucracy operating through the Home Ministry. Because of its control of the police and its wide power of appointment and direction of prefectural and local officials the Home Ministry had been a most important agency of authoritarian and bureaucratic rule. Steps had been taken to reorganize the system of police administration on a decentralized basis before the abolition of the Home Ministry at the end of 1947 when its other functions had been eliminated or absorbed.
by other ministries. This had in effect been forecast in the provisions with respect to local self-government in the new constitution, which established the "principle of local autonomy" for the enactment of regulations by law for the organization and operation of "local public entities." Article 93 of the constitution provided for elective local assemblies and for the selection of officials by "direct popular vote within their several communities." The strength of the tradition centering on the bureaucracy and its allies in the conservative parties' local machines, however, was revealed in the striking tendency of the local electorates to return to office as prefectural governor or mayor those who had previously held office by appointment from Tokyo. Thus at the local as well as the national level, three and a half years of "democratization" had resulted in a reorganization of the political institutional life of Japan so as to make possible the expression of new ideas and forces, but no new political leadership of any real effectiveness had appeared to displace the prewar bureaucrat and politician. If election results are taken as the criterion, the people were content to follow along lines marked out by such of the older leadership as had not been purged under SCAP direction. Even purged leaders continued to exert considerable influence by indirect means.

4. ECONOMIC AND EDUCATIONAL REFORMS

Probably of greater long-run significance than the governmental and political changes instituted by SCAP were those which were economic and educational in their direction. The educational reforms were directed toward a change in emphasis and content in instruction in the schools. They included the introduction of new subjects of instruction and a revision of text materials used for instructional purposes. To change the emphasis the attempt was made to decentralize the system so that there might be a greater possibility of using education for the purpose of development of the individual rather than to promote the ends of the state. Since the organization and methods introduced were American rather than a reorganization of the traditional Japanese, teacher training had to be undertaken. And, if education is put in a broader context than that of formal school instruction, the freeing of the press and the radio from the "thought controls" that had been developed before the war, and extended during its course, was an important part of the relationship of the educational program to the ultimate democratization of Japan.

Similarly, although it had a much more complex motivation, the program of economic change had "democratization" overtones. The revival and great expansion of labor organization from the prewar peak of less than half a million members to the new peak of around six million was one indication of this. The local unions which came into being with
rapidity after the old laws were repealed came to be organized nationally along American lines into two major organizations, a Japanese Federation of Labor and a Congress of Industrial Unions. SCAP policy originally encouraged this organization since the conception of union activities initially was along the lines developed in the American labor movement of utilization of organization to improve the economic position of labor. The policy began to change, however, when political significance was perceived in a general strike which was threatened at the end of 1946 and the beginning of 1947. SCAP intervened to prevent such a general strike with alleged political rather than strictly economic purposes, after having tolerated strikes on a fairly wide scale during the first year of the occupation. By 1948 a general shift in policy from reform to revival of the Japanese economy made SCAP less tolerant of strikes with strictly economic objectives since they had inevitably a bad effect on production. The fact that the strike threats in 1948 came largely from organizations of public employees gave a political tinge, in any case, to strikes for wage increases which the inflation justified, except as the government, without pressure, acted to keep wages adjusted to living costs. The fact that the railways, and other utilities, and many of the industries were or had become, partly as a result of occupation policy, government-controlled enterprises, established this dilemma of political as well as economic motivation for both organized workers and SCAP—one not clearly perceived at the time when labor organization was attempted as a projection into Japan of American conceptions. Communist leadership in some of the unions served to create a presumption, furthermore, that strikes with which they were connected had political purposes.

These conceptions of labor organization divorced from political activity and objectives not only created a dilemma because of economic conditions and relationships in post-surrender Japan, but they also made it difficult for any new leadership developed through the unions immediately to play an important part in politics, and thus in the development of public policy. The fact, however, that labor was given the right of organization and that advantage was immediately taken of that right brought into being a new force to be reckoned with, perhaps even more in the future than in the immediate situation.

The labor reforms, viewed in relation to the total problem of demilitarization and democratization, were designed to help produce a balance in the control of the Japanese economy which was lacking in prewar days. Then the control rested in the hands of the great industrial-financial combinations which had close relations with the government. Without other changes, their power might have been modified, within a democratic political system, through the development of strong labor organization.
But initial SCAP policy with respect to these combinations went beyond this type of neutralization of their monopoly of economic-political power. Many of these (Zaibatsu) combines were linked directly with militarism and the so-called militarists. Consequently "SCAP's directives ordering the Japanese Government to stop the manufacture of arms, munitions, and aviation struck at the Zaibatsu specifically as well as war industry generally." Beyond this, on November 6, 1945, a directive was issued ordering the break-up of all the great economic combines. The method had already been tentatively suggested by the Zaibatsu itself, in anticipation of SCAP action. A Holding Company Liquidation Commission was created to take over the assets of the Zaibatsu holding companies for administration pending their resale to investors, so as to give a wider distribution of industrial power. This move, essentially one against monopoly, was subsequently extended beyond the holding company type of financial control of industry into an attempt to break the economic system down into its component, essentially small, but specialized, production units on the basis of the independence of each. Thus the movement against the Zaibatsu (which was fundamentally a pyramiding system of holding companies organized on a family basis) was extended into a movement to bring about industrial as well as financial deconcentration of control. In an attempt to avoid manipulation within this reform program, as well as to remove from directive positions those who had been associated with Japan's war program, the purge was extended in 1947 to include those who had been managing the Japanese economy, even though they had not held government office.

The immediate effect of these economic reforms was to lessen production and thus to put a brake on Japan's economic recovery even to the level of 1930-1934, which was established by the Far Eastern Commission as the ceiling for industrial production. By September, 1948, for example, over-all industrial production had reached only about 58 per cent of the 1930-1934 level. Consequently when, after mid-summer of 1947, the emphasis in occupation policy began to be put on economic recovery the current of economic reform began to flow much less swiftly, if not to be reversed. Reforms which had been directed, but which remained in the paper stage, from the standpoint of Japanese execution, were suspended as SCAP's pressure on the government was relaxed and the emphasis in its "guidance" was shifted.

