CHAPTER I
FROM BEGINNINGS TO BHĀMAHA

( 1 )

Of the unknown beginnings of Poetics as a discipline, our enquiry in the preceding volume\(^1\) has indicated that we can only make a few surmises, by implication, from the oldest surviving works on the subject, from stray references in general literature, from the elaboration of similar ideas in other disciplines, and from the fully developed Kāvya-style which would warrant the pre-existence of some doctrines of Poetics regulating its art and usage.

Apart from such surmises, the sixteenth chapter of Bharata’s Nāṭya-śāstra gives us for the first time an outline of Poetics which is probably earlier in substance, if not in date, than the earliest existing Kāvya. In this chapter, one meets with a developed dogma, if not a theory, of Poetics which enumerates four poetic figures (alāṃkāras), ten excellences (gunās), ten defects (doṣas), and thirty-six characteristics (lakṣaṇas) of poetic composition. These apparently constituted the principal contents of the discipline as it existed at a very early period; and this may be taken, in the absence of other data, as the first known period in the history of Sanskrit Poetics.

It is proper to note in this connexion that in the Nāṭya-śāstra, Bharata is principally concerned with Dramaturgy and allied topics\(^2\), and deals with Poetics in so far as it applies to the theme in hand. In later poetic theories, Dramaturgy is taken as a part of the discipline of Poetics, and the drama

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\(^1\) See vol. i, pp. 1-17.

\(^2\) An outline of the different chapters of Bharata’s Nāṭya-śāstra is given in Winternitz Gil, iii, pp. 7f, and in Kane HSP, pp. vi-vii.
is accordingly considered to be a species of the Kāvyā. But there are reasons to believe that in older times Dramaturgy and Poetics formed separate disciplines, the former being probably the earlier in point of time, as well as in substance. We have seen that the existence of nāṭa-sūtras, which were presumably works in the sūtra-style on the histrionic art, was known even in the time of Panini; but there is no reference, direct or indirect, to such alaṃkāra-sūtras, and indeed the term Alāṃkāra itself in the technical sense was unknown in early literature. The earliest surviving works on Poetics, on the other hand, do not include a treatment of the theme of Dramaturgy which, having been a study by itself, was possibly excluded from the sphere of Poetics proper. Both Bhāmaha and Dandin, no doubt, speak of nāṭaka as a species of kāvyā, but they refer to specialised treatises for its detailed treatment. Vāmanā, the next important writer on Poetics, shows indeed an unusual partiality towards the drama (I. 3. 30-32), but even he did not think it proper to devote any special attention to it. Among later writers, it is not until we come to the time of Hemacandra, Vidyānātha and Visvanātha, when the study was already entering upon a period of critical elaboration and summing-up of results, that we find special chapters dealing with the topic of Dramaturgy. Of these late writers, Vidyānātha and Viśvanātha explicitly refer to and summarise the Daśa-rūpaka, a recognised work on the dramatic art, while the encyclopaedic Hemacandra, who professed great admiration for Bharata and his commentator Abhinavagupta, deals with the subject rather summarily, referring the reader to the standard works of Bharata and Kohala.

It seems, therefore, that the school of Dramaturgy had an existence separate from the orthodox school of Poetics.

31. Bhām. Alāṃkāra 24 The word anyatra in the context is referring to Bharata.
It is thus not surprising that Bharata should set apart, as he does, a chapter of his work for dealing with the ornaments of Poetry, so far they apply to the drama (nāṭakaśraya). In his discussion of the guṇas and dosas in their application to the drama, he expressly designates them as kāvyā-guṇas and kāvyā-dosas (xvi. 92, 84) respectively; and with reference to the alaṃkāras he says kāvyasyaite hyaṃকārāḥ (xvi. 41)5, making it clear at the same time that he considers them only as embellishments of the dramatic speech.

Bharata opens this chapter on Poetics with the discussion of what he calls the lakṣaṇas (lit. characteristics), which appear to be partly formal and partly material elements of poetry6. Bharata mentions 36 of them and devotes a considerable part of this chapter to their definition; and the whole discipline appears to have received from them the designation of Kāvyā-lakṣaṇa referred to in xvi. 17. From his treatment it appears that he considers Lakṣaṇas to be of greater importance.

5 Ed Kāvyamālā (N S P), ed GOS xvi. 41, but the Chowkhamba Skt Ser ed. xvii 42 reads the line differently. Our references in the following pages are throughout to the Kāvyamālā ed.—Cf also verses 104, 110. Bharata uses the word kāvyā many times here, as in other chapters, to signify the drama, but we must bear in mind that his conception of poetry is dramatic and justifies such employment of the term kāvyā. But in this chapter he appears to imply a distinction between the kāvyā and the nāṭaka as species of composition.

6 The part of the text dealing with Lakṣaṇas and Guṇas exists in two recensions, which we shall call here A and B. Both the recensions are known to Abhinavagupta, but he follows the text of A on Lakṣaṇas, as it had been handed down to him through his teachers (asmad upādīhyāya-paramarāgataḥ, p. 384). The editions of Kāvyamālā and Gaekwad's Series give this recension A, which consists of 39 verses starting with Upajāti and proceeding with Anuṣṭubh stanzas. The B recension, found in Chowkhamba Skt. Ser. ed. (which also gives A in the footnote), consists of 42 stanzas all in Anuṣṭubh. A is followed by the Dasa-rāpaka, but B is accepted by Śūga-bhūpāla and Viśvanātha. Bhoja appears to know both the recensions, but he makes out 64 Lakṣaṇas, he is followed by Śāradātanaya.

7 In Kāvyamālā and Gaekwad's ed., ed. Chowkhamba p. 204, st. 16.
than Alamkāras which are mentioned as just a few in number.

It is not very clear, however, from Bharata's treatment as to what position these Lakṣaṇas should occupy in a formal scheme of Poetics; but the function of most of these is assigned in later Poetics to Alamkāras or Guṇas. Daṇḍin mentions them summarily (ii. 366) under Alamkāras in the wider sense, along with saṃdhyaṅga and vṛttyaṅga which belong properly to the drama, and refers to āgamāntara (interpreted by Taruṇavacaspāti as alluding to Bharata) for their treatment. So does Dhanañjaya (ed. N. S. P. iv. 84); while Viśvanātha (ed. Durgaprasad, i. 171-211, pp. 316-332) takes them in connexion with the drama, calling some of them nātyālamkāra (dramatic embellishment), and is at the same time of opinion that although some of them are properly included under guṇa, alamkāra, bhāva and saṃdhi, they require a particular mention inasmuch as in the drama they are to be accomplished with some care (p. 332). In later literature the Lakṣaṇas, which linger conventionally in Dramaturgy, entirely disappear from Poetics proper, Jayadeva's Candrāloka being the only later work on Poetics which deals with them. This phenomenon would probably indicate not only that the Lakṣaṇas were regarded as strictly proper to the drama, but also the conclusion that what were, in the infancy of Poetics, considered so important as to deserve separate treatment and to be differentiated from the Guṇas and the Alamkāras, were with the growth of critical insight assigned to the Guṇas and Alamkāras themselves to whose sphere in ultimate analysis they were thought properly to belong.

V. Raghavan has already given a detailed account of the

8 For instance, āśīḥ is one of the lakṣaṇas of Bharata, Bhāmaha mentioning it rather doubtfully as an alamkāra with the remark: āśīr api ca leśāṃcid alamkāratayā matā (iii. 54). In Daṇḍin ii. 357 (as well as in Bhaṭṭi), it is already established as an Alámkāra. It is significant that Kuntaka finds fault with those who regard it as an Alámkāra.

history of the concept of Lakṣaṇa; but since the Lakṣaṇa-paddhati perished very early, or lingered as a superfluous relic in the history of Poetics and Dramaturgy, it is not necessary for us to make more than a passing reference. Abhinavagupta, while explaining Bharata’s text, mentions as many as ten different views concerning Lakṣaṇa; but it appears that Lakṣaṇa, otherwise called Bhūṣaṇa, is generally taken (on the analogy perhaps of Sāmudrika Lakṣaṇa), to be an innate beautifying element belonging to the body of poetry, or rather as constituting the body itself. Although similar in function to the Alamkāra in being a Kāvya-śobhākara Dharma, it is not a separate entity, but Aprthak-siddha; that is to say, it imparts beauty to poetry by itself, and is not added, as an Alamkāra is added, for extra beauty. It is obvious that the concept of Lakṣaṇa, even at its birth, had an overlapping of function with Alamkāra, which in course of time swallowed it up. Even as a Nāṭaka-dharma, connected with dramatic Saṃdhyaṅgas, it had little individuality, and the attitude of the Dasā-rūpaka in not considering it separately is significant. The main view, however, which takes Lakṣaṇa, like Alamkāra, as a beautifying characteristic, appears to have died out with Abhinavagupta’s somewhat apologetic formulation.

From Lakṣaṇas Bharata goes on to the more interesting topic of kāvyālamkāras or poetic figures. It appears from his treatment that only four such poetic figures were known or recognised in his time, viz. upamā (simile), rūpaka (metaphor), dipaka (lit. illuminator\(^{13}\)) and yamaka (repetition

10 It is difficult to translate some of these terms, for there are no equivalents for them in European Rhetoric, and therefore attempts at such translation are as a general rule avoided here. The poetic figure dipaka may be generally explained as a figure in which two or more objects, some relevant and some irrelevant, having the same attributes, are associated together; or in which several attributes, some relevant and some irrelevant, are predicated of the same object. It is called dipaka or “illuminator” because it is like a lamp which, when employed for illuminating one object, illuminates others.
of words or syllables similar in sound). The Upamā is subdivided into four kinds, according as the object compared (upameya) or the standard of comparison (upamāna) is one or many. Bharata expressly making use of these technical terms. From another standpoint, five varieties of Upamā are distinguished and illustrated, viz. (1) praśamsopamā (2) nindo-pamā (3) kalpitopamā (4) sudrṣī upamā and (5) kimcit-sadrṣī upamā, according as these qualifications apply to the upamāna. Bharata is apparently unaware of the finer shades of distinction (grammatical or otherwise) introduced later on into the treatment of Upamā by Bhāma, Daṇḍin and Udbhāta, or of its comprehensive definition given by Vāmana; but the very fact that the idea of comparison was even by this time analysed thus far shows a considerable amount of speculation on this point. Bharata’s first two kinds, however, are criticised by Bhāma (ii. 37), but accepted by Daṇḍin without question (ii. 30-31); while the name, if not the idea, of the third kind lingers in Vāmana iv. 2. 2. Of Rūpaka and Dipaka no subvarieties are mentioned, and possibly these were comparatively late inventions. Of Yamaka, on the other hand, ten subspecies are elaborately defined and illustrated, a number exceeding even that given by Bhāma. It would appear that in the earlier stages of Poetics, what in later authors is known as a śabdūlāmākāra

11 Viz. (i) ekasya ekena (ii) ekasya anekena (iii) anekasya ekena (iv) bahūnām bahubhiḥ.

12 Abhinavagupta notices the reading asadrṣī.

13 This figure is certainly one of the most ancient, and the idea of it was not unknown to Yāska (see vol. i, pp. 3-6).

14 The arrangement of the text dealing with these two figures differ in the different editions. But the wordings agree with the exception of saṃprakīrtitom xiv. 55 (in Kāvyamālā ed.), which is obviously a misreading for saṃpradipakam (as Abhinava’s comm. shows), given correctly in other editions.

15 Most of the names of these varieties have survived in Bhaṭṭī, Daṇḍin and other writers; but they are in most cases differently defined. See vol. i, p. 54 footnote 2.
(of which the artifices of Yamaka in particular seem to have found the greatest favour) received a more elaborate treatment\(^{14}\), although the process repeats itself in comparatively modern decadent authors who delight in such external poetic devices. The later distinction between śabdālāṁkāra and arthālāṁkāra is not referred to by Bharata\(^{17}\), as also by Bhāmaha; but Bharata uses the word śabdābhyaśa with reference to Yamaka, which term might have suggested, as Abhinava’s commentary on this point indicates, the later classification, which is implied for the first time by Daṇḍin’s treatment.

After the Alāṁkāras, comes the treatment of ten doṣas (xvi. 84f) and ten guṇas (xvi. 92f), which seem to have constituted the orthodox number of faults and excellences of poetic composition. We shall have occasion to deal with the doctrine of Guṇa and Doṣa in connexion with the Rāti-theorists, who for the first time take it up seriously; but it

16 As in Bhaṭṭi, Daṇḍin, Vāmana, Rudraṭa, the Agni-purāṇa and Bhoja among older authors. Bhāmaha gives only five varieties, and Udbhata is the only old writer who altogether omits its treatment. This figure, as Bharata’s elaborate treatment would show, must have been very early comprehended, e.g., in Rāmāyana, Sundarakāṇḍa v 15-17 in Rudradāman inscription of the 2nd century A.D. Possibly it was favoured as a not unlikely substitute for rhyme, which is nearly absent in earlier Sanskrit and which probably originated from antyānuprāsa in later literature. But Mammata and later writers, following perhaps the dictum of Anandavardhana (on ii. 16 f) that yamaka, in order to be really poetical, requires a special effort on the part of the poet, and is in no way accessory to rasa, allude to it but dismiss it in a few words. As critical insight into the aesthetic requirements of poetry grew, the number of such figures as depended for their appeal chiefly on clever verbal arrangement, as well as their treatment in Poetics, naturally dwindled, although yamaka itself (as well as anuprāsa) played a much larger part in later decadent poetry. Bhoja, with an inaccuracy characteristic of later writers, speaks of tricks like murajaśrudha as having been bharata-kathitā!

17 Abhinava, however, reads into Bharata such a distinction, and in his “Locana p. 5 he says: cirantaṁair hi bharata-muni-prabhṛtibhir yamakopame śabdārthālāṁkāraveneśte.
may be pointed out here that Bharata's enumeration and
definition of individual Doṣas and Guṇas do not exactly
correspond to those of his nearest successors. Except keep-
ing to the conventional number of ten (although Bhāmaha
introduces an eleventh fault from the standpoint of logical
correctness\textsuperscript{18} and a list of ten intrinsic poetic faults in a
different context, as he also mentions only three poetic
excellences), both Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin do not appear to
have accepted implicitly this part of Bharata's teaching.

The faults mentioned by Bharata (xvi. 84) are:\textsuperscript{19}

i. gūḍhārtha=circumlocution or periphrase (paryāya-
sabdābhhihitam\textsuperscript{20}).

ii. arthāntara=digression into irrelevant matter
(avarṇyasya vārṇanam\textsuperscript{21}).

\textsuperscript{18} With the exception of the eleventh fault, Daṇḍin is not only in
complete agreement with Bhāmaha but really follows the latter's enu-
meration and definitions almost literally. This point will be discussed
later.

\textsuperscript{19} On Bharata's Doṣas see V. Raghavan, Śṛṅgāra-prakāṣa, pt. ii,
pp. 229-233. In Kauṭilya's Artha-śāstra the defects of the art of writing
are: vyāghāta (contradiction), punarukta (repetition), apaśabda (gram-
matical incorrectness) and samplava (misarrangement of words).

\textsuperscript{20} This phrase in Bharata cannot mean "expression by means of a
synonym", for it would then be difficult to differentiate this Doṣa from
ekārtha given below. Possibly this is the fault which appears in later
writers as the figure of speech known as paryāyokta (=roughly, circum-
locution or periphrase as a poetic figure). It is apparently so explained
by Abhinavagupta. It is possible that later rhetoricians perceived that
periphrase might sometimes be an ornament of expression, and thus
analysed it into a poetic figure; and this may be taken as an instance in
point of the process by which poetic figures were multiplied in
later speculation.

\textsuperscript{21} Abhinava takes it in the sense of description of matters which
should not be described in words (śabdenāvārṇanīyaṃ api vārṇitam).
and rejects the sense of aprākṛta-vārṇanam. We are, however, inclined
to prefer the sense of digression rejected by Abhinava. The defect
vācyāvacana, mentioned by Mahimabhaṭṭa (p. 100), would possibly be
this Doṣa of Bharata. This seems to be the fault in Māgha i. 43.
Abhinava regards the sva-sabdā-vācyatā-doṣa of Rasa and Bhāva as
iii. artha-hīna = incoherence (asaṃbaddha), or multiplicity of meaning (asaṅgārtha).

iv. bhinnārtha = (a) rusticity or want of refinement (asaṃbhya or grāmya), or (b) changing the desired sense by another sense (vikāśito'nyā evārtho-yatrāñyārthena bhidyate).

v. ekārtha = tautology (ekārthasya abhidhānam).

vi. abhiplūtārtha = aggregation of complete lines without merging them into a complete sentence (yat padena samasyate).

vii. nyāyād apetam = defective logic (pramāṇa-varjitam).

viii. visama = defective metre (vṛttadoṣa).

ix. visamdhi = disjunction in which the words are not well knit.

x. śabda-hīna = use of ungrammatical words (asaṃbhasya yojanam).

But the faults discussed by Bhāmaha are (ch. iv):

i. apārtha = absence of complete sense,

ii. vyārtha = incongruity with the context,

iii. ekārtha = tautology (Bhāmaha noting that others call

included in Bharata’s arthāntara-doṣa, although it is not clear whether Bharata himself regarded this sva-sabda-vācyāta to be a Doṣa at all.


23 The reading anupratiṣṭhāsabdam yat is obviously incorrect. Abhinava’s explanation is not clear; but he appears to read anuprāruḍha-sabdam. By saṃdhi or saṃdhāna he appears to mean compactness, congruity or merging, i.e. where the words are well knit. The Gaekwad ed. reading anupāśiṣṭa-sabdam is more apposite, but perhaps it is not original.

24 asabda = apasabda, Abhinavagupta.

25 Both Bhāmaha and Danḍin say samudāyārtha-sūnyam yat, and this incompletion of the total sense arises, they explain, from the non-satisfaction of the natural expectancy of words in a sentence (ākāṅkṣā), a point already dealt with by grammarians and Mīmāṃsakas.
it punarukta, which well-known term is apparently unknown to Bharata),

iv. sasamśava = ambiguity,

v. apakrama = violation of syntactical regularity,

vi. śabda-hīna = use of words not approved by correct usage (grammatical),

vii. yati-bhraṣṭa = deviation from the rules of metrical pause,

viii. bhīnna-vṛttā = use of long or short syllables in the wrong place in a metre,

ix. visunādhi = disjunction of euphonic liaison when it is necessary,

x. deśa-kāla-kalā-loka-nyāyāgama-virodhi = inconsistency with regard to (a) place (b) time (c) the fine or mechanical arts (d) worldly usage (e) logic (f) āgama (= dharma-śāstra²⁶ i.e. codes of law or jurisprudence).

