ON THE STUDY OF SOCIOLINGUISTIC PROBLEMS IN THE BENGALI LANGUAGE AREA

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Most scholars of the Bengali language treat the development of language as a process closely connected with that of society. Among such scholars the first to be mentioned is undoubtedly, Suniti Kumar Chatterji. Therefore, Soviet indologists (the author of this article inclusive) in their study of problems of sociolinguistics again and again turn to the writings of Chatterji, first and foremost, to his two-volume work, “The Origin and Development of the Bengali Language.”

Sociolinguistics has largely attracted the attention of Soviet indologists of late not only due to the rise of the general interest of Soviet linguists towards the subject under study, but, primarily, because of the immense wealth the Indian subcontinent has to offer in this respect. In all probability, as regards the Bengali language area, to-day there hardly exists a sociolinguistic problem that can be underscored. Here can be named such problems as the interaction of the two functional styles of the Bengali language, “sādhu bhāṣā” and “calit bhāṣā”—or the role of jargon languages, namely, the bazaar Hindustani, or the part of various language sources in building up terminology, and lastly, the problem of Bengali-English bilingualism, and many others.

The diachronic analysis of the language situation (LS) calls for marking off some certain sociolinguistic periods, which do not fully coincide with the intralinguistic periods traditionally observed in the history of development of the Bengali language.

Traditionally, the history of Bengali is known to comprise three periods: (1) the Old Bengali period (950-1200), (2) the
Middle Bengali period (1200-1800) and (3) the Modern Bengali period (1800-present day).

Although in the division into these periods sociolinguistic factors were not entirely overlooked, (thus, inside the Middle Bengali period a special Transitional Middle Period is usually singled out, which is connected with the early Moslem conquests; then again, the beginning of the Modern Bengali period is known to have been attributed to the opening of the Indian college Fort William), yet they were least of all decisive, those decisive being hall-marks of a purely linguistic nature, basically, i.e., those accompanying the development of literature, such as: the appearance of the first literary monuments, of the first complete poetic texts, of the first prose works etc.

The sociolinguistic division into periods, given in this article, should, on the one hand, reflect the macrolevel changes inside the LS, and, on the other hand, the corresponding microlevel changes (i.e., of a directly linguistic character, that must be discussed separately), and it only partly overlaps with the interlinguistic division. It is caused by different approaches to the same material: facts that are relevant in intralinguistics can turn out to be either irrelevant or insufficient in sociolinguistics, and vice versa, the sociolinguistic analyses can be based upon such markers that do not work in the field of intralinguistics. Thus, bearing in mind that the diachronic analysis presupposes to give the background of the description of modern LS, one should agree that the subdivision of the history of the Bengali language into Old Bengali and Middle Bengali is not of great importance from the viewpoint of sociolinguistics. At the same time the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century (i.e. the time of the final settling of Britishees in India) which also opens the period of New or Modern Bengali according to the intralinguistic classification, is very important for the sociolinguistic approach as well, for the problems brought to light in that period remain equally significant for the present LS. Moreover, the general period, dealt with in intralinguistics as the New or Modern Bengali period, is to be treated from the
sociolinguistical viewpoint as one made up of separate periods, proceeding from the part the Bengali language area takes in the respective administrative-political unity: as a part of British India, as a part of the independent state of Pakistan, or as the independent state of Bangladesh. It follows, that it is advisable to keep to the following subdivision in giving a diachronic description of sociolinguistic problems, particularly, of the LS: 1st period—LS of the Bengali language area in precolonial India (950-1800), 2nd period—LS of the Bengali language area in British India (1800-1947), 3rd period—LS of the Bengali language area in the independent states of India and Pakistan (1947-1971), 4th period—LS in the independent state of Bangladesh.

If one holds, that LS is the correlation of different languages (local, regional, international, etc.), which make it possible for people inside a certain administrative unit to communicate, the very interrelation of these different language units can be represented as a kind of pyramid with local languages and dialects for its base, its middle part consisting of regional languages, and, the top made up of macrointermediary languages. The diachronic analysis of the LS of Bengali language area proves to show that it is the bottom part of the pyramid, that tends to remain unchangeable, whereas, on the contrary, its top part is most flexible. Each of the periods singled out above differs not merely by the changes inside the respective layer, but by the specific interrelationship between layers.

During the first period the bottom layer gets filled. It is filled with the Bengali territorial dialects, which are subdivided by the Bengali linguists into four very different groups (especially the dialects of the Vanga group).¹

¹ The sociolinguistic viewing of the problem explains why all these numerous language formations happen to be dialects of no other than the Bengali language (despite their obvious structural differences), and those who speak the dialects consider themselves Bengalees; whereas Oria and especially, Assamese, which have so much in common with the Bengali language, are to be treated as separate languages; Maithili, Magahi and Bhojpuri, so closely related with the oriental group of new Indo-European languages (Bengali-Oria-Assamese), did not become dialects of these languages.
During this period the middle layer gets but partly filled—by the Bengali Literary Language “sādhu bhāṣā” (the second component of this layer, i.e., the Standard Colloquial Bengali, or “calit bhāṣā”, is formed later).

The Moslem conquest of Bengal belongs to the same period. Sociolinguistically this period is of interest in that it has put an end to the social isolation of the Bengali language area and has given rise to close contacts inside social structures and their respective languages.

The Persian language, which is becoming the macrointermediary-language on the territory of the whole of India and in Bengal, in particular, is in the top layer of the pyramid.

Hence, up till the end of the 18th century the structure of the LS pyramid was as follows:

![Diagram of the pyramid with three layers: The Persian Language, Sādhu Bhasha, and Territorial Dialects.]

The second period can be at large called “colonial”; it lasted from the early days of the settling of Britishers in India up to 1947, the year of their retreat from the land. The specific traits of the LS of the Bengali language area of this period are: the change of the macrointermediary language, i.e. the change in the top layer and the appearance of a second element in the middle layer.

The English language fills the top layer. There appears a second element in the middle layer—i.e. the Standard Colloquial Bengali.
As is known, the latter stemmed from the dialects of Calcutta and its neighbouring areas. Alongside with the growth of the economic and cultural significance of Calcutta the importance of this group of dialects also increased. It is the social-economic development that has caused the spread of the Calcutta colloquial standard of speech and has made the latter the language of the educated, functioning in situations that can be qualified as official. Local languages (dialects) are usually spoken at home and by the speakers of the same dialect region.

Speaking of the interrelation of the two functional styles ("sādhu" and "calit") S. K. Chatterji writes: "The speech of the upper classes in the Western part of the Delta and in Eastern Rādha gave the literary language to Bengal, and now the educated colloquial of this tract, especially of the cities of Nadiya and Calcutta, has become, the standard one for Bengali, having come to the position which educated Southern English now occupies in Great Britain and Ireland." 2

Thus, in the second period the LS pyramid looked like this: the base of the pyramid was still made up of dialects, the middle layer comprised two functional styles the Literary Bengali ("sādhu") and the Standard Colloquial Bengali ("calit") whereas English was the macrointermediary.

The third period begins in 1947, after the division of the subcontinent into two independent states—India and Pakistan, which led to the inclusion of West Bengal into India, and East Bengal into Pakistan, later called East Pakistan. Now it is the matter not only of separate changes in a certain layer of the pyramid, but of its complete change—to be more exact, of the necessity to build two pyramids—one for West Bengal and the other for East Pakistan, instead of a single pyramid, modelling the LS of the whole Bengali language area.

The LS pyramid of West Bengal resembles the one of the whole Bengali language area in the second period, the sole difference being the presence of Hindi together with English in the top layer.

As to the part of Bengal, joined to Pakistan after 1947, its LS has undergone essential changes, which, in a way, have told on all the layers.

The division of the Bengali language area separated the Bengali language of East Pakistan from the Calcutta dialect from which it has stemmed historically. According to Bengali scholars the Bengali “calit-bhāṣā” always presented a great difficulty to the Eastern Dialect speakers, especially its system of verbal forms. After the separation, the inhabitants of East Pakistan had their reasons for regarding the Standard Form of the Bengali colloquial language as the “calit-bhāṣā” of the Indian part of Bengal. Hence, dialect forms started speedily
penetrating into the Bengali of East Pakistan. "Intellectuals are found engaged in discussing economics, philosophy, art, politics (that is in situations which are official enough—L. Ts.), all in a language not definitely the same old SCB". It was believed that the Dacca-Mymensing dialect was apt to become the base-dialect of East Pakistan Standard Bengali, considering the growth of Dacca as an administrative and cultural centre of East Pakistan and, hence, the rise of the social prestige of the Dacca dialect. One can very well trace the very same path of Bengali calit bhāśā, based on the dialects of Calcutta and its neighbouring regions.

One can try to apply the LS scheme suggested by M. Chowdhuri in his article, "The Language Problem in East Pakistan", and also present it in the form of a pyramid; then on one shall get the following:

![Diagram of linguistic strata]

[M : The modified dialect form used outside home]

In 1971 the new independent state of Bangladesh was formed, that has caused the opening of a fourth LS period.

The bottom layer remains like in the previous period to be filled by territorial dialects. There is no longer any need of a Non-Bengali macrointermediary. The same as before the middle layer is filled by the two functional styles of the Bengali language, i.e. by "calit" and "sādhu"; the diachronic study has

proved that, of the two styles as one should expect, it is the Bengali calit-bhāṣā, which is more “susceptible” to all sort of social changes.

The Colloquial Bengali in Bangladesh to-day undergoes certain changes under the influence of various extralinguistic factors, the main, in all probability, being:

(a) the increase of the social prestige of the Dacca dialect, caused by the fact that Dacca has turned into the capital of an independent state (from its former position of the capital of East Pakistan);

(b) the fact that the majority of population are Moslems—a fact that largely contributes to the enrichment of Persian-Arabic borrowings.
INDEXATIVE FUNCTIONS OF LANGUAGE

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Heuristic

1. What follows is a sequel to [5] and continues the immanent critique of the neo-Prague theory of language begun in [4] and [5]. The focus remains on Jakobson's [8] Metalingual Function, which, I believe, may be seen as a nexus of two functions, one (Metastructural) geared to a metadiscourse which spells out language structure (phonology, grammar, semology) and the other (Metafunctional) to a laying bare of the social psychological matrix of language use. The focal question this time is going to be: how do the Metalingual functions behave when they are not central—that is, when the message or text under consideration is not as such an instance of metalanguage?

2. A possible answer, of course, is that they don't; that they only come into the picture if there is metadiscourse as such. The purpose of this paper is to explore another alternative. Maybe, after all, it would be nice if we could in some way or other keep all language functions busy in every speech act (just as phonology, grammar, and semology are all omniactive in this sense), although only one or two at a time can be 'nuclear' (fully on duty). Here the initial heuristic, then, derives from a spot of abduction. The other five Jakobson functions enjoy omnipresence. So the Metalinguals should, too, and in a similar way, that is, by being nuclearized (focused on) or satellited (backgrounded) to a varying extent. Let us look at a typical Jakobson function and see in detail how it manages its omnipresence. The Conative function will serve as our example.

3. Conative, the primordial appeal to the assistative listener
which comes to the fore in imperatives and related interjections, undergoes satellitization in the questionary mood. In this and allied questive regions of mood, Conative becomes a less directional appeal to some compathetic hearer who is expected, if not to help actively, at least to participate in the solution or the contemplation of the ‘negativity’ (to use one of Sartre’s [13] coinages) at issue—the problem, doubt, possibility, or desideratum—on the non-actional (pre-practical) plane of conceptual diagnosis, dialogical treatment (analysis, critique, and synthesis), and planning⁴. The situation in this light, of course, attracts an illustrious bunch of relevant ideas on this ambiguity-laden mode of interpersonality—from Winnicott’s transitional objects and Erikson’s play epistemology back to Freud and Adler’s classical dream theory and G. H. Mead’s generalized Other. However, instead of going directly into those ideas, it is possible to stop at the notion of interpersonality and look at it more closely. Does it necessarily presuppose a situation involving more than one Person? There is a sense in which you have to have at least two actors for a field to qualify as interpersonal. But this needn’t always be a ‘strong’, social sense; to assume that it must be is to take the position from which Freud appears to have posited a pseudo-interpersonal dynamic in the individual mind. The weaker sense I have in mind is better expressed by the words actant and interactantial. Even if the actual situation is not a social field, the semiological act, intrinsically communicative, sets up a penumbral role of interlocutor or dialogue-partner. A modern reading of Kerchevskij’s classic work on intonation [9] leads to the insight that this relation of the speaker-pole to the linguistic partner (whose linguistic status is in principle independent of actual sociality) provides the medium for all those delicate adjustments of sentence form and cadence which are not easy to morphize into unsituated description of structure: stress-tone contour, saturation contour (‘Functional Sentence Perspective’), anaphora, presupposition and allegation (Hajicová [7]), parenthesis and parataxis. In addition, to come back to the fading of the primordial appeal in questive speech, the modal
component of AUX has just about everything to do with interactance.

4. Before I carry this any further, I should point out the shift of ground that has taken place in course of this discussion. We started out from a notion of Conative oriented towards the listener. But the satellitical Conative of questive speech seems to be no less intently geared to the speaker’s attitude towards the interactance. That is to say, in a sense, Conative has joined Emotive in a deeper phatic-like unity. This is a significant result. It destroys any simple hope of finding a structure like

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
\text{REFERENTIAL} & \text{POETIC} & \text{METAFUNCTIONAL} \\
2 & 2 & 2 \\
3 & 3 & 3 \\
\end{array}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
\text{EMOTIVE} & \text{METASTRUCTURAL} & \text{CONATIVE} \\
2 & 2 & 2 \\
3 & 3 & 3 \\
\end{array}
\]

where ‘1’ is the highlighted version (for Conative: the version that shows up in requestives), ‘2’ the diluted version (: in questives), ‘3’ the pervasive version (: in all utterings). The reason this won’t do is not that three points on the nuclearity scale is too few. It is that, for Emotive, Conative, and Phatic, a more complex relation holds, somewhat in the direction of

\text{EMOTIVE PHATIC CONATIVE}

\text{INTERLOCUTIVE.}

Clearly, given these new bearings, a corresponding realignment is called for in the heuristic. We must expect a complexity which is more than depth.

\text{Leading up to the focus}

5. Thus chastened, we come back to the tentative notion of actant, now ready to notice something transcendentally interesting about it. The two linguistic actants in a speech situation
may be the same person—the First Person—at different moments. Talking about humour, paradox and ambiguity, Gregory Bateson[2] points out that this translogical ability of an individual to play contradictory roles one after another underlies many of the non-type-theoretic features of natural language. The 'translogic' of such language use bears an ambivalent partial resemblance to the 'dialogic' which governs metadiscourse, Barbara Hall Partee [11] has shown, essentially as it does technically straightforward dialogue. This ambivalent relation may also be said to hold between, say, Marx's 'objectification' and 'alienation', or between true bilingualism and everyday multistylistism (à la Firth, Prague school, Pike, Weinreich, Labov); but the point is better made without use of misleading analogies: in contrast to the clear two-speaker situations characteristic of conversation and quotation, moment-lasting linguistic actants are free to be just about as numerous as the specifier elements in a discourse. Actant differentiation based on time seriality, because it doesn't involve a fundamental divergence, tends to be cheap and ad hoc.