5. THE LAND REFORM PROGRAM

Another area of economic reform affected agriculture. In prewar industrialized Japan approximately 50 per cent of the population continued

5 Occupation of Japan: Policy and Progress, p. 42.
in agricultural pursuits. By 1949 this proportion had been reduced to about 46 per cent. With the land available, this proportion of the population could not produce sufficient food for the total population. Consequently Japan was a food-importing country, and this food had to be paid for out of exports. But agriculture by itself was not able to produce an adequate livelihood for even the agricultural population. Thus the peasant families came to depend for part of their livelihood on subsidiary occupations such as the production of raw silk, the maintenance of a household industry, and fishing. This supplied a link between agrarian and industrial Japan. But in spite of this the livelihood of the peasant families was not adequate. Debts increased, and as a result many peasant families lost their land, remaining on it, however, as tenants. The sharecropping tenant system, which was the modern counterpart of the economic relationships of the older feudalism, was of such a nature that there was virtually no chance of a tenant regaining title to the land as a result of successful cultivation in good years, coupled with saving. 8

In postwar Japan, the peasant initially enjoyed an unusual prosperity as compared with other classes in Japanese society. In spite of government controls, he was able to capitalize on the scarcity of food, owing to the cutting-off of prewar external sources of supplementary supply, and on the scarcity of goods of all sorts. The town had go to the country, on terms set by the latter, for the essentials of living. The peasant consequently profited by the reversal of the usual conditions of exchange either: (1) by retaining for his own use a larger proportion of his production; or (2) by exchanging it (frequently on the black market) more advantageously for goods; or (3) by accumulating currency savings which, in spite of inflation, had the value to him of enabling him to benefit from the land redistribution program which represented the occupation’s move in the direction of reform of the agricultural life of Japan.

The Land Reform Act of 1946 was directed especially against the existing system of absentee landlordism. Approximately 2 million chô (a chô, or chobu, is 2.45 acres) of land was affected by the act, of which the government had secured for redistribution over a million and a half chô by the end of the first quarter of 1948. The program was to be completed within two years. SCAP reported total land sales under the program of 1,320,113 chô by the end of July, 1948. In 1947 the program of redistribution was extended to include pasture as well as agricultural land. “By June, 1952, the government had acquired nearly 2 million chobu of cultivated land

8 “Throughout the modern era, and especially during periods of agricultural depression, the proportion of the arable land held on tenancies increased. By 1936 this proportion amounted to 46 per cent of the total arable area. . . . It is estimated that before the war the tenant paid on an average about two-fifths of the value of his products to the landlord in rent.” G. C. Allen, Japan’s Economic Recovery (1958), pp. 51–52.
and 450,000 chobu of pasturage and had resold most of this to the former tenants."  

Application of the Reform Act brought about dispossession of all absentee landlords. Other owners of tenanted land were permitted to retain only 1 cho of cultivable land in Honshu, Shikoku, and Kyushu, and only 4 cho in Hokkaido, "while the holdings of owner-occupiers were limited to an average of 3 chobu in the three main islands and 12 in Hokkaido."  

This was one of the occupation reforms of probable permanence and real political and social, as well as economic, significance. It was accomplished in such a short period of time because of cooperation of the Japanese themselves and through their detailed administration. As Professor Allen points out, "the reform, though proceeding from the edict of a conqueror, will be difficult to reverse, for the new peasantry is a political force of great influence," taking the place in that respect of the formerly influential landlord class.

The changes made in tenure under the Land Reform Act were significant but in themselves would not either increase production or solve the problem of economic recovery in the agricultural sector of the national economy. For that purpose additional measures were necessary. Thus the main developments which marked a difference between prewar and postwar agricultural life in Japan have been summarized as follows:

1. A 20 per cent increase in the size of the agricultural population; 2. a conversion of tenants to peasant proprietors, without their incurring any substantial financial liability for this change in tenure; 3. the improvement in the economic position of the working farmer in spite of the increase in the agricultural population, partly through the Land Reform, partly through higher agricultural prices, and partly through new opportunities for non-agricultural employment which have offset the loss of income brought about by the decline in silk raising; 4. the diversification of agriculture through the development of livestock, fruit, and vegetable farming; 5. an increased application of chemical fertilizers and of materials for the control of pests and diseases; 6. a greater use of machinery, although the structure of Japanese agriculture still prevents the efficient use of many types of agricultural machines; and 7. the destruction of the landlord class and the reduction of many of its members to the status of working farmers.

1 Ibid., p. 57.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid., p. 58. From the occupation and the conservative Japanese point of view (apart from SCAP's reformative interest) "...the Land Reform was politically expedient, since it helped to damp down revolutionary sentiment among the peasants and to remove a source of unrest that might have shaken the stability of the Japanese government and so weakened the American strategic position in the Far East. Yet it is ironical that the dispossession of a rural middle class should have been undertaken at the behest of the government of a country that asserts so vigorously the rights of private property"
4 Ibid., pp. 64-65.
While these contrasts with the prewar situation existed, it still had to be recognized, for example, that land-holdings in Japan remained small; that a wide gap continued to exist between farm and urban incomes; that there remained under-employment among the agricultural population; and that there continued to be agricultural overpopulation, which meant a continued movement from the rural areas to the cities.

