CHAPTER VII

MAMMAṬA AND THE NEW SCHOOL

( 1 )

The foregoing sketch of the progress of the principal schools and systems, terminating in the dominance of the Dhvani school, will make it clear that the history of Sanskrit Poetics is marked by two or three well-defined stages. The dim beginnings of the science are indeed hidden from us, but we enter upon the first historic stage of its formulation, in a more or less developed form, in the works of Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin. This is followed by a fruitful and creative stage, ending with Abhinavagupta, in which the theories of the different schools or systems were settled in their general outlines, giving rise to four distinct schools of opinion, respectively represented by the Rasa-, Alaṃkāra-, Riti- and Dhvani-systems. It covers more than three centuries, and includes some of the great names in the history of the discipline, like those of Bhāmaha, Udbhāṭa and Rudraṭa, of Lollaṭa, Saṅkuka and Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, of Daṇḍin and Vāmana, of the Dhvanikāra, Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, of Kuntaka, Mahimabhaṭṭa and Bhoja: all of whom helped, in a constructive or destructive way, to shape the different currents of thought which ultimately ran into one stream in the standard text-book of Mammaṭa.

If we attempt to discriminate between these different schools of thought and roughly indicate the broad steps taken in the progress of the discipline, we can state generally that the Alaṃkāra system proposed to confine itself to a theory of embellishment (alaṃkāra) of expression consistently with what was probably the original tradition of the discipline;

1 See vol. i, pp. 322 f.
the Rasa system, starting with the consideration of the drama, was responsible for introducing into poetic theory the subjective element of *rasa*, represented by the feelings, moods and sentiments; the Riti system laid stress on the objective beauty of representation realised by means of diction (*r̥tī*) and its constituent excellences (*guṇas*); while the Dhvani system, admitting the underlying truth of all these doctrines, elaborated a peculiar theory of suggestion in poetry (*dhvani*), including the suggestion of *rasa*, to which everything else was correlated. It will be seen from this that a relative emphasis was laid on the elements of *alaṃkāra, rasa, r̥tī* (including *guṇa* and *doṣa*) and *dhvani* by each of these systems; and although the soft hand of Indian dialectics drew lines of fantastic ideas, consisting of odd and abstruse schemes, it is on these essential points that the theories centred themselves, and the main currents flowed thereof in different directions. It was, however, realised in the end that all these gleams of thought must be gathered into a focus, and all these currents must be made to flow into one stream. The purely normative character of the discipline began to disappear, and it was understood that, however much importance was attached to the fact of externalisation, to the consideration of embellishment or diction, it was far outbalanced by the most necessary and important principle of higher poetry, viz, the art of suggestion, especially connected with the art of suggesting a peculiar mental condition of enjoyment, technically known as *rasa*, of which the charm lies in a disinterested and impersonal pleasure in the mind, the attitude proper to contemplation of the beautiful.

2 The problem, therefore, does not concern rhetoric merely, and the ideal of beauty (if the expression is allowable) is no longer conceived from the outside, being associated with a peculiar condition of artistic enjoyment, the suggestion of which is taken as the chief function of poetry. As explained by an able critic of Sanskrit literature (Oldenberg, *Die Literatur des alten Indien*, pp. 207f), the Indian theorists permit intellectual vigour and subtlety, the masculine beauty, to stand behind that of purely feminine enjoyment born of the finest sensibility. Both
This period ends with the ultimate standardization of a more or less complete scheme of Poetics, outlined in the Dhvanyāloka, in which an attempt is made to bring into a definite focus the scattered ideas of previous speculation. The period which followed this and with which we are concerned in this and following chapters, is necessarily a stage of critical elaboration, the chief work of which consists in summarising and setting forth, in the concise form of textbooks, the results of earlier speculations. The stage is marked by great scholastic acumen, if not by remarkable originality or creative genius, but it denotes also a progressive deterioration of the study itself. It covers the age of numberless commentaries, which may be characterised, like the scholia of European classical literature, as consisting mostly of "comments on comments of annotated annotations". They busy themselves with the explanation, expansion or restriction of the already established rules. We have also the rise of a number of popular writers and textbook-makers who wanted to simplify the science for general enlightenment, the lowest stage being reached when we come to manuals and schoolbooks of comparatively recent times.

It is difficult to classify some of these writers. Here and
there we find isolated and straggling followers of the older schools. Some are frankly uncritical, some merely eclectic; while others are characterised by the very modest ambition of producing nothing more than a popular text-book. But the majority of the writers of this period, which covers more than five or six centuries, accept, with some reservations, the Dhvani-theory and the scheme of Poetics as finally determined by Mammāṭa. There are small groups of writers who devote themselves to special topics, like kavi-śikṣā or the subject of rasa (especially śṛṅgāra-rasa), but this apparent branching off from the main stem of the finally authoritative Dhvani system, is to be explained as due rather to the following of older traditions, or perhaps to the refining or analytic spirit of the times, than to any real split in the domain of general theory. With regard to matters of general theory and the main problems, the decadent Post-dhvani writers as a rule thought that there was nothing new to set forth; they consequently fell back on matters of detail which helped to satisfy their growing speculative passion for fine distinctions and their scholastic bent for controversy. It would be tedious, as well as useless, therefore, to treat them here at any great length, for they repeat more or less the same idea in their own way, sometimes in the same stock manner and phraseology, and differ from each other only in matters of no great theoretic importance. The only subject worth studying in them is their minute analysis and elaboration of numberless poetic figures, which are not treated, as not coming perhaps within the scope of their general exposition, by the Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhana, but which occupy a very considerable position in later literature. Here was room enough to supplement, as Ruyyakā expressly states, the treatment of their predecessors; and this portion of their work is beaten out with such extreme nicety and elaborateness that the Alamkāra-śāstra, judging from these works alone, would be, as it often has been, designated as a study of Rhetoric merely. But even from
Ruuyaka's time, the scope and nature of most of the individual figures appear to have been fairly fixed, only to be criticised and improved upon here and there by such later writers as Jagannātha.

It is important, however, to note that although this new school (navyāḥ, aravācīnāḥ) accepts in the main the general position of the Dhvani school, it is yet not entirely free from the influence of older schools. It betrays a lurking regard for older writers and brings back, rightly or wrongly, some of the old ideas into the elaboration of its own theory of poetry. It is difficult, for this reason, to take these writers in a lump and affiliate them directly to the Dhvani school. Mammaṭa's definition of poetry, for instance, is not altogether free from the influence of the views of such older writers as Vāmana; Ruuyaka follows Udbhata and Kuntaka extensively in his detailed analysis of poetic figures; Viśvanātha clearly betrays the influence of the Rasa school on his own system; while Jagannātha revives in a new form the old definition of poetry given by Daṇḍin. It is remarkable that most of these writers attempt to arrive at a precise definition of poetry, a task which was wisely left alone by the Dhvani-kāra; but in doing so, they probably meant to find out a comprehensive formula to cover the old ideas as well as the new, although it must be said that they succeed less often than they involve themselves in hopeless inconsistencies. This reactionary tendency, however, is interesting as indicating that they were not unconscious of the importance of earlier views as they were not entirely content with the clear-cut scheme of the Dhvanī-vyāloka; a fact which would go to demonstrate, to some extent, that want of originality is a charge which cannot be brought in its entirety against these followers of the finally dominant Dhvani system.

( 2 )

Mammaṭa

The first and foremost writer of this group is Mammaṭa.
whose Kāvya-prakāśa must have helped a great deal, judging from its popularity and influence, in finally establishing the authority of the Kashmirian school of Ānandavardhana. This work, combining as it does the merit of fulness with that of conciseness, not only summed up previous speculations in Poetics in the succinct form of a text-book, but it became in its turn the starting point of endless text-books and exegesis.

Mammaṭa's general standpoint will be obvious at a glance by examining his well known definition of poetry. Although he adheres in the main to the teachings of the Dhvani school and accepts Rasa as an important element of poetry, his definition tad a-doṣau śabdārthau sagunāvanalamkṛte punah kvāpi ("poetry consists in word and sense, devoid of the defects and possessing the excellences, and sometimes devoid also of poetic figures") follows the time-honoured custom of starting with word and sense (śabda and artha) and mentioning the guṇa, doṣa and alamkāra; but it does not expressly include any reference to dhvani and rasa, which are apparently comprehended by implication. For, following up this definition, Mammaṭa begins with the discussion of the functions of śabda and artha, incidentally establishing the function of suggestion (vyañjanā) and the superiority of the suggested sense (vyaṅgya artha or dhvani), and divides poetry into three classes (viz. dhvani, guṇibhūta-vyaṅgya and citra) in relation to the suggested sense. This leads him to enumerate and exemplify the various subdivisions of these three classes of poetry, and in this connexion dilate upon the nature and theory of Rasa, which is included in the scope of "suggestion of imperceptible process" (asamlakṣya-krama vyaṅgya). In this context, he examines and rejects the views of Lollaṭa, Śaṅkuka and Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, and accepts the vyakti-vāda which he ascribes to Abhinavagupta. Mention is made of eight orthodox dramatic Rasas, (aṣṭau nāṭye rasāḥ smṛtāḥ), but the ninth Rasa, the śūnta, is added, apparently as relevant to poetry.
Mammatā then proceeds to discuss the Guṇa and Doṣa, not in relation to poetry in general as his definition would imply, but in relation to their subserviency or otherwise to the awakening of Rasa. The Guṇas as excellences of composition are interpreted in a new sense (after Ānandavardhana) and brought into effective relation with the underlying sentiment in a work, as qualities which serve to heighten its charm. The verbal form of a work cannot be said to possess the qualities of energy or sweetness (except by way of analogy), unless we mean by it that the underlying sentiment is vigorous or sweet. The Guṇas, therefore, are related to the Rasa, as virtues like heroism are related to the soul of a man. The verbal form, the mere sound, produces the excellences only as a means or instrument; the real cause is the Rasa, even as the soul is the true cause of virtues like heroism in a man. The same consideration applies also to the case of poetic figures (Ālāṃkāras), and their place in poetry is justified by their relation to Rasa. They are compared to ornaments on a man's body; and as such, they adorn words and meanings which constitute the 'body' of poetry. They thus serve to embellish indirectly (through sound and sense) the underlying soul of sentiment, but not invariably. If the Rasa is absent, they produce mere variety of expression. It should also be noted that the Guṇas are accepted, after Ānandavardhana, as three in number, and it is maintained

3 Mammatā demonstrates with some care that it is not necessary to accept the ten Guṇas of Vāmana, but that it is quite enough if we postulate three comprehensive excellences, viz. ojas (energy), prasāda (lucidity) and mādhurya (sweetness). If we examine the Guṇas of Vāmana critically, we find that some of them can very well be included in these three; some constitute mere absense of defects; while others are sometimes positive defects. Thus, Vāmana's śīva, samādhi and udārata are comprehended by ojas; artha-vyakti is merely an aspect of prasāda; samātā, consisting of a certain uniformity of diction, is sometimes a fault; while sauksūmārya and kānti, defined respectively as freedom from harshness (or inauspiciousness) and vulgarity, are simply the reverse of the defects śruti-kāsaṭa and grāmyatva. These consi-
that combination of particular letters signify particula
Guṇas, so that the three Vṛttis of Udbhāta (and roughly the
three Ritis of Vāmana) are equalised to the three Guṇas
defined by himself⁴. Mammaṭa admits Doṣas of pada, vākye

derations simplify the classification of the Guṇas and put a limit to their
useless multiplication or differentiation (witness, e.g. Bhoja’s elaborate
scheme of 24 Guṇas). Mammaṭa, therefore, thinks that the distinction
between abda-guṇa and arthā-guṇa is meaningless, for the latter need
not be separately considered. The mental activity, involved in the enjoy-
ment of Rasa, is made to justify only three (and not ten) Guṇas which
are thus brought into effective relation with the principal sentiment of a
composition. Thus, the ojas is supposed to cause a brilliant expansion
(vistāra) of the mind and resides in the moods of heroism, horror and
fury; the prasāda, proper to all the moods, is taken as the cause of a
quick apprehension of the sense, extending over the mind at once
(vyāpi or vikāsa), like a stream of water over a cloth, or like fire
among dry fuel (cf. Bharata vii. 7); while the mādhurya, residing nor-
mally in the erotic mood of love-in-union, but also appropriate to and
rising successively in degree in pathos, love-in-separation and calm, is
regarded as causing a softening or melting of the heart (druti). The
three conditions of the mind, viz. expanding pervading and melting,
which accompany the poetic sentiments, are thus made the basis
of the three Guṇas; and though these mental states are sometimes
mixed up and lead to various other mental conditions, these latter effects
are too many and too indistinct to be taken as the basis of new Guṇas.
This exposition follows and expands Dhvanyāloka ii. 8-11 (see above
pp. 171f); but it is possible that the original hint of associating these
effects on the mental condition of the reader with the three Guṇas was
supplied by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka (*Locana p. 68) who speaks of the enjoy-
ment (bhoga) of Rasa as being characterised by the mental conditions
of expanding (vistāra), pervading (vikāsa) and melting (druti). Viśva-
nātha substantially agrees with this view of Mammaṭa; but he takes
the technical objection that the ojas etc. are not the causes of, but
identical with, the process of expansion etc.

⁴ See above p. 104. We have seen above that Mammaṭa explains
away the so-called excellences of sense (arthā-guṇas), so that the Guṇas
are confined to the sphere of sound. They are produced by a particular
arrangement of letters (varga), compounds (saṃsā) and mode of com-
position (racaṇā). Thus, the mādhurya or sweetness results from the
employment of (i) all spāra letters or mutes (from k to m), excepting
and artha, as well as Doṣas of Rasa, a mode of treatment which is followed by most later writers. Although the poetic figures are not, in his opinion, always necessary to poetry, he rounds off his treatise with an elaborate analysis and illustration of figures of sound and sense (including a limited number of figures which are of a mixed kind), enumerating as many as sixty-seven independent figures.

From this brief summary of the topics of Mammaṭa’s work, it will be clear that its value consists not in its originality but in its orderly and concise discussion of the main issues (excepting those of Dramaturgy, which Hemacandra, Vidyānātha and Viśvanātha include in an attempt to supplement). His definitions as well as general treatment attempt to cover almost all fields of thought traversed by his predecessors.

the cerebrals (t, th, d, dh) coming with the last letters (nasals) of their respective class, (ii) r and ṇ with short vowels, as well as from (iii) complete absence of compounds or presence of short compounds. The ojas or energy is produced by (i) compound letters formed by the combination of the first and third letters of a class with the letters immediately following them (i.e. with the second and fourth letters respectively) (ii) conjunct consonants of which r forms a part, (iii) cerebrals other than ṇ (which letter is indicative of mādhurva), (iv) doubled letters, i.e. combinations of the same letters, (v) palatal and cerebral sibilants (ś, s). (vi) long compounds, and (vii) a formidable or bombastic style. For obvious reasons there are no rules for prasāda. The letters mentioned here are mostly the same as those given by Udbhata as suggesters of upanāgārikā, purusā, and komalā (or grāmyā) Vṛttis respectively. Mammaṭa, therefore, thinks that Udbhata’s three Vṛttis, which Udbhata himself comprehends under vṛttyanuprāsa, are really equivalent to the three Rītis of Vāmana and to his own three Guṇas.

5 From the new standpoint, Vāmana’s view that the Guṇas produce the beauty of a poem, while the Alamkāras merely heighten the beauty thus produced, is clearly inadequate. Mammaṭa argues in this way. If the doctrine is taken to mean that the possession of all the excellences constitutes poetry, the gaudā and the pāhcālī which are not marked by all the Guṇas, would not be poetical; if, however, the presence of a single excellence is enough to dignify a composition to the rank of poetry, then we are driven to accept even a perfectly unpoetical passage as poetry, if it contains, say, the quality of energy.
The great popularity and authority which the *Kāvya-prakāśa* has always enjoyed and which is indicated by the large number of commentaries on it, must be explained as due not to any remarkable novelty of treatment, but to the clear and lucid (albeit the obscurities due to its brevity of exposition, necessitating commentaries) working out of the already accumulated stock of ideas in the light of the new scheme put forward in the *Dhvanīyāloka*.

