CHAPTER III

DAṆḌIN AND VĀMANA

(The Rīti System)

(1)

DAṆḌIN

Daṇḍin comes chronologically after Bhāmaha; and Vāmana, who comes after Daṇḍin, was contemporaneous with Bhāmaha's commentator Udbhata; but the Rīti-system, which Daṇḍin and Vāmana represent in Poetics, was probably older in tradition than Bhāmaha himself, who would not seriously concern himself with the distinction between vaidurdhva and gauḍa Kāvyā. It can be traced back to the time of Bāṇabhaṭṭa (first-half of the 7th century) who tells us that the Gauḍas were already notorious for akṣara-ḍambara, to which fact Daṇḍin also alludes in his depreciation of the gauḍa mārga. It will be seen that although the terms mārga or rīti in the technical sense might not have been very ancient, both Daṇḍin and Vāmana themselves indicate that some such system as they advocate was traditionally existent; and they appear to refer to and sometimes actually quote from unknown expositors of the past. It is probable that the Rīti school, if we use this term to separate those writers who put an emphasis on rīti as the most important element of poetry, had an independent origin and history, and existed for a long time side by side with the sister schools, which threw into prominence the elements of rasa, alaṁkāra or dhvani respectively.

We have already stated that Daṇḍin is influenced, to some extent, by the teachings of the Alāṁkāra school, and as such

1 e. g. under Vāmana i. 2. 11, 12-13; 3. 15, 21; ii. 1. 9, 25; iv. 1. 7 etc.
stands midway in his view between the Alaṃkāra-system of Bhāmaha and the Riti-system of Vāmana. At the same time, there can be no doubt that in theory he allies himself distinctly with the views of Vāmana. In Vāmana, however, we find the system in its completely self-conscious form; and here we have nothing of that vagueness or indefiniteness which characterises the rival Alaṃkāra-system of Udbhāta. With a clear-cut scheme and a definite central principle, Vāmana proceeds to set forth his system in the brief but concise sūtra-form; and whatever may be the value of his speculations, there can be no doubt that Vāmana was the first writer to enunciate a definite theory which, before the Dhvanikāra, must have had great influence on the study of Poetics.

With regard to the commonplaces of poetic speculation,² Daṇḍin’s standpoint does not differ much from that of Bhāmaha; and both start with the same notion of embellishing sound and sense, which, in their opinion, should constitute the ‘body’ of poetry. The classification of poetry into species of composition like the sarga-bandha (mahākāvya) etc., is almost identical,³ the only remarkable divergence occurring, as already noted, in the case of kathā and ākhyāyikā, which rigid distinction is not admitted by Daṇḍin.⁴ Poetry

2 Daṇḍin’s Kāvyādarśa consists of three chapters devoted respectively to (i) Mārga-vibhāga, (ii) Arthālaṃkāra and (iii) Śabdālaṃkāra and Doṣa (the last topic is separately given as ch. iv in the Madras ed.).

3 Under verse, Daṇḍin mentions sarga-bandha (=mahākāvya), muktaka (single verse), kulaka (five verses), kośa (unconnected verses of different authors), and samghāta (unconnected verses of the same author); under prose, he speaks kathā, ākhyāyikā and campū. Vāmana gives two divisions of both prose and verse, viz., nibaddha and anibaddha (connected and unconnected). He thinks that verse is of various kinds, but divides prose into three varieties, vṛttā-gandhi (savouring of verse), cūrṇa (having no long compounds and possessing sweet vocables), and utkalikā-prāya which is the opposite of cūrṇa (i. 3. 21-26).

4 The varieties of kathā mentioned by Hemacandra are ākhyāna, nidarśana, pravahlikā, matallikā, manikulyā, parikathā, bhātikathā,
is classified, according to its form, into prose, verse and mixed (miśra), while language furnishes another fundamentum divisionis yielding four distinct groups, viz., saṃskṛta, prākrita, apabhramśa and miśra, the last kind in both these divisions not being mentioned by Bhāmaha. The effect of combining these two principles of classification gives us four species of composition, viz. surgu-bandha (mahākāvya) in Sanskrit, skandhaka in Prakrit, esara in Apabhramśa, and nātaka in mixed languages, although it is not thought necessary to deal with them all in detail. The old division into śravya and preksya Kāvya, according as a composition appeals to the eye or the ear, is also referred to in i. 39; but regarding preśya kāvya, by which dramatic composition is generally meant, Daṇḍin summarily refers to specialised treatises on the subject.

These speculations, of course, constitute the common stock-in-trade of Poetics, and find themselves repeated in a more or less similar form in most writers irrespective of the school or tradition to which they belong. Thus, Vāmana also gives us preliminary chapters on the divisions of poetry khaṇḍa-kathā, sakalakathā and upakathā (pp. 338 f). The last three are also admitted by Ānandavardhana (p. 141) and defined by Abhinava. The Agni-purāṇa 337. 20 defines kathāṁkā

5 It is not known what Bhāmaha signifies by the term apabhramśa, but Daṇḍin gives it to a definite connotation as the language of the Ābhīras and others in the Kāvya, as distinguished from the Sāstra where it is the name applied to all languages other than Sanskrit. Nāmisadhu sententiously says: prākritam eva apabhramśah. Hemacandra adds to Apabhramśa another kind called grāmyapabhramśa. Cf. Bharata xvii. 49, which makes it clear that the Apabhramśa was a jāti-bhāsā and not a desa-bhāsā. The Ābhīras were ancient settlers in the land and are mentioned by Patañjali (i. 252). See IA, 1918, p. 26.

6 The mixed variety of Kāvya is cryptically summed as nātakūdi tu miśram. But if mixed language is meant, it probably refers to what is now called Hybrid Sanskrit or mixed Sanskrit.

7 This division occurs again in Hemacandra, who divides preksya Kāvya into pāṭhya and geya.
(kāvyā-viśeṣa), on the auxiliary aids or sources of poetry (kāvyāṅga), on the persons entitled to study the science (adhi-kāri-nirūpaṇa). Although belonging to a different school, Rudraṭa in the same way devotes two chapters (i and xvi) to these general topics of Poetics.

But in respect of the attention which Daṇḍin pays to the elaboration of poetic figures, his sympathy obviously allies him with the standpoint of the Alamkāra school. He shares the views of this school in his general opinion that a good Kāvyā should be embellished by those decorative devices which go by the name of alaṃkāra. At the same time, it is important to note that while Daṇḍin believes, with all early writers, in the theory of embellishment, he differs in his view as to the means by which this embellishment should be realised; for he apparently holds that it is not the poetic figures only but the several literary excellences, the guṇas (which are also designated alaṃkāras by him), that constitute the essence of the poetic manners (mārgas) or poetic diction, in the realisation of which alone the essence of poetry lies. Indeed, the marked emphasis laid on the Mārga, which is almost equivalent to Vāmana’s Rīti, and on its constituent excellences, known as Guṇas, to which the Alamkāra school is apparently indifferent, is a distinct feature of Daṇḍin’s work, and places Daṇḍin in his fundamental theoretic attitude in the Rīti school. Although he does not go so far as Vāmana in setting up the Rīti as the essence of poetry, there can be no doubt that he attaches special importance to its literary value. It is true that Daṇḍin never uses the term Rīti throughout his work, but his employment of the term Mārga (i. 9, 40, 42, 67, 75, 101) or Vartman (i. 42, 92), implying ‘mode,’ ‘manner,’ or style in the objective sense, may be taken as almost synonymous. His general definition of poetry, or rather its ‘body’ or framework, as iṣṭārtha-vyavacchinnā padāvalī (i. 10)—a series of words characterised by an agreeable sense or idea—naturally

8 Vāmana also uses the term mārga in iii. 1. 12.
leads him to consider, first of all, the question of appropriate expression of appropriate ideas, or in other words, to discuss the suitable arrangement of sound and sense for the purpose of producing poetic effect, which is technically denoted by the term mārga or riti. Speech, he says, is diversifined in its mode of expression (vicitra-mārga, i. 9; also i. 40), and he is aware of the fine distinctions which mark off one mode from another (i. 40) and result in a multifarious variety of modes. All these he broadly divides into two clearly distinguishable types, called the vaidarbha and the gauda, to the critical study of which his whole work is avowedly devoted. This classification is probably not Daṇḍin's own but derived from some recognised tradition (i. 40), although Bharata, who mentions the kāvya-guṇas, does not refer to mārga or riti, and Bhāmaha's analysis of the two types (as well as of the guṇas) is somewhat different. Of the two types, Daṇḍin gives preference to the vaidarbha mārga, which, in his opinion, results from a harmonious unification of the ten guṇas or excellences of composition, the gauda being the exactly opposite type.

The ten Guṇas, which are spoken of as the prānāḥ or life-breath of the Vaidarbha Mārga and which are said to be generally wanting in the Gauda,¹⁰ are therefore essential in a good composition. They are thus enumerated by Daṇḍin:

9 Bhāmaha does not use the terms mārga or riti but distinguishes between the vaidarbha and the gauda Kāvya as two types of poetry obtaining in two different places. Bāna has already told us that people of different places liked different poetic devices (Harṣa-carita i, sl. 7), with which statement Daṇḍin's remarks regarding the partiality of the Gaudas to certain tricks and excellences agree. As Vāmana distinctly says, the Rātis, which took their names from localities, were probably analysed empirically from the styles which prevailed in these localities. With regard to Guṇas, Bhāmaha mentions them independently of the Rāti. They are madhurya and prasāda marked by the absence of compounds, and ojas by their presence. They would thus correspond to the Rātis of Rudraṭa. Bharata mentions ten Guṇas only as essential to a good Kāvya, and not in relation to Rāti.

10 Daṇḍin says: esām (i.e. of the ten Guṇas) viparyayah prāyo-
(i) śleṣu, the quality of being well knit, the opposite being ṣīthila or looseness.

(ii) prasāda, or lucidity, the opposite being vyutpanna or far-fetchedness.

(iii) samatā, or evenness (in the grouping of word-sounds), the opposite being vaiṣamya or unevenness.

(iv) mādhurya, or elegance, consisting of alliteration of similar sound (śrutyanuprāsa) and absence of vulgarity (agrāmyatva), respectively termed vāg-rasa and vastu-rasa. The name of the opposite of mādhurya is not given, but the opposite of śrutyanuprāsa is uibaṇa-varṇāyṛtī (i. 35) and that of agrāmyatva is grāmyatva, the latter rejected in both the Mārgas.

(v) suκumārati, or absence of harshness due to the use of soft vocobles, the opposite being termed niṣṭhura or dipta.

(vi) artha-vyakti, or explicitness of sense (common to both the Mārgas, the opposite neyatva or neyārthatva being rejected in both).

1 Drśvate gauḍa-varimani. It implies that in his opinion the Viparyayas are generally found in the Gauḍa Mārga and not the ten Guṇas. The word prāyas is significant, and the older commentators draw attention to it. Thus, Taruṇavācaspati: prayaḥ-sābdaḥ arthavyakty-audārya-samādhīyādayo guṇā ubhaya-sādhāranā iti darśayat; Hṛdayāṅgama: prāyo-grahaṇaṇi sākalya-nivṛtyartham, tena arthavyakti-audārya-samādhi-guṇā ubhaya-nārga-tulyā iti ganyate. Some of the Guṇas, therefore, are common to both the Mārgas.

11 The śrutyanuprāsa is the name given to the grouping of similar sounds which exist between letters belonging to the same sthāna, such as kaṇṭha, tālu, mūrdhan, danta etc. It is thus distinguished from varnānuprāsa. The subdivisions of anuprāsa are infinite; but Bhoja (ch. ii. 71f) gives an elaborate scheme of classification containing six main varieties, viz. śruti, vṛtti, varna, pada, nāma-dviraṅki and lāṇa.

12 For the meaning of the terms grāmyatva and rasa occurring in this definition, see below ch. iv.

13 This implies "an excess of a wild variety of Anuprāsa" as V. Raghavan interprets it (Śṛṅgāra-pr. pt. ii, p. 283). For an historical analysis of the Guṇas of Daṇḍin and Vāmana, see this work of V. Raghavan (pp. 282-299).

14 Dipta is explained by Daṇḍin as Kṛchrodyā=hard to pronounce.
(vii) *udāratva,* or elevation consisting of the expression of some high merit (common to both the Mārgas).

(viii) *ojas* or force due to the presence of compounds (common to both the Mārgas, but the Vādarbha attempts a simpler kind of prose, while the Gauḍa attempts a heightened style both in prose and in verse, long compounds prevailing in the latter case).

(ix) *kānti,* or agreeableness due to conformity to general usage; in other words, absence of the unnatural, the exaggerated or the grotesque, the opposite being *atyukti.*

(x) *samādhi,* or transference of the qualities or actions of one thing to another, i.e. metaphorical expression generally (common to both the Mārgas).

It will be noticed that the above enumeration of the literary excellences of diction, which differs greatly from that of Bharata, is neither exhaustive nor strictly logical. The *artha-vyakti,* for instance, may well be included in the *prasāda.* The definition of *udāratva* is rather vague, so also is that of *kānti,* in both of which Daṇḍin apparently admits subjective valuations not clearly indicated. Again, the *mādhurya,* though defined primarily as a particular mode of word-arrangement, is regarded more or less as a subtle excellence which defies analysis. A similar indefinable psychological factor is apparently admitted in the *samādhi,* the definition of which makes it difficult to distinguish from it poetic figures like *rūpaka* or metaphor, where there is also poetic superimposition of an object or its qualities on another. It is quite possible that from Daṇḍin's point of view, the difference between the *samādhi-guṇa* and the *rūpaka-ālāṃkāra* may consist in the fact in the Guṇa there is a transference only of the qualities or actions of one thing to another, while in the Ālāṃkāra


16 Daṇḍin's treatment implies that he considers it both as a *tabdaguṇa* (illustrated in i. 53) and as an *artha-guṇa* (illustrated in i. 64), although this distinction is not mentioned by him (but cf. the word *vibhakta* in i. 68).
either one dharmin itself is substituted for another, or the
new dharma entirely supplants the existing dharma. But
this process of poetic transference is essentially a mode of
figurative expression resting finally on lakṣaṇā, and Vāmana
would regard Daṇḍin’s definition of the samādhi-guṇa as
constituting the figure vakrokti which, in his opinion, consists
in a similar transference based on resemblance.

It must also be pointed out that some of Daṇḍin’s Guṇas
refer to śabda (word), some to artha (sense), while others
to both these elements. The mādhurya and sukumāratā are
primarily śabda-guṇas, depending on the use of specific voca-
bles, while between themselves the mādhurya requires sound-
alliteration, and sukumāratā the prevailing use of tender
cables. But the use of words or syllables suggesting a
vulgar sense must be avoided in mādhurya, a fact which
precludes us from taking it strictly as a śabda-guṇa. Daṇḍin
does not make a hard-and-fast distinction between śabda-
guṇas and artha-guṇas, as his successor Vāmana does; but
taking his definitions as they stand, it would appear that he
probably regards some of them (e. g. śleṣa, samatā, sukumā-
ratā or ojas, all of which refer to sound-effects) as constituting
what later theorists would call śabda-gunas, and others (e. g.,
prasāda, artha-vyakti, udāratva, kānti or samādhi) as con-
stituting artha-guṇas; while Guṇas like mādhurya he would
in the same way classify as belonging both to śabda and
artha. Daṇḍin himself was perhaps conscious of the defective
nature of his classification, and consequently added (i. 101-
102) that in the midst of a general agreement regarding the
usage of Guṇas, there always exist differences between writers
and writers as regards the emotional value of their composi-
tion or their artistic presentation.