6. EXTERNAL ASPECTS OF THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM

The economic reforms of the occupation were designed to weaken the position within Japan of the groups held to be responsible for the development and application of the policy of expansion by war and aggression. Economic recovery was not initially assumed as a responsibility of SCAP. Consequently, reforms which at least would have the short-term consequence of retarding industrial recovery even to the 1930–1934 level and thus of maintaining a seriously weakened Japan were pressed on the Japanese government during the first year and a half of the occupation. As an occupied enemy country, furthermore, the necessary steps to reopen normal exchanges between Japan and other countries were not instituted. This meant that there was not promoted, in this early period, an inflow of raw materials to be processed for sale either at home or abroad. At the same time, the reluctance of the Zaibatsu and government elements to accept the implications of the reform program in relation to the distribution of power within Japan caused them to hold back in production as a method of bringing about a redirection of occupation policy. Available stocks, turned over to the old industrial management by the government between the time of acceptance of the need to surrender and the institution of occupation, for example, were funneled into the black market rather than made available for the revival of industry. Inefficient use of existing plant capacity served to scale down that initially ear-marked for removal on reparations account. Rice collections for distribution through the rationing system regularly fell below even low estimates, partly because of the lack of availability of goods needed by the peasants except as they could be secured through black market exchanges, and partly because of the failure of the government to institute an effective system of collections.

All of this, coupled with currency inflation, developed a picture of a steadily deteriorating economy which could not sustain the livelihood of the increased Japanese population, except as SCAP arranged imports of foodstuffs and other necessary commodities from the United States or took such steps as seemed necessary to assist in the revival of Japan’s international trade. This was one factor in bringing about a shift in emphasis in SCAP policy from reform, at the temporary cost of weakening Japan, to economic revival. Another factor was the steady deteriora-
tion of relationships between the United States and the Soviet Union, coupled with an equally steady deterioration of the position within China of the Kuomintang-dominated National government. The threat of control of China by the Chinese Communist Party, which was the obverse of the anticipated emergence out of the war of a China unified under National government auspices, tended to shift the base in American policy in the Far East vis-à-vis the Soviet Union from China, the war ally, to Japan, the ex-enemy. The circumstances of Far Eastern and international politics, in other words, as they changed during the years 1945-1950, shifted American interest, and with it SCAP policy, from that of weakening to that of strengthening Japan.

This shift in American emphasis from reform to rehabilitation and recovery for Japan was viewed with some alarm by those Far Eastern countries which had found themselves threatened by Japan's economic as well as by her military imperialism. Soviet disapproval of the tendencies in occupation policy was also expressed, both in and out of the Far Eastern Commission. But the effective control of policy, except with respect to the conditions of a peace treaty with Japan, rested with the United States.

The United States itself initiated moves toward a peace settlement, on the basis of which the occupation could be terminated, in the summer of 1947, following a press conference characterization of the occupation by General MacArthur as having virtually attained Allied objectives except in relation to economic recovery. That, he held, could not readily be achieved under the conditions of occupation. The American proposals for a conference among the Allies to work out the conditions of a permanent peace settlement were unacceptable to the Soviet Union and, because of Soviet objections, to the National government of China. The latter attempted to secure agreement on compromise proposals without success. Consequently, SCAP and the Far Eastern Commission remained in control, but with the change in approach to the problem which has been suggested.

The change of policy emphasis away from that of weakening Japan was shown in the movement with respect to the payment of reparations through a transfer of production facilities from Japan to China, the Philippines, and other countries with claims against Japan. Plant and tool production facilities originally earmarked for removal on the basis of the findings of the Pauley Commission were not only not removed from Japan but much of it was gradually brought back into use on the ground that specific plants were needed in production in order to meet requirements in production set by SCAP. Reports made by subsequent investiga-

11 The shift in American policy as shown in relation to the reparation problem is traced by Connolly, op. cit., pp. 419-427.
tors of Japan's own requirements were the basis for modification downward of the conclusions of the Pauley Report. In consequence, by August, 1948, SCAP reports showed a shipment out of Japan to advance transfer claimants of only some 18,000 machine tools, of a weight of under 60,000 metric tons.

At the beginning of 1948, the United States representative on the Far Eastern Commission, on the basis of a review of developments, made it clear that the United States had come to the conclusion that more direct and energetic measures should be taken by SCAP to bring about the industrial recovery of Japan since that had not been accomplished by the Japanese themselves. To that end steps had been taken in the second half of 1947 looking toward the reinstitution of foreign trade, with an increasing measure of private participation. Previously imports and exports had been handled entirely on a governmental basis through SCAP. In 1946 this had meant a United States expenditure of $187 million to finance necessary imports to meet the food deficiency. This type of aid was necessarily continued, and in addition import of raw cotton was begun through arrangements with the Commodity Credit Corporation. Under SCAP controls, imports of necessary raw materials increased in value in 1947 over 1946 by upward of $200 million. A parallel, but smaller, increase in the value of exports occurred. Industrial revival depended, however, on a much greater increase in the volume of imports of industrial raw materials than that possible under existing arrangements. Ultimately this importation would have to be financed out of exports. Thus industrial recovery required the reopening of markets to Japanese production. The opening of Japan gradually to private foreign trade represented a move in both directions. This was also true of such trade arrangements, essentially of a barter nature, made under SCAP auspices, as those concluded in 1948, between Japan and Pakistan, and Japan and Australia. These and other actions, such as the promotion of arrangements for a revolving fund, established from a commercial loan, to be used to finance necessary imports, represented the positive aspects of the changed policy designed to re-create Japan's peace economy, with production to be brought to the level of 1930–1934 (subsequently changed to 1932–1936). At that level, it was expected that the Japanese people would at least be self-supporting. It should be noted, however, that as of 1932–1936, Japan was economically the most powerful Far Eastern state, and that she had been able to exercise, by economic means, considerable influence beyond her own territories in eastern and southeastern Asia and the Pacific area.

It was recognition of this fact which produced dissatisfaction, previously

12 The initially defined policy had been that of non-responsibility for economic recovery. That had been expressly devolved on the Japanese.
referred to, with the new American economic policy among some of the Far Eastern states. And yet it was clear that a way would have to be found to fit Japan into the regional and world economy if the livelihood of the people was to be sustained without continued American support. In the 1930–1934 period Japan obtained 24 per cent of her imports from the U.S. and 53 per cent from Asia (excluding Australia), and shipped 23 per cent of her exports to the U.S., 60 per cent to Asia. In 1947 Japan obtained 92 per cent of her imports from the U.S. and only 6 per cent from Asia, while she shipped only 12 per cent of her exports to the U.S. and 66 per cent to Asia. Obviously something approximating the import-export balance of the prewar period in the relations of Japan with Asia would have to be developed if the abnormalities of the postwar period were to be reduced.