But from the theoretical point of view, Mammaṭa’s definition of poetry has been subjected to much vigorous criticism. Viśvanātha, for instance, undoubtedly takes Mammaṭa’s work as the basis (*upajīvya*) of his own, but begins his *Sāhitya-darpaṇa* with a trenchant attack on his definition. He points out, in the first place, that the Guṇas being merely properties of Rasa, should not have been logically included in the definition of essentials. He shows next that if only faultless (*adoṣa*) compositions be called poetry, some of the best poems will have to be given up, inasmuch as it is almost impossible to keep clear of all blemishes. Nor could it be said that faults mar only those particular words or their meanings in which they occur; for if they are faults at all, bearing relation to the underlying sentiment in the composition, they must mar the whole poem. Lastly, he maintains that no reference to poetic figures ought to have been made in the definition, as they are admittedly non-essential. Jagannātha’s criticism is more fundamental, although he agrees with Viśvanātha as to the impropriety of including a reference to guṇa, doṣa, and alaṃkāra in the definition. He objects that a word and its sense are not what is denoted by the term ‘poetry’; for the universal use of such expressions as ‘a poem is read but its meaning is not understood’ shows clearly that a particular kind of words only is what is meant. If it is said that the essence of poetry lies in its capability of producing a mood (*rasa*), and that inasmuch as a word and its sense have this capability, both constitute poetry, then it can be replied that, according to this too wide
view, musical tones and theatrical gestures will have to be called poetry.

Some of these and other arguments appear, no doubt, fastidious and pedantic, and have been met with equal ingenuity by the commentators and followers of Mammaṭa; but the whole controversy indicates the futility of arriving at a precise logical definition of poetry and the difficulty of combining all the conventional elements in such a definition. The earlier theorists probably realised this and carefully avoided the task, for even the Dhvanikāra contents himself with describing its general nature and its divisions, an omission on which Mahimabhaṭṭa ridicules him by saying: kiṃ ca kāvyasya svarūpam vyutpādayitukāmena matimatā tallakaṇṭām eva sāmānyenākhyātavyam.

From the historical point of view, however, the definition is interesting, its apparent inconsistency and obscurity being a curious fact which can reasonably be explained by a reference to the views of the older schools and systems. The term rasa does not occur in the definition, and the fact that Mammaṭa accepts the citra-kāvyā, which is grudgingly admitted by Ānandavardhana as a division of poetry, would indicate, as Viśvanātha points out, that Mammaṭa does not consider Rasa to be essential. Yet he defines Guṇa and Doṣa in terms of their relation to Rasa, a procedure which is not justifiable if the essentiality of Rasa is not admitted. On the other hand, if it is maintained that all reference to Rasa is omitted in the definition because it is such a well known and established fact in the poetical and critical world, then the prominence of threefold suggestion and the division of poetry on its basis are hardly explicable. The mention of Guṇa and Doṣa should in that case be omitted, as done by Jagannātha, from the definition, which corresponds more to the definition of Vāmana (i. 1. 1-3); and these two elements must be understood in the sense in which Vāmana takes them, viz. as properties of śabda and artha.6 This and other discrepancies

6 This is the modified view of Jagannātha who realises the difficulty
make it probable that Mammaṭa, belonging as he does to the new school, is influenced to a great extent by the views of the older schools. He accepts, no doubt, the general scheme and theory of the Dhvani school, but in trying to reconcile them with those of earlier theorists, he lands himself in objectionable inconsistencies.

(3)

Viśvanātha

Even the definition of Viśvanātha, who took upon himself the task of criticising Mammaṭa, is open to similar objections, and has been criticised in its turn by Govinda and Jagannātha. In declaring that poetry consists of a sentence of which the 'soul' is rasa (vākyam rasātmakam kāvyam), he is indeed betraying the unmistakable influence, of the Rasa school; but he is also putting into a shape, in a way clearer than Abhinavagupta does, the essentiality of rasa-dhvani, wisely left unstated but practically meant by the authors of the Dhvanyāloka. In taking up this extreme position, Viśvanātha involves himself, however, in the somewhat clumsy subterfuge of admitting a distant touch of Rasa (rasa-sparśa) in all poetry, even in what is professedly descriptive or ornamental. Even if it is ideally correct to say that a poem ought always to manifest the Rasa alone, it does not, as a matter of fact, always do so. Jagannātha rightly objects that Viśvanātha’s definition would exclude poems in which the centre of gravity lies only in the matter (vastu-dhvani) or in the imaginative mood (alaṃkāra-dhvani). The opponent cannot reply that this is exactly his own opinion, for thereby he goes against the view of ancient authorities, as well as against the establi-

and does not agree with Mammaṭa (see Rasa-gaṅgādhara p. 55). Similarly Vidyānātha, though belonging to the new school, would accept (p. 334) Udbhata’s dictum saṅghatanā-dharmā guṇāḥ.

7 See above ch. v, p. 166 ; ch. vi, p. 178f.

shed practice of great poets, who have admitted the scope of fact and imagination, and described subjects like a flood or narrated a travel, in which there is hardly any touch of Rasa. It would not do, therefore, to accept the rasa-dhvani alone; for a complete definition must also take into account vastu-dhvani and alamkāra-dhvani. Viśvanātha anticipates this objection by saying that in cases other than those admitted expressly by himself there is always a semblance of Rasa (rasābhāsa); and the verse given in the Dhvanyāloka as an instance of vastu-dhvani is, in his opinion, admissible only because there is such a touch of Rasa in it, and not because mere vyaṅgya vastu can constitute the essence of poetry. Jagannātha replies that nothing is gained by such a supposition of an indirect reference to Rasa, because such a reference may also be construed in phrases like 'the cow moves' or 'the deer leaps.' This cannot be taken as the sole criterion, because thereby any and every content of poetry would be reduced to the position of an excitant, an ensuant or an accessory of Rasa.

Apart from this technicality and the emphasis put on the essentiality of Rasa, which however is not reconciled to other elements of poetry. Viśvanātha's scheme does not substantially differ from that of Mammaṭa, on whose work he also appears to have written a commentary. In one passage, indeed, he pays an elegant tribute to his predecessor's work by admitting his own indebtedness to it. After defining poetry as a sentence the 'soul' of which is Rasa, he proceeds in the usual way to analyse the 'sentence' (vākya) and the different functions of its constituent word and sense, establishing suggestion or vyaṅjanā as the function necessary and important for the purpose of conveying the suggested Rasa (pūdhe rasādīnām). He accepts only two divisions of poetry, viz., dhvani and guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya kāvya, and rejects the third, the citra-kāvya (which is suffered by Ānandavardhana and accepted by Mammaṭa) on the ground that it is entirely devoid of Rasa and therefore inconsistent with his own
definition of poetry. It is curious, however, that Viśvanātha, following Ānandavardhana, partially admits the suggestion of vastu and alanākāra under suggestion of perceptible process (kramoddyota-vyaṅgya), based on the power of word or sense or both. The case of poetry of subordinate suggestion (guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya), where the Rasa involved is secondary, is justified by holding that the mere circumstance of the Rasa being collaterally suggested does not destroy the claim of such poetry; for the relish of Rasa alone, whether circumstantial or essential, is the true criterion. It is this partiality for Rasa which makes him include a treatment, omitted by most writers on Poetics, of dramatic composition, in which the delineation of the Rasas, the moods and sentiments, is already established as fundamental by both poets and theorists. Consistently with the same idea, a Doṣa or blemish is defined as the detractor of the Rasa (rasāpakar-ṣaka), while a Guṇa is explained as a particular mode or quality of the Rasa depending on sabda and artha and enhancing the charm of the Rasa when Rasa is principal. The Guṇas are really attributes of Rasa, but they are secondarily spoken of as belonging to a word and its sense: which secondary use also explains the old distinction between sabda-guṇa and artha-guṇa. The Guṇas are accepted as three in number, viz. mādhurya, ojas and prasāda, depending upon a combination of particular letters and justified by the attributes of expanding, pervading and melting the mind in its enjoyment of Rasa; and the ten Guṇas of older writers are mentioned and criticised after the manner of Mammaṭa. It is curious, however, that Viśvanātha admits the Ritiis separately. instead of comprehending them as Mammaṭa does, under the Vyātis or considering them redundant after the enumeration of the three Guṇas. He defines the Riti as pada-samghaṭanā 9 or particular arrangement of words (and letters) which helps the Rasas (upakartri rasādinām). The Riti, however, relates

9 By the term samghaṭanā stress in laid on its technical sense of Samāsa-vṛttti, but this is not the only criterion.
entirely to the external framework of poetry, and is likened to the conformation of the body in relation to the soul\(^\text{10}\). Finally, the poetic figures (alaṃkāras), which are treated substantially after the manner of Mammaṭa and Ruyyaka, are defined as those non-permanent attributes of word and its sense which add to their beauty and thus embellish the Rasa indirectly. The term ‘non-permanent’ (asthira) is explained, after Mammaṭa, by the statement that the presence of the Alaṃkāras is not necessary but accidental, as compared to the Guṇas which are necessary attributes.

The above sketch of Viśvanātha’s general position will sufficiently indicate that he is more or less a compiler and not an original writer, although he shows some constructive ability in elaborating a full and compact system of his own on the basis of rasa-dhvani. His borrowings from Ānanda-vardhana, Mammaṭa and Ruyyaka are very extensive; and sometimes his judgment forsakes him, making him copy his originals rather slavishly. He is not always happy in his innovations, and sometimes (though rarely) he is wrong or inconsistent in his interpretation. In spite of these and other defects his work is interesting in the history of Sanskrit Poetics as an attempt at a further development of the Dhvani-theory out of itself, an attempt to which recognition was not

10 Viśvanātha speaks of four Rītis as follow: (i) vaidarbhi or sweet style (marked by letters indicative of mādhurya, and by short compounds or absence of compounds). (ii) gaudī or bombastic style (marked by letters indicative of ojas and possessing a large number of compounds). (iii) pāncālī (marked by letters other than those mentioned above and containing five or six compound words). (iv) lāṭī or the style intermediate between vaidarbhi and pāncālī. This is only a variation on the conventional enumeration; but strictly speaking, Mammaṭa is right in not considering the Rītis separately, as they are comprehended by the three Vṛttis or even by the three Guṇas accepted by the new school. Viśvanātha alludes to Vṛttis under vṛttyanuprāsā and simply says (after Ruuyaka): rasa-viśaya-vyāpāravatī varṇa-racanā vṛttih, tad-anugatatvena prakarṣena nyasanād vṛttyanuprāsah.
universally accorded by other strict followers of the theory. The Sāhitya-darpaṇa, written like the Kāvya-prakāśa in the form of Kārikā with Vṛtti, has also the great merit of being written in a more simple and less controversial style than the treatises of Mammaṭa and Jagannātha respectively; and as a suitable and complete manual of Poetics, including a treatment of the dramatic art, it has always held its popularity as one of the most convenient text-books on the subject as a whole.

( 4 )

Ruuyaka

One of the most important writers of this group is Ruuyaka, who comes immediately after Mammaṭa and who also appears to have written a commentary on Mammaṭa's work. In his treatment of the poetic figures with which his work (as its name Alamkāra-sarvasva implies) is directly concerned, he shows, however, a remarkable degree of insight and independence of judgment which distinguishes him from his predecessor. The value of his contribution in this respect may be judged from the fact that his Alamkāra-sarvasva not only helped to define and fix the conception of an alamkāra, of which the first indication was given by Kuntaka but which was left untouched by the authors of the Dhvanyāloka, but it had also a great influence in establishing by its careful analysis the scope and nature of individual poetic figures, so that his views on this matter have been accepted as authoritative by such important later writers as Viśvanātha, Vidyādhara, Vidyānātha and Appayya Dīksita.

The plan of Ruuyaka's work, written in the form Sūtra with Vṛtti, is stated by himself in the introductory portion of his Vṛtti. He starts, in common with other followers of the Dhvani school, with the suggested sense (pratyamāna artha) and demonstrates by a rapid survey of the views of older writers that it was directly or indirectly recognised by
all. But he thinks that, in the opinion of the authorities who came before the Dhvani school, the chief function of the suggested sense consisted in embellishing the expressed meaning (vācyopaskāra), and therefore it was naturally comprehended in the sphere of poetic figures in which the expressed sense prevailed. This is generally the view of Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, Udbhaṭa, Vāmana and Ruḍrāta. The Vakroktijīvita-kāra, who came after Ānandavardhana, includes all ideas of Dhvani in a variety of Vakrokti based on upacāra or metaphorical expression. Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka maintains that the suggested sense, established chiefly through the forcible utterance of the poet (kavi-prādghokti) is only a secondary element in poetry, the essential thing being the relish of Rasa realised through a function called bhoga or enjoyment, which is distinct from and which transcends the denotative or generalising functions of words. The Vyaktiviveka-kāra takes the relation of the expressed and the suggested in terms of the logical liṅga and liṅgin, and regards the process of suggestion as a process of inference. None of these views comes up to that of the Dhvanikāra, which is, therefore, accepted indisputably by Ruyyaka, who lays down sententiously at the end: asti tāvad vyaṅgya-niṣṭho vyaṅjanā-vyāpāraḥ. The three divisions of poetry into dhvani, guṇī-bhūta vyaṅgya and citra are also recognised; but as the first two are already discussed in the Alamkāra-mañjari (p. 15) and the Dhvanyāloka respectively, Ruyyaka proposes in this treatise to take up the remaining citra-kāvyā, which, including in its scope all poetic figures devoid of suggestion.

11 vācyopaskārakatvam hy ālamkārānām ātma-bhūtatvam, Jayaratha p. 3.

12 Presumably this work was composed by himself. But Jayaratha does not expressly say so. In the Trivandrum edition, the reading is different. It reads kālidāśādi-prabandheṣu (instead of ālamkāra-mañjaryān) dāsitaḥ. The Alamkāra-mañjari appears to have dealt particularly with rasa-dhvani, apparently laying stress on śṛgāra-rasa.

13 See above ch. v. p. 171.
naturally covers an extensive field. As all detailed consideration of this topic is omitted in the Dhvanyāloka (as coming not properly within the sphere of its theory), here was an opportunity of supplementing the work of his predecessors.

But the point had already been taken up and discussed in his own way by Kuntaka who recognised that the poet's intention need not always be to awaken the Rasa or anything else unexpressed but may be directed simply to producing a certain strikingness of expression in the form of an expressed poetic figure. He analysed poetic expression and found that the elements which went to make up the being of such a figure consisted of a peculiar turn of expression, which produced a certain charm (called vaicitrya or vicchitti-visēsa) and which ultimately depended on the conception of the poet (kavi-pratibhā-nirvartitata)14. Both these terms are not new, the kavi-pratibhā having been acknowledged as essential in a poetic composition by older theorists, and the saundarya of Vāmana reappearing under the name of vaicitrya or vicchitti. The ukti-vaicitrya is discussed in another connexion by Ānandavardhana (p. 243); and Mammaṭa (probably under the influence of Kuntaka) lays down that the alamkāra is nothing but vaicitrya itself. Abhinavagupta speaks of endless varieties of upamā-vicchitti (p. 5), and in another passage (p. 8) uses the term as almost synonymous with kāmaniyyaka or cārutva-hetu.

Ruyyaka does not elaborate a doctrine on this point but he accepts Kuntaka's analysis implicitly and applies it to the detailed examination of individual poetic figures, a procedure which is followed by Viśvanātha, Appayya Dīkṣita and Jagannātha. That he derived this idea from Kuntaka is indicated by Jayaratha in a passage in which the commentator, while rejecting on this ground the claim of the yathū-saṃkhya to be counted as a poetic figure, says: etac ca

14 See above ch. vi, p. 188f.
vakroktijñita-kṛtā saprapañcam uktaḥ ity asmābhir nāyastam (p. 149). In the Alāṅkāra-sarvasva Ruyyaka does not define the term vicchitti, but in the commentary on the Vyakti-viveka attributed to him, he says (p. 44): tathā ca śabdārthayor vicchittir alāṅkāraḥ, vicchittīś ca kavi-pratibholāsārūpatvāt kavi-pratibhollāsasya ānantaḥ anantatvam bhaja-māno na paricchettum śakyaṁ (‘Then again, an alāṅkāra consists of the charm or vicchitti of sound and sense; and it is not possible to define vicchitti exactly, inasmuch as it is of infinite variety, being identical with the play of the poetic imagination, which itself is infinite in its scope’), the boundlessness or infinite scope of poetic conception having been already admitted by Ānandavardhana himself (ch. iv), as well as by Kuntaka.

Ruyyaka, however, takes this vicchitti, brought out by the productive imagination of the poet, to be the test of a poetic figure; or, in other words, a form of expression or a mere speech-figure (if the phrase is allowable) becomes a poetic figure when a certain charm is lent to it by the peculiar conception of the poet. Thus, a form of expression involving the logical anumāna would not prima facie constitute the figure anumāna, unless this special charm is involved in it: or, the doubt involved in the figure samdeha must be brought into being by the imagination of the poet, for it should not be an ordinary doubt but a ‘poetic’ doubt. Jayaratha makes this doctrine more explicit than his author in many places in his commentary. He lays down repeatedly that a special charm (vicchitti-viśesa) depending on the conception of the poet (kavi-karma or pratibhā) is to be taken as the essential factor of an Alāṅkāra (pp. 144, 149-50, 183), and all so called figures are to be accepted or rejected accordingly.