6. This is the zone of language where endophoric deixis (Halliday's term for word-word as opposed to word-thing (exophoric) indexicality) has a field day. It will be realized that, along the lines of the parable we have been spinning, anaphora, for example, can be handled, to put it very crudely, by imagining the actant 'of' the specifier of the antecedent and the actant 'of' the pro-word pointing to each other; other actants may wear their presuppositions on their sleeves; and so on across the board. Even if we find reasons for not taking quite such a free-for-all dustcloud view of actant production and stick to what seems plausible—that every underlying clause centre may subtend at least one autonomous-actor-like 'centre of responsibility for this predication'—, the dialectical tention, the power ('Communicative Dynamism') play among even these less radical actants can be simply fascinating. Such could be the beginning of a linguistic response to C. Wright Mills' problem of fleshing out a socialness-of-mind theory without consigning logic to the
dustbin. Dialectics does not supersede, overcome, suspend, or transcend logic. Dialectics (translogic) is the interactance in a syntagm of differentiated, constructural actants; logic is the coactance of a field of comfunctional, allied actants which are trying to be consistent, to beat time or anaesthetize it in the manner of a formal-logical system with type-theoretic and Goedelian consequences. Both have their root in natural language use. After all, 'error, correction, forget, remind' are ordinary concepts.

7. All this, of course, can go on and on. But it only makes as much sense as the procedure of starting from an isolated Foreground Conative and going into its Diluted, Interlocutive basis. Such abstract journeys are theoretically extremely risky, because, unlike even the much-criticized Husserlian bracketing, the method of severally following up each factor of a complex phenomenon to determine the contribution it makes to the whole simply brings the likelihood down of our ever getting to know how to put Humpty together again. That's why these ideas about actance shouldn't be taken too seriously; at best, they say as much about how ideation-and-representation really works as a series of suitably placed tangents does about a curve—they provide a set of co-ordinates that embed the idea of 'interlocutivity within a monologue' in a transtextual, psychosocial and protophilosophical milieu, and also help spell out the potential contribution of actance theory to an adequate understanding of textuality. The progress of a text is among other things an intricate mesh of specific ignorings, recalls, encapsulations, and dismissals; one of the major controllers of this selective-storage-differential-retrieval-end alteration game seems to be endophoric deixis embodied in the actant system.

8. Knowing the pitfalls of tracing Focal functions back to their alleged Pervasive presence, we will not try to subject our Nuclear Metalinguals to some process of satellitation which might seem to us to parallel the transition from Focal Conative to Diluted Conative (the Interlocutive). Let us instead move on to a group of phenomena which appear to dovetail in interest-
ing ways with the actant system, are suitably deictic, and more or less qualify for the office of backgrounded counterpart to the Metalinguals. What I have in mind is the set of revolutionary ideas proposed in Binodbihari Mukherji’s analysis, in the Poet-painters Issue of Visvabharati Patrika, of the relation between the fact and content of Rabindranath Tagore’s painting and his poetry since Lipika. He pays no attention to the suggestion in vogue—that the archetypal images of ennui and existential negativity, long held in check by a deeply ingrained layer of Brahmo decency and the essentially nonnegative tone of Bāṅglā poetry, became so potent and vivid in Rabindranath’s sesquagenarian mind, roused all at once by a primordial emotional experience in 1924, that they forced themselves on to the canvas—and persuasively argues instead that there was a specific development, at the end of Rabindranath’s lyrical phase, in his verbal art as such which drew him into working with visual form; this development was in the direction of greater ‘naturalness’, ornament-shedding. It is well known that Rabindranath’s first contribution to Bāṅglā poetry was a formal one: the new architectonic of verse shape in which readers discovered what they had tacitly known but never heard, the rhythmic system that ‘proceeds from the unconscious dynamic habit of the language, falling from the lips of the folk’ (Sapir [12] : 230); there was a substantive follow-up in his prolix explorations of theme and mind along the route which Sapir calls (225) ‘the method of Shakespeare and Heine’ in which ‘there is no effect of strain’. Their personal “intuition” appears as a completed synthesis of the absolute art of intuition (in this connection Sapir alludes to Whitman) ‘and the innate, specialized art of the linguistic medium’ (for which Swinburne is the ideal-type). Having successfully laid bare the dually patterned structure of Bāṅglā, a project which had made some headway in pre-Rabindric times, Rabindranath (on this view of his aesthetic development) proceeded to take part in the worldwide contemporary effort to go beyond style and express the preidiomatic truth of being. This Steinerian [14] view of his later work, redolent of Heidegger, Kafka, and Schoenberg, quite legitimately (to my mind)
conceives of Rabindranath as reflecting on the aletheutical ground of what he had achieved so far, trying to follow cognitively and artistically the potentionomy, the possibility-space which endowed his literations with meaning, and forging a new, originary idiom that would be pretechnical enough to bear the richness of his travels within Sapir’s (: 224) ‘[pervasively present] larger, more intuitive linguistic medium than any particular language’—the ground of all idiom. This seems to me a fair reading of the transstylistic implicates of Rabindranath’s later handling of form to which Sankha Ghosh has drawn our attention in Chhander Bārāndā.

Homage

9. I deem it particularly fitting that this attempt to show in what way the best traditional sensibility of Bānglā literature can serve to enrich the technical infrastructure of a theory of language function should be offered to Suniti Kumar, who like his great contemporaries Edward Sapir and Roman Jakobson is as firmly grounded in the nonliteral discipline of literary scholarship as he is familiar with the grammatical development of languages. The work and style of these ambidextrous scholars stands as a monumental reminder of the possibility of explaining complex language patterns in beautiful and lucid prose. It may be the case that linguists have turned towards a technical esoterism because of the inherent difficulty of the problems they decided to encounter after World War Two, and that ‘as the dust settles’ they will again be able to speak intelligibly to the literate public. But exclusive pursuit of formal and technical goals may tend to lead linguists away from the scholarship of the literati and thus deprive them of insights which could have met some of the research needs within the autonomous theory of language.

The Point

10. When Binodbihari seeks to relate Rabindranath’s poetic development to his career in the graphic arts, the common motif he accentuates is that of gesture\(^8\). Gesture is nature’s semiosis—the trees frozen into classical mudrās, bees exchang-
ing iconic and deictic signals, and the resonant correspondences Rabindranath’s Vālmīki wonders at in Bhāṣā O Chhanda, are the very stuff of felt truth and rhythm. This mode of communication which does not interpolate between form and reality runs through human speech too as a pervasive secret freshness. When technique-heavy history-bound language needs it, succour is at hand. The fatigued versifier always has natural syntax to come home to. And Rabindranath’s experiments in line and colour gave him that numinous insight into the essence of gesture which later on, during the period when he no longer needed to use antirhyme [1] in order to heighten the verse-free lucidness of his poems, provided the material for Rabindranath’s ‘initiation into rigorous solarity’ which Abu Sayeed Ayyub considers to be more modern than the symbolists.

11. ‘Gesture’ in this special usage (call it Suggesture) isn’t limited to the subject matter of kinesiology or proxemics, nor is the ‘deixis’ that goes into it (henceforth Indexation) a mere un-displaceable set or shifters typified by a finger pointing at a flea or even by an abstract ‘you’ tied to the abstract direction of the speech act. On the other hand, the intuition that Indexation subtends a quasi-interpretive mode of understanding which takes the indexic predication as a signifier valid in itself without referring to a separate interpretant for arbitration as to what it may mean—the intuition that Indexation is not manifested as arbitrariness—, though true and suggestive, is not as such rich enough to establish Binodbihari’s idea as a fecund notion in linguistic function theory. But these considerations serve to define the formulation problem.

12. A first approximation could run as follows.—Indexation in all language use involves two functions: (1) connecting constituents so as to build constitutes, binding constitutes into larger wholes, relating actances both in comfunctional text and in dialogue—in short, the structuration of text rhythm on all levels and the networking of attentional foci; (2) using the same measures formally to hint at the pattern of meaning-bestowing relevances, of what would have to be specific allusions
to the appropriate competence if this function got short-circuited. This formulation is quite comparable to the view that explicit ascriptions of motive and responsibility are compensatory, reflect failure of the mutual transparence that normally leaves no clarification to be desired. A loose equivalent of (2) would be the idea that all units in significant action are implicitly enclosed in nondisapprobatory scare-quotes (or have tagged on to them a noncorrective ‘[sic]’ or just a simple self-declaration, a ‘look at me’) which refer to you-know-which chapter of the book of meaningful nature; a more accurate paraphrase would associate with every constitute C an annunciation ‘C is C’ which is nonempty because, given that a natural language contains its own metalanguage, it may be taken to mean ‘“C” is C’. To rephrase (1) in similar ways, a linguistic performance carries with it as if it were a 3-D tree diagram which has going over the flat tree horizontal identification curves equating (and, arguably, disequating) node and node, branch and branch; or one can speak, as the author did in §6, of every actant wearing her political heart on her sleeve. (Notice that this is a bit misleading, though; if (as ‘sleeve’ suggests) there is explicit attention-drawing, to co-reference, say, by bringing the weight of syntagmatics to bear on an otherwise tacit relation, we have a case of compensatory ascription.) The looser reformulations help bring out an easy-to-miss difference between the notions of relation in absentia and associative relation. The subject-object relation alone is syntagmatic in “John washed himself”: the sameness, though in praesentia, is associative, does not appear in unsupplemented tree structure. Associative relations are all and always cross-branch ties, between neighbouring tree tokens accessible in short-term memory (1) or distant tree types available for allusion but not reference (2). Syntagmatic relations may be ascend-and-descend or ‘part-part’ syntagmatic-proper relations as between “washed” and “himself” or what Benveniste calls integrative relations—assend-or-descend or part-‘whole’ relations as between “washed” and “washed himself”. On this view, Ferdinand De Saussure was less confused than is often believed.
13. This formulation suggests many kinds of follow-up, which the author will run through before drawing attention to something of interest. First, (1) and (2), distinguishable as direct versus abstract gestalting, tie in with the notions of attention and memory. And both tie in, very importantly, with learning and retention. For someone new to a communicative system, every piece of discourse he understands is both a message-intake and a step towards acquiring competent control over as much of the system as the piece exemplifies. For old-timers it is a matter of retention and repair—just as a forest trail is still affected by the two-hundredth traveller using it, as one will find out if it falls into disuse. A second reaction to §12 would be to see all this as a submerged Metastructure and ask, usefully, ‘But how about the Metafunctional pervasion?’ A third reactant yet would try and find out what became of Interlocutive Unity and Poetic in face of all this—and would, in so reacting, force basic revisions in §12 as it stands. A typical question of the second species would be: ‘Metastructure, let us say, pervades all Bangla utterances as a Bangla Spoken Here notice. But how about Speech Going On Here?’

14. The last thing the author has to say, however, is not so much an extension of §12 as an attempt to clarify something crucial in it: the first phrase of (2) as formulated. Think of something else. The verse-poet is not doing two things which dovetail (writing Bangla sentences ‘and’ writing Bangla verse), though in an obvious sense one does owe dual allegiance, to grammar and to poetic form. From this starting point we may move in two directions. (A) A song-composer is at least triloyal. (B) Even a prose writer or ordinary speaker, on the other hand, is at least biregular. To the extent that syntax isn’t semantics, the speaker is both doing pattern and making sense. A generative semantic phrasing of this statement is possible and instructive: ‘to the extent that shallow semantics is not deep’ and so on. Semiotic or existential, monothetic or polythetic, all choice has a hierarchical structure. Perhaps mistakenly, but with most of modern thought, we may view this structure in terms of the filters and constraints of a com-
petence; (1) (2) in § 12 are related roughly as phonology is to grammar. The actor follows, as best he can, the overlap of several distinguishable roads.

NOTES

1 If we doggedly pursue this backgrounding to the bitter end—well, we get a banal conclusion: from the Dilute Conative ‘appreciate the quest’ we pass on to the Pervasive Conative ‘take my message’. Like Hegel’s happy Absolute as sequel to the unhappy consciousness, this comes as an anticlimax. And just as the existentialists, reacting against the trivial-looking finale, came up with the notion of the apparently penultimate stage being actually unsurpassable but always under tension because of the unrelenting subjective effort to sublate it (Kierkegaard’s [10] noneliminable dread, Sartre’s detotality), so also we can, with Collingwood [3] and many modern linguists, regard statements as actually questivity-laden—embedded in the matrix of the question it answers which gives it its meaning—and yet virtually, at a certain level of form, independent of its matrix ( freeing it from it through coaction—§ 6—but logic is never able to have the last word).

2 It would be somewhat irresponsible to suggest that tense, mood, and aspect stood in some sort of vague correspondence with Emotive, Conative, and Referential, but it would serve the purpose of making more precise what is meant in, say, a translation of ‘aspect’ as kāryakāl (‘action-tense’, as against ‘speaker’s tense’). Diathesis (voice/ergation/mediality/causeativity) would soon spoil the neatness of such a picture, unfortunately.

3 The fact that Abanindranath Tagore’s Ālor Phulki makes this motif perfectly explicit suggests fruitful directions in which to continue this inquiry. In contrast to the metaphysic of presence that pervades the Tagores’ work, Protothean Bangla literature from Manik Bandyopadhyay and Sudhír Datta to Shirahendi Mukhopadhyāy, Kamal Kumar Majumdar, and Binay Majumdar, arguably, has conceived of the limits of referential mentality (which essentially stem from the fact that self-validation is an unreachable yet unrenounceable human goal: for Sartre, the project of loving interpraxis dissolves into sado-masochism under a detotalized serial sun; in better comprehended formulations such as type theory, relativity, complementarity, and Goedel’s theorems the specific intellectual gain comes with a shrinking of relevance) as surpassable not through what it sees as regress into immanent meaning, but by purifying the semiotic of the tribe. They confront language on her own nonnatural terms (in Grice’s [6] sense) rather than seek to obviate the problem radically in a serene medium. But that is another story.
COLOPHON

This formulation of indexation, in terms of actance theory and the notion that undisplaceability isn’t crucial, relies on a couple of hunches stemming from discussion with Kashyap Mankodi at Deccan College, Poona, and is partly a response to his Deixis and discourse structure (paper read at the LSI Club meeting on 5 Dec. 1974).

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BRAHUI LATERALS FROM PROTO-DRAVIDIAN \(*_r\)  
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In my earlier treatment (1971) of the Brahui representatives of PDr. \(*_l\), I stated (191, table) that there are examples showing \(r, rr, r, d(?)\), and zero. I dismissed from consideration (185, n. 9) an example which had been suggested, in which Brahui \(lh\), i.e. voiceless \(l\), might represent \(*_l\), on the ground that this would be a unique example. This is the verb pilhing 'to squeeze, wring out, massage, press hard (figurative)', which is obviously cognate with Malto pilqe 'to squeeze', and which in DED was grouped with it in entry 3437 and was separated from entry 3440 *pi\(\)i—(e.g. Ta. pi\(\)i 'to squeeze, press out with hands', Ka. pi\(\)i 'to wring or squeeze out', Te. pi\(\)ucu 'to squeeze, wring, press out'). Krishnamurti (1958, 280, 291) had already grouped the Brahui and Malto items with those of DED 3440, and Burrow (1968, 63, 69) in his treatment of \(*_r\) in Kuru and Malto found Krishnamurti's suggestion probable for Malto at least. In DEN (1972) Burrow and I with a query included the Malto and Brahui items of 3437 in 3440 (thereby deleting entirely the entry 3437 of DED). It now is possible to remove the query from DEN 3440, since there are in fact three clear instances of a Brahui lateral (\(l\) or \(lh\)) representing PDr. \(*_l\), backed by three more instances of Kuru and Malto \(1\) in addition to Malto pilqe. Burrow (1968) had already pointed to these last, and it should have been noted that DED 3537 already contained a queried instance of Brahui \(1\) for \(*_l\). The matter is clinched by the third Brahui example, for which my earlier attempt (1962) to find \(*k\) as an origin for Brahui \(lh\) is now seen to be perverse, since Tiri K. Paramasivam has suggested to me a very persuasive and straightforward new etymology. The whole matter is illustrative of the difficulties
of treating definitively the scanty Dravidian etymological remains of Brahui.