One difficulty of accomplishing this lay in the natural fears of the Philippines and other Asian and Pacific countries, as has just been suggested. Another developed with the success of the Communists in China. That country had been an important source of raw materials’ imports for Japan’s industry as well as her principal Asian market. Whether or not agreements on trade could be worked out between Communist China and Japan under American control remained in doubt at the end of 1949. With the United States in control of Japan, incentives of international communism, of which Chinese communism was a part, were away from action designed to strengthen Japan, just as the tactics of Japanese Communists were directed internally toward making economic recovery more difficult. This was on the assumption that the United States viewed Japan as a possible ally in its struggle against the Soviet Union. It was also doubtful whether the United States, under these circumstances, would approve of agreements which might have the effect, through trade, of drawing Japan into the Soviet orbit via China. The alternative to agreement was the development of trade on a de facto basis, with all of the uncertainties which that might involve, together with the development of a planned approach to a system of exchanges with the non-Communist countries in the area, and with the plan implemented financially by the United States.

Such an approach required the assumption of responsibility by the United States for either the security against Japan of the other Far Eastern countries, or the assumption of responsibility for the security of a disarmed but economically recovered Japan. What part of this responsibility would have to be assumed could not, however, be determined in the absence of a peace treaty. Such a treaty was forecast for 1950, the intimation being that it would be concluded in the absence of the signature of the Soviet Union and Communist China, if that proved to be necessary.

The negative aspect of the change in American policy was shown in
the growing insistence that union labor activity must be restricted where it might lead to lessened production, and thus support of an increased measure of government control of the industrial process. It was also shown in the relaxation of the pressure on the Japanese to carry through the deconcentration program in industrial organization, and in an acquiescence in the view that the purge of industrial managers should not be carried to the point of a lessened industrial efficiency. In other words, in general the emphasis on economic recovery at least to the point of self-support shifted interest from pressing forward the aspects of the reform program which might have a retarding effect on industrial revival. However, it should be noted that, in one respect at least, it was arguable that no change of policy was involved. As the shift in emphasis began to appear SCAP reported that the reform program had been carried through, as far as Allied objectives were concerned, since demobilization and disarmament had been completed and the institutions of democracy had been erected. This left the responsibility of permitting the Japanese to restore their means of livelihood, under safeguards against a revival of militarism and of a war rather than a peacetime economy. This would be a sole Japanese responsibility after the resumption of their independence following the conclusion of a peace treaty. In the absence of a treaty a measure of responsibility for the revival of economic activity had to be assumed by SCAP.

7. JAPAN AND THE KOREAN WAR

At the time of the outbreak of war in Korea in 1950, Japan was thus still an occupied country, completely dependent on the occupying powers for its security. Its military and para-military organizations had been broken up and, by Chapter II of the new constitution, military organization was apparently permanently prohibited. As, however, the international climate began to change, and especially after the Chinese Communists displaced the Kuomintang in control of mainland China, SCAP began to interpret this provision of the new Japanese constitution in relative rather than absolute terms. Thus General MacArthur in his January, 1950, annual “message” to the Japanese people made clear his view that Japan had not renounced the right to arm for purposes of national self-defense. This view was extended by the head of the Government Section of SCAP to include the right of alliance for defensive purposes. The Yoshida government im-

13 This chapter reads: “Article 9. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.

“In order to accomplish the aims of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.” My italics.
mediately associated itself with this interpretation of the constitution. Since the Socialist opposition parties dissented, the question of rearmament and its nature and extent came and continued after the peace treaty to be an issue in Japanese politics. From the international point of view, dissent to rearmament for defensive purposes was registered by the U.S.S.R. and China. Other Far Eastern and Pacific area states showed themselves to be at most only lukewarm to the idea.

The outbreak of the Korean War resulted in stronger pressures on Japan from the United States to speed up the re-establishment of its military forces. This was necessary because the United States had immediately to transfer most of its ground forces from Japan to Korea, thus giving responsibility for the maintenance of internal order in, and defense of, Japan to the Japanese government, while at the same time using Japan as a base for United Nations operations in Korea. A move in the direction of rearmament was made, consequently, with the SCAP authorization of a National Police Reserve of 75,000 men to be used to replace the occupation forces sent to Korea. No Japanese troops, however, were recruited for use in Korea itself, although the South Korean government was permitted to recruit Koreans residing in Japan for its own forces.

Beyond this, Japan offered non-military aid to the United Nations forces. This led to the placing of special procurement orders by the United Nations Command which in 1950 had a total value of $149 million. This was in addition to $361 million in foreign aid. American economic aid went down to $164 million in 1951 and then ceased, while special procurement totals went up to $592 million in 1951, $824 million in 1952, $809 million in 1953. They declined to $596 million in 1954, following the Korean armistice. 14

These special procurement orders, necessitated by the exigencies of the Korean War, greatly stimulated Japan's industrial recovery, which depended upon Japan's ability to finance the imports necessary to keep her machines running and to modernize and expand her plant capacity. After the Korean armistice, Japan continued to receive large dollar payments for the "special procurement" necessary to maintain the American military establishment in Japan agreed upon for security purposes. Thus by 1957 Japan had completed her economic recovery.