Bhāmaha also adds another fault to these ten, viz. the Doṣa which arises from a faulty logical proposition (pratijñā), a faulty middle term (hetu), and a faulty logical illustration (dīṣṭānta); but this blemish is treated in a separate chapter (ch. v), being interesting to Bhāmaha from the standpoint of the logic of poetry. In another context, while discussing the general characteristics of poetry (i. 37f). Bhāmaha mentions ten other defects which a poet should avoid, viz. :

i. neyārtha = farfetchedness, when the sense does not follow from the logical order of words but has to be guessed from the general intention,

ii. kliṣṭa = obstruction of the sense,

iii. anyārtha = disappearance of the sense,

iv. avācaka = inexpressiveness, when in the expressed words the sense does not appear to be openly dominant,

²⁶ āgamo dharma-śāstrāṇi, loka-sīmā ca tat-kṛtā / tad-virodhi tadācāra-vyatikramaṇato . . . / says Bhamaha himself in explanation (iv. 48).
v. *gūḍha-sabdābhidhāna*=use of difficult expressions.
vi. *ayuktimat*=impropriety, e.g. making clouds messengers in poetry.
vii. *śruti-duṣṭa*=expressly indecent
viii. *artha-duṣṭa*=implicitly indecent (later writers calling it aśīlātva).
ix. *kalpanā-duṣṭa*=defective conception, where in the alliance of two words an undesirable sense is produced.
x. *śruti-kaṣṭa*=unmelodious or harsh in sound

After giving these ten Doṣas Bhāmaha points out (i. 54-58) how these Doṣas may sometimes become Guṇas. As to how these two different series of ten faults are to be distinguished, Bhāmaha says nothing; but it is conceivable from his treatment that the latter concerns the inner nature or essence of poetry, while the former refers to only such defects as are more or less external. A glance at these two lists of faults, given by Bharata and Bhāmaha respectively, will at once shew that while some of Bhāmaha's faults correspond generally to Bharata's in name or in substance, Bhāmaha in his elaborate treatment is certainly more advanced than his predecessor. It is also noteworthy that Bhāmaha lays down, in his discussion of the last-named fault of *śruti-kaṣṭa*, the general proposition (i. 54) that a particular combination or arrangement sometimes makes even defective expressions allowable; in other words, a fault sometimes is converted into an excellence. Bharata, on the other hand, regards, as we shall see, all Guṇas or excellences to be mere negations of Doṣas or faults.

After dealing with the Doṣas, Bharata speaks of the Guṇas or excellences of composition which are also enumerated as

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27 Bhāmaha's text is obviously corrupt on this point. But the distinction between *śruti-duṣṭa* and *śruti-kaṣṭa* of earlier writers is explained by Abhinava in his *Locana* p. 82 (on ii. 12).

28 The examples given of this fault are words like *aśīlādat* (Bhāmaha), or *adhāksī, akṣautsī, tṛṇedhi* (Abhinava, *Locana* loc. cit.).
ten in number\textsuperscript{29}. He states summarily at the outset (xvi. 91) that the Guṇas are negations of the Doṣas (\textit{guṇā viparyayād eśām}), an opinion which is indeed extraordinary in view of the fact that later writers like Vāmana (ii. 1. 1-3) rightly consider Guṇas in a theory of Poetics to be positive entities, of which the Doṣas are the negations known by implication. It appears, on the other hand, that Guṇas like mādhurya and audārya, mentioned by Bharata in xvi. 91 and 92, are not really, as defined by himself, negations of any particular defect discussed by him. Jacobi’s explanation\textsuperscript{30} is probably right that Bharata’s description of the Guṇas as negations of the Doṣas is in conformity with the common-sense view of the matter, for it is not difficult for one to seize upon a fault instinctively, while an excellence cannot be conceived so lightly unless its essence is comprehended by differentiating it from a more easily understood fault. The Guṇas, according to Bharata (xvi. 92), are the following\textsuperscript{31}:

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textit{sleṣa} = coalescence of words, connected with one another through the aggregate meaning desired by the poet, and consisting of a subtlety which in appearance is clear but in reality difficult to comprehend\textsuperscript{32}.
\item \textit{prasāda} = clearness, where the unexpressed sense appears from the word used through the relation of the easily understood word and sense\textsuperscript{33}.
\end{enumerate}

\textsuperscript{29} Abhinava reads \textit{kāvyasya guṇāh} in xvi. 92 as in Gaekwad and Chowkhamba eds., and not \textit{kāvyārtha-guṇāḥ} as in Kāvyamālā ed.

\textsuperscript{30} In \textit{Sb. der preuss. Akad.} xxiv, 1922, p. 223.

\textsuperscript{31} The alternative readings show that the text for some Guṇas also existed in two recensions. Abhinavagupta attempts throughout to approximate Bharata’s Guṇas to those of Vāmana and strains to make Guṇas of Saṁda and Artha out of each. Hence he is not a safe guide for this portion of the text. On the Guṇas of Bharata see V. Raghavan \textit{Śṛṅgāra-prakāśa}, pp. 271-81.

\textsuperscript{32} Hemacandra (p. 196) and Māṇikyacandra (p. 191) remark: svabhāva-spaṣṭaṁ vicāra-gahanaṁ vacaḥ śliṣṭam iti bharataḥ. Abhinava thinks that this excellence corresponds to Vāmana’s \textit{sabda-guṇa sleṣa}.

\textsuperscript{33} Hemacandra and Māṇikyacandra explain: \textit{vibhakta-vācyā-}
iii. samatā=evenness, which is easy to understand and in which there is no redundancy of expression nor excess of cūrṇa-padas.

iv. samādhi=superimposition (samādhanā) of something special or distinguishing in the sense.

Vācakāyogād anuktayar api sābdārthah pratiyati prasāda iti bharataḥ. Jacobi proposes (ZDMG lxiv, p. 138 contd. fn.) to read mukhya instead of mukha in the text, and thinks that Bharata’s prasāda corresponds to Daṇḍin’s samādhi. But Abhinava reads sukha and explains: sukhayaiti, na prayatnam apeksate yathā sābdārthaḥ. Perhaps by this Guṇa, Bharata means to imply some kind of hint (anukta artha), transparent from the words used (such as we find, e.g., in the figure mudrā in Candrāloka, ed. Jivananda, v. 139, and Kuvalayānanda, ed. N.S.P., 1917, pp. 146-7), which may correspond partly to the metaphorical mode of expression included by Vāmanā in his peculiar definition of vakrokti (iv. 3, 8.), or comprised by later writers under lakṣanā or upacāra. Referring to Vāmanā’s definition of artha-guṇa prasāda as artha-valmyayā (iii. 2. 3), Abhinava seems to support our suggestion when he says so’rtho valmyayop’pi valmyayam upacārati, thus attempting to approximate Bharata’s prasāda to Vāmanā’s artha-guṇa of that name.

34 The cūrṇa-pada is defined by Bharata himself in xviii. 50b, 51. Cf. Vāmanā 1. 3. 22, 24 where cūrṇa is the name given to a kind of prose, which contains short compounds. Commenting on this passage in Vāmanā, Gopendra Tippa Bhūpāla interprets the word as: cūrṇa-padaṇa upaśrād vyasta-pada-samāhārc lakṣyate, tena vyasta-pada-bahulaṃ cūrṇam. Vāmanā himself in his Vṛtti gives two characteristics, viz., adirgha samāsa and anuuddhata pada, short compounds and soft vocables. Referring to Vāmanā’s sābdā-guṇa of the same name in iii. 1. 12, and trying to approximate it to Bharata’s samatā, Abhinavagupta remarks: sābdānāṃ samatvāt samah, cūrṇa-padaṇai a-samāsa-racanā yatra sāttaya na bhavati,.......dirgha-samāsa’pyaṇta-samāsā ca viśamatā, tad-viparyayena samatā, upakrānta-mārgāparyāyagā-rūpety uktam.

35 Abhinava explains: yasyārthasya abhiyuktaiḥ pratibhānatiṣayavaddhir viśeṣopāravḥ svollikhta upapadyate sa samāhita-manaḥ-sampādyaviśeṣatvaḥ artho viśiṣṭaḥ samādhiḥ. In the second line of the text Abhinava reads parikrititaḥ (and not parikṛtyate), and takes arthena as referring to the word samādhi: samādhi-sābdasya yo’rthah parihāra-lakṣyaṇas tena parikṛtitaḥ paritaḥ samantād ākrāntyā uccāraṇe sampānnaḥ. This explanation of sampānna is probably given to make the definition correspond to that of Vāmanā’s ārohā-aroha-kramaḥ sumā-
v. mādhurya—sweetness, where a sentence heard or repeated many times does not tire or disgust.

vi. ojas—strength, which consists in the use of varied and dignified compounded words, having letters agreeable to one another.

vii. saukumārya—smoothness, where an agreeable sense is realised by means of agreeably employed words and well-connected euphonic conjunctions.

viii. artha-vyakti—explicitness, which describes the nature of things, as they appear in the world, by means of well predicates.

dhīḥ (vii. 1. 13); for Abhinava goes on explaining ākrāntyoccārdane ārohāvaroha-krāna eva, the āroha and avaroha depending, as he discusses in detail, on uccāraṇa. Hemacandra and Māṇikyacandra explain Bharata's definition simply as arthasya guṇāntara-samādhānāt samādhir iti bharataḥ.

36 Abhinava reads śrutam and vākyam instead of kram and kāvyam in the printed text (Kāvyamālā ed.); and this is supported by what Hemacandra and Māṇikyacandra say with regard to this excellence of Bharata. The other eds. give the words correctly.

37 Abhinava reads bahunāḥ (instead of vividhāiḥ) and sānurāgaiḥ (instead of sā tu svaraiḥ), explaining the latter reading thus: yatra varṇair varṇāntaram apekṣate tatra sānurāgatvam. Hemacandra, however, attributes a different definition to Bharata, viz., aṅgatasya hīnasya vā śabdārtha-sampadā yad udāttaiva niṣiṇcati kāvyās tad oja iti bharataḥ; and Māṇikyacandra says to the same effect (this follows the reading of Recension B): avaṅgūtori kīno'pi syād udāttāvabhasakaḥ, yatra śabdārtha sampaṭīyā tad ojaḥ parikīṛtitaḥ.

38 Abhinavagupta reads sukha-prayaṃjaiḥ chandobhiḥ (for sukha-prayaṃjaiḥ vyaḥ chabdaiḥ) in the text. Hemacandra and Māṇikyacandra simply paraphrase: sukha-sabadrtham saukumāryam iti bharataḥ.—The "agreeable sense" (sukumārātha), which corresponds to the anisthurāksara-prāyaṭā of Daṇḍin's Guṇa of this name, or to the ajaraṇatva or aparasya of Vāmana's twofold saukumārya, implies probably the avoidance of disagreeable or inauspicious (amaṅgala) statements. Thus instead of mṛtaḥ, one should say kṛitiṣeṣaṃ gataḥ. It is on this ground that theorists after Māmāṭa object that this is no Guṇa but a negation of the amaṅgala dola, which some writers include in the fault known as asliṅga.

39 The text is obviously corrupt. Abhinava reads suprasiddhā-
ix. *udāra*=exaltedness. where there are superhuman sentiments, varied feelings, and the Erotic and the Marvellous moods.

x. *kānti*=loveliness, which delights the ear and the mind, or which is realised by the meaning conveyed by graceful gestures (*līlādi*).

It will be noticed from this enumeration that in some cases it is difficult to see what Bharata means exactly by a particular Guṇa, and that the classification is by no means exhaustive nor free from overlapping. On the other hand, some of the Guṇas can be taken (as Abhinavagupta takes them) as approximating roughly to the individual *sabda-guṇas* and *artha-guṇas* elaborated by Vāmana and other later theorists. The development of the Guṇa-doctrine is intimately connected

*bhidhānā tu* instead of *suprasiddhā dhātunā ca*, which phrase, however, may mean use of well known verbs. Read also *loka-dharma* instead of *loka-karma* Hemacandra explains. *yusmn anyathā-sthuto/pi tathā-sthuto evātthāh pratibhātī sōrthavvakthi*. He also points out that this Guṇa of Bharata corresponds to Vāmana’s *artha-guṇa arthavyakti* (defined as *vastu-svabhāva-sphutatvam in. 2. 13), and would be equivalent to the poetic figure *jūti* or *svabhāvakti* of Dāṇḍin and others. Cf. Mammaṭa p. 583: abhidhāsyāmānā-svabhāvoktyalamkāreyā vastu-svabhāva-sphutatva-rūpārthavyakthī swīkṛtā, but Viṣvanātha would include it in *prusāda-guṇa.*

40 The implication of *adbhuta* Rasa in this excellence and the characteristic that it deals with *divya-bhūva* indicate a certain *utkārṣavān dharmaḥ*, causing wonder, such as Dāṇḍin’s *udāra* would contain. See the illustration of this Guṇa given by Hemacandra p. 199. The inclusion of the *śṛngāra* and *adbhuta* Rasas makes this Guṇa of Bharata correspond partly to Vāmana’s *artha-guṇa kānti.* But Dāṇḍin adds: *slīghyavīśeṣanair yuktam udāram kalścid iṣyate*. There is no reference in Bharata to such ‘praiseworthy epithets’, although Hemacandra says: *bahubhīh śākumais ca viśeṣān sametam udāram iti bhūrahaḥ*. In the Agni-purāṇa 346. 9, however, we read: *utāna-padatadārāyanti yutam slīghyavīśeṣanuh*, which might be a direct echo of Dāṇḍin.

41 *līlādi=*līlādi-cestā Abhinavagupta This would be comprehended by the *dipta-rasatvam* of Vāmana’s *artha-guṇa kānti*—Kauṭilya (ii. 28) mentions the following characteristics of the art of writing: *artha-krama* (arrangement of subject-matter), *sambandha* (relevancy), *paripūrṇātā* (completeness), *mādhuryā* (sweetness), *audārya* (dignity), and *spaṣṭatva* (clearness).
with the central theory of the Riti-school and will be dealt with later; but it may be pointed out here that although the definitions of the individual Guṇas, given by Bharata, do not correspond exactly to those of later writers, there can be no doubt that here we have for the first time a definite statement, if not a proper theoretic treatment, of the doctrine. The disagreement between different theorists with regard to the definitions of individual Guṇas is a well known fact in the history of Sanskrit Poetics, and one need not therefore be surprised that later authors give us definitions which do not agree with those of Bharata. To Bharata, again, the relation of the guṇas to riti, as elaborated by Vāmana, or to rasa, as first clearly enunciated by the Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhana, was probably unknown. So was also Vāmana’s distinction between śabda guṇa and artha-guṇa, although Bharata’s guṇas are mostly of the nature of artha-guṇas, and some of them can be interpreted (as done by Abhinavagupta) as constituting śabda-guṇas as well. But the number and nomenclature of the Guṇas, as well as the substance of some of them, as outlined by Bharata, are conventionally adhered to by all later writers, excepting Bhamaha who, as we shall see, was a radical thinker in this respect, until we come to the Dhvanikāra and his followers who give a new interpretation to the Guṇa-doctrine. It is also important to note that Bharata takes the guṇas, as well as the doṣas and alaṅkāras, to be subservient to the purpose of awakening rasa, which is taken as the principal business of the drama. In this he anticipates and probably influences the view of the Dhvanikāra and his school who, as we shall see, borrow Bharata’s idea of Rasa from the case of the drama and apply it to that of poetry.

(2)

It has been noted above that Bharata makes all these elements, lakṣaṇa, guṇa, doṣa and alaṅkāra, subordinate to the principal purpose of awakening rasa in the drama.
These elements constitute what he calls *vācika abhinaya* (defined in viii. 6, 9), which is dealt with in chapters xiv-xx and which forms an important factor, the *anubhāva* (vii. 5), in calling forth the Rasa. Hence Bharata expressly considers (xvi. 104 f) the question of their employment in relation to Rasa. It is necessary, therefore, to consider here briefly Bharata’s teachings regarding Rasa\(^{44}\), which is dealt with in the *Nāṭya-śāstra*, chapters vi and vii\(^{44}\).

It must be observed at the outset that Rasa does not appear to be Bharata’s principal theme, and that it is discussed only in connexion with his exposition of dramatic representation with which he is principally concerned. It is not surprising, therefore, that Rājaśekhara, probably following some current tradition, should regard Bharata as an authority on Rūpaka (drama) rather than on Rasa, and mention one Nandikeśvara\(^{44}\) as the original exponent of the Rasa-doctrine which, if Rājaśekhara is right, Bharata must have borrowed and worked up into his dramaturgic system. That the Rasa-doctrine was older than Bharata is apparent from Bharata’s own citation of several verses in the Āryan and the Anuṣṭubh metres in support of or in supplement to his own statements; and in one place, he appears to quote two Āryan- verses from an unknown work on Rasa\(^{45}\).

The idea of Rasa, apart from any theory thereon, was

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43 In some other chapters Bharata deals with the cognate topics of the Nāyaka and Nāyikā and their adjuncts and emotional states, which will be referred to in their proper place below (ch. viii).

44 See vol. i p. 1, 2, 19.

45 *aṭrārye rasa-vicāra-mukhe*, ed. Kāvyamālā p. 67. The line is wanting in Grosset’s edition. Keśava Miśra, a comparatively recent writer of the 16th century, speaks of one bhagavān Śaundhodani who, according to him, was a sūtra-kāra on Rasa; but the opinions of this otherwise unknown writer (see vol. i, p. 219), as recorded by Keśava Miśra, do not deviate materially from the conventional views.
naturally not unknown to old writers; and Bharata's treatment would indicate that some system of Rasa, however undeveloped, or even a Rasa school, particularly in connexion with the drama, must have been in existence in his time. But the bearings of this doctrine on poetry were seldom discussed, and the importance of Rasa as one of the essential factors of poetry was indeed naïvely understood but was not theoretically established. As Dramaturgy was in the beginning a separate study, from which Poetics itself probably took its cue, the Rasa-doctrine, which sprang up chiefly in connexion with this study, confined its activity in the first stage of its development to the sphere of dramatic composition and exerted only a limited influence on poetic theories. The importance of this dramaturgic Rasa-system must have been somewhat overshadowed by the early dominance, in Poetics of those later writers of the new school who admit the essentiality of Rasa.

46 We get the first definite exposition, as we shall see, of the idea of Rasa and its relation to poetry in the works of the Dhvani-kāra and Ānandavardhana: and its importance in poetry, as distinguished from the drama, was probably understood from that time Māgha in some verses (see vol. i p. 61, fn 3) shows himself conversant with some theory of Rasa; but it is to nāṭya-rasa (such as described by Bharata) rather than to kōvyā-rasa that he appears to refer. It is not maintained that older Sanskrit Poetry was devoid of Rasa or that the earlier poets never possessed any idea of it; but it is suggested that the theory of Rasa was not critically set forth, nor its aesthetic importance in poetry properly understood until the Dhvani-kāra and Ānandavardhana came into the field. The presence of Rasa is such a familiar fact in Sanskrit Poetry as well as in comparatively modern Sanskrit writers on Poetics that one is apt to lose sight of this fact of historical importance.

47 That the doctrine of Rasa was originally associated with dramaturgy and later on applied to Poetics is clear from the tradition which survives even in very late writers, and makes them not only discuss the theory directly in connexion with the drama (e. g. Viśvanātha) but even borrow the illustrations mostly from dramatic poetry. Abhinava speaks of the Kōvyā as loka-nāṭya-dharmi-sthāṇya, and says: nāṭya eva rasaḥ, kōvye ca nāṭyāya-māna eva rasaḥ. kōvyārthaḥ.
proper, of the Alamkāra and Rīti systems, whose traditions are carried on by the two earliest writers on Poetics, Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, both of whom allow a very subsidiary place to Rasa in their scheme; but at the same time the comparative antiquity of such a Rasa-system in connexion with the drama, going back to a time even earlier than Bharata, cannot be doubted.