Burrow (1968, 69) found Kurux and Malto 1 for *t in DED 4096, *muruk—‘to be submerged, dive’, Kurux mulux-nā, Malto mulg-r-e; since Parji mulg-, Gaḍba mulg- also have 1, he thought of ‘a fluctuation between -r- and -m- going back to’ Proto-Dravidian. This group of etyma also shows fluctuation between *-r- and *-n-: Kannada munugu (beside munugu), Telugu munugu (and munugu, mungu), Kurux munux-nā; this fluctuation is not uncommon, and is seen e.g. in 3985 Tamil murunku ‘to swallow, devour’, Kurux (Hahn) munx-nā ‘to devour’.

Burrow (1968, 65, 66) cited Kurux nulug-nā ‘to insert a thing into another by a sliding push’, nulgur-nā ‘to creep into’, Malto lulq-e ‘to thrust into’, lulq-r-e ‘to disappear (as in a crowd or jungle), lulq-r-e ‘to hide oneself’, items in DED 3076 *nur- (especially Kannada nurgu ‘to force oneself into, creep into’).

Burrow (1968, 69) compared Malto bal-r-e ‘to slip off, be left behind’ with 4336 *varu- ‘to slip, etc.’; the query for Malto in DEDS may be removed.

The items in DED 3437, 3440, DEN 3440, *pi-, include Malto pilqe and Brahui pilhing; there is also a Brahui item, princing ‘to squeeze’, with metathesis and consequently a different development, for which see my treatment (1971, 192-4).

Now that it is evident that North Dravidian, including Brahui, has instances of laterals for PDr. *t, it is possible to point with a considerable degree of confidence to both the Brahui items in 3537 *puru ‘worm’. One item, pū ‘worm, maggot, caterpillar’ has always seemed clear; I listed it previously (1971, 185) as an instance of the process of zeroing of *t, and discussed it (195) inconclusively since the phonological conditioning is unique in Brahui. The other item in 3537 is pulmak(k)i ‘tapeworm’, which consists of pul and mak(k)i. The latter word is listed independently by Bray (1934, 198) as maki
‘intestinal worm’, though the illustrative sentence given specifies it as ‘thread worm’ in contrast with ‘tapeworm’. Bray’s etymological note on makī connects it with makala ‘leech’, which he derives from Persian makil; Persian or some other Iranian origin is then to be accepted for makī (as was done in DED). On the origin of pul-, Bray was uncertain; his note is: ‘[‘flowering-worm’?] or is pul- older form of pū (cf. Drav. pu/u) preserved in cmpd. ?]. The first suggestion involves Indo-Aryan *phull- ‘flower’ (Turner 1966, entry 9092), e. g. Sindhi phulu, Lahnda phull (whence Brahui pull ‘flower’); however, it seems semantically too improbable to need serious consideration. The latter suggestion, finding a quasi-identical compound of words from two languages seems to be a satisfactory analysis; pul- would then (as Bray saw) be the resultant, with *r yielding a lateral, in a context different from that of the independent word pū ‘worm’.

The final Brahui example is mal’h ‘son’, which I attempted (1962, 68) to derive from 3768 *mak-; it was so listed in DEDS. It has now been suggested by Paramasivam that it belongs rather in 3887 with Tamil maça ‘youth, infancy, infant’, etc. This is beautifully straightforward and provides a clinching example of *r > Brahui lateral. The other items in 3887 show the meaning ‘young domestic animal’ and also the fluctuation *r : *n, as in Tamil mañanaku ‘lamb’, Kannaḍa mañaka, mañika, mañaka (*r > l before vowel) ‘young cow or buffalo (fit for breeding)’; DEDS compared with 3887 the items in DED 3912: Kuruḍ mañā ‘male buffalo’, Malto mangu ‘buffalo’, which have n < *n and correspond phonologically very closely with Tamil mañanaku and Kannaḍa mañaka; unification of the two entries 3887 and 3912 is indicated. ¹

¹ Brahui pal’hing ‘to be boiling, be stewed, boil with rage’, palėśing ‘to make to boil, boil (meat)’ were entered with a query in DEn 3540, i. e. with *puŋ—(Tamil puṇṇku ‘to be steamed, stew, be hot with anger’, etc.). In spite of the perfect fit in meaning, the phonology is wrong (Brahui a may represent *a, *e, *o, but not *u), and the item cannot be used as evidence.
Whatever plausibility I claimed to have established has now been removed from my attempt (1962, 67-9, sect. 5) to find *k as an origin for four examples of Brahui lh,—quite apart from the phonological implausibility of such a change. The beginning of the section retains validity in its list of examples of lh and its statement of their etymological connections. All represent *l or *l̂; so too does probably lh in pal̂inge, beside pal̂êinge, whatever the etymology may be (see note 1). We now have added *l as the origin of lh in pilhung (3440) and malh (3887). We are left with mōl̂h ‘smoke’, mēl̂h ‘sheep’, and hill ‘fly’.

mōl̂h ‘smoke’ still remains, on semantic grounds, in a North Dravidian group (DED 4215) of which Malto provides the simplex stem mog-, i.e. *mok-, ‘to emit smoke’. It was tempting indeed to find that *-k- > Brahui lh, but I now feel that this not plausible. As an alternative, it would be possible to suggest that *mok-al (a noun derivative) is the origin of the Brahui word, with -oka- becoming -ō- by loss of -k-. I doubt, however, whether any parallel can be found in Brahui for such a formation, or indeed for the posited phonological development; and yet it is not to be ruled out as impossible.

hill ‘fly’ has been put in DED 453, whose basic form is clearly *i. No form with a lateral extension is to be found in the entry. But it may be noticed that 457 contains items for ‘flying termites’ : Tamil iyal, ical, Malayalam iyal, Kannaḍa ical, Telugu isuḷḷu. Since 453 and 457 have in common *i, there is a possibility that the items in 457 are derivatives of the simpler base of 453 with a specialization of meaning. The South Dravidian items of 457 seem to be basically *ical (c > y in Tamil-Malayalam must be secondary), i.e. with -cal as derivative apparatus. But it must be noted that in 453 Malayalam icca already has an extension -cc-. Can we argue that somehow Brahui hill represents *i plus -al, with or without c

2 To be added to xalk̄h, imperative of xallying ‘to strike, kill’ (1772), are the homophones xalk̄h, imperative of xallying ‘to steal (cattle)’ (1156), and xal̄h, imperative of xalling ‘to uproot’ (1157); these are in DEDS. pilhung is discussed above and is now put in 3440.
or y between? This is without parallel, but not impossible. If it cannot be accepted, nothing is left but to say that hih shows *i plus a lateral suffix not found elsewhere in 453.

mēlḥ ‘sheep’ (DED 4174) is left. All the other items in the entry show *mēkk- or *mēk- (and the meaning ‘goat’), except for Telugu mēka, given in DEDS as inscriptive. It now appears (courtesy of Professor Bh. Krishnamurti) that this form represents mēka which occurs in an inscription of the early 8th century in a sentence of great obscurity. The meaning of the word was only guessed at. Nothing can be based on the form, and Brahui mēlh is essentially left without an etymology, in spite of my earlier efforts (1962, 68-9). A desperate suggestion is that the l-suffix seen in several of the Kafir dialects in words for ‘sheep’ or ‘ram’, (Turner 1966, entry 10334, and Morgenstierne 1973. 125: Ashkun miśalā ‘sheep’, Kati meśele ‘ram’, Kalasha meś ‘ram’, meśalāk ‘young ram’) is the origin of the Brahui lateral; this leaves unexplained the disappearance of the sibilant.

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AN AMENDMENT TO FORTUNATOV’S LAW

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T. Burrow has resurrected from neglect an important chapter of Indo-European and Sanskrit historical phonology.¹ By strengthening the arguments for Fortunatov’s originally claimed evidence, by adding and sifting possible new support, by refining the scope of the claimed law, and by showing the weakness of the objections advanced principally by Bartholomae and Wackernagel (and followed by Brugmann, J. Schmidt, Mayrhofer, and partly F. B. J. Kuiper), Burrow has concluded (545) “that the rule should be accepted in the form in which it was first formulated.” That is to say, ¹ + dental > Skt. lingual (= “cerebral”, “retroflex”); i.e. *I > Skt. t etc. We may perhaps restate the rule as:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(A)} & & +\text{conson.} & & \quad +\text{conson.} & & \quad +\text{conson.} \\
& & +\text{sonant} & & \quad -\text{grave} & & \quad -\text{grave} \\
& & +\text{back} & & \quad (-\text{back}) & & \quad +\text{back} \\
& & +\text{contin.} & & \quad +\text{obstru.} & & \quad +\text{obstru.}
\end{align*}
\]

This assimilation may be broken down as:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(1)} & & +\text{conson.} & & \quad -\text{grave} & & \quad +\text{back} & & \quad +\text{sonant} & & \quad +\text{contin.} \\
& & +\text{obstru.} & & \quad +\text{obstru.} & & \quad +\text{obstru.} \\
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(2)} & & +\text{conson.} & & \quad +\text{sonant} & & \quad +\text{back} & & \quad +\text{contin.} & & \quad -\text{conson.} & & \quad -\text{grave} & & \quad +\text{back} & & \quad +\text{obstru.}
\end{align*}
\]

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¹ A Reconsideration of Fortunatov’s Law, BSOAS 35, 1972 531-45.
² We assume that in Indo-Iranian both *I, *I were retroflex i.e. [+back], but they would have differed by continuance; this makes it reasonable that the descendant of *I was absorbed by the preceding syllabic, unlike that of *I.
³ Perhaps [+coronal] may be preferred to [-grave]; I do not see a clear basis for choice. At an early time all dentals were automatically just that, i.e. [-back].
Certainly, Burrow has made a strong case; I wish to suggest, on the basis of his renewed arguments and evidence, a refinement to Fortunatov's original law. First, some comments on individual points to clear the way.

1. The progress made in recent decades on Dravidian studies and in particular on Dravidian-Sanskritic relations, especially by Burrow himself and by Emeneau, is impressive; and it has rooted out much confusion on the possibilities and directions of borrowings. Since I am not at all competent in this field, I accept in principle the class of exclusions from Dravidian origin as stated by Burrow (533).

2. Without being exactly sure of the status of "spontaneous retroflexion" as established by Bailey and Burrow (533), nor of its precise delimitation from Prakritic loans, I accept such a source for at least some of the offending instances of cerebrals.

3. There does indeed seem to be evidence within Sanskrit for two source dialects, one with merger of *l and *r as in Iranian and the other with conservation of the distinction (see 535). Burrow's hypothesis that the merging dialect was in contact with Iranian and that it arrived only later in India makes good sense. Additionally, it seems reasonable on general areal grounds that the conservative *l preserving dialect should have been located to the east of the merging one on the outer margins of the total speech area. This also gives us a better basis for a plausible explanation of the modern distribution of l and r reflexes in Indo-Aryan.

Yet with all the merits of this view, such a duplicate dialect theory provides a very rich set of sources from which too much might be too easily explained; we must be as parsimonious as possible in drawing on this theory, and constraints would certainly be welcome where they can be formulated. It would be

4 This is different from the illicit use of Prakritic arguments only in the case of forms with *l, which is rightly attacked by Burrow (537 top). On the other hand I assume Prakrit sources for patta- 'cloth' and atta- 'food, flour'; see Burrow 539.
preferable, in particular, if pūrna-, ūrṇa-, mārdhati, mūrdhān-
mardana- did not require such an explanation.

4. Burrow’s proposed development of \(^{\star}\!lH \rightarrow \!^{\star}\!l\!/ul+t\rangle
i/ul+t (537-8) is neat and orderly; it conforms to other known
facts of the history of Sanskrit. And it constrains this special
vocalic development to the dialect which differed by preserving
a distinctive \(l\). It therefore explains puṭa-\(<^{\star}\!pulta-\) and (s) phuṭa-
\(<^{\star}\!sphulta\) etc. quite elegantly. But it must also be remembered
that this has consequences for the prehistory of such forms
which are not sufficiently brought out by Burrow and which
may at times require an additional assumption calling for
further explanation.

In general, such forms must be assumed to be derived from
set bases, or from set variants of known bases. We therefore
have puṭa- \(<^{\star}\!plH-tô\), as proposed by Burrow; perhaps the
length in Khot. pāḍaka- is to be correlated with the set con-
figuration.\(^5\)

Burrow sees (538) two roots \({^{\star}}sp(h)el\)- ‘to split’ and ‘to
shine’; perhaps this formulation may now be refined and clari-
fied. The forms of sphaṭ- ‘split’ seem to point to an original
anit base; sphaṭika- ‘crystal’ seems also to belong here cer-
tainly on grounds of vocalism and also easily on semantic
grounds, despite what Burrow suggests. Moreover, Welsh
hollti and Breton faouta point unambiguously to an original
anit \(spolt\). On the other hand, the vocalisms and semantics of
sphulaṁga- ‘spark’ and sphuta- ‘clear’ point plainly to a set
\({^{\star}}sp\ (u) lH\). I therefore suggest that we have two distinct
original roots here, \({^{\star}}spelt\- ‘split’ and \({^{\star}}sp\ (e) lH\- ‘shine, glitter’.
The aspirate \(ph\) in \({^{\star}}sp\ (u) lH\- was then developed in certain
contexts from the following laryngeal \(H\) either by clustering or
by phonetic anticipation. Later the \(ph\) and the \(u\)-vocalism was
transferred to the descendant of \({^{\star}}spelt\- through contamination

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5 Skt. ghṛṭā ‘nape’ beside ghṛṭa- ‘ankle’ and ghūṛṇ- ‘revolve’ also show
the same relation, \({^{\star}}gḥaHṭa\<^{\star}\!gholHṭa\) (with a sort of metathesis):
\({^{\star}}gḥlHṭa\- and \({^{\star}}gḥlHn(o)-\). This is different from hāṭaka- etc.
of similar forms and perhaps aided by ambiguous semantics e.g. in 'crystal'.

The equation of tata- 'bank' with Lith. t'iltas 'bridge' does not, however, fare so well. In form tata- should be anīt *talta- as Burrow correctly sees (539); but t'iltas, with its acute accentuation, and all its reasonable cognates point to a set base. Besides, I do not see the force of the semantics; IE had no word for bridge that we know (and perhaps no bridges), and Lith. t'iltas is easily derived from a notion 'board, plank' vel sim.