Her gross national product (in real terms) was 44 per cent higher than in the middle 1930's and income per head over 10 per cent higher. For several years her international accounts had shown a favorable balance and she had accumulated substantial foreign-exchange reserves. She had carried through the rééquipment of her major industries and productivity had risen well above the prewar level and was rapidly increasing. 15

14 Figures from ALLEN, op. cit., table 23.
15 Ibid., p. 21.
8. THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY PROBLEM

And yet a major preoccupation of Japanese governments continued to be with the economic problem. Industrial recovery had been stimulated and facilitated by American aid and American procurement in Japan. But it had also been made possible, and it had to be maintained, by re-establishing over-seas markets for the products of Japan’s industries. Japanese goods again began to be sold in the American domestic market as well as being purchased by the United States military services and personnel for use in Japan. This began to produce pressures from American manufacturers to restrict imports of Japanese textiles and other competitive products. When Japan was admitted to GATT in 1955, furthermore, several of the member countries invoked the Article in the Agreement which enabled them to discriminate against Japanese imports by quantitative means. By means of direct barter agreements Japan was enabled, with SCAP approval, to work out exchanges of goods with some of the Latin American countries, with Pakistan and India, and with some of the Middle Eastern countries. Special efforts were made, especially by the Kishi government, to get around the barriers to trade with the countries of southern and south-east Asia, Indonesia, and the Philippines which nationalism, as well as Japan’s activities in those countries as a military occupant during the war, had erected.

The major prewar market and source of raw materials’ supply for Japan had been China, including Manchuria. Together with Japan’s Far Eastern colonies (Formosa and Korea), China supplied 36 per cent of Japan’s imports and took 39 per cent of her exports, as against 25 per cent of the imports from and 17 per cent of her exports to the United States. The natural tendency in independent Japan’s policy, consequently, was to re-establish the trade with China which would materially help to release Japan from undue economic dependence on the United States developed under postwar circumstances. The establishment of the Communist régime in China; the nature of its relationship with the Soviet Union (and also the Japanese Communist Party); and Communist China’s intervention in the Korean War—all militated against the reopening of mutually beneficial trade relations between Japan and Communist China, at least until a basis of accommodation between the United States and the U.S.S.R. and China had been found. This economic side of the problem facing Japan was thus an aspect of the total problem of postwar power relationships in the Far East.

9. PEACE MAKING, 1947–1949

In 1947 both SCAP and Washington, in that order, had reached the conclusion that the purposes of the occupation had been substantially
realized and that the conditions of peace between Japan and the Allies should be defined in a peace treaty. As stated above, it had proved to be impossible to reach an agreement between the United States and the U.S.S.R. even on the method of negotiation. Consequently it was not possible to proceed until the United States, faced with growing dissatisfaction with the occupation in Japan and with an increasing pressure of opinion at home to rid itself of the burden of the occupation, made up its mind to end the state of war, whether or not the Soviet Union concurred. A draft treaty was prepared in the U.S. Department of State, and bilateral negotiations were undertaken by Mr. John Foster Dulles, a Republican appointed by the Truman administration for this purpose. This had the effect of avoiding making policy toward Japan a political issue in the United States. From the outset the Soviet Union was invited to participate in the negotiations. No agreement, however, was reached with it. Some modifications were made in the American draft as a result of Mr. Dulles’ negotiations with Australia, New Zealand, Britain, Burma, France, and other states. A final Anglo-American draft, thus negotiated, was used as the basis for comment and signature at the Conference convened at San Francisco on September 5, 1951. Forty-nine states signed the Treaty, although all of its terms did not meet with the full approval of all of the signatories. The Philippine delegation, for example, recorded its dissatisfaction with the provisions made for reparations, leaving the way open to future direct negotiations with Japan on the subject. Burma, India, and Yugoslavia declined the invitation to attend the Conference and thus failed to sign the Treaty. The U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, and Poland attended the Conference but refused to sign the Treaty. With the Japanese signature, nevertheless, the war in the Pacific was formally ended for all of the belligerents except China, Burma, and the U.S.S.R. India had not been constituted as a state until after 1945, and thus had not been a belligerent in the war except as a part of the British imperial state, so it had not been specially consulted in the prior negotiations among the belligerents. China was not represented at the Conference since the United States continued to recognize the National government while such other states as Britain, India, and the U.S.S.R. had extended recognition to the Communist régime as the government of China. The failure to provide for representation of Communist China was among the reasons why India refused to attend the Conference.

Japan was the only signatory state which had ratified the Treaty by the end of 1951. Consequently it only came into force in 1952, following ratification by the United States and other states which had signed it.

American ratification was delayed until Japan had also accepted the
terms of a separate security treaty under which the United States could, after the termination of the occupation, maintain bases and military personnel in Japan. This necessitated the conclusion, February 28, 1952, of an Administrative Agreement which provided for, and defined the limits of, American jurisdiction over all United States and attached civilian personnel in Japan. It also provided for a joint committee to negotiate agreements for facilities and areas to be used by the United States, and for an annual Japanese contribution of $155 million toward garrisoning costs. Thus the conclusion of peace did not result in a complete withdrawal of the United States from a military position within Japan. As a result, the continued presence in Japan of American military personnel, even on agreed conditions and for purposes of security and defense, produced frictions growing out of individual behavior, as in the Girard case, on which the oil of diplomacy had to be used. Beyond this, these security arrangements had the same effect as the economic situation, of restricting the freedom of the Japanese government in exercising judgment especially in the field of foreign policy. It inevitably brought about the alignment of Japan with the United States and its allies against Communist China and the U.S.S.R. In this respect it confined Japanese policy within the limits within which conservative Japanese governments would perhaps have preferred to confine it, as far as general alignment in international politics was concerned.

This alignment determined the choice for Japan as between the Peking and Formosa régimes. Consequently a separate treaty was concluded between Japan and the National government of China. Under the circumstances this presented a special difficulty in determining the extent of territorial application of the terms of the Treaty. The National government sought through the Treaty Japanese recognition of its claim to be the government of all of China. The Japanese sought to restrict the operation of the Treaty to Formosa. The compromise reached and embodied in the Treaty of April 28, 1952, made it applicable to Formosa, the Pescadores Islands, and territories which might subsequently come under the control of the National government. The Japanese government thereafter defined its policy as that of non-recognition of the Chinese Communist government, the chief of the Asia Bureau of the Foreign Office stating that “the treaty with the Nationalist Government applies to all of China. There no longer is a state of war that calls for any further treaty with China.”

In this way Japan would seem to have closed a possible gap in the San Francisco Treaty. That treaty provided for a divesting of Japan’s title to Formosa, as well as other parts of the pre-1945 Japanese Empire, without formally transferring title from Japan to China. In making this separate peace with the National government, which was ruling Formosa as a
province of China, Japan may be viewed as accepting the transfer of its former colony to China.