After dealing with the Guṇas in relation to the two oppo-
site types of Mārga, Daṇḍin begins (ch. ii) the treatment of
those poetic embellishments which are specifically called
Alaṃkāras or poetic figures. It must be distinctly understood
that the wordalaṃkāra is used by Daṇḍin in the general sense-
of that which causes beauty in poetry, *kāvyā-sobhākarān dharmān alaṃkārān pracakṣate*, ii. 1. It appears to include in its wide scope both Guṇas and Alāṃkāras properly so called. Referring to his own discussion of the Guṇas in the previous chapter, in relation to the Vaidarbha Mārga of which they constitute the essence, Daṇḍin speaks of them in ii. 3 as *alaṃkāras*, and goes on to mention the figures as *sādhāraṇam alaṃkāra-jātam*. In other words, poetic figures are Alāṃkāras common to both the Mārgas (*sādhāraṇa*), while Guṇas are Alāṃkāras belonging exclusively to the Vaidarbha. He says, therefore, at the outset of his treatment of the poetic figures (ii. 3)

\[ kāścīna mārga-vibhāgārtham uktāḥ pragy apy alaṃkriyāḥ/ sādhāraṇam alaṃkāra-jātam adyā pradarśyate// \]

“For the purpose of classifying the *mārgas*, some *alaṃkāras* have been already spoken of (by me in the previous chapter); now are shown those *alaṃkāras* which are common (to both the *mārgas*)”. Taruṇavācaspati rightly comments, on this verse¹⁷: “The *śleṣa* and the like are already spoken of as the ten *guṇas*. If it is objected, therefore, that they cannot also be called *alaṃkāras*, the reply is that the characteristic of an *alaṃkāra* consists in its capacity of embellishing, and that on account of this characteristic they (*guṇas*) are also *alaṃkāras*. The learned teachers have already said that the *guṇas* are indeed *alaṃkāras*. Hence *alaṃkāras*, like the *śleṣa*, which are essentially *guṇas*, were mentioned before to indicate the difference between the (two) *mārgas*; but now are enumerated those *alaṃkāras* which are common to the two *mārgas*.” Daṇḍin, it may be pointed out, uses the word *alaṃkāra*-
kriyā in same general sense in iii. 137 (or iv. 14 in Madras ed.). From what is said above it follows that Danḍin does not make a fundamental theoretic distinction between the guṇa and the alamkāra as such (as later writers from Vāmana onwards do), but apparently regards them both essentially as alamkāra, taking the word in its wider sense of that which embellishes; the guṇas being of primary importance as essentials of a good diction, and the alamkāras (i. e. poetic figures) of subsidiary value as constituents of diction, both good and bad. It is noteworthy that Danḍin never makes a confusion in the use of the two terms, but invariably applies the former term to denote (except in one case in ii. 364) the literary excellences of diction (i. 42. 76, 81, 100), and the latter to designate the poetic figures to which the name is traditionally restricted (ii. 7, 116, 214, 220, 268, 300, 340, 359; iii. 141, alamkāratā in ii 237, 287, 367). In this way he practically foreshadows, if he does not theoretically develop, the rigid differentiation of the Guṇa and the Alamkāra of the Riti school.

The subsidiary alamkāras, consisting of poetic figures, are dealt with by Danḍin in two chapters (ii and iii), devoted respectively to the treatment of the verbal (śabda-) and ideal figures (artha-alamkāras). He does not expressly state this distinction, which is implied in his treatment, but he gives his general opinion that verbal tricks like those of yamāka are not especially attractive (naikānta-madhuram). He deals with them, however, in greater detail than his predecessor Bhāmaha. The prahelika (conundrum), for instance, which is merely alluded to in one verse by Bhāmaha, is elaborately discussed and illustrated by Danḍin (iii. 96-124) who mentions sixteen different kinds of this figure. He also gives a detailed treatment of yamāka, and defines with illustrations such

18 Some prahelikās are already mentioned by Bāṇa. Bhāmaha in a somewhat obscure verse states that a prahelikā is a serious composition possessing varied constituent meanings as well as the tricks of yamāka, and is so called in Rāmaśarman’s Acyutottara. Danḍin men-
difficult tricks as gomutrikā, ardha-bhrama and sarvato-bhadra.

To the Arthālaṃkāras, however, Daṇḍin naturally pays greater attention. He mentions by name (ii. 4-7) only thirty-five poetic figures; but the special feature of his treatment, as contrasted with those of Bhāmaha and Vāmana, consists in his attempt to make a large number of subordinate varieties, the most remarkable instance being that of upamā, which has thirty-two subdivisions, of which eight at least have the value of independent figures to later writers. Daṇḍin also anticipates Udbhata in pointing out the importance of śleṣa as the cause of special charm in other figures (ii. 362), and agrees with Bhāmaha in holding that the atisayokti is essential in all poetic figures (ii. 220). The term vakrokti is used only once and is reserved by him as a collective name of all poetic figures barring the svabhāvokti. According to Daṇḍin’s scheme (as indicated in ii. 362), the whole realm of poetic figures can be divided into two distinct groups, consisting of svabhāvokti, on the one hand, and vakrokti, on the other. By the former, which he characterises as the first or primary figure (ādyā alamkṛtiḥ), he implies a plain and direct description of things belonging to a genus (jāti), or of an action.

tions 16 kinds of prahelikā. Rudraṭa, like Daṇḍin, deals with the prahelikā as well as the citra-bandhas in some detail. But Vāmana excludes them. Some of the citra-bandhas are mentioned by Bāṇa and Māgha. Under the general designation of citra-kāvyā, they are discredited by Ānandavardhana, and their importance diminished in later Poetics. They became the subject of specialised treatises like the Vidaḍhā-mukha-maniśana of Dharmadāsa Śūrī (vol. i, pp 283-84).

19 The figures dealt with in their order of treatment are svabhāvokti, upamā, rūpaka, dipaka, avṛtti, akṣepa, athūntara-vyāsa, vyatireka, vibhāvanā, samāsokti. atisayokti, utprekṣā, hetu, sūkyuṣa, leśu (or lava), yathā-samkhya (or sankhyāna or krama), preyaś, rasavat, ārjavī, pariṣṭokta, samāhita, udāta, apahnuṭa. śleṣa, viśvokta, tulya-yogita, virodha, aprastuta-prāśapsā, vyāja-sūtu, nirdarṣanā, sahokti, pariṣṭiti, āsī, samkīrṇa and bhāvika. The verses ii. 4-7, which give a prefatory list of figures, are suspected to be an interpolation, but the list substantially agrees with the poetic figures dealt with in ch. ii.
(kriyā), of a quality (guna), or of an individual (dravya). In this so-called natural description, there is apparently no scope for any artificial or ingenious mode of expression, and it should, therefore, be distinguished from all other poetic devices, figurative or otherwise, collectively designated as the vakrokti. Among other figures, defined by Daṇḍin for the first time, may be mentioned the āvṛtti, leśa (=vyājokti or vyāja-stutī), sūkṣma and hetu (the last included by Udbhata in his kavya-liṅga). He does not define ananvaya and sasaṃdeha, calling them asādhāraṇopama and samśayopama respectively, and includes upamā-rūpaka and utprekṣāvayava under rūpaka and utprekṣā respectively. With Bhāmaha, he alludes to vārttā (i. 85), which is apparently illustrated by Bhaṭṭi, but which disappears from later Poetics, being included perhaps in the scope of svabhāvokti. The prativastūpamā is not an independent figure in Daṇḍin but a variety of upamā, while the samāhita of Daṇḍin is different from the same figure of Udbhata and Vāmana. These few instances would indicate that, compared with the work of his predecessor, Daṇḍin’s work attempts to present many new ideas. Possessing great inventive powers and gift of lucid exposition, as well as a notable degree of scholastic acumen, he endeavoured not only to refute and correct in many places the earlier views, but sometimes gave a new shape to them.

It will be convenient to examine here briefly the doctrine of Doṣa, which forms a counterpart of the doctrine of Guṇa enunciated by the Rīti school. Daṇḍin mentions, after Bhārata, ten flaws or Doṣas of literary composition (ch. iii. 125f., or ch. iv Madras ed.), but he defines them differently in most cases. They are in name and substance identical with Bhā-

20 These terms are to be taken in the sense they have in grammar (and not as they have in philosophy).
21 This interpretation is supported by Daṇḍin’s commentators (see Madras ed. pp. 201-2). We have already dealt with the question in our Introd. to Vakrokti-jivita, 2nd Ed. pp. xiv f. See above pp. 48f.
22 See above pp. 9-11. Also Jacobi in Sb. der preuss. Akad. xxiv,
maha’s first list of Doṣas noted above\textsuperscript{22}, with the only exception of the eleventh fault of defective logic, which is recognised by Bhāmaha but vigorously rejected by Daṇḍin as a fault difficult to judge and unprofitable to discuss. But even with reference to this fault, Daṇḍin agrees with Bhāmaha in the enumeration of its six subdivisions. With regard to Bhāmaha’s second list of faults, which concern the inner essence of poetry they would correspond in general to the Doṣa (or rather the opposites of Guṇa) which Daṇḍin mentions as being absent in the Vaidarbhā Mārga and as generally characterising the opposite Gaṇḍa Mārga. We have noted that some of these Guṇa-viparyayas are expressly named by Daṇḍin. They are (i) the opposite of śleṣa, called sīthila (ii) the opposite of prasāda, called vyutpanna (iii) the opposite of samatā, called vaiṣamya (iv) the opposite of sukumāratā, called dipta (v) the opposite of kānti, called atyukti (vi) the opposite of artha-vyakti, called neyatva and (vii) the opposite of mādhurya (unnamed). These form seven faults as against ten of Bhāmaha, but Daṇḍin speaks of the excellences udāratva, samādhi (and probably ojas) as having no opposites (or corresponding faults), inasmuch as they are common to both the Mārgas. Daṇḍin does not regularly deal with Upamā-doṣas.

But Daṇḍin does not enter into the question first raised by Bharata as to whether the Doṣas in Poetics are positive entities or mere negations of Guṇas. Bharata holds that Guṇas signify nothing more than the negative condition of doṣabhāva, so that Doṣas are, in his opinion, positive entities, from which the Guṇas are known by implication. It is clear from Daṇḍin’s treatment, however, that he mentions in ch. iv the external faults apparently as positive entities, after the manner of Bhāmaha; while the essential faults are taken as negations of some of the Guṇas of the Vaidarbhā Mārga and consequently as positive characteristics of the Gaṇḍa Mārga. He attempts to avoid the controversy by making use of the distinction of

\textsuperscript{22} 1922, pp. 222-3. On Daṇḍin’s idea of Doṣa see V. Raghavan, Śṛṅgāra-prakāśa, pt. ii, p. 234f.
the two opposite types of diction, making the so-called Guṇas the characteristics of the Vaidarbha type and some of the so-called Doṣas the characteristics of the Gauḍa type. Vāmana, on the other hand, in conformity to his clear-cut theory of Rāti, goes directly against the opinion of Bharata and expressly makes the Guṇas positive entities, defining the Doṣas as opposites of Guṇas and as known from the latter by implication (guṇa-viparyātmāno doṣāḥ, arthatas tad-avagamaḥ). But he adds that the Doṣas should be dealt with separately for the sake of clear understanding. He, therefore, divides the Doṣas into four classes (i) defects of words (pada doṣas) (ii) defects of the meaning of the words (padārtha-doṣas) (iii) defects of sentences (vākyā-doṣas) and (iv) defects of the meaning of sentences (vākyārtha-doṣas)²³.

23 Rudraṭa, apparently accepting both Guṇas and Doṣas as independent entities, enumerates and classifies Doṣas on a different principle. Taking sabda and artha as the two elements of poetry, he mentions in two series (1) sabda-doṣas or defects of words and (2) artha-doṣas or defect of sense. The first series includes eleven faults, viz. (i) pada-doṣas like asamartha, apratīta visamddhi, viparīta-kalpanā, grāmya, avyutpanna and deśya (7 kinds) (ii) vākyā-doṣas, such as saṃkīrṇa, garbhita, gatārtha and analaṃkāra (4 kinds). The second series comprehends (besides four upamā-doṣas) nine faults, viz., apahetu, apratīta, nirāgama, bādhayat, asaṃbaddha, grāmya, virasa, tadvat and atimātra. Rudraṭa recognizes (xi. 24) only four Upamā-doṣas, viz., sāmanyā-sabda-bheda, vaisamya, asaṃbhava and aprasiddhi, but Bhāmaha mentions seven. (On Rudraṭa’s general idea of Guṇa and Doṣa respectively see V. Raghavan, Śṛṅgāra-prakāśa, pt. ii, pp. 302 ff and 239 ff). Like Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, Rudraṭa believes that with change of conditions Doṣas become Guṇas. After the advent of the Dvani-theorists, the Doṣa (like the Guṇa) came to be related to the Rasa, the poetic mood in a composition, and began to be defined as that which depreciates or hinders the awakening of Rasa. The doctrine of Doṣa was taken along with the doctrine of Guṇa, of which it formed the counterpart, and was considered from the standpoint of Rasa alone. They were no longer absolute entities, but attributes or absence of attributes relative to the development of Rasa, and must therefore be governed by the theory of aucitya or propriety which these theorists put forward in their treatment of Rasa. The Doṣas
VĀMANA

Vāmana's work, in comparison with Daṇḍin's, shows further progress and elaboration of the ideas discussed above. Indeed, what is vague and unsystematic in Daṇḍin appears fully developed and carefully set forth in Vāmana, who may thus be fittingly regarded as the best representative of the Rīti-system. To Vāmana belongs the credit of being the first writer on Poetics who, before the Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhana, gave us a well thought-out and carefully outlined scheme of Poetics, no longer naïve or tentative, which came to be defined generally as rasāpakarṣaka (Viśvanātha); but specific rasā-doṣas also came to be defined and discussed. The question whether the Doṣa is nitya or anitya (already raised by Bhāmaha and Rudraṭa) is solved by supposing that a Doṣa may sometimes become a Guna if it helps (and not hinders) the development of the Rasa. Mammaṭa and most later theorists accept the distinction of Doṣas relating to pada, vākya and artha; but they speak also of rasa-doṣas and alamkāra-doṣas. The later opinion regarding the respective character of Guna and Doṣa appears to be that each of them conveys a positive meaning, in spite of the fact that some Dosas approach the condition of guṇābhāva and some Guṇas approach the condition of doṣābhāva. Even Daṇḍin in ch. iv separately mentions ten Doṣas which he does not regard as constituting the opposite of any of his Guṇas.

Instead of having adhyāyas first and adhikaraṇas thereunder, Vāmana reverses the order of older sūtra-writers and divides his work into five adhikaraṇas, each of which consists of two adhyāyas (excepting the first and the fourth which contain three each). The whole work thus having five adhikaraṇas and twelve adhyāyas. The arrangement of these adhikaraṇas is as follows. I. śūrīra: dealing with the object of poetry, persons qualified to receive instructions in the subject, the Rīti and its subdivisions, the subsidiary aids and divisions of poetry. II. doṣa-darśana: treating of the defects or flaws of composition. III. guṇa-vivecana: considering the Guṇas or excellences of composition. IV. ālāmkārika: devoted to the definition and illustration of poetic figures. V. prāyogika: setting forth the poetic conventions and propriety of poetic usages, and śabda suddhi (corresponding to the last chapter of Bhāmaha's work), explaining grammatical solecism.
in spite of its theoretic defects, is in some respects unique and valuable.

