CHAPTER II

PRINCIPLES OF LITERARY TASTE AND CRITICISM

INTRODUCTORY

From the preceding sketch of the history of the old school of writers on Alamkāra and the works on Alamkāra it may appear that though our history of alamkāra begins with Bhāmaha or Bharata, the science of alamkāra must have begun in association with the grammatical ways of thinking, probably from the 2nd or the 3rd century B.C. I have pointed out elsewhere that upamā as a decorated form has been very well investigated by Yāska and Pāṇini. It seems natural therefore to think that the early efforts on the subject must have generally concentrated themselves on the discovery of these decorative forms of speech which go by the name of alamkāra. A close study of the Rudradaman inscription of Junāgaḍh in the 2nd century A.D. shows clearly that certain dignified ways of literary delivery were accepted as binding in high literary circles. It may naturally be regarded quite a feasible process of turning to the other topics of alamkāra-śāstra from an acute observation of the conditions under which a figure of speech becomes really an alamkāra. It was found that a literary composition must first of all be free from grammatical errors and must internally be logically coherent. Kauṭilya’s Arthasāstra gives us fairly elaborate canons for regulating the composition of different types of royal edicts. It also became evident to these early inquirers that different forms of composition became effective in diverse ways and that these ways of composition were of a structural character which belonged to the composition as a whole and could not be located in any particular part of the composition. These were called the riti or mode. No Alamkāra writer has
clarified the matter as to why these different modes of writings were called Gaudī, Pāncāli, Māgadhī, and the like. Bhāmaha, the earliest writer on alamkāra, expresses the view that this has nothing to do with the countries which form the basis of the nomenclature. They are merely technical names of different forms or styles. But it is very curious that in any case different forms of style should be associated with the names of different important centres of culture. We know already from the stray remarks found in the Vyākaraṇa Mahābhāṣya that Patañjali had noticed that people of different parts of India were fond of different kinds of expressions. Thus some had a predilection to an exaggerated use of the taddhita-pratyaya, others for using long compounds.¹ This signifies that already by Patañjali’s time people in different centres of culture had made their mark in literature by their style of composition. This literature must have been at one time pretty vast to make literary tendencies remarkable to an author who lived somewhere in Northern India. We know also that Vidarbha was within the empire of Puṣyamitra at whose sacrifice Patañjali officiated as a priest. Magadha was also a well-known centre of culture from the time of the Nandas. Pāncāla and Śūrasena were places of culture from very early times; but no ancient literature has come down to us except the Rāmāyana and the Mahābhārata. The subject of literary style is naturally associated with what may be called defects and excellences. The attention of the earlier writers on alamkāra was thus drawn principally to the subject of style. We therefore find that no one before the Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhana had turned to the problem of literary emotion and regarded it as the most essential desideratum in literature. Some indeed emphasised the importance of the figure of speech, but others had emphasised the importance of style and grace. Some had also noticed that whenever there is good poetry the utterance is of a striking nature. It is not true, however, that the subject of literary

¹ See Patañjali’s Paspalāḥṣīka.
emotion was not discussed by the writers that came between Bharata and the Dhvanikāra. But as Bharata's own remarks about rasa appertained to dramas that were actually played, people were loath to believe that literary emotion occupied as much place in a poem as in a play. In a play the dialogues formed a necessary part and for this reason Bharata also discussed the faults and excellences of prose speech and also treated of the figures of speech. In the 16th chapter of his work he had referred to these as signifying the defining concept of literature. But excepting Daṇḍin the later writers had ignored this view and had been content leaving them as being connected to the construction of a play. Among the alamkāras, Bharata had counted only upamā, rūpaka, dipaka, and yamaka. We know that fairly elaborate discussions on upamā appears both in Pāṇini and his commentators. There can also be little doubt that Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, Udbhata, Vāmana and others had largely been influenced by these views. Only Daṇḍin had withstood the temptation. Later writers on alamkāra had indeed discovered many varieties of upamā.

Bharata in discussing about defects and excellences pointed out that the following must be regarded as instances of defects, e.g., to say the same thing only by a change of words, to introduce irrelevant or vulgar things, to commit a break of thought, or to say anything which is invalid, metrical lapse, the use of words without propriety and full of grammatical errors. Bhāmaha also mentions the defects and these are as follows:— absence of complete sense, repetition, irrelevant speech, doubtful meaning, break of order, break of metre or pause, to make euphonic combinations in wrong places and to enter into anomalous descriptions,—descriptions which are against the principles of art, common usage and reasonings. Though somewhat differently stated, these agree in essence with the defects counted by Bharata. In addition to these Bhāmaha mentions other defects, e.g., where the sense is forced, unclear, obscure, loss of proper emphasis, use of such difficult words as may
obstruct the comprehension of sense, impossible descriptions, vulgar words and vulgar significance or the use of harsh words. When these are compared with the defects pointed out by Mammața we find that with closer inspection many new defects have come out. Thus, according to Mammața there are sixteen kinds of defects of words, e.g., use of harsh words, incorrect words, those not incorrect yet not current in usage, to use words in a wrong meaning, to use a word in an obscure sense ignoring the more patent meaning, to use words which are antagonistic to the emotions that are to be roused, to use words merely for the sake of keeping the metre, to use words in a meaning which it does not possess, obscenity, to use words in a doubtful meaning, to use words in such technical meanings in which they are used only in special works, to use vulgar words, to have recourse to ungraceful meanings, to create obscurities, to lay emphasis on the wrong place, to use words in such a manner that undesirable and unwholesome suggestions may be apparent, and so forth. To these Mammața adds the defects not of words but of sentences: to use words contrary to the intended emotions, to make euphonic combinations in wrong places, to use more or less words than is necessary, to make an idea drop after rising to a height, after having finished an idea to take it up again, the absence of link between connected sentences, not to give proper importance to an idea, to compose sentences in such a manner that one may be dependent on the other for its comprehension, to make compositions in such a manner that the meaning is not available without making insertions, wrong use of words, breaking of the expected order, to introduce all on a sudden an unexpected and contrary emotion. In addition to these, Mammața has spoken of many defects of sense, such as, to describe such things which are not indispensable for the main purport of the speech; to use words in such a manner that there may be difficulty in comprehending the sense; to contradict oneself; to use words in a wrong order; to use sentences in a manner such that though their meaning is comprehended the
purport remains obscure; to speak unconventionally; to fail to speak in a new manner.

If we consider the above-mentioned defects enumerated by Bhāmaha and Mammaṭa, we find that in a higher sense they may all be regarded as defects of style. In the modern European concept style signifies the manner in which a particular personality gives expression to himself. Whenever the question of personality comes there comes the question of the way of his enjoyment and the motive that is urged by such an enjoyment. Now, many of the defects enumerated are really defects of expression, i.e., defects that delay the expression, obscure its clarity, or effects, the height of its vigour or bring in associations that operate to throw it out of gear. Mammaṭa regarded śabda and artha as being the body of literature. The body should not be such that it might give a false expression to the soul within. It is the soul within that out of the whole nature selects a particular part and enjoys it and returns to the world its enjoyment through the vehicle of thought and language so that similar enjoyments may be produced in others.

But in the earlier writings of Indian authors of Alamkāra the style was limited to the mere externals of śabda and artha though at times the true significance of rasa, of emotional enjoyment peeped in and through them. Mammaṭa had the advantage of the deep wisdom of Ānandavardhana and Abhinava and as such he had counted as defect whatever delayed the communication of the emotion or obscured it or arrested its heightening or laid it in the wrong channel, or to its partial apprehension. From Bhāmaha to Vāmana no one had given the right emphasis on aesthetic emotion and for that reason they could not see eye to eye to Mammaṭa’s view that detraction from aesthetic enjoyment was what constituted defects. But Bhāmaha had so cleverly put the whole thing that it cannot be gainsaid that he regarded the sweetness of emotion as being the fundamental essential of literature. Against Mammaṭa it may be said that we notice some sort of hesitancy in such admission. Though in describing doṣa
he defines them as those that hinder the expression of rasa, yet in defining kāvyā he says—Kāvyā is that which should not be marred by defects, should have excellences, but may or may not have alaṃkāras. Now, such a definition would not necessarily mean that it is indispensable for poetry to be charged with emotion. Among later writers also Jagannātha did not admit this indispensable character of rasa. All the defects that have hitherto been pointed out lead to an obscurity of comprehension, undesirable suggestion or wheeling of the mind out of its track by impossible description which lead to the misapprehension of aesthetic enjoyment. Bhāmaha always insisted on the fact that the style of poetry should be easy of comprehension for if this is not so then even if the poems are charged with emotions they would fail to affect us. He had in many places contrasted literature and other sciences as honey and bitter pills. He had also told us that unless something is said in a striking manner it was no poetry. He was thus in a way hinting that aesthetic emotion and its unobstructed communication constituted the art of poetry. Daṇḍin has not said anything very definite about the relation between the defects and the excellences, yet he has admitted the relativity of some of the defects. He has also said that whatever is not available in the Vaidarbhi style should be regarded as defects. It would not be wrong to think that he had regarded the defects to be those which were opposed to the excellences. In the classification of doṣas there is hardly any agreement between the various writers on alaṃkāra. But it would be unfruitful for us to enter into that discussion. But from Bhāmaha to Mammatā most of the authors have signified the relative character of some of the doṣas. Thus, the use of harsh words may be a defect in amorous poetry but it should be an excellence in heroic poetry. Bhāmaha has said that it is by the manner of use that a defect may be an excellence or an excellence may be a defect.¹