5. The supposed set of words resulting from Fortunatov's law and showing ḍḥ < *ldḥ is very small (see 542-3): ḍḥyā - 'rich' is still of unclear origin, so far as I can see, and I do not think the chronology of its occurrence in pre-classical prose, as Burrow urges, is sufficient to rule out its candidacy as a Prakritism; as a development from a pre-form of arthyā- it would conform to the formulation I give below and could indeed have been early crossed with forms related to rdḥ-. Vedic jaḷḥu- čvRV 8.61.11 is a hapax, its analysis in light of Yāska's paraphrase is quite inconclusive, and j is moreover ambiguous in origin.

6. The set of candidate forms showing ṇ is really quite uncertain. The equation of pana- 'bet, wages' with Lith. peṇnas 'profit' is isolated. The vocalisms of kīña- (supposedly *kilna-) and Lat. callus callum do not provide a satisfactory equation at all without strong additional justification. While kunji- 'lame in the arm' and kullos 'crippled' match well in meaning, (a) Greek λι is ambiguous and probably not *ln, and (b) *kul- is not a likely canonical IE root shape. The meaning of anī 'part of the leg just above the knee' does not in fact match satisfactorily the compact semantics of ω'λέν Lat. ulna etc, which I have studied in an as yet unpublished paper on body-part terms; the latter etymon in IE unequivocally meant 'extent of the lower arm'.

7. The pair jāda—'cold, stiff' and Lat. gelidus 'cold' is not the obvious equation that Burrow seems to take it to be (541).
Latin adjectives in -(i) ḍus belong to a special morphological set (verbs in -eō, nouns in -s- / -or and -u) and have been extensively studied by Ernout in Philologica II; there is no guarantee that such an adjective matches one in simple -da- in Indic. Furthermore, the Prakrit jaḍḍā ‘the cold’ could have other explanations and puts one on one’s guard against opting for a single facile solution.

The equation kāḍa- ‘dumb’ and Goth. halts ‘lame’ is not at all so compelling as to be certain.

While gaḍayitnu- and gardayitnu- look encouraging under the two-dialect theory (§ 3 above) and would indeed fit with galati ‘drips’, the presence of gaḍati pointed to by Burrow (542) actually undermines the analysis of the derivatives with ḍ. Not only is a root galḍ- odd by IE standards, but the presence of Vedic ga’ldā ‘dripping, flow’ beside ga’rdā strongly suggests a root gal- after all, with a nominal derivative in -dā. Finally, Burrow draws too fine a chronology to avoid having ga’ldā simply break the Fortunatov rule, as it seems at face value really to do. Moreover, it is not necessary to derive ‘cloud’ from ‘drip’.

8. We see then that there are no likely examples of ḍh for Fortunatov’s law, that of the cases of ṇ only one (paṇa-) could be considered seriously with better support, and that the three suggested instances of ḍ are riddled with problems. The evidence for Fortunatov’s law in a context with voicing following seems to have evaporated.

9. The examples with s (543-4) show very good and regular matches throughout: pāṣāna- ‘stone’ (and RV pāṣyā- Ashkun/Waigali paṣṇ’, against the Iranian Pashto parṣa), bhāṣ- ‘speak’ and bhāṣ- ‘bark’, laṣṭa- ‘desires’, and perhaps caṣāla-.

10. With t and ṭh we may accept the following examples as satisfactory: paṭa- ‘cloth’ (and puṭa- ‘fold’), sphaṭ- and sphaṭa- (§ 4 above), kaṭaka- ‘ring’ (538-9), kaṭi- ‘hip’ (kalatra-.


11. Burrow cites (532) J. Scheftelowitz (KZ 53, 1925, 248-69) as having restricted the law to contexts with following n and s; he rightly rejects this restriction. In fact, we have seen above (§ 6) that the law seems scarcely to be upheld by examples with *l+n.

Instead, the refined evidence presented by Burrow appears clearly to sustain the law only before *s, *t and *th. These form a plausible and natural set of voiceless obstruents. We therefore reformulate our rules as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(1)} & \quad + \text{conson.} \\
& \quad - \text{grave} \\
& \quad + \text{obstru.} \\
& \quad - \text{voice} \\
\end{align*} \quad > \quad [ + \text{back}] \\
\begin{align*}
\text{(2)} & \quad + \text{conson.} \\
& \quad + \text{sonant} \\
& \quad + \text{back} \\
& \quad + \text{contin.} \\
\end{align*} \quad > \quad \alpha \quad \begin{align*}
\text{\quad ( - \text{voice})} \\
\end{align*}
\]

we may therefore say, to capture the phonetic naturalness of the law, that after the lateral had retracted the following voiceless non-grave obstruent it was itself assimilated to voiceless articulation and then absorbed perceptually by the obstruent. The voiceless lateral was acoustically too weak to be discriminated from the following homorganic obstruent. Alternatively,
it may well have been because the assimilated voiceless lateral could not be readily discriminated from the following obstruent that the retraction of the lateral was attributed to the feature characterization of the obstruent. The [sonant] and [contin.], features could easily have been attributed to the preceding [-conson.].

7 The John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation made this research possible through a Fellowship which freed me in 1973-74 from regular duties to work on research problems, of which the above constitutes an offshoot.
DEGREES OF GENETIC RELATEDNESS
AMONG LANGUAGES

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Family trees have their faults. Aside from their typological irrelevance, they are not the only, nor necessarily the best, nor, perhaps, even fully acceptable devices with which to represent all those relationships among languages which interest the historian. Still, scholars continue to use family trees for what they may be worth. When this happens, there may arise the implication of measuring or expressing, in the very terms of the tree schema, the degree of relatedness thought to exist between any two particular languages within the tree. Since there seems to be no explicit agreement on how this is traditionally done, a few observations are in order.

Some authors construct metrical trees, with the edge lengths representing time elapsed, extent of change undergone, or both of these in correlation. These authors may find it reasonable to measure the degree of relatedness between two ‘related’ languages in path length.1 Suppose, for instance, that two separate lines of descent issue from a proto-language, O. The first line, after a time interval \( t \), terminates in a descendant language A. The second line, after the same interval \( t \), bifurcates in turn, one sub-branch, after the lapse of an additional \( 3t \), leading to a descendant language B, and the other, after a lapse of \( 5t \), to a descendant C. As a result, both A and the subancestor language for B and C are later than O by an interval of \( t \) (years, centuries, millennia...); B is later than O by an interval of \( 4t \) and later than A (from which it is not descended) by \( 3t \); and C is later than O by \( 6t \), later than A (from which it’s not descended) by \( 5t \), and later than B (from which it is, likewise, not descended) by \( 2t \):
In this tree the glottochronological distance, or path length, from A to B equals \( \overline{AO} + \overline{OB} \), or \( t + 4t = 5t \); that from A to C equals \( \overline{AO} + \overline{OC} = t + 6t = 7t \); that from B to C equals \( 3t + 5t = 8t \).

On the whole, however, the traditional family tree is non-metrical in nature. The length of its edges and paths has no strict interpretation; all that counts is the relative placement of the vertices (languages) along the paths (lines of descent). This is so because the standard method of ‘comparative’ reconstruction, unlike glottochronology, aims at just such trees. Under these circumstances, how is genetic closeness assessed?

We submit that scholars proceed, in essence, somewhat as follows. Given a particular tree, the question which of two pairs of two languages each (say, D, E; F, G) is the closer is answered by (1) finding the lowest common dominant node for each (‘X’ for D, E; ‘Y’ for F, G); finding (2) the lowest common dominant node ‘Z’ for X, Y; (3) seeing whether Z is identical with X (Y) and different from Y (X). If it is, the pair dominated by Y (X) may be said to be closer than the other pair.

Let us again construct tree—a non-metrical one this time. As before, two lines of descent issue from O. There are four nodes—the first labeled L, and the fourth labeled K on one of these two lines, and one node on the other. The branching at L leads to a terminal point J; the branching at the second node along the first line leads to a terminal point I; the bifurcation at K leads to two terminal points, G and H. The node on the second line emanating from O dominates three separate offshoots, M, N, and P.

Here G is more intimately related to H (node : K) than I is to J (node : L), since K and L have their lowest common dominant node precisely at L. By the same token, G and I are closer than H and J, and so on.

This, of course, merely amounts to spelling out subfamilies and their hierarchical ordering. It should be noted that where
\( Z = X = Y \), the language pairs in question (such as \( M, N \) and \( N, P \)) are 'equal' in closeness, and that where, on the contrary, \( Z, X, \) and \( Y \) are all distinct, the relative closeness of the two underlying pairs (say, of \( G, H \) and of \( M, P \)) cannot be specified.\(^8\)

Note, finally, that if the earlier tree introduced in the second paragraph above is treated in this non-metrical fashion (rather than metrically), \( B \) and \( C \) emerge as more (rather than less) closely related than either \( A \) and \( B \), or \( A \) and \( C \).

**NOTES**

1 I am indebted to Joseph B. Kruskal for a discussion of this point.

2 On the notion of distance see my *Studies in formal historical linguistics* (Dordrecht 1973), p. 47. On glottochronological subclassification, as based, in particular, on vocabulary data, see of course the work of I. Dyen and his associates.

3 The question whether (a) Bengali and Hindi are more intimately related to each other than are Spanish and Rumanian could only be decided on some statistical (glottochronological) grounds. But to say that Bengali (b) is closer to Hindi than to Persian, and (c) closer to Persian than to Spanish has a non-metrical meaning as well, assuming the customary tree. For (a), \( X = \ast \text{Indo-Aryan}, Y = \text{Vulgar Latin}, Z = \ast \text{Indo-European} \); for (b), \( X = Z = \ast \text{Indo-Iranian}, Y = \ast \text{Indo-Aryan} \); for (c), \( X = Z (=O!) = \ast \text{Indo-European}, Y = \ast \text{Indo-Iranian} \).
SENTENCE AND TRANSFORMATION IN PĀṆINI

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I

The question we are mainly concerned with in the present paper is as follows: Did Pāṇini take it upon himself to give a grammar for constructions larger than padas? Or, was he satisfied with giving a grammar only for padas?

In the recent literature we find scholars saying something to the effect that the basic unit of description for Pāṇini is sentence (e.g. cf. Singh, 1972. § 01). The same people, of course, claim, partly legitimately, that Pāṇini’s description even goes beyond sentence. But we will limit ourselves to the consideration of sentence, as anything decisive about its being a basic unit for Pāṇini would be quite a welcome step.

On the other hand there is no lack of people who say that Pāṇini’s description does not go beyond pada. This view has strong support from a certain fact of Aṣṭādhīyā. We find, in there, a pada defined (1.4.14 suptīnantam padam) but not a sentence defined by Pāṇini; and for that matter we do not find anything like ‘phrase’ or ‘clause’ defined by him. Although, Pāṇini uses the term vākya in several places, we have no reason to interpret any of these usages referring to anything more than what is called ‘utterance’ i.e. ‘a stretch of meaningful sound sequences bounded by pauses’. Consequently, to see if the sentence was a unit for Pāṇini we have to look for implications (jñāpakas) if there are any.

With Pāṇini’s grammar it is possible to derive simple as well as complex sentences. However, the possibility of deriving a sentence is one thing and to assume it as the basic unit is another. The point is made quite clear by the difference between the approaches of the ‘structuralists’ and the ‘transformationalists’.
In order to see whether a sentence is a syntactic unit for Pāṇini let us examine Pāṇinian derivations of some simple sentences. As the overall structure of simple and complex sentences can be seen to be identical in broad respects, proving or disproving that the simple sentence is the basic unit can also be extended to the complex sentences.

The sentences

(1) kaṭam karoti devadattaḥ  ) ‘Devadatta makes

(2) devadattenā kriyate kaṭaḥ  ) the mat’

have the following derivations.

(1') Mat ←→ Make ←→ Devadatta

(i) kaṭa

(ii) kaṭa

(iii) kaṭa – 2

(iv) kaṭam

(v) kaṭam

(2') Devadatta ←→ make ←→ mat

(i) devadatta

(ii) devadatta

(iii) devadatta – 3

(iv) devadattenā

(v) devadattenā

The question of the two sentences being paraphrases has no consequences for the point we are making.
In the derivations the interdependency of the steps (ii), (iii) and (iv) is the only relevant matter for our discussion. In derivation (1') the agent (or, as the diagram suggests the agential relation) gets expressed by -ti attached to kr in step (ii), the unexpressed object relation, therefore, gets expressed by case -2 (dvitiya), in step (iii). On the other hand in derivation (2') the object gets expressed by -ta in step (ii), and consequently the agent gets expressed by case -3 (tritiya) in step (iii). Evidently the above facts have consequences for the introducing of the unmarked case -1 (prathama) with the other noun whose relation is overtly expressed by the verb ending -ti or -te as the case may be.

It is this dependency among padas which indicates that the all interdependent padas constitute a single syntactic unit. And, this is the only fact which could lead us to say that the above sentences represent the syntactic units which pāṇini wanted to deal with in his grammar.

In the above derivations the nominal padas depend on verbal padas. And, we may ask: Do nominal padas always depend on verbal padas in a Pāṇinian derivation? For our case for a syntactic unit larger than pada to be effective the answer to above question needs to be in the affirmative. Unfortunately we have counter examples in the derivations of compounds.

For example, the compound

(3) rājapuruṣa 'King's man'.

has the following derivation,

(3')

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{King} \\
\downarrow \\
\text{man} \\
\downarrow \\
\text{rājā} \\
\downarrow \\
\text{puruṣa} \\
\downarrow \\
\text{rājapuruṣa}
\end{array}
\]

(i) rājā - 6 puruṣa - 1

(ii) rājapuruṣa

Here we do not find any verbal pada on which the given nominal padas would depend. Although one might argue that the above derivation is a part of a fuller derivation of a sentence like kaṭam karoti rājapuruṣaḥ, that the problem does not solve itself thus can be seen from the following fuller derivation:
The introducing of -1 in step (iv) depends on the previous two steps but neither the introducing -6 (śaṣṭhi) or -1 in step (i) depend on any previous steps.

Here, then, we have a case contradicting the interdependence of *padas*. The argument that compounds are in some way prior to sentence formation and could not be considered as the counter-examples of the interdependence which is valid only in the sentence-forming operations does not hold. The compound-forming operation, step (ii) of (3') is an optional operation; it leaves the operant optionally as it is. When step (ii) of (3') does not apply, rājan-6 and puruṣa-1 at that stage do not depend on any verbal *pada*. Although it is not very clear to me why Pāṇini wanted the tatpuruṣa compounds to have all the components to be *padas* the above example proves to be a strong counter-example for the interdependence of *padas*.

In face of the above contradiction I propose the following:

(a) Pāṇini primarily wanted to give a grammar for forming the *padas*.

(b) Secondarily he wanted to give a grammar which states the environmental restrictions among the *padas*.

II

Scholars who like to read transformational operations into Pāṇini’s grammar mainly appeal to the fact that one can derive paraphrases in accordance with his grammar (e.g. cf Ghatage 1972 and Subrahmanyan, 1975.5.3). In a Chomskyan
or Harrisian transformational approach it would be sentences which would be paraphrases. And, there would be certain optional transformations which will be giving the paraphrases. As already discussed it is difficult to talk about sentences in Pāṇini's framework. And although it is possible to derive the paraphrases

(4) Devadattaḥ kaṭam akarot
(5) Devadattena kaṭhaḥ kṛtaḥ

in Pāṇini's grammar one can not talk of transformational approach in such contexts. Optionality in the derivations of these sentences is pre-operational. There is no optionality in the operations deriving these sentences. Whether it would be one or the other sentence depends entirely on how speaker wants to put things (vivakṣā). The scholars see the transformational operations in the cases where Pāṇini has clearly provided for optional derivations. For example, for certain parts of the following paraphrases Pāṇini has provided derivations which are optional.