The oldest known exponent of this system is Bharata, from whom spring all later systems and theories such as we know them, and whom even Ānandavardhana himself (p. 181), in applying the Rasa-theory to Poetics, names as his original authority. It is necessary for this reason to take into account Bharata’s doctrine of nāṭya-rusa as the original source of the doctrine of kāvya-rasa elaborated in later Poetics. But long before the new interpretation of the relation of Rasa to poetry, given by the Dhvanikāra and authoritatively established by Mammaṭa, was dominant, Bharata’s views on Rasa appear to have been discussed in some detail in dramatic systems with the result that divergent theories came to prevail under the names of Bhaṭṭa Lollāṭa, Saṅkuka, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and others, all of whom are supposed to have been commentators on Bharata’s text, or at least to have taken Bharata as their starting point. With Bharata, therefore, we arrive at a distinctly definite landmark in respect of the Rasa-doctrine.

It is worth noticing, however, that although all theorists take Bharata as their starting point and build up their own theories round his authoritative, if somewhat meagre, text, Bharata himself, like all old masters, is tantalisingly simple in his statements; for the subject does not appear to have yet been brought into the realm of scholastic speculation. Bharata’s work is encyclopaedic in its scope, but its primary theme is the drama and its conception of poetry dramatic, a view which perhaps inspired Vāmana’s partisanship towards

48 See vol. i pp 31f
dramatic composition already alluded to, and which is concisely put by Abhinavagupta by saying kāvyam tāvad daśarūpātmakam eva. In such a composition Rasa, according to Bharata, should be predominant, and there are numerous passages which clearly indicate that there can be no sense of poetry, in his view, without Rasa*. Although Bharata does not enter into technicalities, he seems to be of opinion that the vibhāvas and the anubhāvas, which later theory takes to be essential factors, call forth or evolve Rasa; but he is not clear as to what this process of evolution exactly is. He takes the bhāva as the basis of Rasa and explains it generally as that which brings into existence the sense of poetry through the three kinds of representation, viz., through words, gestures, and internal feelings (vāg-aṅga-sattvopetān kāvyārthān bhāva-yantiti bhāvāḥ). This Bhāva, which consists of an emotional state of the mind, reaches, when permanent and not transitory, the state of Rasa through the elements known as vibhāva and anubhāva. A vibhāva is explained thus: vibhāvo nāma vijñānārthaḥ, vibhāvyante’nena vāg-aṅga-sattvābhinayā ity ato vibhāvah. The term vibhāva, therefore, is used to connote knowledge or cognition, and is explained generally as denoting that which makes the three kinds of representation capable of being sensed. In the same way, the anubhāva is explained as that which follows upon and makes the three kinds of representation actually sensed. The third element of Rasa, the vyabhicāri-bhāva, consists of accessory emotional facts which help and strengthen it, and is etymologically explained as: vi abhi ity etāvupasargau, cara gatau dhātuḥ, vividham ābhimukhyena rasān carantiti vyabhicāriṇaḥ. As to what relation these elements bear to Rasa and how this state of relish is brought about, Bharata simply lays down in a cryptic formula: vibhāvānubhāva-vyabhicāri-saṁyogād rasaniśpatiḥ, a formula which, in spite of his own explanation, is so ambiguous with respect to the exact significance of the

49 e. g. na hi rasād ye kaścid arthaḥ pravartate, ed. Grosset p. 87 = ed. Kāvyamālā p. 62. Cf. also vii. 7.
terms samyoga and nispatti that a great deal of controversy has centred round their interpretation, giving rise to a number of theories about Rasa. Bharata's own explanation, if it can be called an explanation, is that just as a beverage is accomplished through various seasoned articles and herbs, so the permanent mood (the sthāyi-bhāva), reinforced (upagata) by various bhāvas, attains the state of Rasa; and it is so called because its essence consists in its taste or relish (āsvādyatvāt), this being the etymological meaning of the word rasa\(^{50}\). He also explains\(^{51}\) that the sthāyi-bhāva is the basis of Rasa because it attains, as it were, mastery or sovereignty among forty-nine different bhāvas mentioned by himself\(^{52}\), which naturally rest upon it as being presumably the principal theme or mood in the composition in question.

Nothing definite can be concluded from all this except that, in Bharata's opinion, the sthāyi-bhāva or the principal mood in a composition is the basis of Rasa, the essence of which consists in āsvāda or relish by the reader or spectator, while the vibhāva, anubhāva and the vyābhicāri-bhāva awaken this state of emotional realisation or 'relish' in the reader's mind. But this explanation by its very ambiguity or vagueness taxed the ingenuity of theorists and commentators, its general trend anticipating theories like the upatti-vāda of Lollaṭa and the anumiti-vāda of Śaṅkuka, and special terms in the passage in question like vyañjita and sāmānya-guṇa-yoga suggesting specialised doctrines like the vyakti-vāda of Abhinavagupta and the bhukti-vāda of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka.

The original outlines of the theory, however, are accepted as fixed by Bharata. It is practically admitted on all hands, on semi-psychological considerations of poetry, that the Rasa

\(^{50}\) ed. Grosset p. 87—ed. Kāvyamālā p. 62. It should be noticed that all the terms which describe the essence of Rasa such as rasanā, carvanā, or āsvāda, refer etymologically to the physical pleasure of taste; this point will be dealt with below.

\(^{51}\) ed. Grosset p. 102, ll. 7-19—ed Kāvyamālā p. 70, ll. 13-22.

\(^{52}\) viz., 8 sthāyi-bhāvas, 8 sūttvika bhāvas and 33 vyābhicāri-bhāvas.
is a state of relish in the reader of the principal sentiment in the composition, a subjective condition of his mind which is brought about when the principal or permanent mood (sthāyi-bhāva) is brought into a relishable condition through the three elements, the vibhāva, the anubhāva and the vyabhicāri-bhāva, exhibited in the drama. Of these elements, the first two are important, the vyabhicārin being only concomitant or accessory. Bharata’s explanation of these terms is rendered with greater precision by his followers. By the sthāyi-bhāva in poetry and drama are meant certain more or less permanent mental states, such as Love, Grief, Anger or Fear. This permanent mood, constituting the principal theme of a composition and running through all other moods like the thread of a garland, cannot be overcome by those akin to it or those opposed to it, but can only be reinforced. Those elements which respectively excite, follow and strengthen (if we may use these expressions) the sthāyi-bhāva are in poetry and drama known as vibhāva, anubhāva and vyabhicāri- (also called samcāri-) bhāva53, corresponding in ordinary life (as opposed to the extraordinary world of poetry) to the mundane causes and effects (laukika kāraṇa and kārya). Devoid of technicalities, a vibhāva may be taken as that which makes the permanent mood capable of being sensed, an anubhāva as that which makes it actually sensed, while a vyabhicāri-bhāva is that which acts as an auxiliary or gives a fresh impetus to it. In the case of Love as a permanent mood, the stock-examples given of a vibhāva are women and the seasons; of anubhāva, glance and embrace; of vyabhicārin, the transient subordinate feelings of joy or anxiety. Now Bharata says that the reader is enabled to realise or relish as Rasa the permanent mood of a composi-

53 Ballantyne renders these terms conveniently, if not adequately, as the Excitant, the Ensuant and the Accessory respectively, a nomenclature which is followed by Ganganatha Jha in his translation of the Kīvyā-prakūsa. Jacobi, however, uses (ZDMG. 1902, pp. 394 f) the terms Factor, Effect and Concurrent.
tion through a certain correlation of these elements with the permanent mood, the correlation taking place apparently for the purpose of manifesting it and bringing it to a relishable condition. The question, therefore, arises, to which Bharata himself gives no definite solution, viz. what relation these elements bear to Rasa, or in other words, how do they bring about this subjective condition of relish in the reader’s mind, the solution depending, as we have noted above, upon the explanation of the two much-discussed terms samyoga (lit. correlation) and nispatti (lit. consummation) in the original sūtra of Bharata. This is the central pivot round which all later theories move, and we shall take it up again in their connexion below (ch. iv).

Bharata mentions eight different moods or Rasas in the drama, of which a detailed account is given in Nāṭya-śāstra ch. vi, which is the authoritative source drawn upon by all later writers, although they sometimes differ, as we shall see, in the enumeration of the orthodox number of eight. Properly speaking, the primary Rasas, according to Bharata, are only four in number, viz., śṛṅgāra (the Erotic), raudra (the Furious), vīra (the Heroic) and bibhatsa (the Disgusting). The other four Rasas proceed from these, as follow: hāsyā (the Comic) from śṛṅgāra, karuṇa (the Pathetic) from raudra, adbhuta (the Marvellous) from vīra, and bhayāṇaka (the Terrible) from bibhatsa (xvi. 39-40).

The eight sthāyi-bhāvas or permanent moods, corresponding to the eight Rasas, are given categorically as (i) rati (Love) (ii) hāsa (Mirth) (iii) krodha (Anger) (iv) utsāha (Courage) (v) bhaya (Fear) (vi) jugupsa (Aversion) (vii) vismaya (Wonder) and (viii) soka (Sorrow), forming the basis respectively of śṛṅgāra, hāsyā, raudra, vīra, bhayāṇaka, bibhatsa, adbhuta and karuṇa. The vyabhicāri-bhāvas are mentioned as thirty-three in number and include the subordinate feelings of self-disparagement (nirveda), debility (glāni), apprehension (śaṅkā), envy (asūyā), intoxication (mada), weariness (śrama), indolence (ālasya), depression (dainya),
reflection (cintā), distraction (moha), recollection (smṛti), equanimity (dhrīti), shame (vṛidā), unsteadiness (capalatā), joy (harṣa), flurry (āvega), stupefaction (jādatā), arrogance (garva), despondency (viṣāda), longing (autsukya), drowsiness (nidrā), dementedness (apasmāra), dreaming (supta), awakening (vibodha), impatience of opposition (amarṣa), dissembling (avahittha), sternness (ugratā), resolve (mati), sickness (vyādhi), madness (umnāda), death (marāṇa), alarm (trāsa) and doubt (vitarka). The sāttvika bhāvas, which can be taken generally as involuntary evidences of internal feeling, are then specified as eight in number, viz., stupor (stambha), perspiration.

54 The English equivalents follow generally Bellantynne's renderings—It must be borne in mind that the vyabhicāri-bhāvas are independent Bhāvas but occurring as accessory or concurrent to the principal mental state depicted, which is known as the sthūy-bhāva. Sometimes it may happen that the vyabhicāra is principally manifested in a composition, and the sthūyā is merely awakened; such cases later theorists would call bhūvas (and not rasas) which are thus incomplete rasas. Attempts have been made to distinguish between Rasa and Bhāva, and this question will be discussed later on. It would appear from the enumeration of the vyabhicāri-bhāvās that the older theorists consider many conditions from the spiritual point of view, which we would regard from the standpoint of the body (e.g. vyādhi or marāṇa). See Jacobi in ZDMG lvi, 1902, p. 395 fn 2.

55 Regarding the sāttvika bhāva (which later theorists, e.g. Abhinavagupta, connect with the svātva guna of the Sāmkhya philosophers), Bharata says (ed, Grosset p. 129—ed. Kāvyamālā, p. 82): iha hi sattvam nāma manah-prabhavam, tac ca samāhita-manastvād utpadvate, manah-samādhitānā ca sattva-nirvṛttī iti; tasyā yo'śau svabhāvārdha-sūkṣma-krite-kṣo. na svayate'ncvā-manastvā kartum iti; loka-svabhāvinukaraṇāc ca nīvāvānā sattvam īpsitam. Thus Bharata connotes by it certain tokens of mental feelings, delineated in the dramatic representation by an imitation of human nature through steady concentration of the mind. Bharata adds the illustration: iha hi nīvāya-dhīrma-pravṛttāh sukha-duhkha-krite bhūvās tathā sattvavā viśuddāh kūryā yathā svarūpā bhavanti. For, how can sorrow, he says, which must be manifested by weeping, or joy which must be expressed by laughter, be delineated except by these involuntary evidences? This is apparently what Bharata means by sattvābhinaya or sāttvikābhinaya. In the Daśa-rūpaka, however, sattva is taken to mean 'a sympathetic heart' and sāttvika is explained as sattvāna
(sveda), horripilation (romāṇca), break of voice (svara-bhaṅga), trembling (vepathu), change of colour (vaivarṇya), tears (aśrut) and loss of consciousness (pralaya). This psycho-physical analysis, however formal it may appear to us, is taken up in detail in chapter vii, and each of these states is categorically defined and illustrated strictly from the standpoint of the drama; but in later literature they are established authoritatively for poetry as well.

This is a rough outline of the teachings, relevant to Poetics proper, that we can gather from the somewhat meagre text of Bharata, and it may be taken as an outline of the discipline as it existed in the earliest known period of its history. With Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin and the Dhvanikāra, on the other hand, begins the next period of its history, a comparatively brief but exceedingly important stage of extraordinary creative genius. Of the period anterior to Bharata our knowledge is extremely scanty; and between Bharata and the definite formulation of poetic theories which begins with Bhāmaha, lies, again, a long gap of which we do not possess much knowledge. It is clear, however, that certain poetical guṇas, doṣas, alamkāras and laksṇas were known to Bharata and dealt with by him even as decorative devices of the dramatic speech. It would not be wrong to presume from this fact that the study of Alamkāra-śāstra, even if it was not yet fully nirvṛttataḥ (Cf Sāhitya-darpaṇa iii. 134). Bhānudatta, in his Rasatarāṅgiṇī gives a somewhat different interpretation, and takes sāttvika to mean physical gestures as evidences of natural feeling (sattvam jiva-kāriya, tasya dharmah sāttvikāḥ, itthā ca śūrā-bhūvāḥ stambhādayāḥ sāttvikā bhavā itv abhidhiyante). Later writers like the author of the Kavyaprakāśa-pradīpa bring in philosophical implications and interpret sāttvika as originating in the sattva-guna. Whatever difference there might be as to the meaning of the term sāttvika itself, all the writers on this subject agree in applying the term to denote those gestures (enumerated above) which give an involuntary expression to internal feelings.

56 e. g., in Mammata.
developed and self-conscious, was probably older than Bharata himself. It follows from this conclusion that the tradition of opinion, which crystallises itself in the oldest available manuals of Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, or in the memorial verses of the Dhvanikāra, comes to us in a definite shape indeed at a date much posterior to Bharata, but it is probable that in substance, if not in actual formulation, it may have been much anterior to Bharata, who himself gives an indication of such teachings. Excepting what we get in Bharata, however, the history of this process of crystallisation (for the different systems appear in a relatively developed form in Bhāmaha and others) is not known to us; but it must have covered a tentative stage whose productions, if they had been extant today, would have shown Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin and the Dhvanikāra in the making, and would have partly filled up the presumably long gap between Bharata and these earliest formulators of Poetics.

Even if they were the earliest formulators, neither Bhāmaha, nor Daṇḍin, nor the Dhvanikāra, however, claims entire originality of having created the system which he individually represents. None of them can be taken as the absolute founder of the particular doctrines of alaṃkāra, riti or dhvani with which they are respectively associated; and with them we do not start at the absolute beginnings of the discipline. Indebtedness of these writers to their predecessors in the line, acknowledged by themselves, has already been noted in the first volume of this work (pp. 50, 67-68, 109); but apart from such explicit admissions, one can easily argue that certain fundamental concepts and formulas (such as vakrokti, riti, guṇa or alaṃkāra) appear in writers like Bhāmaha without a preliminary explanation, as things traditionally handed down or already too well known to require any detailed discussion. It is also unthinkable that these early writers could have, as they certainly do not claim to have, evolved by themselves the relatively developed form and treatment of the main topic of Poetics in the absence of earlier tentative works.
It will be profitable, therefore, to pause and enquire if these works of Bhāmaha and others give us any indication of the stage or stages through which the discipline might have passed in the interval between Bharata and themselves. Fortunately there are passages in these writers which would give us hints as to the existence of such intermediate stages. Jacob has already shown that Bhāmaha, in his treatment of the poetic figures, groups them in a curious but suggestive way which probably indicates the different stages in the growth and multiplication of such figures before his time. Unlike later authors who, adopting some definite principle of classification, enumerate the poetic figures en masse, Bhāmaha begins (ii. 4) by naming and defining first a group of five such figures only, and then goes on to enumerate other such limited groups of figures, taking 24 remaining figures in a final group.

The first group of figures thus mentioned comprises anuprāsa, yamaka, rūpaka, dipaka and upamā, recognised, as Bhāmaha says, by others (anyair udāhritāḥ) and accepted by himself. These five correspond in reality to the four ancient poetic figures known to and defined by Bharata, viz. yamaka, rūpaka, dipaka and upamā. The additional figure anuprāsa, mentioned by Bhāmaha, can be taken as falling in the same class as yamaka, the one being varnābhyāsa and the other padābhya-

57 In Sh. der preuss. Akad xxiv, 1922, pp 220-222.
58 By the time of Dandin, for instance, a large number of poetic figures appears to have been recognised, and he does not find any necessity of ‘reporting’ them or mentioning them successively in groups as Bhāmaha does; but he arranges them in his own way, taking the arthālambikāras first and the sadbhālamākāras next, in two separate chapters. Udbhaṭa, a follower of Bhāmaha, dealt with the first three groups of Bhāmaha in the first three chapters of his own work (omitting, however, Bhāmaha’s phrases like anyair udāhritāḥ, aparāh, abhūhātāḥ, kvacit etc. with reference to these groups, the other three chapters taking up the remaining twenty-four figures of the last group. Although he follows generally the sequence as well as the definition of Bhāmaha, he does not recapitulate in the manner of groups after Bhāmaha.

59 The distinction between yamaka and anuprāsa may be explained thus: in the anuprāsa there is a repetition of one or more consonants,
sa, while both are what Bharata would call śabdābhāya. Abhinavagupta very significantly takes anuprāsa as implied in yamaka by Bharata; and the very fact that the anuprāsa in Bhāmaha is thus clearly differentiated from yamaka may indicate further refinement in the analysis of these figures and betoken a somewhat later stage.

In course of time, six other figures appear to have been analysed and added, and Bhāmaha mentions them next in a group in ii. 66. They are ākṣepa, arthāntara-nyāsa, vyatireka, vibhāvanā, samāsokti and atisayokti. Of these there is no trace in Bharata. This constitutes probably the second stage of development, in which can also be included a seventh figure vārta, which is referred to by Daṇḍin in i. 85, but which is not accepted by Bhāmaha as non-poetic utterance in which there is no Vakrakti (ii. 87). The third stage indicated by Bhāmaha’s treatment does not appear to have been very productive, for in it we have the addition of only two more figures yathāsaṃkhya and utprekṣā (ii. 88), and possibly of a third svabhāvokti. In this connexion it is noteworthy that by Daṇḍin’s time svabhāvokti (also called jāti, recognised by Bāṇabhaṭṭa) is established as the primary or first figure (ādyā

sometimes but not necessarily along with the accompanying vowels. In yamaka, the consonants as well as the vowels are repeated strictly in the same order or sequence. In yamaka, the same group of vocables is repeated but it need not have the same meaning, and may even be quite meaningless in itself, but in the repetition of the anuprāsa one should consider the meaning. Nūtāpi kham upeta nītāuṣa prajāhīnī-hūdavīyamūtāsu would be an example of one variety of yamaka, while adri-dronī-kūlīre kuhativin harinārātayo yūpayant would be an example of anuprāsa.

