suspicious march from Rajmahal to Patna and his openly hostile action in advancing towards Allahabad had duly reached his ears. But he had a poor opinion of Shuja’s ability, military strength, generalship, or rapidity of movement, and, therefore, decided to finish the hunt after Dara first. Hence the pursuit was pushed on down the Indus. But Dara fled like the hunted hare before Aurangzib’s generals, without their being able to catch him anywhere. Meantime the news from the east grew more and more alarming. So, Aurangzib at Multan deemed it unwise to neglect Shuja any longer. Leaving Dara’s pursuit in the hands of his officers (30th September, 1658), he with a select cavalry escort hastened back to the capital, travelling two stages every day to make up for lost time.* It was a splendid feat of endurance, and one supremely needed. Delhi was reached on 20th November. Three days afterwards he despatched a strong force from Agra with artillery under Sultan Muhammad, to join Khan-i-Dauran’s division at Allahabad, block Shuja’s path, and report the situation to the Emperor. A picked body of veterans lately returned from the Panjab was sent from Delhi to join the prince. Shortly afterwards the army near Allahabad was still further strengthened by the arrival of Zulfiqar Khan with more artillery, one kroe of Rupees from Agra fort, and several other officers, mostly Rajputs, with their contingents.† While these arrangements were taking place, Shuja was still at Benares: his one chance of swooping down on Agra was thus lost; the open road on which he had counted was now blocked, and the Emperor himself was within hail at Delhi.

Thus the state of the game was completely changed, and Aurangzib naturally expected that Shuja would now retire quickly from his vain quest, as any wise man would have done. So, he slackened his own speed, halted twelve days at Delhi, and then went to the hunting-lodge of Soron, to wait for news. If Shuja retired, Prince Muhammad would be recalled and the Emperor would return as from a hunt; otherwise he would hasten from Soron to join the campaign. Shuja, however, pushed blindly on

* Alamgirnamah, 212 et seq; Masum, 100.
† Alamgirnamah, 226, 234 and 235.
and reached Khajwa, as we have seen. The Emperor, constantly informed of the enemy's movements, left Soron on 21st December, ordering Sultan Muhammad not to precipitate an action but wait for him. On 2nd January, 1659, father and son united their forces near Kora, eight miles west of Shuja's position.* That very day, by a happy coincidence, Mir Jumla arrived from the Deccan by forced marches, and at once took his place as the confidential adviser and right hand man of the Emperor.

§ 7. The rival armies at Khajwa.

No time was now lost on the imperial side. Next day, 3rd January, Aurangzib formed his plan of battle and assigned to each division its proper position. Early at dawn on the fourth, the order of battle was issued: the artillery was to be planted opposite the enemy's guns, and the army was to advance there. All was stir and bustle in the camp. The marshals and orderlies galloped about to arrange the ranks; trumpets sounded; the kettledrums struck up; the standards were borne aloft. Before each division moved the elephants and guns; behind them tramped the serried ranks of steel-clad cavalry. "A dense cloud of dust" raised by 90,000 horses' hoofs "hid the earth and sky."†

From 8 A. M. Aurangzib himself rode out on a huge elephant inspecting his troops and cheering them by his presence in the field. Under his leadership the army advanced slowly and in perfect order, till, about 3 P. M., when it halted one mile from the enemy's force, behind the imperial artillery, at a spot chosen by the scouts for the battle. Shuja, too, marshalled his ranks, but did not leave his position. Only his artillery was sent half a mile in front of his camp. The imperial artillery replied to their fire, but little execution seems to have been done on either side.‡

†A. N., 242, 245, 250. Aurangzib's disposition of his troops is minutely described in the Alamgirnamah, 245-250, and Shuja's on pp. 250 & 251; also Aqil 75. Khafi Kh. (ii. 49) merely gives an abstract of the Alamgirnamah.
‡Mishum (101b) says that the fire was continued all night, and many were slain. But this is very unlikely. The Alamgirnamah gives the more credible account, which I have followed.
Shuja's struggles for the Throne—Battle of Khajwa

At nightfall Shuja's artillery retired on his army, in order to keep touch with it. Mir Jumla, with a born general's instinct, at once seized the deserted position,—which was a high ground commanding the enemy's camp. By hard labour he dragged 40 guns to it and mounted them, aiming at the enemy and ready for action on the next morning. By Aurangzib's order his soldiers did not take off their armour, their horses were not unsaddled; the men only dismounted and slept each at his own post. The Emperor himself occupied a small tent pitched on the field. His generals hastily entrenched in front of their divisions and kept watch. Mir Jumla went his rounds during the first part of the night, superintending the entrenching and urging the sentinels to remain on the alert. [A. N. 252.]

§ 8. Jaswant's treacherous attack on Aurangzib's Camp.

The eventful 5th of January was about to dawn. A few hours of the night still remained; the Emperor was engaged in the prayer of the last watch (tahajjuat), when a vague clamour arose in the far-off Van of his army and grew louder every moment.* The alarm and confusion rapidly spread through the camp. The air was thick with the yells of assailants, the cries of startled sleepers and timid fugitives, and the tramp of horsemen recklessly galloping away and of cattle stampeding in fright. The ruffianly element among the camp-followers seized the opportunity of plundering on their own account. The darkness heightened the confusion, and the ignorance of its cause added to its terrors.

Messengers began to come running up to the Emperor to report the truth. An act of treachery, disgraceful in any servant, doubly disgraceful in a Rajput,† was the root of all this trouble. Maharaja Jaswant Singh (of Jodhpur), who commanded the imperial right wing, had brooded over some fancied slight or neglect and matured a deep plan of vengeance. He had, it was said, sent a

*A. N. 253, The Ahkam gives the time as "two and a half prahars of the night" (4b); Khafi Khan (ii. 51) says, "when 4 or 5 ghariis of the night remained"; the Alamgirnamah is vague, "towards the morning" (255.)

†Aurangzib's own words, in a letter to Jai Singh, given in the Paris MS., 2b.
secret message to Shuja saying that he would attack the imperial
camp behind the field at the close of the night,* and that while
the Emperor would hasten to the rear to repel him Shuja should
swiftly fall on the disordered army and crush it between two
adversaries. So, shortly after midnight he got his 14,000 Rajputs†
ready, turned his back to the field, and rushed the camp of Prince
Muhammad, which lay in the path of his flight. The few guards
of the camp were soon overpowered, the followers who were found
in the way were slain, and everything that the Rajputs could lay
their hands on was carried off. Some of the camp people, roused
by the noise and mistaking it for the approach of the enemy, hastily
loaded their goods on their beasts to prepare for flight. These now
came into the hands of the Rajputs, who were saved the trouble
of packing their booty! Horses and camels beyond number and an
immense amount in cash and kind were carried off. The baggage,
stores, and draught-cattle of the imperialists, from the Emperor to
the meanest private, which lay in the camp behind the bivouacking
army, were looted. “Everything in the prince’s camp was swept
away with the broom of plunder.” Much of the Emperor’s own
camp suffered the same fate before the Rajputs gained the road to
Agra. The confusion spread to the army at the front. Men assembled
in broken groups, and rumours of a disaster spread through the
ranks. “The news caused distraction among the troops; their order
was broken; cowards and traitors fled away with or after Jaswant;
some double-dealers went over to Shuja. Many commanders left their
posts and hastened to the rear-camp to look after their property.”

*For the atack on the Base Camp, see Masum, 110b-111b; Alamgirnamah,
253-256; Khafi Kh. ii. 51-53; Kambu, 19b, (meagre); Aqil Kh. 76 & 77 (brief
and confused), and Ahkam, Irvine MS., 4b (India Office MS., 34a gives a few lines
more.) The best accounts are those supplied by the Alamgirnamah and the
Anecdotes, § 7. Khafi Khan supplies a few interesting details.

†This number is given by the Ahkam. Masum says “5 or 6 thousand.” I have
taken the larger number because Jaswant as commader of the right wing could
not have had less than 10,000 men; in the reduced Mughal army of the next
day that wing had 10,000 men, with a reserve of 3,000 more. Secondly, the
Alamgirnamah admits that at dawn Aurangzib found that “nearly one half of
yesterday’s force had been scattered by the tumult” (256.)
But the situation was saved by Aurangzib's wonderful coolness and Shuja's hesitation. Shuja received Jaswant's message, heard of the tumult, but did not leave his own camp at night, fearing it might be a mere ruse contrived between Aurangzib and Jaswant to lure him on to destruction! So great was Aurangzib's repute for writing feigned letters, making falso professions, and practising all the stratagems of war and policy, that Shuja durst not take advantage of his seeming distress. The general who hesitates is lost; the psychological moment passed away, never to return.

The Emperor was at his tahajjud prayer in his field-tent, when the news of Jaswant's attack and desertion reached him. Without uttering a word, he merely waved his hand as if to say, "If he is gone, let him go!" After deliberately finishing the prayer, he issued from the tent, mounted a takht-i-rawan (portable chair), and addressed his officers, "This incident is a mercy vouchsafed to us by God. If the infidel had played the traitor in the midst of the battle, all would have been lost. His flight (now) is good for us. Praised be God that by this means friends have been winnowed from secret enemies in my army. The occurrence is a God-send and an omen of victory to us!"*

So Aurangzib firmly kept his own position, and prevented the confusion from infecting his division too. His example put heart into others. Orderlies were sent off to urge the leaders of the various corps not to stir from their places; any one found away from his assigned post was to be dragged to the Emperor with insult. [K.K. ii. 53.] Islam Khan was ordered to command the right wing in the place of Jaswant, and Saif Khan was given independent charge of the front section of that division. In all other respects yesterday's battle formation was retained. But Mir Jumla was empowered to make any change that he deemed necessary. The rest of the night wore on in watching and caution.

At dawn Aurangzib rode out on an elephant to inspect. Jaswant's exploit had scattered nearly half the imperial army. But with the return of daylight many faithful officers, who had not been swept too far away by the tide of flight, hastened to rejoin the royal

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*A. N., 255 and 256; K. K., ii. 53; Akham 4b.
History of Aurangzib

banner. Thus Aurangzib saw around himself more than 50,000 soldiers, as against Shuja’s bare 23,000.* He issued the order of battle with an assurance of victory which the flattering Court annalist ascribes to “his trust in God and the escort of angelic legions,” but which the critical historian must set down to a more mundane cause, viz., his clear superiority of two to one over his enemy.


First spread a screen of skirmishers (qarawwals), a small but picked body under Abdullah Khan. These were the retinue of the imperial hunt accustomed to track the deer and the tiger and to take advantage of every cover in the ground. The vanguard was led by Zulfiqar Khan and Sultan Muhammad, the right wing by Islam Khan, and the left wing by Khan-i-Dauran and Kumar Ram Singh (the son of Jai Singh.) Each of these divisions was 10,000 strong and had a number of guns covering its front. Bahadur Khan commanded the Iltimsh or small Advanced Reserve. The main Reserves of the two wings, each numbering 3,000 troopers, were under Daud Khan and Rajah Sujan Singh respectively. In the Centre the Emperor’s banner waved over a vast host of at least 20,000 men.† His own right and left flanks were commanded by Amin Khan and Murtaza Khan. Khawas Khan brought up the scanty Rear. Aurangzib rode on a huge elephant with his third son, Muhammad Azam, in his hawda. Mir Jumla was seated on another elephant, close to the Emperor’s, ready to help him with counsel at any crisis. The army marched slowly ahead in this formation, and clashed with the enemy at 8 A.M.

*Aqil Khan (p. 76) gives Shuja’s numbers thus:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wing</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Right</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right Reserve</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Reserve</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre (tip)</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This gives a total of 23,000.

No main Reserve is mentioned.

†The actual strength of the imperial army is mentioned neither in the Alamgirnama, nor by Khafl Kh. The former only says that more than one half of the previous day’s force i.e. 90,000, was present (p. 256). This would give 45,000 to 50,000. The latter adds that at dawn many of the dispersed officer,
Shuja’s struggles for the Throne—Battle of Khajwa

Shuja had been impressed by yesterday’s vast assemblage of the imperial host, whose number rumour had swollen to above 90,000 men. He knew that he could not adopt the customary plan of battle, making his force correspond, division for division, to the enemy’s dispositions. His small force would then have been overlapped and swallowed up by the vastly extended front of an enemy who outnumbered him as three to one. So, with great judgment he made a new formation to-day: all his army was drawn up in one long line, behind the artillery. His Right was comanded by his eldest son Zain-ud-din Muhammad and Sayyid Alam (5,000 men), and his Left by Hasan Kheshgi (4,000 men). Behind these two wings stood their Reserves, each 2,000 strong, under Isfandiar Beg and Sayyid Quli respectively. In the Centre rode Shuja with his second son, Buland Akhtar, (10,000 men), his front being led by Shaikh Zarif and Sayyid Qasim. There was apparently no main Reserve. With true generalship Shuja determined to assume the offensive, and make up for the smallness of his number by the moral superiority which the attacking party always has. The first stage of the battle justified his forecast.

The battle began at 8 a.m., with a furious artillery duel; cannon, rockets and muskets were discharged on both sides, doing great havoc. One ball struck Zain-ud-din’s elephant, wounding the driver and the servant at the back, while the rider and mount escaped scatheless. The two Vans now closed together and plied their bows.*

came back to the presence (p. 53.) Therefore Aurangzib could not have had less than 50,000 men with him after Jaswant’s flight; 60,000 would be nearer the truth. Aqil Khan (p. 78) estimates the imperial force thus: Van, right wings, and left wing, 10,000 each; Right and Left Reserves 3,000 each. The number in the Centre (under the Emperor) is unfortunately not given. But it must have been twice as strong as either of the wings, because the Alamgirnamah mentions 43 officers as present in it, against some 20 in each of the wings (pp. 246-248). The statement of the Akhak that when the battle began Aurangzib’s army “did not number even one-fourth of Shuja’s” is an absurd exaggeration and occurs only in the India Office MS. of the work (f. 34a).

*For the battle of Khajwa see Alamgirnamah, 257-265; Masum, 102b-105b; Kafaft Kh. ii. 53-56 (mostly a repetition of the Alamgirnamah); Kambu, 20a & b; Aqil Khan, 75-79. The last adds many incidents which the Court historian has omitted. Masum is of special value as giving a picture of the battle as seen from Shuja’s side. Otherwise, the Alamgirnamah has been my chief authority.
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The first move was made by Sayyid Alam with Shuja’s Right. He charged the imperial left wing, driving in front three infuriated elephants, each brandishing a two-maund iron chain in its trunk. Neither man nor beast could stand their impetuous onset. The imperial Left, which had no prince or great general to command it, broke and fled. The panic spread even to the Centre; the soldiers ran about in confusion; the faint-hearted fled without waiting to be attacked. [K. K. ii. 56; Kambu, 20b.] To make matters worse, a false report of the Emperor’s death suddenly spread through the ranks and took away the hearts of the soldiers. Many fled away; “even veterans of the Deccan wars and old servants of the Emperor joined the stream of flight.” [Aqil, 76.] So great was their panic that some of the fugitives did not halt before reaching Agra. Jaswant’s mysterious appearance and rapid flight had created along the route of Agra a story of the Emperor’s defeat and capture. The later arrivals from the field confirmed the news, gave circumstantial details of the disaster like eye-witnesses, and announced the speedy advance of the victorious Shuja to release Shah Jahan. Agra then must have resembled Brussels just after Waterloo!

But the battle had yet to be fought and won. The enemy, after clearing the left wing, pushed on towards the Centre, where only 2,000 troopers now remained to guard the Emperor. But Murtaza Khan from the Iltimsh, and Hasan Ali Khan from the Left Reserve, each with a handful of men, flung themselves forward and barred the enemy’s path. The Emperor, too, boldly turned his elephant's head to the Left to confront the enemy. Backed thus by the Centre, these few brave officers successfully repelled Sayyid Alam, who galloped back by the same path that he had come.

But the three elephants continued to advance wildly, their wounds having made them fiercer than before. One of them came up to Aurangzib’s elephant. It was the critical moment of the battle. If the Emperor had given ground or turned back, his whole army would have fled. But he stood like a rock, chaining the legs of his elephant to prevent its flight. [K. K. ii. 56.] At his order one of his matchlockmen, Jalal Khan, shot down the mahut of the attacking elephant, and immediately afterwards some imperial elephants surrounded it, a brave royal mahut nimbly leaped on its back and
brought the riderless beast under his control. The other two elephants ran away in front of the Centre towards the right wing. The Emperor now got breathing time, and turned to succour his Right, which had been hard-pressed in the meantime.

For, encouraged by the success of Sayyid Alam’s charge, the enemy’s Van and Left, led by Buland Akhtar, Shaikh Wali, Shaik Zarif, Hasan Kheshgi, and others, had attacked the imperial Right. In spite of their small number, their gallant charge dislodged their opponents; many of the imperialists fled, but the captains kept their places, though with very few men at their back.* All this time so severe was the stress of the fight on the Left that Aurangzib had no time to think of his Right. Now, freed from the danger on his Left, he looked at the Right and found there signs of confusion and flight. His first thought was to hasten to reinforce that hard-pressed division. But even in the greatest difficulty and danger, his coolness and presence of mind did not desert him.† It at once struck him that, as his own front had hitherto been turned towards the Left, if he were now to face suddenly round and march to the Right, the rest of the army would interpret this *volte face* as flight. So, he first sent orderlies to the Van to tell the generals of his real object and to urge them to fight on without fear or doubt.

Then he wheeled the Centre round and joined the right wing. The succour came not a minute too soon. The elephant of Islam Khan, the commander of that wing, taking fright from a rocket had fled scattering and shaking the troops of that division. The commander of the right wing artillery and his son had been slain. But Saif Khan and Akram Khan, the leaders of the vanguard of the Right, with a few men kept their ground, and were fighting hard to stem the enemy’s advance.

Just then the Emperor arrived and reinforced them. This was the decisive move of the day. The tide of battle now rolled resistlessly against Shuja. The imperial Right, newly strengthened, made a counter-charge and swept away the enemy from before them, with great carnage. Shaikh Wali Farmuli, the leader of Buland

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*Kambu, 20a; Masum, 102b & 103a.
†Alamgirnamah, 261 & 262.
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Akhtar’s Van, with some other commanders, was slain. Hasan Kheshgi, the general of Shuja’s left wing, fell down wounded. Shaikh Zarif, a Daudzai Afghan, after a heroic fight in front of the Emperor, was captured covered with wounds. Buland Akhtar fled to his father. [A. N. 263.]

Meantime the imperial Van, under Zulfiqar Khan and Sultan Muhammad, had beaten back the attack on it, advanced, and shaken the enemy’s front line. There the Bengal leader, Tahawwur Khan, with a handful of men, offered a bold opposition and saved the fugitives from slaughter. But so thick was the shower of cannon-balls, rockets and bullets from Aurangzib’s army that no man could stand it. The front line of Shuja began to gallop back to a safe distance in twos and threes at a time.

There was now a general advance of the whole imperial army, Right, Centre, and Left. “Like masses of dark clouds, they surrounded Shuja’s own division, the Centre,” his two flanks having been laid bare by the defeat and flight of his right and left wings. Many of his personal attendants perished from the imperialist fire under his own eyes. The cannon-balls carried off a head or half a body at a time. Some of them, weighing 16 or 20 lbs, flew about his own head.* Therefore, at Mir Isfandiar Mamuri’s advice he left the dangerous prominence of the elephant’s back and took horse.