India also concluded a separate treaty "of perpetual peace and amity" with Japan (June 6, 1952), as did Burma at about the same time. With the ratification of the San Francisco Treaty by the Philippine government, after a settlement of the reparations question in 1956, Japan consequently found itself officially at peace with all states except those in the orbit of the U.S.S.R.

Over the same period in which it had been engaged in re-establishing its relations with other states, Japan had been seeking reintegration into the organized international community. Moves in this direction had been undertaken, with the encouragement of SCAP before the conclusion of the Peace Treaty. Thus Japan became interested in UNESCO activities before 1950, was admitted to the International Labour Organization, sent observers to GATT meetings and was finally admitted to membership, and participated increasingly directly in numerous international technical conferences. The final step in this direction—membership in the United Nations—could not be taken until December, 1957, because of the state of Japan's relations with the U.S.S.R.

One of the sources of friction between Japan and the U.S.S.R. during the period of the occupation had been the refusal of the Russians to repatriate Japanese prisoners of war. Repatriation was pushed by SCAP, as well as by Japan, and was a perennial topic on the agenda of the so-called Control Council. The Soviet Union took no action to meet Japanese and SCAP criticism until 1949 when, on May 20, the Soviet repatriation authority announced that all remaining prisoners of war held in the U.S.S.R. would be repatriated to Japan by November. The first group of 2000, arriving June 27, engaged in pro-Communist demonstrations upon their arrival, showing themselves to have been heavily indoctrinated while held in Soviet prison camps. Altogether it was reported that some 95,000 had been repatriated by December 15. The Russians claimed that this disposed of the issue, since the remaining prisoners were being held for trial as war criminals. The Japanese, however, denied the Russian claim, holding that some 60,000 were still unaccounted for, on the assumption that 150,000 had died in captivity. In spite of this difference the action taken by the Soviet authorities lessened the friction resulting from the repatriation issue.

Another aspect of the problem of relationship with the U.S.S.R. involved the Japanese Communist Party and its activities. Rigorously suppressed before and during the war, it was enabled to resume activities as SCAP, in fulfillment of its mission, required the repeal of "the dangerous thoughts" laws and released from prison and permitted the return to Japan of Communist Party leaders. By 1949, the party, although its membership was not
large (around 100,000), had been able to poll some 3 million votes and increase its Diet representation from 4 to 35. It had also been successful in establishing a position of leadership in the newly created labor organizations. The growth in strength of the Communist Party consequently became a matter of such concern to the government that the third Yoshida Cabinet, constituted after the 1949 elections, pledged itself to a determined fight against the Communists. The limits to the action that might be undertaken were set by SCAP which, while not unsympathetic to the anti-Communist program, initially made clear its determination to uphold the new constitutional régime of civil liberties. The Japanese government therefore moved to fulfill its pledge by the creation of a Diet "Un-Japanese Activities Committee." This committee subsequently (October 26, 1949) charged that the Communist Party planned revolution by promoting labor violence and acts of terrorism. This was denied by the party leaders, but some evidence to support the charge was secured by a police raid on party headquarters.

The charge, whether well- or ill-founded, introduced the political struggle into the area of labor relations. SCAP had been tolerant of strikes when they had had an economic motivation but by 1949 had begun to view with disapproval labor agitation which used political means even where, as was true in pre-independence Japan, that was necessary to attain purely economic ends. The charge against the Communists thus helped to move SCAP to approval of government action directed against the Japanese Communist Party.

Ill-advised actions of the Communist Party in other directions further strengthened the position of the government in moving against it. For example, in the spring of 1950, while the repatriation issue was still being pressed, Mr. Tokuda, one of the principal Communist leaders, was reported to have indicated a lack of desire on the part of the Communist Party to have any prisoners repatriated except those fully indoctrinated with Communist principles, who would consequently serve Communist purposes after repatriation. He was further reported to have told a Diet Committee investigating communism that the Soviet and not the Japanese figures on repatriation should be accepted. This fitted into the pattern of outside direction of party activities indicated by a Cominform criticism in January, 1950, of the failure of Sanzo Nosaka, then head of the party in Japan, to lead the party into active operations against the American occupation.

All these developments moved SCAP policy further toward approval of action directed against the Communist Party by the Japanese government. The government, however, preferred to be moved by SCAP rather than to initiate drastic action itself, even with SCAP approval. Consequently it was on the orders of SCAP that the Japanese government barred the
twenty-four members of the Communist Party Central Committee from holding public office; suspended publication of the principal Communist paper (Akahata) as a foreign subversive instrument, subsequently banning all Communist publications; and issued warrants for the arrest of nine of the principal Communist leaders. These actions drove the Japanese Communist Party underground and at least temporarily eliminated it as a factor in Japanese politics, as was revealed in the failure of the party to hold any of its seats in the Diet in the 1952 elections. Its national status was not improved by the failure of the U.S.S.R. to make peace with Japan in and after 1951.

10. POST-INDEPENDENCE POLITICS

As Japan approached independence an inescapable question was that of the permanence of changes made under the direction or guidance of the occupation authorities. After 1947 and before the actual termination of the occupation, more and more internal freedom of action was permitted the Japanese government. It could, of course, undertake change only with the acquiescence of SCAP until 1952. But, within that limit, indications were given of the nature of the changes which the Japanese would make if and as they had the power to order their own affairs freely.

One aspect of SCAP reform policy had from the start been accepted and applied by Japanese officialdom with great reluctance. This was the policy of making ineligible for public office or for top managerial positions in industry those who had been associated with the development of Japan's expansionist policy. This applied especially to those who came under the "purge" ordinances, although there was also considerable feeling with respect to some (although not all) of those who had been found guilty and imprisoned as "war criminals." Consequently as rapidly as circumstances permitted, the Japanese began to "unpurge" those who had actually been purged and to seek release of war criminals.