(6) aupagavaḥ gacchati
    (aupagava-1)
(7) upagoḥ putraḥ gacchati
    (upaguo-6 putra-1)
(8) upaguputraḥ gacchati
    (upaguputra-1)

{ ‘Upaguo’s son goes’

But the derivations give us nothing like what we expect. We expect that the non-common parts of the above paraphrases are provided by the optional operations, i.e. aupagava-1, upago-6, putra-1, and upaguputra-1 are results only of some optional rule(s). Actually what we get from the optional operations is either

(9) aupagava-upaguo-6 putra
(10) upaguputra-upaguo-6 putra-1.

Following are the respective derivations
(iii) \[ \text{aupagava} \]

(ii) \[ \text{upagu} \rightarrow \text{a} \rightarrow \text{N} \]

(9')a (i) \[ \text{upagu} \rightarrow \text{N} \rightarrow \text{son} \]

(9')b (i) \[ \text{upagu} \rightarrow \text{N} \rightarrow \text{son} \]

(ii) \[ \text{upagu} \rightarrow \text{N} \rightarrow \text{putra} \]

[In the derivation (9') a the step (ii) affecting (son) is optional. When that step is not taken we have the step (ii) of (9') b]

(10) \[ \text{Upagu} \rightarrow \text{son} \]

(i) \[ \text{upagu} \rightarrow \text{N} \rightarrow \text{putra} \]

(ii) \[ \text{upaguputra} \]

[In the derivation (10') the step (ii) is optional. When that step is not taken we have the result of the step (i)].

It is clear, particularly in the case of (10), that Pāṇini's paraphrastic transformations or operations do not relate forms of the same level of abstraction. His transformations are very different.

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HINDI SLANG EXPRESSIONS

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The central purpose of the present paper is to discuss the psycho-socio-linguistic importance of slang expressions in general, draw attention of Hindi lexicographers towards compiling a dictionary of Hindi slangs, and compare briefly the universal semanticity of Hindi-English slang expressions.

In the caste hierarchy of linguistic data the standard form of a given language can be described as Brahmin—the form socially recognized, taught, studied and preserved; slang as Shudra—the pariah, the form with no social status, "use-me", "exploit-me-but-talk-of-me-not" type. The following definitions of slang recorded in the Oxford Dictionary speak for the status of slang:

1. "...language of a highly coloquial type, considered as below the level of standard educated speech, and consisting either of new words, or of current words used in some special sense".

2. "...specialized language of disreputable people".

Slang expressions are often charged with lack of that seriousness of intent which is normally present in conventional speech or treated as a substitute of words usually felt to be humorous and in some manner indecorous for what is felt to be conventional. However, it should not be forgotten at this point that slang expressions do have the potentiality of getting transformed into standard expressions. Take the example of the English slang "mob" (from Latin mobile [vulgus] "fickle" [crowd]). This particular expression was rejected by Dean Swift in 1712 but was regarded as perfectly well established in the latter years of the eighteenth century. It is not unlikely that the American
"O. K." may also ultimately be deemed appropriate to dignified speech, although less than half-century ago it was regarded as slang.

Slang expressions develop most frequently in groups with a strong realization of group activity and interest. The achievement of a specific variety of slang expressions permits its speaker to enjoy the secret culture of its mother-group. Children, lovers, students, players, criminals use their kind of slang expressions for the main purpose of secrecy: to avoid being understood by the standers-by: and also to establish an intimate relationship among themselves.

Slang expressions grow out of the lighthearted attitude towards life. Therefore, it alleviates the starkness and softens the tragedy of death or madness, masks ugliness of rank ingratitude and thus enables both the speaker and the listener to endure the pain, or prepares the listener to develop the same attitude as the speaker has towards the issue under reference at a given point of time. As compared to the standard expressions, slang expressions are more terse, concise and very direct. Carl Sandburg describes slang as follows:

"...language which takes off its coat, spits on its hands—and goes to work".

Dr. Frank K. Sechrist in his book: The Psychology of Unconventional Language: writes of slang expressions being richer in association than standard expressions. He believes it is because slang appeals to recent experience rather than memories. The emotional tension produced by slang is far greater than that produced by more customary and conventional expressions. Dr. K. L. Pike in his book: Language in Relation to a Unified Theory of the Structure of Human Behavior: ascribes the following reason why slang is more powerful than the standard variety of expressions. He says:

"It is useful at this point to introduce a figure of speech to provide an analogy for the distributional
change of words and their impact on the hearer when they pass from metaphorical use to central-meaning use. If, let us say, we have a planet with an artificial satellite, then the distribution of the satellite in a wider orbit carries with it more energy than its distribution in a narrower orbit. As the satellite loses energy it spirals down into an inner, closer orbit. Let us now assume that the central meaning of a word has reference to an ORBIT. Words occur in particular distributions which are frequent and close to the physical situation which they name directly. If, however, the same word is used in distributions remote from the original distribution, and especially if they are remote from the physical contexts in which words were first learned by the child, or within which they have their central meanings, these special distributions carry with them a certain kind of 'communication energy'. These extended symbolic usages, because of their special distributions, have a heavier impact on the listener. Here the outer distributional 'orbit' carries the greater communication energy in the form of hearer impact".

He further adds:

"It seems to me that SLANG obtains its power by an extra-special distribution of words in a metaphorical sense. The impact of the slang seems to come in part from its metaphorical use as such, and in part from the fact that in reference to the community as a whole it has a very infrequent distribution (and hence a 'remote' outer orbit)".

This discussion leads me conclude that when slang expressions get transformed into standard expressions, the former lose their 'communicative energy'. They cease to perform and maintain the function of secrecy, and also lose the sense of intimacy noted amongst the slang speakers. This theory can further be concluded as: the smaller the communicative orbit of slang the greater the communicative energy:
Socio-linguists differentiate between the terms: SLANG and ARGOT (CANT). *In La Science du Mot* Albert Carnoy says:

"Slang consists of a peculiar vocabulary in which intentional fantasy plays a dominant role. It tends to produce a feeling of novelty, unexpectedness and ingenuity by giving to certain words an unusual or even unused and piquant sense. The process employed in achieving this end are analogous to those presiding in general over the evolution of meaning, notably those processes which produce a metaphorical, richly expressive and emotive language. In slang, however, the role played by the conscious mind is greater, and one is always aware of an effort made to speak in a manner different from the normal, to be droll or tortuous or ironical. Slang answers to that disdainful or good humored state of mind which does not take very seriously the things one is talking about”.

Argot or cant is rather vocational, partly social, but, above all protective and self-protective, that is, secret. Argot is more brutal, more realistic and earthy, less humorous and less witty. Argot being vocational and self-protective belongs to outlaws. Therefore, I believe, little children could not be its users whereas, slang represents all age groups. For instance:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. HINDI</th>
<th>ENGLISH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ba (h) u</td>
<td>hot dog</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>phunno</td>
<td>wiener</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nalki</td>
<td>dink (e) y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lulli</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2. aujär</th>
<th>apparatus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>belan</td>
<td>rod</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hat (h) yār</td>
<td>tool</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first group of expressions is used by male children and the second by adults for male genital. Examples of argot will be:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HINDI</th>
<th>ENGLISH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>bīhārī karnā</td>
<td>lift, steal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gol karnā</td>
<td>lift, steal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>katha cukānā</td>
<td>close the book on</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chuṭṭī karnā</td>
<td>send on vacation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>masalnā</td>
<td>rub out, kill</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The last three expressions are rather very mature and, I believe, would only be used by hard-core criminals and not children. However, lines accurately demarcating the age group are difficult to draw, for there is in fact considerable socio-cultural, and probably economic too, reasons involved. Highly industrialized countries like the United States of America, England, France, or countries which are built by the mixed fiber of immigrants like Canada and the United States are likely to have a very developed argot than those which are industrially backward, or those which are built of single fiber of native borns like the African countries. Industrially advanced nations have a higher degree of mobility among its people and also a higher degree of crime. Therefore, they have a larger amount of argot as well.

Technically speaking there are no terms for slang and argot in Hindi. Nevertheless, Hindi like any other language in the world has a fair amount of slang and argot expressions. In the following pages I would like to produce a brief list of Hindi and English slang expressions pertaining to the area of sex. The main purpose of the production of a list here is to show how semantically alike the two languages: Hindi and English: are which, I contend, is a reflection of the similarity of human behavior. Love and sex being one of the most basic human needs have a remarkable similarity in their expression, no matter how different—culturally or geographically—the people are. I contend, racial, cultural or geographical differences have very little to do with the expression of human passions. The following list will hopefully prove this point.
**HINDI**

**ENGLISH**

adā
chamber of commerce,
aujār
brothel
bagal garam karnā
apparatus, male genital,
belan
apply the armstrong heater
bijli
rod, male genital
cārā dālnā
high voltage, attractive girl
ched
bait, seduce
cūhā
hole, female genital
dhand(h)ā
hot-box, female genital
dīrā ġhānā
the trade, prostitution
garam karnā
shake the lily, urinate
garam honā
turn on the heat
ghisnā
be in heat
golī
make out
hat(h)iyyār
balls, testes
jis(a)m becnā
tool, male genital
karvānā
flesh peddling
kbāj
get fixed up
khāj
itch, sexual passion
macnā
have the itch
kharā honā
bone up
khilaunā
joy stick, male genital
koṭhe par baiṭhnā
with apartments to let
lagānā
fix up
lakrī
stick, male genital
lāl f(ph)īte se honā
fly the red flag
lenā
take a girl
mās
hunk of meat, male genital
pani jhārnā (nikālnā)
jack off
savārī karnā
have a joy ride, take a girl
seṭhānī
belly up, a pregnant woman
surāng
hole, female genital
tabia(ya)t rakhnā
have a crush on
tāngrī phāsānā
ley the leg
tambu tannā
bone up, be horny
ṭaiksī
lady for hire
ṭhōnknā
fix up, screw
Slang or argot, whatever linguistic expressions they may be, they do not differ essentially from other linguistic expressions in the sense that they all undergo a linguistic process of change. Language is always changing, and so is slang. I must confess here that slang and argot like expressions are much more faster in change than their counter part standard expressions. It is very likely that slang too is an ancient linguistic phenomenon. We might even be justified in assuming that, even in the remotest prehistoric times, there were individuals who manifested a playful attitude towards life and, therefore, towards the language they spoke, who were secretive and, therefore, coined expressions which could not be understood by the standers-by and that their creations were adopted by the members of their group. Since the prehistoric man did not have the resources to record his speech we are left today to make some assumptions on his language and his slang (if he had any). I wonder if we are doing anything today to record our contemporary Hindi slang especially when we are doing some much to catalogue our broken prehistoric pots in the museums.

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A NOTE ON ADJECTIVAL PHRASES IN MODERN HINDI

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The employment of kā / kī / ke to form what can be called periphrastic adjectives or adjectival phrases is extremely productive of new forms in Modern Hindi. Words and word sequences followed by kā / kī / ke often adopt the qualities of an adjective and phrases formed in this manner constitute, as a matter of fact, a very large sub-group of that word-class. The phenomenon is, of course, by no means restricted to Hindi, nor to the NIA. branch of languages, since a similar adjectivizing function of the genitive marker can be observed in numerous languages and dialects the origin and structure of which differ widely.

The constructions I have mentioned serve as an easy and convenient means to coin new adjectives for literary as well as colloquial usage whenever needed and, in addition, enhance the possibilities of stylistic variation. Their use as adjectives is undoubtedly well established. Their grammatical function can hardly be demonstrated more clearly than by sentences or sentence parts which simultaneously use one or several genuine adjectives and one or several adjectival phrases, as for instance: ve / kāfī umar ke /2 aur / mahattvapūrṇa / vyakti the, “he was an elderly and important person”, / lāl / pūrī bāṁhoṁ kī / ūnī / jaiket, “(a) red, long-sleeved, and woollen jacket”, or / safed / binā kinār kī / dhotī, “(a) white borderless dhoti”. In these examples, mahattvapūrṇa, lāl, ūnī and safed are genuine adjectives, whereas kāfī umar kā, purā bāṁhoṁ kā, and binā kinār kā represent adjectival phrases.

Although some usages of this kind have been noted before and Hindi grammarians do not, as a rule, wholly ignore them, no manual of the Hindi language has yet, as far as I know

(1) Adjectives and adjectival phrases are marked by vertical dashes.
paid sufficient attention to these phrases and presented them adequately. Presumably, most writers on grammar have considered such constructions as self-explanatory and too simple, but, surprisingly, even grammars and readers presupposing pattern drill and language laboratory work as the student progresses, neglect these extra-ordinarily frequent expressions. Thus no explanations or comments are given on the adjectival construction with kā in R. S. McGregor's Outline of Hindi Grammar, one of the most recent and most excellent manuals of the language, which, however, does refer to "the use of kā to form adjectival phrases" by quoting five very useful examples (p. 52 f., c).

Some highly relevant remarks on forms having kā have been made by A. Sharma (A Basic Grammar of Modern Hindi, p. 34f., § 103, note; p. 44, § 129; and p. 122, § 7), though his statement that "a noun or a pronoun to which kā has been attached assumes the nature of an adjective and qualifies the noun which follows it" (§ 103) should be corrected and widened. Adjectival phrases, like all possessive forms and constructions, occur in attributive as well as predicative position: / binā kinār ki / dhoti, "(a) borderless dhoti"; vah dhoti / binā kinār ki / hai, "this dhoti is borderless". Moreover, periphrastic adjectives can be formed on the basis not only of nouns and pronouns, but of any word-class and phrase, except particles and, naturally, adjectives and participles, which behave like adjectives (likhīa, likhā, etc.). Even entire sentences can be turned into adjectival phrases.

I give below some further examples of the commonest adjectival kā-combinations. The list is in no way exhaustive, but I hope it will help the reader to recognize and employ these phrases. Constructions with kā are numerous, but they

(2) Oxford 1972.
are, of course, not all adjectival\(^5\). Therefore, only forms have been listed which, as in the case of real adjectives, qualify a noun and, at the same time, can be used both attributively (A) and predicatively (P).