§ 10. Rout of Shuja’s army.

This was the end of the struggle.† All was now lost. The sight of the empty hawda, visible from the furthest limits of the field, struck terror into his soldiers’ hearts. Their master was slain, so they imagined. For whom would they fight any longer? They had been sorely tried by Aurangzib’s artillery and wanted only a decent

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*Masum, 103a-104a, (last scene graphically described).
†Bernier’s statement, copied by Stewart, that Shuja was on the point of gaining the victory when he lost all by dismounting from his elephant, merely gives the bazar gossip. None of the contemporary authorities on whom my account of the battle is based, supports such an idea, which is also naturally improbable. Indeed, the battle had been already lost and Shuja was in imminent risk of being captured, when he took horse.
Shuja's struggles for the Throne-Battle of Khajwa

excuse for flight. This was now found in the riderless elephant. In a moment the whole army broke and fled.

Shuja's shouts to his men to stand firm fell on unheeding ears; he could not arrest the tide of flight, but stood in the field as a helpless "spectator of the hand of Fate." A few of his captains, who had been gallantly facing the enemy, now looked around and saw with amazement the field behind them deserted, and none of their followers present at their back. The enemy, emboldened by the sight, hemmed them round. It was only left for them to do and to die, and this they did. Sayyid Alam alone broke through the ring of his adversaries. [Masum, 104.]

Already the craven-hearted had begun to buy safety with desertion to the victor's side. While Aurangzib was advancing from his own Right, first Murad Kam Safawi (surnamed Mukarram Khan), then Abdur Rahman Khan (son of Nazar Muhammad Khan, the ex-king of Balkh), and Sarjar Beg (the son of Alawardi Khan), left Shuja and joined him. Under their guidance the Emperor skirted Shuja's artillery on his left hand and charged the enemy's Centre, as narrated before.* But the victory had been already won. A courier now galloped up to him with the happy news that Shuja had fled from the field with his sons, Sayyid Alam, Alawardi Khan, and a small remnant of his army. †

Immediately the imperial band struck up the 'music of victory' which conveyed the happy news to every soldier in the field. The battle was over. Aurangzib descended from his elephant, and knelt down on the field to thank the Giver of Victory. Shuja's entire camp and baggage were plundered by the imperialists. One hundred and fourteen large and small pieces of cannon, and eleven of the celebrated elephants of Bengal became the victor's spoil, as also did a small portion of treasure and jewels which had escaped plunder by the soldiers. [A. N. 265.]

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*Kambu, 20b; Alamgirnamah, 263 & 264.

†Aurangib's own account of the battle is given in the Ruqaat-i-Alamgiri, No. 19 and the Paris MS., 2b
History of Aurangzib

§ 11. Criticism of tactics.

Reviewing the battle, we must give the palm of generalship to Shuja. Aurangzib showed great firmness and presence of mind, but no military genius. Shuja’s plan of battle was admirable; it would have succeeded if he had not been so hopelessly outnumbered, and if Sayyid Alam had been supported from behind and pressed his charge home. The latter, after routing the left wing of Aurangzib, was confronted by the Centre, checked, and forced to retreat. If he had made a longer stand there, he could have utilised the opening made by the rush of his two furious elephants in front of the, enemy’s Centre, and crashed into Aurangzib’s Right from behind, at the very time when that wing was shaken by the charge of Buland Akhtar from the front and the stampede of Islam Khan’s elephant. This would have annihilated both the wings of Aurangzib; and after this splendid success his Van and Centre, left alone in the field would have been demoralised and easily defeated. But either Sayyid Alam was not a stubborn fighter, or Shuja was too timid to risk his all on one throw by denuding his Centre of men to support his victorious Right. In fact, he was held in check at his own position by Aurangzib’s Van. [Aqil, 78; Masum 103a.]

Note. The most original source for Sulaiman Shukoh’s campaign against Shuja has been lately discovered. The Jaipur State archives contain copies of more than a hundred letters that passed between Jai Singh and the Mughal royal family during Shah Jahan’s reign, the majority of them having been written by Dara. Among these 38 refer to the campaign against Shuja and range in date from 5 Dec. 1657 to 5 June 1658;—27 of them were written by Dara and 7 by Shah Jahan to Jai Singh: two were replies of that Rajput chief to Shah Jahan and one to Dara. These letters (which contain the dates of writing and the dates and places of receipt) enable us to follow the campaign, the course of diplomacy, and the policy of the imperial Court in minute detail.

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§ 1. Fugitive Dara enters Cutch.

We have seen how Dara had been pursued all the way from Lahor to Tatta in Lower Sindh and finally dislodged from that town. Leaving it on 18th November, 1658, he had struck inland to Badin, 55 miles eastwards, and then marched for three days along the northern shore of the salt lagoon or Rann, suffering unspeakable hardship through lack of water. That year the rainfall had been scanty, and the tanks on this route were all dry, while the few wells contained only a small supply of muddy water. Many of his transport animals perished of thirst and his soldiers were brought almost to death’s door. The lagoon was eighty miles broad with many quick sands, and no drinking water at all. But everything must bow to necessity. Dara had no choice but to enter the Rann (27th November) with his tender wives and daughters in order to reach Gujrat.∗

Crossing the Greater or Western Rann he reached the village of Luna, at the north-western end of the island of Cutch. Then, making his way through the desert and along the sea-coast by a difficult and untrodden path, under the guidance of some local zamindars, he arrived at the capital of the island. The Rajah hospitably received him, and overcome by the personal charm of Dara and the hope of matching with the imperial house of Delhi, he betrothed his daughter to Sipihr Shukoh† and gave every help to

∗A. N. 282-283. Badin, 55 miles east of Tatta. Dara probably crossed the Rann at Rahimki Bazar, 30 miles s. e. of Badin. Jai Singh afterwards reached the northern shore of the Rann at “the village of Rahman” (Paris MS., 103a), which I take to be another name of the same place.

†The Rao of Cutch, “when he appears in public, alternately worships God in a Hindoo pagoda and a Mahommedan mosque... The royal family of Cutch have never objected to form matrimonial alliances with Mahommedans when the match was suitable, or when a political object was to be gained... The Jharejahs employ Mussulman cooks, and eat from their hands.” (Burnes’s Visit to Court of Sinde & History of Cutch, ed. 1839, p. xiv.)
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Dara to make his progress easy. The fugitive, replenishing his power in the dominion of his new friend, crossed to Kathiawar. Here the leading chief, the Jam of Nawanagar, offered him presents and the necessary provisions and conveyances.

§ 2. Dara occupies Ahmadabad.

Growing stronger as he advanced, he entered Gujrat. The local officers and jagirdars on the way were forced to follow him. On his arrival before Ahmadabad with 3,000 men, Fortune smiled on him unexpectedly. Shah Nawaz Khan, the newly arrived governor of the province, cherished resentment against Aurangzib for having imprisoned him at Burhanpur on his refusal to join that prince in the rebellion against Shah Jahan. True, Aurangzib had married the Khan's daughter, but that lady was dead, and Shah Nawaz Khan felt no natural attachment to his persecuting son-in-law who had treacherously imprisoned Shah Nawaz's second son-in-law, Murad Baksh. Besides, he had taken charge of Gujrat so recently that the officers and troops serving in that province had not been yet brought under his control. His military force was small and too divided by mutual jealousy to offer an effective opposition to the invader.

Whether inspired by revenge or cowardice, Shah Nawaz Khan submitted at the very outset. With his chief officers he advanced to Sarganj, four miles from the capital, to welcome Dara, admitted him into the fort (9th January, 1659), and opened to him the treasury containing ten lakhs of Rupees belonging to Murad. Dara spent one month and seven days in Gujrat, and by lavishly spending money soon raised his army to 22,000 men in that “land bristling with soldiers”. One of his officers took peaceful possession of Surat from Aurangzib's governor, seized the imperial revenue, extorted contributions from the citizens, and brought away 30 or 40 pieces of artillery to his master. In the Ahmadabad palace Dara held Court, occupying a lower seat than the Emperor's, out of respect for his father. But Shah Nawaz Khan's importunity led him to
appear at the window where the Emperors were wont to show their faces to the public.*

Having gathered military strength, and secured a good park of artillery, material, and money, Dara cast about for a plan of operations. Which way should he turn? The Deccan tempted him most. He had long held friendly correspondence with Adil Shah and Qutb Shah; he had opposed Aurangzib's invasions of their territory, and at the end of these invasions he had interceded with his father and secured lenient terms for them. Aurangzib was as much their mortal foe as his, and he might count on their assistance from vindictiveness if not from gratitude. Dara, therefore, at first wished to march into the South and set up his authority there, and then, by joining forces with Golkonda and Bijapur, take revenge on the common enemy of the three. The report that such a movement was contemplated by him reached Prince Muazzam, the governor of Aurangabad, and he set about enlisting troops to be better able to bar the path of his uncle. But a new hope drew Dara off from this enterprise.

The news reached Gujrat that Shuja was rapidly advancing from the east, while Aurangzib was absent in the Panjab. Now was the time for Dara to make a dash on Agra from the west and release Shah Jahan. Soon rumour brought the flattering news that Aurangzib's army had been routed in a battle with Shuja near Allahabad and that Jaswant Singh had returned home loaded with the spoils of the vanquished imperial camp. The golden opportunity had come.

§ 3. Jaswant Singh invites Dara to Ajmir.

Dara hesitated no longer. On 14th February he started for Ajmir,

*For Dara's journey from Sindh to Ahmadabad and his doings there,—A. N. 296-299; Khafi Khan, ii. 62-63; Masum, 136b-137a; Aqil Khan, 80-81; Ishwardas, 43a (meagre). The Persian accounts speak of a chief named Bahara or Rao Bahara in this quarter. From Jai Singh's despatches (Paris MS. 109a and 96a) he can be identified with the Rao of Cutch. I think that the Mughals called him so from Bharmal (or Bahara Mal), the Rao who lived in Akbar's time and fought with imperial Government. (Imp. Gaz. xi. 78). Once or twice Jai Singh speaks of 'the zamindar of Cutch' without using the title Bahara or Rao, but this need not mean that the latter was a different person.
leaving one of his officers behind as governor of Gujarat, and carrying away with himself the servants, children and wives of Murad, as well as several local officers like Shah Nawaz Khan. Three marches afterwards he learnt the truth that Aurangzib had triumphed over Shuja; but this disappointment was made up for by a stroke of unexpected good fortune. Maharajah Jaswant Singh sent one of his high officers to Dara with a letter professing his devotion to Shah Jahan and asking Dara to reach Ajmir quickly, where the Rathors and other Rajputs were ready to join a leader who would take them to the rescue of their captive sovereign. With Jaswant’s promised help a vast Rajput army could be easily raised.

Ajmir is the very heart of Rajasthan, “the centre round which the homes of the Rajput clans cluster.” East of it lie Kishangarh and Jaipur, in the south Mewar, in the s. e. Kota and Bundi, in the west Marwar, and in the north-west, beyond Marwar, are Shekhwati and Bikanir. Therefore the Mughals, and following them the English, have held the isolated district of Ajmir as a means of planting their feet on the breast of Rajputana and dominating all the Rajput clans with ease. With Jaswant as his right hand man, Dara would find Ajmir a most convenient place for raising a vast Rajput army in a short time. On the way he received more friendly letters from Jaswant, till he reached Mairta, three marches from Jodhpur, full of high hopes.*

These hopes were soon dashed to the ground; for, in the meanwhile Aurangzib had succeeded in securing Jaswant. After the battle of Khajwa, the Emperor, justly angry with Jaswant for his treachery on that day, wanted to make an example of him. He despatched an army of 10,000 men and guns under Muhammad Amin Khan to invade Marwar, expel Jaswant, and place Rai Singh Rathor on his throne. For a time Jaswant meditated resistance, gathered troops, and offered an alliance to Dara. But he soon realised his own impotence. “As Agra and Delhi had fallen in a twinkling into Aurangzib’s hands, how long could the fort of Jodhpur hold out against his power?” After waiting with all his troops

*A. N. 229-300, 311; Aqil Khan 81-82. Mairta, 37 miles n. w. of Ajmir and 68 miles n. e. of Jodhpur (Ind. At. 33 S. W.).
for some days in uncertainty at Mandur, his old capital, and then
learning that the army of his chastiser with his rival had reached
Lâlsunth and was ravaging the country, he lost heart and fled to
the hill-fort of Siwana. Meantime, Aurangzib had realised the
wisdom of not driving Jaswant into his enemy’s arms. In the im-
pending conflict with Dara, Jaswant was the decisive factor. His
adhesion would mean an addition of 20,000 of the hardiest warriors
of India to the ranks of his ally, as well as unrivalled local influence
in Rajputana.

§ 4. Aurangzib detaches Jaswant from the side of Dara.

So, Aurangzib made Jai Singh write a friendly letter to Jaswant,
professing true friendship for him and a natural reluctance to see
such a great Hindu prince meet with utter ruin. As a friend, Jai
Singh pointed out the folly of defying Aurangzib and the certaint
of utter destruction as its result. He therefore tendered his good
offices as a mediator with the Emperor, to secure for Jaswant a
full pardon and restoration to his title and mansab, as well as a high
post under the Crown, if he gave up Dara and returned to the path
of loyalty. This letter reached the Rathor chief at a critical time,
when the future looked darkest of him. He at once closed with the
offer, decided to side with Aurangzib, and began a retreat to Jodhpur.
Hence it was that Dara on reaching Mairta saw no sign of
Jaswant’s coming. Alarmed and sahaken in his mind, he halted and
sent a trusty Hindu named Dunichand to urge the Maharajah to
keep his promise. Jaswant gave the lying reply that he was waiting
in expectation of raising more men and organising his force, but
urged Dara to advance to Ajmir where he would join him with
his Rajputs.

From Ajmir Dara again sent Dunichand to bring Jaswant. But
the embassy was fruitless; Jaswant had clearly given up all intention
of going to Ajmir. The unhappy Dara made a third attempt.
Stooping from his dignity under the force of necessity, he sent his
son Sipihr Shukoh to Jodhpur to entreat the Maharajah to come to
Ajmir, by appealing to his sense of honour and the sacredness of
promises. Jaswant received the prince with courtesy, but did not
move from his purpose. After wasting three days in vain expectation and being put off with smooth words, Sipahr Shukoh at last returned to his father in disappointment. A Rajput of the highest rank and fame had turned false to his word. Of all the actors in the drama of the War of Succession, Jaswant emerges from it with the worst reputation: he had run away from a fight where he commanded in chief, he had treacherously attacked an unsuspecting friend, and now he abandoned an ally whom he had plighted his word to support and whom he had lured into danger by his promises. Unhappy was the man who put faith in Maharajah Jaswant Singh, lord of Marwar and chieftain of the Rathor clan.*

But there was no escape for Dara. By this time Aurangzib had arrived near Ajmir and a battle could not be avoided. Dara, plunged into despair by Jaswant’s faithlessness and the defection of other Rajputs who were influenced by his example, had to prepare for battle, whether he wished for it or not.

§ 5. Dara entrenches a pass near Ajmir.

Conscious of the smallness of his own force and the overwhelming strength of the enemy, Dara wisely changed his plan. Instead of fighting a pitched battle in an open plain, he decided to hold the pass of Deorai, four miles south of Ajmir,† in the narrow breadth of which a small host can keep a superior force of assailants back. His two flanks were protected by the hills of Bithli and Gokla; while behind him lay the rich city of Ajmir, where his officers had deposited their property and families and whence he could easily draw his supplies. He ran a low wall south of his position, from hill to hill across the valley, with trenches in front and redoubts at different points. The entire line was divided into four sections, each under a different commander with artillery and musketeers. On the right, at the south-western corner of the position, close to the hill of Bithli, lay the trenches of Sayyid Ibrahim (surnamed

*For Jaswant’s dealings with Dara,—A. N. 300, 309-312; K. K., ii. 65-66; Bernier, 85-86; Ishwardas, 43α; Kambu, 21α (meagre); Aqil 81-84. The Mughal invasion of Marwar after Khajwa is fully described in Ishwardas, 41b-43a.

†Deorai is given as Dorai in Indian Atlas, (Sheet 34 N. E.), 4½ miles south of Ajmer, a little to the east of the Rajputana Malwa Railway line.
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Mustafa Khan) and Jani Beg (Dara’s Chief of Artillery) with a thousand barqandazes besides other soldiers. Next came the trenches of Firuz Miwati, and beyond them, on a hillock overlooking the pass, were mounted some big guns. Here, at the centre of the lines stood Dara with his staff. On his left the line was continued by the third section of the trenches (held by Shah Nawaz Khan and Muhammad Sharif Qalich Khan, the chief officer of Dara), and the fourth section under Sipihr Shukoh at the south-eastern corner adjoining the hill of Gokla.*

The position was admirably chosen, and its natural strength was greatly increased by art. Two hill ranges running beyond Ajmir, rendered its flanks absolutely secure, as they could be turned only by making a very wide detour and threading the way through another defile. In front, the enemy toiling up the slope from the plain below and crowded together within the narrow pass, would suffer terribly from Dara’s artillery ranged on an elevation and his musketeers standing safe behind their earthworks.


In this position Dara waited for the enemy. Marching from the Ramsar lake Aurangzib entered the valley from the south-east and halted one mile from Deorai (11th March). About two miles in front of him Dara’s trenches barred his path and four miles further north lay the city of Ajmir.

That very night a gallant imperial officer named Purdil Khan with 150 men climbed a mound a little north of Deorai and midway between the two armies, and passed the night there. The dawn revealed the party to the enemy who sent skirmishers to dislodge them. But the imperial army pushed forward a body of 2000 men to assist in holding this advanced post, while Dara supported his skirmishers with an equally strong force.† The contest raged for

*For Dara’s dispositions,—A. N. 313-314; Khafi Khan, ii. 67; Aqil Khan, 84; Ishwardas, 43b.

†For the battle our authorities are A. N. 314-326; Aqil Khan, 84-87; Khafi Khan, ii. 68-71; Kambu, 215-22a (very brief); Ishwardas, 43b-44b (brief); Masum, 137b-138a (bare mention). For the bazar gossip about the course of the fight, Storia, i. 342-343, Bernier, 87-88 (a still more incredible tale.)
more than four hours; but the enterprise and tenacity of Purdi Khan had borne fruit; the imperial artillery had been safely dragged to this position of vantage under cover of his resistance, and the post firmly secured. Dara’s advanced troops retired baffled behind their lines. The whole imperial army now moved forward. The Van and the right wing took post opposite the eastern trenches, close to the Gokla hill, and the left wing faced the trenches near Bithli. It was impossible for Aurangzib’s army to be fully deployed; the other divisions were held back from the fighting line and surrounded Aurangzib’s tent which was now pitched 1½ miles from the enemy’s position. That day (12th March) his guns were carried half a cannon-shot forward and disposed before the enemy’s guns in the centre of the line.

