CHAPTER V

THE DHVANIKĀRA AND ĀNANDAVARDHANA

(The Dhvani System)

The origin of the Dhvani school, like that of other schools of Poetics, is lost in obscurity; but the first clear formulation of its theory of dhvani as a whole is to be found in the memorial verses of the Dhvanikāra, whose date is unknown but who could not have been very far removed from the time of his commentator Ānandavardhana. It is possible, however, that the Dhvanikāra himself is following a much older tradition. The fact that he shows himself conversant with some theory of rasa, alaṃkāra and rīti need not be cited to the credit or discredit of this conjecture; for these systems themselves cannot be traced back to any definite period of time, and there is also no conclusive evidence that the Dhvanikāra was aware of the particular views of Bharata, Bhāmaha or Daṇḍin, with whom we begin the historic period of growth of these systems. But the very first line of the first verse of the Dhvanyāloka itself states that the theory that dhvani is the essence of poetry was traditionally maintained by earlier thinkers (kāvyasyātmā dhvanir iti budhair yahi samāmnāta-pūrvaḥ). Accepting this statement of the Dhvanikāra, it is difficult, however, to explain why the dhvani-theory did not in the least, as the rasa-theory did to a certain extent, influence such early writers on Poetics as Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin or Vāmana. It is easy to maintain, on the other hand, that the vyāhjanā as a function must have been evolved by the school which set up a theory of vyāṅga artha or dhvani, as this function is not traceable in philosophers or philosophical grammarians before the time of Ānandavardhana. Bhāmaha¹.

¹ See above ch. ii, pp. 52f.
Vāmana (iv. 3. 8) and other early theorists discuss or show themselves cognisant of such a “suggested sense” in general; but they never use the terms vyañjanā, or vyaṅgya artha or dhvani, as they probably would have done if it had been so universally known or accepted as the Dhvanikāra’s statement would apparently imply. But this non-recognition by other schools need not be taken as a serious argument, as it admits of several reasonable explanations. It is well known that the philosophers refuse to recognise the vyañjanā as a Vyāpāra sui generis², and even after it was put forward by the Ālamkārikas, they would explain it by another recognised function as anyathā-siddha; it is not surprising, therefore, that orthodox grammarians or philosophers should entirely ignore it. The absence of any direct reference to dhvani in early writers on Poetics may be explained by the not unlikely supposition that probably the Dhvanikāra himself, who summed up and uttered the theory in a definite form, was contemporaneous with these writers, as we cannot put him much later if we are to leave sufficient margin between him and his commentator, as well as make room for intermediate scholastic activity evidenced by the recapitulation-stanzas cited by Ānandavardhana in his Vṛtti³. Even leaving aside this conjecture, the cases of such non-recognition are actually explained by the Dhvanikāra himself, in the verse we have already cited, as constituting really cases of half-recognition; for he seems to indicate that these early writers were cognisant of dhvani, but not having understood its nature they naïvely and uncritically looked at it from other points of view, some comprehending it in other elements of poetry, some thinking it incomprehensible, and others (like the poet Manoratha cited by Ānandavardhana) going to the extreme of denying its existence altogether. One of the objects of the Dhvanikāra in this statement was, no doubt, to indicate that he was not putting forward something entirely

2 See Jacobi in ZDMG, lvi, 1902, p. 397 fn 2, and p. 398 fn 1.
new, and to find an authority for his procedure in the implied attitude (real or imaginary) of certain older writers; but, apart from this, it is clear that although there is nothing explicit in the older writers, one can never affirm that some kind of ‘suggested sense’ was not known to them.

It would be extraordinary indeed that a work like Dhvanikāra’s could have sprung into existence without having had a previous history, although such earlier forms of the theory as might have enabled us to trace directly its origin and growth were either not committed to writing or had disappeared in course of time; for at its first appearance as we have it in these Kārikās, we find the theory in a relatively complete shape, the outlines of which, definitely settled, may require considerable filling up but no important or substantial modification. This is probably implied by Abhinavagupta’s gloss on the word paramparā in Ānandavardhana’s explanation of the phrase samāmnāta-pūrvah used by the Dhvanikāra with reference to the previous existence of the theory. Abhinava explains (p. 3) that the theory was stated in unbroken tradition by previous thinkers without its being discussed in particular books (avicchinnena pravāheṇa tair etad uktam, vināpi viśiṣṭa-pustakesu vivecanāt). It is true that Mukula refers (p. 21) to a theory of dhvani being newly described by some men of taste (sahṛdayair* nūtana-tayopavarnītasya) as something not comprehensible by the recognised function of lakṣanā, and does not discuss it for its over-subtlety (etac ca vidvadbhiḥ kuṣāgrayā buddhyā nirūpaṇīyam...ityalam

4 The word sahṛdaya here cannot be taken (see vol. i, p. 105f) as a proper name referring to the Dhvanikāra; nor is it to be taken as a title of the propounder of the dhvani-theory. As in most of the places, it refers in general to the critics or men of taste who established the new theory, or in particular to the Dhvanikāra or Ānandavardhana; and there is no need to go beyond this ordinary meaning of the term in Alamkāra literature. Possibly the reference is directly to Ānandavardhana who was a contemporary of Mukula’s father Kallaṭa (see vol. i, p. 74).
ati-prasaṅgena); but he may in this passage be directly referring to the Dhvanikāra, who for the first time probably summed up in his memorial verses the floating traditions, or to Ānandavardhana to whom belonged the credit of fixing the theory into a new and complete shape.

This conjecture about the traditional existence of the dhvani-theory in some form or other even before the Dhvanikāra receives support from the fact that the theory in its essence derived its inspiration from the works of early grammarians and their semi-philosophical speculations on speech. Originating as a theory of expression, the theory of vyañjanā, no doubt, received no recognition from orthodox grammarians; but not choosing to appear as an entirely novel theory, it sought the protection of the grammarian's authority by pretending that it was founded on the analogy of their ancient sphoṭa-theory. We have already noted the great influence of the older science of grammar on poetics, and Ānandavardhana himself is careful in noting that the system demonstrated by him is built on the system of the grammarians, who were the earliest theorists to apply the term dhvani to the spoken letter which reveals the sphoṭa. Abhinavagupta commenting on this passage, perhaps goes too far in following up, after the authority of the Vākyapadīya, all the details of the sphoṭa-theory, but there is hardly any doubt that the writers on Poetics had this theory before them when they

5 See vol. 1, pp. 6-7.

6 prathame hi vidvāmso vaiyākaraṇāḥ, vyākaraṇa-mūlatvāt sarvavidyādānām. Te ca śiṣyaṁśeṣa vaṁśe dhvanir iti vyaharanī. Tatḥai-vāṇyais tan-mānusāśriḥīś -sūrīhiḥ kāvyā-tattvārtha-darśibhir vācyavācaka-saṃśriśaḥ sābdūtmā kāvyam iti vyapadeśyo vyañjakaṭva-sāmyaṁ dhvanir iti uktāḥ (pp. 47-8). See *Locana* on this. Cf also: parlīścitā-nirapabhrasā-sābdā-brahmanāṁ vipaścitāṁ matam āśrityaiva pravṛtta'yaṁ dhvanī-vyavahāra iti tāhi saha kim virodha-virodha cintyete (p. 199). In this last passage, the reference is not to Vedānta, as some would think, but to the grammatico-philosophical theory of sābdā-brahma. See Jacobi's note on this passage in ZDMG lvii, 1903, p. 56 fn 1.
elaborated their own system of dhvani. The sphota, which has been likened to the neo-platonic logos, is often translated by the terms ‘expression,’ ‘concept’ or ‘idea’; but none of these terms brings out its essential nature. Some philosophers propounded and the grammarians took it for granted that a word has intrinsically a word-prototype corresponding to it. The sphota is not exactly this word-prototype, but it may be explained as the sound of a word as a whole, and as conveying a meaning apart from its component letters (varnas). The sphota does not contain exactly the sounds of the word in the order peculiar to the letters, but the sounds or something corresponding to them are blended indistinguishably into a uniform whole. When a word is pronounced, its individual sounds become reflected in some degree in the order of the sphota in which the particular sounds are comprised; and as soon as the last sound dies away, the sphota, in which the idea corresponding to all these sounds is comprised, becomes manifest and raises to our consciousness the idea thus associated. The sounds of a word as a whole, therefore, and apart from those of the constituent letters, reveal the sphota.

Taking their cue from this somewhat mystical conception, the Alamkārikas developed the idea of dhvani by analogy. The several expressed parts of a poem, they held, reveal the unexpressed deeper sense, which is something singular and different from the denotative and indicative elements both in order and in essence, and which is termed the dhvani (lit. ‘sound’, ‘echo’, ‘tone’) or vyaṅgya artha (suggested sense) in poetry. The word dhvani itself, as Ānandavardhana pointed out, is sometimes used by the grammarians for the word or letters which reveal the sphota. Mammaṭa’s remarks in this connexion are pertinent. In his Vṛtti on the definition given by him of dhvani (i. 4), he says that the dhvani is, according to the grammarians, that word which reveals the all-important sphota, inasmuch as through it arises the knowledge of the word’s meaning. Others, by whom he signifies the writers on the dhvani-theory in Poetica, carry this doctrine of the gram-
marians a step further and apply the term dhvani to the meaning, as well as to the word which is capable of suggesting a meaning superseding the one which is directly expressed. Intrinsically the two theories have scarcely any mutual connexion; but what the Álamkārikas really wanted was an authority for their assumption of the power of vyāñjanā, which the great grammarians did not acknowledge. The sphoṭa-theory of the grammarians, however, presupposed something similar, for the varṇas of a word reveal, as it were, the ideal word. Hence it afforded an analogy which could at least boast of the authority of the Vaiyākaraṇas, the prathame vidvāṃsah, and which could therefore be seized upon by the Álamkārikas as the foundation of their own theory of suggestion. It may also be pointed out that the sense of ‘manifestation’ which exists in the vyāñjanā is an idea which, we have already noted’, is not unfamililiar to Indian philosophical speculation. The vyāñjanā does not consist in the utterance of something new, but in the manifestation of something already existing; it is, to use a familiar illustration from Indian philosophical systems, like the revealing of the already existing jar by the lamp. Although the general concept of dhvani connects itself with such half-mystical currents of thought, Ánandavardhana yet takes care to point out (pp. 232-4) that this dhvani is not, as often supposed, something mystical but it is something that can be properly defined and grasped; and he has no sympathy with those schools which would dismiss it, as Kapila has dismissed the sphoṭa from the philosophical realm, on the ground that it is something inexplicable (anākhyeya).

Although it accepted, with some modifications, the grammarian’s analysis of the nature and function of speech and based its theory of dhvani on the analogy of the theory of sphoṭa, the school really started independently with a distinct theory of expression of its

7 See vol. i, p. 9.
own, which demonstrated a function of vyāñjanā and vyāñgyārtha untraceable in earlier speculative literature. But the influence of other schools of Poetics on the composite work on the Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhana cannot be ignored. The latter, if not the former, appears to be perfectly familiar with the views of Bharata, Bhāmaha, Udbhāta and Vāmana, most of whom are cited directly by name; but even the Dhvanikāra must have known the theories of the Rasa, Alāmākāra and Rīti schools in some form or other. For, the Dhvanyāloka has two professed objects in view, viz., (1) the establishment of the theory of Dhvani and demonstration that this idea cannot be comprehended by the theories of earlier or contemporaneous schools of Poetics, and (2) an examination of the existing ideas of rasa, alāmākāra, rīti, guṇa and doṣa with a view to correlate them with the idea of dhvani, and thus by synthesis to evolve a complete and systematic scheme of Poetics. It succeeded so far in realising both these objects that not only was the concept of dhvani accepted implicitly by almost all later writers, but the systems, which emerged after Ānandavardhana and of which Mammaṭa may be taken as the first and foremost representative, cannot be regarded strictly as constituting independent schools, nor can they be affiliated readily and entirely with the older Rasa, Alāmākāra or Rīti schools. They constitute in substance a new aesthetic scheme in which the ideas of all these schools are worked and harmonised into a comprehensive doctrine, the outlines of this new adjustment being first clearly marked and the foundations firmly laid by Ānandavardhana.

Starting with a theory of expression, the Dhvani school concerns itself, first of all, with the grammatico-philosophical problem about the function of words and their meaning, or in other words, about the relation of a word to that which is expressed by it. The grammarians, logicians and the Mimāṃsakas had already laid down that the function by which the primary or intrinsic meaning (mukhya or śakya artha) of a word is known as abhidhā, generally translated by the term
Denotation, which gives it its conventional significance (saṃkṣetita artha). Thus, the concept of the cow is given by the word ‘cow’ by its power of Denotation. It has been defined as that power of a word which conveys to the understanding the meaning attached to it by convention, without the intervention of any power. This convention (saṃketa) consists in a particular word conveying a particular meaning (asmāc chadbād aṁ artho bodhavya ityākāraḥ sakti-grāhakaḥ samayaḥ), which is comprehended by observing what takes place in the world (vyavahāra). We need not concern ourselves with the question whether this sakti is īśvarecchā or icchāmātra (divine or human will); but there are several theories as to where this convention is to be understood, held respectively by the grammarians, logicians, Saugatas and Mīmāṁsakas. The writers on Poetics maintain, after the grammarians⁸, that it has reference either to genus (jāti), individual (dravya), quality (guṇa) or action (kriyā).

When this abhidheyaṛtha or the primary meaning of a word is incompatible, another power called lakṣañā or Indication (i.e. transference of sense) is communicated, whereby another meaning connected therewith is apprehended, either through usage (rūḍhi) or from some special motive (prayojana). Thus, one can say ‘the country rejoices’, but since the country itself cannot rejoice, it is indicated that the people of the country rejoice. This power really belongs to the sense (artha-vyāpāra), as later analysis points out, but it is attributed to words and is thus an āropita-sabdavyāpāra. That is to say (as other writers explain it) we have first śabda or the word, then its vācyāṛtha or direct denoted meaning, after which or in connexion with which comes the lakṣyāṛtha or indicated meaning through the power or Indication. It is thus sāntara (and not nirantarata like abhidhā), having the

⁸ Both Mukula and Māmāṭa (Śabda-vyāpāra⁸, p. 2) point out that this view of the Ālaṃkārikas is based on the dictum catuṣṭayā śabdānāṁ pravṛttih, occurring in the Mahābhāṣya (ed. Kielhorn p. 19, l. 20).
vācyārtha coming in between; for the lakṣaṇā is resorted to when the primary sense is incompatible (bādhita) and is so far artha-niṣṭha as based on the expressed sense. Hence the three essential requisites of the lakṣaṇā are the incompatibility (or exhaustion) of the primary sense, the connexion of the indicated sense with the primary sense, and the reason or motive (prayojana) for resorting to it. As the Denotation is dependent on worldly convention (vyavahārika saṃketa), so is the Indication (as Mammaṭa points out) upon the special convention based on these three requisites; and as there can hardly be any indicated or transferred sense without the primary sense, the Indication is sometimes called the tail, as it were, of Denotation (abhidhā-puccahbhūtā). In fact, writers like Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, as we have seen, would include lakṣaṇā under abhidhā, of which it is supposed to be an extension.

The lakṣaṇā being thus of a derivative nature, its relations to abhidhā have been summarised differently in different works. The Nyāya-sūtra gives an exhaustive list of the relations on account of which a word is used in a secondary or transferred sense for another (ii. 2. 63), corresponding to the lakṣaṇā of the Ālaṃkārikas; but Mukula quotes the authority of Bhāṛṣmitra who summarises them in a verse

9 lakya-vyavahita-lakṣyārtha-viṣayatvāc chabde āropita eva sa vyāpārah, vastuto’rtha-niṣṭha evety arthaḥ, tad uktam—‘sāntarārtha

10 See above ch. iv. p. 124.

11 Abhidhā-vṛtti-mātrikā p. 17. The verse is also quoted anony-

12 Mukula Bhaṭṭa’s work consists of 15 Kārikās with prose Vṛtti. Its object is to examine the principle which should regulate words in their meanings. It includes Lakṣaṇā in Abhidhā, for it says that the functions of Abhidhā are twofold, direct and indirect, both of which lead to the understanding of the import of words. Mukula discusses Abhidhā only, but Mammaṭa on his Sabda-vyāpāra-paricaya establishes three distinct functions of words, of which the last is Dhvani.
into five categories, viz. *sambandha* (connexion), *sādṛśya* (similarity), *samavāya* (inherence), *vaiparītya* (contrariety) and *kriyā-yoga* (association through action). ‘The fat Devadatta does not eat in the daytime’ (*pīna devadatto divā na bhuṅkte*), ‘the lad is a lion’ (*simhov māṇavakāḥ*), ‘the herd-station on the Ganges’ (*gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ*); ‘this fool is a Bṛhaspati’ (*bṛhaspatir ayam mūrkhaḥ*) and ‘in a great war thou art a Śatrughna’ (*mahāti samure śatrughnas tvam*) are given as respective instances of the usage. We need not further dilate upon these niceties of analysis, nor enter into the elaborate classifications of *lakṣaṇā*, but we may note here that the *lakṣaṇā* or transferred expression lies at the root of figures like metaphor and of metaphorical mode generally, which consist of the fancied transference of the qualities or action of one object to another. It has been pointed out that the transferred expression, resolving into the metaphorical, is the source of a particular beauty, because the special motive (*prayojana*) with which the poet chooses the transferred expression becomes realised along with it, without being directly or at all expressed. When we say, for instance, ‘youth is the springtime of life’, we mean to imply at once, without directly expressing it, the beauty, vigour or enjoyments of spring-time. The *prayojana* or motive, though unexpressed, is yet apprehended. This is supposed to be one of the reasons, as we shall see, why we should admit, besides Denotation and Indication, a third function of *vyañjanā* or Suggestion, by which something not expressed is revealed.