¹ sanviveśa-vikṣeṣāt tu duruktaṁ api sabhate
nilām pālaṁ abaddham antardālo sriyam iev
kṣeṣād āśraya-saundaryād dhatte' sabhāmasdadhuapi
kāntā-vilocaṇa-nyastām maśṭasam idevjñānam.
Bhoja also counted a number of dosas but there is no originality in it. Bhâmaha is unwilling to accept the rigidity of the classification of style as Gaudî, Vaidarbhi, Pânicāli, etc. and he dismisses also the list of ten guṇas accepted by Bharata. In their place he accepts only three, viz., sweetness, strength and simplicity. The excellences (guṇas) are integral to the structure of the style, whereas the figures of speech are comparatively external. This is the view that Udbhāta has expressed in his commentary on Bhâmaha.¹

Vâmana has described excellences as those that beautify speech and he defined Alamkâra as heightening the nature of speech. Mammaṭa has severely criticised this view of Vâmana. Vâmana has counted ten excellences depending on words and ten on its significance. He used the same terms in double senses to denote the excellence of words and the excellence of meaning. Thus, the word ojas means the thickness of word-structure but it also means gravity of meaning. Prasāda means on the one hand the loose structure of a sentence and on the other hand it means simplicity of meaning. Śleṣa means on the one hand smoothness of expression while on the other hand it also means the existence of various meanings of one word, and so on. Bharata, Daṇḍin and Bhâmaha practically followed the same principle in counting the excellences, but there is a difference of meaning in the terms used by them. Thus, what Daṇḍin called ‘śleṣa’ is called ‘ojas’ by Bhâmaha, and Vâmana’s ‘prthak-padatva’ and ‘agrāmyakatā’ are equivalent to Daṇḍin’s mādhuryya! There is no agreement between Vâmana’s ‘samādhi’ and Daṇḍin’s ‘samādhi’; while ‘ojas’

¹ yathā tadavat-asādhyānuh sudhiyusca prayojyet
tad grāhyam surabhikṣusumam grāmyametan nityohyam
dhatte sobham viracitamidam thānamsayaitad asya
mālakāro raceyat yathā sādhu vijñāya mālāṃ
yogam kāryam avahita-dhīyā tatavod evabhīdham.——

—Bhāmaha 1. 54-55, 58-59.

samaṇyaavartiyā sauravyayāh samaṇyaavartiya tu hārādaya ityasmāt guṇālaṃkāra-
pām bhedaḥ, ojaḥ probhāṣyate naṃ prāsopamādindam cocoḥeṣyam api samaṇyaavartiyā sthitirī
guṇālaṃkāraḥ pravahenaiva bhedaḥ.
has been used by Bharata to mean 'solid structure' of long compounds with which Daṇḍin and Bhoja agree, while Hemacandra does not. According to Hemacandra 'ojas' means 'to attribute greatness to the meaning.' The same may be said of Bhoja. His definitions sometimes agree with Vāmana and sometimes do not. We thus see that the technical names used to denote the various excellences by the different writers do not agree. Bhoja and others have mentioned new excellences which are absent in the treatment from Bharata to Vāmana. It also appears that not all our senses can be present in every case of literary structure. The existence of some may easily bar out others. Mammaṭa has emphasised the view that the excellences belong to the aesthetic emotion. For that reason the defects of aesthetic emotion will involve a difference of aesthetic qualities. Generally, the classification of the guṇas are of an arbitrary character. Thus Mammaṭa criticising Vāmana says that what Vāmana calls different guṇas are sometimes such that some of them are modifications of one guṇa. What Vāmana calls śleṣa, samādhi, udāratā and prasāda are included within 'ojas.' It has been suggested that the guṇas are those excellences which influence the mind in a particularly favourable manner and makes its speech original. In many cases the so-called guṇas are but the absence of defects. Again, what has been counted as guṇas by some have been regarded by others as being only poetical skill.

Many of our modern writers have considered it advantageous to speak of the divergence of views of the different Alāmḳāra authors as being capable of being classified in the Western fashion, such as, the Riti school, the alāmḳāra school or the Dhvani school. I am forced to submit a dissenting note, to this way of classification. From Bharata to Ānandavardhana everyone of the writers of Alāmḳāra understood the importance of doṣa, guṇa, riti, rasa, and alāmḳāra as constituting the grounds of appraisal of the value of any kāvya. But of these writers if Vāmana regarded riti or style to constitute the chief essence it
cannot be regarded that he thereby formed a school by himself. We do not know of any other author who like Vāmana says, *ritirātmā kāvyasya!* Daṇḍin as well as most other writers have given much space to *riti, doṣa, guṇa,* and *alamkāra.* The doctrine of *guṇas* was also an old doctrine and we find *mādhuryya, kānti,* and *udāratā* referred to there. Bharata enumerates 10 *guṇas* and they are more or less the same as those enumerated by Daṇḍin and Vāmana. But as *rasa* is more important for *Nātya-śāstra* Bharata laid greater stress on *rasa* than on *doṣa* or *guṇa,* whereas Daṇḍin gives greater preference to *doṣa, guṇa* and *alamkāra,* as almost the whole of his work is dedicated to *doṣa,* *guṇa* and *alamkāras.* Daṇḍin however expands the concept of *alamkāras* and includes the *guṇas* within them. We have already stated that the attention of the early writers was drawn primarily to the literary embellishments found in figures of speech. But as thought advanced it was found that the literary embellishment would not really be embellishment unless certain other conditions be fulfilled, as for example, as Bhāmaha stated, that there must be a strikingness or archness (*vakrokti*) or originality and due exaggeration (*atiśayokti*) without which the *alamkāras* would not be *alamkāras* and Daṇḍin pointed out that the literary excellences or the *guṇas* also constitute *alamkāras* which form the essence of the *Kāvyamārga.* The word *mārga* means the way and this is very nearly the same as the *riti* of Vāmana. The *guṇas* there refer to the way of speech or the style. The previous writer did not fully realise the value of the excellences or the *guṇas* as constituting the essence of good style. Daṇḍin however defines Kāvya as *iṣṭārtha-vyavacchinna-padāvalī.* The *padāvalī* should be *iṣṭārthavyavacchinna,* i.e., agreeable, pleasant. Naturally the question would arise how should the words be arranged that they may produce the *iṣṭārtha.* The way of making the suitable arrangement of sound or sense should be such that they may be pleasurable. Even Kuntaka in later times laid emphasis on the particular *bandha* or arrangement of *sabda* and *artha* as constituting a good Kāvya and he said that
such an arrangement can only be successful when it is manipulated by genius that knows how to make it striking. Daṇḍin had not definitely introduced the idea of the proper arrangement of sense or artha as Kuntaka did, he only spoke of padāvāli and did not introduce the concept of artha which, however, must have been latent in his mind. Kuntaka made it patent. What Kuntaka calls bandha is vyavaccheda or mārga in Daṇḍin. Bharata himself also spoke of the kāvyagunās but he does not speak of riti. Daṇḍin as a matter of fact spread out his gunās as indicating only two varieties of style, the Vaidarbhi and the Gauḍī. These names, however, are not Daṇḍin’s own as we find them also in Bhāmaha. I have already pointed out that even at the time of Patañjali, different cultural centres in India had demonstrated their inclinations towards different styles of composition. Bāṇa in his Harṣacarita in a much later time confirms the view. Bhāmaha mentioned the gunās independently of the style. But Daṇḍin included them within the style. Bharata also regarded the gunās as belonging to the kāvyā as a whole and not to the style, while the later writers like Mammaṭa and others regarded the gunās as belonging to rasa. According to Daṇḍin it is the Vaidarbhamārga that carries within it the correct integration of the ten gunās which may be regarded as the very life of the Vaidarbhamārga and are absent in the Gauḍī. The ten gunās enumerated by Daṇḍin are neither logically distinct nor exhaustive.1 Of the gunās enumerated by Daṇḍin the samādhi is really upamālankāra whereas the other gunās refer to the sonorous effects of sound, compactness of words and clearness of meaning. Daṇḍin says that alamkāras are those qualities that produce the embellishment of kāvyā (kāvyasabhākarān dharmān alamkārān pracākṣate). In such a wide scope gunās

1 The ten gunās of Daṇḍin are:—pleya (compactness), prāśāda (clearness), samatā (proper grouping of the word-sounds), madhurya (alliterative sweetness and absence of vulgarity), sukūmārata (soft sounds), arthavākii (explicitness of sense, which is almost the same as prastāda), udārata (expression of high spirit), ojas (force proceeding from the use of compounds), kānti (agreeableness, due to consonance of usage, convention and the like), samādhi (transference of characters, qualities and actions):
are also included within the concept of alamkāra and in chapter II, 3 he speaks of the gunas constituting the Vaidarbhi style as alamkāras and distinguishes these from other alamkāras which may exist both in the Gaṇḍī and the Vaidarbhi style and these may be regarded as the general alamkāras.¹

We thus find that Daṇḍin conceives of as kāvya that composition of words that produces pleasure. Here, of course, the idea of rasa is very dominant. As a matter of fact it is the very defining concept of kāvya, its very soul. For, if a particular composition did not produce pleasure it could not be kāvya at all; Bhāmaha also distinguishes kāvya from sātra as honey and bitter guḍuci. But the production of pleasure being the common quality of all kāvya, a further criterion of superiority is added as depending on the presence or absence of further embellishment. If Daṇḍin could logically think it would have occurred to him, why do these embellishments add to the charm of poetry if poetry be that which produces pleasure? Is that not an introduction of a new standard? If this is a new standard what constitutes the character of this standard? Or do these qualities add to the charm of poetry because they heighten or make it easy to enjoy the pleasure better! This would have naturally brought him to the position of Mammaṭa. He, however, did not follow this line of thinking and regarded the sobhā of kāvya as being something different from the ‘istārtha’ or desirability. But then a new difficulty occurred—the gunas produce sobhā, so do the alamkāras. Therefore gunas also must be alamkāras.²

¹ kālciṁ mārga-nibhāgārtham uktāṁ prāg apy alamkārādyāḥ
sādāraṇam alamkāra-jāstam adya pradarṣyate

—Kāvyadāra.

i.e., in treating the vaidarbhi style we have shown some of the alamkāras (which are nothing but the gunas), and now we are describing those alamkāras which are present in both Gaṇḍī and Vaidarbhi.