The enquiry as to what is the 'soul' or essence of poetry is for the first time definitely posed and systematically worked out by Vāmana; his predecessors, to whom the 'body' of poetry was more important, never having troubled themselves with this question, Vāmana lays down in clear terms: \textit{ritir ātmā kāvyasya} 'the Riti is the soul of poetry' (i. 2. 6); and working out this figurative description he points out (on i. 1. 1) that the word (\textit{śabda}) and its sense (\textit{arthā}) constitute the 'body', of which the soul is the Riti\textsuperscript{25}. He defines the Riti as \textit{viśiṣṭapada-racanā} or particular arrangement of words. This particularity (\textit{vaśiṣṭya}) of arrangement, again, rests upon certain definite combination of the different Guṇas or fixed excellences of composition. For instance, of the three kinds of Riti proposed by Vāmana, the Vaidarbha unites all the ten Guṇas, the Gauḍī abounds in \textit{ojas} and \textit{kānti}, the Pāncāli is endowed with \textit{mādhurya} and \textit{saukumārya}. This is how Vāmana would distinguish the different Ritis from one another. On these three Ritis poetry takes its stand, just as painting has its substratum in the lines drawn on the canvas (on 1. 2. 13). The Vaidarbhi is of course recommended, for it contains all the excellences; and as the genius of each diction is peculiar to itself, Vāmana rejects the view that the other two inferior dictions ought to be practised as steps leading up to the Vaidarbhi. He argues that the proper

\textsuperscript{25} Vāmana says (i. 1. 1) that the word \textit{kāvyā} applies in strictness to word and sense embellished with Guṇa and Amaṅkāra, but it is employed in the secondary sense (\textit{bhaktyā}) to mere word and sense. By Kāvyā-śārīra he means elsewhere (i. 3. 10) \textit{ittelita} or the content or subject-matter of poetry. But the first chapter of his work is designated Śārīra; and on i. 2. 6 he says that the word śārīra must be understood after the word kāvyā in the Śūtra. meaning thereby that Kāvyā consisting of word and sense is the Śārīra, of which the Ātman is Riti. For the history of the concept of Riti see V. Raghavan, \textit{Some Concepts}, pp. 131-172; Prakash C. Lahiri, \textit{Concepts of Riti and Guṇa}, Dacca University 1937.
diction cannot be attained by one who begins with the improper. If the weaver practises weaving with jute, he does not attain proficiency in the weaving of silk. It will be seen from this analysis of the three kinds of diction that the Vairarbha is the complete or ideal one which unifies all the poetic excellences, whereas the other two encourage extremes. The one lays stress on the grand, the glorious or the imposing, the other on softness and sweetness, whereby the former loses itself often in bombast, the latter in prolixity. It will be noticed also that the names of the different Ritis are derived from those of particular countries, and Vâmana expressly says in this connexion (i.e. 2. 10) that the names are due to the fact of particular excellence of diction being prevalent in the writings of particular countries. This makes it probable that the theory of diction, peculiar to this school, originally arose from the empirical analysis of the prevailing peculiarities of poetic expression in different places, and furnishes another proof of the general a posteriori character of the discipline itself.

26 vidarbhâ gauḍa-pâncâlesu târatyaih kavibhir yathâ-svarûpam upalabhadvatvâd tat-samâkhyâ, na punar deśaih kimcid upakriyate kâvyânâm.

27 In the absence of proper data, it is not possible to determine when the distinction between the Eastern and Southern styles—Gauḍa and Vairarbha—was first recognised. We have already noted that Bâna speaks of people of different localities affecting different tricks of style, some putting stress on sound, some on sense, while others indulging in a play of fancy. In Daṇḍin’s time the distinction must have been fully established. Jacobi (Mâhârâstrî, pp. xvi) suggests that the simpler Vairarbha style was a reaction against the older and more ornate Gauḍa-style (which Daṇḍin disfavours), and that it came into existence probably in the 3rd century A.D., being known to us from Hâla’s Saptasâtî (5th century A.D.). It is possible to argue, on the contrary, that the Gauḍa-style itself is a sign of further development or decadence, exhibiting a tendency to a more elaborate style (as opposed to an earlier and simpler Vairarbha-style) which we find, as a matter of practice, asserting itself more and more in later decadent Sanskrit Kâvyâ. Cf Keith, Classical Sanskrit Literature p. 50.
It should be observed that the term Riti is hardly equivalent to the English word 'style', by which it is often rendered but in which there is always a distinct subjective valuation. Although artha (i.e. sense or idea) is admitted as an element by Sanskrit writers, the Riti consists essentially of the objective beauty of representation (of the intended idea), arising from a proper unification of certain clearly defined excellences, or from an adjustment of sound and sense. It is, no doubt, recognised that appropriate ideas should find appropriate expression; or in other words, the outward expression should be suitable to the inward sense. Bharata goes further and formulates that in the drama the expression should also be in keeping with the temperament and character of the speaker to whom it is attributed. But at the same time, the Riti is not, like the style, the expression of poetic individuality, as it is generally understood by Western Criticism, but it is merely the outward presentation of its beauty called forth by a harmonious combination of more or less fixed literary 'excellences.' Of course, the excellences are supposed to be discernible in the sense or import, as much as in the verbal arrangement, but this subjective content is not equivalent to the indefinable element of individuality which constitutes the charm of a good style. If we accept the nomenclature of a modern analyst of style, we may say that the Sanskrit authors admit what he would call the 'mind'-in-style, as a subject of technical formulation, but not the 'soul'-in-style, which is elusive and which they leave to individual writers to evolve in their own way.

28 Walter Pater's essay on Style in his _Appreciations_ V. Raghavan (Some Concepts, p. 140) demurs to our views, but it does not help to refer to Demetrius or Aristotle, for we are not concerned here with European classical literature but with modern literature, as viewed by Walter Pater or Benedetto Croce. It is not until we come to Kuntaka that poetry is brought in strict relation to poetic individuality (kavi-stābhāva) or poetic conception (kavi-pratibhā). This is admitted by Raghavan himself.
Vāmana, therefore, teaches that the Guṇas are essential in poetry, as they go to make up the Riti, which is the ‘soul’ of poetry. The objection of the author of the Ekāvalī (p. 51) is that to conceive the Guṇas, on the one hand, as the principal element and therefore as something fit to be adorned (upas-kārya) and to call them, on the other hand, properties that adorn poetry (upaskāraka) involves contradiction in terms. This raises only a scholastic quibble which does not bear serious examination. The Guṇas are, no doubt, spoken of as śabdārthayor dharmāḥ, but this, as the commentator points out, is a loose or popular use of the term; for, strictly speaking, they are concerned directly with Riti (guṇā vastuto riti-niṣṭhā api, upacārāc chabda dharmā ity uktam p. 69, ed. Benares), which is described as guṇātmā. To the objection that these entities have no absolute existence, Vāmana replies that their existence is vouched by their cognition as such by men of taste (sāṁvedyatyāt iii. 1. 26, on which comm.: sahṛdaya-sāṁvedanasya viśayatvāt), and that these excellences are not found in all cases of recitation but depend upon the presence or absence of certain well-defined characteristics (iii. 2. 28 and Vṛttī).

Like Daṇḍin, Vāmana enumerates the Guṇas as ten, which appears to have been the standard number from Bharata’s time, but he really doubles the number by clearly differentiating between the śabda-gunas and the artha-gunas, and regarding each Guṇa as belonging respectively to śabda and artha. In other words, each Guṇa is looked at from two different points of view, and the distinction thus proposed between verbal and ideal excellences comes in, as technically put, according as the word or the idea is the denoter (vācuka) or the denoted (vācya). We find in Vāmana, for the first time, the definite classification of Guṇas of Śabda and Artha respectively. This sharp distinction, no doubt, clears away some of the vagueness surrounding definitions of Bharata’s and Daṇḍin’s individual Guṇas; and Vāmana, though widely differing from his predecessors in the peculiar connotation
he attaches to some of them, is careful in distinguishing the allied Gunas from one another. In most essentials Vāmana undoubtedly continues and expands Daṇḍin's somewhat unsystematic scheme, but his definitions bear in some cases an altogether different complexion, and justify us in presuming that Vāmana develops his ideas from elsewhere, as he himself often supports his analysis by verses quoted from unknown sources (e.g. under iii. 1. 9, 25; 2. 15 etc.).

His scheme of the Gunas may be tabulated thus:

**Śūbdha-guṇa**

i. *ojas*, or compactness of word-structure (*gāḍhā-bandhatva*, where *bandha*= *pada-racanā* iii. 1. 4)

ii. *prasāda*, or laxity of structure (*śaithilya*)

iii. *śleṣa*, or coalescence of words resulting in smoothness (*maṣṇātvaṁ, yasmin sati bahūṇy api padāṇy ekavad bhūṣante*)

iv. *samatā*, or homogeneity of manner, i.e., of construction (*mārgābhedaḥ, yena mārgenopakramas tasyātyāgaḥ*)

v. *samādhi*, or symmetry due to orderly ascent and descent, i.e. when the heightening effect is toned down by softening effect, and *vice versa* (*ārohā-varoḥa-krama*)

**Artha-guṇa**

i. *ojas*, or maturity of conception (*artha-sya prauḍhā*)

ii. *prasāda*, clearness of meaning (*artha-vinālāya*) by avoidance of superfluity (*anupayogi-parivarjanāt*, as Abhinavagupta explains)

iii. *śleṣa*, or coalescence or commingling of many ideas (*ghatana*)

iv. *samatā*, or non-relinquishment of proper sequence of ideas (*prakramābheda*)

v. *samādhi*, or grasping of the original meaning arising from concentration of the mind (*artha-drśṭih samādhi-kāraṇatvāt*)
Śabda-guṇa

vi. mādhurya, or distinctness of words (prthak-pudatva) due to absence of long compounds (samāsa-dairghya-nirvṛtti)

vii. saukumārya, or freedom from harshness (ajurathatva)

viii. udāratā, or liveliness in which the words seem as if they are dancing (yasmin sati nṛtyamīva padāṇi) i.e. pada-vicchedāt?

ix. artha-vyakti, or explicitness of words whereby the meaning is easily apprehended (jñāntya-artha-pratipatti hetutva)

x. kānti, or brilliance. i.e. richness of words (anujñāvalya)

Artha-guṇa

vi. mādhurya, or strikingness of utterance (uktivaci-traya), i.e. in an impressive periphrastic manner for special charm

vii. saukumārya, or freedom from disagreeable or inauspicious ideas (apuruṣya)

viii. udāratā, or delicacy i.e. absence of vulgarity (AGRĀMYATVA)

ix. artha-vyakti, or explicitness of ideas which makes the nature of things clear (vastu-svabhāva-sphuṭatva)

x. kānti, or prominence of the rasas (diptu-rosati)

It will be seen from this brief enumeration that Vāmana’s Guṇas differ considerably from those of Bharata or Dāndin. Vāmana’s ojas, for instance, would correspond to Dāndin’s śleṣa, while Dāndin’s mādhurya is split up into prthak-pudatva and agrāmyatva. Vāmana brings in the idea of Rasa in the artha-guna kānti (cf. Bharata’s kānti), thereby admitting it in one of the essentials of poetry, while Dāndin acknowledges it in some of the non-essential poetic figures. Vāmana’s artha-guna artha-vyakti would be regarded by Dāndin as an instance of svabhāvokti amānakāra. But it must be observed that Vāmana’s scheme, while being more systematic and thus marking an advance on the speculation of Dāndin’s, is hardly satisfactory as a whole. The somewhat pedantic classification of Guṇas, into external and internal, verbal and
ideal, is in itself open to objections and has been controverted by later theorists. The distinctions are sometimes unconvincing, and it is natural to suspect that they are made for the sake of symmetry of having two sets each of ten excellences. Taking the individual Guṇas, it appears that Vāmana himself was perhaps conscious of the defective nature of some of his definitions, although he must have elaborated the ten Guṇas according to some current convention. For instance, his śabda-guṇa prasāda is merely a negation of his ojas; Vāmana himself admits this and adds the qualification that the prasāda is an excellence when appearing along with ojas and not by itself, for when it appears by itself it is clearly a defect. If it is objected that there cannot be a combination of two such contradictory Guṇas, Vāmana replies that such a combination is a fact of common experience. Vāmana’s śleṣa is rejected by Mammaṭa as an independent excellence, inasmuch as it is only a particular form of ojas. In the same way, the saukumārya is not admitted by later theorists on the ground that it is merely the negation of the defect of harshness, just as Vāmana’s udāratā is a negation of vulgarity (grāmyatva). His samādhi as an artha-guṇa is different from Daṇḍin’s samādhi, but it is hardly an ‘excellence.’ It is supposed to consist in comprehending the original meaning, but this happens in the case of all compositions; for there can hardly be any poetry, worth the name, of which the meaning is not comprehended. These and other objections are brought forward by Mammaṭa and his followers, who protest against this needless multiplication and differentiation of the Guṇas, and who sum up the literary ‘qualities,’ which they admit as an embellishment of the principal sentiment (Rasa) of the composition, under three broad categories, differentiated on entirely psychological grounds, viz., ojas (energy), prasāda (lucidity) and mādhurya (sweetness).

29 e. g. Mammaṭa viii, Hemacandra pp. 195-200, Māṇikya-candra pp. 191f, Jagannātha 62f etc.
It is also noteworthy that the Riti-system assigns to some of the Guṇas functions which other systems assign to Alamkāras or poetical figures. Vāmana’s *artha-guṇa kānti* corresponds to figures like *rasavat* of the Alamkāra-system, while Dandin’s *samādhī* in some cases will be equivalent to the *rūpaka* and analogous metaphorical figures. Vāmana’s *artha-guṇa arthu-vyakti* is nothing more than the *svabhāavokti* of Dandin, and Dandin’s *kānti* only defines the limit, as Hemacandra puts it, to the figure *atiśayokti* (seym *atiśayokter yantra, na punar gunāntaram*). On the basis of Bhāmaha’s *vakrokti*, the later writers of the Alamkāra school, we shall see, postulate *akti-vācūtrya* as the fundamental principle of all figurative expression, but this is comprehended merely as one of the excellences by Vāmana’s definition of the *artha-guṇa mādhurya*.

It will be clear from the above, as well as from the elaborate review of the Guṇa-doctrine by Hemacandra (pp. 195-200) and Mānikeacandra (pp. 1911) that the writers of the Riti school, especially the followers of Dandin and Vāmana, differ widely in their attempts at defining and classifying the Guṇas, and that such attempts are open to criticism. Some of Bharata’s definitions, on the other hand, do not always agree with those either of Dandin or Vāmana. For instance, Bharata’s *ojas*, which consists in the use of high-sounding compound words of varied strikingness, may correspond to Dandin’s *ojas*, but Hemacandra states that the essence of this Guṇa consists in imparting loftiness to an object which is low or treated with contempt. Again, Bharata’s *prasādu*, corresponding to Dandin’s *samādhī*, is a metaphorical mode of expression, which Vāmana would include in his peculiar definition of the *vakrokti-figure*, and which comes generally under *lakṣanā* or *upacāra* of later theorists. Bharata’s *udāra* differs considerably from Vāmana’s *udāratā* which does not comprehend, as Bharata’s *udāra* does, the Rasas and Bhāivas in its scope; but it corresponds partially to Vāmana’s

30 For this reason Vāmana does not define the *rasavat* as a figure.
artha-guṇa kānti. At the same time, it would seem that, in spite of such minor discrepancies, Bharata’s scheme of the Guṇas as a whole is developed to its furthest possibilities by Vāmana. That there are inevitable differences in the definition of particular Guṇas in the earlier writers on the subject, and that the whole doctrine, despite the care of its exponents, is still unsatisfactory, only indicate the fruitlessness of the efforts of early theorists in comprehending all the literary excellences of a composition within the hard-and-fast limits of a few categories, on the interpretation of which they spend so much ingenuity but on which they cannot in the nature of things arrive at any absolute agreement.

