CHAPTER XIV

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SHIVAJI'S RELATIONS WITH THE ENGLISH AND THE PORTUGUESE

§1. Shivaji's first encounter with the English, 1660.

Early in January 1660, Shivaji's general Doroji seized the port of Rājāpur, in pursuit of three junk of Afzal Khan in which Afzal's agent at Dābhol had fled there with his own and his master's property, on the capture of Dābhol port by the Marāthas. From this incident arose the first collision between the English and the Marāthas, but its real cause was not any hindrance offered by Shivaji to the legitimate trade of the East India Company or its servants. It was solely due to the greed and crooked dealings of Mr. Henry Revington, the Chief of the Company's Rajapur factory. An Indian broker employed by him had lent some money to Rustam-i-Zamān and taken a bill for it, falsely in the Company's name as creditor. When Rustam's governor of Rājāpur was trying to run away from the invaders in one of the Dābhol junk, the broker influenced Mr. Revington to assist him in getting his money back. Mr. Revington sent an English ship, the Diamond, to stop the junk occupied by the governor and make him pay what he falsely represented as "monies due to the Company." A part of the amount was immediately paid in goods. But just then Shivaji's horsemen appeared on the bank to seize the junk of Afzal Khan and called upon the English to give up the
one in which the governor was. The English declined, and
the governor gladly seized this device for escaping capture
by the Marāthas and urged the English “to take possession
of two of these junks and own them.” Mr. Revington took
one of the vessels over, renamed it the Rajapur Merchant,
and placed it under an English captain.

In a parley with Doroji, the Marātha general, the Eng-
lish refused to give up the goods in the junk unless he gave
them an order on the revenue of the town for the money
claimed by them. The largest junk, which had not been
taken over by the English, weighed anchor and fell down
the creek to beyond the range of the Marātha guns, after
firing on Shivā's men on both banks. At this disappoint-
ment, the Marāthas seized the English broker Bālji at Jaitā-
pur (at the mouth of the creek, 11 miles west of Rājāpur),
on the ground that “the English would not take the junk
for them, but let her go.” (F. R. Surat, Vol. 85.)

Mr. Philip Gyffard was sent to the Marātha camp to
demand the release of the broker, but they seized him too,
and carried away the two prisoners to Khārēpātan fort that
night, threatening to detain them unless the English cap-
tured the junks for the Marāthas and delivered to them the
goods they had taken on the governor's junk (18th January
1660.)

On 13th February, Revington wrote a letter to Shivaji
promising him the friendly help of the English in an attack
on Dandā-Rājpuri, and soliciting an order for the release
of the two captives as they had been seized only because the
English “would not take the junks lying in Rājāpur river
and be enemies to those who are our friends.” But before
this the broker had already appealed to Shivaji and Rustam-
i-Zamān, and orders had come from them for the release of
the two captives. Bālji was immediately set free, “but
Mr. Gyffard was kept by a rogue Brāhman in Khārēpātan
castle, out of the lure and expectation of a bribe.” Mr. Revington protested against it to Shivā and Rustam.
(Rajapur to Surat, 15 February 1660.)
Before any reply could come from Shivaji, Mr. Revington, learning that the Maratha governor of Khārēpatai was sending Mr. Gyffard away to Sātavli (9 miles north-west of Rājāpur) or to Khelnā fort, despatched a party of 30 soldiers, who waylayed the Maratha escort in a town 10 miles from Rājāpur and rescued Mr. Gyffard by force. (Ibid, 23 February, 1660.)

§2. English factors of Rājāpur prisoners of Shivaji, 1661-1663.

The second Maratha attack on the English took place at the beginning of March next year, and here again the Englishmen were clearly in the wrong, though the Company’s official attitude was correct and neutral.

In 1660, while Siddi Jauhar, acting on behalf of the Bijapur Government, was investing Shivaji in Panhālā fort, the English factors of Rājāpur supplied him with some grenades “which (the vendors promised) undoubtedly will be the chiefest disturbers of the besieged.” Some Englishmen of Rājāpur were also bribed to go to the Bijapuri camp outside Panhālā and help in the bombardment of the fort, by “tossing balls with a flag that was known to be the English’s.” (Ch. 4 §2.)

Shivaji punished this act of hostility about 3rd March 1661, when he surprised Rājāpur, plundered the English factory, and carried off four of the factors,—Henry Revington, Richard Taylor, Randolph Taylor, and Philip Gyffard,—as prisoners.