60 viniṇṇuprāṣa-lātīvīde am.na (-vamakena) evopasamgrahātī.
61 V. Raghavan (Some Concepts, p 99f), however, argues that in Bhāmaha Vārttā is no name of an Alamankāra.—Here Bhāmaha speaks of three other poetic figures hetu, sūkṣma and leśa, which he rejects as not involving that he calls vakrakti. These, however, appear not in direct connexion with this enumeration of poetic figures but in the immediate context of vakrakti alluded to in the previous verse. These figures, however, are illustrated (as interpreted by commentators) by Bhatti, and were probably recognised before Bhāmaha’s time.
while in Bhāmaha it occupies a rather dubious position; for the latter, in pursuance probably of his peculiar theory of Vakrokti, does not appear to favour this figure very much. With regard to utpreksā, which is indeed an important addition to the Poetics of this period, Bhāmaha reports (ii. 88) that Medhāvin called it samkhyaṇa. Is it possible that Bhāmaha's predecessor Medhāvin was the first to analyse and name this figure? Dāṇḍin, in a well known passage, considers in detail the question whether the word iwa is indicative of utpreksa, a question which was apparently disputed by other rhetoricians between Bhāmaha and Dāṇḍin; but in Vāmana we find this is already an established fact. From Bhāmaha ii. 40, again, we learn that Medhāvin set up

62 The utpreksa and ākṣepa as poetic figures are expressly mentioned by Subandhu, ed Śṛṇṇagam p. 146, while upamā and dipaka are recognised by Bānabhaṭṭa (introd. to Kūdambarī). Both Subandhu and Bāna speak of composition enlivened by slesa; but it is not perfectly clear whether they mean by it a prabandha-guna (as in Bharata) or the specific poetic figure of that name. Bhāmaha not only speaks of slesa but mentions three kinds or cases of its occurrence. Subandhu's boast of having used slesa (as his commentators interpret) in every word of his composition is not an idle one, and from his use of it, one can indeed incline to the view that Subandhu's slesa is no other than our modern poetic figure of the same name, especially as Bharata's definition of slesa as a Guna is hardly applicable to Subandhu's case.

63 The text reads (Bhāmaha ii 88):

yathāsamskṛtam athotprikṣaṁ alamkāra-dvāranā viduh/
samkhyaṇam iti medhāvinotprikṣābhuhūti kvacit//

It should be noted in this connexion that Dandin (ii. 273) gives samkhyaṇa (and krama) as alternative names, not of utpreksa, but of yathāsamskṛta, which seems to be more plausible. It is possible that the text is corrupt here. Kane HSP, pp 61-62 suggests the emendation: samkhyaṇam iti medhāvi notpreksābhuhūti kvacit, which he translates as "Medhāvin (calls yathāsamskṛta) by the name of samkhyaṇa, and in some places (in works on alamkāra) utpreksa has not been spoken of as an Alamkāra". But the difficulty in accepting this emendation lies in the fact that Dandin's elaborate treatment of utpreksā would indicate that this figure must have assumed enough importance, even in Bhāmaha's time, to have been entirely overlooked in works on Alamkāra. Vāmana calls yathāsamskṛta by the name of krama.
seven *upamā-doṣas*, and this statement appears to have been accepted by Nami-sādhu (on Rudraṭa xi. 24), who mentions and illustrates the seven Doṣas by examples. Unfortunately we do not possess any other information about Medhāvin (or Medhāvirudra)\(^{64}\); and to Nami-sādhu and Rājaśekhara, who cite him, he was possibly nothing more than a name. From Bhāmaha's references, however, it is not unreasonable to presume that Medhāvin was the first writer on Poetics who, at an early period, gave an exposition of two very important poetic figures like *upamā* and *utprekṣā.*\(^{65}\)

After dealing with these groups of figures, Bhāmaha takes up (iii. 1-4) in the next chapter the remaining poetic figures recognised in his time, all in a body, without any further break. These constitute a long list as twenty-four figures. This may be taken as the fourth stage which brings us down to Bhāmaha's own time, and which must have ended with the elaboration of a large number of figures, although the number is not as large as we find it in Daṇḍin's time.\(^{66}\) This stage is also represented by a canto in the *Bhaṭṭi-kāvyā* which illustrates in all thirty-eight independent poetic figures, although

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64 See vol i. p. 50. Nami-sādhu's quotation from Medhāvin (on xi. 24) merely refers to Bhāmaha ii. 40 which hardly adds anything to our knowledge. Rājaśekhara and Vallabhādeva (on Śīla xi. 6) cite Medhāvin as a poet, the former coupling his name with that of Kumāradāsa, and the latter actually citing a verse from Medhāvinirudra (see *ZDMG* lxxii, 1919, p. 190 fn 1).

65 The problems regarding *upamā-doṣas* and *utprekṣā* appear to have engaged, to a great extent, the attention of early writers. See vol. i. p. 60, fn 1 on *upamā-doṣas*. On *utprekṣā*, see Daṇḍin ii. 226-234, Vāmana iv. 3. 9 vṛtti, Ud'haṭa ed. Telang, pp. 43-46.

66 The differentiation and multiplication of poetic figures with the growth of speculation is a familiar fact in Alankāra literature; and it is not surprising that as the study advanced, the process of refining went on until a time came when the number became too unwieldy and the distinctions too fastidious; and then they had to be systematised in the light of some central principle. Such attempts were made from time to time, the earliest of which, as we shall see, was perhaps that of Vāmana.
as we have already discussed 67) Bhaṭṭi appears to have made use of a text possibly unknown to Bhāmaha, if not materially differing from the latter's sources. There can be no doubt, however, that by this time the standpoint of the Alamkāra-
śāstra was clearly defined and firmly established. With Bhāmaha begins a new epoch in which the uncertain groupings of the earlier periods vanish with the setting up of a more or less authoritative standard.

67 See vol i pp. 52-56
CHAPTER II

BHĀMAHA, UDBHĀTA AND RUDRAṬA

(The Alamkāra System)

BHĀMAHA

(1)

In Bhāmaha's Kavyalamkāra, the different topics of Poetics are formulated not incidentally, as in Bharata, but in such well-defined outline as would indicate that the Alamkāra-sāstra had already attained the rank of an independent discipline. We have seen that Bharata considered certain important elements of poetry as devices for embellishing dramatic speech and as subservient to the principal purpose of producing the dramatic Rasa. In Bhāmaha, on the other hand, the poetical embellishments form the principal object of study; and, while Dramaturgy and Rasa are entirely ignored, we find for the first time a definite scheme of Poetics more or less systematically elaborated and authoritatively established. Bharata's treatment would show that even before his time some of the older poetic figures, most of the Guṇas and Doṣas, had been recognised and clearly defined, even if no particular theory of Alamkāra had been in existence. But Bhāmaha throws into prominence these poetic embellishments and the consideration of Guṇas and Doṣas in their connexion, in conformity perhaps to a tradition from which the whole discipline appears to have received the significant designation of Alamkāra-sāstra. We have attempted to explain in the preceding chapter that the comparative antiquity of this tradition or of this school of opinion cannot be denied; and the presumption is not unlikely that a system of Alamkāra or an Alamkāra school¹ (if the term is allowed from the em-

¹ The word 'School' is used here in a very general sense to indicate affiliation to a particular doctrine or system. Only Udbhāta
phasis it puts on the consideration of *amaṅkāra* or the poetic figure as the principal element of poetry)* existed side by side with the Rasa school or the dramaturgic Rasa-system, and influenced it, as it was to a limited extent influenced by it. But this doctrine or system of Poetics is represented to us by a comparatively late writer like Bhāmaha, who was by no means its original founder.

The general doctrine of this *amaṅkāra*-system is almost co-extensive with what appears to have been the original standpoint of the *amaṅkāra*-śāstra itself as an objective, empirical, and more or less mechanical discipline; for, despite the previous or synchronous existence of a system which elaborated the idea of Rasa in the service of the drama, there is nothing to contradict the hypothesis, which we have already indicated and which is confirmed by the very early existence of the *amaṅkāra*-system itself, that Sanskrit Poetics started apparent-

and Vāmana, we are told, had their groups of followers respectively designated Audbhata-s and Vāmaniyas. But there is no evidence to show that the particular doctrines of Rasa, *amaṅkāra*, Rūti and even Dvārakā were worked out in proper schools, consciously or unconsciously founded by a great writer and supported by his followers. At the same time it can hardly be doubted that in spite of mutual and inevitable contamination or appropriation, these doctrines or systems had a tradition and a history of their own which naturally differentiated them from one another, and each writer conformed, in his fundamental principles, to some theory which threw into prominence one or other of these doctrines. One could say, for instance, that Abhinavagupta owes his allegiance principally to the *Dvārakā*-system of Ānanda- 
vardhana, although he acknowledges the importance of Rasa or brings in Vāmana’s ideas of Guna in his interpretation of those of Bhārata. With these reservations, the word ‘school’ is meant here to denote the different systems which emphasise respectively the Rasa, *amaṅkāra*, Rūti or Dvārakā theories—Samudrabandha (p. 4) speaks of five Paksas or views about Kāvyā, namely (i) of Udbhata (ii) of Vāmana (iii) of Vakrākhyā (iv) of Bhatta Nāyaka and (v) of Ānanda- 
vardhana. The Anumaṇa-paksha of Vyakty-rūpa is said to be unworthy of serious consideration.

2 Referring to Bhāmaha, Udbhata and other elder writers, Nāyaka says: *tad evem amaṅkāra eva kāvye pradhānam iti prācyānāṁ matam* (p. 7)
ly from some theory of embellishment (alamkāra) which took into consideration the whole domain of poetic figures and confined its energies to the elaboration of more or less mechanical formulas with reference to the technique of expression. Just as there may be a theory of painting consisting of a collection of information regarding the techniques of tempera, of oil-painting, of water-colour, of pastel, on the proportion of the human body and on the laws of perspective, the art of poetry was supposed to comprise a collection of precepts relating to the forms of expression, its structural beauty, its damaging faults and its rhetorical ornaments, without going further into the speculative aspects of the problems involved. The whole aesthetic judgment was directed to these means of externalisation, and aesthetic pleasure was regarded objectively from the standpoint of extraneous facts which contributed to it. It cannot indeed be dogmatically stated that the necessity and inevitability of postulating an ultimate principle did not trouble these older writers; but the study must have begun with a method which resulted in the establishment of a series of more or less rigid definitions and categories elaborated to a degree of fineness. The question as to what constitutes poetry or poetic charm, the aesthetic fact, does not arise until Vāmana and the Dhvanikāra come into the field; for earlier authors like Bhāmaha (1. 23) and Daṇḍin (i 10) propose to confine themselves chiefly to what they call the kāvyā-sārīra² or the ‘body of poetry’, as distinguished from its

3 Vol. i p 7 Sanskrit Poetry, more than ever in this ‘classical’ period of its history, appeared as the careful work of a trained and experienced specialist. The tradition of such poetry points naturally to the working of the rules and means of the art into a system. This, combined with a natural and characteristic love of adornment, which demanded an ornamental fitting out of thought and word, probably supplied the original motive-force which brought the study of Poetics into existence. The word “Alamkāra” (lit. embellishment), applied to the discipline itself, as well as to the poetic figure, which forms the main topic of discussion in the earliest extant works from Bhāmaha to Rudrata, would indicate that Sanskrit Poetics had probably grown out of a theory and practice of
ātman, its ‘soul’ or animating principle. The advantages of verbal arrangement with due regard to the expression of an agreeable sense and of clever clothing of the sense with embellishment, which included and threw into prominence the whole domain of verbal and ideal figures of speech, those decorative devices by which poetic expression may be rendered attractive. It seems that originally Ais Poetica in India, as Jacobi suggests, did not go further than being a series of advice to the poet in his profession, and consisted more or less in formulating prescriptions for the practical working out of poetry. It pointed out the faults to be avoided and the excellences to be attained, and described the poetical embellishments which should enhance the beauty of expression, insomuch as the whole study came to receive the designation of Alankāra-śāstra, or the Science of Poetical Embellishment. This theme of the “education” of the poet became in later literature a separate study when the theoretical aspects of the problems involved began to occupy an important place in the discipline, and we find a group of writers devoting themselves entirely to the subject of kavi-śikṣā which, having the practical and somewhat mechanical training of the poet in his art for its object, really represents the original standpoint of Poetics. Sanskrit poetics was probably raised to the rank of an independent discipline almost about the time when Sanskrit ‘Classical’ poetry was already overstepping itself in its development.

4. The metaphorical expression kavya-svārtha with its implied kavyātman plays an important part in Sanskrit Poetics throughout its history. Its origin has been traced to the allegory of the Vedapuruṣa in Rigveda vi. 58. 3 (cātuvirā śrṅgā), and Rājaśekhara indulges in an analogous poetic conception of the Kavya-puruṣa (Spirit of Poetry) and his bride Sāhitya-vidyā. According to Rājaśekhara’s somewhat fanciful description, the body of this Kavya-puruṣa is composed of word and sense (śabda and artha), the face made of Sanskrit, the arms of Prakrit, the hips and loins of Apabhraṃśā, the feet of Paisāca, and the breast of mixed languages. This is evidently from the linguistic point of view. It is further added that his speech is rich in different modes of poetic expression (uktīcaṇḍam); moods and sentiments (raṇa) make up his soul; metres form the hair of his body; his conversation consists of questions and answers and riddles; and he is adorned by poetic figures like alliteration and simile. The later writers attempt to arrive at greater precision, first indicated by Vāmana, who makes ‘diction’ (ṛiti) to be the soul of poetry. That the external art of poetry can be systematised formed one of the fundamental postulates of Sanskrit Poetics; but at the same time the necessity of some deeper principle to explain the manifold character of its content.
poetical or rhetorical ornaments absorb the attention of these writers; and whatever may be the theoretic basis of poetic charm, it is enough if it is realised by the objective beauty of ingenious expression.

The two important factors, which go to make up the kāvyā-sarīra, i.e. the ‘body’ or external framework of poetry, could not be ignored. Hence the attempt to find the ‘soul’ or the animating principle in the ‘body’ or external framework of poetry. Bhāmaśa perhaps vaguely realised this when he proposed to take vākrokti as the underlying principle of artistic expression; but Dandin goes a step further and designates the Guṇas as the ‘life-breath’ (prānāḥ) of the diction (mārga or rīti), which he sets up as the most important part of poetry. Vāmana is the first known writer to comprehend and state distinctly what this ‘soul’ is, and the Dhvanikāra takes the last step in completing this figurative idea by defining systematically the mutual relation of the ‘body’ and the ‘soul’ of poetry. The Dhvanikāra implies in ii 7 that vyānaya artha is this ṛtima, the guṇa, being compared to natural qualities like courage, and the alamkāra likened to external ornaments like bracelets which adorn the body. This view is apparently accepted by Mammata (viii 1) and taken as authoritative by all subsequent writers, while Nami-vādhu (on Rudraṭa xii. 2) gives a similar but not accurate explanation of Rudraṭa’s opinion on the subject. The final extension of this metaphorical conception is thus set forth by Viśvanātha: kāvyāya śabdārāṇau śāriyam, vasiṣṭhi cōtā, guṇāḥ saundarādīvat, dosāḥ kānatiśādīvat, rītayo’vaya-saṃśthāna-viśevavat, alamkāraḥ katāka-kundalādīvat, thus comprehending all the elements of poetry, discussed by previous writers, into this elaborate metaphor. Whatever may be the value of this metaphor as an index to the conception of poetry gradually evolved by Indian theorists, one point is clear, viz., that they all take, from Bhāmaśa to Jagannātha, the śabda and artha as constituting what they call the ‘body’ of poetry; and with this idea the theories start, ultimately ending in a search for its ‘soul’. From another point of view, the śabda and artha form the central pivot round which all theories move (for they are all theories starting with expression) with particular reference to the question of the function par excellence operative in poetry. And as the study of Poetics itself, on the admission of some of its greatest exponents, drew its original inspiration from grammatico-philosophical speculations on speech, it is not surprising that enormous emphasis should be put on these two elements.
are supposed to be śabda (word) and artha (sense)*, and the 
alamkāras or poetic figures which adorn these are taken as 
forming the essential sign of a Kāvya. In other words, 
poetry consists of a verbal composition in which a definite 
sense must prevail, and which must be made charming by 
means of certain turns of expression to which the name of 
poetic figure is given. This general standpoint is implied by 
Bhāmaha at the very outset in connexion with his general 
discussion of the two kinds of figures based respectively on 
word and sense*:

rupakādīm alamkārāṃ bāhyam ācākṣate pare/
supāṃ tīnāṃ ca vyutpattīṃ vācōṇi vānchānty alamkṛtīm//,
tad etad āhūḥ sauabdyam nārtha-vyutpattir īdrsi/
śabdābhidheyālamkāra-bhedād ḳṣaṇi dvayaṁ tu nahi//

This passage, quoted with approval in the Vakrokti- 
īvita (on i. 8) and the Kāvya-prakāsa vi, is difficult to 
translate, but the meaning is clear, and may be freely rendered

5 See above footnote 3. Sabārthau sahitau kāvyaṃ, Bhāmaha i. 
16, from which, as Kuntaka indicates, the name sāhitya was 
probably given to poetry. The earliest use probably of this term 
sāhitya in Sanskrit Poetics occurs in Mukula (pp. 21 and 22) and in his 
pupil, Pratihārendrāja, while Rājaśekhara expressly uses the term 
sāhitya-vidyā. The orthodox etymology of the term, which derives 
it from the above definition of poetry, as the union of word and 
sense, is thus put by Rājaśekhara: sabārthayor yathāt sahā-
bhāvena vidyā sāhitya-vidyā, an interpretation with which Kuntaka 
agrees. This Sāhitya or alliance of word and sense is admitted as 
a fundamental postulate from a very early time, and with proper 
modifications, by all schools and authors. Cf Danḍin i. 10, 
Vāmana i. 1. 1 (vṛtti), Rudrata ii 1. Ānandavardhana admits as un-
questioned: sabārthaḥ tāvat kāvyam, na vyākhyāya iti darśayati. The 
view is alluded to by Māgha in ii 86b, and apparently by Kālidāsa 
in the first verse of Raghū*.

6 This distinction between Alamkāras cf Śabda and of Artha 
began to be recognised, if not directly stated, from the time of 
Bhāmaha. Although Danḍin is not explicit, he has the same dis-
tinctive view when he deals with Arthālamkāras in ch ii and Sabdā-
alamkāras in ch. iii. It is Bhoja who classifies Alamkāras into those 
of Śabda, of Artha or of both, defining and illustrating 24 of each in 
his Sarvasat-kanṭhā*.
thus: “Others regard metaphor and the like to be external ornaments. They postulate that grammatical correctness adorns speech, and call it excellence of language, (implying that) there is no such corresponding correctness of sense. We, however, accept two kinds of ornaments, referring respectively to word and sense”. Daṇḍin, who does not strictly belong to this school but who substantially agrees on this point with Bhāmaha, is more explicit in his statement, and lays down (i. 10) that the ‘body’ of poetry consists of a series of words regulated by an agreeable sense.