But there is a limited class of writers who postulate another function, called *tātparya* or Purport, which leads us to apprehend the connexion among the meanings of the constituent words in the form of the import of the whole sentence. This function conveys the connected meaning of the several words and therefore differs from *abhidhā* and *lakṣaṇā* which convey the meaning of a particular word, the *tātparyārtha* being manifested, not by word, but by a whole sentence, and therefore remaining distinct from the meanings
denoted or indicated by individual words. The words have, according to this view, the power of denoting or indicating things and not the connexion (anvaya) among things, which is known not from the import of words as such, but from their relations of compatibility (yogyatā), proximity (saṃnidhi) and expectancy (ākāṅksā). When the logical connexion or anvaya is thus known, a special sense arises which is called tātparya. Mammaṭa explains (ii. 1, Vṛtti) the position of these Abhihitānvaya-vādins, as they are called, thus: “When the meanings of the words, to be hereafter explained, are connected in accordance with expectancy, compatibility and proximity, another sense arises, called purport, which has a distinct form and which, though not constituting the sense of words is yet the sense of the sentence—this is the view of the Abhihitānvaya-vādins”. The theory of this school is rejected by another school of Mīmāṃsakas, called the Anvitābhidhāna-vādins, who deny the necessity of postulating a special function like tātparya; for they hold that words have a power to denote not only things but also their purport or connexion along with them. To put it in another way, words do not express their sense generally but connectedly. In ordinary life, for instance, we first understand meanings from sentences, and words convey ideas not absolutely but relatively, i.e., as having a connexion with one another. Mutatis mutandis, the theory would remind one of Berkeley’s denial of abstract ideas.

The formulaters of the dhvani-theory do not enter into these minute discussions but appear to recognise them implicitly, although most writers from the time of Mammaṭa (who deals with these questions in his Kāvyaprakāsa as well as separately in his Sabda-vyāpāra-paricaya) start with a preliminary analysis of word-function; and some later works like Appayya’s Vṛitti-vārttika are devoted specially to the

subject. All writers from Ānandavardhana’s time accept as a rule the abhidhā and lakṣaṇā, but they are not unanimous with regard to the tātparya as a separate function, which they take as included in the vyāñjanā vṛtti, this being the third and most important function established by the Dhvani school as the theoretical foundation of dhvani or the ‘suggested sense’ in poetry. The vyāñjanā or power of suggestion is generally defined as that function of a word or its sense by which a further meaning comes into being, when the other functions, viz. abhidhā and lakṣaṇā, are exhausted in their scope. Ideas or notions are what are conveyed by words through their powers of Denotation and Indication; these, put together in a sentence, convey a complete thought through the supposed power of the sentence, styled Purport. Now, another power is postulated by which a deeper sense, the vyāñgya artha, is revealed, consequent upon but distinct from the simple thought13. All good poetry, called par excellence the dhvani-kāvyā14, must have such a sense implicit in it, a sense which can only be realised by the vyāñjanā-vṛtti or power of suggestion postulated by this school.

Now the question has been animatedly discussed as to whether it is necessary to postulate this separate function of vyāñjanā, or whether it may not be comprehended in other recognised functions like abhidhā or lakṣaṇā, and in other

13 A word (or its sense), in virtue of these three powers, is called respectively the expressive (vācaka), the indicative (lakṣaka) and the suggestive (vyāñjaka); and the sense which arises is termed respectively an expressed (vācya), indicated (lakṣya) and suggested (vyāñgya) sense.

14 The word dhvani (lit. ‘echo’ or ‘tone’) is used almost synonymously (cf. Hemacandra p. 26) with the word vyāñgyārtha (suggested sense), and sometimes wrongly as co-extensive with vyāñjaḍa, which term properly designates the process manifesting it. The dhvani-kāvyā is so-called because the vyāñgyārtha, which predominates in it over the vācyārtha, is ‘echoed’ par excellence in this class of poetry. Viśva-

nātha (p. 198) explains the term etymologically thus: vācyād adhika-
camākāraṇaḥ vyāñgyārthe dhvanyateśminn iti vyutpattiḥ dhvanir nāmo-
tama-kāvyam.
Intellectual processes like anumāṇa or inference. Jayaratha cites (p. 9) a verse which enumerates twelve different ways in which the problem of Suggestion may be and perhaps was explained away; but broadly speaking, we need notice, as Ānandavardhana and his followers have done, only the principal attempted explanations. The first verse of the Dhvanyāloka summarises these antagonistic views into three groups. One sceptical school entirely denies the suggested sense in poetry. A second school, which is agnostic in this respect, holds that it is beyond the province of words (kecid vācāṃ sthitam aviṣaye tatvam ēcus tadiyam), and can only be perceived by a man of refined discernment (sahṛdaya-hṛdaya-sūṃvedyam, Ānanda p. 10). A third school would try to trace it back to the recognised functions like abhidhā, lakṣaṇā and tātparya, or to some such means of knowledge as anumāṇa or syllogistic reasoning. These three schools naturally divide themselves into two distinct standpoints: the one absolutely denies or ignores the concept of dhvani and thus does away with the necessity of vyañjanā; the other admitting the dhvani, attempts to explain away the necessity of vyañjana, as it is sufficiently accounted for by the ordinary recognised functions.

Against the attack of the systems which deny the existence of the suggested sense, the old argument that nothing can be denied which is not apprehended is applied; but apart from such purely scholastic objections, the real grounds for postulating the suggested sense are, the consideration, in the first place, that being a profound verity, it can positively be established by an examination of aesthetic facts as well as facts of experience; and in the second place, that there are some elements of poetry (e.g. the Rasa) which cannot be satisfactorily explained as revealed by abhidhā, lakṣaṇā, anumāṇa or similar other means.

This brings us to the consideration of the views of those who accept the concept of vyañgya artha but dispense with the necessity of such a separate and unauthorised Vṛtti as
vyāñjanā, which is regarded as included in other functions of sound and sense. Some Mīmāṃsakas hold, for instance, that the so-called suggested sense is conveyed by the abhidhā-vṛtti or the denotative power of a word. In this connexion, the dirgha-vyāpāra-vādins are said to have maintained that as a single arrow, discharged by a strong man, destroys by a single movement, called velocity, the armour of the enemy, pierces through his body and takes away his life, so a single word, used by a good poet, brings before us by a single power, called abhidhā, the sense of the word, teaches us its logical connexion (anvaya) and makes us apprehend the suggested sense. The substance of this graphic description appears to be that such is the more and more expanding function of abhidhā that it is not to be measured in the balance and confined to the single business of making us understand the saṃkētita artha, but it is competent to express whatever sense is apprehended after a word is heard. But it is urged in reply that the abhidhā has not the power to give us the perception of a matter (vastu), an imaginative fact (alaṃkāra) or an emotional mood (rasa), because it ceases, in the orthodox opinion, after conveying the conventional (i.e. literal) sense, and the Rasa etc. are not matters of mere convention. Nor is the denoting, for instance, of component vibhāvas, which give rise to Rasa, a denotation of the Rasa itself; for it is acknowledged that the Rasa is not realised by a mere naming thereof but partakes of the nature of a self-manifested joy, the development of which can at most be suggested. These facts cannot be satisfactorily explained unless we assume with the dirgha-vyāpāra-vādins an all-comprehensive power for the abhidhā, for which there is hardly any authority. Moreover, if we assign such extensive powers to Denotation, why even admit the power of Indication, since the sense conveyed by the latter might be understood from the Denotation itself?

15 This view is sometimes ascribed to Lollāta; but see on this question vol. i, p. 36-7.
Admitting the denoted sense, therefore, strictly as that conveyed by convention, it cannot be said to be manifold, for it exhausts itself after conveying the particular conventional concept; the suggested sense, on the other hand, becomes varied in accordance with the diversity of the occasion, the speaker and similar other factors. The denoted meaning is shown to differ from the suggested (1) in point of form, for the suggested sense may sometimes be quite the opposite of the negative or positive (as the case may be) expressed sense, (2) in point of location, for the expressed sense resides in words alone, while the suggested sense may be found in the words, in their position, in their denoted meaning itself, in the affixes or suffixes, in the arrangement of letters and so forth, (3) in its effect, for the denoted sense brings a mere cognition, the suggested a surprise, (4) according to the nature of the speaker, the addressee, or the perceiver. The attempt to maintain that the suggested sense is conveyed by the tāṭparyya or Purport, as some Naiyāyikas hold, is similarly shown to be insufficient, for the function of the Purport is exhausted by simply making us apprehend the logical connexion of the ideas in the sentence itself and cannot, therefore, take us to the vyaṅgaṛtha, which arises after the sentence is understood.

Nor is the laksanā-vṛtti sufficient to explain the subtle power of Suggestion. Those who maintain, however, that the suggested sense is no other than the laksya or indicated sense are asked (*Locana p. 51) whether they consider the non-difference of Suggestion and Indication to mean (1) that the two functions are identical (tādātmya or tādṛṣṭa), (2) that they consider the Indication to be the constant differentiating property (laksukā or vyāvartaka-dharma) of Suggestion, or (3) that the Indication is an occasional differentiating mark (upalaksana or tatastha laksana) of Suggestion in special cases. The Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhana discuss these views generally (pp. 50-9), but Abhinavagupta deals with them somewhat elaborately.
With regard to the first of these views, viz. the tādrūpya or identity of dhvani and bhakti (by which term laksana is meant), the Dhvanikāra lays down that Suggestion cannot be identical with Indication, because both have properties peculiar to themselves (i. 17). Indication is based upon the consideration of the barrering of the expressed sense, and consists merely in upacāra (upacāra-mātraṁ tu bhaktiḥ, Ananda p. 51), or, as Abhinavagupta expresses it, in the secondary application of a word (guna-vṛtti). The suggested sense, on the other hand, though essentially distinct in character, does not yet cancel the expressed sense altogether. The later writers16 explain further that it is not a mere secondary application of a word through usage or special motive. For, if you say that in such a sentence as 'a herd-station on the Ganges', the supposed motive, viz. the coolness and purity of the site, is not suggested but indicated, then the notion of 'the bank', which is the real indicated sense, would become the primary meaning of the word 'Ganges' (for the motive and the secondary sense of 'bank' cannot both be indicated), and consequently would be cancelled, since there can be no Indication without the primary sense being cancelled. We must, therefore, acknowledge another indicated motive for the indication of the first motive (for there can be no indication without the supposition of an indicated motive), and a third motive again to this second indication, and so on ad infinitum. In fact, as already noted before, the prayojana or special motive is not expressed at all; if it is left unexpressed, how is it then apprehended, unless we suppose that it is suggested? It has also been demonstrated that Suggestion is based on the peculiarity of the speaker, the addressee and various other circumstances; and there is a difference as well in location, the Indication resides in a word only, the Suggestion in a word, its parts, its sense and in the style. Mammaṭa adds that Suggestion cannot be said to be co-extensive with Indication and Denotation combined:

16 e.g. Viśvanātha in his Sāhitya-darpana pp. 247-48.
for it is seen to come into existence from mere letters without any specific Denotation.

The second view that Indication is the lakṣaṇa or the constant differentiating characteristic of Suggestion is shewn by the Dhvanikāra to be vitiated by the logical fallacies of too wide (ativyāpti) or too narrow definition (avyāpti). This is more or less a scholastic objection, and is based on the characteristic notion of Suggestion defined by its champions; for both Ṛṇandavardhana and his commentator shew that Indication sometimes covers a much wider, sometimes a much more limited, field than Suggestion. The vyañjanā, for instance, is not accepted when the prayojana of the Indication is not charming; on the other hand, in cases of vivakṣitānaya-
para-vācyā dhvani, there is scope for Indication, for the Suggestion here is expressly based on Indication. The third view that Indication may be an occasional distinguishing mark (upalakṣaṇa) of Suggestion is not denied by the Dhvanikāra, for Suggestion may sometimes rest ultimately on Indication, e.g. those cases which are admitted by Dhvani-theorists as based on lakṣaṇā (lakṣaṇā-mūla dhvani); but this does not prove the opponent's position that Indication is identical with Suggestion.

Some of the oldest and most aggressive objectors to the admission of the vyañjanā-vṛtti are the adherent of the anumāna-theory, whose views are refuted at some length by Ṛṇandavardhana himself. They are represented to us in later literature by Mahimabhaṭṭa in his Vyakti-viveka, a work which was written with the avowed object of establishing that the suggested sense can be arrived at by the process of syllogistic reasoning. Most of these controversies belong to the realm of scholastic speculation and are far removed from actual Poetics. We shall deal with Mahimabhaṭṭa's theory in its proper place; it will suffice here to set forth the theory in its general outline as it obtained in Ṛṇandavardhana's time and notice the arguments with which it is sought to be disproved.
From Ānandavardhana’s repudiation (pp. 201 f) of the views of this school, it appears that its essential position consisted in establishing that the cognition of the unexpressed or suggested sense is nothing more than the cognition of the object of a logical conclusion, so that the relation of the suggestor and the suggested is that of the syllogistic middle and major terms (vyāṅgya-pratītir liṅga-pratītir eveti liṅga-liṅgi-bhāva eva teṣām, vyāṅgya-vyaṅjaka-bhāvo nāparah kaścit). One of the alleged reasons for this assumption is that the Dhvani school itself admits suggestivity as depending upon the intention of the speaker, which intention is always an object of logical conclusion. Ānandavardhana, however, demonstrates that this does not affect the general position of his school. He shews that words have two different aspects, the one inerferable (anumeya) and the other communicable (pratipūdyā). The first, consisting of intention (vivakṣā), may either be the wish to utter a sound or the wish to express an idea by a word; the former, being a common characteristic of all animals, does not come within the sphere of speech. The communicable is something different from this, and consists of the idea itself which forms the object of the speaker’s need of communication (pratipūdyas tu prayoktura artha-pratipaḍana-samīhā-viṣayikṛtaḥ). It may be either expressed (vācyā) or suggested (vyāṅgya); for the speaker sometimes wishes to communicate the idea directly by its Denotation, or sometimes he wishes to do so in such a way that it is not conveyed directly in words. This last-named inner content, Ānandavardhana maintains, cannot be recognised in the form of a syllogistic conclusion, but can be by some other artificial or natural relation; for words, in the form of a logical middle term, can convey that an unexpressed idea is the object of intention, but cannot convey the unexpressed idea itself (vivakṣā-viṣayatvanḥ hi tasyārthasya śabdair liṅgataya prafiyate, na tu svarūpam). If the contrary is maintained, then, as every idea could be logically established, there would be no dispute about the correctness or falsity of an idea, any
more than about any other conclusion from a logical syllogism (yadi hi liṅgatayā sabdānāṁ vyavahāraḥ syāt, tac-chadbārthe samyaḥ-mithyātvādi-vividā na pravartet). It is only when the unexpressed takes the form of the intention of the speaker that it may be a matter of ordinary inference; but the inner content of the idea itself, when unexpressed, can be communicated only by the supposition of another power like Suggestion; for the natural mode of direct expression, as well as inference, is out of the question.

With the establishment, against such hostile views, of the suggested sense and the function of Suggestion in poetry, which is variously termed vyaṅjanā (revealing), dhvanana (echoing), gamana (implication) or pratyāyana (acquainting), we are introduced to the special doctrine of the system. The unexpressed or the suggested sense (vyaṅgya artha), to which the name dhvani is applied when it is predominant, is definitely posed as the ‘soul’ or essence of poetry", and poetry is classified into three kinds in relation to the suggested sense. The best kind, specifically called dhvani-kāvya, is supposed to be that in which the suggested sense predominates and supersedes the expressed. It is thus defined by the Dhvanikāra (i. 13):

17 But the verse i. 2, in which this view is set forth appears, when literally taken, to state that "the sense which is praised by men of taste and which has been established as the soul of poesy, has two subdivisions, viz. vācyā or the expressed, and pratiyamāna or the suggested", implying thereby that the artha itself is the ‘soul’ or essence of poetry and that it includes the vācyā as well, as one of its varieties. The Dhvanikāra, therefore, apparently declares that the expressed sense is also the essence of poetry, although this, as Viśvanātha objects, is opposed to his own statement in the first line of his work, which speaks of the suggested sense alone as the essence of poetry in accordance with the tradition of ancient thinkers. Abhinavagupta tries to reconcile these two apparently conflicting dicta by supposing that the real object of the Dhvanikāra in i. 2 is to distinguish between the vācyā and the pratiyamāna sense, and not to establish both as the ‘soul’ of poetry. The objection is really over-fastidious; for it can be easily shown that in the elaboration of the theory, the suggested sense alone is throughout taken as the ātman.
“The learned call that particular kind of poetry dhvani in which the (expressed) word and sense, subordinating themselves, manifest that (other suggested) sense”\textsuperscript{18}. This is \textit{par excellence} Suggestive Poetry, and therefore pointedly called \textit{dhvani}\textsuperscript{19}. The second class of poetry, in which the suggested sense is not predominant but subordinate, is called \textit{gunaḥbhūta-vyaṅga kāvyā} or Poetry of Subordinated Suggestion\textsuperscript{20}. This Subordination consists in the suggested sense being either of equal or inferior prominence. It has been classified elaborately, if not logically, on the hint furnished by the \textit{Dhvanyāloka} itself, into eight varieties, according as the suggested sense is (1) ancillary, (2) hinted by tone or gesture, (3) subservient to the completion of the expressed sense, (4) of doubtful prominence, (5) of equal prominence, (6) obscure, (7) unconcealed, or (8) not charming. That poetry, which is without any suggested element, is reckoned as the third and lowest kind, being merely ‘pictorial in word’ or ‘pictorial in sense’, and is called \textit{citra} or Pictorial Poetry\textsuperscript{21}. In it could be included all verse which, on account of sound or magnificence of pictorial representation, or some such mechanical means, flatter the ear and is considered worthy of admiration. Under it also comes the whole body of expressed poetic figures (\textit{alaṃkāra-nibandho yaw sa citra-viṣaya mataḥ}, cited p. 221), which, containing no suggestive element, appeal by their turns of

\textbf{18} yatraṅrthah śabdo vā tam arthaṃ upasaranīkṛta-svārthaḥ/ vyaṅktaḥ, kāvyā-viśesāḥ sa dhvanir iti sūribhiḥ kathitaḥ//. Here \textit{tam arthaṃ} refers to \textit{artha} defined in one of the previous verses, e.g. in i. 4.