It was evening before this general movement, shifting of camp and disposition of the artillery and the attacking divisions could be completed. Then the battle began in right earnest. First, as usual in Mughal warfare, there was an artillery duel. From the sunset of the 12th to the dawn of the 13th, there was incessant firing from both sides. “Earth and heaven shook with the noise.” “Clouds of gun-powder smoke covered the field.” [A. N. 315; Aqil 85.]

The 13th passed in the same manner. From morning to 3 o’clock in the afternoon, the artillery duel continued. The imperialists were busily engaged in digging trenches to cover their front; but bands of brave men made sorties from Dara’s lines, fell on these trenches, and after killing men and horses returned to the shelter of the hills. In the afternoon, from the right and left of Dara’s army 2,000 steel-clad cavalry swarmed over the wall and entered the field, brandishing their swords and spears. The imperial army accepted the challenge, and a hot hand-to-hand combat raged in mid-field till the sun went down.

Dara’s artillery and muskets from their high position showered death on Aurangzib’s gunners and troops. But the cannon-balls of the imperialists fell on the stone-walls of the enemy or on the hill-side, doing no harm. All the night of the 13th also the guns continued booming, but evidently as a precaution against a surprise or night-attack.
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The imperial generals recognised the strength of the enemy's trenches as impregnable. "As the lines were strongly fortified and ensconced in inaccessible hills, the efforts of the imperialists to capture them did not succeed." Shaikh Mir and Dilir Khan realised that an attempt to storm the enemy's trenches by a cavalry charge would lead to a fruitless loss of life. So an assault was forbidden. The night was spent in a council of war. Next morning (14th)* Aurangzib assembled his generals, rebuked them for their delay in achieving success, and urged them to do their utmost to capture the enemy's lines.

A new plan of attack was also adopted. The conventional method of each division engaging the one opposed to it and the artillery opposing the enemy's artillery and trying to breach the earthworks, was abandoned as having proved itself useless after a waste of two day's time and much ammunition.

Aurangzib's generals decided to make a concentrated attack in overwhelming strength on Shah Nawaz Khan's trenches, at the enemy's left,† while the imperial left wing was to keep the enemy's right wing in play. The success of the scheme, however, was to depend not on the attack in front but on a secret movement to turn the enemy's left. On Dara's right the high and steep hill of Bithli, running for a length of several miles forbade any attempt to climb it. But the Gokla hill on his left was much shorter in length, and lower in height, with gentler slopes and throwing off spurs on

*Both the Alamgirnamah (319) and Aqil (88) declare the 29th Jamadi-us-sani as the date of the victory, which corresponds to 14th March, 1659 A. D. Both the Alamgirnamah and Jai Singh speak of the day as a Sunday, but 14th March was a Monday. From A. N. (330) it is clear that Jamadi-us-sani that year had a thirtieth day. In the history of the pursuit given in the next chapter the first few dates may be inaccurate by one day as the result of the above irreconcilable difference.

†Kambu (21b) says that this attack was made at a treacherous hint from Shah Nawaz Khan. Bernier, 87, also. Masum (138a) states, "Dara ascribed his defeat to the treachery of Shah Nawaz Khan, and on this false suspicion slew him." But there is no more reason for believing in Shah Nawaz Khan's treachery here than in that of Khalilullah at Samugarh or of Alawardi at Khajwa. Indeed, Khafi Khan (ii. 70-71) holds that Shah Nawaz courted a hero's death to avoid the disgrace of looking Aurangzib in the face.
its eastern face, which was close to the assailants but hidden from Dara’s position by the summit. Rajah Rajrup of the Jammu hills was serving under Aurangzib with a body of his Rajput clansmen expert in mountaineering. His followers had discovered a path by which the back of the Gokla hill could be scaled. Aurangzib ordered the ascent to be made and lent a party of musketeers from his own army to support the attempt.

Towards evening when the gunners on both sides were tired with the day’s firing, Rajrup sent his infantry up the back of the Gokla hill, while he appeared with his cavalry in front of it to divert the enemy’s attention. A body of one thousand troopers sallied out of Shah Nawaz Khan’s trenches and encountered Rajrup. The other imperial generals had been smarting under the Emperor’s reprimand in the morning, and now the sight of the enemy within easy reach of their weapons roused their martial ardour. Dilir Khan with his Afghans galloped into the fray from the right side of the artillery; Shaikh Mir from behind the guns turned to the right and came up to the front line alongside of Dilir Khan. Shaista Khan with the right wing, the artillerymen from the middle, and Jai Singh with the Van, all flocked to this point to support the fighters. The left wing also made a forward movement against Dara’s extreme right.

The fight now became general. The bulk of the imperial army was massed in front of the enemy’s left, where the assault was delivered. Shaikh Mir and Dilir Khan together advanced on Shah Nawaz Khan’s trenches in reckless valour. The imperial artillery reopened fire with great rapidity and prevented the other divisions of the enemy from leaving their trenches and marching across the front to aid their hard-pressed friends in the plain on their left, who got supports only from the trenches immediately behind them. The hardest fight raged in this part of the field. Dara’s men obstinately defended their lines, and the rival generals freely exposed themselves to encourage their men. From Dara’s second and third trenches cannon-balls and bullets were showered upon the assailants. Hill and plain were enveloped in a thick pall of smoke.

According to one account Dara’s artillerymen were corrupted by Aurangzib and fired blank charges. But his musketeers at all
events fought valiantly, and the slaughter in Aurangzib’s ranks was heavy at this point. The vigour of the onset, however, did not abate. The blood of the imperialists was fired by the fierce passion of combat; their horsemen dashed on towards the trenches in the face of a hail of bullets; the wounded who fell were trampled under the horses’ hoofs beyond recognition, but fresh troops from behind pressed forward to take their places. [K. K. ii. 70.] The attack was persisted in for over an hour with undiminished vigour. Wave after wave of imperialists swarmed up to the charge; and at last they pushed all the enemy out of the field and won the ground to the edge of the trenches. Now, if ever, Dara’s lines were to be entered, or all this loss of life would be vain.

By this time Rajrup’s men had toiled up the back of the Gokla hill, while the enemy were absorbed in the severe contest in their front. They flanked their banners on the top and raised a shout. The imperialists were filled with joy and the assurance of success, and Dara’s left wing was seized with despair at its rear being turned. An attack from this quarter had not been expected at all, and it had been left unguarded.

The exultant imperialists redoubled their efforts to enter the trenches. But many of Dara’s men still resisted with the courage of despair. To overcome the last opposition, Shaikh Mir drove his elephant forward. A bullet struck him in the breast and he felt that his end had come. But this faithful servant’s last thoughts were still about his master. He told his kinsman Sayyid Hashim, who was sitting behind him in the same hawda, “I am done for. Clasp me round the waist and prop my head up, so that my followers may not know of my death and give up the fight in despair. I see clear signs of a victory to our arms, and very soon the imperial band will strike up the music of triumph.” [K. K. ii. 71.]

§ 7. Shah Nawaz Khan’s trenches stormed.

The struggle in Shah Nawaz Khan’s trenches was most terrible; “the firing was severe, the enemy resisted to the utmost. Shaikh Mir was slain and Dilir Khan received an arrow in his right hand.” But the fight continued. The devotion of Shaikh Mir and the valour of Dilir Khan’s Afghans carried the day. The imperial banners
were planted in the trenches. Jai Singh entered with the Van and brought fresh strength to the assailants. “The enemy totally lost heart and firmness.” [A. N. 323.]

The resistance in the third section of the lines was at last overpowered. Then a heavy slaughter of the vanquished began. Shah Nawaz Khan, standing on a height, was encouraging his men by voice and gesture when his body was blown away by a cannon-ball. Muhammad Sharif (Dara’s Paymaster) was shot through the stomach with an arrow; two others of his generals, Muhammad Kheshgi and Abu Baqr, were put to the sword. Shah Nawaz’s son, Siadat Khan, got three or four wounds. The rank and file broke and fled under cover of the darkness.

For, in the meantime the shades of night had closed on the scene, and made any general advance of the troops or direction of the battle impossible. Shaikh Mir’s followers, too, at the death of their chief, got out of hand and dispersed for plunder, instead of continuing the fight. The sun set on a scene of wild confusion and tumult. “In the darkness swords played; friends could not be known from foes; the warriors of the two armies fell down fighting side by side.” [Kambu, 22a.] But gradually as the night advanced, the truth became known that the battle had been already decided. True, only one of the four entrenchments had been captured; but it was enough. Dara’s lines were fatally pierced. The redoubt on his extreme left, commanded by Siprih Shukoh had been rendered untenable by the Jammu hillmen seizing its back and the imperial troops who had entered Shah Nawaz’s position turning its right. Thus Dara’s left wing was entirely gone. His Right remained intact. Askar Khan still held the redoubt on his extreme right and kept, the imperialists back. Firuz Miwati’s post, the second redoubt, was also uncaptured, and there were still about 6,000 men to uphold Dara’s cause; but their chief was gone.

From his high position at the back of the Centre, Dara had been watching every phase of the battle. He had been steadily sending up supports to his hardpressed third division by the path in its rear. He had also ordered Shah Nawaz Khan, who was with him at the time of the attack, to hasten back to his redoubt and guide the
defence. Up to sunset Dara had striven hard to maintain the fight; he had constantly put heart into his men and urged them to make a firm stand. But the capture of Shah Nawaz Khan's redoubt and the turning of the Gokla hill shattered all his hopes. It became clear to his men that further resistance was vain. Dara's comrades in these circumstances refused to throw away their lives and prepared for flight. Pleading with them was useless. Safety lay only in a hurried escape, for which the darkness of the night and the dispersion and disorder of the victors presented a golden opportunity.*

Fearing such a reverse, Dara had placed his harem and treasure on elephants, camels and mules, and kept them on the bank of the Anasagar lake, five miles behind the scene of battle, with an escort of troops in charge of his faithful eunuch Khwajah Maqul. He had intended to take them with himself in his flight.


But when Shah Nawaz Khan's redoubt was carried and the victors pressed on towards Dara's position, the luckless prince had not a moment to lose. Accompanied by his son Sipihr Shukoh and his general Firuz Miwati and followed by only ten or twelve of his men, he fled in headlong haste towards Gujrat by the first road he could reach. Terror and bewilderment urged him on, without leaving him the power to turn aside for his family at the appointed place or to send them orders to save themselves.†

Meantime the condition of the ladies was most pitiable. Ever since midday they had been kept in the saddle on the tiptoe of suspense for the terrible news of a disaster in the field and the order to escape. All the forenoon the cannon had boomed in the near battle-field; then there was a lull; but about two hours before

*Kambu, 21b-22a.

†A. N. 325, 409. The slaughter was estimated by Ishwardas at 5000 men on Aurangzib's side and ten thousand on Dara's,—the last figure being too high for a force which numbered less than 22,000 men and held an almost impregnable line of which three-fourths were untouched by the enemy. One hundred and fifteen elephants were killed on the two sides taken together (44a). Khambu says that a heavy slaughter took place in Shah Nawaz Khan's trenches after the imperialists had forced them.
sunset it broke out with redoubled vigour; the horizon was filled with smoke, and the horrid din of battle, louder than the last two days', reached their ears. Something terrible was happening. Their suspense became acute; but no news reached them. About sunset the first signs of the dispersion of a great army were seen: soldiers began to run away in groups from the field; the fugitives approached the city; then the camp of Dara's army became a scene of wild confusion and noise, as it began to be plundered. Parties of victors were seen advancing to the city, slaying and looting. They approached the lake; and yet no news of Dara, no messenger, no order from him reached the agonised women and the anxious eunuch. But these signs told their own tale beyond the chance of mistake: Dara had been ruined and put to flight. The faithful servant by hard exertion removed the ladies with 12 elephants and some mules and camels, from this place of danger and fled by the path between the skirt of the hill and the valley. All but a few of the guards deserted their charge. [A. N. 325, 409].

For, the country round Ajmir had become a wild scene of plunder. In addition to the camp-followers of both the armies, whose trade it was to engage in plunder whichever side might win, thousands of Rajputs had assembled in the neighbourhood of Ajmir at the call of Dara, but had held back from the fight at the defection of Jaswant, and were hovering round like vultures soaring over their expected prey. This night and the next day they got their chance. Most of Dara's property and transport animals were looted. His mules laden with bags of gold coins were driven away by the very Rajputs of Ajmir district whom he had appointed as his treasure-escort! All his camp and base were swept bare by the plunderers from the victorious army, the camp-followers, and adventurers who profit by tumult and confusion. The stores of various departments and most of the money were carried off by the Rajputs and the aboriginal Mairs. "Booty beyond calculation was seized by the troops." "Dara took away nothing beyond the jewels he wore on his person and some gold coins placed in the hawdas of his women." "Wounded soldiers who had fled from the field were stripped of their all, and wandered crying in the hills."*

*A. N. 325-326, 329, 410; K. K., ii. 73; Aqil. 88.*
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When night dropped the curtain on the terrible scene of the day’s slaughter, and Dara fled away, none of his officers (except Firuz Miwati) accompanied him, as their property and families were in Ajmir. Next day they submitted to the victor and entered his service. Askar Khan, Sayyid Ibrahim, Jani Beg and other officers who occupied Dara’s extreme right, had held their positions till about 9 p.m. Then the news of Dara’s flight reached them, and, towards the end of the night they came to Saf Shikan Khan begging for quarter. The wounded Muhammad Sharif accompanied them, but, in spite of medical treatment by his chivalrous enemy, he died.*

The details of the situation and the full extent of his success became known to Aurangzib next morning (15th March). He mourned the death of Shaikh Mir, greatly rewarded that faithful servant’s clansmen, especially Sayyid Hashim, and ordered him to be buried with full honours in the hallowed enclosure of saint Muin-ud-din Chishti’s tomb. Here, too, was buried Shah Nawaz Khan, who had fought against him and, if we can believe Khafi Khan, had courted death to escape the shame of looking his hostile and victorious son-in-law in the face. In the consecrated soil of the dargah of Ajmir, the two chief victims of the rival hosts are united in death. Aurangzib himself visited the holy shrine the day after the victory, did homage to the saint’s mortal remains, and presented Rs. 5,000 to the attendants as a thanks-offering for the victory. A strong force under Jai Singh and Bahadur Khan was detached in pursuit of Dara.†

* A. N. 325-326; Aqil, 87-88; Kambu, 22a; K. K. ii. 73-74.
† A. N. 330-332; Khafi Khan, ii. 72, 74; Storia, i. 342.
§ 1. Miserable flight of Dara from Ajmir to Gujrat.

From the ruin of his last hopes at Ajmir Dara fled with his second son and only one general, Firuz the Miwati. His women, too, were removed from danger by his faithful eunuch Maqul. All the night of 14th March and the whole of the next day they pursued their flight by different roads, till at last towards the evening of the 15th they met together on the way and reached Mairta, 37 miles north-west of Ajmir. Here the miserable victims of Fate, worn out by their twenty-four hours' precipitate march, rested for a moment. But the enemy, flushed with victory, was sure to give them no respite. So, in that very night the wretched prince and his family had to get up and resume their march with the same haste as before.*

Only 2,000 troopers accompanied Dara when he left Mairta. Many times that number had run away from the battle, but they took other routes and never joined him,—some scattered to the right and left of his line of flight, and one party of the fugitives with his elephants moved in a different direction altogether, viz, north-east towards Sambhar.

At Mairta the pursuers were six days behind; but the rumour of their coming preceded them everywhere, and at every halting place robbed the unhappy prince and his followers of their sorely needed rest and lent wings to their flight. Covering thirty miles or even more a day, they fled southwards to Gujrat by way of

*The history of Dara’s flight and the pursuit by the imperialists is given in great detail in Jai Singh’s despatches to Aurangzib contained in Haft Anjuman. A general narrative with much supplementary information is given in A.N. 409-415, 418-419. Berniers personal observations (88-97.) Kambu 22b, Aqil and Ishwarda’s 44a and b are very brief. Masum 138-145b, though a little confused about the route, supplies very useful details about the capture and execution. Storia, i. 345-355, is of little value, as Manucci was invested in Bhakkar all this time.
Pipar (16th March) and Bargaon, and on the 29th reached a place 48 miles north of Ahmadabad, hoping to find a refuge in that city. Their misery was extreme. The baggage and tents had been abandoned in the wild rush to escape from the battle-field, and now all along the route various necessary articles and even treasure had to be sacrificed for want of porters. "The heat was intolerable, the dust suffocating," and the path a sandy waste. Bands of Kulis, a tribe of professional robbers, followed the fugitives day and night, pillaging and slaying stragglers. Horses, camels, and oxen perished from the heat and overwork. The French physician Bernier, retracing Dara's path a few days later, noticed too often by the roadside the sickening "sight of dead men, elephants, oxen, horses, and camels; the wrecks of poor Dara's army."*

In the meantime the hunters had got on the right trail and were following it with relentless vigour. So fast had been Dara's flight and in so many directions had his followers scattered that for three days after the battle none knew Dara's condition or the line of his flight. At first a rumour arose that he had turned north-east towards Sambhar. But when the pursuing force under Jai Singh and Bahadur Khan reached Mairta (20th March) the truth became known to them. Every path was closed to Dara. The Emperor had written to the Maharajah of Jodhpur to arrest Dara if he entered his kingdom. Jaswant got the letter three days after Dara had left Marwar; but he immediately set off in pursuit and reached Bhinmal, whence he turned aside to join Jai Singh in the march to Gujrat. Jai Singh sent off letters to the princes and zamindars in every direction to bar Dara's path,—to Sirohi and Palanpur in the south, Dairawa in the south-east, to the princes of northern Kathiawar and Cutch and the zamindaras of Lower Sindh, and to the officers of Gujrat. Thus it was that everywhere Dara found enemies warned of his coming and ready to seize him.†

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*H. A., 946-95a; Bernier, 88-92; A. N. 410; Kambu, 22b. Pipar, 35 miles s. w. of Mairta, (Ind. Ar. 34 N. W.) Bargaon, 22 miles s. of Bhinmal (Sh. 21 N. E.)

†Aqil Khan, 87; H. A., Paris MS. 95a-96b, 97b, 108a. Bhinmal, 25 N. 72·20 E. (Ind. Ar. 21 N. E.); Sirohi, 24·53 N. 72·55 E. (Ibid). Palanpur, 24·10 N. 72·30 E. (Ibid. 21 S. E.); there is a Dailwara, 9 miles n. of Udaipur.
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The civil and military officers of Gujrat decided to adhere to Aurangzib; they arrested Sayyid Ahmad Bukhari, the governor left by Dara at Ahmadabad, and took possession of the city and fort. Dara’s harbinger returned from Ahmadabad with the dismal news that he would be resisted if he tried to enter the city. This reply reached him at his halting place some 48 miles north of the capital of Gujrat. It was break of day when the party became aware of the destruction of their last hope of a refuge, “and (Bernier records) the shrieks of the females drew tears from every eye. We were all overwhelmed with confusion and dismay, gazing in speechless horror at each other, at a loss what plan to recommend, and ignorant of the fate which perhaps awaited us from hour to hour. We observed Dara stepping out, more dead than alive, speaking now to one, then to another; stopping and consulting even the commonest soldier. He saw consternation depicted on every countenance, and felt assured that he should be left without a single follower.”