15 The question has been dealt with in some detail by Jacobi in his Ueber Begriff und Wesen der poetischen Figuren in der indischen Poetik in GN, 1908, and also in the present writer’s introduction to Vakrokti-jñita, 2nd ed. 1928, pp. xlv-lixvii.
In later writings this doctrine is admitted as settled beyond question. Appayya Dīkṣita explains it at the beginning of his Citra-mīmāṃsā (p. 6), and Jagannātha repeatedly states: alamkārāṇāṃ bhāniti-viśeṣa-rūpāvatvam. In addition to the terms bhāniti-viśeṣa, vaicitrya and vicchitti, Viśvanātha and Jagannātha use the terms cārutva, hṛdyatva, camatkārītvā and saundaryya almost synonymously, while the latter attempts to define it (p. 466, 470) more precisely as the poetic imagination with reference to the power of poetic production; or rather, as the charm which is thereby brought into being, upon which the poetic figures distinguish themselves in their special peculiarities.

Ruyyaka’s work is also important for its acute analysis of the scope and nature of individual poetic figures, of which nearly eighty independent varieties are dealt with. At first sight one would be inclined to classify him as belonging to the Alaṃkāra school. There is no doubt that Ruyyaka was a great admirer of Udbhata, on whose work his father Tilaka (as Jayaratha informs us) wrote a Viveka or Vicāra. Ruyyaka himself tells us (and he is borne out by Jayaratha and Samudrabandha) that he is a follower of the views of the “ancients” (e.g. cīranta-matānusṛtiḥ, p. 205), by which he means apparently the older Alaṃkāra school of Bhāmaha and Udbhata; but of course, he corrects, modifies or expands older authoritative opinions in the light of the progressive study of the subject. Ruyyaka’s development of Udbhata’s idea of śleṣa may be taken as a typical instance. The controversy regarding the divisions of śleṣa and its relation to other figures in cases of combination, started, as Ruyyaka himself and his commentators point out, from Udbhata’s time.

16 Jayaratha refers to Ruyyaka’s following of cīranta-mata at pp. 72, 83, 103, 172 etc., and of Udbhata at pp. 10, 20, 34, 87, 93, 97, 98, 125, 126, 150 etc. Samudrabandha’s references are at pp. 4, 7, 10, 11, 14, 21, 74, 82, 103 etc. Ruyyaka’s own references to Udbhata’s views will be found in numerous places, at pp. 3, 7, 23, 59, 82, 86, 92, 123, 126, 148, 174, 191 etc.
Ruyyaka accepts the division of this figure into śabda-śleṣa and artha-śleṣa (adding ubhaya-śleṣa), and holds that the principle of this distinction consists in the dictum yo' lamkāro yad-āśritaḥ sa tad-alamkāraḥ. He rejects Mammāta's view that the distinction is based on the ground that the śabda-śleṣa is incapable of enduring a change of synonym (parivṛtti-asaha), while the artha-śleṣa is capable of doing so; for Mammata holds that it is not āśrayāśrayi-bhāva (mutual dependence or inheritance) but anvaya (connexion) and vyatireka (contrast) which must be taken as the test for determining whether a figure is of śabda or of artha. According to Ruyyaka, however, a śabda-śleṣa occurs when the expression, being differently split up yields two different meanings. Here the words are really different, as is indicated by a difference of accent as well as by the effort required in pronouncing them. They present the appearance of sameness or coalescence (śleṣa), just in the same way as the lacquered wood appears to be one single object, though really lac is put on the wood. The artha-śleṣa occurs where the expression is the same and has the same accent and effort, but possesses two meanings, just as two fruits hang down from a single stem. The ubhaya-śleṣa is the case where both these circumstances exist.

Rergarding the implication of śleṣa in other poetic figures, the question has been raised whether it should be regarded (i) as stronger than and thus dispelling the notion of the accompanying figure, (ii) as being equally powerful and therefore entering into combination with them, or (ii) as being weaker and therefore not prominent where other figures occur. Udbhāta takes the first position, and thinks that where the śleṣa is present (e. g. along with upamā) there is only the appearance (pratibhā) of the other figure.

17 Viśvanātha follows Mammata, but Vidyādhara agrees with Ruyyaka's interpretation in this matter.

18 Jagannātha, p. 393, sums up the views thus: ayam cālamkāraḥ praṇyāṇalamkāraṁtvasya viṣayam abhinivisate, tatra kim asyc bhādha- kavām syād āhosvit samkīrṇatvam utāho bādhyaṁvain iti.
the real figure being in such a case the śleṣa (and not upamā). Ruyyaka demurs to this view, and agrees with Mammaṭa in pointing out that in such cases of conflict the possession of common attributes (sādharmyā) inherent in upamā is alone sufficient to constitute the latter figure; for the unqualified definition of sādharmyā as community of attributes or circumstances is not exclusive of the verbal sameness conveyed by the accompanying śleṣa. The upamā, therefore, is predominant and the subordinate śleṣa only helps it; for in such cases, the common property is not arrived at without the śleṣa, and without the common property there can be no upamā. If the two figures are thus found together, one helping the other, we have saṃkīrṇatva of śleṣa and upamā.

From these and other instances which we need not multiply, the influence of the Alāmkāra school on Ruyyaka will be obvious; but it will be also obvious that the views of the older school never receive unqualified acceptance from him. His following of ancient opinions, a trait which he shares with Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha in their following of Vāmana and the Rasa-writers respectively, should be explained as an earnest attempt on his part to reconcile the views of later theorists with those of the earlier, of which he was a professed admirer. It is this impulse probably which made him take up the Vakroktijivita-kāra’s conception of a poetic figure, and apply it to his own detailed analysis of individual figures, as this topic of Poetics was not sufficiently dealt with in the Dhvanyāloka. It cannot be said, however, that Ruyyaka was a follower of the Vakroktijivita-kāra, for Ruyyaka himself declares his own adherence to the Dhvani-theory; and, in spite of his borrowing from Udbhāṭa and Kuntaka, he cannot by any means be directly affiliated with the Alāmkāra school.

19 As suggested by Harichand Sastri p. 108.
To most of the writers who followed in the footsteps of Mammaṭa and Ruyyaka, there was hardly any original work that seemed left or unaccomplished. The details of the new system having already been established, there was apparently no occasion for any creative work, and even the task of critical elaboration had well-nigh run its course. Nor did any of the writers possess the genius of making an entirely new departure. This was also the period of early Muhammedan incursions, and was marked, as it was to be expected, by a general decadence of all investigations, reflecting a corresponding ebb in the tide of intellectual, as well as social and political, activity. In the centuries that follow there arose a host of commentators, Mammaṭa alone claiming no less than seventy, who busied themselves in interpreting the already established rules and in adding here and there minor points of detail, not clearly made out by their predecessors. The task of remodelling and presenting the new theory in an easier style was also undertaken, giving birth to works like the Ekāvalī of Vidyādhara and the Pratāpa-rudra-yaśo-bhūṣaṇa of Vidyānātha, the chief merit of which consisted in systematic compilation and arrangement. On the main problems, these treatises and even the later works of Jayadeva and Appayya Dikṣita, which carry in particular the process of analysing the poetic figures to its utmost limits, throw little valuable light.

Vidyādhara, for instance, models his text (consisting of Kārikā and Vṛttī) on the Kāvyā-prakāśa of Mammaṭa, and in the treatment of poetic figures follows Ruyyaka in the main. In characterising the Kāvyā as dhvani-pradhāna, and

20 In this he agrees with Viśvanātha, Vidyānātha and others. See his definition of figures like vicītra, vikalpa or ullekha which are passed over by Mammaṭa.

21 In the first chapter of his work Vidyādhara follows the Dhvanyāloka very closely, and some of his Kārikās, e.g. i. 6, 13, are mere paraphrases of the Kārikās of the older work.
setting forth its purpose as well as the qualifications necessary for the poet, he devotes the first chapter to the establishment of the dhvani or suggested sense in poetry. In this connexion, he refutes at some length the views of those schools which maintain the non-existence of Dhvani or its inclusion in other processes and draws mostly on the Dhvanī-loka and the Kāvya-prakāśa. The second chapter deals with the three functions of word and sense, viz. abhidhā, lakṣanā and vyañjanā, while the third chapter classifies the dhvanī-kāvya, in which the suggested sense excels the expressed, explaining incidentally the different theories of Rasa, which constitutes the province of one of the eight varieties of the imperceptible process of suggestion (asaṃlakṣya-krama vyaṅgya). The second class of poetry, the guṇibhūta-vyaṅgya kāvya, is taken up in the next fourth chapter. The fifth chapter defines the guṇas, distinguishing them from the alamkāras, and concluding with the treatment of the riti, with an incidental attack of older views and general support of Mammaṭa’s position. The next chapter is concerned with the doṣas, while the last two chapters deal with the poetic figures, the śabdālāṃkāras and arthālāṃkāras respectively, adhering in general to the treatment of Ruṣyaka. This brief enumeration of the contents of Vidyādharā’s work will sufficiently indicate the scope and nature of these subsequent treatises, as well as the fact that they embrace the same topics as are dealt with in the Kāvya-prakāśa, even the different chapters sometimes corresponding, in regard to their subject-matter, to the different ullāsas of the latter.

The scope of Vidyānātha’s work, written also in the form of Kārikā with Vṛtti, is much wider, and its plan somewhat different, but from the theoretical point of view it is perhaps less interesting. Its nine prakaraṇas cover almost the same ground as the ten paricchedas of Viśvanātha’s Sāhitya-darpaṇa. Like Vidyādharā, Vidyānātha follows Mammaṭa in general, but prefers Bhoja in the matter of Guṇas and Ruṣyaka in the matter of poetic figures. The author justifies the pro-
duction of his work by stating that although the older writers have already dealt with the different branches of the subject, none of them has described a nāyaka or hero in it; but as the greatness of a composition depends on the representation of the merits of the hero described in it, the first prakaraṇa, entitled nāyaka-prakaraṇa, deals with the attributes of a hero, as well as of the heroine, and their necessary adjuncts. Then follows the kāvya-prakaraṇa, which describes in the usual way the nature of a Kāvya and its constituents, the vṛttis and ritis suitable to the development of different sentiments, the śayyā or repose of words in their mutual favourableness, the pāka or maturity of sense, and the divisions of Kāvya. It is curious that Vidyānātha’s definition of poetry (gūṇālaṃkāra-sahitau śabdārthaṃ doṣa-varjiitau gadya-padyobhayamavam kāvyaṃ kāvya-vido viduḥ) follows closely Mammaṭa’s known definition which is quoted in a slightly modified form immediately afterwards. He speaks of śabda and artha as the ‘body’ of poetry, vyaṅgya as the ‘soul’, the gūnas and alaṃkāras in the usual manner being likened to natural qualities like heroism and to outward ornaments like bracelets respectively. The ritis are described as natural dispositions which lead to the excellence of the soul (ātmotkarṣāvahāḥ svabhāvāḥ). After dealing with the three functions of word and sense, he goes on to the consideration of the vyaṅjanā-vṛtti (pp. 52 f) and mentions (pp. 77 f) in passing 5304 varieties of Dhvani. And yet he defines the excellence, called gūmbhīrya, as dhvani-mattā, after Bhoja! He lays down racanīyā upi rasa-vyaṅja-ktvam prasiddham, which leads him to a separate consideration of the suggestion of Rasa. The third chapter, styled the Nāṭaka-prakaraṇa, deals with the subject of Rūpakā or dramatic composition, a theme generally omitted by most writers, taking up the Nāṭaka as the most important variety and analysing its plot into five sāmdhis. Although based avowedly on Dhanaṇḍaya’s Daśa-rūpakā, this chapter is one of the important later contributions to the subject of Dramaturgy, and a great interest attaches to its inclusion of a model
drama illustrative of all its characteristics and eulogistic of
the author's patron Pratāparudra. Next comes the *rasa-
prakaraṇa* dealing with the nature and theories of Rasa. The
next two chapters are the *doṣa-prakaraṇa* and the *guṇa-
prakaraṇa*, while the last two chapters are devoted to the
topic of *śabdālaṃkāra*, *arthālaṃkāra* and *miśrālaṃkāra*.

It is curious that Vidyānātha follows Bhoja in mentioning
as many as twenty-four Guṇas. The definitions are almost
identical in the two authors. The Guṇas are: (i) *śleṣa*, coales-
cence of words (owing to the imperceptibility of *saṃdhi*, when
it is not harsh to the ear and when the letters belong to the
same *sthāna* or organ of pronunciation). (ii) *prasāda*, lucidity
arising from carefully selected words which lead to the inten-
ded sense at once. (iii) *samatā*, uniformity of diction (rejected
by Mammaṭa as being often a defect). (iv) *mādhurya*, dis-
tinctness of words (*prthak-padatva*) on account of the absence
of *saṃdhi*. (v) *saukumārya*, softness of expression due to the
use of soft-sounding letters. (vi) *artha-vyakti*, clearness of sense
due to the completion of a sentence in all its parts. (vii) *kānti*,
gracefulness of diction, explained as follows by the comments-
tor Ratnesvara: *apratīhata-padair āṛambhāḥ saṃdarbhasyaiva
kāntiḥ ....* 'kusumasya dhanur' iti prahatam, 'kausumam'
ity aprahatam; 'jalanidhau' iti prahatam, 'adhibalam' ity
aprahatam; 'gurutvam' ity prahatam. 'gauravam' iti aprahatam
ityādi......asti tu tulye'pi vācakatve pudānāṃ kaścid ābhyantraro
viśeṣo yam adhikṛtya kīṃcid eva prayuṣjate mahākavyāh.na
tu sarvam. (viii) *audārya*, where the sentence is so arranged
with formidable letters (*vikaṭākṣara*) or hard vocables (*vikaṭa*,
explained as *kaṭhina-varṇa-saṃghaṭanā-rūpa* by Jagannātha)
that the words proceed as if they were dancing (*nṛtyadbhir iva
padair yad vākya-racanā*). (ix) *udātta*, the use of praiseworthy
epithets (*cf Agni-purāṇa 345. 9*); Kumāravāmin notes that
it is the absence of the defect known as *anucitārtha*. (x) *ojas*,
strength due to the presence of compounds. (xi) *sauśabdyā*,
elegance in the use of nominal and verbal forms (*cf Bhāmaha
i, 14-15 ; Rājaśekhara p. 20*). (xii) *preyas*, statement of agree-
able or flattering things (Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin and some other writers regard this as an Ālaṃkāra and not a Guṇa); the commentator notes that this is the absence of the defect paruṣa (see above p. 14, fn 38). (xiii) aurjitya, compactness of structure. (xiv) samādhi, attribution of the properties of one object to another (an echo of Daṇḍin’s samādhi), e.g., attribution of the properties of an inanimate object to an animate object (what Kuntaka would comprehend under upacāravakratā and other writers under the figure rūpaka). (xv) vistara, detailed corroboration of what is said. (xvi) saṁmitatva, use of the absolutely necessary words, neither more nor less, to convey the intended sense, i.e., balance of sound and sense (arthaṣya padānāṁ ca tulā-vidhṛtatvāt tulyatvena saṁmitatvam). (xvii) gāmbhirya, presence of the suggested sense or dhvani (dhvani-mattā). (xviii) saṁkṣepa, brevity of statement. (xix) saukṣmya, minuteness or subtlety of sense. (xx) prauḍhi, maturity of sense (this comes under pāka detailed below). (xxi) ukti, cleverness of speech. (xxii) rīti, homogeneity of manner (corresponding to Vāmana’s samatā), consisting of the completion of a sentence or theme in the manner in which it was begun. (xiii) bhāvika, conduct of a sentence according to its underlying emotion or sentiment (bhāvataḥ). (xxiv) gati, a pleasing effect produced by long and short vowels (suramyatvam svarārohāvarohayoh, in which svarāroha is explained as dīrghākṣara-pratyatva, and svarāvaroha as its reverse).