\textbf{19} For the etymology of the word, see above footnote no. 14.

\textbf{20} \textit{Dhvanyāloka}, ii. 35.

\textbf{21} Ānandavardhana describes \textit{citra-kāvyā} thus : \textit{rasa-bhāvādi-
\textit{tātparya-rahitam vyaṅgaḥsa-viśesa-prakūsanu-sakti-sūnyam ca kāvyam kevala-vācyav-vācaka-vacitrya-mātrāvratya-vyapāyapanibaddham ālekhyā-prak-
hyam yad avabhāsate taḥ citram} (p. 220). Abhinavagupta derives the word in different ways : \textit{vismayakṛd-ṛttādi-vasū...kāvyānukāritāvād vā citram, ālekhyā-mātrāvat vā, kalā-mātrāvat vā} (p. 34). In deference to Ānandavardhana, Mammaṭa speaks of \textit{citra} as the third and lowest kind of poetry; but Viśvanātha altogether rejects its claim as poetry.
expression alone (Vaicitrya) and which are characterised by Anandavadhan as mere Vāg-vikalpa. Anandavadhan makes it clear that the citra-kāvyā is not really fit to be called poetry, it is an imitation or copy thereof (kāvyānukāraḥ); for, strictly speaking, there can be no poetry in which there is no suggestion. It is admitted by him, however, to the category of poetry, because the poets who are unfettered in their mode of expression, have, as a matter of fact, been found producing poetry of this kind, in which there is no intention of developing a suggested sense, but which is wholly taken up with the object of bringing about a strikingness of sound and sense.

These three types of poetry are then elaborated and classified with somewhat minute and subtle ingenuity. In this treatment, we find the characteristic passion for reducing everything to a formula and the scholastic delight in indulging in fastidious refinements; but at the same time there is a sincere effort to do justice to all the aesthetic facts, so far as they have been recognised, and to unify the various currents of ideas obtaining in different schools by synthesising them with the central principle of suggestion in poetry. We see throughout the speculations of this school an anxiety to protect itself from the reproach of being too theoretical, of ignoring or doing violence to facts; and this anxiety made the theorists evolve a scheme which should not overlook the inherited stock of notions but find a place for them in a comprehensive system. We need not take the Dhvani-theory here in all its minute details, and go through the five thousand, three hundred and fifty-five subdivisions of suggestive poetry, the object of which was possibly to mark out not

22 Viśvanātha gives this number. Vidyānātha in his Pratāparudrīya gives 1326 as the number of Śuddha varieties of Dhvani, which with Miśra varieties mentioned by him, comes up to a total of 5304. Abhinavagupta works out the possible number as 7420, and indicates that this number will increase infinitely if infinite varieties of Alamkāra are taken into account.
distinct classes, but distinct properties or circumstances. But we shall attempt to trace here briefly the effort made by this school to dispose of the already accumulated matter of Poetics, represented by the notions of rasa, riti, guṇa, dōṣa and alaṃkāra, into the dhvani-system itself, by means of different arrangements or classification of the idea of suggestion.

The true poetry, the dhvani-kāvyā, is divided into two broad classes, viz., avivaksīta-vācyā and vivaksītānyapara-vācyā, which two designations, clumsy as they are23, respectively indicate their nature. In the first case, the expressed sense is not meant; in the second case, it is certainly meant but ultimately amounts to something else, viz., the unexpressed. The first is obviously based on lakṣaṇa or Indication, which the poet employs with the conscious purpose of bringing the unexpressed into comprehension; and the question involved is about words and expressions which are taken not in a literal but in a transferred sense. This poetic transference, as we have already noted before, is at the root of metaphorical expression generally, the importance of which both the Alaṃkāra and Rīti schools amply recognised and industriously examined, and which Daṇḍin specifically included in the samādhi-guṇa, and Vāmana treated under the special figure vakrokti. As such, therefore, it could not be very well ignored, and by including it, as the Dhvani-theorists did, in one of the principal divisions of good poetry, they rightly assigned to it a prominent place in the new system.

The second division of suggestive poetry, the vivaksītānyapara-vācyā, in which the expressed is meant but is made to resolve itself into the unexpressed, is obviously based on abhidhā or Denotation, and embraces the more important matter of Rasa, which has already been worked out by the

23 Mahimabhaṭṭa criticises both these terms, holding that the former is nothing more than a case of bhakti or lakṣaṇa, and the latter contains an inherent contradiction (i.e., if a thing is vivaksīta or pradhāna, it cannot be anyapara).
Rasa school in the sphere of the drama. Two possible cases of this division are enumerated, viz. (1) that in which the suggested is of imperceptible process (asaṃlakṣya-krama), i.e., where the expressed denotation brings the suggested sense imperceptibly into consciousness, and (2) that in which the suggested is of perceptible process (saṃlakṣya-krama). Under the first group comes the suggestion of rasa and bhāva, for it is made clear that these emotional states can be suggested only in this way. Under the second group are included the suggestions of matter (vastu) and of figure (alamkāra) by matter and figure in turns, based respectively on the power of word, or its sense, or both. Thus, the unexpressed, which is raised to comprehension by the suggestive power of a word, or its sense or both, can be an unexpressed fact or matter, an unexpressed imaginative mood which may be put into the shape of a poetic figure; but in most cases—and these cases are of primary importance in poetry—it is an unexpressed emotional mood (rasa) or feeling (bhāva), which is directly inexpressible, but which can only be suggested by an expressive word or its sense. We have already seen\(^2^4\) that the poet can at best directly express the three factors which bring about the Rasa, viz., the vibhāva, the anubhāva, and the vyabhicāri-bhāva, but not the Rasa itself as a mood which is inexpressible in its nature. At the most, we can give a name to it, e.g. we can call it love, sorrow or anger, but the mere naming of the Rasa in poetry is not capable of awakening the mood itself in the reader which consists of a self-manifested state of the mind. Therefore, with the denotation or description of these factors, the poet can only suggest the Rasa; in other words, he can call up a reflection of the mood which the reader realises as a particular condition of his own mind\(^2^5\). The expressed factors, the vibhāvas

\(^{24}\) See above ch. iv, p. 130.

\(^{25}\) Abhinava explains (see above ch. iv, p. 132f) that the reader realises the feeling depicted because the artistic creations are generalised, and in this generalised form the reader realises them as his own, through
etc., are thus the suggestor or vyañjaka of the Rasa, which is the suggested or vyaṅgya. The suggested, no doubt, depends for its manifestation on the expressed (vācyārthāpekṣa), which consists of a denotation of the factors which suggest it, but it is in no way produced from it as an effect and differs entirely in essence. This suggestion is said to be 'of an imperceptible process', because the perception of the suggested Rasa by means of the various factors necessarily involves a process, but from its quickness the process is not perceived, like the process, as one writer graphically puts it, of the apparently simultaneous piercing of a hundred lotus-leaves placed one upon another. At the moment of relishing a poetic mood or feeling we are so absorbed in it that we do not perceive the process which suggests it, and this subtle suggestion may fittingly be described as one of 'imperceptible process'.

By the side of the dhvani-kāvyā, the true poetry, in which the suggested sense is predominant, we have poetry of second-rate excellence, designated guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya kāvyā, in which the unexpressed plays a subordinate part, in so far as it serves to emphasise or embellish the expressed. Here was an opportunity of including some of the results of earlier investigations of the Alamkāra and Riti schools, which indirectly recognised a suggested sense but comprehended it, consciously or unconsciously, in some expressed poetic figures. Thus, in samāsokti was admitted the apprehension of a suggested matter, in dīpaka of another suggested figure, in rasavat of suggested Rasa. But in all these cases the expressed sense is meant to predominate and constitute the charm of the particular figure, the suggested sense being there only to emphasise or embellish it. Thus, in the much discussed figure rasavat, which was recognised by old Poetics and which helped to smuggle in, as it were, the idea of Rasa into their systems.

a certain community of human feelings, and because the germs of the feelings already remain in a latent form in his mind.
the moods and feelings were supposed to have been roused not for their own sake, but only to embellish the expressed thought. But this was not doing full justice to the fundamental significance of Rasa, and the point was bound to be re-examined. The Dhvani-theorists did not reject but justified this kind of poetry, in which the Rasa is suggested not directly but secondarily, and included it in their second class of poetry. The other important case of this kind, known to earlier writers, in which something remains unexpressed but is understood, occurs in very many poetic figures which depend for their charm upon another analogous figure involved in themselves. Thus, Vāmana thought that the upamā or comparison was involved in all figures, and Bhāmaha stated (in which Daṇḍin substantially concurred) that all figures, in order to be charming, presupposed an atiśayokti, which he took as being involved necessarily in what he calls vakrokti (in the sense of a poetic figure). Udbhaṭa assigned an apparently similar function to śleṣa involved in some figures. Since the upamā, atiśayokti and śleṣa are themselves independent figures, they can be involved in other figures as something unexpressed or suggested by the latter. But as the expressed figure is here in each case prominent, and the unexpressed merely helps to bring out its charm, these cases, in the opinion of the Dhvani-theorists, may also be fittingly relegated to this second class of poetry. In the third class are included those cases where there is no borrowed charm of a suggested sense at all, and where the appeal consists in some striking mode of direct expression, as in those figures of speech, for example, which delight us by their turns of expression alone.

Thus, the suggested sense, or the unexpressed, has three different aspects; it may either be (1) a matter or an idea (vastu-dhvani), (2) a poetic figure (aṃkāra-dhvani), or (3) a

26 Udbhaṭa, however, is said to have held that when the śleṣa is involved in another figure, it predominates and dispels the apprehension of the figure itself.
mood or feeling (rasa-dhvani). The first occurs when a
distinct subject or thought (a matter of fact) is suggested; the
second, where the suggested sense constitutes something
imaginative (not a matter of fact) which, if expressed in so
many words, would assume the form of a poetic figure; and
the last, where a mood or feeling, which is directly inexpressible
but which can be suggested, is the principal element.
The Dhvani-theory, therefore, comprehends three kinds of
poetry which deal with the communication of a fact (or a
thought), or of an imaginative, or of an emotional mood.
Abhinavagupta points out\(^27\) that this doctrine is not expressly
taught in the Kārikās, but is clear from Ānandavardhana’s
treatment in his Vṛttī\(^28\).

It appears, however, that both the Dhvanikāra and
Ānandavardhana put a special stress upon rasa-dhvani; and
in spite of the fact that the citra-kāvyā or the lowest class of
poetry is entirely devoid of it, it seems to afford the most
weighty criterion by which a poem is to be judged. In a
complete scheme, no doubt, the alaṃkāra-dhvani and vastu-
dhvani, tacitly recognised by older writers and practised by
the poets, must also be justified; but the central question,
which is carefully examined, is as to how a composition
should help the Rasa to expression, for it is repeatedly laid
down that neither the alaṃkāra nor mere narrative (p. 148)
but the suggestion of rasa should be the guiding principle
of the poet in his composition of word and sense\(^29\). In other
words, the rasa appears to be the centre of gravity towards

\(^{27}\) yeṣ tu vyāṣaṣṭe—vyāṇgyāṇām vastavalaṃkāra-rasāṇām mukhena
iṣṭi, sa evaṃ praṣṭavyaḥ—etat tāvat tri-bhedatvaḥ na kārikākāreṇa
kṛtam, vṛttikāreṇa tu darśitam, Locana p. 123.

\(^{28}\) e. g. sa hy artho vācyā-sāmarthyāṅkṣiptam vastu-mātram alaṃkārā
rasādayaḥ cety aneka-prakāra-prabheda-prabhino darśayīṣyate, p. 15.

\(^{29}\) āyam eva hi mahākaver mukhyo vyāpāro yad rasiḍīn eva
mukhyatayo kavyārthikṛtya tad-vaktyanugoṇaṇaḥ śabdānām arthānām
copanibandhanam, p. 181; paripākavatām kavīṇāṃ rasādi-tātparya-
virahe vyāpāra eva na śobhate, p. 221.
which everything else in a poem—\textit{riti}, \textit{guna}, \textit{doṣa} and \textit{alamkāra}—should move; and stress coming to be laid on emotion in poetry, the suggestion of Rasa came to prevail over other kinds of suggestion. No doubt, it is laid down in ii. 7 that the unexpressed, apparently in all its three forms, is the \textit{aṅgin} or the principal element, and the \textit{Guṇas} and \textit{Alamkāras} are to be esteemed in so far as they rest upon it. But this all-important \textit{aṅgin} is explained by Ānandavardhana practically with special reference to Rasa (\textit{rasādi-lakṣaṇam})\textsuperscript{30} and the Dhvanikāra himself elsewhere discusses the merits of diction and the adjustment of words, letters and sentences with regard to their capacity of awakening the Rasa, a theme from which a theory of \textit{aucitya} or propriety was evolved. Again, the Dhvanikāra lays down that the \textit{guṇībhūta-vyaṅga} class of poetry can become true poetry (\textit{dhvani-kāvyā}) from the consideration of its tendency, if any, of developing a Rasa (iii. 41). In several places, Ānandavardhana is so much carried away by his enthusiasm for Rasa that he goes almost near stating expressly that the Rasa is in fact the essence of poetry, as it is of the drama\textsuperscript{31}.

This borrowing from the Rasa-system—for the idea of Rasa, as Ānandavardhana himself says, was already well established in the drama by Bharata and others—fills the outlines of the Dhvani-theory with a fundamentally important aesthetic content, which was not yet fully recognised in the poetic art as it had been in the dramatic. And, in this sense, the Dhvani-theory has been characterised as an extension of the Rasa-theory. But in reality it was not an extension so much as a rearrangement; for the Dhvani-theorists accept

\textsuperscript{30} The term \textit{rasādi} should be interpreted to mean the \textit{rasa}, \textit{bhāva} etc. as the \textit{aṅgin}; but the word \textit{ādi} might in every case be taken to imply strictly the other two kinds of \textit{vyaṅga artha}, viz. \textit{vastu} and \textit{alamkāra}, which would be as much of an \textit{aṅgin} as the \textit{rasa}, although such an interpretation is doubtful from the context.

\textsuperscript{31} \textit{rasadāyo hi dvayor api tayoh (=kāvyā-nātyayoh)} \textit{ivabhūtāh}, p. 182. See also the citations in fn 29 above.
the Rasa (despite the emphasis they put upon it) as only one of the aspects of the unexpressed in poetry. Neither the Dhvanikāra nor Ānandavardhana could, at least from the standpoint of theoretic consistency, explicitly make the suggestion of Rasa the exclusive end of poetry, inasmuch as the unexpressed may in some cases be a matter or an imaginative mood, although it can be shewn that their views practically tend to such a proposition and probably inspire later theorists to work out the thesis that the Rasa alone is the essence of poetry. The essentiality thus implicitly, if not explicitly, ascribed to Rasa by the formulators of the Dhvani-theory, is, however, expressed more definitely by Abhinavagupta, who appears to have attached little weight to mere theoretical considerations. The point will be dealt with later; it will suffice here to indicate that Abhinavagupta in many places expresses himself unambiguously that the Rasa is in fact the essence of poetry; and, admitting that the unexpressed may also take the form of Vastu or Alaṃkāra, he thinks that these two forms of suggestion terminate ultimately in the suggestion of Rasa.

We shall see that this opinion probably inspired the somewhat extreme theory of Viśvanātha that the Rasa alone constitutes the essence of poetry; but the considerations, which had wisely restrained the authors of the Dhvanyāloka from expressing it in clear terms, could not, as Jagannātha's criticism of Viśvanātha's view shews, be easily put out of the way, and recognition was refused to any further development of the theory out of itself.

The Dhvanikāra's idea was probably to make his conception of poetry wide enough to cover those varieties of

32 rasa eva vastuta ātmā, vastvalaṃkāra-dhvanī tu sarvathā rasasya prati paryavasyete, p. 27. An almost similar view is expressed in his comment on the word ucita in Ānandavardhana's exposition of the Dhvanikāra's remark on the essence of poetry: ucita-sabdena rasa-viṣayam eva aucityam bhavatī darśayan rasa-dhvaner jīvitatvam sūcayati, p. 13.
poetry which develop no Rasa, or, which develop it imperfectly, although his real leaning to Rasa possibly betrayed itself in a different end, from which theorists like Viśvanātha drew the inevitable logical conclusion. Nevertheless, we have here an honest attempt to do justice to facts; not only to set forth what poetry ought to be but to establish the actual facts of poetry as they appeared to these theorists. They could not ignore the fact that the matter (vastu) or the imagination (alāṃkāra) played an important part in some kinds of poetry, although they were alive to the consideration that the emotion (rasa) was in most cases the important criterion. This attitude towards empirical analysis is also exemplified by the anxiety which made them never spare themselves the trouble of going so far as to classify the cases of the unexpressed into more than five thousand different aspects, taking into consideration all conceivable facts and circumstances, which can be made out by a careful analysis of the forms of poetic speech. This fidelity to facts did not also allow them to ignore the aesthetic ideas of earlier speculation; for though these were found insufficient for explaining the whole problem, the concepts of rasa, riti, guṇa, doṣa and alāṃkāra had to be examined and their place properly defined in the new system before it could be established as a complete scheme. One of the triumphs of this school was, no doubt, the admission of the old idea of Rasa to its full importance in the art of poetry, as in the cognate art of the drama; but the school did not forget at the same time to harmonise the other important elements into its comprehensive theory.