A graphic account of this second sack of Rājāpur is given by the Dutch Chief at Vingurlā: “Shivaji sent 1,000 horse and about 3,000 foot soldiers to take possession of Rājāpur. This force, on reaching the town, invited the principal inhabitants to come out and escort it in, according to custom, promising to do no harm. These simple men, suspecting no evil, went to the place of meeting, accompanied by the English President Revington, with two or
three other Englishmen, who thought it well to pay this
mark of respect. They were all immediately seized and
their property confiscated, after tortures had been inflicted.
Revington and those who accompanied him were placed in
one of Shivaji's fortresses. . . . The factory was entirely
stripped, even the floor being dug up in search of hidden
treasure. The robbers also plundered many foreign
merchants, who yearly bring goods to Rājāpur from Persia
and Musqat.*

While the English prisoners were still at Rājāpur, the
Brāhman agent of Shivaji told them that his master would
give them a fine salt port (mit bandar) on the coast, if they
helped him in taking Dandā-Rājpuri; but they declined to
"discourse about it" unless he set them free. Then Shivaji
laid a ransom on the captives, and sent them to Waisati fort.
Many other persons—Hindu merchants (banians), Indian
Muslims, Persians and Arabs—were kept there in his prison
in a miserable plight and beaten to extort ransom.

The Englishmen steadily refused to pay any ransom
and tried to secure their liberty by feigned negotiations for
helping the Marāthas with English ships in capturing
Dandā-Rājpuri, but taking care to impose such terms as
always left the English "a hole to creep out of their obliga-
tion" after recovering liberty. Then they tried the effect
of threat by saying that if they were not released their
countrymen at Surat would grant Aurangzib's desire by
transporting a Mughal army into the Deccan [i.e., the

* Batavia Dagh-Register, 1661, p. 215, quoted in Foster, xi. 4-5. The
date given is "about the middle of March" [New style], which was
equivalent to "about the 5th of March" in the Old style followed in this
book. The English report has been lost.

The Dutch statement, that "the Englishmen who had remained behind
in Rajapur were likewise imprisoned and one died under torture," was
based on false rumour, as only three factors besides Revington were carried
off into captivity, and the factor who died at Rajapur, evidently Richard
Napier, had been reported on the 16th February before as "dangerously
ill and not expected to live" (F. R., Rajapur to Company.)
Rāoji Pandit had been sent by Shivaji to take charge of all the prisoners in Songarh and "do with them as he thought fit." The four Englishmen were well-treated. But their captivity was prolonged past endurance. To the demand for ransom they replied that they could pay nothing, having lost their all in the sack of Rājāpur. Shivaji's absence on a projected expedition for recovering Kaliān (June, 1661) also delayed the progress of the negotiations about an alliance with the English against the Siddis. The "disconsolate prisoners in Rāigarh," after a year's confinement, lost their temper and wrote in disrespectful and abusive terms to the President and Council at Surat, charging the latter with making no exertion for their release. The reply of the Surat Council written on 10th March 1662, was a stern but well-merited rebuke: "How you came in prison you know very well. 'Twas not for defending the Company's goods, 'twas for going to the siege of Panhālā and tossing balls with a flag that was known to be the English's. None but what [is] rehearsed is the cause of your imprisonment".*

It seems that the four Englishmen made an attempt to escape from Songarh, but were caught and sent off to Rāigarh to be kept in "closer confinement." Towards the middle of 1662, when their captivity had lasted a year and a half, the Council at Surat, finding all appeals to Shivaji and his suzerain fruitless, commissioned some of the English ships to make reprisals by capturing on the high seas Deccani vessels, whether belonging to the king of Bijapur or Shivaji or any merchants of the country, especially the one bringing the Dowager Queen Barī Sāhibā back from Mecca. They hoped that such a success would compel the Bijapur Government to put pressure on Shivaji to release the Englishmen. But no good prize offered itself to the English privateers. The Surat Council also influenced the Mughal governor of Surat to write to Shāista Khan, who was

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* *Ibid*, also Surat to the Prisoners in Rairi castle, 10 March, 1662, *F. R.* Surat, Vol. 85.
then reported to be pressing Shivaji hard (about November 1662), to importune him to move for their release.*