22 This is said to be the absence of the defect called visamdhī. This defect, mentioned also by Bharata and Bhāmaha, is explained as visamphito virūpo vā yasya saṃdhiḥ, Kumārasvāmin explaining visamhitaḥ as vigatā saṃphītā varṇānāṁ paraspara-saṅnikarṣo yatra, and virūpaḥ as simply karna-kaṭhoraḥ. The saṃphītā therefore, means close proximity of letters which leads to euphonic, combinations sanctioned by grammar. The fault occurs (a) when there is no saṃdhi (vītleṣa) and (b) when the saṃdhi is harsh to the ear (kaṣṭa). Mammaṭa (pp. 331f) adds a third case of its occurrence when the saṃdhi gives rise to the implication of an indecent (adilla) idea. See Trivedi’s note to Pratīparudra pp. 73-75.

23 The Agni-purāṇa, while admitting most of these excellences,
The theory of pāka and śayyō. mentioned by Vidyādhara and Vidyānātha follows from the stress laid on felicity of expression, which depends on poetic genius and which lies at the root of all discussions on style, poetic figure and kindred topics. The word śayyō is old, having been used, apparently in this sense, by Bāṇabhāṭṭa in one of the introductory verses of his Kādambarī; while the Agni-purāṇā uses the word mudrā with a similar connotation. Vidyādhara and Vidyānātha develop it further as a special excellence of expression. The śayyō is defined as the repose of words in their mutual favourableness like the repose of the body in a bed, the similitude explaining the etymology of the term. This mutual friendship (maitrī) of words is so close that they cannot, as Mallinātha explains, be replaced even by synonyms: a theory of the immutability of words which mutatis mutandis would remind one of Flaubert's half-platonic view, developed by Walter Pater, that each idea has its fixed word-counterpart. The theory of pāka, is very closely allied with this. The word pāka, meaning literally 'ripeness', 'maturity' or 'fruition', is as old as Vāmana. He speaks of pāka (i. 2. 21 Vṛtti), resulting from the vaidarbhi rīti in a delightful effect on the connoisseur, as "that attaining which the excellence of a word quickens and in which the unreal appears as real". Elsewhere he says (i. 3. 15) that śabda-pāka occurs when the words are so carefully chosen that they cannot bear an exchange of synonym. Later theorists elaborate the doctrine as consisting of (1) śabda-pāka, which may be explained, after Vāmana, as maturity of expression due to the perfect fitness of a word and its sense, and (2) artha-pāka or depth of sense which is of various kinds brought about by the different tastes of different poetic Rasas. Maṅgala, according to Rājaśekhara, regards pāka only as sauṣabdya (excellence of words) or tiṇāṃ supāṃ ca vyutpattīḥ (proficiency in the use of nouns and verbs. cf. classifies and defines them somewhat differently. See ch. 345, and above p. 204.
Bhāmaha i. 14-15). Vidyādhara admits only what is called *pritha-pāka* above; but he alludes to the other theories which say that *pāka* consists of *pada-parivṛtta-vaṃukhva* (Vamana). Vidyānātha calls this last *sayyā*, and accepts and defines *pāka* as depth of sense. Bhoja would call it *pratadiḥ* and enumerate it as a *sabdu-guna*.

Rājaśekhara's discussion of earlier views on this point (p. 20) is interesting and deserves quotation. "The ācāryas ask, 'what is *pāka*?' Maṅgala says it is maturity (*parināma*). What again, is maturity?' ask the ācāryas. Maṅgala replies: it is the skill in the use of nouns and verbs'. Hence it is *saunśabdya* or excellence of language. 'The *pāka* is fixedness in the application of words' say the ācāryas. It is said [by Vāmana i. 3. 15]: 'The insertion and deletion of words occur so long as there is uncertainty in the mind, when the fixity of words is established, the composition is successful'. So the followers of Vāmana say, 'the *pāka* is aversion of words to alteration by means of synonyms'. Therefore it is said [Vāmana, loc. cit.]: 'The specialists in the propriety of words have called that *sabdu-pāka* in which the words abandon the capability of being exchanged (by synonyms)'. But Avantisundari thinks that this want of capability is not *pāka*. Since the varied expressions of great poets, with regard to one and the same object, all attain maturity, the *pāka* consists in the composition of word and sense proper to the development of *rasa*. So it is said:

That is *vākyu-pāka* to me by which the mode of stringing together word and sense, according to *guna, alamkāra, riti* and *uktī*, is relished'. And again: 'There being the speaker, there being the word, there being the *rasa*, there is still not that by which the nectar of words flows' Hence the Yāyāvariyaś say: 'Since the *pāka*, which is capable of being communicated by *sabda* (word) through its inferrability from its effect, is in a high degree the province of *Demonstration* (*ābhidyā*), still it is subject to usage of what is established by the sanction of the *sahṛdaya*'."
From this passage it would seem that Rājaśekhara admits that the pāka is conveyed chiefly through words, and taken as sausabdya or śabda-vyutpatti, it comes primarily under the province of abhidhā; but it finds its scope only in the artha which is established by the taste of the sahṛdaya. In this connexion it is proper to note that the term pāka, like the word rasa, has a reference to its etymological meaning of physical taste which has been fancifully likened to that resulting from the ripeness of fruits. As such ripeness of fruits bears different tastes, some theorists carry the analogy into distinguishing and naming pākas after various kinds of fruits. Thus, Vāmana quotes two old verses (under iii. 2. 15) which speak of vṛntāka-pāka; while Vidyānātha speaks of two kinds of pāka (1) drākṣa-pāka, or the maturity of grapes in which the taste flows both in and out, and (2) nārikela-pāka, the ripeness of cocoa-nut which is rough outside but tasty inside. Bhoja similarly distinguishes between mṛdvikā-pāka and nārikela-pāka; but Ratnesvara in his commentary alludes to various kinds of pāka, named after sahakāra (mango), vārtāka (egg-plant) and nilakapittha (feronia elephantum). Rājaśekhara goes to the length of mentioning nine such cases of pāka named after the following nine fruits (pp. 20-21): picumanda (nimba, azadirachta indica), badara (jujube), mṛdvikā (grapes), vārtāka (egg-plant fruit), tāndi (tamarind), sahakāra (mango), kramuka (betel-nut), trapusa (cucumber) and nārikela (cocoa-nut).
CHAPTER VIII
SOME LATER WRITERS OF THE NEW SCHOOL

Hemacandra and the Vāgbhaṭas

The group of three Jaina writers, Hemacandra and the older and the younger Vāgbhaṭas, may be conveniently mentioned here, but they do not call for any special remark. Hemacandra’s Kāvyānuśāsana, written in the form of Sūtra with Vṛtti, and its commentary, called Viveka¹, composed by himself, indicate extensive learning and constitute a compact manual of Poetics in eight chapters; but there is hardly anywhere any striking trait of originality² or even indepen-

1 The Sūtra-portion is called Kāvyānuśāsana, the Vṛtti is styled the Alamkāra-cūḍā-maṇi, while the brief commentary which explains the Vṛtti may be called Viveka from its mangala-verse.

2 Hemacandra’s treatment of poetic figures, however, is somewhat peculiar. He speaks of six śabdālamkāras, viz. anuprāsa, yamaka, citra, śleṣa, vakrokti and punaruktavad-ābhāsa. The arthālamkāras are much reduced in number and limited to twenty-nine (viz. upamā, utprekṣā, rūpaka, nidarśana, dipaka, anyokti, paryāyokta, atisayokti, ṭīkṣpa, virodha, sahokti, samāsokti, jāti, vyāja-stuti, śleṣa, vyatireka, arthāntara-nyāsa, sasamdeha, apahnuti, parāvṛtti, anumāna, smṛti, bhūnti, viśama, sama, samuccaya, parisaṃkhyā, kāraṇamālā and saṃkara). He includes saṃśṛṣṭi under saṃkara, and treats anavaya and upameyopamā as varieties of upamā. The aprastuta-prāśmaṇsā similarly goes under anyokti. All figures like rasavya, preyas, ārjasvin and samāhita that have a touch of Rasa and Bhāva are omitted as being comprehended (so also Mammaṭa thinks) in the class of poetry called guṇibhūta-vyanāgya. Hemacandra does not deal with parikara, yathāsaṃkhyā, bhāvika, udātta, āśik and pratyāṅka for reasons explained by himself at pp. 292-4. Hemacandra, however, defines some figures somewhat broadly so as to include other recognised figures in them, e.g. his dipaka would include sulyavogitā, his parāvṛtti would contain the paryāya and parāvṛtti of Mammaṭa, his nidarśana would comprehend pratīvastūpamā, drstiṇa and nidarśana of other writers.
dent thinking out of the main problems. This work is chiefly a compilation. Hemacandra not only paraphrases literally most of the standardised definitions, and reproduces almost unhesitatingly the illustrative quotations of Mammaṭa; but his acknowledged and unacknowledged borrowings from the Dhvanyāloka and Līkana, from the Abhinava-bhūrati, from the Vākrokti-jivita, from Rājaśekhara's Kāvyamimāṃsā, as well as from other well known works are indeed numerous. No doubt, Hemacandra adds a chapter on Dramaturgy, chiefly compiled from Bharata and others, but the account of the doctrines of dhvani, rasa, guṇa, doṣa and alamkāra is closely and somewhat uncritically copied from Mammaṭa, supplemented, however, by excerpts, in the commentary, of other views on the subject. In trying to improve upon Mammaṭa's imperfect definition of poetry by substituting sālamkārānu ca in the place of analamkṛti punah kvāpi, he puts himself open to greater technical objection, although he adds the gloss: ca-kāro niralamkārayor api sabdārthayoh kvacit kāvyatva-sthāpā-nārthaḥ.

The older and the younger Vāgbhātas, on the other hand, though making considerable use of Mammaṭa's text (the latter especially borrowing from Hemacandra's version too), do not admit dhvani, and are allied in their sympathies with the Pre-dhvani schools. The authority of Daṇḍin, for instance, carries great weight with them; and the younger Vāgbhāṭa admits some of Rudraṭa's peculiar poetic figures. At the same time, the unmistakable influence of the new

3 The eight chapters of Hemacandra's Kāvyānuśāsana comprehends the following topics: i. The purpose (proyojana) of poetry, its causes (hetu) viz. pratibhā to which are added vyutpatti and abhyāsa; the definition of poetry; the nature of sabda and artha; the denoted, indicated and suggested meanings. ii. The rasa and its factors. iii. The dosas of pada, vākya, artha and rasa. iv. The gunas, accepted as three after Mammaṭa, and the letters which produce them. v. Six figures of sound. vi. Twenty-nine figures of sense. vii. The nāyaka and nāyikā. viii. Division of poetry into pṛekṣya and śravya, and their characteristics and subdivisions.
school on them precludes us from affiliating them directly with the older Alamkūra and Riti schools. The older Vāgbhaṭa defines poetry as:

\[ \text{sādhu-sabdārtha-samārdhām guṇālāṃkāra-bhūṣitam} \]
\[ \text{sphuṭa riti-rasopetāṃ kāvyam kurvītu kirtaye//} \]

while the younger Vāgbhaṭa, whose work is written in the sūtra- and vr̥tti-form like Hemacandra’s. adopts literally the latter’s modification of Mammatā’s definition. The criterion of poetry, according to them, is that it must contain, through its word and sense, the guṇa, alamkāra, riti and rasa, but these elements are mentioned rather in an eclectic than critical spirit. The older Vāgbhaṭa accepts without question the ten Guṇas of older writers, but the younger Vāgbhaṭa follows Mammata in limiting them to three, with the pointed remark:

\[ \text{nī daṇḍi-vāmana-vāgbhaṭādi-pranitā daśa kāvyā guṇāḥ, vayaṇī tu mādhuryaujaḥ-prasūda-lakṣaṇān tīn eva guṇān manyāmahe.} \]

The younger Vāgbhaṭa speaks of Rasa as the ‘soul’ of poetry; but beyond a description, after Hemacandra and others, of the different Rasas, he does not touch upon the theoretical aspect of the question, nor does he indicate the mutual relation of the different elements of poetry with reference to the Rasa. Indeed, both of them do not appear to accept the reconciliation proposed by the Dhvani-theorists; and the younger Vāgbhaṭa specifically includes dhvani, after Bhāmaha and Udbhāta, in the figure paryāyokta with the remark:

\[ \text{evamādi-bhedair dhvanitoktir bhavati, param grantha-gaurava-bhayād asmābhīr nodāhiyate, sa prapañças tvānandavardhanād avagantavyaḥ (p. 37).} \]

The object of these Jaina manuals (though there is nothing specifically Jaina in them) appears to have been the presentation of a popular and easy epitome of the subject, a‘laying themselves to no particular school or system, but following

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the traditional notions in a spirit of eclecticism, without critically systematising them in the light of a central theory. In this respect, they bear a close resemblance to the alamkāra-section in the Agni-purāṇa and the Sarasvuti-kaṇṭhābhārana of Bhoja, whose definition of poetry is forcibly recalled by that of the older Vāgbhaṭa quoted above.

The topics dealt with in the five paricchedas of the Vāgbhaṭa-laṁkāra are as follow: (i) The definition of Kāvya; pratibhā as the source of Kāvya, aided by vyutpatti and abhyāsa; the circumstances favourable to poetry and the conventions observed by poets. (ii) The language of poetry (Sanskrit, Prakrit, Apabhraṃśa and Bhūta-bhāṣā); forms of poetry (metrical chandoni-baddha and non-metrical); its divisions into padya (verse), gadya (prose) and miśra (mixed verse and prose); eight dosas of pada and of vākya respectively, and the dosas of artha. (iii) The ten guṇas. (iv) Four poetic figures of sound, viz. citra, vakrokti, anuprāsa and yamaka, and thirty-five figures of sense; the two rītis (vaidarbhi and gauḍiyā). (v) Nine rasas; kinds of nāyaka and nāyikā and kindred topics. The Kāvyānuśāsana of the younger Vāgbhaṭa is, unlike the Vāgbhaṭa-laṁkāra (which is written in the metrical form, generally in the anusṭubh with only one prose passage at iii. 14), composed in the Sūtra- and Vṛtti-style of Hemacandra’s Kāvyānuśāsana. It is also divided into five chapters with topics as follow: (i) The prayojana, and the hetu (pratibhā aided by vyutpatti and abhyāsa) of Kāvya; its division into padya, gadya and miśra; the classification of poetical composition into mahākāvya, ākhya-yikā, kathā, campū and rūpaka. (ii) Sixteen dosas of pada, fourteen of vākya, and fourteen of artha; the ten guṇas of Vāmana and Daṇḍin reduced to three, viz. mādhurya, ojas and prasāda; three rītis, viz. vaidarbhi, gauḍiyā and pāṇcālī. (ii) Sixty-three figures of sense, in which some of Rudraśa’s old figures reappear. (iv) Six figures of sound, viz. citra, śleṣa, anuprāsa, vakrokti, yamaka and punaruktavatā-bhāsa. (v) Nine rasas; the topic of nāyaka-nāyikā; and the dosas of rasa.
We have now practically closed our survey of the principal Post-dhvani writers who deserve mention and treatment. The school of kavi-śiksā and the erotic rasa-writers stand apart in many respects, and we propose to deal with them separately in the following chapters. But the above account of the Post-dhvani writers must not be supposed to exhaust the extraordinary wealth of scholastic activity of this period. The commentators and textbook-writers continued to multiply, and a glance at their names given in our preceding volume will show the extent to which their activity was carried; but hardly any of these later works, except perhaps Jagannātha’s Rasa-gaṅgādhara, with an account of which we shall close our survey, deserves separate or detailed mention. Even Keśava Miśra’s Alamkāra-śekharā, or Acyuta Rāya’s more modern Sāhitya-sārah, convenient and well-written compendiums as they are, and standing as they do much above the average, add hardly anything fresh to our knowledge.