The justification of the Riti is shown to consist in its relation to the suggestion of Rasa, and it is recognised in so far as it serves as a means to that end. The Dhvanī-theorists, however, dispense with the somewhat useless classification of the varieties of Riti (iii. 52, Vṛtti)33, the nature of which

33 The numbering of this verse is wrong in the printed text: it should have been iii. 47. It is correctly given in the 4th ed. (1935).
is not discussed by Ānandavardhana, but which, Abhinava points out, is explained by the position assigned to the Guṇas (rītra hi guṇeṣveva prayavasāyatā)\(^4\). The function of the Guṇas is justified only by their part in the development of the Rasa in the theme; and from this standpoint, as we shall see presently, their minute classification is needless. Ānandavardhana admitting only three Guṇas corresponding roughly

34 Abhinava says (p. 231): yad āha—’vīteṣa gunātmā’ (Vāmana i., 2. 3) guṇās ca rasa-parvaṃvasāyina iva kṛtya hy uktaṃ prāg guṇa-nirūpane ‘ṣṛgāra eva madhuraḥ’ (Dhva. ii. 8, p. 79) ity atreī. Vāmana has laid down that the rīti is nothing more than a particular arrangement of words (vīteṣa-pada-racanā) and that the essence of this particularity of arrangement consists in the guṇas. The nature and scope of the guṇas, therefore, determine those of the rīti. Now the Dhvanikāra has pointed out in ii. 8f how the three Guṇas, viz. mādhurya (in śṛgāra), ojas (in raudra) and pravāda (in all the rasas) contribute to the development of the Rasas; and his remarks regarding the Guṇas apply to the Rīti, which need not be taken separately. Roughly speaking, his three Guṇas correspond, therefore, to the three Rītis of Vāmana. Ānandavardhana speaks of the Guṇas as having sanḍhaṭanā-dharmatva (p. 5), but this is probably only giving an exposition of the view of Udbhata who, according to Abhinava-gupta (p. 134), had held that the Guṇas are sanḍhaṭanā-dharmāḥ. He might mean, as Mammeta does, that particular combinations of letters or compounding of words produce particular Rasas (see ii. 8f). No doubt, in iii. 5f, both the Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhana speak of sanḍhaṭanā in connexion with the Guṇas; but they define sanḍhaṭanā as depending on the length or shortness of compounds (which would correspond to the definition of Rīti given by Rudraṭa). The appropriateness of the sanḍhaṭanā depends on the ultimate object of manifesting the Rasa, as well as on the speaker and the theme. The question, therefore, resolves itself into a theory of suitability or propriety (aucitya) with regard to the disposition of words, letters and sentences, having a special reference to the Rasa (rasa-niyama), as well as to the theme in hand (vācyā- or viśaya-niyama) and to the temper and character of the speaker (vaktṛ-niyama). Ānandavardhana expressly lays down (p. 135) that the Guṇas are not equivalent to sanḍhaṭanā (na gunāḥ sanḍhaṭanā-svarūpāḥ), nor do they depend on sanḍhaṭanā (na ca sanḍhaṭanā-svarūpāḥ gunāḥ); on the other hand, the sanḍhaṭanā depends on the Guṇas. See S. K. De, Some Problems, pp. 91-94.
to the three Rítis of Vámána\textsuperscript{35}. The relation of the Guñas to the Rasa is further made clear by drawing a sharp line of distinction between them and the Alamkāras, which also serve to embellish poetic expression. Expanding the dictum of Ānandavardhana in his Vṛtti on ii. 7, the later writers explain that the Guñas are the inseparable attributes of the Rasa\textsuperscript{38} without which they cannot exist, and are defined in terms of their having rasa-dharmatva, rasāvyabhicāri-sthiti tvā and rasopakařaraka tvā. If we sometimes speak of them as belonging to a word and its sense, it is said in a secondary or figurative way (upacāra), and the old distinction between śabda-guṇa and artha-guṇa must be regarded in this light. The Alamkāras, on the other hand, belong essentially to śabda and artha, and through these means indirectly embellish the Rasa. Mammaṭa describes their nature thus: “Poetic figures, like alliteration, simile and the rest, are those which sometimes help the existing (rasa), through the parts or members (i.e. śabda and artha), just as a necklace and the like (do to the human soul)\textsuperscript{37}. The Vṛtti explains\textsuperscript{38}: “Poetic figures are those which help the principal existing rasa, through the excellence of the parts, consisting of the expressor

\textsuperscript{35} A similar function is assigned to the vṛtis recognised by Udbhata. See p. 142, and also Abhinava’s remarks on pp. 5-6.

\textsuperscript{36} Ānandavardhana says (ii. 7 Vṛtti): “The guṇas depend on that sense which is the principal existing content (āṅgīna) in the form of rasa etc. Those, again, which rest upon the parts or members (āṅgīga), namely the expressed word and sense, are considered to be alamkāras. The former may be compared to qualities like bravery, and the latter to ornaments like bracelet”. Mammaṭa uses the term acala-sthiti (interpreted by Govinda as aprthak-sthiti) to indicate the relation of Guṇa to Rasa.

\textsuperscript{37} upakurvanti tam santam ye’i ga-dvārena jātucit/hārādivad alaṃkārās te’nuprasopamādayah/}

\textsuperscript{38} ye vācya-vācaka-lakṣanāṅgātīsaya-mukhena mukhyam rasam sambhavinam upakurvan ti te kanṭhādyāṅgānām utkarsādhāna-dvārena śaririṇo’py upakārakā hārādaysa ivālamkārāḥ. Yatra nāsti raso tatrokti-vaiścitrya-mātra-paryavasāyinah, kvacit tu santam api nopakurvanti.
(word) and the expressed (sense), just as a necklace and the like add to the excellence of the soul through the adornment of a part of the body like the neck. Where there is no rasa, these end in mere strikingness of expression (vaicitrya); and sometimes when the rasa is existing, they do not help it". The Alaṃkāras, therefore, have only an indirect relation to the Rasa through their capacity of embellishing the expressed śabda and artha, and add to its excellence only secondarily. They can exist without the Rasa in the form of mere strikingness of expression (uktī-vaicitrya); and even when the Rasa is present, the poetic figures are not invariably necessary³⁹. As to how the Alaṃkāra may sometimes help the Rasa, the question is discussed by the Dhvanikāra in ii. 19-20, and four possible circumstances are said to occur (1) when the poet, not dealing with it as the main point, intends its subordination to the main theme, e.g. the Rasa (tatparatvena, nāṅgitvena), (2) when he accepts or rejects it as suiting the occasion (kāle graha-tyāgayoh), (3) when he does not want to carry it out effectively to the end (nāti-nirvāhe), and (4) when accomplished effectively, it is still made subservient (nirvāhe'-pyāṅgatvē)⁴⁰.

The comparatively subsidiary position thus assigned to the Alaṃkāra⁴¹ must not, however, be taken to indicate any

³⁹ This is explained by the following commentary: guṇā rasam vinā nāvatiṣṭhante: guṇā rasam avaśyam upakurvantī alaṃkārās tvavatyan nopakurvantī; guṇā rasa-dharmā atah sākṣad rase tiṣṭhanti, alaṃkārās tu na rase sākṣat tiṣṭhanti kīṃ tu tvāṅga-dvāreṇa.

⁴⁰ Cf Hemacandra p. 17.

⁴¹ In Mammata's much criticised definition of poetry, therefore, the Alaṃkāra is taken as an accident, not as an essential; and though technically the phrase anaalāṃkṛti punah kvāpi is open to the objections brought forward by Viśvanātha and Jaganātha, the views of the latter on the point under discussion does not differ substantially from those of Mammata. In Mammata's definition there is no direct mention of vākyārthibhūta rasa or of the vyaṅgya sense other than the Rasa (which are there by implication), but the Guṇas and Doṣas are expressly mentioned. The explanation of these peculiarities of the definition must
tendency to minimise its importance, for Ānandavardhana himself admits that poetry depends on it for its operation (kāvyā-vṛttes tadāsrayāt). But the Alamkāra is accepted only in connexion with the angin or the principal element in poetry, which in most cases takes the form of Rasa; and Alamkāras, other than such, which are devoid of or unconnected with the suggestion of Rasa and therefore unpoe tic, are in Ānandavardhana's opinion, mere vāg-vikalpas, and should be included in the citra-kāvyā, which is no poetry but an imitation thereof. The authors of the Dhvanyāloka ignored these because their system had no place for them; but the poet may sometimes intend not to awaken Rasa or anything else unexpressed, but to produce mere strikingness of expression in the form of a poetic figure. Such cases, therefore, should be acknowledged and analysed. We shall see that followers of the Dhvani-system like Ruyyaka realised this deficiency in the treatment of the Dhvanikāra and tried to supply it by admitting the significance of such figures for poetry and analysing their content after the indication given by Kuntaka.

The view indicated above regarding the nature of the Guṇas necessarily dispenses with their endless multiplication and differentiation. Mammaṭa and his followers, accepting the standpoint of the Dhvanyāloka in this respect, admit only three Guṇas, viz., mādhurya (sweetness), ojas (energy) and prasāda (lucidity), out of the ten recognised since Bharata's time. They shew elaborately that these ten are either included in the three mentioned above, or else constitute mere absence of defects, while some of them are even positive defects. In fact, these three Guṇas are defined broadly enough to include most of the ten Guṇas of Bharata, Daṇḍin and Vāmana. Thus, the mādhurya, found chiefly in the Erotic, the Pathetic and the Quietistic moods, is described be sought in the historical development of these ideas in the earlier schools, and not in any attempt to invent an original definition. See below ch. vii.
generally as that excellence which brings delight (āhāda) to the mind and makes it melt, as it were (druti-kāraṇa); the ojas, arising in the Heroic, the Furious and the Disgustful moods, is that property by which the mind is brilliantly expanded (vistāra-kāraṇa); while the prasāda, found in all poetic moods, causes them to pervade the mind (vyāpti-kāraṇa), like fire pervading dry fuel, or water pervading a pure piece of cloth. As they are related to the main poetic mood Rasa in the composition and made suitable to its particular kind, the classification, as given here, naturally proceeds on a psychological basis having reference to their influence on the reader’s mind (so as to lead up to the particular mood), and supersedes the old differentiation resting on an adjustment of sound and sense. It will be also seen from the somewhat comprehensive definitions of the three Guṇas that the śleṣa, samādhi and audārya of older writers may be included in ojas, and the artha-vyakti in prasāda; while sankumarya and kānti are essentially the opposites of the defects of harshness (pāruṣya) and vulgarity (grāmyatva) respectively, and samatā or uniformity of diction may sometimes be a positive defect.

Consistently with this view of the Guṇas, the Doṣas or defects of a composition are recognised in so far as they are the repressors of the Rasa, as well as of the expressed sense. The Doṣas, therefore, convey a positive significance, like the Guṇas, in relation to the Rasa, in spite of the admitted fact that some Doṣas approach gunābhāva (negation of Guṇas) and some Guṇas approach doṣābhāva (negation of Doṣas). The punarukta or tautology, for instance, is generally a fault, but it may sometimes be an excellence if there is an apprehension of the charm of the suggested Rasa through it. The justification of the distinction between invariable (nitya) and non-invariable (anitya) fault lies in the fact that in the case of some poetic moods, we can generalise the avoidance of particular combinations as being always damaging for the effect. Thus, the Dhvanikāra points out that when love or śṛṅgāra
is the principal suggested mood, one should always avoid faults like unmelodiousness (śruti-duṣṭa), although it is not a fault in the case of the Heroic or raudra-rasa.

The attempt, therefore, to estimate the worth of a poem by analysing two kinds of meaning the one explicit and the other implicit, and judging it by a reference to the latter rather than to the former, explains in a new light the nature and function of the Guṇas and Doṣas, as well as of the Alamkāras which were admitted by previous speculation, but over which there had been so much controversy. The explicit, or expressed word and sense, in which poetry is clothed constitutes its mere vesture, but this external or accidental feature alone appealed to earlier thinkers, whose attention was practically confined to the expressed śabda and artha. The Guṇas and Doṣas (along with the so-called Rīti), as well as the Alamkāras, are only certain forms of these, being merely turns given to śabda and artha in expression, and are justified as such. They cannot, therefore, be taken as essential, for they do not touch the essence of poetry which consists of the implicit or unexpressed meaning. But at the same time, they cannot be ignored because they are the means by which the unexpressed is suggested, the expressed word and sense being the vyanjuka of the deeper vyangya sense. In classifying the implicit or the unexpressed, again, into communication of a fact (vastu-dhvani), or suggestion of an imaginative mood (alambkāra-dhvani), or manifestation of an emotional state (rasa-dhvani), the theorists recognised the truth that the essence of poetry may consist of fact, imagination or feeling as the predominant implicit factor, the outward expression being important as a means of pointing to this implicit significance. But it is also perceived that the emotional mood, which the poet succeeds in communicating to us, is of the highest importance in poetry; and stress came to be laid on this emotional mood to the extent even of ignoring the imaginative or the realistic, and poetry came to have a deeper significance as a means of emotional realisa-
tion. This the Dhvani-theorists did by emphasising the rasa-dhvani in poetry.

This, in brief, is an outline of the new system which attempts to take into consideration all the known facts and dogmas and build a compact theory of poetry on their basis. But its chief merit consists in its elaboration of the most necessary and fundamental principle of all higher poetry, viz., the art of suggestion, which should lead the reader through diverse routes from that which is distinctly expressed to that which is left unexpressed. With the arrival at this point, one discovers the real significance of a poem and appreciates the taste or relish of the underlying poetic sentiment, which is in reality inexpressible. The ornamental fitting out of thought or word, as well as the literary excellences of structure or style, everything contributes towards this end. In this connexion, we must not mistake this suggestion to be a form of quiet hinting, or of absolute silence, such as we find in some modern poetic mystics, or that particular train of thought which holds that all things have their being in the unexpressed and resolve themselves into the indeterminable. Sanskrit poetry does not aim at leaving the unexpressed to be darkly gathered, nor does the theory of Poetics regard it as indeterminate. The unexpressed is bound up by means of definite links with the expressed, without which it cannot exist; but it is wrapped up in such a manner as to make it possible only for the initiated in the poetic hieroglyphics to comprehend it in its subtlety. The unexpressed is not understood by those who know grammar and lexicon, but only by men of taste and literary instinct who know the essence of poetry. It is the province of the sahṛdaya, the connoisseur, who is expert in discerning through the intricate meshes of veiled word and sense into the aesthetic relish of deeper significance, in which the pleasure of the beautiful is mixed up with the pleasure arising from the fineness of the problem itself.

This general scheme of Poetics outlined by the Dhvani
school, in spite of the loopholes that may be detected in the
doctrinal edifice, is accepted as canonical by all important
writers coming after Ānandavardhana. Here and there an
isolated theorist arose who dared to question the general
creed, but he was at once put down as a heretic and condem-
ned to neglect and oblivion. The immediately following systems
of the Vakroktijīvita-kāra and the Vyaktiviveka-kāra were,
in spite of their able and ingenious efforts, unable to sup-
plant the Dhvani-theory; and, finding no strong adherents,
themselves languished and died out. These views are taken
notice of by later writers only for the purpose of refuting
them. Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, judging from the long quotations
from his lost work in Abhinavagupta and others, seems to
have made a greater impression; but even he does not appear
to have been very successful. All these writers, no doubt,
accept the concept of a suggested sense, but when they en-
deavour to explain it in a different way, they could hardly
find a patient hearing. Even Viśvanātha’s attempt to push
the theory to its logical extreme did not meet with universal
approval. The labours, therefore, of all later writers, typified
by Mammaṭa, consisted generally in working out the details
of the Dhvani-theory and the scheme of Poetics standardised
on its basis; and they spent all their fine scholastic powers
in refining and explaining but hardly in adding anything of
abiding interest. No other work on Sanskrit Poetics has
indeed exerted so much influence as the Dhvanyāloka, which
brought to a focus the tentative efforts of earlier thinkers,
and by its thoroughness and masterly exposition eclipsed
all its predecessors, dominating, as it did, thoughts of
generations of theorists even down to the present time.
CHAPTER VI

ABHINAVAGUPTA AND THE REACTIONARY SYSTEMS

(1)

Abhinavagupta

The importance of Abhinavagupta as a writer on Sanskrit Poetics lies in his learned exposition of the Dhvani-theory in his well known commentary on the text of Ānandavardhana; and his erudition, reputation and influence as a great scholar and philosophical writer of his generation, no doubt, added weight to his championship of the theory, and contributed a great deal to its ultimate exclusive acceptance in later Poetics. His theoretical standpoint, however, does not differ, except in one material point which will be dealt with presently, from that of the formulators of the Dhvani-system; and he may be fairly regarded as belonging to that group of faithful commentators who are more anxious to interpret than to incorporate new ideas into the system they comment upon. On the other hand, Abhinavagupta was also greatly interested in the dramaturgic work of Bharata and wrote an elaborate and stupendous commentary on this encyclopaedic text. From this interest in dramaturgy, we have seen\(^1\), he can be deeply interested in the various theories about the origin and function of Rasa, not only in the drama but also in poetry; and one of the latest and most important theory on Rasa is directly associated with his name by Mammaṭa, Hemacandra and others. In expounding this theory, he tried to explain clearly how the vyakti or vyañjanā of the Dhvani-theorists could be applied to the case of the manifestation of Rasa, thus correlating the Rasa-

\(^1\) See ch. iv, p. 128.
doctrine with the Dhvani-theory. He defined the concept of Rasa and its place in poetic theory, and furnished a brilliant aesthetic explanation of a phenomenon which had already taxed the ingenuity of many a previous thinker on the subject.