A test case among the "purgees" was that of Ichiro Hatoyama, who had been the leader of the Liberal Party and the probable Prime Minister at the time when SCAP made him ineligible to hold office. Hatoyama thereupon prevailed upon Yoshida Shigeru, "a career diplomat without party experience," to accept the leadership of the Juyuto (Liberal) Party. Yoshida was thus enabled to form his first government in May, 1946. Hatoyama thought of himself as being, and for some years was, the head of the party who exercised power through Yoshida as his deputy. By 1950, however, Yoshida had become a seasoned politician and in his later premierships felt himself released from obligation to Hatoyama. Thus when the latter was "depurged" in 1952, it was in application of a general policy toward which Japan had been moving rather than because Yoshida wanted a
special dispensation for him so that he could return to power. Hatoyama's return to political life, consequently, had the initial effect of splitting the Liberals into three groups. The elections held in October, 1952, gave the Liberal Party a majority vote in the House of Representatives, with a membership of 249, but it was divided as to leadership between Yoshida (105) and Hatoyama (69), with 66 members uncommitted to either.

Another prewar political leader, Mamoru Shigemitsu, who had been released from prison after serving his term as a war criminal, reentered political life at the same time as Hatoyama. He became the leader of a reorganization of political elements which took the name of the Progressive Party. The Progressives returned 85 members to the Diet in the 1952 elections.

With the fourth Yoshida government, organized after the 1952 elections, dependent on a divided majority party, its control of the Diet was uncertain and it shortly encountered a no-confidence vote which necessitated new elections in 1953. In this election the Hatoyama faction campaigned separately from the Liberals and consequently had its representation reduced from 69 to 35. The Yoshida Liberals secured 199 seats, while the Progressives seated 76, the Right-wing Socialists 66, the Left-wing Socialists 72, and the Communists 1. These figures indicate that the Liberal losses, largely in the Hatoyama following, were to the Socialists, both the Right-wing and the Left-wing. This result strengthened the Yoshida position through a composition of his differences with Hatoyama and through the establishment of a better working relationship with the Progressives. Similarity of views and interests, however, drew the Progressives closer to Hatoyama than to Yoshida. Nevertheless the election results enabled Yoshida to form his fifth government, which lasted until the end of 1954. By that time (November 24), the conservative opponents of Premier Yoshida had formed a new party—the Japan Democratic Party. It was made up of Progressives, Japan liberals (who had splintered off in 1953 from the Liberal Party), anti-Yoshida defectors from the Liberal Party, and a few independents. The Democratic Party controlled 121 seats in the House of Representatives, as against 185 Liberals. This brought it to the position where, with the support of the Right-wing Socialists, it could put through a vote of no-confidence in the government.

To avoid the formal overthrow of his Cabinet, which would have had to be followed by new elections, Yoshida resigned, and was succeeded as Premier by Hatoyama, with Shigemitsu designated as Foreign Minister. Right-wing Socialist votes were required, however, to secure a favorable majority for the new government. This support was secured as a result of a pledge by Hatoyama to hold new elections early in 1955. Consequently this first Hatoyama Cabinet had essentially only caretaker functions.
In fulfillment of his pledge to the Socialists, Hatoyama dissolved the Diet on January 24, 1955, and elections were held at the end of February. The elections resulted in a House composed of: 185 Democrats; 112 Liberals; 89 Left-wing Socialists; 67 Right-wing Socialists; 4 Farmer-Labor members; and 2 Communists. The voting showed a slight swing to the left, which was also revealed in elections held in April for the 2,611 seats in Japan's 46 prefectural assemblies. The Diet election results also revealed the fact that, by combination of the two factions, the Socialists could become the second strongest Diet group, with almost as many votes as the Democrats. The results also made Hatoyama dependent on support either from the Liberals or the Right-wing Socialists for a majority in the Diet. The country remained strongly conservative since the two conservative parties polled 64 per cent of the total popular vote. But that would not prevent loss of conservative control of the government if division continued between the two conservative parties. Factional separation also prevented the Socialists from exercising as much influence as their total Diet strength should have given them. Thus an incentive to seek a basis of union existed both on the right and on the left.

The first moves toward union were undertaken by the two wings of the Socialist Party. An agreement to merge was finally reached on October 14, 1955. This merger was followed by that of the Democrats and Liberals, the new party calling itself Liberal-Democratic. These two mergers moved Japan into the pattern of two major parties competing in elections, with the majority party in the Diet constituting the government. Thus in the elections held in November, 1955, which were necessitated by the unstable Parliamentary situation, the Liberal-Democratic Party secured 299 seats and the Socialists 154. Hatoyama thus had a secure position as Premier, a position which he held until he resigned in December, 1956. He was succeeded by Ishibashi Tanzan, who remained in office for a year, when ill health compelled him to resign in favor of his principal competitor for leadership within the Liberal-Democratic Party, Kishi Nobusuke, who still held the premiership at the end of 1958, the Liberal-Democrats having retained their decisive majority position in the elections of May, 1958.

The above account of post-independence politics emphasizes the personal factor in Japan's party life. It should not, however, be concluded that this was the only operative factor in producing intra-party and inter-party divisions affecting the rise and fall of governments. Numerous charges and counter-charges with respect to the improper receipt and use of funds, both public and private, continued to be made with political intent and consequences. Unquestionably there was the factor of corruption in Japanese politics, with the majority or plurality party, because of its control of public office, usually the best target because most vulnerable.
But there was real difference of opinion over questions of public policy, especially as the occupation drew to a close. The Hatoyama following, for example, was critical of the working relationship with the United States maintained by Yoshida, feeling that a greater independence should be asserted. There was a desire on the part of the more nationalist conservatives to amend the new constitution so as to eliminate what they viewed as the more definitely American-imposed features. Constitution revision or amendment, however, required a two-thirds vote in both the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors, as well as popular referendum. The strength of the Socialist Party prevented the initiation of amendments. The Socialists, as well as some conservatives, were opposed to the proposed constitutional changes fearing lest the result would be curtailment of civil liberties and a reversion to the prewar “dangerous thoughts” control under centralized police administration. For the same reason there was opposition to legislative proposals designed to replace the local government system introduced by SCAP with more centralized control of education, police, and civil service. There was opposition to (as well as support for) the reestablishment of a military defense force lest it revive prewar military controls of important areas of policy. Some who saw the necessity for rearmament wanted to proceed more slowly and cautiously than others, and especially deprecated any action which seemed to be based on American views of need, rather than those independently arrived at by the Japanese government and based upon Japanese interest.