Keśava Miśra draws largely upon Mammaṭa and the younger Vāgbhaṭa (besides older writers). He declares that his work is based upon the Kārikās of one Alamkāra-vidyā-sūtrakāra bhagavān Sauddhodani (see vol. i, pp. 220f); but it does not present any theory nor set up any new system. There are, however, certain opinions which are peculiar to the work, the chief of which is that it sets up Rasa as the essence of poetry. The work is divided into eight ratnas, consisting of twenty-two maricis. The first ratna defines Kāvyā as raṣādimat vākya, and discusses pratibhā etc. as its sources. After an enunciation of three Ritis, vaidarbhī, gaudī and māgadhī (which are defined with reference to the em-
ployement of compounds), along with *uktì* (4 kinds) and *mudrā* (4 kinds), it goes on to discuss the three usual *Vṛttis*, viz. *saktī (=abhidhā), lakṣaṇā* and *vyāñjanā*. Then comes the *doṣa-ratna*, in which are detailed two series of eight faults each of word and sense, and twelve defects of sentences. The next third section, called *guna-ratna*, deals with five excellences of *śabda* (viz. *samkṣiptatva, udāttatva, prasāda, ukti* and *samādhi*), and four excellences of sense (viz. *bhāvikatva, suśabdatva, paryāyokta* and *sudharmitā*). This is followed by a discussion of the cases where some of the above Doṣas may sometimes become Guṇas. The influence of Bhoja's opinions on this part of the work is obvious. Then comes the *alaṃkāra-ratna*, where mention is made of eight figures of sounds (citra, vakroktī, anuprāsa, gūḍha, ślesa, prahelikā, praśnottara and yamaka) and only fourteen figures of sense (upamā, rūpaka, utprekṣā, samāsokti, apahnuti, samāhita, svabhāva, virodha, sāra, dīpaka, sahokti, anyadeśatva = asaṃgati of Mammaṭa, viśeṣokti, and vibhāvanā). This is followed by a curious chapter, entitled *varṇaka-ratna*, in which are detailed the *upamānas* appropriate for describing a damsel, her complexion, hair, forehead, eyebrows etc. It goes on to give practical hints as to how poets should describe the physical characteristics of the hero, mentions words which convey the idea of similarity, details the conventional usages of poets (*kavi-samaya*), as well as the topics for description (such as the king, the queen, a town, a city, a river etc.) and the way of describing them, the colours of various objects in nature, words that convey numerals from one to one thousand. Certain tricks of words such as *bhāsā-sama* (where a verse reads the same in Sanskrit as in Prakrit), *samasyā-pūraṇa*, the nine Rasas, the kinds of hero and heroine, the different Bhāvas, the Doṣas of Rasa, and lastly, the arrangement of letters favourable to each Rasa.

Jayadeva's *Candrāloka* has been a deservedly popular

7 See vol. i, p. 199 for a résumé of its contents.
manual, but in spite of its clearness and brevity of exposition and aptness of its illustrations, it is nothing more than a convenient epitome, its most remarkable feature being its detailed treatment of poetic figures, which occupy nearly half its bulk.

The Candrāloka deals with ten guṇas and one hundred alaṃkāras. The third chapter, curiously enough, is devoted to lakṣaṇas, which are not mentioned by later writers except in connexion with Dramaturgy (as by Viśvanātha). Instead of Bharata’s thirty-six lukṣaṇas (ch. xvi 6-39; see above pp. 3-5), Jayadeva defines and illustrates only ten, viz. the economical combination of letters to convey a striking meaning (aṅkṣara-samāhṛati), the prohibition of a fault by the indication of an excellence (śobhā), the deliberation resulting in a negation of what is said (abhimāna), the determination of a proposition by a rejection of other possible alternatives (hetu), the disregard of well established causes (pratīṣedha), the interpretation of a name both as true and false (nirukta), false attribution where both the major and middle terms of a proposition are absent (mithyādhyavasāya), substantiation of the excellence of an object by emphasising its well-matched resemblance to a well known object (siddhi), establishment of a particular attribute through the drift of two different meanings (yukti), and the accomplishment of a purpose through some action or occurrence (phala). Viśvanātha, however, adds thirty-three dramatic embellishments (nāṭyālaṃkāras) to his lakṣaṇas, which are enumerated after Bharata as thirty-six in number, but which do not correspond exactly to Bharata’s lakṣaṇas, as some of the latter fall also under Viśvanātha’s nāṭyālaṃkāras. The two classes cannot indeed be distinguished on any conceivable theory; and though Viśvanātha adopts the conventional enumeration, he remarks in the end: eṣāṁ ca lakṣaṇaṁ nāṭyālaṃkūraṁ ekarūpatvāpi bhedena vyapadeśāḥ gaddalikā-pravāhena.

Thus, we find included under lakṣaṇas the combination of Guṇas with Alaṃkāras; the economical grouping of letters to produce a charming import; the use of double
entendre for the purpose of conveying a less known import along with one more well known; the use of analogy and example; the brief citation of a reason for the intended meaning; the expression of doubt in the case of an object whose nature is not known; the surmise from a matter coincident with the course of nature; the fitting of expression to the sense; the citation of admitted facts to refute inadmissible views; the supposition of a non-existent object or fact from resemblance; the inference of an object from some of its peculiarities; the deduction by reasoning of a fact which is not capable of sense-perception; the description of an object under the similitude of time and place; the statement of agreeable views in accordance with the Śāstras; the indication of acts contrary to one’s qualities; the attribution to an object of qualities in excess of its ordinary qualities; the discrimination of a particular meaning out of other well known meanings by an allusion to the literal sense; the repetition of a proposition already established. the mention of various objects in eulogy of the intended object; the unconscious expression, under the influence of passion, of the contrary of what one means; the alteration of a conclusion through doubt; the compliance with other people’s views by words or acts; the persuasion by means of affectionate words; the statement in succession of several means to attain a desired object; the suggestion and strengthening of one view by a different view; the reproach; the respectful enquiry; the employment of names of well known persons or things in eulogy of the person or thing under description; the mistaken resemblance of apparently similar things causing resentment; the offer of oneself in the service of another; the flattering statement; the employment of a comparison to convey a sense which is not directly desired; the indirect expression of desire; the veiled compliment; and the expression of gratitude in pleasing terms.

The nātyālamkāras are the benediction, the lamentation, the deception, the unforgiving attitude, the arrogant ex-
pression, the expression of a resolution or of an excellent purpose, the raillery, the desire for a charming object, the agitation due to reproach, the repentance for missing an object through folly, the use of an argument, the longing for an object, the request, the commencement of an undesirable act, the mentioning of a purpose, the provocation, the reproach, the observance of the Śāstras, the covert rebuke administered by citing a common opinion, the narration, the prayer, the apology, the reminding of a duty neglected, the recounting of previous history, the determination of an act by reasoning, the ecstasy and the instruction.

It will be seen that the division is not only overlapping, but both the lakṣaṇas and the nāṭyālāṃkāras refer largely to modes of exposition, to the use of what other writers would regard as specific figures or excellences of diction, or they may sometimes appertain to the feelings and emotions which come within the sphere of Rasa and Bhāva. This fact is recognised very early by Daṇḍin who includes lakṣaṇas under alāṃkāras in the wider sense. Dhanañjaya does the same, but he recognises also that some of them come under Rasa and Bhāva. Viśvaśātha, therefore, includes them under the guna, alāṃkāra, bhāva and samādhi, but deals with them only in connexion with the drama. There is practically no need for them in later Poetics from which they ultimately disappear, their function having been assigned to other recognised elements of poetry.

Appayya Dikṣita’s three well known manuals, one of which is directly based on Jayadeva’s work, and Viśvaśātha’s Alaṃkāra-kaustubha are indeed noteworthy for their elaborate treatment of poetic figures and have merits of their own, but they are in reality nothing more than elementary text-books, excellent résumés which methodically register

8 See vol. i, pp. 223-25.
9 See vol. i, p. 303. The work, as its name implies, deals entirely with poetic figures in an elaborate way. The number of independent figures dealt with is about 76.
previous speculations on the subject. There is such a general sameness of characteristics, such a monotony of treatment, as well as repetition of conventional topics in conventional phraseology, that it is not worth while to linger over the activity of these lesser writers. The work of the great Kashmirian writers was over, and although Bengal and the Deccan had come into prominence as fields of later activity, the age of really original or thoughtful writers was long gone by. It was succeeded by an age of commentators, interpreters and critics (some of them were very able and painstaking) as long as there was the need of critical elaboration, of understanding and explaining a great author. But in course of time, even this became superfluous, and there was nothing to be done but the writing of smaller and simpler manuals adapted to general comprehension. The declining age of most of the schools witnessed a host of such manuals and manuals of manuals; but this was the period when the declining age of the Post-dhvani school, as represented by Mammaṭa, went through the same process. Even this was not enough. Out of the debris of these schools there grew up a spirit of eclecticism, of which we have already an early indication in the works of Bhoja and the Vāgbhaṭas after the decline of the older Rasa, Alamkāra and Riti schools; and we meet with hand-books which depend upon no system but which are apparently written for the enlightenment of lay understanding. The different systems of Sanskrit Poetics may now be supposed to have well-nigh run their course and attained their natural termination.

( 3 )

Jagannātha

Jagannātha’s Rasa-gaṅgādhara is the last remarkable work on Poetics. We do not, however, find in it a complete presentation of the subject, as the available text forms about two-fifths of what the work was originally designed to be by
its author and is thus extant only in an unfortunately incomplete shape. Nearly three-fourths of this, again, and the whole of his Citra-mīmāṃsā-khaṇḍana are taken up with the discussion and illustration of poetic figures, a topic which, as here set forth, forms indeed one of the most exhaustive and noteworthy presentation of later times, but is of little theoretical interest from the standpoint of general Poetics. Jagannātha's style is erudite and frightens the student by its involved language, its subtle reasoning and its unsparring criticism of earlier writers. The most criticised authors in this respect are Ruyyaka, his commentator Jayaratha and his follower Appayya Dikṣita. But in spite of this tendency towards controversy, which is combined with an aptitude for hair-splitting refinements, Jagannātha's work displays an acute and independent treatment, or at least an attempt at a rethinking of the old problems. He shows himself conversant with the poetic theories of older writers, which he does not ignore but which he endeavours to harmonise with the new currents of thought. Along with some other important writers of the new school, Jagannātha marks a reaction in this respect; and the school of Mammaṭa and Ruyyaka does not receive from him unqualified homage.

Jagannātha defines poetry as a word or linguistic composition which brings a charming idea into expression (ramaṇīyārtha-pratipādakāḥ śabdaḥ) : a definition which reminds us of Daṇḍin's well known description of kāvyā-śarīra as īṣṭārtha-vyavacchinnā padāvali, but which is further explained in this way. The charmingness belongs to an idea which causes worldly or disinterested pleasure: This quality of disinterestedness is an essential characteristic, which is a fact of internal experience and which is an attribute of pleasure, being synonymous with camatkāra or strikingness. The cause of this pleasure is a conception or a species of representation, consisting of continued contemplation of something characterised by the pleasure itself. Thus, there is no disinterestedness in the pleasure conveyed by the ap-
prehension of the sense of a sentence like 'a son is born to you' or 'I shall give you money'; in such a sentence, therefore, there is no poetry. Hence poetry consists of words which express an idea that becomes the object of contemplation causing such pleasure.

The beautiful (ramaṇiyatā) in poetry, therefore, is that which gives us disinterested or impersonal pleasure. This pleasure is specifically different from that which one finds in the actually pleasing, and depends upon taste formed by continued contemplation of beautiful objects. It will be noticed that this definition not only gives us a remarkable analysis of the beautiful but includes in its generality and comprehensiveness all the elements of poetry recognised by previous theorists, without specifically naming them. We have already noted that the poetic sentiment or Rasa, excited in the reader's mind, is peculiar in its nature; it is, no doubt, a fact of one's own consciousness but it is essentially universal and impersonal in character, being common to all trained readers and possessing no significance to their personal relations or interests. A distinction is made between a natural emotion and a poetic sentiment; the former is individual and immediately personal and therefore may be pleasurable or painful, but the latter is generic and disinterested and marked by impersonal joy. The poetic sentiment in this sense is supernormal (alaukika), and those things which cause disgust, fear or sorrow in ordinary life and those normal emotions which are far from pleasant in actual experience, being conveyed in poetry, become ideal and universal, and bring about this supernormal pleasure which is not to be compared

to the very mixed pleasure experienced in ordinary life. This
pleasure, dissociated from all personal interests, is the
essence of the mental condition involved in the enjoyment of
Rasa; it is also the essence of all poetry, as conceived by
Jagannātha.

In the same way, the definition includes the concept of
the suggested sense (dhvani), and Jagannātha proceeds to
divide poetry on this basis into four (viz. uttamottama,
uttama, madhyama and adhama) classes, corresponding to the
three classes recognised by his predecessors since the
Dhvanikāra's time. The first occurs where the, sound and
sense, subordinating themselves, suggest another charming
sense; it corresponds to the principal dhvani-kāvya of the
Dhvanikāra. The second and third classes, the guṇibhūta-
vyaṅgya and citra, mentioned by the Dhvanikāra, are split
up into three cases, viz. (1) where the suggested sense,
though not principal, is yet the cause of special charm, (ii)
where the charm of the expressed sense is predicated equally
with the charm of the suggested, and (iii) where the charm of
sound, being embellished by the charm of sense, is principal.
This lowest class of poetry, corresponding to the śabda-citra
and artha-citra of Mammaṭa (a distinction which is rejected
by Jagannātha), apparently comprehends those cases where
the artha-camatkṛtī is swallowed up or strengthened by śabda-
camatkṛti. Jagannātha adds that although it is possible to
count a still lower fifth class of poetry, in which the charm of
sound is altogether devoid of all charm of sense (e.g. cases
of conundrums like the padma-bandha) and which is allowed
by the practice of some poets, yet in view of the definition of
poetry already given, as consisting of words expressing a
charming sense, these instances have to be excluded or
ignored.

11 The object of this splitting up is to dispense with the necessity
of minutely subdividing the various cases of the guṇibhūta-vyanṛtya
kāvya and also to include generally all poetry which is alamkāra-
pradhāna.
After this classification, Jagannātha follows the conventional way of dividing Dhvani, infinite aspects as it may present (asaṃkhya-bheda), into two broad groups, based on Denotation (abhidhā-mūla) and Indication (lakṣanā-
mūla) respectively. The former has a threefold aspect, according as it is a suggestion of rasa, alaṃkāra or vastu, while recognition is given to the two cases of the latter, viz., (i) where the expressed meaning passes over to another sense (arthāntara-saṃkramita-vācya) and (ii) where the expressed sense is made to disappear entirely (atyanta-tiraskṛta-vācyā). This brings our author topically to a detailed consideration of Rasa-dhvani which is characterised as parama-ramaṇiya and an elaborate discussion of the nature and theory of Rasa and Bhāva and its constituent elements. He Speaks in this connexion of bhāva-dhvani (pp. 74-98) and takes into consideration different phases of Rasa and Bhāva, such as rasā-bhāsa (p. 99), bhāva-sānti (p. 102), bhāvotpatti, bhāva-saṃdhī and bhāva-sabalam (p. 103f)\textsuperscript{12}. The discussion of the Guṇas come in this context, inasmuch as they are related to the Rasa. Jagannātha enumerates and discusses the ten śabda- and artha-guṇas of Vāmana and other older writers; but he appears to accept only three Guṇas after Mammaṭa, viz. mādhurya, ojas and prasāda, classifying them on the basis of their respective effects on the reader’s mind, viz. druti (melting), dipti (brilliance, i. e. expansion) and vikāsa (pervasion). Jagannātha remarks in this connexion: guṇānaṁ caïṣaṁ druti-dipti-vikāsākyās tisraś citta-vṛttayaḥ krameṇa prayoṣyaḥ, tat-tad-guṇa-viṣṭa-rasa-carvanā-janyā iti yāvat, making it clear that the justification of this classification consists in the divergent nature of the mental activity involved in the relish of Rasa. He does not agree, however, with Mammaṭa in the latter’s statement that when we speak of a composition as madhura we use the word in a secondary

\textsuperscript{12} These topics are also dealt with by Mammaṭa, Viśvanātha and others.
sense (as when we say “the appearance of this man is brave”), inasmuch as the Guṇas being the properties of Rasa, we apply to the ‘body’ what appertains to the ‘soul’ of poetry by an extended use of the term. Jagannātha maintains that when we say the sentiment of love (śrṅgāra) is madhura in a particular case, we mean to imply its influence, such as druti etc. on the mind, and this must be taken to refer not only to Rasa but also to śabda and artha and the composition in general (śabdārtha-rasa-racanā-gatam eva grāhyam).