Having realised the importance of Rasa in poetry, Abhinava, however, went a step further than the Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhana in boldly setting it up as the only essence or aesthetic foundation of poetry, a view which has greatly influenced all later speculation on the subject. From the earlier drama and dramatic theory the authors of the Dhvanyāloka had admittedly worked up the idea of Rasa into poetry and poetic theory; but as the emotional mood in poetry, which the fact of Rasa emphasises, came to be more and more prominent, the Rasa stood out more and more in relief as its essential aesthetic basis. We have seen\(^2\) that Abhinava's predecessors in the Dhvani school consider Rasa only as one of the elements of the unexpressed, which may take other forms in the shape of an unexpressed matter (vastu) or an unexpressed imaginative mood (alamkāra). No doubt, their theory puts great emphasis on the rasa-dhvani or suggestion of Rasa in poetry; but both the Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhana are yet careful in taking into account other kinds of suggestion and do not, as they could not, erect the Rasa into the very 'soul' of poetry. No doubt, it may be thought that they show a decided partiality to rasa, which would practically lead to a conclusion of its essentiality; but they could not, having regard to theoretical consistency give exclusive preference to it; for in their complete scheme of Poetics the rasa-dhvani, which is only one of the three forms of the unexpressed, plays as much part as the vastu- and alamkāra-dhvani. They had to recognise that the centre of gravity in a poem may lie in its material and its imagination, as much as in its emotional element. Abhinavagupta appears to have attached little weight to these theoretical considera-

\(^2\) See ch. v, p. 166.
tions, which had restrained his predecessors from explicitly stating what they practically implied; and brushing them aside, he carries their theory to its utmost logical consequence by declaring the essentiality of Rasa (rasenaiva sarvam jivati kāvyam), without which, in his opinion, there could be no poetry (na hi tac chūnyam, i.e. rasa-śūnyam, kāvyam kimcid asti, p. 65). He attempts, however, to explain the theoretical discrepancy by saying that the two other aspects of suggestion, concerned respectively with vastu and alaṃkāra, resolve themselves ultimately into the suggestion of rasa, which is in fact the essence of poetry (rasa eva vastuta ātmā, vastvalaṃkāra-dhvanī tu sarvathā rasaṃ prati paryavasyete, p. 27). This opinion, no doubt, influenced the view of later thinkers to a great extent; for, although Mammaṭa carefully follows the cautious attitude of the Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhana, Viśvanātha, developing their theory (after Abhinavagupta) further out of itself, pushes it to its extreme limit and builds up his own scheme of Poetics on the basis of the theory that poetry consists of a sentence of which the ‘soul’ is Rasa (vākyam rasātmakam kāvyam). But we shall see that the considerations which led the Dhvanikāra and his commentator to leave their view on this point wisely unstated could not be easily put out of the way, and they are repeated substantially by Jagannātha in his criticism of Viśvanātha’s view. All later writers, however, agree in thinking that the rasa-dhvanī is certainly the most important point for consideration in poetry; and even if they do not explicitly state with Abhinava that the vastu- and alaṃkāra-dhvanī resolve ultimately into rasa-dhvanī, they yet show a decided partiality to the latter element.

This, in brief, is the general position of Abhinavagupta as a champion of the new system established by Ānandavardhana. The final dominance of this system in later speculation is due not only to the intrinsic worth of the theory itself and its masterly formulation by Ānandavardhana, but also probably to the authority which Abhinava’s exposition as well as his
reputation lent to it. We find in the immediate followers of
the system, however, not the extreme position of Abhinava-
gupta, but the theory and the scheme as finally outlined by
Ānandavardhana. With Ānandavardhana, the Dvhani-theory,
which was itself ancient, came to prevail; but with him also
was evolved a more or less complete scheme of Poetics in
which the divergent gleams of earlier thought and the
accumulated stock of recognised ideas meet and are rationally
adjusted. This scheme, with the concept of dhvani (especially
rasa-dhvani) at its centre, was summed up and uttered in the
concise form of a systematic text-book by Mammaṭa, another
Kashmirian, whose influence perhaps was not less potent than
that of Abhinavagupta in raising it to almost exclusive
authority in later times. This system, which for convenience
we have called the Dvhani-system, absorbed and overshadow-
ed all previous schools and systems, and came to reign
supreme, only to be improved in detail by the large crowd of
its followers who form the bulk of post-dhvani writers on
Poetics. Jagannātha, one of the latest writers of this group,
very aptly remarks, therefore, that the authors of Dhvanyāloka
settled the path to be followed by later writers on Poetics
But it must not be supposed that the theory or system
of Dvhani could obtain universal acceptance without some
vigorous opposition. Before we take up the post-dhvani
followers of Ānandavardhana, it will be necessary to consider
here some of the reactionary writers who either follow and
develop other traditions of thought, or who refuse to acknow-
ledge the new theory. Adherents of other schools, such as
Pratīhārendurāja (pp. 79f) who commented on Udbhata, or
Gopendra Tippa Bhūpāla (p. 72) who commented on Vāmana,
carry on the older tradition and do not fail to criticise the
new theory. Says Mukula, Pratīhārendurāja’s Guru: lakṣaṇā-
mārgāvagāḥitvam tu dhvaneḥ sahādayair nūtanatayo-pavara-
nitasya vidyata iti...etac ca vidvacute kuśāgrīyayā buddhyā
nirūpaṇīyam, na tu jhagity evāsūyītyayam ity alam ati-
prasaṅgena (p. 21). But more hostile opposition or attack came from some really thoughtful writers who urged new systems, or new explanations of the Dhvani-theory in terms of old ideas. Most of these theorists lived near enough in time to Abhinavagupta; and coming later than the authors of the Dhvanīyāloka, they accept or show themselves cognisant of the general concept of dhvani, but attempt to formulate other explanations of it. All of them, however, agree that the vyāñjana vyrtti need not be postulated or proved for explaining the suggested sense of poetry, and conservatively maintain that the suggested sense can be reached from the expressed sense by some of the recognised means or processes of knowledge (e. g. anumāna). None of these writers, therefore, is what the Dhvanikāra would call an abhāva-vādin, i.e., none of them would deny the existence of Dhvani, but they would try to explain it in terms of already recognised concepts or processes. These theorists are: Bhāṭṭa Nāyaka who probably preceded Abhinavagupta, Kuntaka who was probably the latter’s contemporary, and Mahimabhaṭṭa who was either a younger contemporary or lived immediately after Abhinavagupta. It will also be convenient to take up in this connexion the school of opinion represented by the writer on Poetics in the Agni-purāṇa and by Bhoja, which stands in many respects apart from the Kashmirian school of Ānandavardhana and which appears to have been entirely untouched by the implications of the Dhvani-theory.

( 2 )

Bhāṭṭa Nāyaka

It is unfortunate that Bhāṭṭa Nāyaka’s Hṛdaya-darpaṇa is now lost. From the citations of Abhinavagupta and others, the conjecture is likely that it was not a commentary on Bharata’s Nāṭya-śāstra but an independent work written in prose and verse (i.e., with verse-kārikā and prose-vṛtti) and

3 See, vol. i, pp. 40f.
resembling Mahimabhaṭṭa’s later Vyakti-viveka written in the same style and with the same object. Like the latter work, it was composed, if not for establishing a new theory of Poetics, at least for controverting the position of the Dhvanyāloka and formulating a different explanation of Dhvani, especially of rasa-dhvani. When Mahimabhaṭṭa later on took upon himself the task of “demolishing” the Dhvani-theory, he boasted at the outset of his elaborate attack that he had composed his Vyakti-viveka without looking into the Darpana (presumably Hṛdaya-darpana, as explained by his commentator), which was therefore obviously written with the same object of dhvani-dhvaṃsa. No doubt, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka was one of the four writers (mentioned by Abhinava, Mammaṭa and others) who formulated explanations of Bharata’s original sūtra on Rasa; but this in itself is no reason to take him as a commentator on Bharata’s text.

4 It is curious that Mahimabhaṭṭa says that in composing his own work he has not also looked into the Candrikā, which was apparently an adverse commentary on the Dhvanyāloka. It is probably the same work as is referred to and criticised frequently by Abhinavagupta in his *Locana and as, he says, was composed by one of his ancestors. Abhinava’s references and criticism also confirm the idea that it criticised the text of the Dhvanyāloka adversely on many points. This Candrikā is also apparently cited by Māṇikyacandra and Someśvara in their commentaries on Mammaṭa. See vol i, p. 101.

5 The question has been already discussed by us in vol. i p. 40. There is a passage, already referred to by us, in the Abhinava-bhūratī ch. i, which appears (see Sovani’s article on the Pre-dhvani Schools in Bhandarkar Commemoration Volume, p. 390; contra in JRAS, 1909, pp. 450-52) to indicate that the Hṛdaya-darpana was a commentary on the Nāṭya-tāstra. The passage runs thus (commenting on brahmaṇā yad udāḥtam in Bharata i. 1): bhaṭṭa-nāyakas tu brahmaṇā paramātmanā yad udāḥtam kṛta-nidarṣanām.......tad anena pāramārthikāṃ prayājanam ukṛtam iti vyākhyānam hṛdaya-darpaṇe paryāgraḥati. This passage is indeed important, for the relevancy of any comment on Bharata i. 1. is difficult to explain in a work which ex hypothesi is not a commentary on the text. But it appears to militate against those references to and passages from Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka’s work (prose as well as verse) which Abhinava cites and criticises in his *Locana (pp. 11, 12, 15, 19, 21, 27,
On the other hand, Abhinava's references in *Locana* make it reasonably clear that the *Hṛdaya-darpaṇa*, like the *Vyaktiviveka*, had the special object of criticising in detail the text of the *Dhvanyāloka* as well as its theory; and its discussion of Rasa might have come in topically in connexion with Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's general views regarding poetry and poetic expression.

The question, however, cannot be definitely settled so long as we get only glimpses of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's views set forth in the brief exposition and adverse criticism of Abhinava and others. We have already considered at some length Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's views regarding the origin and function of Rasa in poetry*. We have seen that Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka regards *rasa-carvanā* as the essence of poetry, but he is apparently not prepared to accept the function of *vyāñjanā* as its means of 'manifestation'. It is possible that he admits a suggested sense, as he accepts

28, 29, 33, 63, 67-68) and which consist mostly of direct criticism of the text of the *Dhvanyāloka*. Either of two explanations is possible: (1) that the *Hṛdaya-darpaṇa* was in fact a commentary on Bharata's *Nāṭya-tāstra*, and Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's criticism of the *Dhvanyāloka* might have constituted incidental discussions in it. But this does not explain the presence of verses in it, which later writers, including Abhinavagupta, quote from Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka in their exposition of his views; or (2) that it was an independent work in prose and verse, consisting of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's propounding of his own views in opposition to those of the *Dhvanyāloka*; and the discussions of Rasa-theory and of Bharata's text are not altogether inexplicable, as they might have been topical in connexion with his general theory. This latter explanation, which we have already discussed vol. i, seems to be more likely.

6 See ch. iv., pp. 123f.

7 Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's objection to the *abhivyakti*-theory is thus summarised by Abhinavagupta (*Locana* p. 68): "If the potentially existing *āṅgūra* is supposed to be manifested by *abhivyakti*, then it would occupy its field of action in diverse degrees (*viṣayārjana-tāratamya-pravṛttiḥ*), i.e., thus contradicting the nature of Rasa as one. There would also be the difficulty mentioned before, namely, whether the Rasa is manifested as existing in oneself or in another person."
the suggestion of Rasa as the essence of poetry (\textit{rasa-dhvanis tu tenaivātmatayāṅgikṛtaḥ}, *Locana* p.15); but from Abhinava’s twitting him on this score it is probable that he denied \textit{vastu-dhvanī} (\textit{kīṃ tu vastu-dhvanīm dūṣyata rasa-dhvanis tad anugrāhakaḥ samarthyata iti suṣṭhutarām dhvani-dhvanis so’yaṃ}, p. 20). Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka maintains in a verse attributed to him by Abhinava (p. 27), Hemacandra (p. 4) Māṇikyaśandra (p. 4) and Jayaratha (p. 9) that the distinction between various kinds of literary composition lies in the fact that in the Śāstra śabda predominates, \textit{arthā} in the Ākhyāna (=probably \textit{itihāsa}), while in the Kāvyā, both śabda and \textit{arthā} are subordinated (\textit{guṇībhūta} or \textit{nyagbhāvita}). Elsewhere he is represented by Abhinava (p. 68) as saying that the verbal composition (śabda) which makes up poetry is different from other species of verbal composition by the fact that it possesses three elements. Of these elements, \textit{abhidhā} or Denotation belongs to the province of expressed meaning, \textit{bhāvakatva} or power of generalisation to that of Rasa, and the \textit{bhojakatva} or the power of enjoyment to the appreciating audience; thus we have three functions attributed to the three elements of poetry. If Denotation, among these, is taken by itself (i.e. without the other two), then what is the essential difference. he asks, between the poetic figures and the dogmas which form the method of Śāstras? Or, if this manifold distinction of functions is without importance (metaphorically as well as intrinsically), then why avoid faults like unmelodiousness (\textit{śruti-duṣṭa})? These considerations, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka thinks, would give us the second function, viz. \textit{bhāvakatva}, by which generalisation is accomplished of poetry as well as of its factors (\textit{vibhāvas}). It is on account of this function that \textit{abhidhā} or Denotation is also Indication (lakṣāṇā), i.e., the Denotation can give to the expressed sense a secondary or metaphorical significance as the basis of Rasa. After the Rasa is thus generalised (bhāvīta), comes its enjoyment or \textit{bhoga} which, we have seen, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka represents, after the Sāṃkhya philosophers, as a process of distinterested
contemplation akin to the philosophic contemplation of Brahma.

Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka thus postulates a function of bhoga, beyond those of abhidhā and bhāvakatva, inherent in poetry, in order to explain the working of Rasa. He seems to imply that the Rasa, which the Dhvani-theorists would take as the suggested emotional sense of poetry, is, in his opinion, purely sva-samvedya and therefore transcending definition. In other words, he belongs to that class of objectors to the Dhvani-theory regarding whom the Dhvanikāra says that they do not deny dhvani but think that its essence lies beyond the province of words (i. 1c). In a verse attributed Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka by Abhinava (pp. 15, 11) and Jayaratha (p. 9), he speaks of kāvyāṅgatva and not kāvyā-rūpatā of what is known as dhvani; a statement which would indicate that having assumed the concept, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's object was to establish an explanation different from that of the Dhvani-theorists. Ruuyaka thinks that Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka would regard what is called vyaṅgya-vyāpāra to be an element (kāvyāṃsatva) and not an essence of poetry, being reached by the bold utterance of the poet (praṇḍhokti). In this sense, the kavi-karman or act of imagination on the part of the poet (indicated by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, as Jayaratha points out, by the word vyāpāra), which makes sabda and artha subservient to itself, is the most important thing in poetry; a view which approximates Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's theory to that of Kuntaka, who makes kavi-karman the source of what he calls vakrokti in poetry.

( 3 )

Kuntaka

Kuntaka, author of the Vakrokti-jīvita, on the other hand, had no direct intention of attacking or disproving the Dhvani-

8 Read in the verse kāvyāṅgatvam na rūpatā, as given by the reading of MS ga indicated in 'Locana' p. 15.
theory. He appears to have accepted the fact of a suggested sense in poetry but, following the tradition of Bhāmaha's vakrokti, he develops a system of vakrokti of his own, in some aspects of which he includes all ideas of dhvani and rasa. Nearly the whole of his long lost work has been recently recovered, and a part of it (chs. i, ii and a part of iii) has been published by the present writer; it is now possible, therefore, to depend no longer on the references to Kuntaka in later literature for an account of his views, but gather it independently from his own statements.

The central idea in Kuntaka is that the vakrokti is the essence (jīvita) of poetry; and by Vakrokti he understands a certain striking or charming (vicitra) mode of expression (vinyūsa-krama), which is different from or excels the common or matter-of-fact expression of words and ideas in the Śāstras and the like (śastrādi-prasiddha-sabdārthopanibandha-vyatireki). It is, therefore, a deviation from the established mode of speech for the purpose of attaining a certain strikingness (vaicitrya or vicchiti), or an imaginative turn of words and ideas (bhaṅgī-bhaṅiti or bhaṅiti-prakāra) peculiar to poetry, and abhorrent of common speech in which facts are more or less simply stated. This is the vakratva or vakrabhāva underlying all poetic speech. A distinction, therefore, is implied not only between the method of the sciences and the scriptures (śastrādi), on the one hand, and that of poetry, on the other, but also between what may be called the "naturalistic" and the "artistic" mode of expression.