§ 2. Dara’s flight through Cutch to Sindh.

Nothing now remained for him but flight; but to which side? The north, east, and south were closed to him; only on the west the path to Cutch lay open. This he took of necessity. Misfortune had made him totally destitute of power and influence. “Neither his threats nor entreaties could procure” a single horse, ox, or camel for Dr. Bernier who attended his sick wife. Dara’s retinue had dwindled down to four or five hundred horsemen, with only a couple of elephants laden with gold and silver coins. Even Bernier had to stay behind because of the absolute lack of transportation. In this miserable condition Dara turned (29th March) westwards to the Kari district, where Kanji, the Kuli chieftain, escorted him faithfully to the boundary of Cutch. On the way the fugitive was joined by Gul Muhammad, his late faujdar of Surat, with 50 horse and 200 foot musketeers. From Viramgaon, “reduced to the poorest and sorriest dress,—a tunic of thin linen and shoes worth eight annas,—with a heart broken into two and constantly shaking with fear, accompanied by one horse, one bullock-cart, five camels for his ladies, and a few other camels
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for transport, his retinue shrank to a few men,” the heir to the throne of Delhi crossed the Lesser Rann and reached Bhuji, the capital of Cutch. But he found his former friend and protector changed; for, in the meantime Jai Singh’s letters “full of hopes and threats,” urging the arrest of the fugitive, had reached the ruler of the island and done their work. Dara prayed for a place in his dominions to hide his head in for some time; but the Rao could not afford to offend the imperialists, especially as their rapid approach was noised abroad. He, however, harboured Dara for two days and then escorted him to the northern boundary of his island, whence Dara crossed the Greater Rann and reached the southern coast of Sindh (beginning of May), with his retinue still further diminished.*

Here, too, Dara found his path closed in the east and north by his rival’s forethought and genius for combination. Aurangzib had sent Khalilullah Khan, his governor of the Panjab, down to Bhakkar, to prevent Dara’s marching further up the Indus, and he had posted men to close the eastern route to Jasalmir. Jai Singh also had warned the imperial officers in Lower Sindh to be on the alert.

After crossing the Rann, Dara found Badin held by a thousand imperialists under Qubad Khan, and he had to give up the hope of entering that village to refresh his men and animals after their terrible hardships in crossing the vast salt marsh. Aurangzib’s local officers and Jai Singh’s advanced detachments were converging on the prey from north, east and south-east. Only one path of escape still remained open: Dara turned to the north-west, crossed the Indus and entered Siwistan, intending to flee to Persia by way of Qandahar. On the bank of the Indus even Firuz Miwati’s love of homeland prevailed over his constancy; he left his master’s hopeless lost cause† and set off to join Aurangzib.

§ 3. Jai Singh’s pursuit of Dara through Gujrat and Cutch.

We now turn to the pursuers. Jai Singh reached mairta on 20th

* A. N. 410-411; Bernier 89-91; H. A., Paris MS. 97a, 100b—101b; Ishwardas, 44a.
† Paris MS. 104, 108a, 102a; A. N. 411.
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March, six days behind Dara, and there learnt the true route of his flight and immediately set out southwards after him by way of Jalor and Sirohi. On the way, one march beyond Sirohi, he was joined by Jaswant Singh and his Rathor army (31st March), and then, “in order not to allow Dara time to gain composure at Ahmadabad,” the imperialists pushed on, marching from 16 to 20 miles a day, “in spite of scarcity of water, want of fodder, and exhaustion of the horses and transport-cattle.” Reaching Sidhpur on 5th April they learnt that Dara had been refused entrance into Ahmadabad, and had turned aside towards Cutch. Jai Singh had before this sent letters to the princes of northern Kathiawar and Cutch urging them to bar Dara’s path and seize him. Now he wrote to them again to be up and doing on the Emperor’s side. The pursuing army marched on to Ahmadabad to refit. Their misery was hardly less than that of Dara. The year was one of drought in Gujrat; and this vast army of 20,000 men moving together exhausted the scanty water-supply and fodder in their path. It was summer and the forced march broke down the houses and cattle; grass was very scarce and grain so dear that even six seers of bajra (spiked millet) could be had for a Rupee with difficulty. To encourage the soldiers and compensate them for the heavy loss of transport cattle, cash salary was distributed among them, probably at a higher rate than usual. For this purpose Aurangzib had wisely sent up a sum of money from behind.

From Sidhpur to Ahmadabad, owing to “the utter scarcity of water both by the road-side and at the halting places,” the army had to advance in three divisions, at intervals of one day’s march from one another. Some delay thus occurred. Ahmadabad was reached about 11th April. Halting there for probably one day only, Jai Singh distributed 2½ lakhs of Rupees from the treasury to his troops to enable them to provide themselves with enough water and fodder for the journey, and on the 12th set out again. Turning his face to the west, he arrived (22nd) in the Pathri district, west of Viramgaon, and there, getting further news of Dara’s movements, advanced towards Halwad, en route to Cutch. On 3rd May he
reached a place 6 miles from Halwad and there learnt that Dara had crossed the Rann and entered Sindh again.*

On the 13th the pursuers reached the capital of Cutch. In this country, never trodden by Mughal troops before, as Jai Singh proudly writes, his letters and the rumour of his approach had already done their work. The Rao had refused to harbour the Emperor’s enemy in his land and had personally conducted him out of it. As Jai Singh approached Bhuj, the Rao sent his son in advance to welcome the imperial general and then personally received him with due honours outside his capital (13th May), and gave him a bond solemnly asserting that Dara was not in his territory. Jai Singh halted there to learn the truth and soon got news from the Mughal officer of Badin that Dara had reached Lower Sindh. A small detachment of 500 under two officers was at once sent ahead with orders to hasten onwards and cross the Rann, while the main army was to move more slowly at night.

§ 4. Jai Singh crosses the Greater Rann: sufferings of his army.

In crossing the Greater Rann the army suffered frightful privations. The Rao of Cutch had turned unfriendly, and refused to supply a guide across the salt marsh; one of his grandsons accompanied Jai Singh, but only to the shore of it. At one halting place, six miles south of the Greater Rann, they found a few wells and the soldiers with all their exertions got out of them only some drops of water mixed with mud, with which they were forced to quench their thirst. Next day they heard of three or four wells, ten miles from their camp. The soldiers hastened thither for the precious water; a few got it, while the others returned with their thirst unquenched after twenty miles of fruitless marching. Towards evening the army arrived at the southern edge of the Rann, at the village of Lahu (?=Luna), and began to cross the salt plain at night. The Greater Rann was here 70 miles in breadth, in the whole extent of which not

*H. A., Paris MS. 94b-101b. Jalor, 25·21N. 72·41 E., 32 miles n.e. of Bhinmal (Ind. At. Sh. 20 S. E.) Sidhpur, 23·55 N. 72·27 E., 63 miles north of Ahmadabad. (21 S. E.) Viramgam, 23·7 N. 72·7 E., 30 miles w. of Ahmadabad; Patri, 18 miles w. of Viramgam; Halwad, 23·1 N. 71·15 E. (Ibid, 22 N. W.)
a drop of drinking water could be found, nor for 10 miles beyond its northern shore.

The army plunged into this dreary wilderness at sunset. Up to midnight the moon lit up their path, and when it set, torches were kindled at every mile’s interval to guide the soldiers on. No trooper or follower was lost in this trackless plain. It was two hours after dawn when the crossing was over and the northern shore was reached. An hour afterwards they came to the village of Rahman, into the small tank of which the whole army, dying of thirst and worn out by their toilsome march, rushed. In a moment it was filled with struggling men and the water was turned into mud. In their agony of thirst, men and beasts crying for water wandered to the nalas of the village and drank up the putrid water, “the taste of which made life itself bitter to them.” It was only after marching on till noon that they reached their camping ground at Kulabi, and got rest.*

The experience had been most terrible: the army had marched 80 miles without halting, and that march had consisted of wading through sand over a roadless wilderness with no water to slake their thirst. The horses and camels were so worn out by their long journey and scantiness of fodder and water that, after crossing the Rann as the sun grew hotter and they were urged to travel eight more waterless miles before reaching a suitable place for camping, they fell down dead in large numbers along the road. At every halting-place, many transport-cattle lay down, never to rise again. So disastrous was the march to them that out of Jai Singh’s personal contingent of 4,000 troopers, less than a fourth had horses left for riding on. The loss was equally great in Bahadur Khan’s division. Afterwards the Emperor made some amends by presenting 200 horses to the former and 100 to the latter general.

Jai Singh had thus achieved a most remarkable military feat; but he had to pay a heavy price for it. Even before reaching the Rann, the privations of the pursuing army had been very great: dearth of food had been added to the long familiar water-famine. At places grain had sold at a seer per Rupee, and even at this price

there was not enough for all. "At other places no food at all could be procured." His soldiers were dead beat; and his camels, horses and other transport animals had been almost exterminated. Halting was enforced on him by outraged nature, and his progress in Sindh was slow, as the remaining cattle were unable to walk more than eight or even six miles a day.* The southern coast of Sindh had been reached, probably near Rahim-ki-bazar, about 18th May, but it was the 29th before he arrived at Nasarpur, 7th June before he reached Hala, and the 11th of that month before he struck the Indus near "the river of Siwistan." Here he learnt that Dara had crossed over to the right bank of the Indus and entered Siwistan, intending to go to Qandahar with the help of the Maghasi tribe.

Jai Singh’s task was done; the enemy was no longer on the Indian soil. So, he wrote to the Emperor asking to be recalled to Court,—

"When appointing me to this service, your Majesty had told me that so long as Dara was not captured or killed, or did not quit the empire, I should not withdraw my hand from him. I have left no means untried to accomplish the first two alternatives. I have, at no place, however hard and difficult to traverse, taken thought of the scarcity of water and grain or of the predominance of lawless men. But God ordains everything, and so the third alternative has come to pass. As your Majesty has now been freed from the mischief of that (enemy), I beg to submit that, in view of the extreme privations borne by the army and the weakness of the horses and transport cattle, which have not strength enough to move more than six or eight miles a day,—I should be recalled to Court."†

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*H. A. Paris MS., 103b-104a, 106a, 108a; A. N. 433.

†H. A., Paris MS. 105a-106a; A. N. 412. Manucci asserts that Jai Singh deliberately carried on a slack pursuit in order to leave Dara time to escape to Persia. There is nothing improbable in this suspicion, as no old general of Shah Jahan, whether Indian Mulsim or Rajput, could have willingly consented to bring about the capture of his eldest son, since all knew that if they did it the result would be his murder by his victorious rival. But I can find no semblance of slackness in the pursuit, that is not satisfactorily accounted for by the utter exhaustion of the troops and loss of transport, so graphically described in Jai Singh’s letters to his master.
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With the object of returning to Northern India, Jai Singh was slowly moving up the Indus towards Bhakkar, when about the middle of June he received the startling news that Dara had been captured on the 9th of that month and that the imperial generals must hurry on to take charge of the prisoner.*

§ 5. Dara hesitates to flee to Persia.

We left Dara in Siwistan bent on making his escape to Qandahar and Persia. In the trans-Indus country he was attacked and plundered by the Chandi tribe † and barely escaped capture at their hands by fighting desperately. The Maghassis whom he next visited were more hospitable; their headman, Mirzai Maghasi, welcomed the royal suppliant in his house and promised an escort of his men to the frontier of Qandahar, only twelve marches off. But Dara’s women were utterly opposed to leaving India and entrusting their lives to the savage Baluches or their honour to the Persian king. His beloved wife, Nadira Banu Begam, was seriously ill, and the privations of a journey through the desolate Bolan Pass and the inhospitable hills beyond up to Qandahar, would have killed her. Others of his party, too, needed some days’ rest after he fatigue and hardships of the terrible two and a half months’ ceaseless flight through desert and salt marsh in summer heat; ‡ before another and more terrible journey could be undertaken.

The last glimmering sparks of ambition also influenced Dara to linger in India. He wanted to make another effort before finally giving up the contest for the throne. His plan was to take the armed help of any friendly Baluch chieftain, relieve the fort of Bhakkar

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†A. N., 412, has “the country of Chand Khan” or ‘of Jandban’ according to a different reading. Khafi Khan, ii. 82, has Jawani. Jai Singh’s letter has Rukhandia, (Paris MS. 105b.) I get the correct name of the tribe from Masson’s Kalat, 334. “The Pat of Shikarpur, (between Kach Gandava and Shikarpur) separates the lands of the Magghazis, subjects of Kalat, from those of the Chandi tribe, dependent on Sind.”

‡ ‘The Afghans have a proverb. ‘The sun of Sind will turn a white man black, and is sufficiently powerful to roast an egg.’ . . . The mountain tribes say of Sindh, ‘Duzak ast,’ it is pandemonium.” (Postans’s Sindh, 11 and 14.)
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which was gallantly holding out under his eunuch Basant against Aurangzib’s forces, deposit his treasure and women in that island fortress, and then march into Afghanistan from the south, secure the adhesion of its imperial governor (once his partisan), and finally with a fresh army at his back enter India again through the Khaibar Pass and try to wrest the crown of Delhi with fair hope of success.*

Dara, therefore, changed his mind, and looked about for a chieftain in that neighbourhood who would give him a safe shelter and the services of his clansmen. Such a friend he hoped to find in Malik Jiwan, the zamindar of Dadar, a place nine miles east of the Indian end of the Bolan Pass. Years ago this Afghan chief had offended against the State and been sent by the governor of Mulatan, bound in chains, to Delhi, where Shah Jahan had sentenced him to be trampled to death by an elephant. Dara, then at the height of his father’s favour, had been interested in the case by one of his servants, and had successfully begged the condemned man’s life and liberty from the Emperor. He now looked for Jiwan’s gratitude in his own need. Giving early notice of his coming, he reached Dadar under the guidance of Ayub, a servant sent by Jiwan in advance. Two miles from the fort the chief himself welcomed his honoured guest and patron, and took him to his house, showing him every respect and care (probably 6th June).

§ 6. Death of Dara’s wife.

On the way to Dadar the greatest of all misfortunes had overtaken Dara. His wife Nadira Banu, who had been long ailing of diarrhoea, and was heart-broken at the loss of her eldest son, succumbed to hardship and want of medicine and rest. She was a daughter of Prince Parwiz and grand-daughter of the great Akbar on both sides of her parentage, and had borne her husband all his three sons and one daughter. Dara was frantic with grief at losing his constant companion and counsellor in weal and woe. “The world grew

* A. N. 412; H. A., Paris MS. 105a and b; Bernier, 94-96; Masum, 139a; Storia, i. 347. K. K. (ii. 83) supports Bernier by saying that Dara wanted to contest the throne again.
dark in his eyes. He was utterly bewildered. His judgment and prudence were entirely gone." "Death was painted in his eyes. He became helpless and weak through intense grief. Everywhere he saw only destruction (staring him in the face), and losing his senses became utterly heedless of his own affairs."

In spite of the warnings of his son and followers, Dara, stupefied with grief, entered Jiwan’s house, wishing to spend there the three days of mourning, instead of at once marching towards the Persian frontier. His wife’s last wish had been that her body should be laid in the Hindustan. So, after two days he despatched her corpse to Lahor, in charge of Khwajah Maqul, to be buried in the graveyard of the renowned saint Mian Mir, his own spiritual guide. By a supreme act of folly he sent his most devoted officer, Gul Muhammad, with all the seventy troopers still left at his side, to escort the coffin. In a fit of magnanimity which can be ascribed only to utter despair and apathy to his own future, he left to his companions free choice between returning to their homes and accompanying him to Persia. None, he said, would be forced to go into exile and peril for his sake. [Kambu, 23a.] Thus it happened that no devoted officer or brave captain, not even a single common soldier of his own, now remained with Dara. He became utterly helpless and dependent on his host’s fidelity.

§ 7. Dara is treacherously made prisoner by Malik Jiwan.

And too soon was he to learn the strength of an Afghan’s gratitude or faith when opposed to cupidity. On 9th June, when Dara began the march towards the Bolan Pass, the treacherous Jiwan with his wild clansmen surrounded the party, captured the rich prize and brought them back to his village. Against these human “wolves and robbers” of the desert, the few eunuchs and servants who still followed Dara could offer no defence. Only his second son, the Jad Sipihr Shukoh, gallantly struck some blows for freedom, but he was overpowered, his arms were pinioned behind his back, and the party was dragged back to their host’s house, now their prison.*

*For the capture of Dara, Masum, 139b-142a; A. N. 412-414, 419; Kambu, 22b-23a; K. K., ii. 83-84; Storia i. 347-351; Bernier, 95-96; H. A. Paris MS. 108 (dates).
Malik Jiwan, with his greed sharpened by the hope of reward from Aurangzib, sent fast couriers with the news of the capture to Bahadur Khan and Jai Singh, who had reached the left bank of the Indus near Siwistan. But they had learnt of the event earlier from their agent Qazi Inayetullah, whom they had sent to instigate the zamindars of the Bhakkar district against Dara. They at once hastened forward, leaving their camp and baggage behind, and making a forced march through midsummer heat and raging simoom. Near Bhakkar they crossed over the Indus to the right bank (20th June) and pushed an advanced detachment on to bring the captives away, while the two generals marched more slowly behind. On the 23rd Dara, with his son and two daughters, was delivered by Jiwan to Bahadur Khan, and the imperialists set out on their return. The fallen prince was speechless with despair and utterly dazed by calamity; he consented to everything that his captors suggested. They made him write a letter to the eunuch Basant, ordering him to give up to the imperialists the fort of Bhakkar with Dara’s property and family lodged there, and sent the eunuch Maqul to carry it as a proof of Dara’s ruin.

§ 8. Captive Dara is brought to Delhi.

The pursuers, at last successful after more than three months’ chase through desert and jungle, in summer heat and sand-storm, began their return march to Delhi, carefully guarding the prisoners. The Indus was recrossed above Bhakkar on 28th June. Passing over the rain-swollen rivers of the Land of Five Waters with due caution for their important charge, they arrived outside Delhi* on 23rd August, 1659.

The first news that Aurangzib received of the downfall of his rival, was on 2nd July, from Malik Jiwan’s letter forwarded by the faujdar of Bhakkar. He read the letter out in open Court. "But so great was his control over his emotions, that he did not go into exultation over it, and rarely referred to the capture, nor did he order the imperial band to play the music of victory." The true

reason of his moderations was that the news seemed too good to be true. But when, on 15th July, Bahadur Khan's despatch arrived, reporting that he had taken charge of the captive, there was no longer room for doubt. Rejoicings were ordered in Court, "to inform the public, who were still sceptical about Dara's capture."*

On arriving outside Delhi the miserable prince and his son were handed over to Nazar Beg, a slave sent by Aurangzib to work his purpose on them. The Emperor ordered that the captive should be paraded through the capital in order to let the people see with their own eyes that it was he and none else, so that in future no counterfeit Dara might raise his head in the provinces and by winning the support of the credulous create disturbances against the Government.

§ 9. Dara in chains paraded through Delhi with insult.