Although Bhāmaha is the oldest representative of this system whose work has survived, he was, as we have stated more than once, by no means its originator. The system, as we find it set forth in his work, is certainly not primitive, but indicates the clear existence of a developed teaching on the subject. Rājaśekhara, as we have noted (vol. i, p.1), gives us a long list of mythical names with which he identifies the original treatment of the various topics relating principally to the poetic figures. He assigns the elaboration of the poetic figures anuprāsa, yamaka and citra, śabda-śleṣa, vāstava, upamā, atiśaya, artha-śleṣa, and ubhayālamkāra respectively to Prace-tāyana, Citrāṅgada, Śeṣa, Pulastya, Aupakāyana, Pārāśara, Utathya and Kubera. While the antiquity of the distinction between śabdālamkāra and arthālamkāra generally (in spite of the above passage of Bhāmaha’s) and of śabda-śleṣa and artha-śleṣa in particular may be seriously doubted, some of these poetic figures may be allowed to have been very early recognised, as Bharata mentions some of them and Bhāmaha acknowledges nearly all (excepting citra which we find in Daṇḍin and vāstava which we find in Rudrāṭa). Medhāvīn, cited by Bhāmaha, probably belonged to this school, and his is the only authentic name of an early exponent of this system.

With Bhāmaha’s work, however, we emerge from the region of conjecture and doubt, and arrive at the first classic statement of a definite doctrine of Poetics. We must not yet
look to his work, nor to that of his follower Udbhata, for a thoroughly critical system. We can deduce certain broad conceptions, but the practical object, underlying the speculation of this school in general, and its more or less normative character did not allow sufficient scope for purely theoretic treatment; nor can we expect such treatment at this early stage. Bhāmaha, therefore, nowhere attempts a formal definition of poetry, nor does he state clearly the theory of Vakrokti and Alamkāra which, as we shall see, was first systematically enunciated by his follower, the Vakroktijivitakāra. The first chapter of Bhāmaha's work gives us some preliminary remarks about the general characteristics of poetry and its subdivisions, but a large part of it is taken up with the enumeration of the general faults which obstruct the proper expression of an idea.

Bhāmaha states at the outset the purposes of poetry (kāvya-prayojana) and the qualifications of a poet (kāvyahetu), incidentally mentioning the 'sources' of poetry (kāvyayonayah). Regarding the first topic of the aim and purpose of poetry, it is not necessary to discuss the different views in detail, as they generally enumerate extraneous objects and throw little light on the general theory of poetry. In the older writers there is a more or less uncritical mention of fame (kīrti) for the poet and delight (priti) for the reader as the chief objects of poetry; and herewith Bhāmaha (i. 2), Daṇḍin (i. 105), Vāmana (i. 1. 5), Rudraṭa (i. 21, 22) and Bhoja (i. 2), though belonging to different schools of opinion, seem to be content. But it became customary to add, from the poet's standpoint, 'wealth', 'social success' and 'escape from ills'. From the reader's point of view, poetry is said to bring 'solace', 'instruction in knowledge' and 'proficiency in the arts and ways of the world'; and these are sometimes summarily comprehended by the term trivarga, viz., profit, pleasure and

7 Bharata had already laid down this pleasure-giving function of the dramatic art as kriṇanaka (i. 11), vinodakārpa (i. 86).
8 E. g. Mammata i. 2, Hemacandra p. 2 etc.
virtue, to which later on the caturvarga, anticipated by Bhāmaha (i. 2), adds mokṣa or liberation of the soul. This is probably an attempt to bring poetry on a level with other arts or sciences which profess similar ends, and is in harmony with the deep-rooted idea of the functions of śāstra. It is, however, pointed out by later theorists like Mammaṭa and his followers, who in their turn develop Abhinavagupta's idea ("Locana p. 12), that the Kāvyā, as distinguished from the scriptures and the sciences, is kāntā-sammita, i.e., like the teaching of a loving mistress, implying thereby that the pedagogic powers of poetry resolve themselves into a peculiar power of suggesting a condition of artistic enjoyment. The famous opening verse of the Kāvyā-prakāśa makes this clear when it describes poetic speech as comprehending a creation ungoverned by nature's laws and consisting of pure joy. The caturvarga and the other material objects of poetry are mentioned in almost unbroken tradition; but with the elaboration of a full-fledged scheme of Poetics in connexion with the suggestion of Rasa, the purpose of poetry was brought into a level with the ultimate theory about its nature; and poetry was supposed to create a peculiar mood of aesthetic pleasure, conveyed generally by the philosophic term ānanda.  

9 Abhinava uses the terms prabhu-sammita, jāyā-sammita and mitra-sammita, which are accepted by Mammaṭa (ed. B.S.S., 1917, p. 9). Later writers distinguish (e.g. Ekāvalī pp. 13-15) between the Vedas which are prabhu-sammita, the Itihāsa etc. which are mitra-sammita, and the Kāvyā which is kāntā-sammita.

10 Abhinavagupta’s comment on Bhāmaha i. 2 on this point is interesting ("Locana p. 12, partially copied by Hemacandra in his commentary, p. 3): yathoktaṁ—dharmor̄tha-kāma-mokṣaṁ vaicakṣaṇyaṁ kalası ca / karoti kirtim pritiṁ ca sādhau-kāvyo-nīcevaṁ // iti, taṁ api priti eva pradhānam. Anyathā prabhu-sammitēbhyaḥ vedā-dibhyo mitra-sammitēbhyaḥ cetiḥsādibhyo vyutpatiḥ-hetukhyuḥ, ko’sya kāvyo-rāpasya vyutpaiḥ-heor jāyā-sammitatva-laksanato viṣeṣa iti prā-dhānycnānanda evoktaḥ. Caturvarga-vyutpattier api cānandaḥ pāryan-tikṣam mukhyam phalam. The essence of Rasa, which came to be considered as the most important thing in poetry, is said to consist of this priti or ānanda; naturally ānanda or priti became in later
Jagannātha completes the idea by defining it as a 'disinterested' or 'dissociated' (alaukika) pleasure, which depends upon a taste formed by repeated representation of beautiful objects, and which can be enjoyed by a man initiated into the poetic mysteries.

With regard to the other two questions, viz. the equipment of a poet and the sources of poetry, Bhāmāha appears to be cognisant of their importance. His remarks on these points are, however, brief as compared with those of Vāmana, who deals with the subject elaborately for the first time. It may be pointed out in this connexion that Sanskrit Poetics, consistently with the original idea of its having been a more or less mechanical discipline, gives a long list of the essential qualifications which a poet should possess and lays down elaborate rules for his 'education'. With the advance of the theoretical aspects of the science, this theme was, no doubt, made the object of a separate study by a group of writers who make it their business to instruct the poet in his profession; but all early writers on general Poetics, more or less, touch upon the point. We shall have occasion to deal with this school of kavi-śikṣā; but it will be convenient to indicate here briefly the earlier speculations on the subject. While not denying the supreme necessity of genius or poetic gift (sat-kavitva, Bhāmāha i. 4) which consists in pratibhā (poetic conception), all writers, early or late, agree in emphasising the necessity of study and experience. Both Bhāmāha (i. 5) and Daṇḍin (i. 103-4) acknowledge pratibhā which is said to be natural (naisargikī) or inborn (sahajā); and Vāmana puts it into a formula that in pratibhā lies the seed of poetry, and defines it (i. 3, 16 Vṛttī) as an antenatal capacity of the mind without which no poetry is possible, and if possible, it is only ridiculous, a dictum which is almost literally copied by

Poetics the chief object of poetry. Mammaṭa calls it sakala-prayojana-maultibhūtam.

11 ānāntara-gata-sanskāra-viseṣaḥ kaścit. Daṇḍin describes it as pūrva-vāsanā-guṇanubandhi.
Mammaṭa who, however, uses the more general term śakti. Abhinavagupta (*Locana p. 29) defines it as intelligence (prajñā), capable of fresh invention (apūrva-vastu-nirmāṇa-kṣama), its distinguishing characteristic being the capacity of creating poetry possessed of passion, clarity and beauty (tusya viśeṣo raṣṭeva-vaisadya-saundarya-kāvya-nirmāṇa-kṣamatvam); and it quot. the authority of Bharata (vii, 2) who designates it as the ‘internal disposition’ of the poet (antarṣata bhāva). This agrees with the definition of pratibhā as prajñā nava-navollekha-śālinī, given in a verse cited anonymously by Hemacandra, but attributed by Kṣemendra (Aucitya-vicāra* ad sl. 35) to Abhinava’s guru, Bhaṭṭa Tauta; and it is recognised as canonical by later writers, to whom Abhinava and Mammaṭa were the final lawgivers, but who sometimes add that it is lokottara and capable of producing an indefinable charm variously termed vaicitrya, vicchiti. cārutva, saundarya, hrdayatva or ramanīyatva.

While these theorists believed in pratibhā, they also believed in “making a poet into a poet,” and maintained the importance of what Dauḍīn calls śrūta and abhiyoga, but what later writers call vyutpatti (culture) and abhyāsa (practice). Rudraṭa, therefore, thinks that pratibhā is not only sahajā or inborn, but also utpādyā or capable of attainment by vyutpatti or culture. The poet is thus required to be an expert in a long list of sciences or arts. The earliest of such lists is given by Bhāmaha in i. 9, where mention is made of the following studies as ‘sources’ of poetry, viz., grammar, prosody, lexicography, stories based on Itihāsa, ways of the world, logic and the fine arts. This substantially agrees


13 Read kāvya-yonavah (instead of kāvya-yayvāravah in the printed text), as indicated by Vīmanā i. 3. 1 (kāvya-yahāni) and Rājasekhara viii (kāvya-yonavah). Cf. Jacobi in op. cit. p. 224.
with Rudraṭa's list (i. 18), but Vāmana deals with the topic in greater detail in i. 3. 21-22, and requires the poet to be conversant with grammar, lexicon, metrics, arts, morals, erotics, politics, and, above all, the ways and means of the world. It is also sometimes implied that the poet must have studied the theory of poetry and made himself proficient in poetical exercise (abhyāsa). He must be clever at weaving metaphors and other poetic figures, at the trick of producing a double meaning, at manipulating complicated schemes of alliteration and rhyming, at following up quick composition, at making complete verses out of broken lines and sentences, and similar ingenious practices. When a new work is published, it is submitted to and approved by assemblies of experts, as we are told by Maṇḍhāka, Rājaśekhara and others. It was obviously expected to answer all the demands of theory, although it was by no means an easy test; for style, says an Indian stylist, is like a woman's virtue which cannot bear the least reproach. The public likewise possessed or were expected to possess a certain amount of theoretical knowledge; for the rasika or sahṛdaya, the man of taste, the true appreciators of poetry, must be, according to the conception of the Sanskrit theorists, not only well read and wise, and initiated into the intricacies of theoretic requirements, but also possessed of fine instincts of aesthetic enjoyment\(^\text{14}\).

The poet naturally liked to produce an impression that he had observed all the rules, traditions and expectations of such an audience; for the ultimate test of poetry is laid down as consisting in the appreciation of the sahṛdaya. Thus, the poet is required to be true to his natural gifts and yet conform to the rigid demands of theory. The art of poetry in this way came to flourish in a learned atmosphere, and the theory of Poetics, as we shall see, naturally assumed a scholastic

\(^{14}\) On the subject of the "education" of the poet, see F. W. Thomas, The Making of the Sanskrit Poet in Bhandarkar Commemoration Volume p. 375 f.
and dialectic character in common with the whole scientific literature of ancient India. It is true that a certain amount of inevitable difference is always to be found between theory and practice; and, as on the one hand, we have gifted poets aspiring to untrammelled utterance, so on the other, there is a tendency to degenerate towards a slavish adherence to rules, which naturally resulted in a strong overloading of a composition by complicated or artificial expressions.

With these general remarks we may now turn to a brief consideration of other topics in the work of Bhāmaha. Bhāmaha rests content by taking the Kāvya to consist of śabda and artha (śabdārthau sahitau kāvyam), giving equal prominence to word and sense in poetry. But he implies by his treatment that the Kāvya should also be faultless (nirdoṣa) and embellished by poetic figures (sālāṅkāra). Then follows the classification of poetry (i) according to form, into verse and prose, (ii) according to the language employed, into Sanskrit, Prakrit and Apabhraṃśa, (iii) according to the subject-matter, into fourfold division, so far as it deals respectively with incidents human or divine, incidents invented by the poet’s imagination, or incidents based on the several arts or sciences, (iv) according to the conventional way of grouping compositions into fivefold recognised division, viz. sarga-bandha (mahākāvyya), abhineyartha (drama), ākhyāyikā, kathā and anibaddha-kāvyā (i.e. detached poems like gāthās or individual ślokas). Bhāmaha’s definition of mahākāvyā is more or less conventional, and practically agrees with that to be found in Daṇḍin (i. 14f) and in the Agni-purāṇa (336. 24-32). With regard to abhineyartha, he omits its treatment because others have treated of it already. Bhāmaha lays down a somewhat hard-and-fast line of demarcation between the kathā and the ākhyāyikā, a view which is not accepted

15 Bhāmaha’s work consists of six chapters: ch. i on poetry generally (60 verses), ch. ii and iii on Alamkāra (160 verses), ch. iv on Doṣa (50 verses), ch. v on logical correctness or Nyāya (70 verses) and ch. vi on grammatical correctness (60 verses).
by Đaṇḍin and which Vāmana does not enter into as being too fine. With regard to the formal classification of verse and prose, it may be remarked that poetry, according to the view of Sanskrit theorists, has a twofold aspect according as it consists of verse (padya) or prose (gadya), although some authors speak of a mixed kind (miṣra), e.g., the drama in which both prose and verse occur. The doctrine that prose is the opposite, not of poetry but of verse, which began to be realised rather late in European critical theories, was very early admitted without question by Sanskrit authors with whom metre does not play the same part as it does in European poetry; for in India from the earliest time, it was usual to put down even the driest teachings in a metrical form.

Bhāmaha, however, appears (i. 31-35) to be indifferent

16 Vol. i. p. 65. We have tried to show elsewhere (The Kathā and the Ākhyāyikā in Classical Sanskrit in BSOS, vol. iii (reprinted in Some Problems, pp. 65-79) that two or three well-defined stages are distinguishable in the development of these two species of the Kāvya in Classical Sanskrit, the earliest being represented by the characteristics given by Bhāmaha and the latest by those given by Rudraṭa; and that while Bhāmaha cannot be taken as having accepted Būna's two masterpieces as his prototype, Rudraṭa has only generalised their important features into universal definitions of the kathā and the ākhyāyikā. Lacôte in his Essai sur Gunāḍhya et la Brhatkathā suggests (p. 282) that Đaṇḍin must have found that Gunāḍhya did not observe the traditional distinction between the kathā and the ākhyāyikā (e.g. in the original Brhatkathā, on Lacôte's showing p. 220, there was a narration by Naravāhanadatta of his own victories, which is contrary to the rule laid down by Bhāmaha). He was, therefore, led to reject it altogether. Bhāmaha, no doubt, refers to a Lathā in Apabhramśa in i. 28 but it is not known whether he was aware of the existence of the Brhatkathā.

17 One need not emphasise the point that Sanskrit theorists define poetry so as to include any literary work of the imagination in its scope, and absolutely refuse to make of rhyming or versing an essential. This tradition is so well established that the question is nowhere discussed and never doubted. Thus, the theorists include under the head of poetry romances like Kūdambu or Harṣa-carīva which are written for the most part in prose. Vāmana even quotes a dictum which says that prose is the touchstone of the poets (gadyam kāvīnāṃ nikaśaṃ vadanti, cited in Vyātī on 1. 3. 21).
to the literary value of *riti* (roughly, "diction"), to which Daṇḍin and his followers of the Riti school attach so much importance. He thinks that the distinction made by the Riti-theorists between *vaidarbha* and *gauḍa* is meaningless; and though he does not use the terms *mārga* (Daṇḍin) or *riti* (Vāmana), his statement would imply that he is speaking of *vaidarbha* and *gauḍa-kāvyas* respectively, in which some had apparently seen differences of manner and treatment.\(^{18}\) As a necessary corollary apparently to this view, he does not think it worth while to devote much attention to the *gunas*, which the Riti-theorists take as forming the constituent excellences of *riti*, and summarily mentions in another context (ii. 1-3) only three *Gunas*, viz., *mūdhurya*, *ojas* and *prasāda*, apparently rejecting Bharata's ten orthodox excellences. He does not, however, connect them directly with the Riti, and thinks that they are distinguished according to the presence or absence, in varying degrees, of compound words, *ojas* employing long compounds, and *mūdhurya* and *prasāda* not doing it. These Gunas, in his opinion, are not qualities of any particular diction, but of the good Kāvya generally. It is noteworthy that this brief description of the *Gunas* precedes in context the treatment of *Alamkāras*, implying probably that they are analogous to each other. It is also noteworthy that Bhāmaha does not employ the term *Guna* at all, except in another context in connexion with the Bhāvika *Alamkāra* which he, like Daṇḍin, designates as a *prabandha-guna*.

Bhāmaha then proceeds to define and discuss, with illustrations, the poetic figures or *alamkāras*, to which he devotes two long chapters (ii. 4-95, iii. 1-56), consisting of nearly one hundred and fifty verses. Then come (ch. iv) the *doṣas* or demerits of composition (some of which are already dealt with in i. 37-56), and the whole subject is wound up

\(^{18}\) As each of these types have certain distinguishing features Bhāmaha is of opinion that one need not condemn Gauḍa nor praise the Vaidarbha; but he himself does not deal with these types which must have been well known in his time.
with two chapters (v-vi) on the logical\(^{19}\) and grammatical\(^{20}\) correctness of poetry respectively. Now leaving aside these two requirements and the Doşas, all of which are in a sense negative requirements, the only thing of the highest importance in poetry, in Bhāmaha’s view, is apparently the Alamkāra or the poetic figure, which takes up the bulk of his treatment\(^{21}\) Bhāmaha attempts to classify poetic expression into fixed rhetorical categories, and from this point of view his work possesses the general appearance of a technical manual, comprising a collection of definitions with illustrations and empirical canons for the benefit of the artist desirous of externalising his ideas. But in the course of his enquiry, it probably struck him that a philosophical or scientific classification of expressions is not possible; for, although every single expressive fact may be grouped together generically, the continuous variation of the individual content results in an irreducible variety of expressive facts. He attempts, therefore, to arrive at a synthesis by holding that there may be modes or grades of expression, of which the best mode is that which involves vukrokti\(^{22}\), by which a certain peculiarity or charm of expression is posited as the essential principle of all Alamkāras.

19 In which are discussed such Nyūya-vaiśeṣika topics as the pramāṇa, prajñā, hetu, dhvālīna etc.

20 Giving practical hints for attaining grammatical correctness (saunśabḍya), and corresponding to the last adhiṅkaraṇa of Vāmana’s work.