The next chapter proceeds to discuss other varieties of suggestion, including suggestion based on lakṣaṇā, which is dealt with in detail. It then takes up the poetic figures (to the number of about 70), to which the rest of the work, breaking off in the middle of the figure uttara, is devoted. The poetic figure or Alamkāra comes in as the source of the charm or ramaṇīyatā essential in the principal suggested element of poetry already defined (prāg-abhihita-lakṣaṇa-sya kāvyātmako vyāngyasya ramaṇīyatā-prayojakā alaṃkārāḥ, p. 156). The aesthetic pleasure (camatkāra or lokottaratva) into which this ramaṇīyatā resolves itself is an essential element in the poetic figure; Jagannātha thus harmonises his own conception of poetry with Ruyyaka’s theory of the alaṃkāra (which he accepts and elaborates) as involving this camatkāra (also called hṛdayatva, cārutva, saundarya, or denoted by the technical terms vaicitrya, vicchitti-viśeṣa or bhāṇiti-prakāra) imparted by the conception of the poet (kavi-pratibhā). Kuntaka, from whom Ruyyaka appears to have derived his analysis, laid down that in every poetical production the activity of the poet, which consists in an act of the productive imagination (pratibhā), is the principal point, and it should result in poetic expression. Jagannātha asserts that the pratibhā alone is the source of poetry and therefore of poetic expression, and as such it fixes the nature of the alaṃkāra. The special charm (vicchitti-viśeṣa), which is thus imparted to poetic figure by the imagination of the poet, is taken (pp. 466, 470) as the basis upon
which the poetic figures distinguish themselves in their special peculiarities, and is explained as an act of imagination on the part of the poet in so far as it is produced in the poem, or as that aesthetic pleasure\textsuperscript{13} which is thereby brought into being. As to how this \textit{vicchitti} is determined, Jagannātha settles the question by resting it not only upon established usage (\textit{sampradāya}) but also upon one’s own internal experience (\textit{anubhava}). On this fundamental principle, the various figures are minutely defined, differentiated, illustrated and classified; and this portion of Jagannātha’s work, in spite of its subtlety and polemic attitude, is one of the most acute, though unfortunately uncompleted, treatment of the subject.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{13} This translation of the term \textit{camatkāra} is justified by Jagannātha’s own definition of poetry.

\textsuperscript{14} For an elaborate account of Jagannātha as a literary critic see V. A. Ramaswami Sastri, \textit{Jagannātha Paṇḍita} (Annamalai Univ. Skt. Series 1942), pp. 78f (chs. iv-vi).
CHAPTER IX
LATER WRITERS ON RASA
(1)

The doctrine of Rasa, which is advocated, if not first enunciated, by Abhinavagupta, is finally adopted by almost all writers on general Poetics who accept rasa-dhvani as an important element of poetry. With the exception of Viśva-nātha and Keśava Miśra, they do not indeed go so far as to declare expressly with Abhinavagupta that Rasa alone is the essence of poetry, but they accept in reality the suggested sense in the form of Rasa as essentially the main element. The Rasa is viewed as a pleasant sentiment belonging to the reader whose dormant emotions, derived from experience or inherited instincts, are evoked by the reading of poems into an ideal and impersonalised form of joy; an appreciation or enjoyment, consisting of a pleasant mental condition in which the reader identifies himself with the feelings of the hero and experiences them in a generic form, the fulness of the enjoyment depending upon the nature and experience of the particular reader. The sentiment thus evoked is essentially universal in character, and the aesthetic pleasure resulting from it is not individual (even though enjoyed as an intimately personal feeling), but generic and disinterested, being such as would be common to all trained readers (samasta-bhāvaka-svasamvedya). It is, therefore, described as something supernormal (alaukika) and invariably pleasant, not to be compared to the normal pleasures of life which have always a reference to one’s personal relations or interests, and which may be pleasant or painful. Things, which would be called causes of an emotion in the normal sense and which may produce disgust, horror or pity in real life, awaken these feelings indeed in poetry and drama, but convey them in such an ideal and generic form that these emotions, which
are far from pleasant in ordinary life, are converted into an impersonal joy, which is ineffable and indivisible. One may be moved by disgust, horror or pity and shed real tears; but the underlying sentiment is always one of exquisite joy\(^1\), which must be distinguished from an ordinary feeling.

This is the general position of all later theorists with regard to the nature and function of Rasa in poetry. Dhanañjaya, for instance, gives us the same process of transformation of an ordinary emotion, dominant in a composition, into a poetic sentiment, as formally laid down by Bharata and interpreted by Abhinavagupta; and in this he is practically in agreement with Mammaṭa, Vidyādhara Viśvanātha and others. The dominant emotion (sthāyi-bhāva), he says, becomes a sentiment (rasa) when it is brought into a relishable condition through the co-operation of the excitants, the ensuants and the accessories (including the sāttvika bhāvas). This statement is further amplified by the assertion that the enjoyer of Rasa (rasika) is the audience (sāmājika) on whose capacity of enjoyment it depends, and that the dominant feeling becomes a sentiment when it is so enjoyed. The Rasa, being a mental state, a subjective experience of the reader, in which enjoyment (āsvāda, carvaṇā, rasanā or bhoga) is essential and in which the enjoyer and the object of enjoyment become identical, the reader receives the represented feeling into his own soul and thereby enjoys it\(^2\). The locus of the Rasa is not in the

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1 But the Nāṭya-darpaṇa, as noted above (p. 132 fn), as well as Bhoja (sukha-duḥkhāvasthā-rūpa), believes that Rasa is sukha-duḥkhātmaka. The Rasa-kālikā (vol. i, p. 318) also holds this view. See the elaborate arguments set forth in Nāṭya-darpaṇa (ed. GOS, p. 159) in support of this view. Siddhicandra (Kāvyaprakāśa-khaṇḍana pp 16-21) refers to this theory of the “Navyas” that all Rásas are not pleasurable, but some distinctly painful. They accordingly admit the four pleasurable Rásas, viz. Śṛgāra, Vīra, Hāsya and Adbhuta only, and not those which involve pain, viz. Karuṇā, Raudra, Bibhatsa and Bhayānaka. See the question discussed by V. Raghavan, Number of Rásas, ch. viii.

2 Cf. Jacobi in GgA, 1913, pp. 308f.
represented hero who belongs to the past; nor is it in the poem itself, the task of which is merely to exhibit the excitants etc. by which the dominant emotion is brought into expression and the Rasa, on its part, becomes revealed to the reader. Nor does the Rasa consist of the reader’s mere apprehension (pratiti) of the emotions exhibited in the poem or enacted by the actor; for the reader would then apprehend not the Rasa but a feeling varying in different individuals, just as in real life the spectacle of a pair of lovers in union gives different spectators who witness it the varying emotions, according to their individual nature, of shame, envy, desire or aversion. The vibhāvas etc., therefore, bring the sthāyī-bhāva to the enjoyment of the rasika, the aesthetically receptive reader or spectator, and thereby convert it into rasa; but they must be generalised and have no specific relation to a particular individual (parityakta-viśeṣa). Thus, the vibhāva Sitā, Dhanika explains, must refer to woman in general, and not to the particular individual who was the daughter of Janaka. Hence things, which are the exciting, ensuing or accessory circumstances in ordinary life, act as vibhāvas etc. in poetry, and generalise the dominant feeling into Rasa. The spectator, say, of the deeds of Arjuna on the stage may be compared, therefore, to the child who, in playing with clay elephants, experiences the sensation of its own energy as pleasant. The enjoyment in the spectator’s mind is a manifestation of that joy which is innate as the blissful nature of self, a circumstance which gives us the frequent comparison of rasāsvāda with brahmāsvāda.

The mental activity involved in this enjoyment has got four aspects taken in connexion with the four primary sentiments of the erotic (śṛṅgāra), the heroic (vīru), the

3 These circumstances, Dhanika thinks, disprove the vyangyatva of Rasa. It seems that Dhanika does not accept the vyangyu-vyañjaka relation of Rasa to Poetry, but holds some views similar to the bhāvya-bhāvaka theory of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka (ed. Parab, 1917, p. 96).
horrible (bibhatsa) and the furious (raudra) admitted by Bharata⁴, and consists respectively of the conditions of unfolding (vikāsa), expansion (vistāra), agitation (kṣobha) and distraction (vikṣepa). We have seen that Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka (along with Abhinavagupta) speaks of the bhoga (or āsvāda) of Rasa as involving only three mental conditions, named vikāsa (pervasion), vistāra (expansion) and drutī (melting), which later theorists have taken as the basis and justification of the three Guṇas of prasāda, ojas and mādhurya respectively. With regard to the ninth Rasa, the quietistic, which is not mentioned by Bharata but which is acknowledged by some theorists, Dhanañjaya forbids its delineation in the drama (iv. 35); for the sentiment of absolute peace is in its own nature undefinable, and consists of four states mentioned by philosophers⁵, viz. maitrī, karuṇā, muditā and upekṣā, which are not realisable by the Sahārgaya. If it exists at all as Rasa, it must comprehend the fourfold mental activity enunciated above, as corresponding to the fourfold states recognised by philosophers in śama⁶.

It is not necessary in this connexion to take up in detail the views of Mammaṭa, Vidyādhara and other writers, for it would be repeating substantially what has already been said regarding the final doctrine of Rasa. Viśvanātha is the only important writer, among later theorists, who boldly accepts Abhinavagupta’s extreme view that the rasa-dhvani alone is the essence of poetry and builds up a system of Poetics on its basis⁷.

4 See above p. 23. The fourfold division is probably adopted as an ostensible rationale for the doctrine of four primary and four secondary Rasas recognised by Bharata.

5 E. g. Yoga-sūtra i. 33.

6 na ca tathābhūtasya śānta-rasasya sahṛdayāḥ svādayitārāḥ santi, atha tad-upāyābhūto muditā-maitrī-karuṇopekṣādī-lakṣaṇas tasya ca vikāsa-vistāra-kṣobha-vikṣepa-rūpataiveśī.

7 Bhānudatta, who substantially follows the doctrine of Rasa detailed here, is however singular in his classification of some aspects of Rasa.
Following up his own definition of poetry as “a sentence of which the soul is the Rasa”, Viśvanātha gives us an elaborate analysis of Rasa in almost all its aspects. He sums up at the outset the characteristics of Rasa in two verses thus: “The Rasa, arising from an exaltation of the quality of sattva or goodness, indivisible, self-manifested, made up of joy and thought in their identity, free from the contact of aught else perceived, akin to the realisation of Brahma, and having for its essence supernormal wonder (camatkāra), is enjoyed by those competent in its inseparableness (as an object of knowledge) from the knowledge of itself”. He explains camatkāra as consisting of an expansion of the mind and as synonymous with vismaya. In this connexion, Viśvanātha quotes with approval an opinion of his ancestor Nārāyaṇa who put a premium on the sentiment of the marvellous (adbhuta rasa) and maintained that it was essential in all Rasas. It is also explained clearly that the Rasa is identical with the enjoyment of itself, or, in other words, there is no distinction between the object and the operation in the apprehension of Rasa; so that when we say ‘the Rasa is enjoyed’, we only use a figurative expression. It follows from this that the enjoyment of Rasa is different in its nature from the ordinary processes of knowledge.

Viśvanātha insists very strongly on the necessity of vāsanā. He speaks of Rasa as laukika and alaukika, subdividing the latter into svāpniya (enjoyed in a dream), mānorathika (fanciful like a castle in the air) and aupaṇāyika (as depicted in poetry). He again gives us (Rasa-taraṇī, ch. viii, p. 65, ed. Regnaud) a three-fold arrangement of Rasa with reference to its manner of manifestation: (i) abhimukha, when it is manifested by means of the bhāva, vibhāva and anubhāva. (ii) vimukha, when these elements are not directly expressed; so called because it is comprehensible with difficulty. (iii) paramukha, which has again two aspects according as it is (a) ałamkāra-mukha, i.e. where the ałamkāra is principal and the rasa is secondary. This includes probably the cases of figures like rasavai, which are included in guṇi-bhāta-vyāsya kāvya by the Dhvani-theorists, and (b) bhāva-mukha where the bhāva is in the same way principal.
in the spectator, which consists of experience (*idānimānti*) or instincts acquired from previous births (*prāktani*). If one is not endowed with these germs of the capacity of appreciation, one may develop them by study of poetry and experience of life. In the case of the grammarian, the philosopher or one well-versed in the sacred lore, these susceptibilities are deadened. If it is sometimes found that an eager student of poetry is still deficient in the capacity of relishing *Rasa*, we must assume that it is the result of his accumulated demerit of a previous birth. Thus, Viśvanātha is anxious to show that experience and cultivation of the power of imagination are essential in one who seeks to enjoy *Rasa*.

Viśvanātha also insists that the *vibhāvas* etc. as well as the dominant feeling (*sthāyi-bhāva*) must be felt as generic or impersonalised. The reader must not take the feeling as his own individual emotion; for it would then remain as his feeling (and never become *Rasa*) and would sometimes (e.g. in the case of the pathetic sentiment) cause pain, and not joy. Nor should the feeling be taken as pertaining solely to the hero; for then it can not, as the feeling of another person, affect the reader and become *Rasa*. It is necessary, therefore, that the excitants etc. as well as the dominant feeling, should be generalised by a generic function (*sādhāraṇī kṛti*) inherent in themselves, which corresponds to the generic power (*bhāvakatva*) postulated for poetry by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka. This universalisation of the factors and the feelings enables the reader to identify himself with the personages depicted; and this conceit of community removes all difficulty about accepting extraordinary episodes of exalted personages who may be superior in virtue or prowess to the average reader. The excitants etc. are indeed normally called causes, but in reality the *Rasa* is not an effect in the ordinary sense; for in the case of *Rasa* there is the simultaneous presence of itself and its excitants, which is not true of an ordinary cause and effect. It is also pointed out that all the factors (*vibhāvas* etc.) need not be present at once, for the presence of one would revive
the others by association of ideas. In other words, what might seem wanting in the utterance of poetry is supplied, from the suggestive character of poetry itself, by force of association of ideas. It also follows from the character of Rasa described above that it is not necessarily found in the actor, who in assuming the rôle of the hero performs his part only mechanically by rule and rote; he ranks as a spectator (and therefore as a recipient of Rasa) in so far as he is himself a man of taste and actually experiences the feelings he enacts.  

( 2 )

In spite of the unquestioned dominance of the Dhvani School, which no doubt recognised the importance of Rasa but regarded it as one of the phases of the unexpressed only, one class of writers, who still adhered to Rasa as the only element worth considering in poetry, continued to devote exclusive attention to it and built up a system, so to say, on the basis of the Rasa alone. Of all the Rasas, however, as śṛṅgāra (or love) forms the absorbing theme of Sanskrit poetry and drama in general, and as this particular poetic sentiment has an almost universal appeal, these writers naturally work out this important Rasa in all its phases; and we have in consequence a series of erotic-rhetorical treatises, of which the earliest known and the most remarkable is Rudrabhaṭṭa's Śṛṅgāra-tilaka. Rudra states distinctly at the beginning of his work that although Bharata and others

8 This follows Dhanaṅjaya's dictum that the enjoyment of Rasa is not precluded in the actor, if he realises in himself the feelings depicted.

9 The topics dealt with in its three chapters are: I. The rasas, the sthāyi-bhāyas, the dramatic vṛttis; śṛṅgāra and its division; the Nāyaka, classified with illustrations; his assistants; classification of the Nāyikā. II. Characteristics of love-in-separation, of pūrva-rāga, the ten stages of love, the upāyas, etc. III. The other rasas, viz. hāsyā, karuṇa, raudra, vīra, bhayānaka, bībhatsa, adbhuta and sānta; the four vṛttis appropriate to the rasas.
have spoken of Rasa in the drama, his object is to apply it to the case of poetry, and that a Kāvyā, in his opinion, must possess Rasa as its constant theme. Following upon this we have Bhoja's Śṛṅgāra-prakāśā, which deals with the subject in the usual elaborate cyclopaedic manner of its author, with profuse illustrations of every phase of the erotic sentiment in no less than eighteen out of its thirty-six chapters. After this come innumerable works of a similar nature, which take Rasa, especially Śṛṅgāra, as their principal theme and which were composed apparently with the object of guiding the poet in the composition of erotic pieces so popular and profuse in Sanskrit poetry. Of these, the Bhāva-prakāśa of Śāradātanaya, which reproduces the substance of most of the chapters of Bhoja’s work, and the exhaustive Rasārnava-sudhākara of Śīṅga Bhūpāla, as well as the two well-known works of Bhānudatta, deserve mention. But none of these later treatises adds anything new or original to a subject already thrashed out to its utmost.