On 29th August the degrading parade was held. To complete his humiliation, Dara was seated in an uncovered hawda on the back of a small female elephant covered with dirt. By his side was his second son Sipihr Shukoh, a lad of fourteen; and behind them with a naked sword sat their gaoler, the slave Nazar Beg, whose heart shrank from no act of cruelty or bloodshed at the bidding of his master. The captive heir to the richest throne in the world, the favourite and pampered son of the most magnificent of the Great Mughals, was now clad in a travel-tainted dress of the coarsest cloth, with a dark dingy-coloured turban, such as only the poorest wear, on his head, and no necklace or jewel adorning his person. His feet were chained, though the hands were free. Exposed to the full blaze of an August sun, he was taken through the scenes of his former glory and splendour. In the bitterness of disgrace he did not raise his head, nor cast his glance on any side, but sat "like a crushed twig." Only once did he look up, when a poor beggar from the road-side cried out, "O Dara! when you were master, you always gave me alms; today I know well thou hast naught to give." The appeal touched the prisoner; he raised his hand to his shoulder, drew off his wrapper and threw it to the beggar.

* A. N. 414-419; Masum, 142a; Kambu, 23b.
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If Aurangzib had wished to make Dara ridiculous to the public, the result proved the contrary. The pity of the citizens swept every other feeling away. Dara had been popular with the lower orders for his magnificent display and lavish charity, and now all classes were moved to sympathy at the sight of fallen greatness. Bernier, an eye-witness of the scene, writes, "The crowd assembled was immense; and everywhere I observed the people weeping, and lamenting the fate of Dara in the most touching language...From every quarter I heard piercing and distressing shrieks,...men, women, and children wailing as if some mighty calamity had happened to themselves." But not a hand was raised in rescue, for, the prisoner was girt round by squadrons of cavalry clad in shining steel, with drawn swords in their hands, and mounted archers with arrows placed ready in their bows, led by Bahadur Khan on an elephant. In this manner the ignominious procession entered the New City or Shahjahanabad by the Lahor gate, traversed the whole length of it, through Chandni Chawk and Sadullah Khan's Bazar, by the foot of the fort, till it passed out to the suburb of Khizirabad in Old Delhi. There Dara was lodged in the Khawaspura mansion, amidst a strong guard, to await sentence.*

§ 10. Dara sentenced to death as a heretic.

That evening his fate was the subject of a debate in the Emperor's Hall of Private Audience. Danishmand Khan pleaded for his life; but Shaista Khan, Muhammad Amin Khan, Bahadur Khan, and Hakim Daud demanded his death for the good of Church and State. The malignant influence of his younger sister Raushanara was thrown into the scale against Dara, and her clamours silenced the feeble voice of mercy in a Court where most ministers shaped their opinions after their master's inclinations. The pliant theologians in the Emperor's pay signed a decree that Dara deserved death on the ground of infidelity and deviation from Islamic orthodoxy. "The pillars of the Canonical Law and Faith apprehended many kinds of disturbance from his life. So, the Emperor, both out of

*Storia, i. 354-355; Bernier, 98-99 (an eye-witness); A. N. 431; Khafi Khan, ii.86; Ishwardas, 44b-45a; Kambu, 23b; (for Dara's public parade).
necessity of protect the Faith and Holy Law, and also for reasons of State, considered it unlawful to allow Dara to remain alive any longer as a destroyer of the public peace." Thus does the official history published under Aurangzib’s authority justify this act of political murder.

The doomed prince’s agent tried hard to save his life by running to different mediators, but in vain.* Dara learnt of his fate and made a last appeal to Aurangzib’s pity. He wrote, “My Lord Brother and Emperor! the desire of kingship is not at all left in my mind. Be (it) blessed to you and your sons. The plan of slaying me which you are cherishing in your heart is unjust. If you only grant me a house fit for (my) residence and one young handmaid out of my own handmaids to wait on me, I shall employ myself in praying for your (good) in the retired life of a pardoned man.”

On the margin of the petition Aurangib wrote in his own hand in Arabic, “You first acted as a usurper, and you were a mischief-maker.”† For Dara there could be no pardon from Aurangzib. For more than sixteen years Dara had been a blighting shadow on Aurangzib’s life: he robbed his younger brother of the sunshine of their father’s favour; he had thwarted his plans and backbitten him at the imperial Court; his had been the secret influence behind the throne that accounted for Shah Jahan’s attitude of coldness and undeserved censure towards the able viceroy of Multan and the Deccan; he had intrigued with Bijapur and Golkonda in open opposition to Aurangzib in the wars against them sanctioned by the Emperor himself; every enemy of Aurangzib had found a ready patron in Dara; Dara’s officers had insulted and calumniated Prince Aurangzib without any punishment from their master; his sons had monopolised all the favours of Shah Jahan, leaving none for Aurangzib’s offspring. All these Aurangzib had borne with patience and even with affected humility for sixteen long years. Now at last he had got his chance of revenge; and he was not the man to give it up.

*A. N. 432; Khafi Khan, ii. 87; Masum, 142b; Bernier, 100-101; Storia, i. 356.
†British Museum, Or. MS. Addl. 18881, f. 77a; Addl. 26,240 f. 55; I.O.L. 3301, f. 29b.
A riot on the 30th precipitated the end of Dara. The populace of Delhi had marked the traitor Malik Jiwan in yesterday's procession; but in the presence of the strong escort they could not vent their indignation except by cursing and pelting at him. This ungrateful wretch and perjured host had been appointed a Commander of One Thousand Horse and raised to the peerage under the title of Bakhyar Khan, as the price of his treachery. On thirtieth August, as he was going to Court with his Afghan followers, the populace of Delhi, instigated by Haibat, a gentleman trooper (ahadi) of the imperial army, and joined by the ruffians, beggars and other desperadoes of the city and workmen from every lane and bazar, besides Dara's friends, mobbed the party. From abuse they quickly passed to hurling stones, clods of earth, and sweepings at the traitors, and finally growing bolder assailed them with sticks. From the housetops on both sides the women showered ashes and pots of filth on the heads of the Afghans and spectators mingled in melee below. The tumult and noise were very great. Some of Jiwan's followers were slain outright, and some wounded; and if the prefect of the city police had not come to the rescue with his men, not one of the Afghans could have escaped from the crowd with life. The newly created Khan, going to his first audience at Court, was brought away in safety under cover of a wall of shields formed over his head.*

§ 11. Murder of Dara.

Immediately Aurangzib passed the order for Dara's execution, and entrusted the task to Nazar Beg and some other slaves under the supervision of Saif Khan. Early in the night (30th August) the wretches entered Dara's prison in order to separate Sipihr Shukoh from their victim before attempting the deed of blood. On their hideous features and relentless eyes Dara read his doom. Starting up he approached them, and falling on his knees cried out, "You have come to murder me!" They pretended that their order was only to remove Sipihr Shukoh to another place. The

*For the riot K. K. ii. 86; A. N. 432; Bernier, 99; Aurangnamah gives new details.
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boy, too, knelt down, nestling close against his father's body. Nazar with a malevolent glance bade him get up. In madness and despair Sipihr began to weep and clung to Dara's legs. Father and son hugged each other tightly, with loud cries of grief. The slaves grew more threatening in their tone, and then tried to drag the boy away by the hand. At this Dara wiped his own tears and calmly appealed to the slaves to carry his entreaty to his brother to leave Sipihr Shukoh with him. But they scornfully replied, "We cannot be anybody's messenger. We have only to carry out our orders." Then with a sudden rush they tore away the boy from his father's arms by sheer force, took him to a side-room, and prepared to despatch Dara. That prince, knowing that his end was near, had already prepared for a last desperate struggle. He had secured a small penknife and concealed it in his pillow. Now he tore the cover open, grasped the knife, and attacked the slave who was advancing to seize him. This small instrument was driven with such force into the wretch's side that it stuck fast in the bones. Dara tugged at it, but in vain. Then he flung himself blindly on them, dealing blows with his fist right and left. But the slaves were accustomed to such bloody work; they fell on him in a body and seized and overpowered him. All this time Sipihr Shukoh's agonised shrieks were reaching his father's ears. A minute after the room grew still; the daggers of the slaves finished the work: the struggle ended in a pool of blood.

§ 12. Dara's grave.

The severed head was sent to Aurangzib, to satisfy him that his rival was really dead, and that no fraud or substitution of victims had taken place. By Aurangzib's order the corpse was placed on an elephant, paraded through the streets of the city a second time, and then buried in a vault under the dome of the tomb of Humayun, without the customary washing and dressing of the body, without a funeral procession following it. Beside him lie not only that royal ancestor, but also two of his grand-uncles, the younger sons of Akbar.*

*For the murder and burial of Dara, Masum, 143b-145b (most graphic account, followed by me); Bernier, 102; Tavernier, i. 354; Storia, i. 358; Kambu, 24a;
The end of Dara Shukoh

Two centuries rolled by, and then the dynasty of the Great Mughals closed in a still bloodier scene. On 22nd September 1857, not far from the spot where the mangled remains of Dara Shukoh were laid in earth, Princes Mirza Mughal, Mirza Quraish Sultan, and Mirza Abu Bakht, the sons and grandson of the last Emperor of Delhi, and one of them his chosen heir, were shot dead in cold blood by a foreign soldier, as devoid of principle as of pity, while they were vainly protesting their innocence and crying for an inquiry into their past conduct.* The bodies of the last of the legitimate Timurids were flung like carcasses on the terrace of the Police Office and exposed to the public gaze, as Dara's had been. In brothers' blood did Aurangzib mount to the throne, and in the blood of his children's children did the royal name pass away from his race.

A.N. 432-433; Khafi Khan, ii. 87 (all very brief.) The popular story of the insult done to his severed head by Aurangzib, rests solely on the doubtful authority of Bernier and Manucci. Masum says,—"When the head was carried to Aurangzib he remarked, 'As I did not look at this infidel's face in his lifetime, I do not wish to do it now.'" (145b). Aurangnamah gives full details, some new.

*"Unscrupulous, unprincipled...[Hodson] was a man without fear, if not without reproach...In slaying them as he did he was guilty of an outrage against humanity," Holmes's Indian Mutiny (4th ed.), 372, 377. "The spirit of the condottiere now came into play [in Hodson's mind.] A more brutal or a more unnecessary outrage was never committed...Not a single item of evidence had been adduced to substantiate the charge [that the princes had instigated the massacre of Europeans in May.]" Malleson's Indian Mutiny (ed. of 1879), ii. 77, 80. With their dying breath the princes vainly appealed to Hodson to make a ta'ziqat (investigation) into their conduct, before shooting them.
§ 1. Sulaiman Shukoh hastens to return to Dara.

Early in May 1658, Sulaiman Shukoh, then pondering on how he should force or turn Shuja’s wall from the hill to the river at Mungir, received a summons from his father to return quickly to him, as Aurangzib and Murad had overwhelmed Jaswant in Malwa and were marching on Agra. A peace was hastily patched up with Shuja, through the exertions of Jai Singh, and the imperial army soon set out its return. On 2nd June when he reached Kora 105 miles west of Allahabad, fast couriers brought to him the fatal news of his father’s crushing defeat at Samugarh five days earlier. A letter from Shah Jahan sent with them urged him to make a rapid march with his army to join his father at Delhi. Dara, too, wrote to the imperial officers requesting them to accompany his son. But it was in vain. The news of Dara’s downfall produced the greatest excitement in his son’s army; the soldiers were distracted or openly hostile to the fallen cause; the road to Delhi was long and would soon be blocked by Aurangzib’s men. What was Sulaiman Shukoh to do? The youthful prince, bewildered by the calamity, took counsel with Jai Singh. The Rajput general advised him either to push on to Delhi or to fall back on Allahabad and there wait within its sheltering walls for news of his father. For himself, Jai Singh openly refused to follow the losing side any longer; he would go away with his troops and join the new Emperor. The hapless Sulaiman waited another day and held a second consultation. Dilir Khan, the Afghan general, advised him to cross the Ganges at Allahabad, go to Shahjahanpur, the home of a large Afghan colony, and there raising an army of his clansmen wait for fresh developments. Only on such conditions was he willing to accompany the prince. Sulaiman had no help but to obey. So, he ordered a retreat to Allahabad (4th June). But meantime Jai Singh had convinced Dilir Khan of the folly of
such unselfish devotion; these two generals with their contingents parted company with the prince at Kora, and so also did all the other imperial officers and many newly enlisted troops* whose home was in this doab country. Only 6,000 men, less than a third of Sulaiman's army, accompanied him in the retreat to Allahabad, under the guidance of his guardian, the faithful Baqi Beg. While he should have flown on wings to his father's side, if he was to reach him at all, he wasted a week's time here in distraction, daily consultation, and the maturing of conflicting plans. He was burdened with a harem of women and "furniture and articles of pomp beyond imagination." Couches of gold, chairs of gold and silver, jewellery, gold plate, rich clothing,—in short every gift that a loving father and a doting grandfather could bestow on him on his first campaign, accompanied him and impeded his march. He could not carry them and yet he was loath to leave them. Some advised him to seize and govern the country from Allahabad to Patna and there build up an independent power. Others counselled him to retreat to Patna and by joining Shuja raise a strong force against Aurangzib. But the Sayyids of Barha, who were among Dara's chief followers, pressed him to make a wide loop round Delhi, march by the northern side of the Ganges, through their home the Middle Doab, and then cross the Ganges and the Jamuna at the foot of the hills, near Nagina and Saharanpur, in order to reach Dara in the Panjab without fear of interception by Aurangzib's forces.

§ 2. Sulaiman marches from Allahabad to Hardwar.

This last course Sulaiman Shukoh adopted. Leaving his surplus property, heavy baggage, stores, and harem attendants in the fort of Allahabad in charge of his father's trusty servant Sayyid Qasim of Barha, he crossed the Ganges with light kit (14th June), passed by Lucknow and Moradabad, and rapidly moved on Nagina, where he plundered the Government treasury of two lakhs of Rupees and some private property also. But numbers of soldiers deserted

*Masum, 147a-148b; A. N. 168-170. Manucci says that Sulaiman conspired to murder Jai Singh and Dilir Khan at an interview (Storia, i. 284-287).
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him daily, and his following rapidly dwindled from the 6,000 men who had left Allahabad with him. Even for his diminished numbers he could not secure a crossing over the Ganges to the right bank. "At every ferry... the men took their boats to the other side at the report of his approach, and he could not cross. So he was forced to proceed further up the river towards Hardwar in the hope of crossing with the help of the local zamindars." At Chandi, situated in the Srinagar State opposite Hardwar, he halted for some days, and sent his officer Bhawanidas to the Rajah of Srinagar to beg his help.*

But in those few days of enforced waiting his path was completely barred by strong forces of the enemy and his further progress rendered impossible. As early as the middle of July, Aurangzib from Delhi had sent an army under Shaista Khan to the Hardwar side to oppose Sulaiman Shukoh's attempt to cross the Ganges. On 24th July another detachment was sent under Shaikh Mir and Dilir Khan to guard the right bank of the Jamuna and prevent Sulaiman's flight across that river.† Thus the young prince's path was closed on the south and the west; he was cut off from his father and the Panjab.

While Shaista Khan was advancing to the right bank of the Ganges near the hills, a very enterprising officer, Fidai Khan, fired by the new honours and favours received from the Emperor, outstripped him, reached the ferry of Puth, south-east of Hapur, in the expectation that Sulaiman would naturally cross the Ganges there in his westward movement from Lucknow. Here he learnt from a letter of the Rajah of Kumaun, the neighbour and therefore the enemy of the Rajah of Srinagar, that the fugitive was marching northwards to Hardwar in order to cross the river there with the help of the latter Rajah. Fidai Khan by hard riding covered 160 miles in one day and reached the right bank of the river at Hardwar in the afternoon. Sulaiman with several thousand men occupied the opposite bank, wishing to cross there that very afternoon.

* A. N. 125-126, 148, 170-173; Musum, 148b-151a.
† 4. N. 148, 159-160; 126 (Khan-i-Dauran sent to besiege Allahabad); Aqil Khan, 71.
The end of Sulaiman Shukoh

Only 50 troopers had been able to keep up with Fidai Khan in his strenuous march. But his appearance was enough. At once the rumour spread that this bank was held by the vanguard of the imperial army and that their main body under Shaista Khan was approaching. Sulaiman Shukoh lost heart, and durst not force a passage across. The precious moment was lost, and he had to turn back from the Ganges towards the Srinagar Hills in search of an asylum.* His best followers, the Sayyids of Barha, who had their homes in the Middle Doab, round Sambal, feared for the safety of their wives and children and refused to enter the hills.

His most faithful officer and chief manager of affairs, Baqi Beg, a Badakhshani, who had served Dara from his boyhood, died on the way. At the death of such an experienced able and resourceful leader, confusion fell on Sulaiman’s party. The master-mind which had firmly held the men together was gone, and the party broke up into flying atoms. “At the death of such a faithful follower, utter despair and confusion overtook Sulaiman.” More than half the party with him fled back to their homes. His force was reduced to 2,000 men.†

§ 3. Sulaiman flees to the Garhwal Rajah.

In despair of making his way to the Panjab, Sulaiman had appealed to the mercy of Prithwi Singh, the Rajah of Srinagar, and marched to his frontier. Here the Rajah’s men met him and guided him into their country. Four marches from the capital, the Rajah himself waited on the august guest and offered him a refuge in Srinagar on condition of his being accompanied by his family and a few servants only; but his army, horses and elephants were to be dismissed, as the country was poor and the roads bad.

The miserable supplicant hesitated before consenting to render himself utterly powerless and become absolutely dependent on his strange host. He spent a week in meditation and consultation. But there was no escape for him. The path to Hindustan was effectually closed. At Hardwar, Sambal, and the Middle Doab,

*Agil Khan, 71-72. Path, 28 · 41 N. 78 · 15 E., 8 miles s. of Garh Muktesar, (Ind. Atlas, 49 N. E.).
†Masum, 152a; A. N. 174.
strong forces of the enemy vigilantly waited for him; and a fourth force was already on the march to invest Allahabad, while Aurangzib himself had entered the Panjab. A dash to the plains would only make Sulaiman Shukoh fall into the jaws of death.

At last he made up his mind to accept the Rajah’s terms. Those of his servants who wanted to desert him but were deterred from the attempt by the roads out of the hills being guarded by the Rajah’s men, now advised Sulaiman not to trust his life to the hill-people, but to return to Allahabad. To lend support to this counsel, they showed him a forged letter purporting to have come from his father’s devoted commandant of Allahabad and reporting that Shuja had arrived there with a vast army. Sulaiman, therefore, changed his mind, thanked the Rajah for his offer of hospitality, gave him some presents, and returned to Nagina. There all the traitors fled away, leaving only seven hundred men with him.