21 Excluding subvarieties the Alamkāras mentioned or defined by Bhāmaha are 39 (+4) in number, viz. in this order: anuprūsa (two varieties), yamaka (five kinds), rūpaka (two varieties), dipaka, upamā, pratīvastūpanā (as a variety of upamā), ākṣaṇa (two kinds), ardhāntara-nvīsa, vavtareka, vibhāvanā, samāsokti apiṣayokti, yathā-samākhyā, utprekṣa, svabhāvokti, premāya, rasavat, ārṇasi, paryīvyokta, samāhita, udātta (two kinds), śṣṭta, aprahmata, veseṣokti, vriddha, tulya-yogita, aprastuta-praṣaṇa vṛja-stuti, nārājanā, upamā-rūpaka, upameyopana, sahōki, parivṛtti, sasamdeha, anuvaya, utprekṣāvaya, samsrṛṭi, bhāvika, ādiḥ (according to some), as well as hetu, sūkṣma leka and vṛttā (to which the status of Alamkāra is denied).

22 It is true that in one place Bhāmaha speaks of the figure
The etymological meaning of the term *vakrokṭi* is “crooked speech”; and this meaning appears in the verbal poetic figure defined by Rudraṭa (ii. 13-17) and, after him, by all later theorists, who connote by this figure a kind of pretended speech based on paronomasia (*śleṣa*) or peculiarities of intonation (*kāku*). In Vāmana, on the other hand, *vakrokṭi* appears not as verbal figure (*śabdālaṃkāra*) but as a figure based on the sense (*arthālaṃkāra*); and it is defined as a metaphorical mode of speech based on “transference of sense” (*lakṣaṇa*). Bhāmaha, while admitting it, apparently in common with Daṇḍin (ii. 363), as a collective designation of *all* Almaṃkāras\(^{23}\), uses the term to imply a selection of words and turning of ideas peculiar to poetry and abhorrent of matter-of-fact speech. Kuntaka, who develops this idea and builds a unique theory of *alaṃkāra* on its basis, makes this meaning clear when he indicates by such *vakratā* the peculiar charm (*vicchitti*) or strikingness (*vaicitrya*) which can be imparted to ordinary expression by the conception of the poet (*kavi-pratibhā*). When words are used in the ordinary manner of common parlance, as people without a poetic turn of mind use them, there is no special charm, no strikingness; and

*bhāvika* as the characteristic excellence of a composition as a whole, a view which coincides with that of Daṇḍin, as well as of Bhaṭṭi who (according to commentators) illustrates this figure in one whole canto (canto xii). It is defined as the representation of objects, whether past or future, as if they were present, the condition of the representation being that the story or theme must have picturesque, strange and exalted meaning *(citrodāṭṭdaḥbhuṭārthatvac kathāyāḥ)* and must be capable of being enacted well (*svabhīnītatā*), and that the words used must be agreeable (*śabdānukulatā*). Bhāmaha, however, does not appear to lay any special emphasis on *bhāvikatva* in Poetry, but deals with it as he does with any other poetic figure. No doubt, he speaks of *bhāvika* as a *prabandha-guṇa*, but Bhāmaha does not seem to have made any theoretical distinction between *Guṇa* and *Alaṃkāra* as such, and the word *guṇa* here should not be taken in any technical sense.

\(^{23}\) On this subject, see S. K. De, introd. to Kuntaka's *Vakrokti-jivita*, 2nd Ed. pp. xiv-xxv.
consequently it is not poetical in the sense in which Bhāmaha and his follower understand it. Such svabhāvokti or 'natural' mode of speech, which Daṇḍin calls ādyā alamkṛti and distinguishes from vakrokti, is not acceptable to Bhāmaha and to Kuntaka, who refuse to acknowledge svabhāvokti as a poetic figure at all; for these theorists apparently imply a distinction between the "artistic", or ornamental or extraordinary, on the one hand, and the "naturalistic", or unadorned or ordinary expression, on the other.

24 See Jacobi in *ZDMG* lxiv 130 ff., and in *Sb der preuss. Akad. xxiv.*, 1922, pp. 224 ff. Kuntaka also uses the term vakrokti as almost co-extensive with the term alamkāra (p. xxx), and regards the so-called poetic figures as aspects of vakrokti. — Bhāmaha does not, as Kuntaka does, elaborate argue against Svabhāvokti; he acknowledges it, but the terms by which he refers to it (ii. 93-94) would make one think that it is not as acceptable to him as it is to Daṇḍin. Daṇḍin would divide Vāśmaya into Svabhāvokti and Vakrokti, the latter including in its scope all the poetic figures. Bhaṣja (Sarvasva-vāk) would divide Vāśmaya into Svabhāvokti, Vakrokti, and Rasokti.

25 To Bhāmaha and Kuntaka, svabhāvokti, which consists in a description of the natural disposition (svabhāva) of an object, is obviously wanting in the requisite strikingness to be poetical; for they take it to be merely plain or unadorned description and imply that a poet should express things or ideas differently from the banality or prosiness of the Śāstras or of common life. But Daṇḍin and later theorists, on the contrary, reckon pūta or svabhāvokti among the poetic figures. On this point we quote what we said elsewhere (Intro. to *Vakrokti-nītī*, p. xix, fn 19). "Though formally the expression of the svabhāvokti may not differ from a statement or description in common life there is still a substantial difference. For the poet sees or conceives the very same thing not in the same way as common people. In the case of the latter, all things stand in some relation to his personal interests, which should be understood to connote also scientific interest in them as objects of knowledge. But for the poet the object has no connexion with his or anybody's interests, not even as an object of knowledge; he has a vision of the thing in itself in its true nature. This is what is partially understood by lokātikraṇa-gocarata, and Jagannātha makes it clear (ed. Bombay, 1915, p. 4) while explaining the term lokottarata as an element of poetic charm. Literally lokottara means supermundane, but in the sense indicated above it may be translated roughly as 'disinterested' or 'dissociated'. Now, Daṇḍin, adopting the traditional term alamkāra and applying it to the svabhāvokti, could not very
Bhāmaha, therefore, lays down, in his classification of the different kinds of Kavya, that the subdivisions of poetry mentioned by him are admissible to that designation in so far as they possess vakrokti (1. 30); and this is made more explicit by declaring later on that whatever value might be attached to the function of Rituv in poetry, the vakrokti is desirable as an embellishment of poetic speech (1. 36), which he characterises elsewhere as vakrā (vi. 23). Therefore he calls upon the poet to be diligent in accomplishing this, as the vakrokti manifests the sense of poetry and as no embellishment of poetry is possible without vakrokti (11. 85). It is not surprising, therefore, that he rejects figures like hetu, sūkṣma and leśa on the ground that they do not involve vakrokti.

It is curious, however, that Bhāmaha nowhere explicitly defines or explains the word vakrokti. Perhaps here we have the work of early theorists who have not yet learnt to theorise systematically, but who are carried away more or less by their practical object of establishing definite norms and prescribing general formulas as a means of attaining literary expression. Or, perhaps the idea of vakrokti was traditional or already too well known in his time to require detailed explanation. At any rate, after enumerating and defining the poetic figures up to and including atiśayokti, he says generally saṣā saṁvāive vakroktir (11. 85), with a hint (as it appears from the context) of identifying the vakrokti in substance with the idea involved in atiśayokti. Kuntaka appears well accept Bhāmaha's statement that vakrā is the characteristic of all poetic figures, because vakrokti excludes the svabhāvokti (Danūtin ii. 362); but he tries to reconcile his own view with Bhāmaha's opinion by extending the latter's remarks regarding the atiśayokti (11. 81) to all poetic figures, thus including the svabhāvokti. The Indian theorists have almost neglected an important part of their task, viz., to find a definition of the nature of the subject of a poem as the product of the poet's mind, this problem is the main issue of Western Aesthetics. Only svabhāvokti and bhāvika can be adduced as a proof that the Indian theorists were conscious of the problem, but did not attack it in its entirety, treating it only in some of its aspects”. See also, on this point, Jacob in Sb. der preuss. Akad. cited above, pp. 224 f.
to agree with Bhāma that some kind of *atiśaya* is involved in *vakrokti*, and thinks that the *atiśaya* is a necessary element in what he calls *vicitra-mārga*, where *vakrokti* *vaicitrya* prevails (i. 27). Daṇḍin probably arrives at the same conclusion in a different way when he speaks of all poetic figures as depending on *atiśayokti*, a view which is explained thus by one of his commentators: *alamkarantarānām api eṣa (=atiśayoktyalamkāraḥ) upakāri bhavati, atiśaya-jananaśvatam vinā bhūṣaṇatayā na syād ity abhiprāvaḥ.* Ānandavardhana’s remarks in this connexion are illuminating. He says that it is possible to include *atiśaya* in all poetic figures, as it has been successfully done by great poets, for the purpose of increasing the beauty of poetic composition; and citing Bhāma’s idea of *atiśayokti* and *vakrokti* he remarks (pp. 208)*: “There is an excellence of charm in that poetic figure in which the *atiśayokti* is established by the imagination of the poet; other figures are merely so called. Since it is able to enter into the body or composition of all poetic figures, it is, by assuming it to be identical with them, called their essence.” The *atiśayokti*, therefore, is taken, in the words of Abhinavagupta’s explanation, as the common token or generic property of all poetic figures (*sarvālamkāra-sāmānya-rūpam*), or as Mammā puts it, as their life-breath or essence (*prāṇutvenavatīsthate*, p. 743). One can realise from this the close connexion between this important figure and Bhāma’s notion of *vakrokti*.

Bhāma defines *atiśayokti* as *nimittato vaco yat tu lokātikrānta-gocaram* (ii. 81), which Daṇḍin paraphrases as *vivakṣā yā viśeṣasya loka-simātvartinī* (ii. 214). It would seem, therefore, that the *atiśaya* in the *vakratā* of poetic figures consists essentially in this *lokātikrānta-gocaratā*, and Abhinava makes this clear when he explains in this connexion (*Locana* p. 208): *śabdasya hi vakratā abhidheyaśya ca vakra-

26 tatātiśayoktir yam alamkāram adhitīṣṭhati kavi-pratihā-vasāt
tasya cūrātviatiśaya-yogah, anyasya tvalamkāra-mātraṇāvetai Sarvālamkāra-sarva-vikaraṇa-yogotvenābhedopacārīt sa evam Sarvālamkāra-rūpasya ayam evārtho-vagantānayaḥ.
tā lokottirṇena rūpenāvasthānam. From this it is reasonable
to conclude that by vakratā Bhāmaha implies a kind of height-
tened or extraordinary turn given to expression (what Kuntaka
would call bhāngī or vicchitti), which constitutes the charm
or strikingness of poetic expression, as distinguished from
common speech where facts are simply stated. We shall see
that Kuntaka elaborates this idea by the peculiar theory of
vucitrīya or vicchitti (which is taken as almost equivalent to
the term vakratā) of word and sense as forming the basis of
all poetic decoration (the so-called poetic figures being mere
aspects of it), whereby the poet lifts ordinary speech to the
level of extraordinary poetic utterance.

As a necessary corollary from the prominence given to
vakrokti or alaṃkāra in poetry by this system, it follows that
ideas of Rasa should be included in the scope of particular
poetic figures. We shall see that Bhāmaha actually assigns
this function to the particular figure rasavat, and if we are to
accept Udbhāta's position as indicative of that of Bhāmaha,
also to the figures preyas and ārjasvin. By putting a technical
interpretation on the word vibhāvyate in Bhāmaha ii. 85,
Abhinavagupta attempts to make out that Rasa as well as
Alaṃkāra originates in vakrokti; but this is probably an
instance of the not-unusual but rather far-fetched ingenuity
of the commentator. Regarding vyaṅgyārtha or dhvani, the
"suggested sense", which plays such an important part in
later theories, Bhāmaha nowhere expressly alludes to this
idea; but we can never dogmatically affirm that some kind of
suggested sense was not known to him. He defines figures
like paryāyokta, vyāja-stuti, aprastuta-praṣaṁsā and samāsokti,
in all of which there is an indication of an implied sense.
The paryāyokta, for instance, is defined as paryāyoktaṁ yad
anyena prakāreṇaḥbhidhiyat (iii. 8), and Udbhāta expands this
with vācy-a-vācaka-vṛttibhyāṁ sūnyenāvagamāmanā, in which
there is a clear indication of an avagamyamāna artha27. This

27 Cf. Ruyyaka's remarks on this figure. See also Bhāmaha's
definition of samāsokti. ii. 79.
is also apparent from the criticism of Anandavardhana, who does not agree, however, that in Bhāmaha’s paryāyokta there is a predominance of the suggested sense, inasmuch as the expressed sense is not intended there to be merely subservient (pp. 39-40). In another place (p. 108), Anandavardhana further remarks that Udbhāta has shown in detail that expressed poetic figures like rūpaka can sometimes be a suggested element, a case of what is explained by Dhvani-theorists as alaṃkāra dhvani. Thus, in the opinion of the great exponent of the dhvani-theory himself, Bhāmaha as well as Udbhāta (cf. "Locana" p. 10) is not an abhāva-vādin or one who denies the existence of dhvani (as Mallinātha, p. 24, wrongly considers him to be), but an antarbhāva-vādin who includes the idea of dhvani in other elements of poetry. Discussing this point, Pratīhārendurāja appears to agree with Anandavardhana; for, in his opinion, the dhvani, which is considered by some school to be the ‘soul’ of poetry, is not separately dealt with by these early writers because they include it in poetic figures (p. 79). In the same way, Jagannātha (pp. 414-15) remarks that although Udbhāta and others, who were earlier than the author of the Dhvani-system, never use the term dhvani, it is yet unreasonable to hold on that ground that the concept of dhvani was unknown to them, because they indicate some of its aspects in their definitions of figures like paryāyokta, samāsokta, vyāja-stuti and aprastuta-praśamśā. To the same effect is the general statement of Ruyyaka (p. 3), who says that Bhāmaha, Udbhāta and other ancient writers would comprehend the suggested sense in the Alamkāra as an adornment of the expressed sense; in other words, they do not take it independently but as an accessory to the expressed sense, in the same way as they take Rasa as an accessory element. Following perhaps the tradition of Bhāmaha’s paryāyokta, the younger Vāgbhāṭa defines (pp. 36-37) the figure as dhvanitābhidhānanam, and refers the curious reader to the treatise of Anandavardhana for a detailed treatment of dhvanitokti; while Hema-
candra defines (p. 263) it more briefly as vyaṅgyasyoktiḥ. In all this, one can perceive an attempt to read the idea of dhvani into older authors like Bhāmaha and Udbhaṭa and thus to find an orthodox authority for it from an early time; but it is not unlikely that the general notion of a suggested sense, like the general notion of Rasa, was not unknown to these ancient authors, although it was only naively understood and never independently treated, being uncritically included as an element of some poetic figures.

(2)

UDBHAṬA

The only writer of later times who develops Bhāmaha's notion of vakrokti is Kuntaka, the author of the Vakrokti-jīvita; but for this exposition, it disappears from the writings of this school. Udbhaṭa, one of the earliest avowed followers of Bhāmaha, nowhere mentions it, although it is quite possible that we would have got a much more comprehensive idea of Udbhaṭa's standpoint from his lost Bhāmaha-vivaraṇa or Kāvyālaṅkāra-vivṛti than from his existing brief compendium of poetic figures. His Alamkāra-saṃgraha, as its name implies, consists merely of a collection of verses defining forty-one poetic figures (including three varieties of anuprāsa), and we are left absolutely in the dark regarding his views on general problems.

In his treatment of these poetic figures, Udbhaṭa follows

28 See vol. i. p. 46. The six chapters of Udbhaṭa's existing work deal exclusively with the poetic figures in the following order and divisions: I. punaruktavad-ābhāsa, chekānuprāsa, vyṛtyunuprāsa (with three vyṛtis), laṭānuprāsa, rūpaka, dipaka (3 kinds), upamā, pratvastūpamā. II. ākṣepa, arthāntara-nyāsa, vyātireka, vibhāvanā, samāsokti, atiśayokti (4 kinds). III. yathāsaṃkhya, utprekṣā, svabhāvokti. IV. prevasat, rasavat, ārjasvin, paryayokta, samāhita, udāṭta (2 kinds), śleṣa. V. apahṛti, viśeṣokti, vrodha, tulyayogī, aprastu-prāsamsā, vyāja-stuti, vidarśanā, saṃkara (4 kinds), upameyopamā, sahokti, parivṛtti. VI. saṃsādeha, ananyā, saṃsṛṣi, bhāvika, kāvyalīṅga (hetu) and kāvyā-dṛṣṭānta (dṛṣṭānta).
Bhāmaha very closely, enumerating the figures in the same order and even borrowing literally the definitions of a large number of them. In the case of a few particular poetic figures, however, Udbhāta enters into distinctions which were probably unknown to Bhāmaha. Thus, he speaks of four forms of the atisayokti, which Bhāmaha does not mention, but which agree substantially with the four out of the five varieties of that figure recognised by later writers. Bhāmaha spoke (ii. 6-8) of only two kinds of anuprāsa, viz., grāmyānu-
prāsa and lāṭiyānuprāsa, which classification, Pratībhārendurāja thinks, is based on a tacit admission of the two Vṛttis, viz.,
grāmyā and upanāgarikā. Udbhāta, on the other hand, distinguishes three varieties of anuprāsa, called chekānuprāsa, lāṭānuprāsa and vṛttyanuprāsa, the last of which appears to be classified again on the basis of the three Vṛttis, viz., grāmyā (or komalā), paruṣā and upanāgarikā. These Vṛttis, which consist primarily of suitable sound-adjustment with a view to alliteration, appear to have been first recognised, as Abhinavagupta points out, by Udbhāta, and from him known to Ānandavardhana (pp. 5-6). We shall see presently that Rudraṭa mentions five Vṛttis (ii. 19 f); but we find Udbhāta’s views accepted by later theorists like Mammaṭa and Ruuyaka who, however, consider the whole question from the point of view of Rasa. Again, the grammatical basis of the divisions of upamā (of which there is only a hint in Bhāmaha ii. 31-33) first appears in Udbhāta (i. 35-40) in a form which establishes itself in later theory. It is true that Udbhāta does not in the present treatise devote, as Bhāmaha does, a special chapter to the question of grammatical correctness, nor does he allude to the theories regarding functions of words already hinted at by Bhāmaha (vi. 6f), yet in deference to the grammatical analysis of speech, he discusses at some length the various

29 These Vṛttis refer primarily to anuprāsa (alliteration, or sound arrangement of letters), and has nothing to do with the four dramatic Vṛttis mentioned by Bhārata (vi. 25, xx. 24f).
subdivisions of \textit{upamā}, due to suffixes like \textit{vat}, \textit{kyac}, \textit{kyaṅ}, \textit{kvip}, \textit{kalpap} and the like, indicative of resemblance; and this analysis became almost standardised in later literature.