On 3rd February, 1663, the Council commissioned the captain of H. M. S. Convertite to capture two vessels of considerable burden which Shivaji was fitting out at Jaitāpur for Mochā and loading with "such goods as were driven by storms upon his coast, which was of considerable value." But such a step became unnecessary, as Rāoji Pandit, the Marātha governor of Rājāpur, sent for the four captives from Rāigarh and set them free (about 5th February) with a solemn assurance from Shivaji that the English would enjoy his protection in future. The Council at Surat say that they "had desisted from calling that perfidious rebel Shivaji to an account, because they had not either conveniency of force or time." They were still resolved to avenge the wrong done to their masters' property and the sufferings of their "loving brethren," but sadly realized that "as yet we are altogether uncapable for want of shipping and men necessary for such an enterprise, wherefore patience."†

Therefore, instead of resorting to force, they began negotiations with Shivaji for compensation for the loss done to their factory at Rājāpur. These were protracted for many years till the hearts of the Englishmen grew sick. Even when Shivaji agreed as to the amount of the damages and admitted his liability for it, the actual payment was repeatedly put off and never fully carried out. With the help of the Factory records preserved in the India Office, London, we can clearly trace the history of these negotiations through their successive stages,—the alternate hopes and disappointments of the English, their diverse tactics, their series of embassies, and their final conviction, at the close of Shivaji's life, that

they would get nothing at all from him. The records of this long-drawn diplomatic intercourse afford striking examples of the perseverance and patience of the English traders, though one is apt to smile when he reads how they held diametrically opposite views of Shivaji's character and feelings at different stages of the negotiations, as they hoped for or despaired of a settlement of their claims. Our psychology is naturally coloured by our emotions.

Shivaji's encounter with the English during his two raids on Surat (in 1664 and 1670) and the dispute between them in connection with his fortification of the Khanderi island have been dealt with in earlier chapters.

§3. Negotiations for Rājāpur factory damages.

The policy of the English traders is thus clearly set forth in a letter from the Deputy Governor and Council of Bombay to the President and Council of Surat, dated 25th November, 1668:

"According to your commands, we shall at convenient time enorder such as we employ to treat Shivaji's servants civilly wherever they meet them, but not to enter into any contract with them, letting them know the great damage the Hon'ble Company hath suffered and the abuses offered to our people on several occasions, for which we expect satisfaction and reparation before we enter into any league with their master,—all of which, we suppose, will come to his ears by one or more of his servants, though we are not of opinion that ever he will be brought to a peaceable treaty till he be forced to it." (F. R. Surat, Vol. 105.)

In another letter, dated 17th March, 1669, the Bombay Council write, "Shivaji Rajah having by his servants requested a favour of no great import, not exceeding Rs. 300 ... we ... having much occasion for a good correspondence with his people on the main [-land] from whence most of provisions come hither, and wood [i.e., fuel] in special,
(which is not to be had otherwhere), we were the more ready to gratify Shivaji Rajah." (Ibid.)

On 5th March, 1670, the Surat Council instruct Bombay thus: "The war broke out between Shivaji and the Mughal hath put a check to some overtures which were made to the President of an accommodation with Shivaji touching the Company's demands on him; but we hope they will yet go forward, . . . but we would not have you appear too forward lest you undervalue our pretence [=lawful claim] and make him cool." (F. R. Surat, Vol. 3.)

In October Shivaji tried to put the English of Bombay in distress, evidently because they refused to sell him warmaterial (esp. lead) for his contest with the Siddi of Dandā-Rājpuri. Bombay writes to Surat on 14th October, 1670: "A few days since we, as usually, sent our boats to the main [-land] for wood to burn our chunam with; but . . . our boats returned empty, being forbid by Shivaji's people to cut any more wood in those parts." On 12th August 1671 Bombay writes to Surat, "The Deputy Governor [of Bombay] received an answer from Shivaji, . . . by which your Honour, etc., will see how he slighted our friendship." (F. R. Surat, 105.)