A new turn was given to the theory by Rūpa Gosvāmin’s

10 See above p. 209.
11 See vol. i, pp. 238f, and chapter on Minor Writers.
12 See vol. i, p. 240.
13 See vol. i, p. 241f. The three vilāsas of this extensive work deal with the following topics: i. The hero, his qualities and classification; his adjuncts; the heroine, her classification and qualities, her sāttvika excellences; the uddipana-vibhāvas; the rītī and the guṇas; the dramatic vṛttis; the sāttvika bhāvas. ii. The vyabhicāri-bhāvas, the anubhāvas, the eight sthāyi-bhāvas, the eight rasas. iii. The drama and its varieties, characteristics etc.
14 The eight taraṅgas of Rasa-taraṅgiṇī are: i. Definition of bhāva and subdivisions thereof; the sthāyi-bhāvas. ii. The vibhāvas. iii. The anubhāvas. iv. The eight sāttvika bhāvas. v. The vyabhicāri-bhāvas. vi. The rasas and detailed treatment of Śṛṅgāra. vii. The other rasas. viii. The sthāyi-bhāva and rasajā dṛṣṭi. The Rasa-mañjarī, a much smaller work, devotes more than half of itself to the nāyikā and her companions, and applies the rest to the Śṛṅgāranāyaka, his assistants, the eight sāttvika guṇas, the two aspects of Śṛṅgāra and the ten stages of vipralambha-Śṛṅgāra.
Ujjvala-nilamani, which attempted to deal with Rasa in terms of the Vaishnava idea of ujjvala or madhura rasa, by which was meant the srngara rasa, the term ujjvala having been apparently suggested by Bharata’s description of that Rasa. The madhura rasa, however, is represented not in its secular aspect but primarily as a phase of bhakti-rasa (madhurakhyo bhakti-rasah, i. 3); for according to Vaishnava theology there are five Rasas forming roughly the five degrees of the realisation of bhakti or faith, viz., satha (tranquillity), dasya (servitude or humility, also called priti), sakhya (friendship or equality, also called preyas), vatsalya (parental affection) and madhurya (sweetness). The last, also called the ujjvala rasa, being the principal, is termed bhakti-rasa-raji and constitutes the subject-matter of the present treatise.

The krshna-rati or the love of Krsna forms the dominant feeling or sthayi-bhava of this sentiment, and the recipient here is not the literary sahdaya but the bhakta or the faithful. This sthayi-bhava, known as madhura rati, which is the source of the particular Rasa, is defined in terms of the love of Krsna; and the nature of nayaka and nayika is defined in the same manner and their feelings and emotions illustrated by adducing examples from poems dealing with the love-stories of Krsna and Radha. The work is, therefore, essentially a Vaishnava religious treatise presented in a literary garb, taking Krsna as the ideal hero, with the caution, however, that

15 yat kiicil lokas uci medhyam ujjvalam darshanam va tac chhrngarenopamlyate, ed. Grosset, pp. 89-90.
16 i. 2, explained by Viivanatha Cakravartin as satha-priti-preya-vatsalyojvala-namasu mukhyesa........sa evojvalapara-paryayo bhakti-rasantam raji madhurakhyo rasah.
17 svayyam ydhi bhaktanam anta travanadibhihbsd krsna-ratih sthayi bhavo bhakti-raso bhavet, cited by Viivanatha Cakravartin, p. 4.
18 madhurakhyo rater laksanam coktam—mitho harer mrgaksyat ca sambhogasyadi-kraavamadharopara-paryyo priyatikhyodita ratih, ibid, loc. cit.
what is true of Kṛṣṇa as the hero does not apply to the ordinary secular hero (i. 18-21)\(^{19}\).

With the exception of the *Ujjvala-nilamaṇi*, which attempts to bring erotic-religious ideas to bear upon the general theme of *Rasa*, these specialised treatises have, however, very little importance from the speculative point of view; and as they belong properly to the province of *Erotics* rather than *Poetics*, treatment of them should be sought elsewhere. The simple idea, elaborated more or less in all these works, is that the awakening of *Rasa* is all important in poetry, and that the fundamental *Rasa* is *śṛṅgāra* or the erotic, which is consequently treated in its various phases with copious illustrations. This is clearly expressed in the attitude of the author of *Agni-purāṇa* and of Bhoja, who accept only one poetic *Rasa*, viz. the erotic\(^{20}\). In the same way, Rudrabhaṭṭa declares *śṛṅgāro nāyako rasah* (i. 20), and Bhānudatta appears to take it for granted that *śṛṅgāra* occupies an honoured place among all the *Rasas* (*tatra raseṣu śṛṅgāraśyābhyaṛhitatvena* etc, ed. Benares, p. 21).

(3)

It is unnecessary, as it is unprofitable, in the discussion of general principles, to enter here into the elaborate definitions, distinctions and classifications of the amorous sentiment with all its varying emotional moods and situations, which these treatises industriously discuss and which have always possessed such attraction to mediaeval scholastic minds. The theorists delight in arranging into divisions and sub-

\(^{19}\) The orthodox theorists (cf. Jagannātha pp. 47f) would regard *bhakti* (which being based on *anurāga* or attachment cannot be comprehended by *tānta rasa*) as included in *bhāva*, being *devādī-viṣayā rati*, and as inadmissible as a fully developed *rasa*. Cf. Bhānudatta, *Rasatarāṅgini* ch. vi.—On *Ujjvala-nilamaṇi* and Vaiṣṇava theory of Rasa see S. K. De, *Vaiṣṇava Faith and Movement*, Calcutta 1942.

divisions, according to rank, character, circumstances and the like, all conceivable types of the hero, the heroine and their adjuncts, together with the different shades of their gestures and feelings, in conformity with the tradition which already obtained in the cognate sphere of dramaturgy. 21 Thus Rudrabhāṣṭa, after a preliminary enumeration and definition of the Rasas and the Bhāvas, proceeds to speak of two aspects of Śṛgāra, viz. saṃbhoga (love in union) and vipralambha (love in separation) 22, and classify the hero (nāyaka) into the faithful (anukūla), the gallant whose attention is equally divided among many (dakṣina), the sly (śaṭha), and the saucy (dhrṣṭa), according to his character as a lover. Later writers, however, subdivide each of these, again, into the best (uttama), the middling (madhyama) and the lowest (adhama), and arrange the whole classification under the fourfold division of the genus hero into four types viz., (i) the brave and the high-spirited (dhirodāta) (ii) the brave and haughty (dhirodhaṭa) (iii) the brave and sportive (dhiralalita) and (iv) the brave and serene (dhiṇa-praśānta), thus giving us altogether forty-eight subdivisions of the hero 23.

21 See Bharata ch. xxii-xxiv; Data-rūpaka iv. 50f and iii.
22 This statement follows Bharata and is accepted by most theorists including Bhoja; but Dhanañjaya distinguishes three cases, privation (ayoga), sundering (viprayoga) and union (saṃbhoga): the first denoting the inability of lovers, through obstacles, to secure union, and the second arising from absence or resentment. The first case of love may pass through the well-known ten stages (longing, anxiety, recollection, praise of the beloved, distress, raving, insanity, fever, stupor and death; cf Śīgabhūpāḷa ii. 178-201); while the second condition may be caused by a quarrel, due to discovery or inference of unfaithfulness (which may be counteracted by six upāyas, viz. conciliation, winning over her friends, gifts, humility, indifference or distracting her attention) or by absence arising from business, accident or a curse.
23 The good qualities of the hero are innumerable. For his characteristics, see Dhanañjaya ii. 1f; Viśvanātha iii. 30f; Śīgabhūpāḷa i. 61f; etc. On the theme of Nāyaka-Nāyikā, as treated in Alamkāra works, see V. Raghavan, Introd. to his ed. Akbarshahi Śṛgāra-mahājārī pp. 14-90.
Then follows a brief description of the assistants of the hero in matters of love (narma-saciva), viz. the Comrade (piṭha-marda), the Companion (vīṣa) and the Buffoon (vidūśaka), some adding ceṭa (or the servant) in the enumeration.

In the same way, the heroine is taken broadly in threefold aspects in her relation to the hero as his wife (svīyā), or belonging to another, (parakīyā) and as common to all (sūmānyā). The Svīyā is subdivided again into the adolescent and artless (mugdhā), the youthful (madhyā), and the mature and audacious (pragalbhā), i.e. the inexperienced, the partly experienced and the fully experienced. Later authors introduce greater fineness by subdividing each of these according to her temper, into the self-possessed (dhirā), the not-self-possessed (adhirā), and the partially self-possessed (dhirādhirā), or according to the rank, higher (jyeṣṭhā) or lower (kaniṣṭhā), each holds in the affection of the hero. The Parakīyā or Anyadiyā who, according to Vaiṣṇava ideas, is the highest type of the heroine, is twofold, according as she is a maiden (kanyā) or married (ūdha); while the sūmānyā heroine, who is sometimes extolled (Rudrabhaṭṭa) and sometimes deprecated (Rudraṭa), is only of one kind, the veṣyā or courtesan. The sixteen types of heroine thus

24 The Pratināyaka or the rival of the hero is dhīroddhata, haughtiness being his essential characteristic; but he is described also as stubborn and vicious (Dāsa ii 9; Sāhitya-darpana iii. 130, p. 136). The piṭhamarda of the hero possesses, in a lesser degree, the qualities of the hero (e.g. Makaranda in the Mālavi-mādhava). The term piṭhamardikā in the feminine occurs in the Mālavi-kṛṣṇimitra in the sense of a trusty go-between, applied to the nun Kaśikī. The viṣa, usually neglected in the serious drama, except in Cārudatta and Mṛcchakaṭikā, appears in all his glory in the Bhāna, for which he is prescribed as the hero.

25 An amour with a married woman cannot, according to Rudraṭa and Rudrabhaṭṭa form the subject of dominant Rasa in a play or poem; but this is the central theme of Vaiṣṇava yrics.

26 Bharata xxii. 197-206: Dhananjayā i. 21f: Viśvanātha iii. 67-70; Śiṅgabhūpāla i. 121-51. Rarely a heroine, she must be represented as in love when she is a heroine; but she cannot be so when the hero is
obtained are further arranged according to eightfold diversity in their condition or situation in relation to her lover, viz. the heroine who has the lover under absolute control (svādhīna-patikā), the heroine disappointed in her assignation through misadventure or involuntary absence (utkā), the heroine in full dress expectant of her lover (vāsaka-sajjikā), the heroine deceived (vipralabdha), the heroine separated by a quarrel (kalahanataritā, also called abhisāmdhitā), the heroine outraged by the discovery of marks of unfaithfulness in the lover (khanḍitā), the heroine who meets her lover by assignation27 (abhisārikā) and the heroine pining for the absence of her lover gone abroad (proṣita-patikā). We arrive in this way at an elaborate classification of the heroine into three hundred and eighty-four types; and one of the later writers states characteristically that there are other types also, but they cannot be specified for fear of prolixity (Vīśvanātha iii. 88, p. 120).

But here the theorists do not stop. The hero is endowed further by a set of eight special excellences, as springing from his character (sāttvika): e.g. brilliance (śobhā) including heroism, cleverness, truthfulness, emulation with superiors and compassion to inferiors; vivacity (vilāsa) indicated by his glance, step and laughing voice; grace (mādhurya) displayed in placid demeanour even in trying circumstances; equanimity (gambhirya) consisting of superiority to emotions; steadfastness (sthairya) in obtaining one’s object; sense of honour (tejas) manifested in his impatience of insult; gallantry (lalita) in his word, dress or deportment; magnanimity (audārya) exhibited in generosity, agreeable words and equal treatment to friend or foe. The heroine is allowed a

divine or royal. The exception occurs in a prahasana or farce (and incidentally in a bhāga or the erotic monologue) where she can be represented in her low and avaricious character for comic effect.

27 The usual meeting places are given as a ruined temple, a garden, the house of a go-between, a cemetery, the bank of a stream, or any dark place generally.
more generous set of qualities. First we have the three physical (āṅgaja) characteristics; bhāva or first indication of emotion in a nature previously exempt, hāva or movement of eyes and brows indicating the awakening of emotion, helā or the decided manifestation of feeling. Then we have seven inherent qualities, e.g. brilliance of youth, beauty and passion, the touch of loveliness given by love, sweetness, courage, meekness, radiance and self-control. Then are enumerated her ten graces, to which Viśvanātha adds eight more. All her gestures, moods or different shades of emotion, e.g. giggling, trepidation, hysterical fluster of delight, involuntary expression of affection, self-suppression through bashfulness, affected repulse of endearments, as well as the deepest and tenderest display of sentiments, are minutely analysed and classified. To this is added a detailed description of the modes in which the different types of heroines display their affection, the maidenly modest demeanour of the mugdha or the shameless boldness of the more experienced heroine. We should recognise the subtle power of analysis and insight which these attempts indicate; but speaking generally, the analysis is more of the form than of the spirit, based on what we should consider accidents rather than essentials. At the same time, marked as it is by much of scholastic formalism, there is an unmistakable attempt to do justice to facts, not only as they appeared to the experience of these theorists but to the observation of general poetic usage; and in the elaborate working out of the general thesis that the Rasa is evolved on the basis of one or other of what they call the permanent mental moods, with the help of the various emotional adjuncts, the writers on Poetics have proceeded a long way in the careful analysis of poetic emotions, the psychology of which bears an intimate relation to their theory and in itself deserves a separate study.
The discussion of this extensive topic of the nāyaka and nāyikā comes in topically under the theory of vibhāva and anubhāva, which act as factors of Rasa. The mood, which is at the root of sentiment, is held to be the sthāyi-bhāva, the dominant feeling, the main theme of the composition in question. These feelings, according to Bharata, who is accepted on this point by all writers, can be classified into eight categories, viz. Love (rati), Mirth (hāsa), Sorrow (soka), Anger (krodha), Energy (utsāha), Fear (bhaya), Disgust (jugupsā) and Astonishment (vismaya). though some later writers add, as we shall see, Tranquility (śaṃc or nirveda) to the number. These dominant feelings are worked up into a corresponding number of sentiments or Rasas through the means of the vibhāvas etc. The vibhāvas or Excitants are said to be of two

28 Theoretically the Rasa is one, a single ineffable and impersonal joy, but it can be subdivided, not according to its own nature but according to the emotions which form its basis. Bharata (ch. vi) and other theorists give a full description of the stāyi bhāvas, vibhāvas etc. in the case of each Rasa, into which space forbids us to enter. A summary of it will be found in Lindenau, Rasalehre Leipzig 1913, pp. 18f. Thus, in the case of the heroic sentiment (vīra), the dominant feeling is energy (utsāha): the excitants (vibhāvas) are coolness (asam-moha), resolve (adhyavasaśya), circumspection (naya), strength (bala) etc.; the ensuants (anubhāvas) are firmness (śaṁśraya), heroism (saśraya), sacrifice (tyēga) etc.; the vyabhicārans or accessory feelings are those of assurance, arrogance etc. Viśvanātha gives them somewhat differently. The essential excitant (ālambana-vibhāva) of the heroic sentiment, according to him, consists of those to be vanquished, and their acts and gestures form the enhancing excitants (uddipana-vibhāvas); the ensuants comprehend the desire or seeking for assistants and adherents; while the accessory feelings are patience, intelligence, remembrance, cogitation etc. The sentiment may take three forms of courage (Bharata vi. 79=ed. Regnaud vi. 80), viz. in battle (yuddha-vīra), in virtuous deeds (dharma-vīra) and in liberality (dāna-vīra), to which later writers (e.g. Viśvanātha) add dāyā-vīra. It should also be noted that a special colour and a presiding deity is attributed to each Rasa. Thus, red, black, white, dark (śyāma) and grey are associated, not unreasonably with
kinds²⁹, viz., (1) the Substantial or Essential (ālambana), which consists of such material and indispensable ingredients as the hero, the heroine, the rival hero and their adjuncts, and (2) the Enhancing (uddipana), viz. such conditions of time, place and circumstance as serve to foster the Rasa, e.g. the rising of the moon, the cry of the cuckoo etc. in the case of the erotic sentiment. The anubhāvas or the Ensuants, which follow and strengthen a mood, comprise such outward manifestations of feeling as sidelong glances, a smile, a movement of the body, or such involuntary action of sympathetic realisation of the persons depicted (sāttvika)¹⁰ as fainting (pralaya), change of colour (vaivarṇya), trembling (vepathu) etc., which are, again dogmatically classified into eight varieties. There are other feelings of a more or less transitory nature, which accompany or interrupt the permanent mood without, however, supplanting it; and these are known, as we have noted, by the name of Accessories or vyabhicāri-bhāvas. These are likened to servants following a king or to waves of the sea, whereby the dominant mood is understood as the king and the sea respectively, and classified elaborately into thirty-three categories, first mentioned by Bharata (p. 23f above) and implicitly accepted by his followers.

All these elements contribute towards developing the eight or nine sthāyi-bhāvas into eight or nine different types of

the furious, terrific, comic, erotic and pathetic sentiments, although it is difficult to explain why horror is dark blue (nīla), wonder is orange, and heroism is yellow. The respective deities are Viṣṇu (erotic), Yama (pathetic), Pramātha (comic), Rudra (furious), Indra (heroic), Kāla (terrible), Mahākāla (disgustful), Brahmā (marvellous). Viśvanātha adds that Nārāyaṇa is the presiding deity of sānta rasa and the colour associated is that of jasmine (kunda).

²⁹ These two divisions of vībhāva are not maintained by Bharata but distinguished by Dhanañjaya (iv. 2) and traditionally handed down by Viśvanātha.