Regarding definitions of individual figures, minor differences, as well as further elaboration, are noticeable. Thus, Udbhaṭa's \textit{tulyayogitā} corresponds to that of Māmaṭa, but Bhāmaha's figure of the same name is perhaps equivalent to Māmaṭa's \textit{dīpaka}. The figures \textit{dṛṣṭānta} and \textit{kāvyā-linga} (also called \textit{kāvyā-dṛṣṭānta} and \textit{kāvyā-hetu} respectively) are omitted by Bhāmaha, but defined and illustrated by Udbhaṭa for the first time. But Udbhaṭa is the only older writer who entirely omits the treatment of \textit{yamaka}. Again, Bhāmaha recognises \textit{stena} involved in \textit{sahokti}, \textit{upamā} and \textit{hetu}, and Daṇḍin speaks of \textit{śleṣa} as coming in and increasing the charm of all figures. But the well-known controversy regarding the division of \textit{śleṣa} into \textit{sabda-śleṣa} and \textit{arthas-śleṣa}, together with the question of its relations to other poetic figures in which it may appear, seems to have started, as Ruuyaka notes, from Udbhaṭa's time; and Udbhaṭa declares that in cases of combination, the \textit{śleṣa} is stronger than the other figures to the extent even of dispelling their apprehension. We shall also see that Udbhaṭa is certainly more advanced in recognising Rasa and defining its place in the poetic figures, if not in poetry as a whole; and he even goes so far as using the technical terms \textit{bhāva} and \textit{anubhāva}, which cannot be traced in Bhāmaha. The \textit{samsṛṣṭi} of two or more independent poetic figures is found indeed in Bhāmaha and Bhaṭṭi (as also in Daṇḍin and Vāmana), but Udbhaṭa does not refer to the two cases of such \textit{samsṛṣṭi} mentioned by Daṇḍin (ii. 360) and distinguishes it definitely from \textit{sāmkara} (pp. 63 and 72), of which he mentions four cases\(^{30}\).

\(^{30}\) Vāmana gives the \textit{samsṛṣṭi} a limited scope, recognising only two varieties, \textit{upamā-rūpaka} and \textit{utprekṣānayava}, in opposition to Daṇḍin ii. 258-60. Daṇḍin does not mention \textit{sāmkara}. Possibly Daṇḍin's \textit{aṅgāṅgibhāva-samsṛṣṭhāna} variety of \textit{samsṛṣṭi} comes, as Pratihārendu indicates, under Udbhaṭa's \textit{anugrāhyānugrāhaka} variety of \textit{sāmkara}. 
All this, however, means an advance, and not a deviation; it indicates an aspect of the growth of scholastic activity, which delighted in indulging in fine distinctions and minute classifications, and not a departure from the original standpoint. To later writers, however, it is not Bhāmaha but Udbhata who is the authoritative exponent of this system and whose views are entitled to great respect from all schools of opinion. Bhāmaha indeed commands veneration due to his antiquity; but he was, in course of time, eclipsed by his commentator, and later theorists turn to Udbhata's work as embodying the standard opinions on the subject. We have the testimony of Anandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and Ruyyaka that some of the later speculations and controversies (e.g. those regarding upama-divisions, or śleṣa) started from Udbhata's time; and Udbhata (as also Daṇḍin and Rudraṭa) probably showed the way to minute analysis and differentiation of poetic figures, which play such an important part in later theories. We can understand what influence Udbhata's teachings exerted in this respect when we bear in mind that they guided very considerably the enquiries of two important later lawgivers in Poetics, Mammaṭa and Ruyyaka, who fixed for the last time the definitions of most figures, analysed and arranged them on some general principle, and systematised their underlying doctrine. Although Kuntaka elaborated one part of Bhāmaha's teaching which he took as the basis of his own peculiar system of vakrokti, it was Udbhata who properly carried on Bhāmaha's tradition and gave a systematic exposition of his work. Along with his contemporary Vāmana, Udbhata may be taken without exaggeration to have been the founder of the Kashmirian school of Poetics which produced its finest fruit in Anandavardhana; for Udbhata in Kashmir established the alamkāra-doctrine in Poetics at a time when Vāmana was skilfully constructing a theory of rīti on the basis apparently of Daṇḍin's teachings, and both of them prepared the way for Anandavardhana.
Pratīhārendurāja’s interpretation of Udbhāta is not always reliable as an indication of Udbhāta’s standpoint, for the commentator flourished a little over a century later than the text-writer and frequently reads his own notions into the text. For instance, Udbhāta can be taken, as we have seen, to have been cognisant of a suggested sense, though he never speaks of dhvani or deals with it directly; but Pratīhārendurāja refers to it in clearest terms and attempts by forced interpretation to make out that Udbhāta deliberately included it in the treatment of poetic figures. There is no doubt, again, that Pratīhārendurāja was a great deal influenced by the views of the Riti school of Vāmana. Discussing the mutual relation of guṇa and alaṃkāra (pp. 75 f). Pratīhārendurāja not only cites Vāmana but closely follows his exposition. To Bhāmaha, the distinction between guṇa and alaṃkāra was hardly of any theoretic importance, and Udbhāta appears to have been of the same opinion; for Ruṣyaka distinctly states udbhāṭādibhis tu guṇālaṃkārānaḥ prāyaśca śāṃyam eva sūcitam (p. 7), and Hemacandra adds in the same way: tasmād gaḍarikā-pravāheṇa guṇālaṃkāra-bhedā iti bhāmaha-vivaraṇe... bhātodbhato’bhyaḥdhāt (p. 17). Vāmana, on the other hand, putting greater stress on riti elaborately distinguishes between the guṇas and the alaṃkāras; and Pratīhārendurāja apparently reads Vāmana’s views into Udbhāta. Udbhāta omits all mention of riti which Bhāmaha had only referred to in passing; but Udbhāta speaks of three vṛttis, which are connected in particular with the figure anuprāsa but which correspond roughly to the three ritis of Vāmana, and like the latter, again, to the three guṇas recognised by Ānandavardhana and his followers.\footnote{31} But even then it cannot be said that Udbhāta’s vṛttis cover the same ground or possess the same functional value as the three ritis of Vāmana or the three guṇas of Ānandavardhana. Udbhāta, according to Abhinavagupta (p. 134), regards the guṇas, again, as the properties of

31 riter hi guṇesveva paravyasyitā, *Locana p. 231.*
sāṃghaṭanā, but this sāṃghaṭanā cannot be taken as equivalent to Vāmana’s rīti\(^{32}\). In the same way, Pratihāren-durāja speaks of rasa as the ‘soul’ of poetry (p. 77), although there is nothing to warrant the supposition that Udbhata, fully aware as he appears to be of the importance of this element, would regard it as anything but a subservient factor in some special poetic figures.\(^{33}\)

( 3 )

RUDRAṬA

Although influenced considerably by the Rasa-doctrine, Rudraṭa belongs properly to the Alakāra school. He recognises the Rasas and devotes two fairly long chapters to it; but, as we shall see later on, the function he assigns to Rasa is more or less extraneous. On the other hand, what

\(^{32}\) Ānandavardhana speaks of sāṃghaṭanā as threefold, viz., a-samāsā, dīrgha-samāsā and madhyama-samāsā, according as there is the presence or absence, in varying degrees, of compound words. Each of these is suited, though not invariably, to a particular Rasa. But he thinks that the Guṇas are not of the nature of sāṃghaṭanā, nor are they dependent upon sāṃghaṭanā, but that the appropriateness of the sāṃghaṭanā is determined by the Rasa and by the speaker and the subject (pp. 133-5). See Jacobi in ZDMG, lxi, 1902. p. 779, fn 6, and S. K. De, Ānandavardhana on sāṃghaṭanā in Some Problems pp. 91-94.

\(^{33}\) This point will be discussed in ch. iv below. Rājaśekhara attributes some other doctrines to Udbhata and his school (audbhataḥ), which cannot be traced in Udbhata’s existing work: (1) that a sentence has a threefold denotation (vākyasā tridhābhidhā-vyāpāra iti audbhataḥ), (2) that artha is of two kinds, viz., vicārita-sustha and avicārita-ramāṇya, the first found in the Śastras and the second in Kāvyas. The Vyaktiviveka-vākyhyāna attributes a similarly untraceable Siddhānta at p. 4. Such citations or association of earlier authoritative names with a particular view may be merely pūjārthā, which is not an unusual procedure with later commentators, as Sukthankar in ZDMG lxxvi, 1912 discusses. Pratihārendurāja, for instance, attributes a strange opinion to Bharata that grammatical works and the like do not deserve the name of poetry because they are not acceptable as such in the absence of the necessary Guṇas.
he appears to consider as important in poetry is the *alamkūra* or poetic figure, to which he devotes ten chapters which form indeed the bulk of his work. His work itself is named *Kāvyālāmkūra*, apparently after the works of Bhāmaha and Udbhāta, and is so designated, as his commentator Nami-sādhu admits (on i. 2), from the undoubted emphasis laid on *kāvyālāmkūras* or poetic figures as elements of poetry.

Rudraṭa, like other writers of this school, does not seem to attach much importance to the Rīti or its constituent Guṇas. He speaks, no doubt, of four Rītis (and not two, after Daṇḍin, or three, after Vāmana) viz., pāṇcāli, lāṭīyā, gauḍīyā and vaidarbhī; but in his exposition he is not influenced by the views of the Rīti school. The classification of ‘diction’, he thinks, depends on the presence in varying degrees of short (*laghu*), middling (*madhya*) and long (*āyata*) compound words, or on their entire absence as in the case of the Vaidarbhī which is, apparently for this reason, considered to be the best type. Bhāmaha, we have seen, adopts a similar principle of classification, not with regard to the Rīti but to the three Guṇas admitted by himself. The notion of Rīti, therefore, belongs, in Rudraṭa’s opinion, altogether to the province of *sabda*, governed by fixed rules of verbal arrangement, or rather, of using compounds, and is therefore called the *samāsavati vṛtti* of *sabda*. Rudraṭa does not speak of dhvani, nor does he appear to have been cognisant of its function; but he implies a suggested sense (as also Bhāmaha and Udbhāta do) ancillary to the expressed sense in a limited number of poetic figures, e.g., in figures like paryāya or paryāyokta and in the figure bhāva viii. 38-41.31

34 The two illustrations that Rudraṭa gives under the figure are quoted in the *Kāyya-prakāśa*, and in the *Locana* p. 45. Abhinava distinctly refers to Rudraṭa’s *bhāvālāmkūra* as a case in which the vyaṅgya sense is subordinate. Abhinava thinks that Udbhāta would take *bhāvālāmkūra* as *preyas* (pp. 71-72). It is remarkable that Ruuyaka, in his review of Rudraṭa’s opinion on this point, states that Rudraṭa admits the three kinds of suggestion mentioned by the Dhvani-theorists. He says that Rudraṭa implies *vasu-dhvani* in the figure bhāva:
Rudraṭa's detailed treatment of the poetic figures or alamkāras, however, is the distinguishing feature of his work and indeed justifies its title. It is not only elaborate and exhaustive, but also presents considerable difference of method and treatment, which distinguishes him from other earlier writers of this school, and which may lend plausibility to the supposition that he is not only later in time but is also probably following a tradition other than that of Bhāmaha and his followers. To Udbhāta's limited number of poetic figures Rudraṭa adds nearly thirty more independent figures, besides enumerating several subvarieties of most of the important ones, and devoting an entire chapter to citra (already discussed by Daṇḍin). Udbhāta (not to speak of Bhāmaha and Bharata) nowhere treats clearly of the distinction between ideal and verbal figures (i.e. figures relating to word and sense respectively), although such a distinction is implied by alamkāra-dhvani in rūnaka etc., rasa-dhvani in rasavat and preyas. But it may be pointed out that excepting what is stated with regard to vastu-dhvani being traceable in Rudraṭa's bhūva, the remark does not apply Rudraṭa does not mention, define or otherwise deal with the figures rasavat, preyas etc., nor does he speak of pratiyamūnā utprekṣā referred to by Ruṣyaka in this connexion (although he gives an example of implied utpreksā in ix. 13). See on this point Jacob on ZDMG lxii, 1908, p. 295 fn 5.

35 The number in Udbhāta is 41, in Rudraṭa 68 (excluding sub-varieties). The sixteen chapters in Rudraṭa deal with the following subjects: (I) the purpose and object of poetry, the qualifications of a poet etc. (II) the four rūtis (pāṇcūli, lātipūḥ, guṇāpūḥ and vaudarbhī), the six bhūṣās (Prakrit, Sanskrit, Māgadha, Pāścāa, Saṇharṣeni Apanbhrāṃśa), and five alamkāras of śabda, of which vvakroktu and anuprūṣa are here treated, along with five Vrttis of anuprūṣa. (III) Yamaka. (IV) slesa and its eight varieties, (V) citra. (VI) śabda-doṣas, including doṣas of pada and vākva. (VII) four bases of arthīlamkāra (vāśtava, aupamva, atisaya and slesa), and 23 figures based on vāśtava. (VIII) 21 figures based on aupamva. (IX) 12 figures based on atisaya. (X) 12 figures based on slesa, suddha and samkīraṇa. (IX) nine doṣas of atha, and four upamā-doṣas. (XII) ten rasas, and treatment of śrīgāra. (XIII) saṃbhoga-śrīgāra etc. (XIV) viprālamkha-śrīgāra, and the upāyas. (XV) characteristics of other rasas. (XVI) kinds of poetic composition, such as kathā and ākhyāyikā and their characteristics.
his treatment of four *śabdālaṃkāras* first, followed by an exposition of the *artha-lāṃkāras*. Daṇḍin also implies a similar distinction by a similar separate treatment without expressly stating it. Rudraṭa, on the other hand, classifies the figures, like Vāmana, clearly into two groups according as relative prominence is given to *śabda* and *artha*. He also gives us for the first time a basis or principle of arranging the individual figures in groups in respect of their general nature or characteristic. The *śabdālaṃkāras* are arranged under five broad heads, viz., *vakrokta* (equivocation), *śleṣa* (paronomasia), *citra* (tricks of pictorial effects, like conundrum etc.), *anuprāśa* (alliteration) and *yamaka* (repetition of sounds or rhyming); while the *artha-lāṃkāras* are classified on a principle of his own, viz., under *vāstava* (reality). *aupamya* (comparison), *atiṣaya* (elevatedness) and *śleṣa* (coalescence)\(^{36}\). The figures mentioned under *artha-lāṃkāras* are: (1) VĀSTAVA. *Sahokti*, *samuccaya*, *jāti*, *yathāsaṃkhyā*, *bhūva*, *paryāya*, *viṣama*, *anumāna*, *dīpaka*, *pawikara*, *parivṛtti*, *parisaṃkhyā*, *hetu*, *kārana-mālā*, *vyatireka*, *anyonya*, *uttara*, *sāra*, *sūkṣma*, *leśa*, *avasara*, *milita* and *ekāvali* (23 figures). (2) AUPAMYA. *Upamā*, *utprekṣā*, *rūpaka*, *apahnuti*, *samāśa*, *samāsokti* *mata*, *uttara*, *anyokti*, *pratipā*, *arthaṅtara-nyāsa*, *ubhaya-nyāsa*, *bhṛāntinat*, *ākṣepa*, *pratyānika*, *dṛṣṭānta*, *pūrva*, *sahokti*, *samuccaya*, *sāmya* and *smarana* (21 figures). (3) ATĪSAYA. *Pūrva*, *viṣeṣa*, *utprekṣā*, *vibhāvanā*, *tadguṇa*, *adhika*, *virodha*, *viṣama*, *asaṃgati*, *pihita*, *vyāghāta* and *hetu* (12 figures). (4) ŚLEṢA. Two kinds—*śuddha* and *saṃkīrtṇa*, the former subdivided into *aviṣeṣa*, *virodha*, *adhika*, *vakra*, *vyāja*, *uktī*, *asaṃbhava*, *avayava*, *tattva* and *virodhābhāsa*, and the latter comprising two varieties (10 + 2 = 12 figures).

36 Vāmana had already taken *aupamya* as the basis of his classification, for he would regard all figures as *aupamā-prapañca*, implying that all figurative expression forms nothing more than aspects of metaphorical expression. Rudraṭa, however, thinks that all figures do not imply comparison; and in this he is in agreement with all writers excepting Vāmana who is unique in his extreme view.
Danḍin, who himself enumerates a very large number of poetic figures\(^{37}\), very sagely remarks that if for some slight difference, a different figure is to be defined, there would be hardly any end to their infinite multiplication. This remark partly applies to Rudraṭa whose general scheme, as well as particular definitions, is open to such an obvious objection. One of the curious results of rigorously following this classification is that the same figure reappears as an \textit{alaṅkāra} under different groups. Thus \textit{sahokti} and \textit{samuccaya} have two aspects, based respectively on \textit{vāstava} and \textit{aupamyā}, while the figure \textit{upprekṣā} appears similarly under \textit{aupamyā} and \textit{atiśaya} respectively. Some of Rudraṭa’s figures have been abandoned by later writers, while some have changed their names or have been modified\(^{38}\), later speculation inclining rather towards the more orthodox expositions of Udbhata or even of Danḍin; yet the general merit of Rudraṭa’s analysis and definitions, testified to by the more or less implicit acceptance by later theorists like Mammaṭa\(^{39}\), cannot be denied. They indicate not only a considerable advance in scholastic activity on Bhāmaha and Udbhata, but also remarkable independence, and consequent divergence of treatment in several notable cases.

Taking the verbal figures, Rudraṭa’s \textit{vakrokti}, based on paronomasia (\textit{śleṣa}) and intonation (\textit{kaku}), has nothing in common with that of his predecessors. The intonational \textit{vakrokti} is indeed not accepted by some of his successors

\(^{37}\) Viz. 35 in ch. ii. and \textit{yamaka}, \textit{citra} and \textit{pahelika} in ch. iii.

\(^{38}\) E.g., Rudraṭa’s \textit{bhūva}, \textit{mata}, \textit{sāmya} and \textit{pihita} are not defined by later writers (excepting Vāgbhaṭa in his \textit{Kāvyāñusāsana}), while his \textit{hetu} is not admitted by Mammaṭa. Rudraṭa’s \textit{avasara} and \textit{pūrva} (mentioned by the younger Vāgbhaṭa) appear to be the same as the second variety of Mammaṭa’s (and Udbhata’s) \textit{udātta} and the fourth variety of Mammaṭa’s \textit{atiśayokti} respectively.