² Thus, Tarunā Vācaspati in commenting on Kāvyaprakāśa II. 3 says:

pūrṇam ilaṅgādayo dala gunā ityuktaṁ, kathāṁ te’alamkāra ucyante iti cet sobhākaratvaṁ hi alamkāra-lakṣaṇam, tallakṣaṇa-yogat te’alamkārāh...............gunā alamkāra esa ityuktaṁ

ataḥ ilaṅgādayah guṇamakālaṃkārāḥ pūrṇam mārga-prabhodha-pradarṣyante uktāḥ, idānāṁ tu mārga-dvaya sādāraṇā alamkāra ucyante.

O.P. 150–73
In the treatment of the figures of speech that are common to Vaidarbhi and Gauḍī Daṇḍin takes up the śabdālaṃkāras; particularly yamaka and 35 arthaḷaṃkāras.¹

As regards doṣa Daṇḍin generally regards the opposites of the guṇas as doṣa, but as three of the guṇas have no opposites, Daṇḍin counts the doṣas as seven. Daṇḍin does not discuss the question as to whether doṣas are positive or negative. He only holds that the Vaidarbhi riti is free from the doṣas and that they are only to be found in the Gauḍī riti. But Vāmana positively declares the doṣas as being the negations of guṇas. According to Vāmana sabda and artha form the body of kāvya, and riti; the structural arrangement of words (vīśiṣṭa-pada-racanā) is its soul. But if only a particular structure or regiment of words be the soul of good poetry what is this particular element? Vāmana’s answer is this that it is that structure that contains guṇas. He holds further that in Vaidarbhi we have all the ten kinds of guṇas, in the Gauḍī we have only ojas and kānti and in the Pāṇcālatī only mādhurya and saukumārya. But he does not discuss the question as to why a particular guṇa should be so called and should a particular structure containing particular guṇas be given preference to other structures. The guṇas are regarded by Vāmana as qualities of sabda and artha, but the commentator notes that the guṇas really belong to the riti. Their existence is proved according to Vāmana by the testimony of men of taste. Vāmana’s enumeration of guṇas or rather the names that he ascribed to the various guṇas is different from that of Daṇḍin. But in essence they may be regarded as a consequence of an expansion and systematization of Daṇḍin’s ideas. It cannot also be said that the classifications and the definitions are all logically valid and they have been severely criticised by Māmata. It may also be pointed out that some of the guṇas of Vāmana as well as Daṇḍin are really alobha. Following

¹ Both Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin devote much time to citrabandhas called prahelika Bhṛga and Māgha and Bhāravi as well had much preference for these. But Ānandavardhana entirely discredited them.
Bhāmaha the later writers of alamkāra have regarded vakrokti or ukti-vaicitrya the principal criterion for the admission of figures of speech.

It is because that none of these writers could discover the underlying principle of guṇa and doṣa that they tried to pick up in a haphazard manner some of the appealing qualities of a delightful poetic conversation. The difference in classification, enumeration and nomenclature among the various writers was therefore natural. But on the whole it was really Bharata’s classification that has been developed upto its furthest limits by Vāmana. Vāmana, however, does not stop with the guṇas but he thinks that a kāvyya is acceptable because it is alamkāra (kāvyam grāhyam alamkārāt) and defines alamkāra as beauty (saundaryyam alamkāram). We find here a double scheme. Riti is called the soul of kāvyya, but a kāvyya is acceptable only if there is alamkāra or saundaryya. The compromise has been arrived at by holding that while the guṇas are the permanent qualities constituting kāvyya, and are hence called the guṇas, the alamkāras form additional charms. But why the guṇas constituting the riti should be regarded as essential for kāvyya? The answer that we get is that they are indispensable qualities without which no beauty or charm of poetry can be produced (guṇāḥ nityā tairvinā kāvyanāmānupapattih). The alamkāras produce only additional charms. The guṇas are said to be related to the riti in the samavāya relation or the relation of inherence, whereas the alamkāras exist in the relation of samyoga. Mammaṭa has; however, pointed out that this view is not correct, for a guṇa like the ojas and an alamkāra like anuprāsa or upamā, should be regarded as being in samavāya relation. The upshot of the whole thing is that alamkāras cannot produce kāvyā without the guṇas but the guṇas may produce kāvyas without there being any alamkāra. Vāmana does not pay much attention to the alamkāras. He counts only anuprāsa and yamaka and śabdā-alamkāra and regards all arthālamkāras as involving upamā or different modes of upamā.
It is desirable, however, that though here and there among the ancients there may have been people who are inclined to give a special emphasis to riti, yet it would be wrong to speak of the writers of Alamkāras in the past as belonging to the Riti school or the Alamkāra school. No such classification is current in the Indian tradition of Alamkāra and I do not know of a number of writers of a particular time as upholding the riti theory so that they might be referred to as belonging to the Riti school as we may very well find in the field of Indian Philosophy. When we find that from the time of Śaṅkara there is an unbroken chain of authors who held the monistic doctrine and supported it against the attack of the opponents, we can speak of these authors as belonging to the school of Śaṅkara. But if a writer here and a writer there have any special fondness for, riti we cannot call them as belonging to a particular school, any more than we can speak of Hegel as belonging to the Aristotelian school or Kant to the Platonic. The fact was that these early writers were groping in the dark for discovering a rational principle about the essential sine qua non constitution and the nature of kāvyā and, they faltered in their attempts and ran into contradictions. Thus in Vāmana we may ask: what is riti apart from the guṇas? A riti is a viśiṣṭa-pada-racanā, but this viśiṣṭatā of arrangement or racanā includes the guṇas. Vāmana therefore regards the guṇas as essential in poetry. If that is so there would be no riti without them and it is said that they are in the samavāya relation with the riti. That which is in a samavāya relation with any thing must be regarded as being such an indispensable character of the thing that the thing can hardly be conceived without that quality. We can hardly speak of any riti without speaking of the guṇas. The riti, therefore, which is supposed to be the soul of kāvyā, would be only imaginable as an abstract and theoretical entity for upholding the guṇas. The Ekāvali points out that if the guṇas are the principal element, they themselves cannot be regarded as adorning poetry, for they themselves should be the objects of adornment.
Prof. Kane says: “Vāmana is the foremost representative of the riti school.” But where are the others? Mr. Kane further says that “The Alamkāra school looked upon the alamkāras, which are really of secondary importance, as very important. The riti school marks a very real advance over the Alamkāra school, and though it did not reach the real essence of poetry it approached very near it. Instead of looking upon mere alamkāras as the essence of poetry it looked upon the guṇas as the essence. The riti school was not yet quite aware of that to which the guṇas belonged. It is therefore that the Dhvanikārikā says about the Riti school, “asphuṣta-sphuritam, etc.”¹ But this seems hardly correct. Bhāmaha regarded vakrokti as the soul of all alamkāras and regarded honey-like sweetness to be the characteristic of kāvya.

Going back to Bhāmaha, Udbhata and Rudraṭa we may say that here also to call them as belonging to the Alamkāra school is not quite correct. For, though Bhāmaha collects many alamkāras from the previous writers and regards them as embellishment as everyone does, he never regards alamkāras as the soul of kāvyas. As a matter of fact the problem as to what constitutes the essence of literature was not solved till the advent of Dhvanikāra. When Vāmana said, ‘ritir ātmā kāvyasya’ he probably simply meant that kāvya necessarily implies a bandha or arrangement of sabdārtha. Though he uses the word ātman yet by that word he really means deha (body) of kāvya, which is really sabdārtha.² But Bhāmaha was shrewd enough to perceive that it is not merely the bandha that constitutes a kāvya but the expression must be out of the commonplace. It must be vakra. Probably the word vakra has been suggested by the amorous glances of women. The glance made in a straightforward manner is simple vision but an arch-glance signifies the whole

¹ asphuṣta-sphuritam kāvyaṃ tatām etad yatadhitam
alamkāraḥ bhiyakartum rśiṣyaḥ sampravartītah

Dhvanikārikā III, 52.

² ātmā deha dhṛte vīves evabhūve paramātmane
situation of mental complex and emotion that fills us with a thrill. Similarly, an expression carries with it the heart of the poet when it is used in a special and unique manner and without that uniqueness mere communication of information is not a kāvya. For this reason he had dismissed the claims of hetu, leśa, etc., to the status of alamkāra.

Bhāmaha no doubt accepts two kinds of alamkāras, sabda and artha, but so does everybody. In his treatment of the object of kāvya he counts a number of external reasons, along with prīti or delight, which have been followed by other writers of alamkāras also. Bhāmaha thus puts in mokṣa also as the object of a kāvya to bring in it a line with darśanas. Bharata had described the function of dramatic art as being of the nature of play or pleasure and uses the terms krīḍanaka and vinodakaraṇa (Nātya-śāstra I. 11 and I. 86).