1. Noun + \(kā\).

A : \(/ khatre \ kā / kṣaṇ, "(a) dangerous moment".\)

P : \(vahī kṣaṇ / khatre kā / hotā hai, "this very moment is dangerous".\)

A : \(/ sone kā / kalaś, "(a) golden cupola".\)

P : \(kalaś / sone kā / hai, "the cupola is of gold".\)

1.1. Adjective (numeral), noun + \(kā\).

A : \(/ safed raṃg ki / kitāb, "(a) white-coloured book".\)

P : \(yah kitāb / safed raṃg ki / hai, "this book is white-coloured".\)

A : \(/ tīkhe svād kā / ras, "(a) juice of sharp taste".\)

P : \(vah ras / tīkhe svād kā / hai, "this juice is of sharp taste".\)

A : \(/ āth sāl kā / lārkā "(a) boy of eight years".\)

P : \(un kā lārkā / āth sāl kā / hai "their son is eight years (old)".\)

Cf : \(maim / bis baras kā / ho rahā hūm, "I am twenty years (old)".\)

\(vah / das mahīne ki / hokar mar gai, "she died, ten months (old)".\)

1.2. Comparative, noun + \(kā\)

A : \(ek / isse halke raṃg ki / dhotī, "a lighter-coloured dhoti than this".\)

P : \(yah dhotī / isse halke raṃg ki / hai, "this dhoti is more light-coloured than that".\)

1.3. Preposition (postposition), noun + \(kā\).

A : \(/ binā raṃg kā / kaprā, "a colourless cloth".\)

P : \(yah kaprā binā raṃg kā/hai, "this cloth is colourless"\)

(5) Not adjectival \(kā\)-constructions are, for instance, \(us kā in us ke būd, "after that", or is nām kā in is nām ki ek aṃt kāhānt hai, "this name has a story of its own".\)
1.4. Noun (pronoun), postpositional adverbial phrase + kā.
A: / blauz kī tarah kā / libās, “(a) blouse-like dress”.
P: yah libās / blauz kī tarah kā / hai, “this dress is blouse-like”.
A: / us ke sāth kī / kamīz, “the shirt (worn) together with that”.
P: yah kamīz / us ke sāth kī / hai, “this shirt is (worn) together with that”.
A: / pūjā ke bād kā / nṛtya, “the dance after the (religious) ceremony”.
P: yah nṛtya / pūjā ke bād kā / hai, “this dance is (one which comes) after the (religious) ceremony”.
A: / pūṁch ke nice ke / par, “(the) feathers under the tail”.
P: ye par / pūṁch ke nice ke / haim, “these feathers are (those which are) under the tail”.

2. Adverb + kā.
A: / āj kā / samācārpatra, “today’s newspaper”.
P: samācārpatra / āj kā / hai, “the newspaper is today’s”.
A: / vahāṁ ke / ākṭar, “the doctors from there”.
P: ye ākṭar / vahāṁ ke / haim, “these doctors are from there”.

2.1. Adverb, postposition + kā.
A: / vahāṁ tak kā / kyā kirāyā hai, “what is the fare to (go) there?”
P: pūṁc rupayā to / vahāṁ tak kā kirāyā hai, “the fare to (go) there is five Rupees”.

3. Infinitive + kā.
A: havāi jahāz ke / utarne—caṛhne kā / sthān, “(a) place (where) aeroplanes land and rise”.
P: yah sthān havāi jahāz ke / utarne—caṛhne kā / hai, “this is a place (where) aeroplanes land and rise”.

3.1. Gerund + kā.
A: / (na) karne kī / bāṭem, “things (not) to be done”.

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P: ye bātem / (na) karne kī / haiṁ, “these things are (not) to be done”.
A: vah / mujhe dene kā / kāgaz dhūndhne lagā, “he started searching for the paper to be given to me”.
P: vah kāgaz / mujhe dene kā / hai “that paper is to be given to me”.

4. Sentence + kā.
A: / serialization ko khā liyā kī / kahānī, “(a) story about the tiger (who) devoured the goat”.
P: yah kahānī / serialization ko khā liyā kī / hai, “this story is about the tiger (who) devoured the goat”.

Constructions with vālā / vālī / vāle compete with some of the phrase types quoted above, but represent, in many cases, less elegant counterparts of the kā-forms (us ke sāth kī kamīz : us ke sāth vālī kamīz ; serialization ne bakrī ko khā liyā kī kahānī : serialization ne bakrī ko khā liyā vālī kahānī). Some adjectival phrases can be used as components in verbal phrases as, for instance, in : / safed ramg kā / karnā, “to make white”, which is the equivalent of safed karnā. As I have already mentioned, kā is, for natural reasons, not attached to adjectives. Still we may occasionally come across expressions like bekār kī bāt, “meaningless thing(s)”, for the correct : bekār bat. Such a form will naturally not be accepted by every native speaker of Hindi, though this and similar phrases, too, confirm, by their very incorrectness and pleonastic construction, the high frequency of the pattern.

The types I have described are basic, and their syntactic position (koī / satīr sāl kā / ādmi corresponding to koī / bābhā / ādmi) as well as the fact that, in speaking and writing, no difference is made between genuine adjectives and kā-phrases (as in : lāl / pūrī bāhmōm kī / ānī jaikēt quoted above) demonstrate very clearly that grammatical descriptions of the Hindi adjective ought to be made on a much broader basis than those so far presented. The adjectival phrases form a large and important sub-group which, in my opinion, must be taken into account in comprehensive descriptions of the modern standardized language.
WHOSE INTELLECTUAL ANCESTOR WAS
PĀṆINI—REALLY?

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One of the great beauties of the Indian grammatical tradition is its intellectual and spiritual communality. In mediaeval and ancient India a grammar was not so much the personal product of a particular author; it was rather the common intellectual property of an entire generation of pundits and grammarians, who felt free to build on the work of their predecessors. Thus Pāṇini’s Grammar, for instance, is as much his personal grammar as it is the grammar of his numerous commentators.

In keeping with this tradition, we have decided to write this paper in honor of Suniti Kumar Chatterji, the doyen of Indian linguistics, with a minimal amount of footnotes and bibliographical references, concentrating on the main intellectual issues relevant to our profession. The names and movements we mention are well known, and the reader interested in detailed documentation can engage in bibliographical prowess to whatever extent he would wish. We believe, in other words, that the Latin proverb verba volant, scripta manent, is actually only a half-truth: whereas it is true that ‘words fly away, written texts remain’, it is equally true that intellectual movements, indeed entire philosophies, are frequently transmitted as much orally as they are in writing.

In the first part of the paper we will discuss the recent habit of the ‘Ancestor Hunt’ in Western Linguistics; how it originated and what it has led us to. Then we raise the
question: is Pāṇini a forerunner of traditional grammarians, of the Junggrammatiker, of the structuralists, of the transformationalists, the case grammarians, or the stratificationalists?

We intend to keep the reader in suspense as to our final verdict.

What is an Ancestor Hunt?

An Ancestor Hunt (henceforth AH) is the attempt on the part of a modern, typically Western intellectual, to find a Venerable Intellectual Ancestor among the great figures of the past whom he can claim as his intellectual forerunner. But why is this necessary? Isn't the West typically a cultural milieu where people are proud of new things and suspicious of the old? Isn't the West, and the USA first of all, a place where today's car and today's refrigerator are considered bigger and better than yesterday's? Where people sooner throw away old clothes than repair them? Yes, that has certainly been true about American society in general. But this future-orientedness rooted in a materialistic Weltanschauung, has brought with it a powerful psychological reaction of insecurity. Whenever an American restaurant advertises its cuisine, it will call it 'home cooked food', or 'food like Grandma used to make'. This may co-exist with vitamin candy being advertised as 'space food', or 'food that the Astronauts eat'. There is a tremendous push towards the future, toward 'bigger and better' things, followed by a sentimental longing for the cozy, the small, the home-spun, and the traditional. It is important to point this out here at the beginning, since the philosophical AH of recent American linguistics certainly did not arise in a socio-cultural vacuum, but is indeed very much a part of the total picture of contemporary American culture and civilization.

In 1957, Noam Chomsky published his booklet, Syntactic Structures, and current historians of grammar of the Transformational-Generative variety look upon 1957 as the beginning of the Golden Age of Linguistics, when the Kali Yuga, the black iron-age of the Neo-Bloomfieldian Structuralists, came to a
happy end. The TG rhetoric of the years following 1957 can be characterized as Expurgation and Denial. As the new, militant school sought more and more convertees to its cause, it had to belittle and denigrate linguists of the older generation. Berger and Luckmann, the authors of that classic, *The Social Construction of Reality*, call this the phase of 'nihilation'. As the new, militant movement emerges, it justifies its existence by nihilating the past. Once it has emerged and has taken over, it must justify its existence. Berger and Luckmann call this 'legitimation'. Legitimation arizes out of a profound sense of insecurity. Having denigrated and belittled the leading figures of the past, the socially triumphant movement must 'legitimate' itself; thus the Great Ancestor Hunt begins.

The history of recent American linguistics proves the model of Berger and Luckmann beyond the shadow of a doubt. After the phase of Expurgation and denial TG reached the stage of Pretender's Vacuum when the need to base the new claims on ancient, but irresponsibly forgotten truths became keenly felt. Just one year after the appearance of *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax* (1965), Chomsky published a book, *Cartesian Linguistics* (1966), in which he makes his notorious nomination of the French rationalist, Rene Descartes, as his great Intellectual Ancestor. The book was uncritically devoured by many and immediately decried a classic; some more thoughtful scholars, such as Hans Aarsleff, and Keith Percival spoke up, and corrected Chomsky's exaggerated claims. Those debates took place on the pages of *Language, Language Sciences, and Foundations of Language*, and the consensus today, a decade after the appearance of *Cartesian Linguistics* in the USA, is that the legitimation of most of the TG claims was as faulty as the original, revolutionary nihilations that introduced the controversy in the first place.

But Chomsky's claim to Descartes was not the only instance of the American AH; it only started a trend. Others have followed the Master. Peter Salus has claimed, both at the Chicago Linguistic Society, and on the pages of the XIth Inter-
national Congress of Linguists, that the Modistae, a group of
mediaeval philologists, were, in fact, proto-generativists. S-Y
Kuroda, another MIT graduate, made the claim, that Anton
Marty, the German philosopher, can be viewed as a proto-
generativist of sorts. The medium was *Foundations of Language.*
In a review of Lancelot and Arnaud’s *Grammaire raisonnée,*
Robin Lakoff asks the rhetorical question: ‘Where DOES
Transformational-Generative Grammar really start?’
(*Language*).

This attempt at legitimating TG would not have been com-
plete, had TG advocates overlooked the giant of Indian thought
on language, Pāṇini. The legitimating comparisons between
TG’s ordered rewrite rules and P’s rules were made by Paul
Kiparsky in a number of various publications.

The oriental mystique of Pāṇini’s name, the lustre of
antiquity and the prestigious Sanskrit language must all have
added to the desirability of proving Pāṇini’s grammar an
‘inexplicit, early generative grammar’. And there was conside-
rable evidence for such a claim: TG operates with ‘rules’ and
so does Pāṇini. TG has ‘underlying representations’ and,
depending on how one looks at it, so does Pāṇini. But Pāṇini
is primarily concerned with the phonology, morphology, and
the morphophonemics of one variety of Sanskrit, essentially the
language of the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa; and the formal work he so
elegantly does is essentially nonsemantic. Would this not make
him a pre-eminently good ancestor for Bloomfield? And what
about William Dwight Whitney? There is barely any mention
of syntax and semantics in Whitney’s *Sanskrit Grammar,* with
the phonology, morphology, and the morphophonemics being
discussed in Neo-Grammario, pre-structuralist terms. So may-
be, after all, Pāṇini could be viewed as the intellectual ancestor
of Whitney and later, of Bloomfield. But whose interests would
it serve to make such a claim? The more knowledgeable
members of the Old Guard got tired of the arguments and just
refused to participate. The militant New Guard had nothing
to gain by making the obvious comparisons between Pāṇini and
Whitney, and so all the laying of claims was done by those who felt the need for doing it. Little if anything was ever made of some quite plausible ‘ancestries’: many of the Neo-Grammarians, including Rasmus Rask, could be shown to have had ‘generative undercurrents’. That Bloomfield himself had inexplicit generative assumptions in his deep structure was alluded to by Karl Teeter of Harvard in a Yale Linguistics Club talk given a few years ago.

Strange as it may seem, no claim was ever made that Fillmore’s Case Grammar is an intellectual descendant of Pāṇini. Perhaps case grammarians realized that Sanskrit being a case language, the best description of it would, by necessity, be a case grammar, and hence the connection would seem trivial. Nevertheless that connection would have been worth exploring. Modern English, an essentially isolating language with only vestigial overt inflectional endings and a more obvious portion of agglutination, could be characterized as a language which has lost its overt, morphologically marked cases which have receded to the semantic level. To have, nevertheless, found these ‘deep cases’ in modern English, then, could be regarded as all the more praiseworthy. After all, English is a member of the Indo-European family of languages and, as such, a distant relative of Sanskrit. Thus by finding ‘the case for case’ in modern English is not just a sophisticated insight in the synchronic sense, but it ‘restores’ English to its inflecting status by an indirect leap into history through semantics. Thus we offer Fillmorian case grammar as a likely descendant of Pāṇini with this caveat: the historian working with this proposition must allow for a movement of English ‘cases’ from morphology into semantics (which is justifiable); but then he must take the ‘deep case’ version of English as ‘closer to Sanskrit’. Given the trend among TG grammarians to describe synchronic language states based on the known histories of the languages (as is proposed by Theodore Lightner in *Language*, Vol. 51), a Pāṇinian ‘case grammar’ would cease to be trivial. It could, of course, be false. But then the synchrony-diachrony battle must, in any case, be refought in the profession.
On ‘rules’ and ‘meta-rules’.

In order to decide what the philosophy of a grammarian really is, one ought to take into account not so much the actual descriptions themselves, whatever forms these take, but the major policy statements as to how the description itself is to be interpreted. This is why Pāṇini has remained so enigmatic for Westerners for so long. The reader will find no policy statements, i.e., ‘meta-rules’ in the Aṣṭādhyāyī itself ; these are to be found in the works of the commentators and other grammarians, who have inferred them from the Aṣṭādhyāyī. There are quite a few of these but they can all be summed up, we believe, in one sūtra in Kātyayana’s Vārtikā, on 1.3.11 :

parāntaraṅgāpavādanām uttarottaram baliyaḥ

Here, to refresh the reader’s Sanskrit, is a brief analysis of this ‘meta-rule’ followed by a free translation :

para = latter
nitya = regular, unconditional
antarāṅga = referring to the essential part or base of a word, i.e., ‘suppletive’
apavāda = (gen. pl. of the preceding entire construction) = exception
uttarottaram (from uttara-uttara) = gradation, progression
baliyaḥ = stronger

“The rules are stronger in this progression : A later rule takes precedence over an earlier, an unconditional rule takes precedence over a conditional, a suppletive rule takes precedence over a non-suppletive one, and an exception rule takes precedence over a non-exception rule.”

The meaning of this Meta-Rule

Pāṇini’s rules have been set up in such a way that, insofar as possible, they should not conflict with one another. In such cases we have simply an unordered set of rules that are used to derive surface forms from more abstract forms. As we have noted before, Pāṇini is doing formal work here without any consideration of semantics. This, so far, would make him a
structuralist. But it should also be noted that his 'abstract forms' are, in reality, not all that abstract. Consider, for example, the rules used to form the nasal infixing class of verbs:

III. 1. 78 rudhādibhyaḥśnam (the word breaks are: rudh-adibhyaḥ śnam) "with rudh roots, śnam is used."

This rule is applied in conjunction with the mit rule:

1. 1. 47 midaco’ntyātparaḥ (the word breaks are mid aco ’ntyāt paraḥ) "mit is added after the last vowel".

Consider, as an example of the application of these rules, the derivation of 'he joins', yunakti:

yuji + śnam + tip → yu + śnam + ji + tip → yunajti → yunakti

Once the artificial designating segments s, m, i, and p are deleted, the final form, which can be considered the true underlying form, *yunajti, is very close indeed to the surface form, yunakti. Furthermore, since Pāṇini works on the word level, we cannot say that he has any kind of true 'deep structure' or the like. His grammar is, essentially, a description of Sanskrit morphology and morphophonemics.