\(^{39}\) Mammaṭa’s indebtedness to Rudraṭa is discussed by Sukthankar in \textit{ZDMG}, lxvi, 1912, p 478, as well as in many places in Nobel’s \textit{Beiträge} already cited. Ruyyaka, on the other hand, while drawing largely on Mammaṭa himself, is more indebted to Udbhata.
(e. g. Rājaśekhara p. 31 and Hemacandra p. 234), inasmuch as it is supposed to depend on mere peculiarities of reading (pātha-dharmatvāt): but on the whole, Rudrata’s definition of the figure replaced that of Vāmana’s metaphorical vakrokti, survived Kuntaka’s broader interpretation of vakrokti, and established itself as the only recognised figure of that name in later literature from Mammaṭa onwards. Again, Rudrata’s classification of anuprāsa is somewhat different from that of Udbhata, the former basing it on the five vṛitis of letters (varṇa), viz., madhurā, paruṣā, praudhā, lalitā and bhadrā, and the latter admitting only three vṛitis (paruṣā, upanāgarikā and grāmyā or komalā) only in connexion with one of his three kinds of anuprāsa, viz. vṛtyanuprāsa. The later writers follow Udbhata, on this point Udbhata, again, omits the treatment of yamaka, in spite of the examples of Bharata and Bhāmaha before him, and in spite of the fact that Dāṇḍin had already given one of the fullest treatments of that figure in the whole realm of Alamkāra literature. Rudrata perhaps ranks next to Dāṇḍin in the fulness of his treatment, though there is considerable divergence in the details of classification of these two writers. In the same way, there is no reference to citra in Bharata, Bhāmaha or Udbhata, although Māgha says (xix. 41) that it was in his time a figure indispensable in a Mahākāvyaya. Dāṇḍin dilates upon some of its varieties, but Rudrata gives a much fuller exposition; and it is noteworthy that although Mammaṭa does not attach much value to such verbal ingenuity, yet in his discussion of this figure he quotes almost all the illustrations from Rudrata. In connexion with the faults concerning verbal figures, Rudrata points out several cases (vi. 29-33) where punarukta or tautology is not a fault; Udbhata, as Nami-sādhu also notes, includes all these cases in the figure punaruktavād-ābhāsa or ‘semblance of tautology’. Udbhata, again, speaks of śleṣa apparently as an arthālaṃkāra, and divides it into sabda śleṣa and artha-śleṣa, which correspond respectively to abhaṅga- and sabhaṅga-śleṣa of later writers. Rudrata, on the other
hand, speaks of śleṣa as a sabdālaṃkāra which he carefully distinguishes (ii. 13) from the arthālaṃkāra of the same name, which he deals with separately in ch. x and which forms the basis of twelve independent figures. The verbal figure śleṣa, on the contrary, is elaborately classified according as it relates to varṇa, liṅga, prakṛti, pratyaya, vibhakti and vacana (iv. 12), Rudraṭa thus avoiding the controversy carried on by later theorists as to whether the śleṣa is a figure of sabda or of artha.

Regarding arthālaṃkāras, Rudraṭa mentions only four upamā-dosas (xi. 24), in contradistinction to seven of Bhāma ha and Medhāvin and six of Vāmana\(^{40}\), viz., vaisamya, asaṃbhava, aprasiddhi and sāmānya-sabda-bheda, the last defect including all cases of change of a word signifying common property (as construed with the upamēya and the upamāna), due to the difference of liṅga, vacana, kūla, kāraka and vibhakti. We have already noted that Udbhata enters rather minutely into the grammatical subdivisions of upamā, but this finds no place in Rudraṭa’s treatment, which includes them in a lump in samāsopamā and pratyayopamā. Again, Bhāmaha positively rejects hetu as a poetic figure, although Daṇḍin speaks of it as vācām uttama-bhūṣanam, including it under kāvyā-liṅga (kāraka-hetu) and anumāna (jñāpaka-hetu). Udbhata recognises only kāvyā-liṅga, calling it also kāvyā-hetu and distinguishing it from dṛṣṭānta which he calls kāvyādṛṣṭānta. It is Rudraṭa (vii. 82) who first defines and fixes its characteristics as finally accepted in Poetics. It is needless to cite any more instance; but what is said above will be enough to indicate, in the first place, that there is a considerable divergence of view between Rudraṭa and his predecessors with regard to the nature and scope of individual figures and their classification; and what is more important to note, it is easy to demonstrate that most of these differences are fundamental. We can reasonably assume, therefore, that Rudraṭa, possessed as he is of great inventive power, either follows a

\(^{40}\) See vol. i. p. 60, fn 1.
system of classification and definition peculiar to himself, or follows a tradition of opinion different in some respects from that of Bhāmaha and his followers, although in general theory he belongs to a common school.

Although Rudraṭa's work is remarkable indeed for its careful analysis, systematic classification and apposite illustration of a large number of poetic figures, some of which have become more or less standardized, his direct contribution to the theory of Poetics cannot be valued too highly. Indeed, the practical nature and scope of his work, like that of Udbhāṭa's, leave hardly any room for discussion of general principles or of speculative aspects of the questions involved. Rhetoric rather than Poetics appears to be his principal theme, as it is of most writers of this system who concern themselves entirely with the elaboration of rhetorical categories in which they suppose the whole charm of poetry lies. Partly perhaps to his novelty of treatment and partly to his omission of discussion of ultimate principles is due the fact that Rudraṭa has hardly any direct follower in later literature, unless one cites Rudrabhaṭṭa who, however, utilises only his Rasa-chapters. Rudraṭa's name is not associated with the establishment of any particular system, although he shows great fertility and acuteness in his treatment of individual figures, which, in some cases, have been implicitly accepted by later writers on the subject. Rudraṭa is the last great exponent of the Alamkāra school, strictly so called; for after him the school began to decline and merge ultimately, like the two other sister schools relating to Rasa and Rīti, into the finally dominant Dhvani school.

(4)

The decline of the Alamkāra-system was probably synchronous with and perhaps hastened by the rise of the rival Rīti-doctrine. The first step towards this is indicated by the general trend of Daṇḍin's work. Daṇḍin who stands, as it were, midway between the Alamkāra and the Rīti
schools, admits, no doubt, the great importance of poetic figures (alāmkāras) in a scheme of Poetics (ii. 1); but he takes them, along with the guṇas, as constituting the essence of what he calls the mārga (or rīti). As the characteristic of 'embellishing' poetic speech is possessed by both Alamkāras and Guṇas, both are, in his opinion, Alamkāras in a wider sense, the Guṇas being special embellishments of the Vaidarbhā Mārga, while the Alamkāras are common to both the Vaidarbhā and the Gauḍa Mārgas. Vāmana, who systematically established the Riti-theory, goes further and lays down that the Guṇas are essential (nitya) excellences, while the Alamkāras are not essential (anitya) but serve only to increase the beauty of a poem already brought out by the former.

With the advent of the Dhvani-theory, there was an elaboration of the concept of Rasa as the principal suggested element not only in the drama but also in poetry; and both the Guṇa and the Alamkāra naturally came to be subservient to it. But the Guṇas were supposed to reside in intimate relation to the Rasa, without which they could not exist and existing with which they only served to heighten its beauty. The Alamkāras, on the other hand, were supposed to be extraneous and artificial sources of beauty, just as ornaments are to the body. We shall have occasion to deal with these questions in greater detail in connexion with the views of the Riti- and the Dhvani-theorists; it would be enough to indicate here that the later theorists, in their search for a fundamental principle, could no longer regard the discipline as co-extensive with an external theory of embellishment; and necessarily the Alamkāra, as well as the Guṇa, which appertain more or less to the objective beauty of representation, came to occupy a subordinate position as an element of poetry. It was held that the term alāmkāra 'embellishment' should explain the question as to what is to be 'embellished' alāmkārya; and as such it must confine itself, as the early formulators of the Alamkāra-system modestly yet wisely held, to the 'body' or framework of poetry; it must not attempt to explain its 'soul' or essence
The Alamkāra-system, however, left its undoubted impress on later theories. The Riti-systems of Daṇḍin and Vāmana amply recognise its influence by devoting considerable attention to the detailed discussion of various poetic figures; and although no writer after Anandavardhana seriously contends that the poetic figure is the only element worth considering in poetry, yet all of them acknowledge its importance and assign to it a place in their system. In spite of the emphasis which they put on Dvāni and Rasa, the new school, beginning from Mammata, devote a large section of its work to the elaboration of various poetic figures, and the Alamkāra-chapter may justly claim to have been a thoroughly worked out theme. Here was given to Indian scholars rich material for subtle distinction and endless classification; and with a hair-splitting care, baffleing scholastic minds, all kinds of metaphors, similes, alliterations and other figures were minutely analysed and defined. Indeed, the multiplication of limitless varieties of poetic figures, based on minute differences, as well as the making of a large number of subvarieties of each figure, went on through the whole course of the history of the discipline; and down to the latest times, we find traces of new and ever new poetic figures.

The extent to which this specialisation is carried will be understood by taking a typical example. The beauty of a lady's face is described; this can be done in several ways, resulting in a number of poetic figures, by taking the familiar comparison of the Sanskrit poet as the starting point “Your face is like the moon”—upamā; “the moon is like your face”—pratipa; “your moon-face”—rūpaka; “is this your face, or is this the moon”—sasaṃdeha; “this is the moon, and not your

41 Excluding subvarieties, Bharata mentions only 4 Alamkāras, but in Viṣṇu-dharmottara we find 18, Bhāmaha 39 (+4), Daṇḍin 38, Udbhata 41, Rudraṭa 68, Vāmana 31, Mammata 61 (+6), Ruyyaka 75 (+4), Vāgbhaṭa II 63 (+6), Viśvanātha 77 (+7), Jayadeva (Candrāloka) 100, Kuvalayānanda 115. Hence Anandavardhana says (p. 8): sahasraśo hi mahātmabhir anyair alaṃkāra-prakārāḥ prakāśītāḥ prakāśīyante ca!
face”—apahnuti; “the moon is like your face, and your face is like the moon”—upameyopamā; “your face is only like your face”—anavaya; “having seen the moon I remembered your face”—smarana; “thinking it to be the moon, the cakora (a bird which is said to feed on moon-beams) flies towards your face”—bhrāntimat; “this is the moon, this the lotus, thus the cakora and the bee fly towards your face”—ullekha; “this is verily the moon”—utprekṣā; “this is a second moon”—atiṣayokti; “the moon and the lotus are vanquished by your face”—tulya-yugitā; “your face and the moon rejoice in the night”—dipaka; “the moon shines in night, but your face always shines”—vyatireka; “in the heavens the moon, on earth your face”—dṛṣṭānta; “the moon reigns in heaven, your face reigns on earth”—prativastūpamā; “your face bears the beauty of the moon”—nidarsana; “the moon is pale before your face”—aprastuta-prāṣāṃsā; “by your moon-face the warmth of passion is cooled”—parināma; “your face beautifully spotted with black eyes and adorned with the light of smile”—samāsokti. Some of these turns of expression lose their force or point in the translation, but this will roughly indicate the varieties of figures arrived at by nice distinctions, although these constitute only a few, of which comparison forms the basis. They are sharply separated from one another; and although some of the distinctions may appear to us to be somewhat trivial or formal, we cannot refuse to recognise the amount of ingenuity shown in the matter. Even taking only one figure upamā, they subdivide it into a number of inferior varieties, most of which, however, are based on peculiarities of grammatical construction, but which Appayya Dīkṣita, one of the latest writers on the subject, refuses to admit on this very ground in his treatise on poetic figures⁴².

But the different theorists are not agreed in their exposition of the exact nature and scope of individual poetic figures. This difference is partly due to the inevitable change of viewpoints and gradual growth of ideas consequent upon the progress of the study itself, and partly to the favourite refining process which loved to indulge itself in niceties of distinction. The development of the conceptions of the different poetic figures in the writers of different schools affords an interesting field of study in itself, and cannot be comprehended in our limited scope; but one or two instances will make the process clear. The figure ākṣepa, which (generally speaking) consists of an apparent denial of something which is intended to be said for the purpose of conveying a special meaning, is variously analysed by different writers. Vāmana defines it as the repudiation of the standard of comparison, upamānākṣepaś cākṣepaḥ (iv. 3. 27). One interpretation of this, as given in Vāmana’s own Vṛtti, is upamānasyākṣepaḥ pratiśedha upamānākṣepaḥ, tulya-kāryārthasya nairarthakya-vivakṣāyām; that is to say, the standard of comparison is rejected for the purpose of indicating that it is useless in the presence of the object described. This would be equivalent to the figure pratīpa of later writers. But Vāmana adds another explanation which indicates that the figure can also occur when the standard of comparison is only hinted at (upamānasyākṣepataḥ pratipattir ity api sūtrārthaḥ). This

43 No complete attempt has yet been made to study the development of the different conceptions of individual poetic figures from the earliest time to that of Jagannātha. Much material, however, will be found in Trivedi’s and Kane’s notes to their learned editions of Ekāvall and Sāhitya-darpāna respectively. J. Nobel has published a series of articles on some of the Alamkāras studied in their development. His Beiträge zur älteren Geschichte des Alamkāra-sthāra (Diss. Berlin 1911) deals with the figures dīpaka, tulya-yogita, vibhāvanā, viśeṣokti, aprastuta-praśamsā, samāsokti, nidārśana, and arthāntara-nyāsa; while his articles in ZDMG lxvi, 1912, pp. 283-93 and lxvii, 1913, pp. 1-36 deal with vyāja-stuti, and sahokti and vinokti respectively, and in lxviii, 1919, pp. 189f with prativastūpamā and dṛṣṭānta.
would be equivalent to the samāsokti of some writers. Daṇḍin’s definition of ākṣepa, on the other hand, is very wide; for, according to him, the denial (pratiśedha) need not be of what has been said (uktā) or of what is about to be said (vakṣyamāṇa), but it may be of anything whatever. Bhāmaha, Udbhāta and Mammaṭa limit the denial in so far as it concerns the uktā or the vakṣyamāṇa. They are followed by Ruuyaṇa, Vidyādhara and Viśvanātha, but a second kind is added, viz., the apparent permission of what is not wished for. Jagannātha refers (p. 421f) to both the views of Vāmana and Udbhāta, but adds that, according to a third view, which he takes to be the view of the Dhvanikāra, all suggestive negation or denial is the province of ākṣepa. This is supported by the fact that the viśesā or special meaning to be conveyed by the apparent denial is never expressed but always left to be understood. It would, therefore, be classed by the Dhvanikāra under “poetry of subordinate suggestion” (guṇibhūta-vyaṅgya), for the expressed sense itself is charming here and the suggested sense is subordinated to it. It is probably in reference to such views that the Agni-purāṇa lays down: sa ākṣepo dhvaniḥ syāc ca dhvaninā vyajyate yatoḥ. The case of ākṣepa will exemplify, to some extent, the way in which each poetic figure is not only minutely analysed, but elaborately classified into subvarieties by taking into account the different cases of its occurrence. Thus, upamā (simile) is classified into six complete and twenty-seven incomplete forms: the figure utprekṣā into thirty-two varieties, the vyatireka into forty-eight, the virodha into ten. The number of self-standing figures, together with their innumerable adjunct of subvarieties, goes on increasing as the study progresses, until it reaches to a number exceeding one hundred; and it is not surprising that in the later stages of its history, whole volumes like Ruuyaṇa’s Alamkāra-sarvasva, Jayadeva’s Candrāloka or Appayya’s Kuvalayānanda are dedicated exclusively to the special purpose of analysing, defining and illustrating the various poetic figures.
The simple basis of classifying the poetic figures, according as they appertain to the word or the idea, into śabdālaṃkāra and arthālaṃkāra (verbal and ideal figure) obtained throughout from Rudraṭa's time, but some writers add figures which are both of the word and the idea (śabdārthālaṃkāra). The Agni-purāṇa appears to be one of the earliest known works to mention this third division, and the position is taken up by Bhoja in his Sarasvatī-kaṇṭhābharaṇa and Śrīgūra-prakāśa. A long controversy, however, has centred round the propriety of such a classification; and it has been held that although, generally speaking, all figures are both of sabda and artha, the raison d'être of such divisions is the relative prominence given respectively to sabda, artha or both, on the dictum yo'laṃkāro yadāsritaḥ sa tad-alaṃkāraḥ. But this relation of āśraya and āśrayin (i.e. interdependence) is not accepted by all, and Mammaṭa maintains that anvaya (connexion) and vyātireka (disconnexion or contrast) must form the test, which consists in considering whether the particular figure does or does not bear a change of synonymous words (parivṛtti-sahatva). If the figure disappears with the change of the word by its synonym, it is a verbal figure or śabdālaṃkāra; if not, it is an ideal figure or arthālaṃkāra. The number of independent Śabdālaṃkāras has never been large, the largest being probably the twenty-four mentioned by Bhoja. The older writers pay, as a rule, greater attention to this class, which apparently afforded ample scope to decadent classical poets for mere verbal jugglery; but more recent writers like Anandavardhana or Mammaṭa do not deal with it with so much care, on the ground that though such word-play brings about variety or vai-citrya of expression to some extent, it does not help but only retards the comprehension of Rasa in a composition by entirely engrossing the reader's mind. The Arthālaṃkāras, on the other hand, have always engaged more care and attention, and the favourite refining process has been systematically and

44 See above p. 62.
untiringly pursued in this sphere. Their number, however, has always been subject to fluctuation; but it can be generally stated that while in the older writers the number is limited, in comparatively recent authors the multiplication is more marked. On the one hand, Bharata speaks only of four Arthālaṁkāras; Bhāmaha, Udbhāta and Vāmana deal with about thirty to forty different figures; the number reaching its maximum perhaps in Rudraṭa’s sixty-eight. In Bhoja, Mammaṭa and Ruuyyaka there is a reaction towards restriction and decrease; but in the latest stage of our history, the Candraloka gives about one hundred, while the Kuvalayānanda adds a score more. Daṇḍin, himself a great sinner in this respect, very early protested against such endless differentiation, and Ānandavardhana agrees with him; but it appears to have afforded endless scope to the scholastic ingenuity of later theorists who, after the time of Ānandavardhana, finding hardly anything to systematise in respect of the essentials of theory, occupied themselves in elaborating the details.

As to the classification of the ideal figures (arthaḷaṁkāra) according to their essential characteristic, Daṇḍin divides all figures into svabhāvokti and vakrokti; Vāmana makes an early attempt to take aupamya as the central principle; while Rudraṭa groups them systematically under vāstava, aupamya, atīsaya and śleṣa. Mammaṭa has no definite principle of classification. Ruuyyaka suggests one based on (i) aupamya (comparison) (ii) virodha (incongruity) (iii) śrṇkhalā (linked succession) (iv) nyāya (logical reason) (v) gūḍhārtha-pratiti (understanding of a concealed sense) (vi) combination of figures (saṁsṛṣṭi or saṁkara). Vidyādhara and Viśvanātha substantially follow this classification, only splitting up nyāya into tarka-nyāya, vākya-nyāya and loka nyāya; but Vidyānātha substitutes the word sūdharmya for aupamya (or sādṛṣya) and speaks of adhyavasāya (complete identification) and višeṣaṇa-vacitrya (strikingness of adjectives or attributes) as two other bases of

45 iii. 9. See above p. 62.
classification. Perhaps none of these classifications would be regarded as strictly scientific, for they mix broad heads indicating psychological factors (like similarity, contrast or contiguity) with mere formal bases of classification as guḍhārtha-pratiti or apahnaṇa.

A development is also noticeable in the general conception of a kāvyālaṃkāra or poetic figure. It is true that a "poetic figure" corresponds to a certain extent to a "speech-figure" or to what is known as a figure of speech in a formal scheme; but later theorists explain that something more belongs to a poetic figure as such. The special charm, known as vaicitrya or vicchitti, peculiar to each composition, which rests ultimately on the conception or skill of the poet (kavi-pratibha or kavi-kauśala) makes up the kāvyālaṃkāra as such, and gives it its distinguishing characteristic. This view would be entirely omitted in a treatise on rhetoric merely; and with this point of view it is misleading to describe the theory of Alamkāra as a theory of rhetorical categories only. Originally it might have been, more or less, a theory of externals, but the problem was complicated by the appearance of this new factor of thought, first introduced by Kuntaka and then elaborated in the sphere of individual figures by Ruuyaka, Jayaratha and others, the development of which will be traced hereafter in its proper place.