Despair seized Sulaiman Shukoh as he discovered the real motive of his faithless advisers. He decided to return to Srinagar. But his troubles were only beginning. Next day, when he set his face towards the hills, “all the servants of the various departments and stores,—foragers, camel-drivers, and elephant-men,—fled away. From 700 men his train sank to 200 only. With such a diminished retinue and transport it was impossible for him to supply conveyances to the ladies of his harem, who numbered two hundred. The enemy were close behind; there was no time to be lost. So, he made up his mind to distribute his women to anybody who would take them. At the very proposal these “ladies of spotless honour” who “had so long been kept in seclusion with care, became frantic with grief, plucking their hairs out and slapping their own cheeks.” But misfortune is pitiless. Some of the women were given away to new masters, many others were abandoned, and only the highest ladies of his harem accompanied the prince on the few elephants whose drivers still clung to him faithfully. The party, now reduced to two hundred souls, made a precipitate flight, covering long distances every day without daring to halt, as the enemy was close on their track. Qasim Khan, the imperial jagirdar of Moradabad, reached Nagina only 18 hours after Sulaiman had left it, and learning of the fugitive’s route he continued the pursuit without halting.
there. The news of the approach of the imperialists and the rapidity of the flight dissolved Sulaiman Shukoh's party; most of his men deserted him, and at last with his wife, a few other ladies, his foster-brother Muhammad Shah, and only seventeen followers, he reached the entrance to the hills.* The Rajah of Srinagar gave him an asylum, promising to harbour the suppliant in spite of the danger and loss that were sure to befall him for his hospitality.

The host was all kindness and attention to his princely guest in distress. "He repaired the old and ruined palace of his ancestors, lodged the prince in it, and day and night served him attentively. He considered the arrival of such a prince as a divine grace, because no such event had ever happened (to his dynasty) before," The Rajah even gave his daughter in marriage to Sulaiman, in order to mingle his blood with that of the imperial house of Delhi.†

For a year Sulaiman enjoyed peace in his rude but safe shelter. He must have been sighing for the comforts of civilised life, the luxuries of his father's Court and the power and wealth of a ruling prince. According to Masum, his evil counsellors, —or, as is more probable, his own restless ambition prompted him to sally forth from the hills and raid a Mughal village in the plains, in the hope of re-establishing his authority and assembling his father's old retainers and other officers from the neighbouring tract. The only result of the expedition was the plunder of his all by his faithless followers and his return in naked poverty to the Garhwal hills again. [Masum, 154.]

§ 4. Aurangzib invades Garhwal to secure the surrender of Sulaiman.

Aurangzib had already warned the Rajah that, if he did not wish to see the ruin of his house, he must yield the fugitive. Prithwi

*Masum, 151b-153b; A. N. 173-177; Khafi Khan, ii. 42 (says that the Rajah treated Sulaiman like a prisoner in greed of his gold and jewels.) Sulaiman's flight to Garhwal took place at the beginning of August, 1658, as the detachment sent by Aurangzib from Delhi on 24th July under Shaikh Mir and Dilir Khan to watch the Jamuna above Saharanpur against the fugitive, returned to Aurangzib some miles east of Rupar on the Satlej on 10th August with the report that Sulaiman had entered Shrinigar (A. N. 167)).

†Masum, 153b, 156a.
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Singh tried evasion and pretended that Sulaiman Shukoh had found an asylum in a neighbouring hill-State and not in Garhwal. But the falsehood failed in its object. At the end of a year, Aurangzib now triumphant over all his rivals, was free to turn to Sulaiman Shukoh. On 27th July 1659 he sent Rajah Rajrup of the Jammu hills with a party of imperial troops to influence Prithwi Singh, either by persuasion or by threat, to surrender his guest. For a year and a half the hill-Rajah struggled against temptation and fear in the sacred cause of hospitality. Reinforcements in pioneers artillery and musketeers were sent to Rajrup in October 1660.* But a campaign among the rugged hills of Garhwal was a slow and doubtful expediaent. Aurangzib therefore fell back on diplomacy. He intrigued with Prithwi Singh's all-powerful minister and virtual ruler of Garhwal, and promised him his master's throne if he brought about the capture of Sulaiman. This man, corrupted by ambition, administered to the prince a poison in the form of medicine. Sulaiman experimented with it on a cat and learnt of its deadly property. When he disclosed the plot to Prithwi Singh, the Rajah in righteous indignation cut the wretched minister to pieces. Masum, [157b—159b.]

Aurangzib next employed Jai Singh, his agent in all intrigues with Hindu princes. The Rajput chief wrote to Prithwi Singh professing his own extreme sorrow at the impending ruin of a Hindu ruler like him, and pressing him to give up Sulaiman as the only means of saving himself from the imperial vengeance. The Garhwal Rajah was old and refused to undertake the sin and shame of betraying an accepted refugee. But his son and heir, Medini Singh, was more worldly-minded; the hope of rewards from Delhi conquered his scruples. There was also the fear of losing their kingdom, as Aurangzib was instigating the neighbouring and rival hill-Rajahs to invade and annex Garhwal. The three Mughal generals who had invaded the country, had seized and established outposts in some parts of it and pressed the Rajah hard.† So, Medini Singh overruled his father and decided to give Sulaiman Shukoh up to the Mughals. A submissive reply was sent to Jai Singh with a

*A. N. 421, 589; Masum, 156b-157b.
†Probably by cutting off his subjects' access to the plains.
promise to obey the imperial order. On 12th December 1660 Aurangzib despatched Jai Singh’s son, Kumar Ram Singh, to the foot of the hills to bring away the captive. Hearing the news, Sulaiman tried to escape over the snow to Ladak, and when pursued by the Garhwal troops he offered resistance. His foster-brother and some other companions were slain, and he himself wounded in the vain struggle for freedom against heavy odds. On 27th December he was sent down to the plains and delivered to Ram Singh,* and on 2nd January 1661 brought to the fort of Salimgarh at Delhi.

§ 5. Captive Sulaiman before Aurangzib.

On 5th January the prisoner was placed before his dread uncle in the Hall of Private Audience of the Delhi palace. His youth, extreme beauty, martial fame, and present misery deeply interested the courtiers and even the ladies of the imperial harem in his fate. The eldest and most favoured grandson of Shah Jahan, he might under happier stars have one day adorned the throne of Delhi and sat on the seat of state in the very hall where he now stood as a captive in chains with a secret and ignominious death before him. As a European eyewitness describes the scene, “Many of the courtiers shed tears at the sight of this interesting young man... The principal ladies of the Court, concealed behind a lattice-work, were also greatly moved. Aurangzib spoke to him with apparent kindness, to relieve him of the fear of a death-sentence, ‘Be comforted; no harm shall befall you. You shall be treated with tenderness. God is great, and you should put your trust in Him. Dara, your father, was not permitted to live only because he had become a kafir, a man devoid of all religion.’ The prince made the salam or sign of grateful acknowledgment... He then told the Emperor, with much self-possession, that if it were intended to give him the pousta to drink, he begged that he might be immediately put to death. Aurangzib promised in a solemn manner, and in a loud voice, that this drink should most certainly not be administered, and that his mind might be perfectly easy. [Bernier, 105; Storia, i. 380.]

*A. N. 600-602; Aqil 105; Storia, i. 378-380.
§ 6. Sad end of Sulaiman.

The pousta is a drink made of poppy-heads crushed and soaked in water for a night. This was the potion generally given to princes confined in the fortress of Gwalior, whose heads the Emperor was deterred by public shame from taking off. A large cup of this beverage was brought to them early in the morning, and they were not given anything to eat until it was swallowed. This drink emaciated the wretched victims, who lost their strength and intellect by slow degrees, became torpid and senseless, and at length died.

But the fate that Sulaiman Shukoh had dreaded more than death itself, was meted out to him by Aurangzib in violation of his 'solemn promise.' The captive was sent to Gwalior (on 15th January) and there ordered to be plied with the drink of opium-seeds. In this dismal State-prison the hapless prince dragged his miserable life on for a year, and finally, in May 1662, "he was sent to the next world through the exertions of his keepers." His career that had begun with so much promise and splendour was cut off at the age of thirty. On the Gwalior hill he was buried close to another princely victim of Aurangzib's ambition, and Sulaiman Shukoh and his uncle Murad Bakhsh were united in death in that unhonoured cemetery.*

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*Kambu, 24b; Ishwardas, 41b; Bernier, 107; Storia, i. 380; A. N. 603 (silent about his fate); Inayetullah's Ahkam-i-Alangiri, 286b, 302b.
§ 1. Shuja's retreat from Khajwa, pursued by Mir Jumla.

After the victory Aurangzib marched through Shuja's camp, near the tank of the village of Khajwa, and halted for the night on the other side of it. To give the enemy no time to rally, he despatched a pursuing column under Prince Muhammad that very afternoon. Supplies, including horses, dress and arms, were given to him from the imperial stores, as all his property had been plundered by Jaswant in the morning. Reinforcements were soon afterwards despatched [under Mir Jumla, as joint commander-in-chief, raising the pursuing force to 30,000 men. [A. N. 265-269.]

The unhappy pretender to the throne rode away 30 miles from the fatal field, before he halted to give repose to his exhausted body and drooping spirits. After four days of flight he crossed the Ganges and encamped at Jusi, opposite Allahabad. Dara's commandant of Allahabad shut the fort-gates in his face, and invited the imperialists to come and take delivery of the fortress, (which was done on 12th January, 1659). [A. N. 285, Masum 1056.]

On reaching Bahadurpur, east of Benares, Shuja stopped for some days, repaired the wall and trenches round his former camp, and thought of making a stand there against his pursuers. If the worst came to the worst, he could retreat in his flotilla, which lay moored at hand. Seven large guns were brought away from Chunar and mounted on the ramparts. Sultan Muhammad, who had no boats, could not cross the flooded Ganges near Bahadurpur; so he marched back upstream, forded the river near Allahabad, and advancing by way of Kheri and Kuntit arrived two stages from Chunar.*

*A. N. 492; Aqil Khan, 91. Kheree is in the Khurragh Dist. Kuntit is near Bindhachal, 10 miles west of Mirzapur, (Indian Atlas, Sh. 88). The whole
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This fact, joined to the news that Fidai Khan, another officer of Aurangzib, was marching north of the Ganges from Gorakhpur towards Patna, alarmed Shuja, and he fled precipitately to Patna, arriving at the garden of Jafaq Khan in its suburbs on 10th February, 1659. Here some precious days were wasted in marrying his son Zain-ud-din to the daughter of the old and retired officer Zulfiqar Khan Qaramanlu, in the vain hope of thus buttressing up his fallen fortunes. Meantime the enemy arrived within 20 miles of the town, and there was another rapid flight to Mungir, which was reached on the 19th. Sultan Muhammad arrived at Patna about the 22nd, eight days after Shuja had left it, and here he was joined by Fidai Khan. [A. N. 493, Aqil 91-92.]

At Mungir Shuja made a longer stand (Feb 19th—March 6th). The ground favoured the defence against an invader from the west. The city of Mungir stands in a narrow plain, 2½ miles wide, bounded by the Ganges on the west and the Khargpur hills on the east. Along this plain runs the most convenient road from Patna to Bengal. If it were blocked, the invader would have to make a long detour through the desolate hills and jungles of the Santal Parganas and Birbhum, far away from the Ganges and its populous cities, and strike the river again only in the neighbourhood of Murshidabad.

During the period of Afghan rule, a wall and moat had been run in front of Mungir, from the hill to the river-bank for the defence of the town. Last year, when opposing Sulaiman Shukoh, Shuja had repaired these old defences, raised bastions every 30 yards along the wall, and connected the ditch with the stream. Guns were now landed from his boats and mounted on the walls, the trenches were regularly manned by his soldiers, and Rajah Bahroz, the zamindar of Khargpur, undertook to guard the southern hills, through which ran a difficult path to Rajmahal. [A. N. 493.]

History of the war with Shuja is given in great detail in a Persian poem named Aurangnamah, belonging to the Haidarabad State Library, and written by a Rozbhani follower of Mir Jumla. It merely confirms and supplements the narrative given by the official history, A. N., and Masum (the Shujaite.)

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The pursuit of Shuja and the war in Bihar

Early in March Mir Jumla approached Mungir, and finding the main road barred, did not waste his time in attempting the siege of the town, but bought over Rajah Bahrooz. Under the Rajah’s guidance the imperial army marched through the hills and jungles of Khargpur, and making a detour round Mungir, threatened to seize Shuja’s rear.* That prince, on hearing of Bahrooz’s desertion and the unexpected movement of his enemies, fled from Mungir on 6th March. At this, Mir Jumla, who had reached Pialapur, 40 miles east of Mungir, left part of his army there under Prince Mohammad, while he himself hastened westwards to Mungir,† to take possession of it and appoint governors on behalf of the Emperor.

§ 2. Mir Jumla’s turning movement at Sahibganj.

At Sahibganj‡ Shuja made another halt of 15 days (March 10th to 24th), built a wall from the river to the southern hill, barring the narrow plain through which the road runs. He had mistaken Mir Jumla’s westward march from Pialapur as a sign that the imperialists were tired of crossing the hills and jungles and would now pursue him along his track by the southern bank of the Ganges. So he hoped to detain them long before his wall at Sahibganj. His right was protected by the river, his left by the Rajmahal hills stretching southwards in a long line from the Ganges to Birbhum. To guard against the imperialists again

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*A. N., 494 & 495; Aqil Khan 92; Massum, 113b. Khargpur is due south of Mungir. (Indian Atlas, Sh. 112).

†There is a Pialapur, 4 miles south of the Pir Pointy Station on the E. I. Ry. Loop Line, and 11 miles east of Colgong. It is more than 65 miles east of Mungir. Tarrapur, 6 miles due east of Khargpur, in Rennell’s Atlas, Sh. 2, exactly corresponds to the description in the text. But the form Pialapur is given too often to be taken for a copyist’s error for Tarapur. There is a second Pialapur in the Mungir district, with a hill close to it, (Pioneer, 3 Jan. 1912, p. 2), but I cannot find it in the Atlas.

‡Alangirnamah, 495, gives “Rangamati, 33 kos from Mungir and 15 kos from Rajmahal.” Aqil Khan (92) gives Garhl, i.e., Teliagarhi. The place meant is undoubtedly Lalmati, half a mile south of the Sahibganj station on the E. I. R. Loop Line (Indian Atlas, Sh. 112). It is situated midway between Teliagarhi and Sikrigali.
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turning his left flank by making a detour through the hills, he
sent his follower Mir Isfandiar Mamuri to Khwajah Kamal
Afghan, the zamindar of Birbhum and Chatnagar, with orders to
oppose such a move and close the path on the south.

But again the gold of the imperialists upset his plans. As at
Mungir, so here too, Mir Jumla won over the trusted zamindar
and purchased a safe passage through his lands. After twelve days
of toilsome march through the hills south-east of the Mungir
district, in which Rajah Bahroz acted as guide and provided
rations and fodder, the imperialists emerged from the jungles*
and entered the zamindari of Birbhum. The chief town, Suri, was
passed on 28th March.

Here a strange occurrence damped the ardour of the imperialists
and weakened their strength. It had been known that Dara Shukoh
had again made head in Gujrat, and that the emperor had hastened
thither to oppose him. On 13th March 1659, the two armies
clashed together near Ajmir; Dara’s power was destroyed for
ever, and he was fleeing helplessly before the pursuing imperialists.
But rumour, with her usual love of falsehood, wafted to the
Mughal army at Pialapur the news that Aurangzib had been routed
at Ajmir and had fled to the Deccan abandoning everything.
Distance magnified the extent of the disaster, and the tale received
many embellishments as it flew from mouth to mouth. The whole
army was thrown into alarm and confusion. Mir Jumla’s flanking
movement through the hills was suspected to be not an attack
on Shuja’s rear, but a covert design to flee with Prince Sultan
Muhammad to the Deccan by the unfrequented route of Chota
Nagpur and Orissa !

The Rajput contingent was particularly upset. Their homes in
the far west were exposed to the victorious enemies of Aurangzib.
The wrath of Dara would descend heaviest on the house of Jaipur,
as Jai Singh had deserted Sulaiman Shukoh and won over Jaswant
Singh to Aurangzib’s side, and both he and his son Ram Singh
had done signal service to the emperor. This march through the
hills was bad enough, but the outlook before them was worse

*Alamgirnamah, 496 and 497; Aqil Khan, 92.
still. What could they expect on reaching the Deccan even if the
march there were safely accomplished? To join the broken rank
of a defeated pretender to the throne, and to be for ever exiled
from home and chased hither and thither with the fugitive
Aurangzib! Better return west through Patna and Allahabad
and make peace with Dara, or at least push on to Rajputana in
time to guard their homeland.

The Rajputs brooded over the matter and slowly made up their
minds. Some days after leaving Pialapur they stopped waiting
on the prince like other officers, at the times of his starting and
dismounting. Then on 26th March, after the day’s advance they
did not occupy the respective quarters marked out for them in
the encampment, but all the Rajputs of the different divisions
collected together and took up a position behind the camp. Next
day they followed the main army at some distance, keeping their
tents and baggage with themselves. On 30th March, two stages
beyond Birbhum, the Rajput contingent 4,000 strong, seceded from
the army and set out on their return towards Agra. *

Mir Jumla did not waste any time in trying to dissuade them
or even to punish their desertion, but pushed steadily on towards
his objective. He had still some 25,000 troopers† with him, double
the strength of Shuja,‡ and every moment was precious to him
if he hoped to cut off the enemy’s retreat to Dacca.

Shuja, hearing that the imperialists had gained a passage through
Birbhum, evacuated Sahibganj and hastened to Rajmahal (about
27th March.) But he could not find safety anywhere on the right
(or western) bank of the Ganges. Therefore, leaving Rajmahal
he planned to cross the river at Dogachi (a few miles south of the
town), remove his family and army to Tanda (4 miles west of the

*A. N. 497 & 498. Aqil, 93, (reason of the Rajput defection). Aurangnamah
ascribes it to the news of a general order for temple destruction by Aurangzib.

†The Rajput contingent that seceded is numbered 4,000 men by Aqil, Masum’s
estimate of “about 10 or 12 thousand troopers,” is an exaggeration. All the
Rajputs did not return, Rajah Indradyumna remained loyal. Aqil says that two
Muhammadan officers accompanied the deserters.

‡Masum (116a) says that Shuja had not more than 5 or 6 thousand men.
fort of Guar), and prolong the struggle with the help of his powerful flotilla, against which Mir Jumla's purely land force could make no head.

§ 3. Alawardi Khan's plot: he is put to death.

But treachery was brewing in his ranks. The advance of the imperial army in his rear destroyed his last chance of success; their arrival at Belghata, 30 miles from his position, supplied his wavering followers with protectors close at hand in case they deserted. Fidelity to Shuja now meant only a choice between two miseries, viz., slaughter by the overwhelmingly superior imperial army, and voluntary exile to the dreadful land of the savage Arracanese. “Many of his old and trusted followers” now conspired to desert him. The leader of the malcontents was Alawardi Khan, a noble who had governed Bihar in the closing years of Shah Jahan's reign and joined Shuja's standard at Patna when that prince made his first attempt for the throne in 1657. Shuja had promoted him to the rank of his chief adviser, used to call him Khan Bhai (My noble brother), and had recently created him Amir-ul-umara or 'Premier Noble.'*

The plan of the traitors was to lag behind at Rajmahal after Shuja had gone to the ferry, and to slip away to the imperial camp when he would be across the river. Shuja certainly went to the ferry of Dogachi (1st April, 1659), but a storm prevented his embarkation that night, and he had to return to his tent, 5 miles from the river. The conspirators had not foreseen this delay. The plot had already got wind. Shuja heard of it at the end of the night, and acted with unwonted promptitude and decision. He had left two officers at Rajmahal to superintend the transport of the men and stores that were to follow him.