Hemacandra and Māṇikyacandra in their review of this doctrine cite the opinion of an authority31, called Maṅgala who, we are told, agrees with Bharata in his definition of ojas and maintains with Vāmana that Daṇḍin is not right in emphasising it in the Gauḍī Riti inasmuch as it is common to all Ritis. The only other reference to this writer is made by Rājaśekhara, who cites some opinions of this writer agreeing substantially with those of Vāmana, and quotes at p. 14 a dictum from Maṅgala which occurs in a slightly different form in Vāmana i. 2. 1. From these citations by Rājaśekhara it appears that Maṅgala, if he is not earlier in date than Vāmana, belongs most probably to the same school of opinion. There can hardly be any doubt that the system existed even before Vāmana gave a definite form to it, and Vāmana’s systematic formulation certainly obtained for it a large number of adherents and followers, so that important later authors like Rājaśekhara; Hemacandra and Jayaratha cite with respect the opinions of the Vāmanīyas, just in the same way as they cite the Audbhata’s, the followers of Vāmana’s contemporary and rival Udbhata.

31 Vāmana himself quotes some verses giving us ancient definitions of the various sabda-guṇas (under iii. 1. 25).
After the Guṇas, Vāmana deals with the poetic figures or Alaṃkāras as elements of subsidiary importance. This definite differentiation of Guṇa from Alamkāra we meet for the first time in Vāmana; for Bhāmaha was indifferent to it. Daṇḍin does not accept it, and Udbhata appears to have denied any difference. At the outset Vāmana states, no doubt, that poetry is acceptable from embellishment (alamkāra); but he is careful to explain embellishment, not in the narrow sense of poetic figure, but in the broad and primary sense of beauty or charm (kāvyam grāhyam alamkārāt, saundaryam alamkārah). He also points out that it is only in the secondary instrumental sense that the term alamkāra or embellishment is applied to simile and other poetic figures (alamkṛtar alamkārah, karaṇa-vyutpattiyā punar alamkāra-sabdo'yam upamādiṣu vartate). In this view, Vāmana apparently develops logically Daṇḍin's teaching; but Vāmana does not make the presence of poetic figures a necessary condition. What makes poetry acceptable, in his opinion, is the presence of charm or beauty (i.e. Alamkāra in its broad sense of Saundarya) which he does not define and which is in some respects undefinable. The Rīti and its constituent Guṇas come in as a sine qua non in the production of this beauty, but the poetic figures only contribute to its heightening. This distinction between the Guṇa and the Alamkāra as to their respective position in a formal scheme of Poetics, which is vaguely hinted at by Daṇḍin, is fully developed for the first time by Vāmana (iii. 1. 1-3). The Guṇas, being essential to the Rīti, are defined as those characteristics which create the charm of poetry (kāvyā-sobhāyāh kartāro dharmāḥ)—a function which is assigned to both Guṇas and Alamkāras by Daṇḍin—but Alamkāras are such ornaments as serve to enhance the charm already so produced (tad-astiṣaya-hetavah).

32 The distinction was established by the Dhvanyāloka.
33 Vāmana simply says that this beauty is to be attained by avoiding Doṣas and employing Guṇas and Alamkāras (sa doṣa-guṇā-laṃkāra-hānādānābhyām).
The Gunas are said to be nitya (permanent), implying that the Alamkāras are anitya (punar alamkāra anityā iti gamyate eva, Kāmadhenu com. p. 71), for there can be charm of poetry without the Alamkāras but no charm without the Gunas (tair vinā kāvyā-sobhānupapatteḥ). In other words, the Guna stands to poetry in the samavāya-relation (see Kāmadhenu on iii. 1. 4), while the Alamkāra in samyoga-relation, samyoga being explained as mere conjunction and samavāya implying inseparable connexion or inherence (nitya sambandha)34. To put it in the usual figurative language, the Guna is related to the ‘soul’ of poetry (viz. Riti), while the Alamkāra rests merely on the ‘body’ (viz. śabda and artha). The Alamkāra, without the Guna, cannot of itself produce the beauty of a poem, but the latter can do so without the former. But Vāmana justifies at the same time the existence as such of the Alamkāra as an element of poetry, and supports a phase of poetry, which is indeed admitted by Ānandavardhana but not properly dealt with by him, and which is elaborated only by his follower Ruuyaka who, however, takes his inspiration on this point from the Vakroktijīvita-kāra.

Vāmana’s treatment of the poetic figures is in some respects peculiar to himself in its general outline, as well as in the specific definition of individual figures. Vāmana is the only old writer who deals with the smallest number of poetic figures35. He recognises only two kinds of śabdālaṅkāra, viz., yamaka (rhyming) and anuprāsa (alliteration). He rigidly excludes prahelikās and bandhas. With regard to

34 This is criticised by Mammāta viii. p. 470; for he maintains that Gunas like ojas and Alamkāras like anuprāsa and upamā reside in the relation of inherence (samavāya-sthitī).

35 They are in their order of the treatment: yamaka, anuprāsa, upamā, prativastūpamā, samāsanvī, aprastuta-prāśūmā, apahnuti, rūpaka, śleṣa, vakrokti, utprekṣā, atiśayakā, samdeha vrodha, vībhadra, anavaya, upameyopamā, parivṛtti, krama, dīpaka, nidarśana, arthāntara-nyosa, vyuttreka, viśesakā, vyājabhūti, vyājoktī, tulya-yogitū, ākṣepa, sakhokta, samābhita, and samāśruti (including upamā-rūpaka and utprekṣāvatara):—30 i.e., excluding Sāmsṛsti.
the arthālāṃkāras, he lays down in general terms that the upamā or comparison lies at the root of all poetic figures, which are defined in relation to it and to which is given the collective name of upamā-prapaṇa. The importance of upamā, involved in other figures, is recognised from Bāmaha’s time; and consequently this figure, which is the source of all the figures grouped together by later writers as sādṛśya-mūla or aupamya-garbha Alāmkāras, is always given a place of honour at the beginning of most treatises on Sanskrit Poetics; but Vāmana goes to the extreme of defining all figures with reference to the idea of comparison, or in terms of the relation of the upamāna and the upameya. On account of this fundamental postulate, his definitions of some of the figures differ widely from those given by other writers; and he has also to exclude such figures as paryāyokta, preyas, rasavat, ārjasvin, udātta, bhāvika and sūksma which he does not define. He gives a peculiar definition of the figure vakrokti as a mode of metaphorical expression. His viśeṣokti would correspond to the rūpaka of Jagannātha, and his ākṣepa to the pratipa or samāsokti of some later writers. Vāmana defines apahnuti as the concealment of one thing by a similar thing with a view to impose the character of the latter on the former; in other words, the upameya is denied its nature and the upamāna is established in its place. Daṇḍin states that denial of something and the representing of some other thing in its place constitute the figure which need not be based on aupamya; and following him, some later writers (e.g. Viśvanātha) speak of a second variety of

36 The commentator explains: pratisthastu-pramukhānam alāmkāra-ṇaṃ upamā-garbhatvād upamā-prapaṇa iti vyapadeśan kṛtaḥ (on iv 3 1).
37 upamayāvān-ka-prakāra-vacitrivānālāmkāra-bijabhūteti prathamāṃ nirdeśa, Ruyyaka p. 26, sādṛśya-vi-chittavatat rūpaka dīpaka dyane prāukānālāmkāra-bijatvapamāyaḥ prabhūtām nirūpaṇam. Mallāśātha p. 195. Although it need not be involved in all poetic figures, Vāmana regards the use of figures which are based on poetic comparison as highly harmful to them.
apahnuti in which there is no ganyamāna aupamyā or implied comparison.38

(3)

This brief summary of the views of the leading authors of this school will shew that the Rīti-teachings mark a great advance on the Alaṃkāra-doctrine in many respects. There are many points which are common to both these systems; but, by clearly defining and working out the doctrine of Rīti as that distinct characteristic of poetry which sharply separates it from dry philosophical or technical writings, the Rīti school seems to have first suggested and started the enquiry (only hinted at by Bhāmbha's theory of vakrokti) as to what constitutes the essential charm of poetry, and anticipated the theory of vicchutti (or ukti-vaititya) elaborated later by Kuntaka and other adherents of the Alaṃkāra-doctrine. The Dhvanīkāra pays an indirect compliment (iii. 52) to the Rīti school for having first perceived, however dimly, the true nature of poetry, although he does not agree with its peculiar theory of Rīti. The Rīti school also goes a step further than the Alaṃkāra school in including Rasa among the necessary characteristics (in Kānti as an Artha-guṇa). It is possible that Vāmana's partiality for the drama, which he considers to be the best form of composition and from which he supposes other forms of poetry to proceed (i. 3. 30-32), led him to realise the importance of Rasa, already worked out as fundamental in the drama by the dramaturgic Rasa school, and to incorporate it in one of the essential properties of poetry (iii. 2. 15 and Vṛtti). But, at the same time, it was perhaps his idea to make his definition of poetry comprehensive enough to cover a larger field and include those instances, e.g., which develop no Rasa. The kāya-sobha, a term which he probably borrows from Daṇḍin (ii. 1), or saundarya which conveys the same general idea as

38 Cf Uddyota, ed. Candorkar, p. 39.
the word 'beauty', is regarded as the ultimate test of all poetry; and this beauty, in his opinion, agreeing with the common-sense view of the matter, is realised by carefully worked-out diction, which avoids the damaging flaws by adopting primarily the so-called literary excellences, as well as the poetic figures for the secondary purpose of heightening the effect thus produced.

But the Ritu-system, in spite of Vāmana's well-reasoned formulation and the advocacy of his followers, never appears to have wielded very great influence, and its existence was comparatively short-lived. There is no doubt that like the Rasa and the Aṅkāra-systems, it left its impress on later theories, but it never found a serious champion after Vāmana among latter-day writers, and its theories never found unqualified acceptance. Its general doctrine of Ritu began to be discredited and severely criticised from Āṇandavardhana's time as too crude an explanation of the nature of poetry; and Mammaṭa, the foremost authority of the latest school, ingeniously combats and sets aside the leading views of Vāmana.

It may, however, be noted that some of the broad principles enunciated by the Ritu school have been tacitly recognised by later theorists. The importance of Ritu or diction, as such, became established as a stock-idea in Poetics: but it was accepted with grave modifications. It was accepted by the Dhvani school in so far as it contributed to the development of the rasa-dhvani, and its chief characteristic was supposed to consist in an arrangement or disposition of words or letters for that purpose. This modification naturally diminished the value of all discussion and elaborate

39 A commentator on Vāmana, named Sahadeva, tells us that Vāmana's work went out of vogue, and its tradition was restored by Bhaṭṭa Mukula (1) who obtained a copy of the work. See notes to the Kāvyā-mimāṃsā, ed. Gaekwad Oriental Series, p. 5.
40 vāṇa-samghatan-ādharatva, Āṇandavardhana p. 5, see also u. 8-11.
classification of the Rūtis into different types, and the function of the three Rūtis of Vāmana was made practically equivalent to the three Guṇas admitted by the authors of the Dhvanyāloka; but they do not yet appear to have lost all interest with later theorists. Even those writers, who do not subscribe to the doctrine either of the Rūti school or of the Dhvani school, pay considerable attention to this question. Thus, Rudraṭa adds lāṭi to the enumeration of the three Rūtis of Vāmana, although by Rūti Rudraṭa means a definite usage of compound words. The Agni-purāṇa accepts this fourfold classification, but the distinction is supposed to lie not only in the length or shortness of the sentences but also in the qualities of ‘softness’ or ‘smoothness’, as well as in the prominence of metaphorical expression (upacāra). Bhoja, who carries the elaboration still further, adds two more types of Rūti to the Agni-purāṇa’s four, viz. māgadhī and āvantikā, the former being an intermediate diction between Vaidarbhi and Pāncāli, and the latter forming only a khanda-rūti, i.e. a defective or incomplete type. Rājaśekhara in his Kāvyamī-māmsā gives us the same three Rūtis as Vāmana does, but in his Karpūra-mañjarī he appears to speak of three Rūtis, respectively named vacchomī (from Vatsagulma41), māalī (māgadhī) and pāncāli (pāncāli). The older Vāgbhaṭa mentions only two Rūtis, viz., pāncāli and lāṭīyā, the one having some compound words and the other having none: but the younger Vāgbhaṭa accepts the three Rūtis of Vāmana and classifies them on the basis of the three excellences, mādhura, ojas and prasāda, which were the only three Guṇas recognised since Mammaṭa’s time. The Dhvanikāra does not discuss this question, but Ānandavardhana appears to assign equal functional value to the three vṛttis of Udbhaṭa and the three rūtis of Vāmana, a view which Mammaṭa enunciates thus:

etās tisro vṛttayo vāmanāvināṃ mate vaidarbhi-gaudī-pāncalīkhyā rītayo maṅgha.42

41 In Vidaṛbha; so this is really Vaidarbhi.
42 But a distinction has always been theoretically maintained
Abhinavagupta, however, thinks (p. 6) that the three Ritis of Vāmana, which, in his opinion, characterise an elevated, soft and middling theme respectively through a peculiar combination of the Guṇas, have, together with Udbhāta’s Vṛttis, no separate existence from Guṇas and Alāmkūras. Attention, therefore, was naturally directed to the Guṇas and Alāmkūras more than to the Riti itself, of which they formed, in Vāmana’s opinion, the constituent elements; and the Riti, if recognised at all, was recognised as consisting in a particular disposition of words, letters or syllables which favours the development of Rasa, and stands in the same relation to it as (in the usual figurative conceit) the conformation of the ‘body’ to the ‘soul’ (padu-samghatana

between the vṛtti and the riti. The Vṛttis, originally styles of dramatic composition (Bharata iii 25), have been included by Udbhāta (i. 4 f) under anuprāṣa or alliteration, as they are formed by a special arrangement of letters for conveying different ideas, suitable (Abhinavagupta adds, *Locana* pp 5-6) to different Rasas. Ruyyaka. therefore, says: vṛtti tu rasa-visayo vāpārah, taddhi punar varṇa-racaneha vṛttiḥ, pp. 20-21. The Riti, on the other hand, is mostly a matter of objective adjustment of the different ‘excellences’ of a composition, although admitting artha as an element of consideration; while the Vṛtti concerns itself with the psychological effect produced by the arrangement, as well as by the sense of which that arrangement is a vehicle. One and the same Riti may conceivably produce different Vṛttis, and the same Vṛtti may be produced in different Ritis, although a fondness for symmetry led the theorists to assign a distinct Vṛtti to each Riti. Ānandavardhana expressly distinguishes between the dramatic Vṛtti and the poetical Vṛtti by saying that the former is dependent upon the sense, the latter upon the expression: vācyāraṇa vo vyayāhāraś tā etāḥ kauśikādhyaḥ vṛttah, vācakāraṇaḥ copanūgarikādhyaḥ. They enhance the beauty of drama and poetry respectively by being used according to the drift of the Rasa in the composition: vṛttāya hi rasādi-tātparyena samnivisīyah kām api nātyasya kāvyasya ca cāchāyām āvahanti p. 182. Rājasekhara (*Kav. nim.* p. 9) sums up the differences wittily and concisely, if not accurately: ināra veṣa-vinyasa-kramah pravṛttiḥ, vilāsa-vinyāsa-kramo vṛttiḥ, vacana-vinyāsa-kramo ritiḥ. On the concept of Vṛtti generally see V. Raghavan, *Some Concepts* p. 182-93; *Śrāgāra-pr.* pp. 196-215.
It follows from this that the respective functions assigned to Guṇa and Alamkāra are not in relation to the Rīti but to Rasa, which is one of the fundamental elements of poetry with the later schools. We have already noted that, after Ānandavardhana, the Guṇas are taken as inseparable attributes and causes of excellence (aṅgino rasasya utkarṣa-hetavah acala-sthitavo guṇāḥ, Mammaṭa viii. 1) of the Rasa or the principal poetic mood in the composition (and not, as Vāmana thinks, of the Rīti). The poetic figures, on the other hand, are only attributes of śabda and artha43, which constitute the 'body' of poetry, and therefore heighten the poetic mood or Rasa in an indirect way (ibid, viii. 2). Vāmana's ideas about 'poetic charm' are also taken as axiomatic, but they appear in later theories in a somewhat different form as the vicchitti, or vaicitrya, or kavi-praudhokti underlying all figurative expression.