Bhāmaha regards kāvya as being the togetherness of sabda and artha implying thereby that both were equally important. He further conditioned it and said that it should be free from defects (nirdoṣa). He does not pay that attention to rīti that Daṇḍin and Vāmana gave. His emphasis was on vakrokti. This vakrokti was also the same as atiśayokti. He says that unless any composition can transcend the limits of its meaning it can neither be striking nor be poetic. He further says that unless this transcending character is found no alamkāra can claim any excellence. He therefore defines atiśayokti as nimmattato vaco yat tu lokātkrānta-gocaram and this is paraphrased by Daṇḍin as—vivakṣā vā viśokasya lokasīmativartini. Abhinava also in defining vakratā says sabdasya hi vakratā, abhidheyasya ca vakratā lokottirṇenaiva rūpēṇa avasthānam. The vakratā

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1 These external reasons are:—

\[
\text{dharmaṁ tathāmokṣaṁ sabda ca, kāśyapa kalasū ca, karoti prīti ca, sādhākṣaraṇi ca.}
\]

2 But Abhinava says that the real essence of kāvya is prīti or joy without any further end and it is this which distinguishes kāvya from the commandatory scriptures and the recommendatory stories. Abhinava is probably the first to distinguish between three kinds of upadeśas, guru-sammita, swēt-sammita, kāntā-sammita.
thus means according to Abhinava the same as the atiśayokti of Bhāmaha, namely, that words and their meaning should transcend their ordinary local limits. It cannot be denied that in laying his emphasis on vakratā and atiśayokti Bhāmaha had implicitly caught the secret of the charm of literature, which has been so explicitly brought out in the works of Ānandavardhana and Abhinava. From this point of view he had attained a state of literary perspective which underwent no improvement in the hands of his successors, until we come to Ānandavardhana. Kuntaka also admits the vakratā of Bhāmaha though he would call it a bhaṅgi or vicchitti, which constituted the special charm and strikingness of poetry as distinguished from common speech. Naturally enough he included the function of rasa within alaṃkāra. In II, 85 Bhāmaha says that rasa as well as alaṃkāra are produced from vakrokti. This meaning has been accepted by Abhinavagupta and it really means, though implicitly, that rasa is the result of vyaṅjanā and the vyaṅjanā is in reality the vakrokti. Bhāmaha, of course, never dealt with the subject of vyaṅjanā as a special topic but it is clear from his definition that implicitly at least he had caught the real purport of vyaṅjanā and its real function in poetry.

Bhāmaha in the treatment of his alaṃkāras, paryāyokta, vyājastuti, aprastutapraśamsā and samāsokti, shows that in them all there is always an implied sense which is explained by Udbhaṭa as vācyavācaka-vyaktibhyām śūnyenāvagamāmanā. Thus there is an ‘avagamyamāna artha’ or an implied meaning in these alaṃkāras. But Ānandavardhana criticises that mere avagamyamāna or implication is not enough to produce dhvani. The implication must be superior to the ordinary meaning, which should play only a subordinate role and this alone can produce dhvani. Udbhaṭa has also shown in detail that even in the case of the expressed poetic figures like rūpaka, etc., there may be an underlying current of implication. This has been admitted by the writer of the Locana. This brings out the fact that it is not true that Bhāmaha and Udbhaṭa denied dhvani, but they did not
simply count *dhvani* as an independent and separate function but as included in the elements of the general structure of good poetry. Thus, again, Pratīdhārendurāja, the commentator of Udbhaṭa, says that the *dhvani* which has been regarded by some writers as the soul of literature has not been specially treated by Udbhaṭa as it has been already dealt with in an implied manner in the treatment of *alamkāra*. Jagannātha also remarks that though Udbhaṭa and others never mentioned *dhvani* in an explicit manner, yet the fact of the implication playing a very important, nay, an indispensable, part in poetry was well-known to them. Ruyyaka also confirms this view. In Vāgbhaṭa and Hemacandra also we find the same view operating that Bhāmaha and Udbhaṭa had all perceived the essence of *dhvani* and its function in kāvya but had not treated them separately as the Dhvanikāra did. Kuntaka, however, develops and expands Bhāmaha’s definition of *vakrokti* and founds on it his own doctrine of literary excellence. Udbhaṭa also, though he does not treat of *rasa* separately, does indeed treat of *rasa* in association with *alamkāras* and treats also of *bhāva* and *anubhāva*, which may be traced in Bhāmaha also. In both Bhāmaha and Udbhaṭa also there was but little distinction between the *gūnas* and *alamkāras*. But Vāmana, as we have seen, distinguishes between *gūnas* and *alamkāras*. Again, while Bhāmaha simply mentioned the *rittis* but does not lay any importance to the rigidity of classification, Udbhaṭa does not even mention the *rittis* but only mentions the three *vṛttis* which are associated with *anuprāsa*, which correspond roughly to the three *gūnas* of Vāmana, and so does Ānandavardhana. But it cannot be said that Udbhaṭa’s *gūnas* tally wholly with the *rittis* of Vāmana or the three *gūnas* of Ānandavardhana. But while the *gūnas* are regarded by Udbhaṭa (according to Abhinavagupta) as belonging merely to the *sangathana* or arrangement, such as, *a-sāmāsa*, *dirgha-samāsa* or *madhyama-samāsa*, it does not seem that

1 udbhāpādibhiṣṭa gūṇālāmākārañām prāyaḥ sāmyam eva śucitam.

2 rītir hi gūṇeṣu paryavavasītiḥ.

3 Alāmākāravāsa, p. 7.
Vāmana is specifically clear as to whether the guṇas are something over and above saṅgatana. It is interesting here also to note that Pratīhāryendurāja regards rasa as the soul of poetry and attributes the same view to Udbhata whose work was commented upon by him.

Rudraṭa, again, does not attach much importance to the ritis or the guṇas but he descends straight away to the classification of alaṃkāras, saṃdālāmśkāras, and arthālāmśkāras and their enumeration and definition. He no doubt speaks of rasa also but he does not give it the prominence it deserves.

I have so long combated the theory of many of my predecessors that the inquiry into the nature and genius of poetry could be sub-divided into a number of schools. But I contended from the very beginning that the study of alaṃkāra first attracted and in fact originated the inquiry into the science of poetics. I have also observed that a number of poetic figures were discovered in the time of Pāṇini in the grammar school, and a further investigation into which for specialised treatment passed into the hands of a school of writers who were regarded as writers on poetics. This early predilection towards the poetic figures had gained such traditional strength that even when as a result of further enquiry the essence of literature was considered by some to belong to the style, the absence of doṣas, and the possession of guṇas or to dhvani and rasa, elaborate treatment of the alaṃkāras never ceased. Indeed in the later writers we find more and more classification and ingenious distinction and dialectical skill were displayed in the treatment of alaṃkāras. These different writers, however, did not agree in their classification of the alaṃkāras or the subtle distinctions maintained by one or the other writer. This was largely due to the change of perspective due to a more recondite acquaintance with the principles of literature. A comparative study of this in itself may prove to be an interesting field by itself. Some of the writers had a much wider scope attached to a particular figure of speech than others. But it is needless for us to enter into the discussion of such elaborate details.
Vakrokti

Bhāmaha in his work says that as the night is without the moon, as beauty is without the humility, so is dexterity of speech without poetic talents. Even a fool can be a scientist, or learned in the Scriptures with the instructions of the teacher, but without genius it is not possible to be a poet. The literary body of a poet shines even greater at the fall of the physical one. Genius alone is not sufficient for the production of poetry but one must acquire a thorough acquaintance and experience with the words and their subtle meanings and must study also the literature of other poets. A poet should be careful to see that not one word used by him be defective or transferable. Poetry like a woman receives an enhancement of her beauty by adornments. But before all adornments the language must be faultless.

Kāvyā or poetry consists of a co-operative conjunction of words and their meanings. Above all, such a conjunction must be significant and striking. By the word ‘striking’ or vakra Bhāmaha means that kind of expression where “more is meant than meets the ear.” He therefore dismisses svabhāvokti or natural description from the status of alamkāra as it is simply informative of a particular scene. Real adornments belong to that special trait of expression by which it implies more than it says. It is this striking implication of expression on which depends the adornment of all alamkāras. Therefore there cannot be any alamkāra where there is no vakrokti. He thus says that such expressions as ‘the sun has set’, ‘the moon has risen’, ‘the birds are flying’, cannot constitute literature.¹

All the faults that Bhāmaha had described as faults or dosas because they obscure the significance of turn of expression. It is the peculiarity and uniqueness of the significance of an expression that constitutes the literary character of a composition.

¹

saiyl sarvaiva vakroktir anagārthe vibhāvyate
yatekṣaśyaśam kauṁdā kāryau ko’lamkāravagāy vīnāv

...........

gatośtaṃ arko bhūtindur yanti vādā kāryau paktān

ityanandau kīṃ kāryau varātām nanātā pravakṣyate.
This *vakrokti* of Bhāmaha has been differently understood by different later writers. Daṇḍin, Vāmana and Rudraṭa understood *vakrokti* as a śabdālāṃkāra depending upon the pun existing in the two meanings of a word, making it possible for the hearer to draw a different meaning from the expression than what was intended by the speaker.¹

When Bhāmaha said that *vakrokti* is the same as the atiśayokti he probably meant that *vakrokti* leads to the implication of an extra sense of atiśaya. Ānandavardhana understood it rightly and agreed with Bhāmaha.² Abhinavagupta, however, does not agree with it. Daṇḍin takes atiśayokti in the sense of exaggeration and says that in all alāṃkāras we have an element of exaggeration. *Vakrokti*, therefore, which is the same as atiśayokti, is a name of alāṃkāra in general. Alāṃkāra is, therefore, twofold, svabhāvokti and vakrokti. Other alāṃkāras are subdivisions of vakrokti. Vāmana counts vakrokti as a separate alāṃkāra. Kuntaka, probably a contemporary of Abhinava, was the first to attach a special importance to vakroti. He says that though there are hundreds of works on the science of alāṃkāra there is no one among them which lays special importance to the transcendental delight and inexpressible joy that poetry produces. Compared with this joy all other pleasures are trifling. Though literature consists in the co-operative conjunction of words, yet until such a conjunction can produce a superfluity of transcendent joy, it cannot be called literature. The same idea may be expressed in two such different ways that one may have an appeal of beauty to us far excelling that of the other.³

¹ *aho kenedṛśi buddhir dārupā tava nirmitra i*
  triguṇā śrīyate buddhir na tu dārunaṁ kaṅcita i

Here there is a pun on the word dārupā, as cruel or made of wood.

² tatrātiśayoktire vam alāṃkāram adhitiṣṭhāt kavi-pratibhā-vaśat tasya dūrāpātiśayā,
  yogonāsya tvakākāramārtasaiva iti sarvāśaṁ kārnavacārāpā svatthāpam-yogasattvānāh.