Now in some cases the rules will conflict, and it is in these cases that the 'meta-rule' cited above is applied. Let us consider the four points. The last two are clearly variants of the same principle, since suppletion is itself a type of exception. And these principles are in reality no different from anything any other grammar has to have. Natural languages on our planet simply have exceptions, and these exceptions include suppletion. *In order to account for the data, a rule must simply list them.* And that is precisely what structuralists have been doing! It would seem, then, that there is nothing very distinctive about a rule or a set of rules that deals with this basic problem of any grammar.

The second section of the meta-rule, likewise, is not really a bone of contention. It does show, however, one interesting feature. In most grammars rules are written so that more restricted cases are stated first and the rest of the cases
are covered by an unrestricted rule stated in more general terms. Thus, for example, the simple morphophonemic rule of modern English which states the phonemic realization of the plural morpheme \{s\} after regular nouns is usually stated as follows:

\[
/\text{t}z/ \text{ after } /s/, /z/, /s/, /z/, /c/, \text{ and } /j/ \text{ (as in } \text{busses, buzzes, marshes, garages, watches and judges)}
\]

otherwise \(/s/\) after voiceless stem finals and \(/z/\) after voiced ones (as in \textit{boys} and \textit{cats})

Since \(/s/, /z/, /c/, \text{ and } /j/\) are all homorganic with \(/s/\) and \(/z/\), the generalization can be made that \(/\text{t}z/\) occurs after \(/s/, /z/,\) and its homorganic palatalized and affricated versions.

In Pāṇini, however, such an arrangement would be impossible, as the unrestricted would overrule the specific. Thus the unrestricted rules are written in a more specific way; a seeming paradox, perhaps. Thus the significance of this-meta-rule is that it shows that Pāṇini’s way of structuring rules does not always match any system proposed as his ‘descendant’.

The first section of the meta-rule is really the most interesting of all. As we have noted above, Pāṇini’s rules were really an unordered set. Yet this rule would seem to introduce order in certain cases. The crucial point we must make here is that this meta-rule does NOT permit rule ordering in any sense that we nowadays usually intend.

Transformationalists are particularly fond of borrowing grammatical terminology from biology. Thus the terms “bleeding” and “feeding” have been invented. “Bleeding” and “feeding” are cases of rule ordering in TG, when given two rules, both apply, but the range of application of one is expanded or restricted depending on its ordering with respect to the other. Thus with usual rule ordering feeding and bleeding are possible, but there can be no feed/bleed distinction in Pāṇini. When two rules, dealing with the same phenomenon, and not governed by any of the principles already mentioned, conflict, the latter applies and the former is ignored. Thus
bleeding is impossible, and so is inverse bleeding. In Pāṇini the later rule will take over and former will simply be ignored. We can thus state with certainty that what the meta-rule deals with is not rule ordering at all. It does not tell us in what order rules apply; but rather which rules from the unordered set apply in any given derivation.

What, then, do we really have in the Aṣṭādhyāyī? We have a tight description of the morphology and the morphophonemics of one variety of Sanskrit, roughly the language of the aforementioned Aitareya Brāhmaṇa. Since this involves morphophonemics, it necessarily involves the conversion (vikṛti) of the ideal form (ākṛti) into the actually attested surface form. But ANY morphophonemic form will do this much. What is particularly interesting for our purposes is the fact that it does this by an UNORDERED SET OF RULES, because this fact separates Pāṇini from any system that is dependent on rule ordering.

As a matter of fact, since the grammar deals with ‘ideal’ and ‘realized’ and leaves the rules unordered, there is ample reason to regard Hjelmslev’s Glossematics and Sydney M. Lamb’s stratificational grammar as equally plausible descendants of Pāṇini’s system. Pāṇini’s hierarchical set of principles moving from “later” to “earlier”, from “unconditional” to “conditional”, from “suppletive” to “non-suppletive”, and “exception” to “non-exception” is, in fact, very reminiscent of the way Hjelmslev orders his priorities in the description of a natural language in his Prolegomena to a Theory of Language (1944/1961). We quote Hjelmslev’s famous ‘meta-rules’ in toto:

The description shall be free of contradiction (self-consistent), exhaustive, and as simple as possible. The requirement of freedom from contradiction takes precedence over the requirement of exhaustive description. The requirement of exhaustive description takes precedence over the requirement of simplicity. (1961, p. 11)

The similarity in spirit (if not in letter) to Kātyayāna’s
Vārtika (1. 3. 11), as quoted above, is so strong that it is almost certain that Hjelmslev must have been thoroughly familiar with Pāṇini as well as his commentators. That Lamb’s stratificational grammar (1966, and various articles in Makkai and Lockwood 1973) is a direct descendant of Hjelmslev’s glossematics, was attested to by Lamb himself (1966b). Why, then, has then never been any claim made insisting that Pāṇini is, in fact, a proto-stratificationalist?

Because—and this is the simple truth—it ESSENTIALLY DOESN’T MATTER whose ancestor he actually was. The Ancestor Hunt is only for the insecure.

There has been a mystique about Pāṇini, a mystique grounded in his elegance, his extreme conciseness, and, as a consequence of the latter, the difficulty of understanding him without special training. But when we cut through that mystique, we see a system that could be the intellectual ancestor of anyone or of no one at all, depending on the aspect we look at. Stratificational Grammar has at least as good a claim as does Transformational-Generative Grammar, the Junggrammatiker of the 19th century, or the American Structuralists of the 20th century. In truth, none of the aforementioned Western systems have a very valid claim on Pāṇini at all. The real descendants of Pāṇini are the Indian linguists, his commentators, and those contemporary Sanskrit scholars who work within the living Pāṇinian tradition.

This last observation amounts to an important comment on modern linguistics in general. We can best illustrate what we mean by citing the motto of Thomas Mann’s famous novel, The Holy Sinner (Der Erwählte). The motto says: “Above languages there is Language”. How does this apply to our present dilemma, our inability to find “real” descendants of the great Pāṇini? Simply this way: perhaps it is true that above linguistics there is Grammar. Pāṇini’s uniqueness rests in the fact that he came very close to that “Grammar”; the rest of us are merely lost in the “languages” of our “linguistics”. 

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FRICATIVES AND SPIRANTS

ANDRÉ MARTINET

In international phonetic terminology there exist a number of competing terms for designating the same notions. For the different types of consonants, in particular, if the terms ‘vibrants’ and ‘laterals’ are generally used in reference to the different varieties of [r] and [l], there is no general agreement regarding the labeling of other types of obstruents. For total obstruction, the term ‘occlusive’, relayed in English by the handier ‘stop’, is frequently used. But those who want to stress less the static aspect of the product than the dynamics of its contact with neighboring phonic elements are apt to speak of ‘plosives’, a term that tallies with, and actually derives from, the more specific ‘impllosives’ and ‘explosives’, the whole group being probably ultimately back-formed from the everyday term ‘explosion’.

If there seems to be some justification for the coexistence of ‘occlusive’ and ‘plosive’ since they appear to stress different aspects of the same phenomenon, it is not quite certain the same applies to the three different designations of the consonantal continuants, namely ‘fricative’, ‘constrictive’, and ‘spirant’. It could no doubt be argued that the opposition of ‘fricative’ to ‘constrictive’ parallels that of ‘occlusive’ to ‘plosive’ in the sense that both ‘fricative’ and ‘occlusive’ refer to the physical nature of the core of the phonic product: the crucial feature of the former is a friction, that of the latter is a stoppage, whereas ‘plosive’ (more precisely ‘impllosive’) and ‘constrictive’ point to a motion toward that crucial feature. And indeed it would seem that the linguists and phoneticians who normally use ‘plosive’ in preference to ‘occlusive’ also favor ‘constrictive’ rather than ‘fricative’, two choices that might indicate a more or less conscious wish to stress the dynamics of the production. We are thus tempted not to question the
legitimacy of the coexistence of 'fricative' and 'constrictive', although it is likely that we have there, in most instances, a case of two parallel traditions and nothing else.

The case of the 'fricative' vs. 'spirant' opposition is somewhat different. If we are inclined to pair the two of them rather than 'constrictive' vs. 'spirant' it is, of course, because 'spirant', just like 'fricative', seems to point to the constituent nature of the product. In 'spirant', there is a reference to the flow of air (generally an outflow from the lungs) through the speech organs, a flow that is not checked by any obstacle as in the case of occlusives. 'Spirant' of course sounds less specific than 'fricative'. A friction, as a phonic product, implies a flow of air, but one with a definite acoustic effect. One wonders whether the obvious disinclination of some authors to use the term 'fricative' does not, in the last analysis, stem from the desire to avoid an admixture of acoustic elements to the mainly articulatory terminology of non-instrumental phonetics. But, although a friction is audible, it nevertheless constitutes in itself an articulatory incident, and, reasonably, purists should not object to it.

In the practice of a majority of linguists, 'fricative' and 'spirant' are used indiscriminately or, more precisely, those who are used to 'spirant' understand 'spirant' when they read 'fricative' and vice-versa.

As far back as the fifties, this author decided to take advantage of the existence of the two parallel terms and suggested that 'fricative' be restricted to cases in which a friction is clearly audible, as in the sibilants, the ich-Laut and ach-Laut of German, and most labiodentals, while 'spirant' should be used when the articulation is so lax that no friction is perceived and the identity of the product is secured either by the quality of the resonance of the accompanying voice or, in the absence of the latter, by the effect on the neighboring vowels. In my experience, such a distinction is never found to be phonemically relevant, as it would be if a given language offered, for one and the same-
articulatory type, two phonemes differing only by the degree of their respective constrictions. Yet, it was found necessary in order to prevent dangerous identifications when passing from one language to another. In English, for instance, the specific apicodental articulations of the initial consonants of *thigh* and *thy* may be described as identical, such minimal differences as could be detected being by-products of the different actions of the glottis for the voiceless and for the voiced phonemes. In Castilian Spanish, however, the intervocalic continuant of *caza* ‘hunting’, an interdental surd, cannot be described as the voiceless counterpart of the intervocalic continuant of *cada* ‘each’, the degree of constriction being, as a rule, considerably lower in the latter. In other terms, the [θ] of *caza* is positively constrictive and audibly fricative, whereas the [s] of *cada* is an imperfectly articulated [d]. On the plane of distinctiveness, the fricative /θ/ of *caza* stands in opposition to the occlusive /t/ of *cata* ‘testing’, while the [s] of *cada* is the intervocalic relaxed allophone of a /d/ phoneme. There can be no doubt that the relevancy of the continuant feature in *caza*, its allophonic status in *cada* accounts for the articulatory difference. It is necessary to mark that difference, and calling the continuant of *caza* a fricative and that of *cada* a spirant seems a good way to do it.

The distinction appeared in print, in 1956, in my book *La description phonologique*. Yet I was, for a while, not inclined to stress it, since I doubted the actual difference was as clear-cut as the use of different terms seemed to imply. But my assistants and some of my students, who acutely felt the need of that distinction, insisted on its being emphasized and promoted.

In 1967, Pierre Delattre, who was not aware of my terminological suggestion, presented to the participants of the Sixth International Congress of Phonetic Sciences a series of spectrograms illustrating the fundamental difference between the two phonetic types. The distinction is carefully presented and consistently exploited in the recently published *Initiation à la*
phonétique* by Jacqueline Thomas, Luc Bouquiaux, and France Cloarec-Heiss.

The contrastive redefinition of the two words has led to a number of interesting observations which will be best presented in dynamic terms.

When a weakly articulated stop loses its occlusion the product is a spirant: the relaxing of [p] yields [φ], that of [b] gives [β]. If voice is present, the spirant product may endure, resonance securing in such a case autonomous audibility. If voice is absent, the spirant, as such, is likely to be short-lived: the relaxing of the specific articulation will, sooner or later, result in an aperture larger than that of the glottis, so that what is then perceived is no longer the specific, but the glottal articulation. If we retain [φ] as an example, any further relaxation of the labial narrowing is likely to result in the perception of an [h]. Such a shift is likely to start in open vocalic surroundings: the Japanese reflex of an ancient p is normally [h], except before [i] where what is heard is [ç], a friction in the [i] region, and before u where the former lip-rounding of the vowel has been transferred to the preceding consonant which has consequently been preserved as [φ].

But, among voiceless spirants, the disintegrating process is not restricted to [φ]: a shift from [k] to [x] and [h] is found in Germanic, with a further evolution from [h] to zero in some varieties of English and Flemish; a weakening of intervocalic [t] to [θ] and zero (through [h]) is attested in Irish. Such variations as that of f-ch in German Luft, Dutch Lucht or c-p in Latin lacte, Romanian lapte, presuppose a voiceless labial spirant in Luft-lucht, a voiceless dorsal spirant in lacte as pronounced in Dacia. In both cases, we must posit [-pt-] > [-φt-], [-kt-] > [-xt-], with a tendency, in casual speech, to shift both [-φt-] and [-xt-] to [-ht-], leading to interchanges of [-φt-] and [-xt-] in a more accurate type of pronunciation, and an ultimate hardening to a labiodental fricative in Luft, a dorsal fricative in lucht, a labial stop in lapte.

If, at a certain stage, a language presents, in all positions, a
whole series of voiceless spirants, say /φ/, /θ/, /χ/, the necessity of communication will as a rule oppose a general weakening of all of them to [h]. Only one will be affected. The others will be kept distinct and a secure stability by becoming fricatives. Bilabial [φ] will be hardened to a labiodental [f], dorsovelar [χ] tilting back toward an ach-Laut or front toward an ich-Laut. It would seem that what is the best articulatory position for a stop gives poor results for a continuant. Or, to put it differently, a firm constriction entails a shift away from the positions that are normal for occlusions.

Attentive readers may have noticed that we have been using Greek χ as a symbol for a dorsovelar voiceless continuant. This conflicts with the recommendations of the I.P.A. according to which Greek χ should refer to a uvular product and [χ] should be used for the dorsovelar. My reason for interverting the symbols is that I think we should, whenever it is possible, use Greek letters for spirants, Roman letters for fricatives, as shown in Chart 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>bilabials</th>
<th>labiodentals</th>
<th>dorso-palatals</th>
<th>dorso-velars</th>
<th>dorso-uvulars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stops</td>
<td>p</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>k</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td></td>
<td>...</td>
<td>g</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuants</td>
<td>φ</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>ζ</td>
<td>χ</td>
<td>χ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>β</td>
<td>v</td>
<td>j</td>
<td>γ</td>
<td>Ψ</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chart 1

The apicals have been left out of Chart 1, because, in their case, fricatives and spirants being articulated at practically the same level, no separate symbols have been provided in the I.P.A. I suggest that Greek letters, namely θ and δ, should be
used for the spirants, Roman letters for the fricatives with ʃ (the ‘thorn’) for the voiceless and s for the voiced varieties. In this connection, it is important to stress that the spirant vs. fricative opposition does not coincide with that of ‘slit’ vs. ‘groove’ which is basic for distinguishing interdentals and sibilants. Both the fricatives [\(\phi\)] and the spirants [\(\theta \ \delta\)] are ‘slit’, and, as a rule, [p] and [s] do not get ‘hardened’ to [s] and [z]⁴. The case of the apicals requires that spirants and fricatives be presented in charts as two different horizontal bundles. The same applies to retroflex consonants as shown on Chart 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>bilabials</th>
<th>labiodentals</th>
<th>apicals</th>
<th>retroflex</th>
<th>dorso-palatals</th>
<th>dorso-velars</th>
<th>dorso-uvulars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stops</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p</td>
<td></td>
<td>t</td>
<td>(\dagger)</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>k</td>
<td>q</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td></td>
<td>d</td>
<td>(\ddagger)</td>
<td>j</td>
<td>g</td>
<td>G</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spirants</td>
<td>(\phi)</td>
<td>(\theta)</td>
<td>r</td>
<td>(\chi)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\beta)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(\delta)</td>
<td>(\iota)</td>
<td>(\gamma)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fricatives</td>
<td>f</td>
<td>p</td>
<td>(\varsigma)</td>
<td>(\varsigma)</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v</td>
<td></td>
<td>(\varsigma)</td>
<td>z</td>
<td>j</td>
<td>(\varphi)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chart 2

The voiceless spirant series shows gaps, which is easily understood in reference to what has been said above about their inherent instability. The symbol \(\chi\) is affected here to the fricatives, but the \(r\) phoneme of Parisian French, which is generally noted as \([\chi]\), certainly belongs among the spirants.