¹⁰ See above p. 24, fn 55. The sāttvika bhāvas in later works form a special class of anubhāvas.
Rasa. We have the earliest and most orthodox mention in Bharata (p. 23 above) of eight sthāyi-bhāvas and the resulting eight Rasas corresponding to them, of which the Erotic (śṛṅgāra), the Heroic (vīra), the Furious (raudra) and the Disgustful (bibhatsa) are the main, leading to four others, the Comic (hāsyā), the Marvellous (adbhuta), the Pathetic (karuṇa) and the Terrible (bhayānaka). Daṇḍin accepts this classification (ii. 280-87), but Udbhata (iv. 4) adds 31 the Quietistic (śānta) as the ninth Rasa, although Bharata 32 neither defines it nor mentions its corresponding vibhāvas. Rudraṭa is singular in postulating a tenth Rasa, called the Agreeable (preyas), which is accepted by Bhoja, with the addition of two new Rasas, Udātta and Uddhata, as well as Śānta. Rudrabhaṭṭa admits nine Rasas in poetry; so do Hemacandra and the two Vāgbhaṭas. The Agni-purāṇa in the same way mentions nine Rasas (and eight sthāyi-bhāvas), but follows Bharata in regarding four as principal and lays special stress on the Śṛṅgāra. Ānandavardhana admits Śānta (pp 138, 238). Those later authors who accept the ninth Rasa, the Quietistic, necessarily postulate nirveda or self-disparagement, arising out of the knowledge of reality (tattva-jñāna), as its sthāyi-bhāva, which is called by some authorities śama, or repose resulting from freedom from mental excitement 33. The Vaiṣṇava writers (especially Kaviṅkarṇapūra add Dāsya, Sakhyā, Vātsalya, Preman and Bhakti. 34

31 If the verse is genuinely Udbhata's. See above p. 114, fn 15.—
On the Śānta Rasa in Bharata and Dhanañjaya see S. K. De, Some Problems pp. 139-41. On the number and nomenclature of Rasas generally see V. Raghavan, Number of Rasas, Adyar 1940
32 The Śānta texts in Bharata, available in certain recensions, are interpolations. See Raghavan, op. cit. pp. 15f. Kālidāsa knew only eight Rasas, Vikramorvaśīya ii. 18, where Muni Bharata is also mentioned.
33 This sentiment is also closely related to the sentiment of disgust; for it arises from an aversion to worldly things.
34 See S. K. De, Vaiṣṇava Faith and Movement, p. 145.
The author of the Daśa rūpaka, however, contends that there can be no such sthāyi-bhāva as nirveda or śama, for the development of that state (if it is at all possible to destroy utterly love, hatred and other human feelings) would tend to the absence of all moods; and in the drama, the object of which is to delineate and inspire passion, it is inadmissible. Others, again, hold that the Quietistic Rasa does exist, as it is experienced by those who have attained that blissful state, but it has no sthāyi-bhāva in dramatic composition; for nirveda, being the cessation of all worldly activity, or śama being freedom from all mental excitement, it is not fit to be represented. Hence Mammaṭa takes eight Rasas in the drama (p. 98) and nine in poetry (p. 117). Bhoja, in accordance with the views of the school which lays special emphasis on the Śṛṅgāra, accepts only one Rasa, the Erotic, in his Śṛṅgāra-prakāśa; and although he mentions as many as ten Rasas in his Sarasvati-kaṇṭhābharaṇa, including the śānta and the prejas, he appears to devote almost exclusive attention to the Śṛṅgāra in his treatment of the Rasas in this work. The views about the admissibility of the śānta are discussed by the author of the Ekāvalī (pp. 96-7) who maintains that Bharata has mentioned nirveda as a vyabhicāri-bhāva immediately in context after the enumeration of the sthāyi-bhāvas and at the beginning of the list of the vyabhicāri-bhāvas; and this fact is interpreted as indicating that the sage meant it both as a sthāyi-bhāva and as a vyabhicāri-bhāva; but Hemacandra (p. 81) anticipates and rejects this quibble of verbal interpretation, though agreeing in the general proposition as to the admissibility of Śānta as the ninth Rasa.

Viśvanātha primarily admits eight orthodox Rasas (iii, p. 160) but adds the ninth Śānta in deference to the views of these authorities, and a tenth Rasa, called vātsalya or parental affection, subscribing apparently to Vaiṣṇava ideas (pp. 185 6)35. He quotes a verse to explain that the mood,
called by the great sages the Quietistic, which has, among all sentiments, tranquillity (śama) as its basis, is that state in which there is neither pain nor pleasure, nor hatred, nor affection, nor any desire". But the question arises how can the Quietistic, being of the nature described, arising only in a state of emancipation wherein there is an absence of all feelings like the Accessories etc., be Rasa, which implies a state of relishable enjoyment". To this objection Viśvanātha replies that the Quietistic is a Rasa because in that state the soul is only about to be emancipated (yukta-viyukta-daśā) and is not completely absorbed in the Divine, so that the presence of feelings, like the Accessories etc. in it is not incompatible. As for the statement that there is an absence of even pleasure in it, it is not contradictory, for it refers only to worldly pleasure". Jagannātha, the latest writer on the subject, advocates nine Rasas and maintains (pp. 29-30) that like all other Rasas, the Śānta is capable of being represented and appreciated by the audience. Since the clever performance of the actor, representing such a state of mind, free from disturbance and not affected by passions or desire, is found in actual experience to produce an impression on the mind of the audience, it is their state of mind, exhibited by their silent and rapt attention, which ought to settle the question. The representation of absolute indifference or the actor's power of representing it is not the point in issue: it is the capacity of

Rudrata mentioned preyas (friendship), 'which Rasa is accepted by Bhoja. Some writers add śraddhā along with bhākţ'. See Bhānudatta, op. cit. p. 56, ll. 25f (ed. Regnadu), Śinga-bhūpāla admits only eight Rasas, but his treatment is from the standpoint of dramaturgy.

36 na yāra duḥkhāṁ na sukhāṁ na cintāṁ, na dveṣa-rāgau na ca kācid iccabārasyāḥ sa śāntāḥ kathito munīndraḥ, sārvesu bhāveṣu nama-pradhāañāḥ //, cited also in Deśa" iv. 49 (comm).

37 ity evam-rāpasya śāntasya mokṣāvasthāyāṁ evātma-varūpāpatte-laksāṇāyan prādurbhūtatvat tatra sahāényādīnāṁ abhāvāt kathāmn rasatvam.

38 yaś cāsmin sukhābhāvo'pyaktas tasya vaisvāyika-sukhu paraśvān na virodhaḥ.
the spectator who actually feels the sentiment. Jagannātha also adds that even those, who do not admit this Rasa in the drama, should accept it in poetry from the fact that poems like the Mahābhārata have for principal theme the delineation of Śānta Rasa, which is thus established by universal experience (akhila-lokānubhava-siddhatvāt). Nāgęsa remarks on this that the śānta rasa should also be admitted in the drama on this ground, inasmuch as the Prabodha-candrodaya is universally acknowledged as a drama (p. 30).

Coming to the essential basis of Rasa, viz. the bhāva, we have seen that Bharata defines it in general terms as that which manifests the sense of poetry through the three kinds of representation, vācika, āṅgika and sāttvika39; it is the emotion which ultimately becomes a sentiment, if it is dominant and therefore, serves as the basis of Rasa. But later writers arrive at a greater precision and apply the term technically to those cases where there is no proper or complete development of Rasa. Both Dhanaśjaya and Bhāṇudatta expand the definition of Bharata, the latter defining it as a deviation from the natural mental state (vikāra) which is favourable to the development of Rasa (rasānukūla) and which may be either physical (śāriṇa) or mental (āntara). But Mammaṭa fixes the conception of Bhāva as ratir devādi-viṣayā vyabhicāri tathānjītah ('love having for its object a deity or the like, and also the suggested Accessory'), on which he adds the gloss: ādi śabdān muni-guru-nṛpa-putrādi-viṣayā, kāntā-viṣayā tu vyaktā śṛṅgāraḥ ('by the term the like are meant sages, preceptor, the king, son etc., the one having a beloved woman for its object becomes the erotic') Govinda explains that the word rati here implies the sthāyi-bhāva which has not attained to the state of Rasa40. What is meant is that when the sthāyi-bhāvas, like rati, have for their objects

39 A fourth kind of abhinaya is sometimes added, viz. āhārya (extraneous) i.e. derived from dress, decoration etc.
40 ratir iti sthāyi-bhāvopalakṣaṇam, devādi-viṣayety apy aprāpta-rasāvasthopalakṣaṇam, p. 206.
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god, king, son and the like, or when the vyabhicāri-bhāvas are manifested as the principal sentiment in a composition, there is no rasa but bhāva; and this definition is accepted by all writers after him.

Thus, Viśvanātha explains the Bhāva as follows:

\[
\text{sañcārinah pradhānāni, devādi-visayā ratiḥ/}
\text{udbuddha-mātraḥ sthāyī ca. bhāva ity abhidhīyate} //
\]

In other words, when the Accessories are principal, or when love etc. has a deity or the like for its object, or when a dominant feeling (sthāyī-bhāva) is merely awakened, we have Bhāva. His own gloss upon the above verse explains it in this way. Although they are always concomitants of Rasa in which they finally rest, such Accessories as are for the time being principally developed, like a servant for the time being followed by his king in his marriage procession; or love etc. having a deity, a sage, a spiritual guide, a king and the like for its object; or such sthāyī-bhāvas as are merely awakened or have not attained the state of a Rasa from their not being fully developed, are denoted by the term bhāva. In all these cases apparently there is no complete or proper development of Rasa; and a Bhāva, therefore, in later terminology, may be generally described as an incomplete Rasa. But this must be distinguished from the rasābhāsa or semblance of Rasa and the analogous bhāvabhasa, which occur when the poetic sentiments and emotions are falsely attributed (e.g. sentiments in animals such as described in Kumārasambhava, iii. 36-7), or when they are brought out improperly, i.e. when there is a lack of entireness in them as regards their ingredients. The cases occur, according to Bhoja (v. 20) when the mood or emotion is developed in an inferior character (hina-pātra), in animals (tiryac), in the rival hero (nāyaka-pratīyogin) or in any other subordinate object (gauna

41 anaucitya-pravṛttatve ābhāso rasa-bhāvayoh (Mammtā) explained as: anaucityam cātra rasānām bharatādi prāṇā-lakṣaṇānām sāmagni-rahitam eva deśa-yogīvopalaksana-param bodhyam.
padārtha), but Viśvanātha elaborately summarises various other cases (iii. 263-66), especially noting improprieties in connexion with particular Rasas. Thus, there is an impropriety if the Terrible (bhayānaka) is made to reside in a noble personage, or the Comic (hāsya) in a spiritual guide. It must be noted, as Jagannātha explains, that if a mood or feeling is developed by impropriety, the impropriety, unless it acts as a bar, does not constitute a fault.

In the same way (1) when there is an excitement only (and not full development) of sentiments, (2) when two opposing sentiments, striving for mastery, are represented as being relished in one and the same place and at the same time, or (3) when a number of sentiments, of which each succeeding one puts down the preceding, they constitute respectively bhāvodaya, bhāva-saṃdhi and bhāva-śabalsā. Now, all these phases of sentiment are taken as Rasa topically, inasmuch as they are capable of being tasted (sarve'pi rasā-nād rasāḥ). These cases do not seem to have been formally recognised by Bharata, though hinted at by him in vi. 40, as we learn from Abhinava's commentary on ch. vi, which is partially reproduced also in his "Locana, p. 66. They are first met with in Udbhāta, who includes them under ārjasvin (iv. 6) ; but in Rudraṭa (xii. 4) and the Dhvanikāra (ii. 3) we find them definitely established.

This incomplete development of Rasa and its subordination must be distinguished from the cases of the opposition (virodha) of simultaneously existing sentiments in the same theme. It is laid down formally that some Rasas are intrinsically inconsistent with one another, e.g. the Erotic is opposed to the Disgustful, the Heroic to the Quietistic, and so forth.

42 Śīṅga-bhūpāla (pp. 141-2) distinguishes two cases (i) where Rasa is ascribed to an inanimate object and (ii) where it is developed in an inferior character or in animals.

43 yāvatī svanaucityena rasasya paṣṭis tāvat tu na vāryate, rasapratikūlasyaiva tasya niṣedhavā.

44 Some Rasas again are mutually consistent, e.g. karuṇa and
The incongruity or opposition results in three ways, viz. (1) from identity of the exciting cause (ālambana-vibhāva) (2) from identity of the subject of emotion and (3) from immediacy of succession. The incongruity in the first two cases may be removed by representing the sentiments as having different exciting causes respectively, or as existing in different subjects (e.g. in the hero and the rival hero). The last case of conflict may be removed by placing, between the two immediately succeeding sentiments, a sentiment which is not opposed to them. These are cases where two or more Rasas stand in the relation of principal and subordinate; the term 'subordinate' being misleading, it is sometimes called a concomitant Rasa (sañcārin), which implies that it cannot terminate absolutely in itself and at the same time is distinct from a fully developed Rasa, as well as from a mere undeveloped Bhāva. There is also no incongruity where a conflicting Rasa is recalled or described under a comparison. All these questions properly come under the theory of Propriety or Aucitya in relation to Rasa, elaborated by Ānandavardhana and his followers, and is ultimately based on the dictum attributed to the Dhvanikāra (p. 145, cf. *Locana* p. 138), which lays down in general terms that the secret of Rasa lies in conforming to the established rules of propriety.

*bibhatsa* go with *vīra*; *śṛṅgāra* goes with *hāṣya* (cf Bharata vi. 40) etc. On this question see Lindenau, *Rasalehre* (pp. 71f). According to Viśvanātha, the Rasas hostile (i) to *śṛṅgāra* are karuṇa, *bibhatsa*, *raudra*, *vīra* and *bhayānaka* (ii) to *hāṣya*—*bhayānaka* and karuṇa (iii) to karuṇa—*hāṣya* and *śṛṅgāra* (iv) to *raudra*—*hāṣya*, *śṛṅgāra* and *bhayānaka* (v) to *vīra*—*bhayānaka* and śānta (vi) to *bhayānaka*—*śṛṅgāra*, *vīra*, *raudra*, *hāṣya* and śānta (vii) to śānta—*vīra*, *śṛṅgāra* *raudra*, *hāṣya* and *bhayānaka* (viii) to →*bibhatsa*—*śṛṅgāra*. Bhānudatta gives the antagonistic Rasas as follow: *śṛṅgāra*→*bibhatsa*; *vīra*→*bhayānaka*; *raudra*→*addhuta*; *hāṣya*→karuṇa.

The doctrine of the Dhvanyāloka that in a composition in which the sentiment is awakened, proprieties of various kinds (e.g. with reference to the speaker, the theme, the employment of the vibhāvas etc., the use of the alamkāras and other elements, pp. 134f, 144f) should be observed, and that certain items of conflict (virodha) with the dominant sentiment should be avoided, gave rise to a theory of Propriety, which is generally comprehended by later writers under the discussion of the Doṣas of Rasa. Thus, in later treatises, the rasa-doṣas occupy a separate and important place, in addition to the conventional doṣas of pada, padārtha, vākyā, vākyārtha recognised since Vāmana’s time. It is Kṣemendra alone who emphasises the importance of the subject by making it the theme of his Aucitya-vicāra-carca which will be noticed in its proper place. Mahimabhaṭṭa, in the second chapter of his work, considers the question of anaucitya in some detail. According to him, impropriety or incongruity has two aspects, according as it refers to śabda or to artha respectively. Then he speaks of propriety as external (bahirāṅga) or internal (antarāṅga), apparently as it is śabda-viṣaya or artha-viṣaya. The cases of internal propriety, which consists in the proper employment of the vibhāvas etc. have already been explained by previous writers (e.g. the Dhvanyāloka pp. 144f). Mahimabhaṭṭa, therefore, takes up the question of external propriety, which he thinks falls under five faults of composition, viz. vidheyaśiṣyā (non-discrimination of the predicate), prakrama-bhedā (violation of uniformity in the expression), krama-bhedā (syntactical irregularity), paunaruktyā (tautology) and vācyavacana (omission of what must be expressed), to the explanation and exemplification of which he devotes, amidst several digressions, the rest of the chapter (ch. ii). It is difficult to say why these faults of expression alone are singled out as defects resulting in a violation of Rasa (rasa-bhaṅga). Later writers would include them under general defects, reserving the cases of virodha or opposition of Rasas as specific instances of rasa-doṣas.