But in September 1671 Shivaji sent an ambassador to Bombay to treat with the English. His chief motive was to secure English aid against Dandā-Rājpuri, especially a supply of "grenadoes, mortar-pieces and ammunition." The Bombay Council immediately realized that unless he obtained these war-materials he "would not pay a penny" of compensation for the loot of their factory at Rājapur. The President of Surat sent the following instructions to the factors at Bombay: "Let him know that if he gives us such encouragement that we settle in his port, he may obtain from us those advantages that other nations do in whose ports we trade. But we would not positively have them [the English representatives in these negotiations] promise him those grenadoes, mortar-pieces and ammunition he desires, nor absolutely deny him, in regard we do not think it con-
venient to help him against Dandā-Rājpuri, which place, if it were in his possession, would prove a great annoyance to the port of Bombay; and on the other side, our denial is not consistent at present with our interest, in respect we believe the keeping in suspense will bring him to a speedier conclusion of the treaty, hoping thereby to be furnished with those things he desires.” (F. R. Surat, 87.)

The negotiations, as might have been expected from the diverse aims of the two parties, could not possibly end in an agreement. They were protracted till December, when Shivaji was out on his forays and “now not easily to be found or treated with.” The English proposed to send Lieut. Stephen Ustick to treat directly with him. This envoy was directed to “set out in a handsome equipage belitting the Company’s honour,” with Rām Shenvi, the Company’s interpreter. (F. R. Surat, 106 and 87.)

As early as the end of November, the Council of Surat gave up all hope of a settlement. They wrote to Bombay (30th November, 1671), “Rām Shenvi hath private [-ly] discoursed with us [as to] what Shivaji proposes to us by way of accommodation and what he demands from us in order to the supply of his wars against Dandā-Rājpuri, in both which we find so much subtility, self-policy and unsecure inconstancy on his part, and so great difficulties and apparent hazard on the Company’s to deal with him on these terms, that we begin to despair of bringing the business to any issue in the way it is now carried. . . . We do confirm our former resolution that till the matter of satisfaction for the Company’s and nation’s former losses be first determined, we cannot with honour or safety concede to any thing which he proposeth.”

The instructions to Lieut. Ustick were “that he endeavour to end the dispute touching satisfaction of past damages . . . , as also to procure his [i.e., Shivaji’s] general qaul or farman for us to trade with freedom and security in all the ports of his country and inland cities whatsoever, paying 2 per cent. custom.” (F. R. Surat, 87.)
The Marātha envoy had brought with himself to Bombay Rs. 6,000 worth of the cloth looted at Surat in October 1670, consisting of kātanis, rumāls, etc., and asked the English to buy them; but “they being not commodities proper for the Hon’ble Company to deal in” the factors refused to buy them. But as Shivaji had presumably no ready money to spare, the English were prepared to accept these goods in part payment of “what shall be agreed on to be due for satisfaction of our former losses, provided that the commodities were not over-rated, but cheap and good in their kind.” A compromise was, however, made with the Marātha ambassador; the English lent him Rs. 1,500 upon his goods payable at two months’ time. Lieut. Ustick was to have set out on his embassy on 15th January, 1672, but was detained at Bombay by a message from Shivaji saying that he was then too busy opposing the Mughal generals in Punā and Baglānā to receive the envoy. (F. R. Surat, 87 and 106.)


At last Lieut. Ustick was sent on his mission on 10th March, 1672, and came back on 13th May, with failure. “He, after a long and tedious attendance, had half an hour’s discourse with him (Shivaji) and his Brahmins to little effect, but at last [Shivaji] proffered 5,000 pagodas towards our losses, and promiseth, if your Honour will please to settle a factory at Rājāpur, to show all kindness and civility imaginable to the said factory.” (F. R. Surat, 106, 13 March and 14 May, 1672.)

The negotiations broke down on the question of the amount of the indemnity. A Bombay letter to the Company, dated 21st December, 1672, states, “We demanded one hundred thousand Rupees, they offered 20,000, declaring that Shivaji never made more advantage by what was robbed of the English; . . . . that what was taken in the chests, trunks and warehouses of particular men (i.e., European
private traders), it may be was plundered by his soldiers, but he never had anything thereof, and therefore would not satisfy for it; but what (booty) was received and entered into his books he was willing to restore and make satisfaction for. . . . . While these things were transacting, Shivaji was engaged in a great design against the Koli country, whereupon the (Brāhman) minister appointed to treat (with Mr. Ustick) being called away, Mr. Ustick also returned to Bombay.” But the English factors deliberately held back from pressing the negotiations to a close. As they write, “We have a hard and ticklish game to play, for the King (Aurangzib) being highly enraged against Shivaji, should he understand that we . . . . hold any correspondence with him, it might probably cause him to order some disturbance to be given to your general affairs, not only in these parts but in Bengal also. On the other hand, we are forced to keep fair with Shivaji also, because from his countries we are supplied with provisions, timber and firewood, and likewise your inhabitants of Bombay drive a good trade into the main [-land], which would be a great prejudice to your island if it were obstructed. On these considerations we judge it your interest to suspend the treaty at present. . . . We shall have great difficulty to recover anything for those gentlemen (i.e., private traders) who suffered particularly in that loss at Rājāpur, for Shivaji . . . . by the merchants of Rājāpur hath understood what did belong to the Company and what to particular men; the latter he disowns totally. . . . Had it not been for our standing on some satisfaction for them, we had ended the dispute before now.” (O. C. 3722.)