In spite of these and other important contributions to the general theory of Poetics, it is obvious that the fundamental doctrine of the Rīti school could not have been accepted in its entirety. Nor could it have competed against that of the Dhvanikāra, because Vāmana comprehended poetry only from the formal point of view, whereas the former showed a deeper insight into its inner nature. The more or less objective definition of the Rīti, given by this school, was hardly enough to satisfy the search for ultimate principles. Viśvanātha, following the Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhana in this respect, states this objection when he says that the Rīti is a particular kind of formal arrangement, a peculiar disposition or posture of parts; what is called the 'soul' or

43 Mammaṭa, we shall see, takes the Guṇa as directly related to the Rasa as the aṅgin, and if we sometimes speak of them as belonging to śabda and artha, we do so only figuratively (upacāreṇa); but Jagannātha (pp. 33-35), going back to Vāmana's old position, combats this view and thinks that this usage is not figurative.
essence of poetry is something quite different. Again, the analysis of the several types of diction shows considerable ingenuity indeed, but it was found almost impossible, as Dāṇḍin himself admitted very early (1. 101-2), to label and classify all the modes of poetic expression with definite and unalterable characteristics. As the Rīti school, therefore, tended to make invidious and essentially unprofitable (except as empirical facts) distinctions between the Vaiḍarbha, Gauḍī and other kinds of diction with regard to whose exact significance there was bound to be inevitable difference of opinion, it naturally provoked criticism and opposition. In the same way, the endeavour to exhaust and classify all the literary excellences and flaws within clear-cut bounds on the basis of more or less formal analysis, was sure to prove unconvincing; and a protest against minute differentiation or endless multiplication of the Guṇas was rightly and definitely propounded by Mammaṭā who (following Ānandavardhana, pp. 79 f) reduced the number to three only, viz. mādhurya, ojas and prasāda, in relation to the ultimate factor of the poetic sentiment. The attempt, therefore, to stereotype the entire poetical output into so many ready-made dictons and fixed excellences, was bound ultimately to be discarded in favour of other and more penetrating principles. We shall see in the next few chapters that such a principle in poetry came to be recognised in the suggested element of Rasa, which was being already elaborated in the service of the drama and which was utilised by the Dhvani-theorists as one of the most important aesthetic foundations of poetry.

44 yat tu vāmanenoktam—ritir ātmā kāvyasya iti, tan na, riteh saṅghaṭanā-viṣeṣatvāt, saṃghaṭanāyūṣ cāvayava-saṃsthāna-rūpatvāt, ātmanaḥ ca taddhunaratvāt, p. 18 ed. Durgaprasāda, 1915. (It will be noticed that Viśvanātha here speaks of Rīti as a kind of saṃghaṭanā).
CHAPTER IV

LOLLATA AND OTHERS

(The Rasa System)

(1)

While the orthodox schools of Poetics were elaborating systems of Alamkāra and Riti, there flourished several writers who discussed the question of the dramatic Rasa after Bharata, and formulated explanations of the latter's much discussed sūtra on the subject. Their exposition, however, concerned the dramatic art, and their theories did not as yet come properly within the sphere of Poetics, which was entirely dominated by the Alamkāra- and Riti-systems. The aesthetic importance of the Rasa, therefore, was never realised, as we shall see, until it was taken up and worked into Poetics by the Dhvanikāra and his followers. The dramaturgic Rasa school, however, had in the meantime elaborated several theories of Rasa and brought it into prominence as an element of the drama; and in this way it succeeded, to a certain extent, in reacting upon and influencing the orthodox theories of Poetics, which appear to have possessed, even at an early period a limited acquaintance with Rasa, and which actually accord it a place, however small, in their general systems of Alamkāra or Riti.

This will be obvious from a reference to the views of Bhāmaha and Dādīn on this subject. To Bhāmaha, the most important element in poetry is alamkāra or vakrokti. He does not seem to possess any clear notion of the function of Rasa in poetry, the only direct reference to it occurring in the definition of the figure rasavat which, in his opinion, must manifest the Rasas clearly (rusavad darśita-spaṣṭa-śṛṅgārādi-)

1 See above p. 20. The Sūtra runs thus. vibhāvūnubhāva-vya-vhicūri-saṃyogād rasamitṝpatiḥ.
rasam, iii. 6). The Rasa is thus included in the scope of a particular figure only and given a very subordinate place in his system. Bhāmaha seems to have been aware of the existence of the śṛṅgāra and other dramatic Rasas; but the speculations regarding the origin and function of Rasa do not appear to have started in his time; and, in common with Daṇḍin, he never thought it necessary to use the technical terms vibhāva, anubhāva etc., so familiar to later writers on this subject. In Bhāmaha’s opinion, the Rasa need not be invariably present in poetry, but it may sometimes be delineated in some poetic figure. In i. 21, no doubt, Bhāmaha lays down that a Mahākāvyya must separately depict all the Rasas; and in v. 3 he speaks of the kāvya-rasa as mitigating the rigour of the Śāstras, a sentiment which is endorsed by Rudra (xii. 1-2) and which probably inspired the dictum of Abhinavagupta that the Śāstra is prabhū-sammita, while the Kāvya is jāyā-sammita. The term kāvya-rasa is used here probably to indicate ‘the flavour of poetry’ in an untechnical sense; but even if we read, with Abhinavagupta (‘Locana p. 182), a technical meaning into it, it only shews that the earlier authors were content with assigning a pleasing but extraneous function to Rasa in poetry, although all the Rasas may be developed in the drama (i. 21).

2 Commenting of Bhāmaha’s central verse on vakrokti (ii. 85), saṣā sarvātvā vakroktir anayārtho vibhāvyate, Abhinavagupta attempts to read into it his own idea of the importance of Rasa and interprets vibhāvyate technically as pramadodyānat vibhāvatāṁ niyate, viṣeyata ca bhāvyate, rasamayikājata iti. He apparently makes Bhāmaha mean that by vakrokti, the sense of poetry is rendered into a suitable factor of Rasa, so that by using the word vibhāvyate with the technical meaning given to it Bhāmaha would imply that the Rasa as well as Alamkāra originates in vakrokti.

3 Such a distinction appears to be implied also in Daṇḍin ii. 292; and one can differentiate two meanings of rasa (see below): (1) kāvya-rasa, the flavour of poetry or the aesthetic delight produced by it, and (2) rasa in the technical sense of nātya-rasa. It is worthy of note that in the latter sense it is very rarely used in earlier classical poetry (except
The same remarks with regard to the recognition of Rasa apply more or less to Daṇḍin; but Daṇḍin seems to have been more alive to its importance than Bhāmaha. Like Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin allows the Rasas to be included in figures like rasavat, which appear to have been the only means by which they could permit the Rasa to play any role in their systems. It may be contended that Daṇḍin gives prominence to Rasa by including it in one of the essential excellences (Guṇas) of the diction (Ritu), viz., in mādhurya, which is defined as the establishment of Rasa in the word and in the object (vāc vastuv api rasa-sthithā, i. 51); but from ii. 292 it appears that Daṇḍin means by the term Rasa in the mādhurya-guṇa to connote absence of vulgarity (agrāmyaṭava)\(^5\), and does not contemplate the inclusion of Rasa in the technical sense\(^6\). The mādhurya-guṇa, according to Daṇḍin (i. 51 7), may appear in two different aspects, in so far as it creates vāg-rasa and vastu-rasa, the former consisting of repetition of similar sounds (stutyanuprasya)\(^7\) and the latter connoting absence of perhaps in Maghā. This kānte-rasa in its essence is not very different from Bhāmaha’s vākroktā, for it is possibly a kind of heightened expression incumbent with commonplace utterance. The word rasa must be taken in this untechnical sense when one meets with it in early classics and in such expressions as rasavat or rasā, aha in Daṇḍin.

4 Jacobin ZDMG lvi, 1892, p. 401 fn

5 Strictly speaking, grāmya is not ‘vulgar’ in its usual restricted sense, although Daṇḍin seems to bring under its connotation the asilā or the indecent. It means ‘the low’, ‘the rustic’, or ‘the common’, as opposed to the noble or the refined, and probably corresponds to the French word vulgaire.

6 This is made clear by the Hṛdayāngama commentary on this point: mādhurya-guṇa pradarśaḥ sabdarśhayor a-grāmyatayā yāto rato vākṣatyā bhavati. alamkāratya nirūṣṭān rasavatram aṣṭaraśāyaṃ (p. 167), the last part of the passage calling attention to the fact that the only cases where the eight (dramatic) rasas are admitted by Daṇḍin occur in connexion with his inclusion of the rasas in figures like rasavat. In i. 64 Daṇḍin speaks of agrāmya artha as rasāvaha.

7 See above p. 80, fn 11. Daṇḍin speaks of anuprāsa as rasāvaho in this sense in the same context (i. 52).
vulgarity (agrāmyatva). Thus, Hemacandra explains (p. 198) the Rasa in Daṇḍin’s mādhurya, according as it resides in the vāk or vastu in this way: śruti-vāṇāṇuprāśābhyaṁ vāgrasah....... agrāmyābhidheyatayā tu vastu-rasaḥ. Thus, the Rasa in Daṇḍin’s mādhurya has a distinct connotation which separates it from the technical dramatic Rasa of the Rasa school.

At the same time it cannot be affirmed that Daṇḍin was entirely ignorant of the concept of Rasa as elaborated by Bharata and his followers. He declares (i. 18) that a Mahākāvya should invariably depict rasa and bhāva; so does Bhāmaha (i. 21). His treatment of the figures rasavat, preyas and ārjasvin (ii. 280-87) gives a much clearer indication of his undoubted acquaintance with the eight recognised Rasas, all of which he enumerates by their respective names, and four of which (viz. śṛṅgāra, raudra, vīra and karuna) he illustrates as elements of the poetic figures under discussion. If we are to accept Abhinavagupt’s statement,

8 With this explanation Māṇikyaśandra agrees: śruti-vāṇāṇuprāśābhyaṁ vāgrasah, agrāmyatayā tu vastu-rasaḥ, ittham rasa dvedhā (p 189, ed. Ānandāśrama).

9 A similar untechnical use of the term rasa (which, however, Daṇḍin does not explain, as he does in this case) is to be found in in. 149 (or iv. 26, Madras ed.) where the phrase girāni rasah (=vāgrasah) is interpreted by Tarunavacāspati merely as sādhvatvam. The modern commentators, misled, no doubt, by their own idea of the importance of Rasa, read into Daṇḍin their own ideas on the subject. Daṇḍin nowhere speaks of the suggestion of Rasa (rasa-dhvani) as the ‘soul’ of poetry, but Premacandra, commenting on i. 10, reads this into Daṇḍin. The artha-rasa in i. 62 seems also to have a distinct reference to agrāmyatā.

10 On Bharata vi, partially reproduced by Hemacandra p. 571. The text of Abhinava’s valuable commentary on Bharata’s rasa-sūtra, so far as it is relevant to the theories on Rasa discussed below, has been published as an appendix to S. K. De, Theory of Rasa in Sir Asutosh Mookerjee Silver Jubilee Commemoration Volume (Orientalia, vol. iii 1922). It is cited below as “Abh. on Bh.,” with references to the pages of the article, which has been largely utilised in this chapter. It is reprinted in S. K. De, Some Problems, pp. 219-35.
Danḍin’s conception of Rasa is similar to that of Bhaṭṭa Lollāṭa (which we shall deal with presently), and he believes therefore in the development of Rasa as an effect from the vibhāvas and anubhāvas. Danḍin’s somewhat meagre treatment hardly justifies us in making a definite assumption on this point, but we may assume that Danḍin apparently speaks of Rasas like śṛṅgāra or raudra being developed as effects from such permanent moods as rati or krodha. For, speaking of the figure rasavat which should possess the characteristic of manifesting the Rasas, he gives an example of the manifestation of śṛṅgāra in such a figure with the remark: ratiḥ śṛṅgāratām gataḥ / rūpa-bāhula-yogena (κ. 281). Similarly, with reference to the development of raudra from krodha, he says: ity āruhya parāṃ koṭim krodho raudrātmatām gataḥ (κ. 283). But the Rasa in these figures is subordinate to the expressed figure itself of which it serves as a means of embellishment (alaṃkāratayā smṛtā); in other words, the Rasa is developed not for its own sake but as increasing the beauty of expression. It would seem, therefore, that Danḍin was, to some extent, cognisant of rasa and bhāva, but he could not give it a place in his system except as an embellishment of the language or of the sense; and this objective view of the function of Rasa, if we may presume it in these early authors, was apparently responsible for this subordinate position given to it by the Alamkāra and Rīti systems.

Although Vāmana improves upon Danḍin’s system in other respects, he does not seem to have gone further in the treatment of Rasa. His idea of making all poetic figures an aspect of metaphorical expression precludes him from defining the figure rasavat, but he attempts to include Rasa in one of the essential (nitya) characteristics of poetry, viz., in the artha-guna kānti, which he defines as an ‘excellence of sense’ in which the Rasas should be conspicuously present (dipta-rasavat kāntiḥ, iii, 2. 15). The suggestion for this inclusion of the Rasas
in one of the excellences was probably found in Bharata's definition of the kānti-guna, or more directly in Bharata's peculiar definition of the udara-guna, but it is clear that this certainly marks an advance upon the treatment of Daṇḍin and Bhamaha, who include the Rasa in some of the non-essential figures.

Udbhata adheres in the main to the views of Bhamaha and deals with Rasa as an element of the some of the figures like rasavat. One verse, however, which occurs in the text of Udbhata published by Jacob in JRAS, 1897, p. 847:

\[
\text{rasāḍyadhiṣṭhitam kāvyam ṭvad-rupanāya yatath/ kathyate tad rasādīnāṁ kavāṭmatvam vyavasthitam/}
\]

apparently designates Rasa as the essence or 'soul' of poetry, without, however, setting up an aesthetic system on its basis. But the verse is quite out of place in the context in which it occurs\(^\text{11}\), and in the text published by the Nirnay Sagar Press, it is wanting, although given as a quotation (with a tad āhuh) in the accompanying commentary of Pratihārendurāja (p. 77). Misled by Jacob's text, Jacobi supposes\(^\text{12}\) that Udbhata was the first writer to consider the question as to what constitutes the soul of poetry and to regard Rasa as such. It is clear, however, that the verse in question is not Udbhata's, and cannot be reconciled either with its immediate context or with Udbhata's general standpoint, as well as with his definition of rasavat. It cannot be denied at the same time that Udbhata betray an acquaintance with some theory of

11 This verse (vi. 17) occurs after the figure kāvya-liṅga (vi. 16), after the definition of which one should expect its illustration, which is given in the verse vi. 18 next after the verse in question. If Jacob's text is accepted, then the verse rasāḍyadhiṣṭhitam (vi. 17) would be abruptly thrust in between the definition of kāvya-liṅga and its illustration. As a matter of fact, it occurs in Pratihārendurāja's commentary on kāvya-liṅga and is erroneously incorporated in Udbhata's text by the editor.