Next morning (2nd April), he galloped from his tent to the city, a distance of 10 miles, and alighted in his garden in the suburbs.† He was in a towering rage and kept shouting to his officers to bring Alawardi Khan. Man after man was sent on this errand.

*Alawardi Khan, A. N., 421, 422, 499-501; Masum 114a-115b.
†Was it the Nageswar Bag garden given in Rennell, Sheets 2 and 15?
Meantime Alawardi Khan was guarding his house with his own retainers, against any attack. Shuja’s officers came in rapid succession and gathered round his house with their troops, waiting for the prince’s order to storm it. At this Alawardi lost heart; his partisans were terror-striken. So, when the diwan Mirza Saraj-ud-din Muhammad Jabri, arrived to fetch him, he easily consented to leave his stronghold and accompany him to the prince.*

Alawardi, with this younger son Saifullah, was taken to the prince outside the city. They were immediately seized and handcuffed by the loyal soldiers, placed on an elephant, and carried back to the city with Shuja. Here at the palace-gate they were beheaded publicly. Two other mansabdars, who had joined the plot, shared the same fate.


After passing three more days at Rajmahal, Shuja, on 4th April, crossed the Ganges at Dogachi, and encamped at Baqarpur on the opposite bank, with the flotilla guarding his front. The imperial army after leaving Birbhum, had turned to the n.e., wishing to strike the Ganges above Murshidabad and block Shuja’s line of retreat to Dacca. It had reached Belghata† when it heard of Shuja’s evacuation of Rajmahal, and immediately made a dash northward, to seize that town. The Van, under Zulfiqar Khan, entered it on 13th April, and established their own government there. Some 4,000 of Shuja’s soldiers, having failed to get boats at Dogahci,

*The official history accuses Shuja of having induced Alawardi to come out of his house by a false promise of safety, and then treacherously executed him. (Alamgirnawmah, 500). But the Tarikh-i-Shujai does not support the charge. It says, “Mirza Saraj-ud-din Muhammad, a confidential servant of the prince, offered to bring Alawardi, went to the latter, and told him all the case (haqiqat-i-hal). The latter had no help but to come with one or two mansabdars engaged in the same plot” (f. 115a). I have accepted his account as more likely to be true under the circumstances, Alawardi had no chance of escape if he resisted arrest.

†Belgotta in Rennell, Sh. 2, about 2 miles west of Jangipur and 4 miles south of the battle-field of Gheria.
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returned helplessly to Rajmahal and submitted to the imperialists. Thus the whole country west of the Ganges, from Rajmahal to Hughli, passed out of Shuja's hands. [A. N. 501 & 344.]

The river Ganges, after flowing due east for four hundred miles from Allahabad, takes a sudden turn to the right below Sikrigali and sweeps southwards for about 80 miles to Bhagwangola, where it again turns to the east. East of this stretch of the river lies the district of Malda with the ruins of Gaur, on the west stands Rajmahal, and south of it the district of Murshidabad.

In its upper courses the rocky soil, as at Chunar, Benares, Mungir, and Teliagarhi, confines the river to a fixed bed. But after leaving Sikrigali, it flows through a softer ground and give free play to its fondness for changing its bed or splitting up into many streams. Thus the valley of the Ganges, between the Rajmahal hills on the west and the upland of Barind at the back of Malda on the east, is intersected by countless thin serpentine brooks and nalas, dry sandy deposits marking the deserted beds of the river, and the one or more streams of the Ganges and the Mahananda. "The earth is as water" here, and travelling is extremely difficult. On the north of this tract, the main artery of the Ganges receives many straggling branches of the lower Kushi, on the east the Kalindi, the Mahananda (the river of Malda), and several of its own ramifications. On the south, a little east of Suti, the original Ganges branches off in a thin tortuous stream, which still bears the name of Bhagirathi or the Holy Ganges, and flows past Murshidabad, Nadia, and Calcutta, to the sea. But its main current flows eastwards by Rajshahi and Goalnand in a vast volume of water known as the Padma.

During the rains much of this valley is flooded. As the rains stop and the flood subsides, innumerable water-courses (nalas) and lakes are found to intersect the land. Only a few of the nalas carry off running water; all the others first grow stagnant, then their ends dry up, and they form slimy pools and soft morasses. Only in their last stage, in the hottest part of summer, do they present the solid land again, but immensely changed from its last year's configuration. This process goes on year after year, making fantastic variations in the surface of the ground.
§ 5. The relative strength of the rival forces.

Shuja had a hopeless inferiority of troops. He had brought back about 10,000 men from Khajwa. Of these some had been lost by desertion and many others had been intercepted by the Mughal capture of Rajmahal.* On land he could not have made an hour's stand against the imperialists. But he had an artillery of big pieces admirably served by European and half-caste gunners. He was also strong in an arm peculiarly suited to the theatre of the war, an arm in which Bengal, of all the provinces of the empire, enjoined a notable superiority, and the lack of which paralysed his enemy's efforts. Bengal is the land of waterways, and its subahdar (Viceroy) used to get a large assignment on the revenue (tankhah) and extensive jagirs (fiefs) for maintaining a flotilla (nawwara)† to patrol the rivers, convey officers and troops, and resist the pirates of Sondip and Chatgaon. The Mughals were proverbially bad seamen. Expert cavaliers, they were powerless on board a ship. The deep had unknown terrors for them, and even a voyage down a river was a penance to be gone through with set teeth and breathless expectation of its end, when they would tread on solid land again!

Mir Jumla's army was a purely land force. He had not brought a single boat with himself, nor could he get any in Bengal, as Shuja had anticipated him by seizing and sinking all the private boats in this part of the country. For want of water-transport Mir Jumla was confined to the western bank, unable to cross over and attack the enemy, or advance on Dacca, as many rivers interested his path. Shuja, on the other hand, could mount his guns and men on his boats and employ this extremely mobile force anywhere he pleased along the entire Mughal line from Rajmahal to Suti. But he was too weak in troops to take the offensive against an enemy so overwhelmingly superior on land. The Bengali nursery tale of the duel between the alligator and the tiger aptly typifies this stage of the war.

After a council of war with his generals, headed by Mirza Jan

*Aqil, 95; Masum, 116b and 126a.
†Talish's Continuation, tr. by me in Journal and Proceedings, A. S. B., June 1906 and June 1907.
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Beg, Shuja had decided to evacuate the western bank of the Ganges, to remove his headquarters and family to Tanda, (where he would be protected by the Ganges and a labyrinth of nulas on his west), to resist the hostile movements of the imperialists, and to utilise the precious months thus gained through the enemy’s want of a fleet in “recruiting his shattered power.” [Masum, 116.] The plan was the best under the circumstances; but it failed through Mir Jumla’s wonderful activity in procuring boats from remote places, the Emperor’s fine strategy in sending another army under the governor of Patna to make a diversion on the left bank of the Ganges and turn Shuja’s right, and lastly through both the roads for the arrival of hardy recruits from Oudh, Allahabad and Bihar being closed to Shuja by the Mughal occupation of Rajmahal and all the country west of the Ganges.

Shuja, making Tanda his base, entrenched on the eastern bank at various places opposite the entire Mughal front, which stretched from Rajmahal to Suti, on the western bank. On his own side Mir Jumla placed pickets at every ferry and road to prevent Shuja’s deserted followers at Rajmahal from crossing over to him. After the occupation of Rajmahal (13th April, 1659), his first object was to get boats, without which he could not take one step forward. By persistent efforts for a fortnight he succeeded in securing a few.—kosas, khaluahs, and râhwâras, from distant or obscure places. [Masum 118a.]


Taking up his quarters at Dogachi,* about 13 miles south of Rajmahal, he carried out his first bold and well-planned stroke. In midstream opposite his post there was a high island, which formed a half-way house to the other bank. A detachment from Shuja’s army had already occupied it, and begun to entrench and erect batteries, in order to molest the imperial camp in co-operation with their flotilla. Mir Jumla resolved to wrest it from them.

*Dogachi is given in the Indian Atlas, Sh. 112, about 13 miles south of Rajmahal. There is another Dogachi, 14 miles further south; but that is not the place meant in this history. Dunapur is given on the same sheet as Dugnapur near the s. e. corner.
Under his careful arrangement and personal supervision, his few boats made several silent and secret trips after midnight, transporting to the island, 2,000 soldiers under Zulfiqar Khan and some other high officers, with 22 hatchetmen and a few guns. The morning discovered their arrival to the enemy, who fled away in their boats, carrying off their guns. The imperialists occupied the deserted position and hastily entrenched. Next day they repelled a formidable attack by Shuja's entire flotilla, sinking some of the boats. A party of the enemy that had landed on one side of the island and was trying to throw up entrenchments, was gallantly charged by a body of Afghans under Taj Niazi and driven out after a severe and bloody struggle. A second attempt of the enemy's combined forces to recover the island was defeated two days later, and the imperialists were left in undisturbed possession of the captured post. [A. N. 501-503.]

But here their success ended. Shuja, warned by the past, now guarded his defences carefully, his flotilla daily cruised up and down the river, exchanging fire with the Mughals on the western bank, and his army and guns were massed opposite Dogachi. It was hopeless for Mir Jumla with his half dozen boats to carry his army across in small bodies or effect a landing by suprise at this point in the face of such a powerful and vigilant enemy.

So, he made other arrangements and bided his time. The imperial army was distributed along the entire western bank: Muhammad Murad Beg was left in command at Rajmahal in the extreme north; the prince with Zulfiqar Khan, Islam Khan, and the bulk of the army, remained at Dogachi 13 miles southwards, facing Shuja. At Dunapur, some 8 miles further south, Ali Quli Khan was posted, while Mir Jumla himself with six or seven troops occupied Suti, the southermmost point of the Mughal lines, 28 miles south of Rajmahal. [A. N. 504.]

Here he collected about a hundred boats of various sorts, and daily watched for an opportunity to land on the other bank by surprise. The enemy had erected a high battery of eight large guns opposite him, which did great damage to his followers and cattle on the riverside. An expedition sent one night in ten boats was detected by the enemy and repulsed. Next day the attempt was
repeated, and succeeded by its very audacity. In the broad glare of noon, when the wind had freshened and the enemy were off their guard, he embarked 20 imperial troopers and a party of his own retainers and sent them over. Quickly going across with the help of the wind, they fell on the battery, drove nails into the port-holes of the two largest guns and carried off the other six without any loss. This splendid feat struck terror into the enemy’s heart. Shuja’s general, Nurul Hasan, who had been thus caught napping, was removed from his command. [A. N. 505.]

But Mir Jumla was soon to learn the fickleness of fortune. Encouraged by the success of his first two coups, he planned another on a much grander scale. But this time Shuja was on the alert. His able and devoted officer Sayyid Alam of Barha with a picked force now commanded at this point. He left the trenches and batteries on the riverside scantily guarded as before, but posted his troops and fierce war-elephants behind them in ambush cleverly masked in front. Mir Jumla had either not taken the precaution to reconnoitre and ascertain the enemy’s strength there (as Masum says), or he had committed the fatal mistake of despising the enemy. But he was destined to get a lesson which made him extremely cautious and even slow for the rest of the campaign.

§ 7. Mir Jumla’s third coup fails with heavy loss.

At dawn (3rd May) when the first two or three boats of the expedition sent by Mir Jumla reached the opposite bank, Ihtamam Khan landed with some men and assaulted the enemy’s trenches, driving them out and planting the imperial banner there. Then Sayyid Alam issued from his ambush and fell upon this small party, which gallantly defended itself in the captured redoubt. Some of the boats were busy trying to land their men; most others had not yet reached the bank; these lost heart at the sudden appearance of the enemy and rowed back to their own side; only six boats were left behind. The enemy growing bolder turned aside from the redoubt to attack the boats, leading two elephants with them. The imperialists were perplexed; of many troopers the horses had not yet landed, and even those few who were
mounted could not gallop on the loose sand. To complete their misery, some of the enemy's fast boats (kosas) now surrounded them, and a confused naval battle began in which the odds were against them. Zabardast Khan, though wounded, cut his way through the ring of the enemy. His brothers and nephews, in another boat, were trying to disembark and aid Ihtamam Khan, when another party of the enemy, 200 strong, with a furious elephant (a noted fighter named Kokah), fell on them. It gored Shahbaz Khan with its tusk and sank two or three boats. Two other captains were slain. Of the common soldiers, "many were drowned or slain, and the wounded were made prisoners."

After disposing of the boats, Sayyid Alam turned upon Ihtamam Khan, who was helplessly cooped up in the redoubt. The Khan fell fighting, with many of his men; the rest surrendered. "The very pick of the imperial army thus perished miserably; 500 of them were taken prisoner, and some of these were afterwards put to death by order of Shuja,"* or released according to Aurangnamah.

Meantime Mir Jumla had been a helpless spectator of their reverse from the western bank. In vain did he command and entreat his fugitive boats to return to the aid of their brethern; they were too demoralised to face the Bengal flotilla again. He was deeply mortified; the disaster dimmed the lustre of his hitherto victorious career; he had lost a choice body of men and given cause of exultation to his enemies, both across the river and in his own army.

Soon afterwards the imperial party had to meet with a loss which paralysed it for a time, and would have been disastrous but for Mir Jumla's wonderful courage, presence of mind, and mastery over men. Late in the night of 8th June, his camp at Suti was startled to hear that Prince Muhammad had deserted his post at Dogachi and fled to Shuja!

§ 8. Prince Muhammad discontented, flees to Shuja.

Sultan Muhammad had been long chafing under the tutelage

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* A. N. 506-509; Masum, 118a-119b; Aqil, 95.
of Mir Jumla. Youthful flatterers were not wanting to tell him that he was the hero of Khajwa, and that while the other divisions of the imperial army had been routed or shaken, his alone had stood its ground and beaten back the enemy’s onset. Was he not more worthy of the throne than his father, especially as he was beloved by his captive grandfather? To these dreams of ambition were added the tenderer ones of love. Years ago (1652), when the Emperor Shah Jahan was holding Court at Kabul, the Prince Aurangzib and Shuja had taken leave of him to go to the provinces assigned to them. Their way lay together up to Agra. In jealousy of their eldest brother Dara, they had vowed to unite against him on their father’s death, and the vow had been strengthened by each entertaining the other for a week at Agra and betrothing the young Sultan Muhammad to Shuja’s little daughter Gulrukh Banu, “Lady Rose-cheek.” [Aqil, 10.] Their fathers’ quarrel had broken off the match when the pair came of age. Shuja, whose servants and agents in Rajmahal kept him constantly informed of the state of the Mughal army, had been sending secret messages to the prince, offering him the throne and the hand of his daughter. The temptation was too great for a young man, with his heart sore against his father and his father’s confidant.

So, one dark and rainy night (8th June), he slipped out of Dogachi in a small open boat with only five confidential servants and some gold coins and jewels, and went over to Shuja’s camp, where he was welcomed, married (after a time) to his betrothed, and made his father-in-law’s chief commander and counsellor.*

Meantime alarm and distraction reigned in the imperial camp. The news flew from tent to tent. But there was a born ruler of men on the spot; Mir Jumla at Suti firmly kept his own men quiet, and the morning after the flight rode to the prince’s camp at Dogachi, harangued the leaderless troops, put heart and hope into them, and restored order and discipline. A council of war was held; all the other generals agreed to obey him as their sole head. Thus through his heroic exertion, the army weathered the storm; “it lost only one man—the prince,” as Aqil Khan pithily puts it.

*Sultan’s flight, A. N. 511, 406 and 407; Masum, 120b-124a; Aqil, 96.
The pursuit of Shuja and the war in Bihar

It was now the middle of June. The torrential rains of Bengal suspended operations, and the army went into cantonments. Mir Jumla with about 15,000 men fixed his quarters at Masumabazar (Murshidabad), “a high tract of land, with abundance of supplies.” Zulfiqar Khan and many other officers with the rest of the arm stayed at Rajmahal. Evidently the posts at Dogachi, Dunapur and Suti were withdrawn. [A. N. 512.]

The moral effect of the prince’s flight was very great. Coming so soon after the reverse of 3rd May, it damped the spirit of the imperial army and suspended its activity. The Emperor was alarmed at the news; he sent out strong reinforcements, and himself left the capital for Allahabad, to be within easy reach of the Bengal army, should the danger increase and roll westwards. The Shujaites were correspondingly elated, and now for the first time in the war took the aggressive. Their enemy’s force was split up into two bodies separated by sixty miles of almost impassable road. They had only to wrest Rajmahal from Zulfiqar Khan, and then march south and crush Mir Jumla. A daring blow achieved the first of these objects with startling quickness and ease.

§ 9. Rajmahal water-locked, is recaptured by Shuja.

The rains had converted the environs of Rajmahal into one marshy lake (jheel), except at the n. w. corner where the hills approach it. Boats plied even in the midst of the city. The enemy’s flotilla prevented Mir Jumla from sending the promised supplies from Murshidabad by water. Harchand, the Rajah of the Majwa hills, stretching west of Rajmahal on receiving Shujah’s subsidy, stopped the coming of supplies from that side, and robbed every grain-merchant (banjara) who ventured to send even a bullock’s load of grain to Rajmahal. “Not a grain of corn reached the city, the troops were weakened by abundance of water and dearth of (solid) food.” “Scarcity reached its extreme point. Grain rose to the price of gold. Coarse red rice and dal sold at nine seers for a Rupee.” In the agony of hunger men ate noxious weeds. The imperial troops in the city were reduced to the last extremity by famine and the loss of their horses and draught cattle;
and the discord among their generals made matters worse.

First, Shuja’s admiral, Shaikh Abbas, seized a hilly tract named Patura,* 5 miles south of Rajmahal. From this base he began to make boat-raids into the water-girt city. Then on 22nd August Shuja suddenly attacked Rajmahal with this flotilla. The commandant, Zulfiqar Khan, was too ill to ride. Rajah Indradyumna alone offered a gallent opposition to the invader. The other imperial officers wavered, held a council of war, could not agree to anything, but quarrelled with each other, and fled at night for Murshidabad, evacuating all their positions,—the city on the bank, the upland (a spur of the hill), midway between old and new Rajmahal which was their main camp, and the causeway leading from the hill-side to the new town. All their property was seized by Shuja, who thus recovered his capital and re-established himself on the western bank of the Ganges.†

The rainy season wore off without any further adventure. At its close Shuja, with an army now raised to 8,000 men, marched from Rajmahal against Mir Jumla who issued from Murshidabad and took post behind a deep nala near Belghata, throwing two bridges over it and fortifying their heads.

§ 10. Shuja’s advance towards Murshidabad.

The scene of the war now was the same which a century afterwards witnessed the final contest between the English and the Nawab of Bengal, Mir Qasim. Belghata is only four miles south of the battle-field of Gheria, and Dogachi about the same distance from the famous lines of Undhua Nala.