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SUNITI CHATTERJI COMMEMORATION VOLUME
This chart summarizes the dynamics of the labial, apical, and dorsal spirants; boldface for fricatives; double-shaft arrows indicate hardening; single-shaft arrows point to results of weakening.

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NOTES


4. Andalusian and American Spanish [s], e.g., in caza does not derive from Castilian Spanish [p]; [s] and [h] are diverging reflexes of a former [ts].

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SOCIOLOGY OF SOME JAPANESE EXPRESSIONS

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In this part of the paper, I have made an attempt to study some Japanese expressions in order to point out their relevance in establishing human relations and mutual understanding. I have selected only those expressions which are frequently used by the Japanese in their day-to-day conversation and thus are functionally significant. These standard expressions being used ceremoniously and excessively have become fixed and hackneyed. In most of the cases they reveal Japanese attitudes and approaches to human relationships and may be taken as a part of their behaviorism.

The expressions I have collected can be put into the following four categories:

1. Expressions showing naturalism and physicality,
2. Expressions creating distance,
3. Expressions which help in creating amiability, and
4. Miscellaneous.

1. Expressions showing naturalism and physicality

My assumption will run contrary to the general belief with most of the Japanese that they are basically a spiritually minded people. They see spirit in every matter and spirituality in every physical demand and action. They argue, if the mind is spiritually attuned then automatically physical needs and acts, in spite of their carnality, do not fall into the category of physicality.

Before coming to the specific expressions, a word about the structure of Japanese society is necessary. Besides the hierarchal nature of the Japanese society, people when they
communicate with others have a very clear horizontal distinction in relation to the other party. According to Chie Nakane, Japanese make clear distinctions according to the following three categories: 1. those people within one's own group, 2. those whose own background is fairly well-known, and 3. those who are unknown—the strangers.

Natural urges, states and demands of the body and mind are usually very explicitly expressed by the Japanese people within their own group, but also these are loud enough to be heard by an outsider. Expressions like o-naka ga sukimashita (I am hungry), nodo ga kawaite imasu (I am thirsty), nemui (I am sleepy), atsui (It's warm), samui (It's cold), are very directly and frequently used by the people within their own group. To my knowledge, Indians seldom use direct expressions in similar circumstances. Recently, I met a Japanese lady married to a Swede. The language of her family was Swedish but her husband used Japaesee with the children, only for asking such questions as: Are you hungry?, Are you sleepy? It was a very interesting piece of information in support of my observation.

Another set of expressions includes: sabishii (lonely), ii kimochi (feeling good), suki (like), kirai (dislike), vakimochi (jealousy), wagamama (selfish), etc. Sabishikunai desu ka? (Aren't you lonely?) is one of the questions very often asked of foreigners in Japan and Japanese people themselves do not hesitate in expressing their own loneliness. One of my Japanese friends once told me about his six year old son's lonely feelings. I was confused and thought that the boy may not be having any friends. It was sometime later that I found out the real reason of his loneliness. As he had neither a brother nor a sister, he was considered lonely.

In relation to things, Japanese people instinctively know their likes and dislikes. A person with strong likes and dislikes or one who is very choosy is considered suki-kirai ga hageshi. The word suki is very liberally used but, as ought to be,
discretion is shown in the use of the word *kirai*. Women in particular distinctly remember the likes and dislikes of the family members and others who they are in contact with. Their use of the expression *suki dakara* (Because you like...) is very much heard. Mothers, when they offer something to a child and do not receive a favourable response from him, come out with the expression *iya desu ne* (It’s because you do not like it, isn’t it!).

Relatively, the Japanese people have a quite healthy and earthy attitude towards man-woman relationships. *Kekkyoku otoko to onna no sekai desu ne* (After all this world belongs to man and woman) can be heard when any unconventional relationship between men and women is discussed. The general reaction, of the Japanese people was unfavorable when some members of the opposition parties mentioned on the floor of the parliament the extra-marital relations of a former prime minister. The reaction rather than condemning the prime-minister condemned the action of the opposition members.

Closely related to such an approach is the Japanese attitude towards drunkards. A person’s misconduct and unseemly behavior in a drunken state is usually disapproved by the societies, I am familiar with. In India, it would be quite normal to treat roughly or give a thrashing to a drunkard, who might prove to be a public nuisance. In some other societies to show indifference may be the normal reaction. But in Japan, indulgence of a drunkard is tolerated to a very great extent. Basically it is sympathetic, because a drunkard who is out of his senses, needs all the more help and kindness from persons who are in a position to help.

In a way, Japanese naturalism and physicality comes to its best in their public bathing system. There people nonchalantly enjoy themselves.

The question, why a society, so explicit and open physically, is so reserved and closed mentally, always racks my brain. I have found a tremendous gap in mutual understanding among
Japanese themselves. An extreme case was the suicide committed by Yukio Mishima in 1970. Even his wife had no idea of the world Mishima was living in. To her horror and disbelief she heard the news of her husband's action while travelling in a taxi. This lack of communication on the mental level creates innumerable misunderstandings and tensions even in one's own group.

In comparison to many traditional societies, Japanese society's attitude towards man's biological needs is less inhibited and sound, more accommodating and considerate to human limitations. In my view, they are more positive and understanding to human emotions, urges and failings.

2. *Expressions creating distance*

Some patent and fixed expressions, besides playing a role in establishing harmonious relationships among the members of the Japanese society, also create a golden distance between physically proximate individuals and groups.

Japan is a densely populated country, not for the simple reason that it is mountainous and limited in land area but on account of its social structure and pattern of living. Since earliest times Japanese people have lived in close proximity in clustered houses. This clustered pattern of house construction and living has its own merits and demerits. On the merit side, it gave a sense of security to the people and worked as a defence mechanism and made them community conscious. But a lack of privacy and an excessive interference in each others affairs were very pronounced demerits of this way of life. Moreover, the design, the lay out and the material used for the construction of Japanese houses made this situation worst. No wonder, under such a physical environment, there grew counter forces to provide social and and instinctive needs of the people. An ingenious trend in language, reflecting the social reality as well, fulfilled this need and a very elaborate system of expressions for different kinds of situations came into existence.

The whole *keigo* (polite language) structure of the Japanese
language falls into this category. The hierarchal nature of the Japanese society is a well known fact. The differences in status, age, sex, etc., are clearly demarcated through the use of personal pronouns or the absence of them, verbal forms, honorifics and other devices of the Japanese language and social conventions. *Keigo* works in two spheres, as a characteristic of the language it provides a unique discipline to the Japanese language and sets the people in an order, which functions as an automatic machine. This aspect has been thoroughly investigated by many scholars.

In comparison to other societies the Japanese are very conscious of external differences—both vertical and horizontal. Goldstein and Tamura have applied the principle of reciprocal-non-reciprocal to Japanese and American English to ascertain some of the circumstances under which one man speaks to another and how and why he does so. Japanese patterns conform to the nature of the person spoken to, or the person spoken about, in relation to the speaker himself. This pattern helps in setting a clear relationship and much inherent information, for example status, age, sex, relationship, etc., of the speaker, as well as the referent, as a by-product is simultaneously conveyed through this speech pattern. I think that *keigo* is a great distance demarcator between Japanese people and though linguistically its structure is non-reciprocal, socially it has much strength in establishing clear reciprocal relationships, in context of the structure of the Japanese society.

The preponderance of *keigo* patterns in the Japanese language and its inseparability in interpersonal relationships creates many problems of a psychological nature. The verbal forms and conjugation patterns in the Japanese language show a degree of respect, formality, politeness, informality, intimacy, etc. By a slight variation in the verbal forms the position, status and relationship can be altered and a range from highest esteem to contempt for a person can be expressed.

There are three: *sensei, sama, san*, postnominal honorifics and some others such as *kun* and *chan*, simple postnominal
particles in the Japanese language. By dropping completely or lowering the level of the honorifics, i.e., instead of the use of \textit{sensei}, if one uses \textit{san} as a postnominal suffix to a person's name, insult or less respect can be shown. Even the selection of words indicates the degree and level of a relationship. The Japanese language has its own characteristic sensitivity and strength to soothe or to hurt. Once I felt really hurt, when one of my most intimate Japanese friends introduced me to his circle of friends as his \textit{tomodachi} (a friend) instead of his \textit{vujin} (an intimate friend).

The postnominal honorifics and graded polite forms make Japanese behaviour very formal and bound to well established norms of expressions. Similarly, there are sets of standard expressions for different situations, which one comes across in one's daily life.

There is a set of expressions used when a family member leaves home for work or for school:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{itte kimasu} or \textit{itte maerimasu} \quad I am leaving and coming back.
\item \textit{itte irasshai}
\item \textit{tada-ima}
\item \textit{okaeri nasai} \quad You have returned or welcome return.
\end{itemize}

Another set is used at the time of formal dinners:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{meshi-agatte kudasai} \quad Please help yourself.
\item \textit{itadakimasu} \quad I receive it with thanks.
\item \textit{gochisōsama} (deshita) or \textit{oishikatta desu} \quad It was a delicious food.
\item \textit{o-somatsu deshita} \quad It was very bad in quality.
\end{itemize}

(A very formal and humble form.)

The following expressions are used between a visitor and his host:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{gomen kudasai} \quad Please forgive, may I enter.
\item \textit{o-agari kudasai} \quad Please come up or in.
\item \textit{raku ni shite kudasai} \quad Please be comfortable.
\item \textit{o-kamai naku} \quad Please do not bother.
\item \textit{go-enryō naku} \quad Please do not hesitate or do not be so formal.
\end{itemize}
These sets of expressions, along with the expressions for thankfulness dōmo arigatō, regret sumimasen deshita and forgiveness gomen nasai help in making different situations and the role of the participants very clear. At times, formality turns human relationships quite stiff and mechanical but it saves people from many unpleasant situations, which would be normal happenings in an informal society. These standard phrases used in the appropriate situations, save people from unnecessary verbosity. Considering the density of population in Japan, clustered housing complexes and lack of privacy in the houses, the frequent and methodical use of these standard expressions creates psychological distance between people living in close proximity. In spite of the fact that the Japanese society is highly interdependent in composition, the phrase, familiarity breeds contempt does not apply to it because of these formal expressions which check it from occurring.

I am inclined to think that this standard expression-oriented formality of the Japanese society will be a cue for those societies whose population is growing at a menacing rate, giving rise to tensions of a varied nature.

3. Expressions which help in creating amiability

Apparently, Japanese people lay much emphasis on human relations. The Japanese virtue of considerateness has been acknowledged in glowing terms by many impressionable foreigner. The survey reports on child upbringing in Japan point out that more than sixty percent of the parents give top priority to the aspect: How their children may not be a nuisance to others? To behave as one of the whole group is the cardinal principle of the Japanese community sense. The idea that one must not excel others or be outstanding, is a kind of self-egalitarianism with the Japanese. Though the sphere of interaction is usually limited to one’s own group.

Japanese people’s approach and attitude in human relations is generally constructive and positive. They invariably prefer to start any dialogue on anything with agreement and good feeling. Such expressions of greetings as atsui desu ne (Isn’t
it warm.), *li tenki desu ne* (Isn't it nice weather.), usually get affirmative responses, one's personal view notwithstanding.

It is quite customary to compliment a foreigner on his Japanese, even the poorest possible Japanese, with the expression *o-jōzu desu ne* (You are an expert.). Sometimes completely unmindful of a foreigner's possible embarrassment.

To show how much one values meetings with the person concerned, the expressions *shibaraku deshita* or *hisashiburi desu* (It was since long that we have not met) are very much used.

There are standard expressions to approach somebody for favors or to encroach on somebody's time and space. They work as qualifiers. For example,

$o$-jama shimasu Excuse me for disturbing you.

$o$-negaishimasu I request you ...

warui keredomo It may be improper but ...

*itsumo o-sewa ni natte orimasu* I am always obliged to you.

*tanomimasu* I request you.

Usually an employer for better human understanding, will recognize the trouble a worker has taken for his sake, by using the following two expressions:

*go*-kurō-sama deshita It was a painful trouble.

*o*-tsukare-sama You must be tired. (It serves additional purpose for taking leave after day's work.)

4. *Miscellaneous*

A. *Shikata ga nai* or *shiyō ga nai* It can not be helped, There is no alternative, is a phrase very much used by the Japanese people. The range of circumstances when it is used or applied is very wide.

The law enforcing offices take shelter under this expression to show their helplessness because of the rigid rules but at the same time impress upon the party that he has their sympathy in his cause. It is a polite impersonal no.

When people are faced with problems and wish to implement
their preferred solutions, they use this phrase to shut down any possibility for compromise.

Yukio Mishima told the hostaged Commander of the Japanese Self-defence Army *shikata ga nai* before committing suicide. He may have meant that as he had failed in his mission, there was no other alternative in saving his face than to sacrifice his life for his cause.

B. *kao ga tatanai, kao o tsubusu, mentsu o nakusu* are Japanese expressions meaning to lose one’s face.

Not to lose one’s face or saving the face is a very strong national trait of the Japanese. They very judiciously avoid such situations, where somebody may lose his face thus matters involving delicate negotiations are usually carried out through a mediator or a go-between. The proposals passed through a third party avoid acrimonious confrontation and leave the door open for compromise through the good offices of a mediator.

This personal trait is also reflected in the structure and activities of small and big trading companies in Japan, where employees completely identify the company’s interests with theirs. These firms even make payments to potential disruptors to insure orderly conduct at the general shareholders meetings, in order to maintain the firm’s credibility.

The Japanese people recognize the value of face in their social life and expressions like *watakushi no kao o tateru to omotte* (Thinking that my face will be saved) and *shachō no kao o tateru tameni* (To save the face of the director) are used to persuade help and assure the best effort from others.

Charging Japanese police for harassment, Shig Katayama, one of those involved in the multinational bribery case, said: “They (police) are looking for a scape-goat. The police have a face problem. And somehow they are going to get me.”

In this respect, the Japanese are very self-conscious but at the same time are careful in dealing with their fellow men.