12 ZDMG, 1902, p. 396.
Rasa and its technicalities using, as he does, terms like vibhāva sthāyin, sañcārin (iv. 4) and anubhāva (iv. 2), and enumerating, after Bharata, the eight orthodox nāṭya-rasas with the addition of a ninth Rasa (viz. śānta) in the category. But Udbhāta takes all this into account as an embellishment of an expressed figure like rasavat\textsuperscript{13}; the Rasa is not considered on its own account, but because it helps to emphasise or constitute the charm of a particular figure. Hence Pratihārendurāja remarks that the question as to the nature of Rasa and Bhāva, and as to how far they may stand as the very ‘soul’ of poetry is not discussed by Udbhāta at all, partly for fear of prolixity and partly because it is irrelevant\textsuperscript{14}.

Rudraṭa, on the other hand, seems to be the earliest writer who explicitly includes Rasa in his treatment of Poetics, and devotes four chapters to its discussion. At the beginning of his work, he praises the poets who have won eternal fame by composing Kāvyas enlivened by Rasa. In ch. xii he speaks of ten Rasas (adding preyas and śānta to the orthodox eight of Bharata)\textsuperscript{15}, describing śṛṅgāra (love) and the charac-

\textsuperscript{13} Udbhāta’s definitions of rasavat etc. differ from those of Bhāmaha and Dandin, and he admits a new figure, namely, samāhita. In his view, preyas consists of development of emotions like love to the extent of a Bhāva and not Rasa, rasavat occurs when Rasas are fully developed through sva-sāhda, sthāyin, sañcārin, vibhāva and anubhāva; ārjasvi is development of improper or incongruous (an-aucitya-pravīta) Rasa or Bhāva, which would correspond to Rasābhāsa of later writers; samāhita = calming down of Rasa, Bhāva or their Ābhāsa.

\textsuperscript{14} Udbhāta might have been one of the commentators on Bharata, and was probably conversant with Bharata’s text, as his citation of a half-line (iv. 5, though it is doubtful if this is at all a kārikā-verse of Udbhāta’s) from Bharata vi. 15 and use of technical terms like vibhāva etc. would indicate. But it does not prove that Udbhāta belonged to the school of Bharata. On the other hand, Udbhāta in his theoretical standpoint was undoubtedly a follower of Bhāmaha.

\textsuperscript{15} If Udbhāta iv. 5 is a kārikā-verse (and not wrongly incorporated into the text from Pratihārendurāja’s commentary), then Udbhāta was
teristics of the hero and heroine in that connexion. The next two chapters take up the two kinds of śṛṅgāra (sambhoga and vipralambha)—love in union and in separation) and questions cognate to each. This treatment is rounded off by a short chapter describing the nature and character of the diction (ṛiti) suitable to each. It is not clear, however, as to what significance Rudraṭa attaches to Rasa as an element of poetry, for he is entirely silent with regard to the theoretical aspect of the question. Out of the sixteen chapters into which his work is divided, only four chapters deal with Rasa not theoretically but descriptively, while the rest of his work is taken up with the details of the poetic figures on which obviously he puts greater emphasis. Speaking of the necessity of making a poem sarasa from the standpoint of the reader, he says (xii. 1) that to those, who enjoy Rasa but fight shy of Śāstra, instruction in the caturvarga is easier to impart through the medium of delectable writing; and this is the chief motive, in his opinion, for inspiring the sense of poetry with Rasa. Rudraṭa starts with śabda and artha as the two constituents of poetry, and elaborates his views about poetic figures as embellishment of these elements; but he does not discuss how the Rasa comes into his system, a fact which may lead one to suspect that these chapters on Rasa were probably later engraftment extraneous the first writer to admit śānta as a category of eight Rasas. The preyas Rasa of Rudraṭa is probably suggested by the poetic figure preyas admitted by Bhāmaha, Dandin and Udbhata. Rudraṭa appears to allude (as Nami-sādhu rightly comments) to Bharata by the term āśā in xii. 4.

16 Rudraṭa defines Ṛiti, as we have already seen, in reference to the employment of compound words. He recommends the Vaiḍarbhī and Pāṇcāli Ṛittis in the cases of the four Rasas, preyas, karuna, bhayānaka and adbhuta, and the Lātiya and Gaudīvā in the case of raudra, there being apparently no fixed rule with regard to the remaining Rasas. He uses the term avicitra in this context, which anticipates the theory of Aucitya first elaborated by Ānandavardhana in connexion with the delineation of Rasa.
to, if not inconsistent with, his general standpoint. Rudraṭa, in his theoretical tendencies, has no affinity with the Rasa school, but belongs to the Alamkāra school, a fact which would distinguish him from Rudrabhaṭṭa, the keynote of whose system is to be found in the idea of Rasa. We have to this effect the testimony of Ruyyaka and Jayaratha. Ruyyaka says\textsuperscript{17} that Rudraṭa laid special stress on ālamkāra, in which were comprised the three kinds of suggestion (dṛṇi), including the suggestion of Rasa, and that in figures like rasaśvata, the rasa and bhāva implied are taken as elements which heighten the charm of the expressed idea\textsuperscript{18}.

The older writers on Poetics, therefore, before the advent of the Dvani-theorists, content themselves with the working out of the outward form of expression, the ‘body’ of poetry, and hardly trouble themselves with the question of an ulterior aesthetic principle, the ‘soul’ of poetry; nor do they identify, as some later writers do, this ‘soul’ with the psychological factor known as Rasa. Vāmana, no doubt, starts the question and offers to solve it by declaring that the diction or Riti is this ‘soul’; but we have seen that in Vāmana’s view, the Riti is not the expression of poetic individuality but the objective beauty of representation called forth by a definite adjustment of certain fixed literary excellences. The older writers, therefore, put the greatest emphasis on the ālamkāra (or poetic figure), or on the riti (or diction in the objective sense), the advantages of which were considered sufficient for poetry;

\textsuperscript{17} ed. Kāvyamālā p. 5. Samudrabandha agrees with this view.

\textsuperscript{18} Nami-sādhu, explaining Rudraṭa xii. 2, states that in the opinion of his author, śabda and artha constitute the ‘body’ of poetry, the poetic figures take the place of artificial ornaments, while Rasa resembles natural qualities like prowess and beauty (rasās tu saundaryādaya iva sahajā gunāḥ). But there is nothing in Rudraṭa which will support this description of his standpoint, especially as Rudraṭa can scarcely be supposed to look upon poetic figures, which are of great importance in his view of poetry, as mere artificial embellishments of poetry. See above pp. 59-60, 61.
and, cognisant as they were of that aesthetic delectableness which must be present in all poetry and which in Sanskrit goes by the name of *rasa*, they could not harmonise it well with their theory of externals and treated it more or less as an embellishment of the language by including it in poetic figures or by allowing it to form an element of one of the excellences of diction. This was the only way in which they could recognise *Rasa*. It is partly for this reason that the Dhvanikāra (iii. 52) condemns earlier theories as crude and insufficient for the purpose of explaining the nature of poetry, and expounds his own system in which the suggestion of *Rasa* (*rasa-dhīvānmi*) plays such an important part.

(2)

The reason why *Rasa* was, even thus perfunctorily, admitted into the older systems appears to have been the fact that Bharata’s treatment of *Rasa* in the drama had already established itself, having been further elaborated by a number of commentators and writers on the subject, and it naturally influenced, to a limited extent, the enquiry of early thinkers. We have already noted that Bharata’s famous *sūtra* on *Rasa*19 by its ambiguity taxed the ingenuity of his followers and led to a great deal of controversy regarding its true interpretation; and as each writer tried to explain it in his own way, it gave rise to a number of theories on *Rasa*. There are four such theories associated with the names of Lollaṭa, Śaṅkuka Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and Abhinavagupta; but Jagannātha (*Rasa-gaṅgādhara* p. 28) speaks of eight different interpretations.

Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa appears to have been one of the earliest formulatores of such an explanation. His work is unfortunately lost, and very little can be gathered from the brief review

19 Viz. *vibhāvanubhāva-vyabhicārī-samyogādd rasā-nispattih* (see above p. 20), the different theories starting with the different explanations given of the terms *samyoga* and *nispatti*. Besides the vagueness of these two terms, it is noteworthy that term *sthāya* or *sthāyi-bhāva* does not occur in this dictum.
of his opinion in Abhinavagupta’s commentary on Bharata, which is copied more or less by all subsequent writers who deal with Lollaṭa’s views. But it is clear even from this summary exposition by an adverse critic that Lollaṭa, in explaining Bharata’s sūtra, took the vibhāva as the direct cause (kāraṇa) of Rasa, which therefore is an effect (anukārya or utpādyya), and the term nispatti of Bharata should be explained as utpatti or puṣṭi. The Rasa, found in characters like Rāma, is attributed to the actor, who imitates the characters in form, dress and action, and thereby charms the spectator. Mammaṭa and his followers make this interpretation of Lollaṭa’s view more clear by saying that the permanent mood or sthāyin is directly connected (mukhyatayā vr̥tyā = sākṣāt sambandhenā) with the hero like Rāma, but it is recognised as existing in the actor through a clever imitation of the original character, this imitation being apparently the source of the charm to the spectator. The Rasa, therefore, resides in the hero; but the objection is that it is not clear how a mental state which belongs to the hero can be transferred to the actor, and how the spectator can be charmed by a feeling which does not exist in him. The spectator’s mere apprehension of the feeling imitated by the actor cannot produce even a semblance of the original feeling and consequent delight in the mind of the spectator; otherwise such a delight would be brought about even on witnessing a love-affair in the ordinary world, as distinguished from the world of poetry.

20 Abhinava’s review of the opinions of Lollaṭa, Śaṅkuka and Bhaṭṭa Nāṭaka, which is followed by Mammaṭa and all later writers, is extensively reproduced by Hemacandra (pp. 57-66) and Māṇikya-candra (pp. 40f, ed. Ānandaśrama). This portion of Abhinava’s commentary will be found in the article already mentioned above on the Theory of Rasa (reprinted in S. K. D2, Some Problems of Sanskrit Poetics, Calcutta 1959). Detailed references, therefore, are not as a rule given here.

21 See for instance, Mammaṭa ch. iv, Hemacandra p. 57, Mallinātha on Vidyādharma p. 85, Govinda on Mammaṭa p. 63 etc.

22 Govinda criticises Lollaṭa’s view thus: tād aṣṭa-lam, sāmājīkeṣu
also argued that this cause-and-effect theory of Lollāṭa cannot satisfactorily explain the relation of the vibhāvas etc. to the Rasa. An effect may exist even when its efficient cause is destroyed; but as the life of the Rasa is circumscribed by the exhibition of the vibhāvas, it disappears when the latter disappear, a fact which goes to prove that the Rasa must not be taken as an ordinary laukika effect. Again, the cause and the effect cannot be contemporaneous; if the Rasa is supposed to be an effect, its relish cannot be, as it actually is, contemporaneous with the appearance of the vibhāvas. Hence Viśvanātha remarks (p. 86) that if the Rasa is an effect, having for its cause the perception of the vibhāvas, then at the time of the relish of Rasa the vibhāvas would not be perceived; for we do not find the simultaneous perception of a cause and its effect. The perception of the touch of the sandalwood unguent and the perception of the pleasure produced thereby cannot take place simultaneously. However rapidly the one may succeed the other.

Śaṅkuka, the next important writer on this subject mentioned by Abhinavagupta and others, therefore rejects this interpretation of the utpatti-vādins, who are said to follow, in their peculiar theory, the Mīmāṃsā school of philosophers. Lollāṭa’s view does not deal with Rasa as a matter of the spectator’s feeling. Śaṅkuka, on the other hand, thinks that the Rasa is not produced as an effect, but inferred by the spectator, and the inferred feeling is relished by him as Rasa. The permanent mood of the hero is inferred to exist in the actor (though not actually existing in him) by means of the vibhāvas etc., cleverly exhibited by him in acting, so as to produce an illusion of identity with the

tadabhāve tatra camāktārāñubhava-virodhāt, na ca tajjñānam eva camāktāra-hetuh, laukika-śrīgārādi-darśanenaḥpi camāktāra-prasāṅgāt

23 Govinda p. 69, Mallinātha pp. 87, 93-4.
24 The reference to Śaṅkuka’s views is to be found in Mammaṭa and others, as cited above in fn 21.
feelings of the hero; and the mood thus inferred, being sensed by the spectator through its exquisite beauty, adds to itself a peculiar charm, and thus develops into a relishable condition of his own mind which is called Rasa. The realisation of Rasa, therefore, is a process of logical inference, and the nispatti of Bharata’s sūtra is explained as anumiti, the vibhāvas standing to Rasa in the relation of anumāpaka or gamaka to anumāpya or gamya. But the mood itself, though inferred in this way from the relation of logical major and middle terms, is yet cognised as different from the objects of ordinary inference, being inferred, as it were, by force of its connexion with the vibhāvas, which factors, though artificial in themselves, are not then recognised as such. This cognition or knowledge is characterised as being based on what is called citra-turaga-nyāya (or the analogy by which a horse in a picture is called a horse), and should be differentiated from the true (‘he is Rāma’), the false (‘he is Rāma’ with a following negation ‘he is not Rāma’), the doubtful (‘he may or may not be Rāma’) knowledge, as well as from the knowledge of similarity (‘he is like Rāma’). The theory, however, has been discredited by later schools on the ground (as Govinda concisely puts it) that it disregards the well-recognised fact that the inference of a thing can never produce the same charm as direct cognition. It has also been pointed

25 rāmādyahhedah-bhāvitena nati tat-prakāśitair eva vibhāvādibhir anumitah, Mallinātha p. 85.

26 vastu-saundarya-balād rasanīyatvena sthāyinām anyānumeyavailaksanāyāt Govinda p. 65, practically paraphrasing Mammaṭa.

27 As interpreted by Mammaṭa as well as Abhinava p. 241. Hemacandra expanding the exposition of Abhinavaputra and Mammaṭa puts it in this way: na cātra nartaka eva sukhīti pratipatiḥ, nāpyayam eva rāma iti, na cāpyayam na sukhīti, nāpi rāmaḥ syād vā na vāyam iti, na cāpi tat-sadṛśam iti, kim tu samyaḥ-mithyā-saṃśaya-sadṛśya-pratītiḥyo vilaksanā citra-turagādi-nyāyenā yaḥ sukhī rāma asāyam iti pratītiḥ asti (p. 59).

28 pratyakṣam eva jñānam sa-camatkāram nānumityādir iti loka-prasiddhim āvadhūyānayathā-kalpane mānābhāvah, p. 65.
out that the Rasa is not capable of being cognised by the ordinary means of arriving at knowledge, for the feeling of a hero like Rāma, being past, cannot be cognised directly by the organs of sense belonging to the present. The anumāṇa-theory is criticised elaborately in connexion with the theory of 'suggestion', coming topically within the province of the suggestion of Rasa (rasa-dhvanī). We shall have occasion to deal with this aspect of the theory in its proper place; but the general argument with which it is sought to be discarded is that the vibhāvas cannot be taken as the middle term in proving the sthāyin, because the former do not stand in the same relation to the latter as the middle term (sādhana) does to the major term (sādhyā), but are simply its suggestors (vyānjaka).