Kuntaka, therefore, holds that sālaṅkṛta śabda and artha or embellished word and sense alone constitute poetry, and this embellishment consists of Vakrokti. The so-called embellishments, which go by the name of poetic figures

9 In the Calcutta Oriental Series, 2nd revised and enlarged ed. 1928. The work consisted probably of four chapters. See vol. i. p. 128 above.
10 An account of Kuntaka's theory of poetry is given in the introduction to the above edition, which see for detailed references.
11 See above ch. ii, pp. 48-49.
(alamkāras) in orthodox Poetics, are merely aspects of this Vakrokti, and can be properly included in its comprehensive scope. So can also the ideas of dhvani and rasa. This Vakrokti being the only possible alamkāra and being essential as such, Kuntaka finds fault with the common statement that the alamkāra belongs to poetry; for such a statement would imply that poetry may exist without it (i. 7, 11).

Kuntaka then explains that the Vakrokti charms us by the skill of the poet, and is therefore called vaidagdhya-bhaṅgī-bhanīti. It rests ultimately on the conception (pratibhā) of the poet, or on his skill (kausāla), or on an act of imagination on his part, which is termed kavi-vyāpāra or kavi-karman. Kuntaka does not exactly define this kavi-vyāpāra, which is the ultimate source of poetry, perhaps because he is conscious of the fact that it is in its nature undefinable; but he analyses it elaborately, and distinguishes and classifies its function in six different spheres, namely, in the arrangements of letters (varṇa), of the substantive and terminal parts of a word (pada-pūrvārdha and pada-parārdha), of a sentence (vākyā), of a particular topic (prakaraṇa), and of the composition as a whole (prabandha). He devotes

12 The word vidagdha is used in opposition to the word vidvat to signify a man versed in belles-lettres as distinguished from a scholar; and the Dhvanyāloka often speaks of an appeal to vidagdha-vidvat-parīsad (pp. 201, 239). Avantisundari is cited in Kavya mīmāṃsā p. 46 as saying vidagdha-bhanīti-bhaṅgī-nivedyaṃ vastuno rūpaṃ na nityata-svabhāvam. The vaicitrya is discussed by Ānandavardhana at p. 243, in which connexion he uses the term bhaṅgī-kṛtam vaicitrya-mātram. Abhinava speaks of infinite variety of upamā-vicchitti (upamā-vicchitti-prakārādām asaṃkhyatvāt, *Locana p. 5), and uses it also synonymously with cārūtva (p. 8). It would appear from the verse quoted by Ānandavardhana at p. 130, the word vicchitti, used in this sense in poetic theories, is applied analogically from the same word used to signify a certain feminine charm or elegance derived from carelessness in dress and decoration (Bharata xxii. 16). See on this point Haricand Sastri, L'art poétique de l'Inde pp. 64-65. The word bhaṅgī in the sense of a turn of expression is used in Dhva* pp. 139, 241. Etymologically it appears to have the same meaning as vicchitti.
nearly the whole of his work, with the exception of the introductory portion of the first chapter, to the definition, classification and illustration of these varieties of kavivyāpāra-vakratā, which thus form the different categories into which poetic speech may be analysed.

It is clear from this brief exposition that Kuntaka cannot admit as poetry a composition involving mere svabhāvakoti, which he takes to be plain description without the requisite strikingness; and he consequently develops Bhāmaha's indication that a kind of atiśaya is involved in vakrokti-vaicitrya. This atiśaya, if it is taken in the sense of the lokātikrānta-gocaratā of Bhāmaha's atiśayokti, would imply a kind of heightened charm of expression which is lokottara or dissociated from personal interests and relations. The dissociation, therefore, which is supposed in the artistic attitude involved in the relish of Rasa, is also implied in Vakrokti; and on this point Kuntaka appears to agree with the main position of the Rasa-theorists. Kuntaka also thinks that the ultimate test of this lokottara vaicitrya is tadvidāhlāda or pleasure of the appreciating sahṛdaya, who plays here apparently the same part as he does in the Rasa-theory or in poetic theories generally. It seems, therefore, that the exponents of the different theories approach ultimately the same standard, albeit through different avenues of thought, and agree in holding that vaicitrya or camatkāra (in Almaṅkāra or Rasa) must be finally subjected to the taste of the sahṛdaya.

Thus a new turn was given to the Almaṅkāra-system of Bhāmaha; or rather, what was implicit or naïvely expressed in it was developed to its logical consequence by Kuntaka's systematic analysis of its implications. In spite of the obviously extreme nature of his central theory and his some-

13 See above ch. iv.
14 The Vakrokti-system of Kuntaka may properly be regarded as an off-shoot of the older Almaṅkāra-system (ch. ii).
what quaint nomenclature, his work is of great value as presenting a unique system, or rather as systematising the Alamkāra-theory of earlier writers in a refreshingly original way. The Dhvani-theorists had either dismissed the poetic figures (alamkāras) as mere vāg-vikalpas, or considered them only as heightening the charm of the unexpressed element in poetry. They speak of the relation of the Alamkāra to the principal suggested element of poetry (e.g. in the shape of Rasa); but there might arise cases where the poet’s obvious intention is not to awaken Rasa or anything else unexpressed, but simply to produce a strikingness in the form of an expressed poetic figure. In these cases, the authors of the Dhvanyāloka think that all such figures which, in connexion with an involved unexpressed element, possess a peculiar charm, belong to the class of poetry called by the guṇibhūta-vyāṅgya; if there is no such unexpressed element involved, the figures have a pictorial effect merely, and may be included in the lowest class of poetry, called by them citra and described by them as no poetry but an imitation thereof. In other words, they take into consideration such poetic figures as being connected with the unexpressed possess a peculiar charm, and thus justify their position in poetry; the figures unaccompanied by the unexpressed or in no way connected with it are condemned to the level of no-poetry, as phases of speech which is of infinite variety. As Āṇandavardhana says: anantā hi vāg-vikalpās tat-prakāraya eva cālamkārāḥ. Kuntaka, on the other hand, justifies the significance of such figures in poetry as figures, and shews that this significance is independent of all considérations of their connexion with the unexpressed; for it consists in the very vaicitrya or strikingness involved in them, which is sufficient in itself, and does not borrow its power of appeal from elsewhere.

But he justifies the alamkāra as such only when it involves the vaicitrya, vicchitti or vakratva and becomes a phase of Vakrokti. He admits that the poetic figures are particular forms of speech, aspects of the expressed denotation
(ahdhā-prakāra-viśeṣāḥ), in which there need not be any connexion with the unexpressed; but he supposes at the same time a specific differentia in them which consists in a peculiar turn of expression resulting in a characteristic strikingness (vaicitrya or vicchitti) and depending upon an act of imagination on the part of the poet (kavi-pratibhā-nirvartita). Thus, the so-called alaṁkāras of orthodox Poetics are admissible when they are found on analysis to possess these characteristics of peculiar charm imparted to them by the fertile imagination of the poet; and these, therefore, constitute the elements which go to make up the being of a poetic figure. Kuntaka in this way not only supplies a remarkable deficiency in the teaching of the Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhana, but also justifies the existence and fixes the conception of a poetic figure as distinguished from a mere speech-figure. It is no wonder, therefore, that later followers of the Dhvani school, who form the bulk of post-dhvani writers on Poetics, readily accept Kuntaka’s analysis, and regard the two characteristics, viz. vicchitti and kavi-vyāpāra, as forming the ultimate test of a poetic figure. Mammaṭa lays down that where there is no suggested Rasa, the poetic figures simply result in ukṣi-vaicitorya or charmingness of expression, and states generally that Alaṁkāra is charmingness itself (vaicitryam alaṁkārah). We shall see that Ruyyaka was the first writer who accepts Kuntaka’s test of a poetic figure and applies it systematically to a detailed examination and classification of individual poetic figures.

On Riti Kuntaka puts greater stress than Bhāmaha, and gives a more elaborate classification of Guṇas. He is aware of the classification of Mārga or Riti made by Daṇḍin and

15 Hence, the word “poetic figure” or kāvyālaṁkāra, instead of “figure of speech.” See above ch. ii. pp. 74. In a formal scheme of Poetics they no doubt correspond, but this point of view of its involving poetic charm would be entirely omitted in a treatise of rhetoric. It is, therefore, misleading to translate Sanskrit Alaṁkāra as Sanskrit Rhetoric. See ZDMG, i, 392 fn.
Vāmana, but he does not accept it. He does not also believe that a particular Rīti is determined by Deśa-dharma (regional characteristics) or that it should be named after a particular locality; for in that case one has to admit infinite varieties of Rīti, as there is infinite number of countries. The classification of Rītis into good (Uttama), bad (Adhama and indifferent (Madhyama) is also futile, for the best kind of mode alone is acceptable, and there is no point in admitting or framing rules for the so-called Adhama or Madhyama mode. In Kuntaka’s opinion, it is Kavi-svabhāva alone which furnishes the criterion, and Rītis (Kuntaka employs the term Mārga) should be classified according to the essential difference in the power (Śakti), culture (Vyutpatti) and practice (Abhyāsa) of particular types of poets. One class of poets has special fitness for composition characterised by what he calls Saukumārya, while others prefer Vaicitrya, these being the two extreme modes of composition admitted by him. But there may still be other poets who would prefer to steer a middle course, thus favouring a mixed mode. In the Sukumāra Mārga the natural powers of the poet find an unfettered scope in describing the Svabhāva of things, and consequently whatever ornamentation is required is effected with the least effort; while in the Vicitra Mārga, favoured by all good poets, the art is chiefly decorative, and the Kavi-Kauśala is Āhārya, being characterised by more deliberate and greater skill. Each of these Mārgas, according to Kuntaka, should contain four sets of excellences or Guṇas, which are designated by the same name but defined differently. In the Vicitra-mārga, we have Mādhurya=compactness of skillful structure avoiding laxity of form; Prasāda=lucidity due to the use of expressive words and easy syntax; Lāvanya=beauty due to the arrangement of short and long syllables; and Ābhijātya=elevatedness which is neither too soft nor too hard. In the Sukumāra Mārga, there should be Mādhurya=sweetness due to the fewness of compounds; Prasāda=perspicuity; Lāvanya=beauty arising out of proper
arrangement of letters and words; and Abhijātya = smoothness. The Madhyma Mārga, which stands midway, combines the excellences of both (ubhāyātmaka). To these characteristics Kuntaka adds Aucitya (i. 53-54) and Saubhāgya (i. 55-56) as excellences common to the three Mārgas. The Aucitya emphasises fitness of words and ideas, which Saubhāgya arises out of the realisation of all the resources of a composition.

It follows from the prominence given by Kuntaka to Vakrokti in poetry that all ideas of Dhvani and Rasa should be comprehended in certain aspects of vakrātā, just as the Vyrttis of Udbhata, connected with anuprāsa, as well as anuprāsa itself and yamaka of orthodox writers, are taken as kinds of varṇa-vīnyāsa-vakrātā or vakrātā depending upon the peculiar arrangement of letters. The idea of Dhvani is included partly in rūḍhi-vaicitya-vakrātā, where Ānandavardhana’s own verse tāla jaantu guṇa, as well as the verse snigdha-śyāmala-kānti cited by Ānanda as an example of arthāntara-saṃkramita-vācyadhvani (i.e. suggestion where the expressed sense passes into another sense), is given as instances. Other aspects of Dhvani are acknowledged in upacāra-vakrātā, where the verse gaṇam ca māttameham, cited by Ānanda as an instance of atyanta-tiraskṛta-vācyadhvani (i.e. suggestion where the expressed sense disappears entirely), is given as an example. From Kuntaka’s treatment it appears that he takes upacāra in the sense of a supposed or fancied identification of two objects, however distinct, on the basis even of the slightest resemblance. As such, therefore, it is admittedly involved in figures like metaphor (rūpaka) and forms the basis of metaphorical expression generally. This would come under the comprehensive domain of transferred expression known as lakṣaṇā, and would be included by Dhvani-theorists under lakṣaṇā-mūla-dhvani, i.e. suggestion.

based on transference or Indication\textsuperscript{17}. Kuntaka would thus belong to that group of writers regarding whom the Dhvanikāra says that they do not deny the existence of dhvani but regard it as bhākta (bhāktam āhus tam anye), i.e. depending on a transference of sense or Indication.

Regarding rasa-dhvani which comes under asamlaksya-krama-vyaṅga (i.e. suggestion of an imperceptible process), it is clear that Kuntaka, who admits not the essentiality of Rasa but that of Vakrokti, can comprehend Rasa only as an element in some aspects of Vakrokti. In the third chapter of his work, dealing with vākya-vakratā, he discusses how poetry may be made charming by delineating appropriate Rasas. In this connexion he examines in some detail such figures as rasavat, preyas etc., in which Rasa was admitted as an element by early theorists, whose system, maintaining the importance of Alamkāra in poetry, could not otherwise recognise Rasa independently. The special poetic figures like rasavat etc., constituted the back-gate, as it were, for the admission of the idea of Rasa in the Alamkāra-systems. When, however, the theory of Rasa assumed its proper importance in the schools, the necessity naturally arose of explaining how Rasa, which is essential and therefore fit to be embellished (alamkārya or upakārya) can itself be regarded as a means of embellishment (alamkāra or upakāraka) in figures like rasavat. We find accordingly in the Dhvanikāra and Anandavardhana an attempt to comprehend the rasavat etc. under the class of poetry called by them guṇībhūta-vyaṅga, in which the suggested sense (in this case the suggested Rasa) is subordinated to the expressed sense. The theory was put into shape by distinguishing the sphere of asamlaksya-krama dhvani from that of figures like rasavat on the ground that when the Rasa is predominant and forms the essence of the poem in question, it constitutes the principal suggested

\textsuperscript{17} It is for this reason that Ruysaka thinks that the Vakrokti-jivita-kāra comprehended all ideas of dhvani in upacāra-vakratā and the like (p. 8 with Jayarāja thereon).
element, and as such it is *alamkārya*; but when it is subordinate to the expressed sense, it constitutes mere *alamkāra* or embellishment (*Dhva* ii. 4 f). The *Pradīpa* puts this concisely by saying: *yatra pradhānām rasādis tatra dhvaniḥ, yatra tvapradhānām tatraalamkāra iti bhāyāḥ*. Logically following this view, Mammaṭa does not regard the cases of *rasavat* etc. as poetic figures at all, but only as a variety of *gūṇihūta-vyaṅgya* poetry\(^\text{18}\).

18 Later writers and commentators, however, unwilling to depart from the authority of the "ancients," attempt to explain the problem of *rasavat* in various ways by a method of ingenious interpretation, which keeps to the letter but changes the spirit of the old dictum. Most of these views are discussed by Viśvanātha. One school holds that the designation *alamkāra*, given to figures like *rasavat* merely because they help the development of Rasa, is a purely secondary application of the term (*bhākta*); for they are not really *alamkāras* but should be accepted as such in deference to the practice of ancient writers (*rasādyupakāra-mātreṇehālaṁkṛti-vyapadeso bhāktas cirantana-prasiddhy-āṅgikārya eva*). These theorists admit a difference between *rasavat*, on the one hand, and *alamkāras* properly so called (such as *upamā*), on the other; for in the one case the Rasa directly embellishes another Rasa, while in the other case, the Rasa is indirectly embellished through the form of word and sense. But they maintain at the same time that there is one thing in common between the two kinds, viz. that both of them embellish the Rasa, either directly or indirectly, by being subservient to it. On account of this similarity of function, the designation *alamkāra*, which is properly applicable to such figures as *upamā*, is applied to the *rasavat* by an extension of the sense (*bhakti*); and this usage has the sanction of ancient and respectable authority to which we must bow. But this explanation is rejected by others as being too fine. The difference between *alamkāras* like *upamā*, on the one hand, and the *rasavat*, on the other, which is supposed to be due to the fact of direct and indirect embellishment, is admitted to be true, but is explained away as purely accidental and immaterial; and, strictly speaking, we should designate both as *alamkāras* instead of indulging in fine distinctions. A third view, which altogether rejects this distinction between direct and indirect embellishment, maintains that the general definition of *alamkāra* as that which embellishes the Rasa through word and sense is applicable as much to *rasavat* as to regular figures like *upamā*.
Kuntaka takes up the rasavat topically under vastu-vakratā, which may relate to both sahaja and āhārya vasuv, the delineation of Rasa coming apparently under the latter head, which is described as kavi-śakti-vyutpatti-paripāka-praudha. He criticises the definitions of rasavat given by Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin and others, and holds that it is neither darśita-sapṣṭa-ṭhīgārādi-rasam, nor rasa-saṃśrayam, nor again rasa-peṣalām, but rasena tulyaṃ vartamānaṃ; and consequently it is not an alaṃkāra but an alaṃkārya. In other words, the Rasa is awakened in these cases for its own sake, and not for the purpose of embellishing the expressed word and sense. If not theoretically invulnerable, this view is interesting as indicating that the importance of Rasa, first advocated in poetic theories by the Dhvanikāra, appears to have influenced thinkers belonging to other traditions of thought. The Dhvanikāra attempts to reconcile the older idea of rasavat as involving the idea of Rasa secondarily, by admitting it in his second division of poetry; but Kuntaka brushes aside even the view of his predecessor Bhāmaha in this respect, and thinks that this case should be regarded as one in which the poet has an opportunity of creating a kind of vakrokti in which the Rasa supplies the principal charm. But he allows Rasa to play the greatest part in what he calls prabandha-vakratā, i.e. in vakratā occurring in the composition as a whole which, he thinks, must be accomplished chiefly by the aid of pleasing Rasas (rasāntareṇa ramyena yatra nirvahanam bhavet). It is not the mere matter or plot, but the beauty imparted to it by the continuous sense of Rasa in it which can make the words of a poet live (nirantara-rasoddhāra-garbha-saundarya-nirvarāḥ | giraḥ kavīnām jīvanti na kathāmātram aśritāḥ). Kuntaka even accepts the Dhvanyāloka’s judgment that in the Mahābhārata, the sānta-rasa is the aṅgin or predominant Rasa and constitutes its principal charm, although he thinks that it is ultimately the kavi-pratibhā which is the all-important thing in poetry.
Mahimabhaṭṭa

Mahimabhaṭṭa begins his *Vyakti-viveka*, whose very name implies that it is a consideration of the theory of *vyakti* or *vyañjanā* established by the authors of the *Dhvanyāloka*, with the proposition that his object is to comprehend all ideas of *dhvani* in the process of *anumāṇa* or syllogistic reasoning (*anumāṇe’ntarbhāvaṁ sarvasyaiva dhvaneḥ pra-kāśayitum*). He proceeds, therefore, to consider in detail the text as well as the theory of the Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhana. He criticises minutely the definition of *dhvani* given in Dhva*" i. 13 which, if properly considered, applies, he thinks, to *anumāṇa*. He considers (especially in the third chapter) most of the examples given in the *Dhvanyāloka* and tries to demonstrate that they are really cases of *anumāṇa*. Indeed, throughout his work he proceeds by an elaborate process of destructive criticism and makes the definition of *dhvani*, propounded by its advocates, conform to his definition of what he calls *kāvyānumiti* as the process through which another sense is revealed by the expressed sense, or by a sense inferred from it connectedly (*vācyas tad-anumito vā yatrārtho’rthāntaraṁ prakāśayatiḥ sambandhataḥ kutaścit sā kāvyānumitīḥ ity uktā, p. 22*).