³ pacaṁo saṁa sarvāśaṁkaāra-rūpā ityayamvāroha vaṅgakāroha.—Ānandavardhana.

³ māṁśe-jane-vilocana-panāṁ
  upa-odepa-kalūṣān-abhihrān,
  manda-manda-muditaḥ prayayau śrāman
  bhī abhiṣaiva iṣṭa-muṣābhāh i
Words commingle with words and sense with sense, and as if by mutual rivalry they are mutually rising into a climax, an ascension point where they again commingle together.\(^1\) Here Kuntaka suggests that the function of art is in the production of a whole in which the sound and the sense co-operate together in purity and propriety to rise gradually in an ascending scale till they rise to a completion. Words and sense are two different elements and the harmony must be attained both in their individual sphere and their mutual sphere of co-operation. There should be nothing in the arrangement of words that would produce a shock to the progressive march of thought and \textit{vice versa}. They should march towards a common end. The word \textit{sāhīya} (literature) etymologically means unity of thought and language. Intuition and expression are here for the sake of analysis split up as two and the growth of intuition and expression must be of such an organic order that they may produce a whole without a hole.

The words should be so chosen that they may express exactly what the poet intends to express.\(^2\)

\begin{quote}
\begin{Verbatim}
śraddha-sāyāpaści-parimānī-tāpamata
kālakā-sāyāpa-sāyāpa-śara-śara-kandākura-ruca
tūndhīśapāyām ṛtu-virahā-dahanodātavātā-vyātā
kāpākāytya bibhakya nibhyā śvavā sva candro bhuyādai
\end{Verbatim}
\end{quote}

Of these two verses the idea is the same, but the second is far more beautiful than the first. This is due to the mode of expression. Words meet with words, sense with sense, until by their mutual combination they create a picture more beauteous than what the mere sense or the purport would have given.

\(^1\) \textit{śraddha-sāyāpaści-parimānī-tāpamata} \textit{tūndhīśapāyām} \textit{kālakā-sāyāpa-sāyāpa-śara-śara-kandākura-ruca}
\textit{nīrloka-loka maraṇasārāma hānāvājana}
\textit{adaraṇā-kandarṇām jananepañcāmāṃśam apahām}
\textit{jagajjīrṇārayaṃ katham Asi vidhatuṃ vyāsitaṃ}

The verse is from \textit{Mālātāmāvha} and idea after idea with the words co-operating with them rise into a greater and greater resonance of sound and sense until they attain a climax in the last line.

\(^2\) \textit{kālola-vellita-dṛṣṭa-paruṣa-prabhāra}
\textit{rajanāyamūni makaraśca māvamāṃśiśhā}
\textit{kīṃ kaustubhaḥ bhavate vikita na nāma}
\textit{yādeva-pratāsītā-karṇā pūrvottamaḥ pī}

In this verse of Bhālītā, p. 587, the ocean is asked not to treat harshly and disdain the jewels with its roaring billows, for even Lord Nārāyaṇa spreads out his hand to snatch the
What Kuntaka wants to say is that the things of the external world that take the forms of ideas and images in the mind of the poet are not exactly a mere copy or a mere symbol of these objects, but held within the emotion of the boiling soul of the poet, they assume new spiritual forms with new spiritual values. Thus, the external objects, to which the poet is supposed to refer, become spiritually metamorphosed, and they are as such largely different from the objects themselves, and they in their turn react on the poet’s mind in an ineffable manner such that, inspired by them, the poet, through an inward spiritual activity, of which he is not even explicitly aware, chooses words and phrases, meanings and ideas of such propriety that may assemble together for the creation of an undivided piece of art. The upshot of this is that the process by which external physical objects and our ideas relating to them become transformed into poetic intuition vibrating with emotion, is a transcendental affair. It is transcendental in the sense that in our ordinary affairs our thoughts are moved in the tune of self-interest, the fulfilment of a need or the removal of a sorrow. It has always an external end to fulfill. But in the case of poetic intuition, no such interest or fulfilment of needs plays any part. It is therefore unlike all our ordinary activities, cognitive or conative. It is therefore called transcendental (alaukiya-nyāpāra). It is in consequence of the movement of the same process that suitable words, phrases, ideas and metres are churned out, as it were, unconsciously or subconsciously from the ocean of our internal experience and set in order for the creation of an artistic whole. The poet’s ordinary personality is treated as an instrument, as it were, by his poetic personality.

Kaustubha jewel from it. Now, the high value of the Kaustubha does not demonstrate the importance of other jewels which this illustration was intended to demonstrate. Therefore, the word Kaustubha is wrongly chosen and does not convey the sense which the poet wished to convey. If in the place of the third line we substitute ‘ekena kim na vihi bhavatā ‘as nāma,’ the idea would have been consistently expressed.
Poetry consists in the translation of a spiritual form in the form of words and meanings. Poetry consists of unique combination of a unique class of words and their meaning. It is that peculiar combination which shows itself as the aesthetic quality in a work of art that was designated as vakratā by Kuntaka. A natural description can only become poetic when somehow or other the poetic personality, intuition or perspective is infused into it. Kuntaka has dismissed the svabhāvokti of Daṇḍin in the same manner as some Western art critics have dismissed portrait painting from the dignity of art. But both in svabhāvokti and portrait painting, if they are works of art, there may be infusion of personality, apprehension of perspective, choice, emphasis and attribution of grace, which will naturally make them supersede their originals in nature. If a particular piece of composition did not contain any exuberant excess, an overflowing of significance, sonorousness and joy far beyond that which is carried by the words in their simple meanings, the composition would be a dry piece of information but not poetry. It may be history and philosophy but no literature. As life is to the body, which being in the body exceeds it in an unspeakable manner and gives meaning to all its dreams, so does the poetic and aesthetic quality charge a piece of composition with an excellence and emotion, a life and a thrill, that is far beyond the words and their meanings. This is what we call the aesthetic quality, which arises out of that unique character of the constitution of proper words and their meanings which can transform them into literature. It is this quality which may be regarded as the spontaneous ebullition of life and this is what Kuntaka understands by vakratā.

Kuntaka in criticising Vāmana and Daṇḍin says that it is wrong to associate poetic styles with particular countries or to say that there are three kinds of style. Styles may be of infinite variety in accordance with the personality of the poet and it is impossible to enumerate them. It does not matter what name you might give to a particular style. It is not only
but useless. What is important is whether it is beautiful or not. There are poets who are habituated to write in a soft and tender fashion, while there are others who write in a more forceful manner, and a poet may be great and distinguished in whatever form of style he may choose to write. As it is impossible to discover the mystery of the creation of the Lord so it is impossible to delve into the mystery of any particular kind of style.

He distinguishes between a subjective aesthetic quality and an objective aesthetic quality. A subjective aesthetic quality is an internal character belonging to the intuition itself. The objective quality is that which belongs to the expression. He calls the former, saubhāgya and the latter tārūgya. According to the difference in style of expression and the mode of intuition the nature and character of aesthetic qualities must also vary. The manner of style followed by poets like Kālidāsa and others has been designated by Kuntaka as sukumāra, i.e., delicate and tender.

Speaking of the vicitra-rīti or ornamented style, Kuntaka says that it is very difficult to write in this style, and unless the words and the sense flow in their own dynamic competing with each other for the production of a piece of art, without any effort on the part of the poet, it will be impossible to be successful to write in this style. The writers of this style can make both the apparent and the implied meaning beautiful. It is unnecessary for me to go into any further details and elaborate illustrations, indulged in by Kuntaka in his work. Kuntaka did not deny rasa as emotion but he regarded that only as a mode of vakratū which produces both rasa and beauty.

1 Tat kavi-prayatna-nirapokṣayaśva tabdārthāḥ svabhāvikāḥ ko'py vakratūprakāraḥ paripūrḥam paridyayate.
2 khe khe-jīta-bodhi-rattva vacasām kim vistarāsteyadhe
nāsti tva-sadhāh parah parabhājikāh prabhāvyā vratāḥ ||
trīyat-pānḥa-janopakāra-gheṣanāvaśūnābhyā-prabhāvyaye
bhāra-pravahane karoṣi kipy aṁṣāyakāryaṁ-marēḥ ||
3 niśantara-rasodgūra-garbhā-saundarya-nirbhāraḥ
ghaṁ kṣaptaṁ jīvanti na kathāmātram akṣayaṁ ||
Writers like Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin had said that when the rasa is subordinate to the ordinary meaning it is a rasavat alaṃkāra. But Kuntaka does not admit it. He says that whenever there is rasa that alone is predominant. Kuntaka had also admitted dhvani under another name but included that also within vakratā. Though later writers did not accord a high place to Kuntaka yet it appears clear that an all-round estimate of literature with emotion and beauty as its root, as conceived by Kuntaka, seems to beat even the authors of the dhvani school, who were more or less obsessed by the dhvani and the rasa perspectives.

The Theory of Rasa

We must start the theory of rasa or aesthetic emotion with Bharata’s maxim, vibhāvānubhāva-vyabhicāri-saṁyogād rasa-nisṛpatiḥ. The meaning of this line has been a subject of much discussion to which we shall attend later. But after this, the later writers are not particularly eloquent about rasa until we come to Anandavardhana. Bhāmaha was also acquainted with rasa as he speaks of kāvyā-rasa with which as a first starting people are to be tempted to study the Scriptures. Daṇḍin also had not only spoken of rasavad-alaṃkāra but had also spoken of the mādhuryya riti as being rasamayī. But the word rasa has a general and a technical meaning. In the general sense rasa means taste, rasamayī means tasty, while in the technical sense it means the well-known dominant emotions, such as, the amorous, the ludicrous, the pathetic, the passionate, the heroic, the wonder-producing, the fearful and the repugnant (śṛṅgāra-hāṣya-karuṇa-raudra-vīra-bhayānaka-bibhatsād bhutačiti).