On 6th December, 1659, Shuja came in front of Mir Jumla’s position. After spending some days in cannonade and skirmishing, he attacked the right bridge with all his force on 15th December and seized its head. In this obstinate contest both sides lost heavily. Their gallant leader Ekkataz Khan being slain, the imperialists fled to their own side of the nala and burnt the bridge of boats to prevent pursuit. While this fight was raging, Mir Jumla crossed

*Puttoorah, 5 miles south of Rajmahal, (Indian Atlas, Sh. 112.)
†A. N., 516-519; Musum, 125; Aqil, 98, (graphic description.).
the nala by the left bridge and marched on Shuja from behind. Catching up the enemy’s rear on the bank of the Bhagirathi near the village of Gheria, which was afterwards the scene of two other memorable combats,—Alawardi Khan’s triumph over Nawab Sarfaraz Khan in 1740 and the rout of Mir Qasim’s troops by the English in 1763,—he dispersed it with loss. But their main army came back and faced him in battle order, behind their guns, which did great execution and arrested the Mughal advance. Evidently there was a disorderly shrinking back among the imperial troops. The Court historian tries to explain it away by saying that, as the officers disobeyed Mir Jumla’s orders, the different divisions were separated too far, and the enemy could not be charged. At sunset Mir Jumla had to return baffled to his camp, after a little fruitless cannonade. Two days afterwards the Shujaites again came upon the imperial army and did some damage with their powerful artillery.*

In this arm Mir Jumla was very weak. He had dragged only light pieces with himself by the land route from Allahabad, while Shuja could take his big guns in and out of his boats, and had also enlisted excellent gunners from the Europeans of Hugli, Tamluk, and Noakhali. Mir Jumla, without wasting any more men and ammunition, quietly retired to Murshidabad, as he was every day expecting a diversion in another quarter, which would send Shuja flying back to his own base. That prince, emboldened by the enemy’s retreat and ignorant of the danger in his own rear, marched parallel to the Mughals down the other bank of the Bhagirathi, to Nashipur (12 miles north of Murshidabad), in order to cross there and cut off the imperial army from the last-named town.

The Emperor with his usual foresight had ordered Daud Khan

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* A.N., 519-525; Masum, 131a-133b. Aqil (99-103) tells a story which cannot be reconciled with the other two histories. He says that Mir Jumla surrounded Shuja in the village of Gheria and could have captured him if he had boldly made a night-attack. In the morning Shuja escaped. This passage is incomprehensible to me; it does not look like an invention, but bears the stamp of an eyewitness’s report. But it is contradicted by the official history. Masum on the country asserts that if Shuja had charged he could have defeated Mir Jumla!
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the subahdar of Bihar, to march upon Tanda along the left or northern bank of the Ganges and co-operate with Mir Jumla who was on the right bank. The Khan had started from Patna as early as 13th May, 1659, but the rains, the many flooded rivers of North Bihar, and the enemy’s flotilla and trenches on the river-bank had brought him to an absolute halt at Qazi-keria, opposite Bhagalpur. Early in December he resumed his advance, forced a passage across the Kushi, swept away a Shujaite detachment under Sayyid Taj-ud-din of Barha, Jamal Ghorī, and Khwajah Mishki, which barred his path, and was in full march from the north-west towards Malda, (by 20th December). Shuja at Nashipur heard this dismal news in the night of 26th December and at once beat a retreat towards Suti, intending to cross the Ganges there and fall back on Tanda.*

§ 11. Mir Jumla gives chase to Shuja.

Mir Jumla had been waiting for this development. He now sprang forward in pursuit. Starting at 9 A.M. next day, he sighted the fugitive enemy behind a nala flanked with swamps. After an ineffectual artillery duel, Shuja fled from his position next morning, at 3 A.M. Very timely reinforcements with artillery, material, 700 rockets, and 12 lakhs of Rupees now reached Mir Jumla from the Court. At sunrise he crossed the nala, continued the chase, and at night halted at Fatihpur, 8 miles behind the enemy’s former position. Next morning (28th December), he advanced further, and came upon the enemy’s army beyond Chilmari, near Suti.

Four or five days passed in a fruitless exchange of fire, the men on both sides standing to arms all day; but there was no fight at close quarters, though the scouts and patrols had daily skirmishes. Nurul Hasan now deserted to the imperialists. In the night of 1st January, 1660, Shuja fled northwards to Dunapur, and thence in great disorder and confusion to Dogachi, Mir Jumla following hot at his heels, though delayed by bad roads, nala and broken bridges. By this rapid march the imperial general had outstripped

* Alamgirnamah, 513, 514, 524-526; Masum, 134a.

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his heavy artillery, and so when the enemy turned at bay behind the nala of Dogachi, his men shrank from forcing a passage across in the face of Shuja's big guns. He therefore advanced by the left side towards Rajmahal (2nd January), Shuja marching parallel to him on the other side of the nala, with the Ganges on his right. That prince was now in a terrible dilemma; how could he cross the Ganges so close to an active enemy? If he went over first, his army would desert him; and if they were transported before him, he would be captured by the enemy. So he dug a deep moat round his camp, entrenched, mounted guns, and then marched over the Ganges with this whole army by a bridge of boats, (9th January).

Next morning, Mir Jumla at Dogachi, hearing the news, pushed forward a detachment to occupy Rajmahal and open the riverside road to Mungir, which had been so long closed by the enemy. On 11th January, the imperialists recovered Rajmahal. The whole country west of the Ganges was now lost to Shuja for ever. It only remained to crush his power on the eastern side of the river.*

* A. N. 526-532; Masum (134a) is extremely brief; Aqil (101-103) evidently refers to this stage of the war; but there is probably a gap after p. 100 in the A. S. B. MS. of Aqil Khan which I have used.
§ 1. The military situation in Bengal in 1660.

Preparations were quickly made for invading the eastern bank of the Ganges, and events moved apace. Daud Khan had now arrived at a place on the left bank of the Ganges, some 16 miles north of Rajmahal. A contingent of 2,500 Afghans under Dilir Khan had been sent by the Emperor to reinforce the army in Bengal. These crossed the Ganges (9th January, 1660) at the ferry of Kadamati* and joined Daud Khan. Another equally necessary sinew of war reached Mir Jumla in the form of seventeen lakhs of Rupees from the Court. [A. N. 533.]

Last year Mir Jumla had attempted to cross the Ganges near Suti and march north-eastwards on Tanda, i.e., to attack Shuja from the south-west. This was a bad plan, as it involved the crossing of one large and many smaller rivers close to the enemy’s position and in the teeth of his powerful flotilla. It was rendered impossible by Mir Jumla’s lack of boats. This year his plan of campaign was brilliantly novel; he would attack the enemy from the opposite point, i.e., the north-east. He would make a wide detour round the enemy’s position. He would cross the Ganges 10 miles above Rajmahal, join Daud Khan near Akbarpur (due east of Sikrigali), pass over the shallow upper courses of the Mahananda and some nalas, reach Malda, and then turn sharply south, cross the Mahananda again, swoop down upon Tanda from the east, and thus completely encircle Shuja in his net. All the while he would keep a screen of men in front of the enemy’s trenches along the Kalindi river, and deceive him with feints. Shuja’s position was a long line, stretching north-west to south east, from Samda†

*K. K. ii. 93. Kadamala is 9 m. due n.n. e. of Rajmahal (Indian Atlas, Sh. 112). The Alamgirnamah gives its alternative name as Dodha (which I cannot find in the maps).

†Samdah is given in Rennell, Sh. 2 & 16. Chauki Mirdadpur (Indian Atlas, 112), is 8 m. east of Rajmahal. Tanda is Tarrah in Rennell, Sh. 16, about 4 m.
The end of Shuja

(opposite Rajmahal) to his base at Tanda, south-west of the ruins of Gaur. His head-quarters were at Chauki-Mirdadpur, in the middle of this line. There was an off-shoot of defences north-eastwards to Malda. Mir Jumla’s plan, therefore, was to describe a semi circle round this line, from the north of Rajhamal through Malda to Tanda or Tartipur. It was only his immense superiority in number (five times the strength of his enemy) that enabled him to carry out such a vast turning movement while holding the western bank of the Ganges in force.

The Mughal general first posted troops at various points from Sikrigali to Suti to guard the right bank and prevent a repetition of the enemy’s blow of last year. Then, with the help of the 160 boats brought from Patna by Daud Khan, he carried his army over the three streams into which the Ganges was split up near Kadamtali, some 9 miles north of Rajmahal (15th Jan.—7th Feb.), and joined hands with Daud Khan. But the big char (island) of Samda, east of Rajmahal, remained his head-quarters till 29th February.* The two generals now co-operated to distract the enemy and converge on Malda.

The rest of the story is soon told. Shuja offered an obstinate resistance along the banks of the Kalindi and the Mahananda. But he was hopelessly outnumbered from the first. The imperialists were delayed only by their lack of boats, and by the dense jungles and countless nalas that barred their path; their only losses were from drowning. The enemy were too few to face them in the open plain, and no more pitched battles took place. The details of the marching and counter-marching through this labyrinth of nalas are neither interesting nor instructive to the student of the art of war. It will suffice to trace the outline only.

Shuja had built a wall and a double line of entrenchments along the Kalindi (a branch of the Mahananda) barring Mir Jumla’s direct route to Tanda. But the latter made a feint in his front, turned the enemy’s flank by a swift march northwards, and safely

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west of the fort among the ruins of Gaur. Tartipur is the Toortepoor of Indian Atlas, Sh. 119.

*A. N., 534-536; Aqil, 103; Masum, 134b.
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crossed both the easternmost branch of the Ganges and the Mahananda. He now despatched a column towards Malda on the eastern bank of the Mahananda, (8th February.) [A. N. 537-541; Masum, 135.]

Ruin now stared Shuja in the face. On his west stretched the Mughal lines from Rajmahal to Suti; on his north they occupied various points from Samda to the Mahananda, and now another force was moving southwards to hem him round on the east and finally to cut off his only line of retreat in the south. At this time Prince Muhammad deserted him and sneaked back into the Mughal camp at Dogachi as secretly as he had left it, (8th February). The luckless youth was sent closely guarded to his relentless father and doomed to sigh out the remainder of his life in a captive cell of the rock-prison of Gwalior. Only four years before his death did he gain even a limited amount of liberty and transfer to the prison of Salimgarh (Delhi).

§ 2. Mir Jumla advances on Malda.

On 29th February Mir Jumla finally left Samda, and on 6th March reached Malda. At Mahmudabad, a few miles below Malda he spent a month in active preparation for his crowning stroke. "He bade adieu to ease and rest, spending days and nights in exertion, in order to dispose of Shuja, and prevent the war from being dragged on till the coming of the rainy season,"—which would mean the loss of another year. A short distance further down the stream was the ferry of Bholahat, where a detachment under Dilir Khan was entrenched. Four miles below it an obscure ford was discovered, which the enemy had neglected to guard well. The water was shallow for only a thin strip across, but very deep on both sides.

Everything being ready, Mir Jumla left Mahmudabad at

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*A. N., 542-544, 546; K. K. ii. 99-100. The Poem asserts that Sultan’s flight was due to his wounded vanity at Shuja having summoned Sayyid Alam from Dacca to his aid.

†Alamgirnamah, 547 & 548. This work as well as the Poem (544, 545, 547, &c.) (pells the name as Baghaht. From the bearings given it must be Bholahat sIndian Atlas, Sh. 119, &c. Rennell, Sh. 16).
3 A.M. on 5th April, united with Dilir Khan’s force on the way, and after a march of 10 miles down the bank came to the ford at dawn. The enemy were taken by surprise; they had posted only a small force with some guns on the opposite bank. Without a moment’s delay the imperialists began to ford. The leaders drove their elephants into the water; then the cavalry plunged in. “The soldiers rushed into the river from right and left, and rear, troop after troop like a succession of waves.” All order was gone; many swerved aside to avoid the enemy’s shower of shot and bullet. In the rush of so many men and beasts the water was thrown into waves, the sand was kicked away, the two lines of sticks which marked the borders of the ford were knocked off, and the right track was lost. The smoke of gunpowder darkened the sky. Vast numbers went beyond their depth on the two sides. Swimming was impossible for mail-clad troopers on barbed horses. More than a thousand brave soldiers were drowned—Fatih, the son of Dilir Khan, a heroic Afghan youth of 20, being among them.*

But even this heavy price was worth paying for the passage across.† It was the decisive move of the campaign. All was now over with Shuja. His men, after some hours’ fight, evacuated their trenches on the bank, leaving all their guns behind. Reinforcements under Sayyid Alam and Prince Buland Akhtar arrived when it was too late, and they fled at the sight of the triumphant Mughals. The prince hastened to Tanda in distraction. Sayyid Alam carried the dismal news to Shuja at Chauki-Mirdadpur.

*This is the estimate of the Alamgirnامah (550). Masum has “about 2,000,” Aqil “nearly 3,000 men,” and the Poem 3,500 troopsrs. Descriptions of this disastrous fording are given in Masum, 161, K. K. ii. 94-97, and A. N., 548-551. From the Poem it seems to have been a long affair and not much of a surprise.

†The heavy loss of men, however, did one harm to Mir Jumla. He could not with decency leave the dead uncared for, and so he had to spend the whole of that day in “dredging the river for the corpses of the drowned men” to give them burial. Otherwise, he could have made a dash for Tanda immediately after fording, and captured Shuja’s capital in the afternoon of 5th April, while Shuja was still at Mirdadpur, ignorant of Mir Jumla’s crossing. Then Shuja would have been caught there instead of gaining a day (6th April), for his escape to Dacca. Thus the loss of a single day at this critical time altered the history of the prince and saved Aurangzib from another act of fratricide.
§ 3. Shuja’s flight from Malda to Dacca.

The imperialists were now on the right bank of the Mahananda with nothing but eleven miles of road and the narrow brook of the Bhagirathi (or Bagmati) between them and Tanda. Swift must be Shuja’s flight to Dacca, if he did not wish to see the net completely drawn round him and his only path of retreat cut off from the south. Dazed at the news, he held a hurried consultation with Mirza Jan Beg, who gave him the only advice possible in this case,—“You should cling to nothing here, but flee at once to avoid capture.” So, at nightfall he hastened back from Chauki-Mirdadpur to Tanda. [Masum, 162a.]

Then ensued all the sad and sickening scenes which attend a sudden fall from power and the hurried flight of vanquished princes. Shuja reached Tanda at dawn (6th April), alighted in a garden outside the city, and immediately proceeding to the harem ordered his Begams to come away at once “without waiting even to change their dress.”* By great exertions and constant supervision he loaded his treasure in two strong boats (ghurabs), and a selection from his property and stores in two others, and sent them off. Then leaving Tanda for ever, he went to the river bank at 4 A. M. and embarked. His two younger sons, (Buland Akhtar and Zain-ul-abidin), his chiefs, Mirza Jan Beg, Sayyid Alam of Barha, Sayyid Quli Uzbek, and Mirza Beg, a few soldiers, servants, and eunuchs, —300 men in all —accompanied him in 60 boats (kosas.) This was the sole remnant of the splendid Court amidst which he had ruled three provinces, and the vast army with which he had twice contested the throne of Delhi! The other officers and servants parted from the victim of misfortune, and went their own way. [A. N. 552.]

The 6th of April was a very busy day with Mir Jumla. Early in the morning he set out from the fatal ford towards Tanda, but on the way turned sharply to the left to cut off Shuja’s retreat at Tartipur on the Ganges. Hastening thither with a light division, he seized 400 loaded boats of the enemy’s flotilla, left a detachment

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*Masum, 162a. Here the work ends abruptly.
in charge, and then with only 400 troopers, made a forced march backwards to Tanda, arriving there at midnight.

He was not a minute too early. All through that day Tanda had been a scene of wild terror and confusion. The soldiers, deserted by their master, roved about in disorder, plundering his un guarded property. Treasure loaded on 6 elephants and 12 camels, which was being taken by the eunuch Sandal (the custodian of Shuja's toshak-khanah) to the bank for embarkation, was looted by the ruffians, as also were some led-horses of the prince. "Men ran about in disorderly groups. Great tumult and confusion prevailed. Everyone plundered what he could lay hold of."

But next day (7th April) Mir Jumla restored order; he seized for the Government all the property he found, and worked hard to recover what the ruffians of the army had looted. The women left behind were taken care of; guards were posted round the harem, and its officers and eunuchs ordered to do their duties as before. [4. N. 552.]

The fugitive prince could not keep all that he was carrying off. Mughal troops had now hastened to the bank along his route down the river. His two treasure-laden ghurabs were seized at Tartipur, and 30 boats of his flotilla (with many officers and men on board) were captured at Sherpur and Hazrahati. His servants, who had refused to part from their families merely to show an unavailing devotion to a ruined man, now submitted to the victor (9th April), and were graciously taken into the imperial service. Two of them, Mir Murtaza of the artillery and Ibn Husain of the flotilla, afterwards covered themselves with glory in the Assam war and the capture of Chatgaon.

§ 4. Shuja's flight from Dacca to Arracan.

After spending twelve days in settling matters at Tanda and organising an administration for the conquered districts, Mir Jumla left it for Tartipur (19th April). Thence he set off next day by land for Dacca. [4. N. 554-555.]

On 12th April, Shuja reached Dacca, a bankrupt in fame and fortune. But it was to be no asylum to him. The zamindars were
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all up against him, and he was too weak either to chastise them or
to face Mir Jumla, who was coming hot foot on his trail. He had
already begged succour from the pirate king of Arracan, but no
reply had yet come. The near approach of the imperialists, however,
left him no choice. On 6th May, he bade farewell even to his eastern
capital and with his family and a few faithful nobles and servants
glided down from Dacca to Dhapa, 8 miles southwards. Next day he
reached Sripur (probably short for Srirampur). At every stage
soldiers and boatmen deserted him in large numbers; even his old
ministers and confidential servants forsook their doomed master.
On the 8th, shortly after leaving Sripur, he met 51 Magh and
Feringi boats, (jalbas), sent by the governor of Chatgaon under
orders of the king of Arracan.

Next morning starting from the pargana of Lakhi-deh (=Lakhi-
pur), he halted 8 miles from the fort of Bhalua,* and made a mad
effort to secure its surrender by inviting it’s commandant to an
interview and then treacherously imprisoning him. But the party
sent by him with the captive commandant’s letter ordering his
men to surrender the fort, was attacked and captured by the
garrison.

On 11th May a Magh general arrived from Chatgaon with three
more ships. Seeing Shuja’s power hopelessly broken and his fortune
gone, he refused to support his wild plan of an assault on the fort
of Bhalua. An open quarrel broke out between the fallen prince
and his barbarous allies. They frankly told him, “Our king had
ordered us to help you in fight, if you had any chance of success or
held a single fort. But you cannot take even Bhalua unaided! So,
you had better at once start in our ships for Arracan, or we shall
leave you alone and return to our country.” The cup of Shuja’s
misery was now full. He abandoned all hope and steeled his heart
to accept the former of these terrible alternatives and embark for
Arracan. [4. N. 556-561.]

The news spread consternation among his family and followers.
The piracy of the Arracanese of Chatgaon in the rivers of East

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* Dhapa is given as Daapeka Kella in Rennell, Sh. 12. Sripur is evidently
Serampur, and Lakhideh Luckipour of Rennell, Sh. 9. Bhalua is Rennell’s
Bulloorah, 10 m. s. e. of Luckipour.