This being his main position, he accepts only two senses of *śabda*, namely, the actually expressed (*vācyā*) and the inferable (*anumeya*), including under the latter both *lakṣya* and *vyañgya* senses, whose independent existence he does not admit. He says (p. 7); “Meanings are of two kinds, the expressed and the inferable. Of these, the expressed belongs to the function of a word, and is alone called the primary sense of a word..... From it, or being inferred from it, as from a logical *hetu* or middle term in a syllogism, another sense which is inferred, is called the inferable sense. This again is threefold, consisting of mere matter (*vasaṅa*), the poetic figures (*alaṃkāra*) or the mood and sentiments (*rasa*). The first
two of these varieties can also become the expressed; the last is always inerable”. It is clear enough from this that Mahimabhaṭṭa apparently accepts the recognised concept of a suggested sense in the shape of a vastu, alaṃkāra and rasa, but maintains that these are not revealed by vyakti or suggestion but by anumāna⁴⁷; for the expressed sense and the so-called suggested sense stand in the relation of liṅga and liṅgin, the middle and the major terms of a syllogism (p. 12).

Mahimabhaṭṭa maintains, by analysing many examples taken from the Dhvanyāloka, that the expressed sense does not really suggest the unexpressed sense, but that between the two, inferences are possible and do occur. The vyakti, as Ānandavardhana himself admits (p. 192), is the manifestation of that which is desired to be manifested, and which becomes manifest along with that which manifests it, just as a jar in a dark room becomes visible along with the light which makes it visible. The vastu, alaṃkāra and rasa, which are the three suggested elements in the opinion of the Dhvani-theorists, are not manifested in this way; for they are not comprehended along with the expressed which suggests them, but only afterwards. The interval between the perception of the expressed vibhāva and the suggested rasa, for instance, is indeed very short, and is therefore called by the Dhvani-theorists themselves a process of imperceptible sequence (asaṃlakṣya-krama); but this very nomenclature shows that the existence of a krama or sequence cannot be denied, and that the expressed and the unexpressed, therefore, are sequential. Being such, they must bear the relationship of a logical premise and its conclusion (pp. 11 f). Even in the case of the indicated sense, as in the phrase gaur bāhikaḥ, what one first understands is that the two (go and bāhika) are not identical, and from this the conclusion arises.

19 This is the only important point of his disagreement with the Dhvanyāloka; in other respects, he says, there is hardly any disagreement (prāṇadhūta dhvaner vyaktir iti saiva vivecitā yat svanyat tātār vimatiḥ prāyo nāṣity upakṣitum//).
they are meant as possessing similar qualities; the indicated sense here is ultimately reached by anumāṇa (p. 24). Thus, artha is merely a ground of inference and not a vyañjaka. The process of Anumāṇa or inference is very wide in its scope, much wider than that of Dhvani which is naturally included in it (tasya, i.e. anumāṇasya, ca tad-apekṣayā mahāviṣayatvāt p. 12). With regard to śabda, it cannot be taken as the vyañjaka or suggestor of anything else but its literal meaning. As it exhausts itself after expressing its literal or primary sense, even the secondary indicated meaning (lakṣya artha) has admittedly to be inferred, not from itself but from the latter; how can it be supposed to suggest any deeper sense? But such words, through their expressed sense, can well become the ground or source of inference (anumāpaka), pp. 27 f.

The process of inference in poetry by which the unexpressed may be thus reached is presumably the ordinary process of syllogistic reasoning, which consists in the invariable concomitance (vyāptī) of the middle (liṅga) and the major (liṅgin) terms. The Dhvani or suggested sense is the liṅgin, and its suggestors (viz. word and sense) are apparently its liṅga. The invariable concomitance is ascertained in three ways, viz. by anupalabdhi (non-cognition), tādātmya (identity) and tad-uptatti (causation). In reply to Mahimabhaṭṭa’s position, it has been shewn that none of these means of proving a syllogism is applicable to establishing the invariable concomitance between the liṅga śabdārthau and the liṅgin dhvani. The non-cognition of word and sense does not prove the existence of dhvani; for non-cognition only proves that liṅgin which consists of the absence of something. That a jar is absent can be proved from its non-cognition. But here the liṅgin dhvani does not consist of the absence of anything. Therefore the hetu is vitiated, and the non-cognition of word and sense can only prove their absence, but not that of Dhvani. There can be no identity (tādātmya), again, between the suggested sense (dhvani) and that which suggests it (śabda and artha); for the suggested meaning is essentially different from
the expressed, and comes out prominently by keeping the latter in subordinate position. Similarly, the test of *tad-uptpatti* or causation does not apply, for here the word and sense cannot be regarded as being caused by the suggested sense, in the same way as the smoke, which proves the existence of fire, can be taken as being produced from the fire itself.

Viśvanātha puts the objections in another way. Inference is the knowledge of the *liṅgin* by means of the *liṅga*, qualified by its existence in the subject (*pakṣa-sattva*), its existence in similar instances (*sapakṣa-sattva*) and its exclusion from opposite instances (*vipaḵṣa-vyāvartatva*). For example, we conclude in the subject, e.g. a smoky hill, the existence of the *liṅgin* fire by the *liṅga* smoke, which we see existing in it, as well as in similar instances (such as in the culinary hearth, where there is no doubt as to the existence of fire), and which we see absent from opposite instances (e.g. such places where the absence of fire is certain). But this syllogistic method is not strictly applicable to establishing the suggested sense from the expressed; for logical inference, Viśavnātha points out, has nothing to do with works of imagination. Take, for instance, the following verse:

*dṛṣṭiṁ he prativesīni kṣanam ihaṁ asmad-grhe dāsyasi praṇayasya śīśoḥ pitaḥ na virasaḥ kaupīr apaḥ pāsyati/, ekākiny api yāmi satvaram itah srotas tamālākulam nirandhrās tanumāhābhāya jaraṭha-cchedā nala-granthayāḥ//*

"O neighbour, will you cast your eyes for a moment here on our house? The father of this child will scarcely drink the tasteless water of a well. Though alone, I go quickly hence to the river whose swarming banks are covered with *tamāla*-trees. Let the densely swarming knots of reeds with their hard projections scratch my body". Here the reed-knot's scratching the woman's body and her going alone to the quiet river-side may be taken as the *liṅga* of her enjoyment with a lover, which is the suggested sense (*liṅgin*) here. But these alleged reasons, though they help to reveal the unexpressed sense, are not
invariable; for dalliance with a gallant is not, from the logical point of view, universally predicable of a woman going alone to a river-side or from her being scratched by the reed-knots.

It is noteworthy that Mahimabhaṭṭa relies (p. 26) also upon the arguments of those objectors of the Dhvani-theory who think that dhvani is identical with bhakti; but he opposes alike the views of those Mīmāṃsakas who believe in the single pervasive power of the expressed sense, as well as the view of the Vakroktijivita-kāra. His objection to the latter system is naturally based on his own idea of the importance of Rasa and unimportance of Dhvani. In his opinion, any deviation from common usage involving charmingness of expression, such as Kuntaka upholds, may take either of two forms, viz. (1) it may resolve itself more or less into a theory of propriety (aucitya), or (2) it may mean the manifestation of an implied sense other than the expressed sense. If the first alternative is meant, it is superfluous to one who admits Rasa in poetry, as no theory of Rasa can dispense with a theory of propriety or suitability with regard to the adjustment of its factors. To admit the other alternative is to bring in the idea of dhvani in a more or less disguised form.

Mahimabhaṭṭa's work is undoubtedly a masterpiece of

20 See above ch. v, pp. 152f.
21 See above ch. v, 168 fn.
22 Mahimabhaṭṭa treats the question of aucitya (already dwelt upon in the Dhvanyāloka) in the second Vimarṣa of his work. He divides the subject of impropriety, which may be śabda-visaya and artha-visaya, into two heads according as it concerns the matter or form of poetry. The former, called antaraṅga anaucitya, consists in improper employment of the vibhāvas etc. in the manifestation of Rasa. It has already been dealt with in the Dhvanyāloka. The formal impropriety, called bahiraṅga anaucitya, is chiefly concerned with the occurrence of five defects, viz. vidheyāvimarṣa (pp. 37-58), prakrama-bheda (pp. 58-66), krama-bheda (pp. 66-69), paunaruktya (pp. 69-84) and vācyāvacana (pp. 84-109). The question of aucitya will be dealt with in the next chapter.
scholastic argumentation, exhibiting much fastidious criticism and great learning of a miscellaneous kind; but its avowed object is polemical and it does not pretend to set up a new system. Mahimabhaṭṭa possesses all the qualifications of a subtle controversialist and enters into his task with a decided animus, which constitutes the source at once of his weakness as well as of his strength. A fine product of a scholastic age, he cannot yet look beyond the pettiness of immediate issues; and whatever might be the value of his peculiar proposition, he hardly ever adds to its limited interest any independent treatment of the larger problems of Poetics. This is perhaps one of the reasons why even his logical acumen and his erudition failed to keep the interest of his work alive; but the chief reason why his book was forgotten in later times and was cited only to be condemned—a fate which it shared with the Vakrokti-jīvita of Kuntaka—was that it pitted itself against the more formidable theory of the Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhana which was destined to supersede it by attracting away the best thinkers of later times. The anumāna-theory of Mahimabhaṭṭa, like the vakrokti-theory of Kuntaka, appears to have never received any liberal recognition in the hands of later theorists, nearly all of whom, since Mammaṭa's time, accepted without question the system of the Dhvanyāloka. In attempting to explain away the new theory of Vyaśijana in terms of the already recognised idea of Anumāṇa, or reviving Bhāmaha's old position in the face of the more widely received theory of the new aesthetic school, Mahimabhaṭṭa and Kuntaka were apparently fighting on behalf of a cause already doomed.

(4)

Bhoja and the Agni-purāṇa

The school of opinion, represented in Poetics by the alamkāra-portion of the Agni-purāṇa apparently follows a tradition which departs in many respects from the orthodox
systems, and which we find developed by Bhoja in his own way in his Sarasvati-kaṇṭhābharana.23

This apocryphal Purāṇa of uncertain date is ambitiously cyclopaedic. There is hardly any doubt, however, that the alamkāra-portion of this work, as we have already remarked, is chiefly a compilation, in a somewhat eclectic fashion, by a writer who was himself no theorist but who probably wanted to collect together and present a workable epitome, conforming in essentials to the teachings of no particular orthodox school, but gathering its material from all sources. This will be borne out not only by its independent, if somewhat loosely joined and uncritical treatment, but also from the presence of verses culled from various old writers.

Taking the Alamkāra-section of the Agni-purāṇa and the Sarasvati-kaṇṭhābharana side by side, one is struck at once by some fundamental characteristics which are common to both. The most peculiar feature of the Agni-purāṇa theory is the absence of the doctrine of Dhvani, although the concept of dhvani is included casually, after the manner of ancient authors, in the figure ākṣepa (sa ākṣepo dhvaniḥ syāc ca dhvaninā vyajyate yatāḥ, 344. 14). The word dhvani is also used in the opening verse (336. 1 = Bhoja i. 1), which says generally that speech consists of dhvani, varṇa, pada and vākyā (dhvanir varṇāḥ padaṃ vākyam ity etad vāṁmayam matam); but apparently this alludes to the grammatical word which reveals the sphoṭa, and which is indicated by the same term in the Vākyupadiya. The work, however, recognises abhidhā and lakṣaṇā, the ideas of which were already elaborated by philosophers and philosophical grammarians. At the same time, apart from obvious borrowings or copyings from Bharata, Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin, this work cannot be taken as substantially following the views of any one of the schools represented by these names.

23 Much of this section was printed originally as an article contributed to JRAS. 1923, pp. 537-49. On Viṣṇu-dharmottara Purāṇa see vol. i, p. 95f and on Agni-purāṇa i, p. 97f, where an account of their contents is given.
There is no doubt that in one verse, which is conveniently cited by Viśvanātha in support of his own extreme view, the Agni-purāṇa speaks of Rasa as the "soul" of poetry in contrast with mere verbal ingenuity (vāg-vaidagdhya-pradhane’pi rasa evātra jīvitam. 336. 33). It devotes a somewhat lengthy chapter to the description, after Bharata, of rasa and bhāva; yet there is nowhere any central theory of Rasa or any elaboration of a system of Poetics on its basis. As to the origin of Rasa, it propounds a peculiar view that from infinite bliss (ānanda) proceeds self-consciousness (ahamkāra), from self-consciousness proceeds conceit (abhimāna), from conceit pleasure (rati), of which śṛṅgāra (love), hāsyā (laughter) and other rasas are modifications (338. 2-4). It admits with Bharata four fundamental Rasas, from which are derived five others. Although partiality is thus shown to Rasa in poetry and drama, the Agni-purāṇa cannot be affiliated to the Rasa school; for it does not make any attempt to correlate with this central principle the other factors of poetry, viz. rīti, guṇa and alaṃkāra, which are also recognised as of great, if not of equal, importance. One fact, however, worth noticing in this connexion is that although the Agni-purāṇa recognises nine Rasas, adding sānta to the orthodox eight, it extols and gives prominence to śṛṅgāra: a trait which is unique and which is found fully developed in Bhōja who, as we shall see presently, accepts no other Rasa than śṛṅgāra in his Śṛṅgāra-prakāśa and gives almost exclusive attention to this important Rasa in his Sarasvatī-kaṇṭhābharaṇa

On the other hand, although treatment is accorded to rīti (ch. 339) and guṇa (ch. 345), the Agni-purāṇa does not follow the tenets of the Riti school, as represented by Daṇḍin and Vāmana. Daṇḍin classifies Riti, which he calls Mārga, into two extreme types, vajdarbhi and gaudī, to which Vāmana adds pāncūlī as an intermediate type; but the classification, according to both, depends upon the presence or absence of certain fixed excellence of diction, known as Guṇas. To
this enumeration Rudraṭa adds lāṭī, but by Riti he means a
definite arrangement of sentences with reference to the use
of compound words of variable length. The Agni-purāṇa
accepts this four-fold classification, but the distinction is
supposed to lie not only in the length or shortness of com-
 pound words, but also in the qualities of softness or smooth-
 ness, as well as in the prominence or otherwise of metaphori-
cal expression (upacāra). The Guṇas, again, are regarded
as fundamental characteristics both by Daṇḍin (i. 42) and
Vāmana (i. 2. 6-8), who take them as forming the essence
of Riti, and distinguish them carefully from Alamkāras, which,
in the opinion of Daṇḍin, form the general characteristics
of both the Mārgas, and, in the opinion of Vāmana, are
merely accidental characteristics enhancing the charm of
poetry already brought out by the Guṇas. The Agni-purāṇa.
however, defines the Guṇas, which are nowhere connected
directly with Riti, simply as those characteristics which reflect
great beauty on poetry (yah kāvye mahaśiṁ chāyām anu-
gṛhṇāty asau guṇaḥ, 345. 3), a definition which hardly
distinguishes them from Alamkāras, the definition of which
is here almost the same: kāvya-śobhākarān dharmān alam-
kārān pracaksate (341. 17)²⁴, and is merely copied uncritically
from Daṇḍin ii. 1. The classification of Guṇas themselves,
again, in this work is peculiar to itself. Ordinarily, the
Guṇas are classified as either sabāa-guṇas or artha-guṇas,
and this procedure is sanctioned by Vāmana. The Agni-
purāṇa brings in finer distinctions (345. 3 f.). The Guṇas are
here said to be of two kinds, specific (vaiśeṣika) and general
(sāmānya), the former apparently confining itself to any
specific part or feature of a composition, the latter existing
as common to its several component parts. The sāmānya
guṇa, again, is in its turn classified into three subdivisions.