The vibhāvas, therefore, do not constitute either the efficient cause (kāraka-hetu) or the logical cause (jñāpaka-hetu) of Rasa, as held respectively by Lollaṭa and Śaṅkuka. Apart from technicalities, Lollaṭa’s view appears to be that the spectator ascribes to the well-trained actor the same mental state as belonged to the hero, and his apprehension of this imparted feeling produces a similar feeling in his mind, causing delight. Śaṅkuka thinks that the well-trained actor so cleverly simulates the action of the hero that the spectator apprehends the actor to be identical with the hero, and infers from this illusion the actual feeling of the hero in his own mind, being moved by the extraordinary beauty of the represented action. In both these theories, however, the difficulty remains, viz. that if Rasa is an objective entity, produced or inferred, how can it bring about a subjective feeling of relish in the audience in whom these factors (vibhāvas etc.) are presumably absent? If, on the other hand, it is supposed that the Rasa exists in the audience also, the question still remains as to how the particular feeling of a particular hero (like Rāma, who is different from or superior

29 Vidyādharā p. 94.
to the spectator himself) can be relished or realised as his own by the spectator? These objections are thus ably set forth by Bhāṣṭa Nāyaka\(^{20}\), as interpreted by Abhinavagupta in his \(^{1}\)Locana (pp. 67-8): “If the rasa is perceived as belonging to another person, then it is a case of tāṭasthya i.e. one would not himself be personally affected by it. It is also not perceived as belonging to oneself out of poetry dealing with the deeds of heroes like Rāma. If it is perceived as belonging to oneself, then origin of rasa in self is admitted. But this is not reasonable, for there is nothing there which can operate as a vibhāva for the audience. If it is objected that the generalised idea of the beloved (kāntātva), which lies dormant and awakens in us germs of latent impressions, operates in the capacity of a vibhāva, then how can it be applied to the description of a deity and the like? The recollection of one’s own beloved does not intervene in one’s consciousness. How can vibhāvas, like the construction of a bridge over the sea, which form the attributes of an extraordinary hero like Rāma, become generalised (in the mind of an individual spectator)? One does not recollect only Rāma’s energy, because it has no resemblance (to one’s own energy). The rasa is not perceived when one learns it from a verbal composition, because a man would learn it in the same way from the direct observation of a pair of lovers. If it is assumed that rasa is produced, then a man would feel disinclined to tragedy, inasmuch as he finds only pain following upon the production of the pathetic mood (karuṇa) \(^{31}\).

30 Another objector to Śaṅkuka’s view appears to be Bhāṣṭa Tauta, whose opinions are summarised by Abhinava (who refers to him simply as asmac-upāśhyāya) in a passage which is substantially reproduced by Hemacandra at p. 59 under Bhāṣṭa Tauta’s name. See also Māṅkikya-candra p. 43 who draws also upon Abhinava’s exposition of Tauta’s view.

31 ‘Raso yadi para-gatatayā pariṣyate, tarhi tāṭasthyam eva syat. Na ca sva-gatatvena rāmādi-caritamayāt kāvyād asau pariṣyate. Svātmā-
Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, therefore, attempts to refute these earlier theories and set up a peculiar doctrine of aesthetic enjoyment (bhoga) which makes the relish of Rasa possible. He argues (as interpreted by Mammaṭa and others) that (i) Rasa cannot be produced as an effect, because the causes (namely, the vibhāvas), being non-realities, cannot bring about a real effect; (ii) it cannot be inferred, because the real character (e.g. Rāma), not being before the audience, his feeling does not exist, and what does not exist cannot be inferred (na tattvato rāmasya smṛtih, anupalabdhatvāt). Nor is it a case of revelation (abhivyakti) of something potentially existing (sakti-rūpa); for in that case, the potential emotions, once awakened, would occupy their field of action in diverse degrees, thus contradicting the nature of Rasa as one. Moreover, there would be the same difficulty as to whether the Rasa is revealed in oneself or in another person. To solve these and other difficulties, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka (as interpreted by Abhinavagupta) maintains that Rasa is enjoyed in connexion with the vibhāvas through the relation of the enjoyer (bhojaka) and the enjoyed (bhojya). This school postulates three different functions of a word, namely, abhidhā (already admitted by the Mīmāṃsakas and grammarians), bhāvakatva and bhojakatva, and thus ascribes to a poem threefold potency of its own, namely, the powers


32 Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's views are set forth and criticised by Abb. on Bh. p. 244, Locana p. 68, Mammaṭa ch. iv, Hemacandra pp. 61 f Govinda p. 66.
of denotation, of generalisation and of enjoyment.\textsuperscript{33} The ablādhā is not merely the actual Denotation of a word, but is given an extended meaning so as to include lakṣaṇā or Indication in its scope (ablādhā lakṣaṇāiva),\textsuperscript{34} thus embracing the two functions already analysed by previous speculation. It is meant probably that the Denotation (as postulated by Bhāṭṭa Nāyaka) also gives to the expressed sense a metaphorical significance as the basis of Rasa. The bhāvalatva (or rasa-bhāvanā), which, as Abhinavagupta suggests, is apparently derived from Bharata's general definition of bhāva, is described as the power of generalisation which makes the vibhāvas as well as the sthāyi-bhāva, sensed in their general character without any reference to their specific properties. The vibhāva, Sītā, for instance, is understood through this power not as a particular individual but in the general character of a woman, and the sthāyi-bhāva (here Rāma's love towards her) is taken as love in general without any reference to the agent or the object. In this way the audience can appropriate the vibhāvas, as well as the sthāyi-bhāva, as universal. After the Rasa is thus generalised, comes its enjoyment. By the third function of bhōjakatva, the sthāyin is enjoyed in this general form, accompanied by the vibhāvas, sensed also in a general form; and this enjoyment is described as a process of delectation similar to the enlightened, self-sufficient and blissful knowledge, arising (in the language of the Sāṃkhya philosophers, which is borrowed by these theorists) from the prominence

33 T. R. Cintamani would prefer the terms signification, idealisation and illumination.

34 T. R. Chintamani (JOR i, 1927, p. 275 fn) would read abhidhāvilakṣaṇāva. He thinks that having been a Mīmāṃsaka, Bhāṭṭa Nāyaka would not include Lakṣaṇā in Abhidhā. But K. P. Trivedi (Ekāvāli p. 425) reads as we do: abhidhā lakṣaṇāiva. V. Raghavan appears to agree (JOR vi, 1932, p. 211 fn) that Abhidhā is "here used not in its restricted sense of Sakti but in its larger and more general meaning, viz., the poet's expression as a whole."
of the attribute of goodness (sattva) in a man, and different from what is known as worldly happiness, being divested of personal relations or interests. It is differentiated from the two kinds of knowledge, anubhava and smarana; and consisting of the qualities of melting, pervading and expanding the mind, it is compared to the indescribable bliss of divine contemplation (brahmāsvāda-sacivāḥ). According to Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, therefore, Rasa consists in the sthāyi-bhāva or the permanent mood, experienced in a generalised form in poetry and drama through the powers of abhidhā and bhāvakatva, and enjoyed by a blissful process, known as bhoga, till it is raised to a state of pleasurable relish, which is not worldly (a-laukika) but disinterested and which is akin to the philosophic meditation of Brahma.

It will be noticed that these different theories about Rasa, though applied to drama and poetry, are yet generally tinged with the doctrines of the various schools of Indian philosophy. Lollaṭa, it is clear, is a Mīmāṃsaka who believes in the far-reaching function of the Denotation of a word and thinks that it is capable of expressing all other implied or suggested sense in the shape of the Rasa. Śaṅkuka, on the other hand, is a Naiyāyika or logician who would demonstrate the Rasa by means of syllogistic reasoning. He believes that the implied Rasa can be reached by the logical process of inference from the expressed sense, although he has to admit that the inferred mood is cognised differently from the objects of ordinary inference, being sensed by the spectator through the force of its exquisite charm. In Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka we mark a further development. In his theory there is not only a transition from what may be called the objective to the subjective view of Rasa, and an understanding that the whole phenomenon should be explained in terms of the spectator’s inward experience, but also the fact that Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka in his peculiar theory of aesthetic enjoyment (bhoga) is substantially following the teachings of the Sāmkhya philosophers.
We need not enter here into the details of Sāmkhya psychology or metaphysics, but we may indicate briefly the application of its main teachings to the conception of poetry and the artistic delight resulting from it. The purpose of evolution in Sāmkhya is the attainment of bhoga (experience of pleasure and pain) and apavarga (spiritual emancipation through right knowledge). The enjoyer of Rasa in poetry is like the knower of Brahma, but the aesthetic attitude is different from the philosophic. The aesthetic attitude is indeed one of samvit (or cit-svabhāvā), i.e., pure contemplation dissociated from all personal interests, and results in viśrānti or composure; but in the philosophical attitude there is complete detachment or aloofness from pleasure and pain and egoistic impulses, for the knower becomes impersonal by transcending his buddhi. This comes about through the predominance of the sāttvika guṇa in both cases; but in the spiritual attitude the buddhi, which contains in it vāsanās or acquired impulses, modifying its intrinsic sāttvika character, is purged of all its egoistic tendencies, and the true knower, realising the intrinsic disparateness of prakṛti and puruṣa, transcends the empirical plane. Such complete detachment is not possible in the aesthetic attitude. The world of poetry, being idealised, is different from the natural world and does not evoke egoistic impulses; for the objects contemplated in poetry have no reference to any one in particular but are entirely impersonal. These impersonalised forms, therefore, afford to the enjoyer of poetry escape from the ills which arise from personal relations, but they are the means only of temporary release from the natural world, for he cannot, like the ordinary man, transcend his buddhi altogether. The three stages in the appreciation of poetry which lead ultimately to the aesthetic experience of Rasa indicate that the apprehension of the meanings of words

35 M. Hiriyanna, Indian Aesthetics, in Proceedings and Transactions of the First Oriental Conference, Poona, vol. ii, has dealt with the subject at some length.
(abhidhā) is not important in itself but only as a means of apprehending the generalised conceptions which are unrelated to any one in particular, the bhāvakatva being the process of such generalising, by which the factors of the feelings, as well as the feeling itself, become impersonalised. These idealised creations of poetry lead to enjoyment or bhoga, which implies that the condition produced is one of pleasure, as distinguished from the case of the natural attitude which is not always pleasurable, as well as from the spiritual attitude which is neither pleasurable nor painful.

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If we may judge from the somewhat elaborate criticism levelled against Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s theory, it seems to have produced a greater impression than earlier theories, and paved the way, no doubt, for the later theory of Abhinavagupta to whom belongs the credit of explaining the new aesthetic system of the Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhana.

The Dhvanikāra, however, in his exposition of rasa-dhvani and rasa, seems to have been greatly influenced by the Dramaturgic Rasa school. Bharata had declared that the business of the drama was to evolve one or more of the eight Rasas; and therefore a more or less elaborate psychology of human sentiments had been analysed in the service of the dramatic art even before poetic theories began to be seriously discussed. Bharata’s ideas on these psychological processes and on Rasa, which is the final internal experience consisting in the consciousness of a certain condition of the ego, were elaborated by his commentators and followers, until the Dhvanikāra, followed by Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, came into the field. From the earlier drama and dramatic theory, the idea of Rasa was naturally taken over to poetry and poetic theory; and as the transition from naïve to sentimental poetry was accomplished, the theorists went a step further and erected Rasa into one of its essential foundations. Ānandavardhana is quite explicit on this point.
when he says (p. 181): \textit{etac ca rasādi-tātparyena kāvyānibandhanaṁ bharatādāvapi suprasiddham eva}. In other words, what was already well established in the drama by Bharata and others thus found its way into poetry, profoundly modifying, as it did, the entire conception of the Kāvyā\textsuperscript{36}. From his extensive literary and philosophical studies as well as from his interest in the work of Bharata and his followers, Abhinavagupta goes further and lays down: \textit{nāṭyāṁ samudaya-rūpād rasāḥ, rasa-samudayo hi nāṭyam}; \textit{na nāṭya eva ca rasaḥ kāvye'pi nāṭyāmāna eva rasaḥ kāvyārathah}. These theorists realised that no system of Poetics, as no system of Dramaturgy, can ever ignore the feelings, moods and sentiments, and must find an important place for Rasa, the manifestation of which is as much the business of poetry as of the drama. Gradually stress came to be laid on the emotional mood, as well as on the imaginative thought, which the poet succeeds in communicating to us; the outward expression, on which the older writers pinned their faith so much, being regarded only as a means of suggesting or pointing to the implicit significance of such a mood in poetry.

The insufficiencies of the earlier theories on Rasa are obvious and are therefore rightly criticised by Abhinavagupta; but it was a happy idea to elaborate the theory in such a way as not only to supply these deficiencies but also to fit it well into the theory of \textquote{suggestion} or dhvani formulated by the new school. It is not necessary for us here to enter into the details of the Dhvani-theory, which will be treated in its proper place; but we may for convenience and continuity of treatment indicate here generally how the idea of Rasa was worked up into them. The Dhvani school, in its analysis of the essentials of poetry, found that the contents of a good poem may be generally distinguished into two parts. The one

\textsuperscript{36} Rudrabhaṭṭa states (i. 5) in the same way that Bharata and others have already discussed Rasa in connexion with the drama, while his own object is to apply it to the case of poetry. Cf M. Lindenau, \textit{Rasalehre}, p. 2.
is that which is expressed and includes what is given in so many words; the other content is not expressed but must be added to it by the imagination of the reader or listener. The unexpressed or suggested part, which is distinctly linked up with the expressed and which is developed by a peculiar process of suggestion (*vyāñjanā*), is taken to be the 'soul' or essence of poetry. To the grammarians and learned writers, it perhaps seemed paradoxical to state that the very essence of poetry was that which was not even expressed. On the other hand, some form of symbolical speech, in which wisdom demands that one should express oneself more in hints and suggestions than in actual words, was always in vogue, and the poets had been more or less partial to the method of speaking in metaphor or wrapping up their ideas in transparent allegory. But suggestive poetry is something different from the merely metaphorical, which Vāmana had already amply recognised and on which the Alamkāra and the Riti schools had put so much emphasis. The metaphorical or the allegoric, however veiled it may be, is still in a sense expressed and must be taken as such; but the suggestive is always unexpressed, and is therefore a source of greater charm by its capacity of concealment. This unexpressed or inexpressible is called into being by a particular function of suggestion, appertaining to words and their meanings, which this school postulates.

Now the unexpressed, through the suggestive power of sound or sense, may be an unexpressed thought or matter (*vastu*), or an unexpressed figure of speech (*alamkāra*), but in most cases it is a mood or feeling (*rasa*) which is directly inexpressible. The Dhvani school, therefore, took up the moods and feelings as an element of the unexpressed and tried to harmonise the idea of *rasa* with the theory of dhvani.37

It was realised that poetry was not, as Dāṇḍin thought, the

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37 Anandavardhana himself says (*Dhv.* p. 163) that his object is not merely to establish Dhvani but also to harmonise it with Rasa.
mere clothing of agreeable ideas in agreeable language; the feelings and moods play an important part in it. But the feelings and moods are in themselves inexpressible. We can give a name to them, but naming a mood or feeling is not equivalent to expressing or developing it. At best, therefore, we can suggest it. What the poet can directly express or describe are the vibhāvas etc.; but with the help of these expressed elements which must be generalised and conceived, not as they appear in the natural (laukika) world, but as they may be imagined in the world of poetry, the poet can awaken in us, through the power of suggestion inherent in words and their meanings, a particular alaukika (dissociated) condition of the soul in which the relish of the feeling is possible. It is true that the poet cannot rouse the same mood or feeling as, for instance, Rāma whom he describes felt, but he can call up a reflection of it, which is similar in some respects; and the condition of the reader’s soul in the enjoyment of such feeling is in poetry and drama the relish of Rasa, which can be brought into consciousness only by the power of suggestion inherent in words or ideas.