In our current literary discussions there is much confusion between these two senses of rasa. In one sense it means merely
pleasant, in other sense it means that a particular dominant emotion constituting our personality has been affected and roused. A mere sonorousness of alliterative sound has been spoken of by Daṇḍin and Vāgbhaṭa, but it means nothing more than the pleasant jingles. But in the description of mahākāvyā or epic, Daṇḍin says, that these should be inspired with rasa or bhāva. Abhinavagupta in his commentary on Bharata’s maxim of rasa had said that Daṇḍin’s view of rasa is very much like that of Bhaṭṭa Lollāṭa. But if that were so it cannot be denied that Daṇḍin had a fair acquaintance with the view that it is the dominant emotions that come to be expressed as rasa. But we find no further treatment of rasa in Daṇḍin. Vāmana has admitted rasa as an important quality of literature and calls it kānti. Udbhāṭa has also admitted rasa in the case of the rasavad-alamkāra. He says that a piece of kāvyā can only be called living when it is inspired with rasa. Rudraṭa also accepted the view that there is an intimate relation between kāvyā and rasa, but he could say nothing further about this intimate relation.

Before proceeding further it is necessary to explain a few of the technical terms that are continually associated with any discussion of rasa:—(1) Vibhāva, the objective condition of producing an emotion. Vibhāva may be of two kinds, (i) alambana and uddīpana. Alambana-vibhāva means a person or persons with reference to whom the emotion is manifested. Uddīpana-vibhāva means the circumstances that have excited the emotion. Thus a man may feel attracted to a woman if the circumstances are co-operating with it. Thus it is easier for a man to be attracted towards a woman of young age if they are thrown alone and there is a beautiful scenery before them, the moon peeping through the clouds, the fragrant breeze blowing, and the like. Any one of such circumstances may be regarded as uddīpana-vibhāva, whereas both the man and the woman are alambana-vibhāvas to each other. (2) Anubhāva means bodily expression by which the emotion is expressed. Thus the arch glances of a lady, her inviting smile, may be regarded as anubhāva. (3) The vyabhicārī
means a series of diverse emotions that feed the lamp of a dominant emotion. A woman in love anxiously waiting at the rendezvous to meet her lover may feel disappointed that he is not coming, may be anxious that something might have happened to him, may be jealous that he might have been courted by another woman, may feel delight in remembering the coaxing words that he had whispered into her ears, and so on. Like pictures in a cinematograph emotions of diverse sorts may be passing in quick succession and may all at the same time be continuing the constitution of the same emotion.

The real discussion of rasa was started by Abhinavagupta in his commentary on Bharata’s maxim on rasa. The real point of discussion and diversity of opinion was on the two words samyoga (conjunction) and rasa-nispatti (expression of rasa or completion of rasa). Before proceeding further it is necessary to say a few words about the foundation of rasa. It is based upon a particular view of psychology which holds that our personality is constituted, both towards its motivation and intellection, of a few primary emotions which lie deep in the subconscious or unconscious strata of our being. These primary emotions are the sex, the ludicrous, the pathetic, the heroic, the passionate, the nauseating, the wonderous. Other aesthetic psychologists have in later times added to it the peaceful or intellectual, the devotional and the filial. These emotions are running through all natures in a permanent manner and may in that sense be called dominant emotions (sthāyibhāva). These dominant states that determine the particular internal temperaments are regarded as the dominant characteristics of those emotional states. Emotional states, such as, the amorous, the heroic and the others, show in their expressions the appearance of atomic formations, i.e., each emotion in its manifestation shows a composition of diverse sentiments constantly shooting out and changing like the kinetic atoms and gases, like the

\[ \text{vibhād} \text{āśubhāvayabhidārisam} \text{ṣ} \text{yogād} \text{rasanīppattih} \]
flamelets that continually come and go and thereby produce the appearance of the permanent, undivided whole of a flame; there are continually passing little flames of diverse sentiments that give expression to the permanent emotion of love or hate, heroism or anger. It should, however, be noted that no emotion is called rasa unless it is aesthetically excited. When a young man falls in love with a young woman and his whole frame is shaken, we cannot speak of him as being the subject of śṛṅgāra-rasa, or when his son is dead and he is crying in tears, we cannot speak of him that he is in the karuṇa-rasa. Rasa is an emotion excited by artistic circumstances or situations.

Now, the question that puzzled the old Alamkāra writers, was this: How can our dominant emotions be roused by aesthetic or artistic means? Some writers like Bhaṭṭa Lollāṭa held that while the vibhāva, anubhāva and nyabhicāri are either ingeniously described or set forth vividly by mimic, they co-operate together and in their conjunction rasa is produced. As through hallucination we may perceive a snake and be afraid of it even if there be no snake, so though there is no real Rāma, no real Sītā, the mimic actors may by their acting produce a situation of reality in our minds and induce the amorous sentiments of Rāma in our minds. The internal datum which guarantees the production of such an illusory perspective is the fact that we have the amorous emotion running through subconscious stratum of our personality as our very constituent. Bhaṭṭa Lollāṭa says that when the vibhāva ideation of the situation and the person together with the atomic emotions that are the feeders of the sentiment of love, are made to coalesce with or penetrate into the inner vein of the dominant amorous, it is only then that a new superimposition of an illusory amorous emotion can be produced. In further explanations of the view of Lollāṭa, it appears that the actor tries to imitate the sentiment of the hero whose part he plays, but that the audience by the conjunction of the amorous situation and the projection of the person has in him the dominant stream of a particular
emotion transformed into the aesthetic sentiment called rasa. Thus Mammaṭa, in speaking of Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, says that the dominant emotion of, say, the amorous, is roused or produced by the vibhāvas consisting of the woman on the one hand and the exciting circumstances, such as, the garden, the moon-light and others, and then this is made intelligible by the external gestures of the actors, and then this being heightened by the free flow of the associated emotions, one intuits the rasa mainly in the hero of the plot and also in the player who has tried to live up to him.\footnote{vibhāvair \textit{lalanodayānādibhir \ alambanoddīpama-karāṇīh \ ratyādiho bhāva gacitek \ anubhāvaḥ \ nityakasya bhujārpa-prabhṛtiḥhīh \ kṣāyaḥ pratīcyayoḥ kṛtaḥ nyabhicārih \ nireṇdotāhīh \ sahakārih \ ndacito \ mukhyayoḥ \ rāmdāra \ anukāryaḥ \ tadbānāmuṇamadānīh \ \textit{nārītakaḥ} \ \textit{pi} \ \textit{pratīcyamāno} \ rastih \ iti \ Bhajjulollaṭa-prabhṛtyāyaḥ.} According to this view, a dominant emotion of the aesthetic type is produced by vibhāvas and they are made intelligible by anubhāvas and enriched by the associated, changing feelings (\textit{nyabhicāri-bhāvas}). Though this emotion primarily excited in the dramatic personage (e.g., Rāma or Sītā), yet by imitation or the assumption of the role of Rāma or Sītā it appears in the actor or by transference into the aesthetic audience who witness the play, and the emotion thus roused in the audience is called rasa.

But the above quotation from Mammaṭa (see footnote) does not tally with the actual statement now available in the \textit{Abhinava-bhāratī}, the commentary by Abhinava on Bharata’s \textit{Nāṭya-śāstra}. It appears there as if anubhāva meant those feelings which are similar to \textit{sthāyibhāva} in their nature as feelings, but were constantly changing. These are, no doubt, internal states but they are not co-existent with the dominant emotion. Yet contact of these loose and changeable feelings with the dominant emotions is possible only because the dominant emotion resides in the back of the mind as an instinctive character of it. The idea seems to be that the dominant emotion resides in the mind as a vāsanā. The concept of vāsanā in Indian thought is rather difficult and to some extent obscure also.
It means in the first instance the motivation within us, that spring of desire that adapts us to find our enjoyments in this or that particular way. It is supposed that in the animal world the behaviour of the animal, its impulse to action and its adaptation to find enjoyment in a particular mode of behaviour, is guided by its own particular vāsanā. Vāsanā thus means a complex integration of emotion and impulse. Man is born with a large number of such emotion-impulse complexes or vāsanās. Some of these lie dormant in him and may become active by external stimulus. It is peculiar in man that on the basis of these emotion-impulse complexes similar other complexes may spring into being through mere description, delineation or imitation. It is here that the artistic faculty finds its place. This second type of emotional complex is not directly connected with the kleśas or the affliction which are concerned with the moral career of a human being in his struggle with his environment. It, therefore, belongs to a new order of reality. The discussion among the scholars was about the nature, origin and character of these second-grade complexes. Bhaṭṭa Lollāṭa was of opinion that in addition to the dominant emotion-impulse complexes or vāsanās there were the changing feelings in and through which each dominant emotion expressed itself. He further held that these feelings were also of the nature of vāsanās and that reason when aroused they could commingle with the dominant emotion and so enrich it as to make it shine through them.

On the point that in a dramatic performance the player imitates the dramatic personages and thereby produces feelings similar to them, Abhinava shows sharp opposition. He says that imitation produces laughter. Imitation is also done in a case where the thing itself cannot be completely done. Again, a dramatic emotion is supported by the situation and the person (ālambana- and uddipana-vibhāva). Both these are of the nature of facts and entities and therefore cannot be imitated. It is not also possible to imitate a mental feeling. There is
either a feeling there or not. If I have in my mind a feeling which is similar to a feeling of another, it is no longer an imitation; for if I have the feeling, it is a real one, and if I have not got it, it does not exist. A mere imitation of external gestures is not an imitation of the internal thing. I do not also know in what particular manner Rāma expressed his sorrow at his separation from Sītā. We may at least imitate the gestures of an ordinary man of whom we have seen grieving. Abhinava says that the player in a drama does not go to the stage with the idea that he was going to imitate Rāma's gestures. But the whole situation, his dress, the music, the surroundings, the utterance of the poet's words as coming from Rāma, make him forget for the time his local personality, and while playing the part of Rāma, he spontaneously assumes Rāma's personality and the real world of his particular time and place slips away (ucita-gītā-todya-carvāṇā-vismṛta-sāṁsārika-bhāva-vyayā).