²⁴ This verse is also cited by Bhoja (ch. v, p. 355); but he remarks:
tatra kāvya-śobhākarān ity anena śesopamādīvad guṇa-rasa-bhāva-
tadābhāsa-praśamanādān apy upagṛhṇāti, apparently as a commentary
on Daṇḍin’s view!
according as it appertains to śabda, artha, or both; the Agni-purāṇa (and Bhoja) admitting for the first time, so far as we know, this threefold classification. An altogether different scheme of enumeration of these Guṇas then follows. Vāmana mentions in all ten Guṇas, making each of these a śabda-guṇa as well as an artha-guṇa. The śabda-guṇas, according to the Agni-purāṇa, are seven in number, viz., śleṣa, lālitya, gāṃbhīrya, saukumārya, udāratā, satyā, and yaugikī; the artha-guṇas are six, viz. mādhurya, śaṃvidhāna, komalatva, udāratā, prauḍhī, and sāmayikatā; the śabdārtha-guṇas are again six, viz. prasāda, saubhāgya, yathāsāmkhyā, praśastyatā, pāka, and rāga. The characteristics of some of these Guṇas are not very clearly marked25; and in Guṇas like śaṃvidhāna and yathāsāmkhyā are included ideas which are credited by other writers to Alamkāras. Although not enumerated as such, Daṇḍin’s ojas is reproduced (345. 10=Daṇḍin i. 80) in the course of the treatment of individual śabda-guṇas.

In the same way, it can be easily shown that the influence of the Alamkāra school, as represented by Bhāmaha and Udbhaṭa, is not very marked in this work. The śabdālām-kāras are, with some modification, developed, no doubt, on the general lines of Daṇḍin’s treatment26, but the arthālām-kāras do not strictly conform to the orthodox classification or definition. The Agni-purāṇa gives eight varieties of the latter, viz. svarūpa (or svabhāva), sāḍṛṣya, utprekṣā, atiśaya, vibhāvanā, virodha, hetu and sama (343. 2-3); the figures upamā, rūpaka, sahokti, and arthāntara-nyāsa being included separately under sāḍṛṣya (343. 5), and mention being made of eighteen kinds of upamā embracing most of

25 See V. Raghavan, Rīti and Guṇa in the Agni-purāṇa in IHQ, x (1934) pp. 776-79. The printed text in the Ānandārama ed. appears to be corrupt; Raghavan suggests corrections and interpretations.

26 It recognises nine classes of śabdālāmkāras, viz. Chāyā, Mudrā, Ukti, Yukti, Guṃphanā. Vākovākyam, Anuprāsa (including Yamaka), Citra and Daṣkara (including Prahelikā).
Daṇḍin's numerous subvarieties of that figure (343. 9 f). The Agni-purāṇa is also one of the earliest known works which adds a separate chapter on the ubhayālaṃkāras (not recognised by earlier writers), and this includes six varieties, viz. praśasti, kānti, aucitya, saṃkṣepa, yāvad-arthata and abhivyakti (344. 2), some of which would come under Guṇās of other writers. Indeed, the classification and definition of the Guṇās and Alamkāras, which are not differentiated very clearly, would appear crude and unsystematic, when compared to the elaborate critical treatment of the Rīti and the Alamkāra schools.

From this brief outline, it will be clear enough that the Agni-purāṇa follows, in its general standpoint, none of the orthodox schools of Poetics, so far as they are known to us, although with regard to its material it attempts to cull, in its cyclopaedic spirit, notions, expressions and even whole verses from the authors of the different schools, without, however, connecting them with a central theory. It borrows, for instance, Daṇḍin's definition of the kāvyasa-śārira (iṣṭārtha-vyavacchinnā padāvalī), but the attempt to supplement it by adding kāvyam sphaṭa-alamkāraṃ guṇavad doṣa-varjitaṃ (336. 6-7), is merely eclectic and hardly constitutes an improvement. The same remarks apply to its definitions of fundamental notions like guṇa or alamkāra, which are merely copied or paraphrased uncritically from earlier writers. At the same time, mere eclecticism is not enough

27 It is noteworthy in this connexion that Daṇḍin's samādhi-guṇa is treated here under the context of lākṣaṇā with a hint apparently of identifying them.—The borrowings from Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin by the Purāṇa are extensive. For instance, the definitions of the figures rūpaka, ākṣepa, aprastuta-praśaṃśā, samāsokti and paryāyoṣka given by the Purāṇa (343. 22; 344. 15, 16, 18, 17) are almost the same as those of Bhāmaha (ii. 21, 68; iii. 29, 8; ii. 79); while the definitions of rūpaka, utprekṣi, viṣeṣokti, vibhāvanā, apihnuṣi and samādhi (343. 23, 24-25, 26-27, 27-28; 355. 18, 13) appear to have been repeated from Daṇḍin (ii. 66, 221, 323, 199, 304; i. 93) respectively.
to explain certain features of this work; the peculiar treatment and arrangement, for instance, of the guṇas and alaṃkāras which depart very strikingly from orthodox views of the matter. In order to explain this novelty, we should, having regard to the essentially derivative nature of the work itself, admit the probable existence of an altogether different line of speculation, of which unfortunately no other early traces are preserved.

This tradition of opinion we find fully developed in Bhoja. The prominence given to rasa and the absence of the dhvani-theory in Bhoja, therefore, need not surprise us; nor should the peculiar arrangement of the guṇas and alaṃkāras appear unintelligible. The same reverence to Bharata and Daṇḍin is shown throughout; and in fact, Daṇḍin is estimated to have supplied Bhoja with more than two hundred unacknowledged quotations28. At the same time, Bhoja very freely incorporates definite verses and illustrative stanzas from most of his well-known predecessors, especially from Bhāmaha, Vāmana, Rudrāṭa and Dhanika. He even appropriates Kārikās from the Dhvanyāloha29, although he does not accept its theory. His huge compilation, like its prototype the Agni-purāṇa, in more or less cyclopaedic in scope and eclectic in spirit, and represents apparently one of the several forms of arranging the teachings (with the exception of ignoring the dhvani-theory) of earlier schools in the light of a different tradition, of which another form is perhaps preserved, to a certain extent, in the two Jaina Vāgbhaṭas. But in some of the main points, similarity of his treatment to the Agni-purāṇa is obvious, and here the teachings of the orthodox schools are of no avail. The verbal borrowings are numerous. Thus Agni 341. 18 f has much in common with Sarasvatī-kaṇṭhābharaṇa ii, some

28 While the Agni-purāṇa takes no less than 160 passages from Daṇḍin.
29 As the Agni-purāṇa appropriates six of its Kārikās.
verses of the former being literally adopted by the latter. 
The *Agni* 341. 18-19, says:

ye vyuptspyādinā śabdam alasīkārtaṃ iha kṣamāḥ/
śabdālaṃkāram āhus tān kāvyā-mīmāṃsā-kvidāḥ.

This definition of a śabdālaṃkāra is adopted by Bhoja, with the only verbal change of the defective last line into śabdālaṃkāra-samjñās te jñeyā jātyādayo budhaiḥ (ii. 2). Such instances can be easily multiplied, and we may cite for comparison *Agni* 341. 21 and Bhoja ii. 39; *Agni* 342. 10 and Bhoja ii. 79; *Agni* 338, 11 and Bhoja v. 3, etc. Apart from this fact of literal similarity, which, however, is not conclusive, there is a striking coincidence, as we shall see presently, of treatment, as well as agreement of views on fundamental points, which is more than merely accidental. It is not suggested that Bhoja is directly copying from the *Agni*-purāṇa or the Purāṇa copying directly from Bhoja; it is quite possible that they exploit in common an unknown source. But there is hardly any doubt that they follow a common tradition which is different in many respects from that of the Kashmirian writers. 31

30 Instead of kāvyā-mīmāṃsakā vidāḥ in the text.

31 With regard to the relation between the Agni-purāṇa-compiler and Bhoja, our views do not appear to have been clear to P. V. Kane and V. Raghavan. We have explicitly stated them in *Poona Orientalist* ii, p. 15-17; we repeat them here. A comparative study of Bhoja’s Sarasvait-k. and the Alāmkāra-section of the Purāṇa would, in our opinion, indicate that (1) Both the works are more or less compilations, (2) As compilations both are eclectic, but not very well assorted and critical, (3) Both follow a tradition of opinion which is distinctive and which stands apart from that of the orthodox Kashmirian writers, (4) Bhoja is more systematic and certainly more elaborate, and the distinctive topics are found in Bhoja in a more developed form. These considerations led us to believe that there might be no question of direct mutual borrowing, but both were drawing upon a common source, and that the more elaborate and systematic Bhoja was probably chronologically later. If the Purāṇa-compiler was later and took from Bhoja, it would be strange indeed that he should present as undeveloped and
Bhoja develops the definition of poetry given by the Agni-
purāṇa by adding expressly Rasa among its essential
characteristics, which, as the commentator Ratnesvara points
out, indicates the influence of the “Kāśmirakas”:

nirdosāṃ guṇavat kāvyam alaṃkārāir alaṃkṛtam/
rasānvitam............(i. 2).

In conformity to this definition, which mentions rather
uncritically all the requisite elements, Bhoja deals in the first
chapter with the Doṣas and Guṇas and devotes the next three
chapters respectively to the consideration of poetic figures
(Alaṃkāras) of sabda, of artha, and of both sabda and artha.
In the last chapter is given a detailed treatment of Rasa, for
Bhoja thinks that rasokti is essential in poetry (v. 8). But
like the author of the Agni-purāṇa, Bhoja is not explicit with
regard to the question of correlating this aesthetic element
with other elements of poetry, and his conception of Rasa
bears resemblance to that of the utpatti-vādins whose causal
theory, as Abhinavagupta points out, is accepted by earlier
authors like Daṇḍin. No doubt, in one verse (i. 158) Bhoja
is apparently of opinion that a poem is relished only if it
contains the Guṇas, even though it may possess various kinds
of poetic figures; for even excellent poetic figures in a
composition without the Guṇas present an ugly aspect, as
the form of a woman, destitute of youth, looks ugly even
though she wears excellent ornaments. But this verse is only
an unacknowledged quotation from Vāmana (iii. 1. 2. Vṛtti),
and must be taken as an instance of eulogistic statements,
not unusual in Sanskrit writers, made for the purpose of
simply emphasising a point, or as a characteristic of the
uncritical and confused nature of the work itself; for other-
wise we cannot reconcile this dictum with others of a similar
nature made in connexion with Rasa or Alaṃkāra.

unsystematic what was already developed and systematic in his
presumed source. It would hardly make any difference if the Purāṇa-
compiler is proved later than Bhoja; but as our available evidence is at
best uncertain, it would be better to leave the question open.
Although Bhoja puts a great deal of emphasis on Rasa, probably in accordance with the views of the new school of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, he cannot yet be taken as an adherent of the Dhvani school, nor of the older Rasa school. Bhoja mentions here as many as twelve Rasas, adding the śānta, preyas, udātta and uddhata, to the eight orthodox Rasas mentioned by Bharata (vi. 15)\(^{32}\); but in his treatment he follows the Agni-purāṇa tradition in singling out the Śṛṅgāra for almost exclusive attention. This trait is also noticeable in his other work, Śṛṅgāra-prakāśa, in which he accepts only one Rasa, the Erotic\(^{33}\), thus justifying its title.

Bhoja modifies the Agni-purāṇa’s classification of the Guṇas by dividing the general (sāmānyā) Guṇas, according as they relate to sabda and artha, into external (bāhya) and internal (ābhyaṃtara), on the one hand, with specific (vaiśeṣika) Guṇas on the other. By the last he understands those which under special circumstances are Guṇas in spite of their being essentially Doṣas or faults (i. 60 f). He carries the differentiation and multiplication of Guṇas still further, and enumerates twenty-four sabda-guṇas and as many artha-guṇas, again, of identical names. Like the Agrī-purāṇa, Bhoja is not very precise or critical in his definitions of individual Guṇas, and he assigns to some Guṇas properties which are ascribed to Alamkāras by other writers. It is curious to note that the artha-guṇa kānti is defined, after Vāmana, as dipta-rasatvam (i. 81), including Rasa therein; and in the sabda-guṇa gāmbhirya (i. 73) is incorporated the concept of Dhvani. At the same

32 Of these Śānta and Preyas are already recognised. The four additional Rasas (to orthodox eight) are meant to be associated with the four kinds of heroes, namely, Dhira-śānta, Dhira-lalita, Dhirodatta and Dhiroddhata respectively. See V. Raghavan, Number of Rasas, pp. 121-22.
time, Rasa is taken elsewhere as a fundamental aesthetic concept, and the idea of Dhvani is omitted from his treatment. Bhoja, however, does not pay any homage to Vāmana's classification of Riti, the elaboration of which he carries still further. He adds two more types of Ritis, viz. āvantikā and māgadhī (ii. 32), to the four mentioned by the Agni-purāṇa, the former of these being an intermediate kind between vaidarbhī and pāñcālī, and the latter forming only a Kathā-rīti, i.e. defective or incomplete type. It is also noteworthy that some of the upamā-doṣas, such as hīnatva and adhikatva, are included in the general discussion of Doṣas as hīnopamā and adhikopamā, and not mentioned, in the usual manner, in connexion with the figure upamā itself.

In the treatment of Aṃākāras, Bhoja is one of the earliest writers who, in common with the Agni-purāṇa, classifies them into three groups, viz. śabdālaṃkāra, arthālaṃkāra, and ubhayālaṃkāra. Without entering into details here, we may state that Bhoja's treatment is much fuller. He enumerates, for instance, and defines the largest number of śabdālaṃkāras mentioned by any author, namely twenty-four, and develops further the treatments of Daṇḍin, the Agni-purāṇa and Rudraṭa. The number of arthālaṃkāras, however, is surprisingly limited, and a love of symmetry probably leads him to enumerate them also as twenty-four in number, which is also the number of the ubhayālaṃkāras. The most curious chapter is that which deals with the last-named class of poetic figures, which includes figures like upamā, rūpaka, utprekṣā, dipaka, atiśaya and other well-recognised arthālaṃkāras. Mammaṭa later on admits this three-fold classification of poetic figures, which is not recognised by all, but unlike

34 His treatment also is sometimes very curious. He makes poetic figures, for instance, out of the six pramāṇas of Jaimini (cf. Māṇikya- candra on this point at p. 304). One of the results of this is that he has to admit the philosophical idea of upamāna (as a means of knowledge) in a poetic figure of that name, and distinguish it as a figure from the well-known figure upamā.
Bhoja, he includes a very limited number in the mixed third class of Ubhayālāmākāra, such as punaruktavād-ābhāsa, in which stress is laid equally on śabda and artha.

This novel and somewhat unorthodox standpoint, which follows a peculiar line of speculation different in some respects from the accepted views of the various established schools, makes Bhoja’s work an interesting study; but its theoretic importance has been exaggerated. The work, no doubt, possesses a certain importance for this unique treatment in the history of Sanskrit Poetics; but its value consists, not in its theories, nor in its discussion of general principles, but in its being a very elaborate, if somewhat diffuse, manual and an exhaustive store-house of definitions and illustrations, for which not only the works of Ālāmākārikas but also of almost all the well-known poets have been laid under contribution. The later writers, in spite of the fascination which the magic name of Bhojarāja carries with it, cite this work chiefly for its abundant wealth of illustration, or for the purpose of supporting some unorthodox view to which Bhoja might have lent the authority of his name. The learning which this work parades, though extensive, is ill-assorted and uncritical, its ideas lacking in system and its expression in preciseness. The school of opinion which Bhoja represents does not appear to have received any support or following in later times.35

35 Apart from occasional citations from Bhoja by later authors, Vidyānātha (as well as Prakāśavarṣa in his Rasārnavālāmākāra) appears to be the one writer who goes to the length of following Bhoja’s elaborate classification of the Gūnas (see below, ch. vii).—Bhoja’s truly “mammoth” work, the Śrṅgāra-prakāsa, has not yet been published, but a detailed account of its contents will be found in V. Raghavan’s thesis on the same. It has the same eclectic and encyclopaedic character of an all-comprehending type (but on a much more extended scale) as his presumably earlier and smaller work, the Sarasvati-kanṭhābhārana. With regard to subject-matter and essential ideas, however, it adds nothing substantially new which is not contained in a brief form in Sarasvati-k. In spite of its name the Śrṅgāra-pr. comprehends in its
36 chapters most of the important topics of Poetics and some of Dramaturgy. Thus, ch. i-vi. deal with Šabda and Artha; ch. vii-xi with grammatical and poetical aspects of Sāhitya of Šabda and Artha, including treatment of Doṣa, Guṇa and Almaṃkāra; ch. xii. mainly with Drama and its general features; ch. xiii-xiv with a preliminary treatment of Rasa; ch. xv-xvii with Vibhāvas and Anubhāvas of Rati; ch. xviii-xxi with four Šrāgāras of four Puruṣārthas—viz. Šrāgāras of Dharma, Artha, Kāma and Mokṣa; ch. xxii-xxxvi with elaboration of the lower Šrāgāra Rasa (apart from the higher Šrāgāra of Abhimāna explained in ch. xi) of Rati between man and woman. Thus, after dealing with Doṣa-hāna, Guṇopādāna, Almaṃkāra-yoga and Rasa-viyoga (which last should be avoided) he gives an exposition of his theory of Almaṃkāra-Abhimāna-Šrāgāra Rasa. With reference to the general features of the Drama he devotes a large part of his work to the two phases of Vipralambha and Sambhoga Šrāgāra viewed as a relation between man and woman.