Here comes in the new colour given to the Rasa-theory by the exponents of the Dhvani school. They interpret Bharata’s central dictum to mean that the Rasa is suggested by the union of the sthāyin with the vibhāvas through the relation of the suggested (vyaṅgya) and the suggestor (vyaṅjaka); the nispatti of Bharata, therefore, should mean abhivyakti.

The elaboration of the Rasa-theory, however, by this school in the direct tradition of Lollāta, Śaṅkuka and Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, is associated by Mammāta and others with the name of Abhinavagupta. Commenting on Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s theory, Abhinava points out that there is no need, as there is no authority, for assuming the two powers of bhāvakatva and

38 There is some difference in the general theoretical positions of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta which will be noticed later.
bhogikaranā; for they are implicitly included in the idea of rasa-vyañjanā and its ultimate āsvāda. Bharata’s dictum kāvyārthāṁ bhāvayanānīḥ bhāvaḥ implies that bhāvakatva is an inherent capacity of all bhāvas, as the means of bringing into consciousness the sense of poetry, the term sense indicating here the principal sense consisting of the relish of Rasa. Hence the sthāyin, together with the vyabhicārin, being bhāvas themselves, bring into existence through this inherent power the extraordinary relishable sense of poetry, cognised in a general or impersonalised form. In this way, the sthāyin may be regarded as the bhāvaka or nispādaka of Rasa; and this so-called bhavakatva, according to Abhinava, consists in nothing more than a suitable use of Guṇa and Alamkāra (samucita-gunālamkāra-parigrāhātmakam) for the ultimate purpose of awakening Rasa through the suggestive power of word and sense. Thus, partially admitting bhāvanā or bhāvakatva but explaining it somewhat differently, Abhinava turns to the other power assumed as bhoga or bhogikaranā by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka. He remarks that beyond prasīti or perception of Rasa, he is not aware of any other process called bhoga. If it is relish or enjoyment, it is already admitted as the essence of Rasa, and nothing is gained by giving it a new name. Abhinava thinks that the bhoga supposed by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka is nothing more than the āsvāda or relish of Rasa, based on permanent moods like rati etc., and made possible by the suggestive power of poetry. It falls naturally, therefore, within the domain of suggestion and need not be taken as a separate function (bhogikaranā-vyāpāras ca kāvyātmakara- rasa-visyo dhvananātmavā).

This prātiti of Rasa, Abhinavagupta maintains, results from its abhivyakti or manifestation by the power of suggestion, and consists of a state of relish known as rasanā, āsvāda or carvanā. What is manifested is not the Rasa itself, but its relish: not the mood itself but its reflection in the form of a subjective condition of aesthetic enjoyment in the reader. This taste or relish partakes, no doubt, of the nature of cogni-
tion; it is nevertheless different from the ordinary laukika forms of the process, because its means (viz. the vibhāvas) are not to be taken as ordinary or laukika cause. Although Rasa requires these three factors for its manifestation and cannot exist without them, it cannot yet be regarded as an ordinary effect, and the cause-and-effect theory is inapplicable; for in the transcendental sphere of poetry, it is

39 This will make it clear why the Rasas like karaṇa, bībhatṣa and bhajānaka, which cause pity, disgust or horror, can be termed Rasas in which enjoyment is essential. The relish of Rasa is supposed to be an extraordinary bliss, dissociated from personal interests, and not to be likened to ordinary pleasure and pain in which personal or egoistic impulses predominate. The mind is so entirely lost in its contemplation that even when the sentiment of grief or horror relished in such a state, pain is never felt, and even when felt it is a pleasurable pain. This fact is borne out by the common experience that when grief is represented on the stage, the spectator says 'I have enjoyed it'. Hence Abhinavagupta says: samājakāṇiḥ harṣaika-phalāṁ nātyaṁ na tōkādi-phalam. Viḍvānātha similarly remarks (iii.6-7 and Vṛtti) that those very things which are called causes of pleasure and pain in the world (e.g. banishment of Sitā in the forest), when consigned to poetry and drama, possess the right to be called, in consequence of their assuming such an impersonalised form, ataukika vibhāvas etc., and from them only pleasure ensues, as it does from bites and the like in amorous dalliance. If pain were really felt, no one would have been inclined to poetry and drama (kim ca teṣu yadi duḥkhaṁ na ko'pi syāt tad-unmukhāḥ). It is also maintained that tears constitute no proof that anything but pleasure is felt in poetry; for the tears that are shed by the reader are not those of pain but those of sentiment. Jagannātha’s remarks in this connexion are interesting. He says (p. 26) that the shedding of tears and the like are due to the nature of the experience of particular pleasures, and not to pain. Hence in a devotee tears arise on listening to a description of the deity; in this case there is not the slightest feeling of pain. Such is the power of detachment which poetry produces that even unpleasant things like sorrow generate dissociated pleasure; and this pleasant relish of impersonalised or idealised artistic creations should be distinguished from the ordinary experiences of life.—The Nātya-darpaṇa, however, sets forth a theory (pp. 158-59) that Rasa has a touch of sorrow in it, and Bhoja in his Śṛṅgāra-prakāśa says: rasā hi sukha-duḥkhāvasthā-ṛūpāḥ. See V. Rāghavan, Number of Rasas (Adyar 1940), p. 155.
said, the connexion between cause and effect gives place to an imaginative system of relations, which has the power of stirring the reader’s soul into Rasa. The resulting Rasa cannot be identified with the constituent vibhāvas, for the latter are not experienced separately, but the whole appears as Rasa, which is thus simple and indivisible. At the time of relish nothing else but the Rasa itself is raised to our consciousness. The writers on Poetics are fond of explaining this phenomenon under the analogy of a beverage which, made up of black pepper, candied sugar, camphor and other ingredients, gives us yet a taste different from that of its constituents. The result, therefore, is an indissoluble unity of taste from which every trace of the constituent elements is obliterated.

Abhinavagupta goes a step further also in maintaining that the permanent mood (sthāyin) inferred from its laukika causes (e.g. women, garden etc.) remains in the hearts of the appreciating audience in the subtle form of latent impressions, the idea of vāsanā or latent impression having been already admitted by the philosophers. On reading a poem or witnessing a drama, this permanent mood, remaining in the form of latent impression, is suggested by the depicted vibhāvas etc., which cease to be called laukika causes but go by the name of vibhāvas etc. in poetry and drama, and which are taken in their general form without specific connexions. The vibhāvas, therefore, are generalised or impersonalised in the minds of the reader, and do not refer to particularities, not through the power of bhāvakatva, as supposed by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, but generally through the suggestive power of sound and sense and specifically through a skilful use of Guṇa and Alamkāra in poetry, and clever representation in the drama. In the same way, the sthāyi-bhāva, which is the source of Rasa⁴⁰, is also generalised, because the germ of it is already

⁴⁰ The sthāyin is so called because, in spite of its being transient like all feelings, its impression in the form of vāsanā or saṃskāra is
exist in the reader's mind in the form of latent impressions; and this, together with the beauty of the generalised representation of the vibhāvas etc., removes all temporal and spatial limitations. The mood is generalised also in the sense that it refers not to any particular reader but to readers in general, so that the particular individual, while relishing it, does not think that it is relished by him alone, but by all persons of poetic sensibility. This subjective relish in the mind of the spectator or reader is known as Rasa in poetry and drama.

To state it briefly and without any technicality, there is in the mind a latent impression of feelings which we once went through (or which we acquired from previous births), and this is roused when we read a poem which describes similar things. By universal sympathy or community of feeling we become part and parcel of the same feeling and imagine ourselves in that condition. Thus the feeling is raised to a state of relish, called rasa, in which lies the essence of poetic enjoyment. It will be noticed that these theorists presuppose latent impression of experience (vāsanā) and universal sympathy (sādhāraṇya ar sādhāraṇikaraṇa). Those who have not experienced the feeling of love, for instance, and have therefore no impression of experience left in them, as well as those who have no sense of community of human feelings, can never relish Rasa. The vāsanā, we are told, is natural (naisargikā) and may have been left in our mind through the saṁskāra of previous births, but it may also be acquired by more or less permanent, being called up when the Rasa is cognised.

Cf Prabhā p. 61: antahkaraṇa-pravṛtti-rūpasya ratyāder āśu-viṇāśatvam prābhātādbhātmanā cirakāla-sthāyitvād yāvad-ṛasa-pratīti-kālam anuśaṅdhānāc ca sthāyitvam. But possibly it was originally called sthāyin because it constituted the permanent mood or sentiment in the composition, which nothing akin to it or opposed to it could overcome, but which could only be strengthened by other bhāvas. But the sthāyin itself is not rasa; it must be vyakti-viśīṣṭa and vibhāvādi-melaka, and thus made carvenopayogī or relishable, Govinda p. 62. The ultimate relish of rasa is free from the contact of the sthāyin, as it is of the vibhāvas.
study and experience. The writers on Poetics, therefore, are merciless in their satire on dull grammarians and old Mīmāṃsakas, to whom such relish of Rasa is denied, and they declare unanimously that the rasika alone is capable of realising the rasa; for Rasa is not an objective entity which can reside in the hero or the actor, but a subjective condition realised by the reader's own capacity of aesthetic enjoyment. Thus, a degree of culture, experience and aesthetic instinct is demanded in the critic, the rasika or sahrdaya, in conformity with this subtle conception of poetry. As Abhinavagupta puts it, adhikāri cātra vimala-pratibhānaśāli-hṛdayaḥ, and describes such a sahrdaya ("Locana p. 11) as yeśāṁ kāvyānusīlanābhyaśa-vasād viśadībhūte mano mukure varṇaśyata-tanmayībhavana-yogyatā te hṛdaya-saṃvādabhājāḥ sahrdayāḥ.

It may be pointed out here that this subtle conception of Rasa makes it difficult to express the notion properly in Western critical terminology. The word has been translated etymologically by the terms 'flavour,' 'relish,' 'gustation,' 'taste,' 'Geschmack' or 'saveur'; but none of these renderings seems to be adequate. The simpler word 'mood', or the term 'Stimmung' used by Jacobi may be the nearest approach to it, but the concept has hardly any analogy in European critical theories. Most of the terms employed have association of subtle meanings of their own, and are therefore not strictly applicable. For instance, the word 'taste' or 'relish' though literally correct, must not be understood to imply aesthetic judgment, 'good or bad taste,' but must be taken to indicate an idea similar to what we mean when we speak of tasting food. At the same time, this realistic description must not lead us to drag it down to the level of a bodily pleasure; for this artistic pleasure is given as almost equivalent to the philosophic bliss, known as ānanda, being lifted above worldly joy.

This peculiar condition of the mind, the rasa, is realised, according to Abhinavagupta, through the characteristic func-
tion of *vyāñjanā* or suggestion inherent in word and sense. The idea is elaborated by later theorists who take pains to shew that it does not not come under the province of Denotation (*abhidhā*), nor of Import (*uātparyā*), nor of Indication (*lakṣanā*), nor of Perception (*pratyakṣa*) nor of Inference (*anumāna*), nor of Reminiscence (*smaraṇā*), which means of knowledge are admitted by philosophers and grammarians. Into these technicalities which properly come under the discussion of the *vyāñjanā-vṛtti*, we need not enter; but it may be noted here that Abhinava describes this *abhivyakti*, which is taken as synonymous with *carvaṇā*, as *vītavighna-pratīti* or realisation freed from obstacles. Jagannātha and the author of the *Prabhā* commentary on *Kāvyā-pradīpa* describe *vyakti* as *bhagnāvaranā cit*. Both these terms constitute a link connecting the present theory with the teachings of the Vedānta. The dismissal of the *avidyā* and the elimination of *kāma* and *karman* (interest and activity) lead us to a point of detachment where we realise the intrinsic identity of self with Brahma and apprehend the bliss or *ānanda* resulting from such a realisation. The idea of Vecāntin’s Mokṣa, which consists of a condition, not to be produced but to be made manifest by the removal enveloping obstacles, finds an analogy in the idea of the manifestation of Rasa, implied in its *abhivyakti*, which consists not in the expression of anything new but in the revealing of something already existing. The *brahmāsvāda* is likened to the *rasāsvāda* because in both cases the intimate realisation comes after the limitations of the ego-centric attitude are transcended, and all separate existence is merged in the unity or harmony realised. This happens in the case of *rasāsvāda* when the poetic sentiment, which remains in his heart in the form of latent impression, is made to shine forth, and the spectator’s mind is purged of all egoistic impulses by the force of the idealised or generalised creations of poetry, consisting of the *vibhāvas* etc., which are therefore termed *vighnāpasārakas* or removers of obstacles. It is, therefore,
alaukika, being unlike the taste of interested worldly happiness and being incompassable by the ordinary processes of knowledge. Its essence consists in its relish or taste, āsvāda, carvanā, or rasanā; but it is a relish in which the Rasa alone, apart from its constituent elements, is raised to consciousness. It is, therefore, described as a relish in which the contemplation of anything else but Rasa is lost (vīgalita-vedyāntara), or which is free from the contact of aught else perceived (vedyāntara-sparśa-śūnya), like the state of mind lost in the philosophic contemplation of Brahma. It is not capable of proof or designation and cannot be made known, because its perception is inseparable from its existence; or in other words, it is identical with the knowledge of itself. The only proof of its existence is its relish itself by the sahṛdaya or the man of taste (sakala-sahṛdaya-hṛdaya-saṃvedana-sākṣika); and the sahṛdaya to whom alone this bliss is vouchsafed, is like the yogin or devotee who deserves this preference through his accumulated merits (puṇyavantaḥ pramīṇvanti yogī vad rasa-saṃtatim)\textsuperscript{41}.

This, in its general outline, is the Rasa-theory as finally fixed by the Dhvani school; and all later writers, from

\textsuperscript{41} The artistic attitude is, therefore, different from the natural, and more akin to the philosophic. But art affords only a temporary release from the ills of life by enabling one to transcend his personal relations or practical interests, and restores equanimity of mind (viśrānti) by leading him away from the common world and offering him another in its place. This is an attitude of pure pleasure, of disinterested contemplation (saṃvīt), but not of true enlightenment which comes to the knower who, no longer on the empirical plane, transcends completely the sphere of pleasure as well as of pain. The attitude is variously termed camatkāra-nirveśa (awakening of poetic charm), rasanā (relish), āsvāda (taste), bhoga (fruition), samāpatti (accomplishment), laya (fusion) and viśrānti (repose), which terms indicate the philosophical colouring given to the doctrine. For the idea of camatkāra involved in Rasa, see S. K. De, introd. to Vakrokti-śivita (2nd ed. 1928) p. xxxvi, fn 33 and below under Jagannātha (ch. vii). See also V. Raghavan, Some Concepts, pp. 268-71.
Dhanañjaya to Jagannātha, accept, more or less, this new interpretation and attempt to work it out in detail. Even Mahimabhaṭṭa, who tried to demolish the Dhvani-theory, acknowledges the importance of Rasa and declares that on this point there is no difference of opinion between himself and the Dhvanikāra, the only difference existing with regard to the function *par excellence* which manifests the Rasa. Thus, an endeavour was made by the Dhvani-theorists not only to explain the concept of Rasa in terms of inward experience, but also to absorb this idea of aesthetic delectation into the new theory of Dhvani, and make it applicable to poetry as well as to the drama; and the Rasa school, properly so called, began to merge from this time onwards into the dominant Dhvani school, to the consideration of which we now turn, leaving the treatment of the later development of the Rasa-theory to a subsequent chapter.

42 काव्यस्यसमानी सह्गिनी (सह्गिनी ?) रसादि-रूपेना कस्याच्छ विमो- तिः, p. 22.