The upshot, then, is that according to Abhinava no imitation can produce the illusion which holds its sway both among the actors and the audience. On the other hand a conscious imitation would spoil the very illusion which is the business of the dramatic art to stir up. In our ordinary life the events that stir us up are present with us, and immediately affect our interest, excite and change our motives to the success or failure of our wishes leading to pleasure and pain. The criterion of truth in this field is a correspondence of the objective field in time, place and character with the subjective field of consciousness or it may also be that since the action of our operation of the external world is that all truth is rational and logically consistent, truth may as well mean consistency of the objective finding with the subjective expectation in time, place and character throughout the entire field of their application. Or truth may also mean that it may somehow or other affect our feelings, our beliefs and our wills. Most discussions about truth whether it be realistic, idealistic or pragmatic, are generally restricted to the field of occurrence through which our little selves have to run for their
final fulfilment. In this field we ourselves are connected with the external world directly and intimately, and as such the manner in which we are affected by our intercourse with the external world seriously hurts or promotes our position in the external world and also our minds. But if such be our nature that a presentation in a particular literary form of certain events, real or unreal, produces in us such a charm that the whole of the present environment slips off, as it were, like an enfolding garment, from our consciousness and we feel ourselves to be real participants of an imaginary situation, appearing no longer as imaginary, we can no longer judge the status of this appearance by our criteria of our living world and call it true, false or doubtful. Our judgments of truth and falsehood are merely in and through, and in terms of, the experiences of the living world. All our perspectives of truth and falsehood are from different points or sections of the living world with reference to which and relative to which our judgments of truth and falsehood are made. But with reference to the imaginary representations and experiences that introduce us to the field of poetry or drama, we can no longer set our limits to the real objective world. No co-ordinates from it can be drawn to find our location in the aesthetic world and consequently we can make no judgment of truth or reality about it. In witnessing a play as a result of the joint co-operation of all the factors including the music, we seem to indentify ourselves with the dramatic personages and feel ourselves to be one with them.

Abhinava's teacher in his work Kāvyā-kautuka says that a dramatic play is not a physical occurrence. In witnessing a play we forget the actual perceptual experience of the individuals on the stage playing their different parts or their individuality as associated with their local names and habitations. The man who is playing the part of Rāma does not appear to us in his actual individual character and it does not also appear to us that he cannot be the Rāma about whom Vālmīki wrote. He stands
somewhere midway between the pure actuality and the pure ideality. This together with all the scenic associations and those of music produces an experience which vibrates with exhilaration; and as a result thereof the whole presentation of actuality becomes veiled, as it were, in so far as it is an actual occurrence of presentative character. The past impressions, memories, associations, and the like, which were lying deeply buried in the mind, became connected with the present experience and thereby the present experience became affiliated and perceived in a new manner resulting in a dimension of new experience, revealing new types of pleasures and pains, unlike the pleasures and pains associated with our egoistic instincts and the success or failures of their strivings. This is technically called rasāsvādana-camatkārā carvapā which literally means—the experiencing of a transcendent exhilaration from the enjoyment of the roused emotions inherent in our own personality. A play or a drama is the objective content of such an experience. A drama or a play is not a physical occurrence. It is a pure spiritual enlightenment, a spiritual expression throbbing and pulsating with a new type of music, joyous and pensive. As a result of this experience a unity is effected between the individual's own experience and the expression of the art. This experience is, therefore, nothing else but the enlightenment of a universal. Or it may also rather be said that it is a new creation involving the personality of the individual and the objective dramatic contents as constituents—a new appearance, a revelation different from all other experiences and all external objects. If this analysis be true, dramatic experience and art can no longer be regarded as imitative.

Bhaṭṭācārya thought that on the one hand all the equipments of the stage together with the music release from our mind the hold of the impression that such and such a person has taken a particular part, and it also makes us indifferent to the suggestion of an impossibility that the player before us cannot be Rāma. Being cut off of its connection on two sides, namely,
the positive connection of the play with the present actor as a known individual with the actuality of all his bearings, and on the other hand the impossibility of connecting the actor with the realised Rāma's character having lost its force, the suggestive influence can very naturally surcharge the mind with new exhilarations and feelings which can, without any relation to anything else, modify the state of the mind. In this state the previous experiences existing in the mind of the audience as impressions work up independently in association with the suggestion of the dramatic performance. The affiliation, apperception, and integration of these roused impressions and expectations produce new joys and new intuitions. The aesthetic content of a drama is all that is illuminated in such a process.

Mammaṭa repudiates Bhaṭṭa Lollāṭa's view that rasa is related to the vibhāvas in the relation of the produced and the producer, as effect and cause. He says that if the vibhāvas are to be regarded as cause they must be regarded as the cause of agency or the efficient cause—nimitta-kāraṇa. But in the case of nimitta-kāraṇa, we know that an action may remain intact even when the efficient agent is destroyed. There cannot be any rasa unless there is also the vibhāva and the anubhāva. The vibhāvas, etc., cannot also be regarded as a communicative agent, for a communicative agent pre-supposes the existence of the thing to be communicated, but the rasa does not exist before. It can be lived through only when it is suggested by the vibhāvas and the rasa has no other existence than being lived through and enjoyed. For, it should be remembered that the dominant emotions existing in the subconscious strata of the person are not themselves rasas. They acquired that designation only when they are aesthetically presentable and enjoyable. Bhaṭṭa Lollāṭa cannot also explain the method as to how the rasa produced in the player can infect the audience.

It is not the place here to enter into all the niceties of discussion into which the various exponents of the rasa theory
entered, such as Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, Sri Śaṃkuka, Bhaṭṭatauta, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and Abhinava himself.\footnote{For a more elaborate treatment of the subject, see the author’s Kāya-videśa.}

Sri Śaṃkuka introduced the similitude of painting to explain the enlightenment of aesthetic emotion. He said that just as of a painted horse it can be said that it is not a horse and that it is a horse, so of an aesthetic experience we can say that it is both real and unreal. Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka said that rasa is neither produced nor suggested, nor created by anything. He held that a proper aesthetic creation has the peculiar function of generating in us a new spiritual creation and we have in us a special function by which we can enjoy it. These two functions are called by him bhāvakatva and bhojakatva. The enlightenment of rasa is not the subject of ordinary psychology but of aesthetic psychology. For the presentation of the spiritual situation throbbing with exhilaration we are bound to admit two different functions, bhāvakatva and bhojakatva, without which the aesthetic experience cannot be explained. Abhinava, however, has combated the view with all the force that he can command. Abhinava is unwilling to admit these two extraordinary functions. Abhinava holds that in the case of a truly poetic composition, after having grasped the full significance of the words and their meanings, there is a mental intuition as a result of which the actual, temporal and spatial character of the situation is withdrawn from the mental field and the emotion suggested therein loses its individual character and also becomes dissociated from such conditions as might have led us to any motivation. The emotion is apprehended and intuited in a purely universal character and in consequence thereof the ordinary pathological symptoms of emotion lose their significance and through all the different emotions bereft of their pathological characters we have one enjoyment of joy. It is for this reason that in the experience of a tragedy we find as much enjoyment as in that of a comedy, for the experience of a grief would have
been unpalatable if it was associated with its pathological consequences. These pathological consequences are always due to a sense of self-struggle, self-motivation, loss, and the like. But in the intuition of the rasa we live through the experience of a pure sentiment bereft of all its local characters.

In the subconscious and unconscious regions there are always lying dormant various types of emotio-motive complexes. When through artistic creation a purely universal emotional fear, amour, etc., are projected in the mind they become affiliated to those types of emotio-motive complexes and this mutual affiliation or apperception or implicit recognition of identity immediately transforms the presented artistic universal into artistic joy or rasa. It is for this reason that in the rousing of artistic joy there is a kinship and identity among all art-enjoyers.

Here we find that the universalization of poetic art is of two kinds. First of all, the aesthetic composition by nature of its special suggestive force presents before our minds an aesthetic situation and an emotion that is devoid of all its local character. Secondly, the expression of this artistic enlightenment has a universal character in its manifestation in different minds. In the next stage this presented whole becomes commingled with various types of subconscious and unconscious feelings or emotio-motive complexes which are lying dormant in the minds of various people. It is easy to see that so far as these latter are concerned they are naturally different in different persons in accordance with the nature and diversity of experience. It is for this reason that the same artistic whole, though it be presented in the same manner in different minds, their artistic apperception of it would be different in accordance with the difference of diverse emotio-motive complexes. But neither in the universal whole presented to the mind nor in the motive complexes do we find any trace of any local character or colouration that are associated with the ego or the self in its practical commerce with the real objective world around it. It is therefore called transcendental, i.e., alaukika, and its other name is

camatkāra. The word camatkāra is in reality used in three different senses. It is sometimes used to denote the special aesthetic attitude of the mind produced by the comingling of the universal artistic situation and the stirred up emotio-motive complexes. It also means the aesthetic pleasure arising out of it; and thirdly, the bodily manifestation of such an enjoyment. In addition to this, it is also used to denote that special mental function by which the whole thing is enjoyed.