Hatoyama and Shigemitsu, when they reentered politics and returned to power, took the initiative in seeking to reestablish relations with the U.S.S.R. and Communist China, something which Yoshida had not undertaken in the years between 1952 and 1955. Thus in December, 1954, the newly designated Foreign Minister in the Hatoyama caretaker Cabinet, Shigemitsu, stated as the policy of the new government the exploration of all available means,

to restore close and cordial relations with our friends in Asia. . . . We are therefore willing to restore normal relations with Russia and China on mutually acceptable terms without prejudice, however, to our basic collaboration with the free nations. As for trade with the Soviet Union and China, we do not necessarily expect much from it at the present juncture, but, all the same, we shall welcome opportunities of expanding the volume which is now rather small.

Early in 1955 Hatoyama followed this statement with an expression of his own view that Japan should take the initiative in calling upon Russia and China to end the state of war. The Russians, in response, indicated their readiness to enter upon negotiations, which were subsequently undertaken at London in June, 1955. The negotiations continued without result
during 1955. They were recessed in September to enable the Russian negotiator to attend the United Nations General Assembly meeting in New York. At that meeting the Soviet veto was used to prevent Japan from becoming a member of the United Nations. This action, viewed as taken to enable the U.S.S.R. to put pressure on Japan in the peace negotiations, aroused considerable feeling in Japan. Nevertheless Japan resumed negotiations in January, 1956. By March, agreement had been reached on the less important issues. But neither side was willing to modify its position on the territories in dispute. The Japanese sought the return of south Sakhalin, the southern Kuriles, and Hobomai Islands and Shikotan, off Hokkaido. The Russians indicated a willingness to consider the return of Hobomai Islands and Shikotan, to which they had actually no justified claim except that of war occupation. They refused to consider the restoration of Sakhalin and the Kuriles, however, since they had been promised to Russia in the Yalta agreements. With neither government willing to give way to the other, consequently, negotiations were broken off on March 20.

Thereupon the Soviet government began to apply pressure by restricting Japanese fishing off the Kamchatka coast. This issue then had to be resolved before further attempts could be made to conclude the peace negotiations. A ten-year fishing convention and a three-year air-sea rescue treaty were concluded on May 12, and negotiation concerning the terms of a peace treaty was resumed, Shigemitsu going to Moscow for that purpose. His negotiations with the Soviet Foreign Minister led to no agreement, and negotiations were again suspended—this time to enable the two Foreign Ministers to attend the London Conference on the Suez question.

By this time it had become apparent that Japan would either have to (1) accept the loss of Sakhalin and the Kuriles in order to conclude a definitive peace treaty; (2) look forward to protracted negotiations, with no probable solution in sight; (3) give up negotiation and thus tacitly acquiesce in the postwar status of neither hostility nor peace; or (4) seek a method of restoring relations without concluding a formal peace treaty.

Since Hatoyama was determined not to leave office until this, the major undertaking which he had instituted, had been brought to some sort of at least relatively successful conclusion, in spite of objections on the score of his health he went to Moscow, having found through correspondence that the Kremlin was prepared to settle five major questions: (1) restoration of diplomatic relations; (2) exchange of Ambassadors; (3) fisheries; (4) United Nations membership; and (5) repatriation of Japanese still detained in Russia. Consequently, at Moscow, Hatoyama was able to secure agreement on the terms of a Japanese-Soviet Joint Declaration on the
normalization of relations and a protocol on trade. These were signed on October 19, and were ratified by Japan in time for the latter to be admitted to the United Nations in December, 1956. The territorial question was thus left to future decision, although Russia at this time agreed to transfer the Habomai Islands and Shikotan to Japan, but only after the conclusion of a peace treaty.

While it was possible for the Japanese government to institute negotiations looking toward a peace treaty with the U.S.S.R., this could not be attempted with respect to Communist China since Japan was committed, both by declaration and by circumstance, to deal with China through the National government. In the case of Communist China, furthermore, the incentives were clearly economic rather than political. Consequently the Hatoyama government and its successors tolerated, and within limits encouraged, Japanese to enter into private trade-exchange agreements with Communist China. This enabled trade to be developed, although within limits set by the post-Korean war restrictions and prohibitions on trade required by the United States. In any event, however, the Japanese traders, since they were dealing with state agencies, found themselves in a disadvantageous bargaining position, especially when China began to seek through trade agreements to shape Japan's governmental policy.

Under the circumstances, therefore, the Japanese government put more emphasis on the reéstablishment of friendly relations with the countries of south and southeastern Asia than with Communist China. This was especially evident after Mr. Kishi became Premier and leader of the Liberal-Democratic Party. Thus, before visiting the United States in June, 1957, Prime Minister Kishi went on a "good will" trip to Pakistan, India, Burma, Ceylon, Thailand, and Taiwan. Later in the year he made a similar visit to the Asian countries not included in his first itinerary, and to Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines. These Asian tours realized the purpose of laying the groundwork for closer and more friendly relations with Japan throughout non-Communist Asia.

On this foundation Japan began to inaugurate a more positive foreign policy, beginning to play a leading role in international relations. This was shown in the controversy over the further testing of nuclear weapons. In this controversy Japan not only cooperated with but began to exercise leadership of the so-called neutralist Asian states. A further step in the direction of leadership was taken with the election of Japan, on October 1, 1957, to a seat on the Security Council of the United Nations.

Thus within this short period after the termination of the occupation, Japan had again become an important factor in the equation of Far Eastern politics.
REFERENCES FOR FURTHER STUDY