It will again be out of place for us to enter into the various problems of rasa over which we have the accounts of the most recondite discussion.¹

The view of rasa expressed by Abhinava had been accepted in later times as the almost unchallengeable gospel truth and as the last analysis of the aesthetic phenomenon as propagated through literature. Kṣemendra, however, in his Aucitya-vicāra-carccā tried to find the secret of poetry in propriety. But as many other Alaṅkāra writers have pointed out, the secret of the production of propriety is again nothing but the production of rasa. As rasa is the soul of poetry, many prominent later writers, like Viśvanātha and others, have regarded doṣa, guṇa and alaṅkāra as belonging to the rasa. The guṇa and the doṣa belong permanently to the structure of the composition, whereas the alaṅkāras are additional charms. Jagannātha is disposed to take a more metaphysical view of the situation and thinks that the essence of rasa consists in pure consciousness as conditioned by the aesthetic situation and content. Jagannātha also gives us various definitions of rasa, mostly of a metaphysical character from the standpoint of different systems of philosophy.

DHVANI

We have indicated before that words have a two-fold function primary (abhidhā) and indicatory (lakṣāna). In most cases

¹ See the author’s Kāya-vicāra.
wherever there is an indicative sense there is also reflected and suggested sense. It is generally for giving scope to the reflected or suggested purport that a word is used in an indicative sense instead of its primary sense. Thus instead of saying "The holy man lives on the side of the Ganges," one may say "The holy man lives on the very stream of the Ganges". The latter proposition being physically impossible, has the same purport as the first proposition. But yet the phraseology was so chosen in the second proposition that this meaning could be arrived at only by indirect indication. The reason for this was that the latter expression naturally suggests that the holy man lives so near the Ganges that he draws all its advantages. This suggested sense which arises separately, as it were, when the first two functions had ceased to operate, is called dhvani. The idea of dhvani has been drawn from the theory of sphota of the grammarians. Bhārtṛhari in his Vākyapadīya as well as later grammatical writers have elaborately maintained this view. It involves many obscure philosophical discussions which are out of place in the present context. But the general upshot of the theory is that the words and propositions in particular contexts and with reference to particular speakers and audience under particular circumstances and situations, may induce rasa or suggest important truths or ideas or alamkāras. Dhvanikāra says that from early times people had regarded dhvani or implicative suggestion as essence of poetry. But there have been some who held that there is no necessity of admitting dhvani and that the purpose of dhvani could be served by the extension of the primary sense as in the case of lakṣapā. There are others again who hold that apart from words, their meanings and alamkāras, there is nothing else that raises the beauty of literature, or that whatever heightens the beauty of literature must have to be regarded either as guṇa or alamkāra, that words and their meanings form the core of kāyya and that none of them could be regarded as dhvani. It is for refuting the views of such people that Dhvanikāra
undertook his work. It is thus evident that long before Dhvānī-kāra there had been thinkers of the alamkāra school some of whom not only admitted dhvani as a separate function of words and propositions but have been extremely enthusiastic over it, while there have been others who denied the existence of dhvani as a separate function.

Udbhāta had said that the abhidhā function of words is twofold, primary and subordinate. Vāmana had admitted laksanā and called it vakrokti. Thus opinions differ not only about the existence of dhvani but also about its nature and function. But in spite of this difference of opinion people have always marked that there was some secret in the compositions of great poets which makes them charming, and Abhinava remarks that those who by constant association with literature can make their mind like a mirror, are the persons who can be called sahādaya or men of taste. It is they who can feel at once that dhvani is the essence of poetry. Ānandavardhana further says that just as the loveliness of women is something over and above their limbs so in the words of great poets we find an exquisite charm which is over and above the words and their meanings, and this is dhvani. The rasa, of which so much has been spoken, is also communicated by the dhvani. But what is dhvani? Let us take an example:

Holy father, go thou fearless thine way,
The dog that barked at thee lies dead quite near the bay
Mauled by the lion that on the banks of the Godā does rove
And loves to poiter in that shady grove.

1 kāṇḍyāvatā dhvānir iti budhair yah samānānā-pūrvas
tasyābhāva jagadur apare bhāktam ahūsthānaye
kecid vāca sthitam avaiṣya tattvam ātman tadīya
tena brāhmaḥ sahādaya-manahprātiṣṭaye tat-svārthāṃ.

Thus, Manoratha, the poet, who has been already referred to spoke of the newfangled admirers of dhvani in the following terms:

yasmin nāsti vastu kīkana manah-rahidāhi sālamaḥ-kriṣṭir
vyutpānair roṣita ca naiva vacanair vakrokti sānaya ca yat
kārṇa tad dhvāmānā samanvītaṃ pristā pradeśamḥ sajña
no vidmaḥbhidдвāti kīṣa naḥmaninā prajñāḥ svārthāṃ dhvaneḥ.

2 yogin kāṇḍyāvatālo dhvāsa-vidāñca sālātike manah-mahatvam varjanvyayanmaṇi-
śavane-rājęte te hṛdaya-cānāda-bhājāḥ sahādayāḥ.
A lady had a place of assignment in a particular flowery grove, but a religious man used to disturb the solitude of the grove and despoiled it of its beautiful flowers. The lady in order to frighten the holy man started a cock-and-bull story that a lion was seen in the grove and that it had killed a dog. But the lady addresses the holy man in quite a different manner. Her idea comes to this: A lion is loitering about in the grove and you may now walk about the place just as you please. Her words are, "go thou fearless thine way". The words, "go thou fearless thine way" is finished by signifying that the man may walk as he pleases. The primary meaning has not been barred by the context and therefore there cannot be any indicatory meaning (laksanā) by the extension of the primary. Yet we understand from the sentence very clearly that the holy man had been very politely warned. This significant suggestion comes only by the implication of dhvani, for this meaning is completely different from the primary meaning. Bhāṭṭa Nāyaka holds that it is a suggestion of fear by the introduction of lion that may be regarded as desisting the holy man from walking by that path. To this Abhinava's reply is that the warning becomes apparent only when the whole situation is taken into consideration and as such it is the suggestive sense of the whole context. And even if there has been any suggestion of fear that also would be possible only through implication. Abhinava gives another example:

Mother-in-law in deep slumber sleeping here,
While I lie quite on this side, dear,
Mark out cops in daylight clear,
Don't by chance come of me too near.

This is spoken by a spoilt lady who lived alone with her mother-in-law, who snored deeply in the night and the lady in showing their mutual positions of their sleeping places and in warning the guest not to come too near her bed is actually
inviting him to come to her bed in the night, for the mother-in-law would be sleeping like a stick. Here the negative meaning suggests the positive meaning.

In the case of the manifestation of rasa also Abhinaya said that it is the delineation of the exciting scenery and the circumstances as well as the various passing feelings and their expressions that jointly suggest to our minds by the process of dhvani an aesthetic situation which later on develops into rasa. By the suggestive process of dhvani one can indicate rasa through any particular suggestion, warning, admonition or the like, or an alamkāra. It is needless for me to enter into these scholastic discussions by the opponents of dhvani like Mahima Bhaṭṭa, who wanted to show that all cases of dhvani are but cases of inference, or Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and others, who wanted to include it within lakṣanā. It may, however, be pointed out in this connection that just as in the sphota theory it is supposed that the words and propositions as a whole conjointly signify a particular meaning, so it is held by the upholders of dhvani, like Ānandavardhana and Abhinava and others, that a whole situation, a context, the speakers, the words and their meanings, all may jointly co-operate to produce a suggestion. The consideration of the context and the situation is the most important condition of dhvani. Thus, in a story in the Mahābhārata when a baby was brought to the cremation ground, the jackal gives a speech that the attendants should sorrow over the death of the baby and wait till dusk, for by some good chance the baby may come to life. The vulture delivers a counter-speech that there is no use in further delay, weeping over the dead child, for no one who comes to the cremation ground ever revives. Both of them have cogent reasons on their side, but the real motive of their speech becomes obvious when we remember that if the baby is protected till nightfall, the vulture would have no share in the carcass, and the jackal would have to contend over the mastery of the carcass with the vulture, if the carcass is not protected till dark. So all their reasons emanate from their greedy look at the carcass.
They are like two European diplomats, and all the meaning and import of high-sounding moral speeches become apparent as soon as we can catch the suggestion of the real motive.

The upholders of the *dhvani* further urge that a piece of composition should not only contain implications or implied suggestions but it is when these suggestions are more beautiful and charming than the primary sense or when the suggestive meaning is the only meaning intended, then we can call a piece of composition a good piece of kāvyā. When the suggestive sense is weaker than the ordinary sense or is less charming, the *dhvani* becomes weaker, and this type of kāvyā is called *gunibhūta-vyaṅga*.

Anandavardhana divides *dhvani* into two classes: (i) *avivakṣita-vācyā*, i.e., where the primary sense has to be absolutely ignored; (ii) the other type is *vivakṣitānyapara-vācyā*, i.e., where the primary sense remains in force but along with it a superior suggestive sense flashes out. The first class, namely, the *avivakṣita-vācyā*, can again be divided into two classes: (a) *arthaṅtara-sāṃkramita* and (b) *atyanta-tīraskṛta*. The *arthaṅtara-sāṃkramita* is that where the implication modifies the primary sense, whereas *atyanta-tīraskṛta* is that where the implied sense entirely reverses the primary sense. Thus, in speaking to one’s mortal enemy one says: “What immeasurable benefits have thou conferred on me; what debts of magnanimity do I owe to thee. Behaving in the same manner, oh my friend, may you live a hundred years more”. Here the implied suggestion is that for all the ill treatments he had received from the enemy he curses the latter. Here the implied sense completely reverses the primary sense. The *vivakṣitānyapara-vācyā dhvani* is again of two kinds: (a) the *lakṣya*, and (b) the *alakṣya*. The *alakṣya-krama-dhvani* is that where the process of suggestion is so quick that it cannot be apprehended. It is only in the case of the implication of the *rasa* that this *dhvani* occurs. The *lakṣya-krama-dhvani* is that where the process of the implied suggestion can be recognised.
The limits of my subject preclude me from entering into many interesting discussions on the nature of dhvani and the conflict of opinions, which forms a very interesting chapter on the study of the development of our aesthetic traditions. But on the whole it may be said that the dhvani theory came to stay in the field of Indian poetics, and no further notable progress has been made upon it through the centuries that have passed away.