§5. Embassy of Thomas Nicolls, 1673.

Between May and December 1672 two envoys were sent by Shivaji to the English factors at Bombay. In February 1673, a third envoy, Pilaji, came from Shivaji, but was dismissed without effecting anything. In May the
Bombay Council resolved "to send Mr. Thomas Nicolls with a Banian broker to make a final demand of the damage done us at Rājāpur, and now lately by his forces in Hubli."*

On 19th May, Nicolls left Bombay with 37 persons in all for Rairi castle, which he was permitted to ascend on the 23rd. He interviewed Shambhuji on the 24th as Shivaji was absent on a pilgrimage. On 2nd June Shivaji returned to the castle, and next day Nicolls was received in audience. The Rajah took the English envoy by the hand and showed him where he should sit, which was on the left hand near one of his side-pillows, and then asked him his business. But in spite of the kindness of his manners, Shivaji did nothing to settle the dispute and on the 6th dismissed Nicolls, saying, "He would send on an answer to the President by one of his own people named Bhimāji Pandit, a day or two after me." So Nicolls returned to Bombay (17th June) without achieving anything. (Nicolls' diary in O. C. 3787.)

Soon afterwards Bhimāji arrived at Bombay (21st) and after some discussions left with Nārāyan Shenvi (the interpreter of the English) to represent matters to his master. Late in September the two returned to Bombay with the following letter:—

From Shivaji Rajah to the Hon'ble Gerald Aungier, Governor of Bombay: "I received your Honour's letter by Bhimāji Pandit and Nārāyan Shenvi, who manifested the good correspondence that your Honour doth use with me; likewise they treated with me about the business of Rājāpur which I have answered and do send them again to treat with your Honour, my desire being only to keep the same correspondence which your Honour doth with me. I shall not say more but desire you that there may be no difference in our friendship, for I am very well acquainted of your Honour's prudence. I sent your Honour a present, which I desire you to accept of." (O. C. 3952.)

* The latter amounted to 7,894 pagodas, or £3,500. (F. R. Surat, Vol. 3 Surat Consult., 24 May, 1673.)
A Committee of the Bombay Council was appointed to meet on 1st October and receive Shivaji's objections to the Company's demands. On 3rd October the Marātha envoy offered 7,000 pagodas, which was refused. Later he increased it to 10,025 pagodas, to be allowed in custom duties, etc. (O. C. 3758; F. R. Surat, Vol. 106, Bombay to Surat, 29 September, 1673.)

The Surat Council agreed with Bombay "to accept so small a sum as eight to ten thousand pagodas, which is not the quarter part the damage the nation sustained in Rājāpur;" of this amount 8,000 pagodas were to be paid in money or goods, and the balance in the form of exemption from all custom duties at the port of Rājāpur for five or at least three years. (F. R. Surat, Vol. 3, letter 10 July 1673.)

The repeated evasions of Shivaji at last thoroughly dis- gusted the English merchants. As the Surat Council records (19 July, 1673), "Seeing there is no probability of security from such a heathen, who, while we are in treaty with him for satisfaction for our losses at Rājāpur, gives orders for the robbing our factory at Hubli, we can think of no better way to recover the Hon'ble Company and nation's right than by taking what vessels belong to his ports." A little earlier, on 21th May, they had concluded, "It is absolutely necessary to break with him, but not at this time when we have war with the Dutch." But by 1st October an amicable settlement was in sight, "Shivaji holds a fair understanding with us and we with him, the old difference of Rājāpur being in a manner concluded upon honourable terms, to our advantage and reputation." The hopes of the English ran high; on 23rd October Bombay wrote to Surat, "We are near a conclusion with our neighbour Shivaji for the old wrongs of Rājāpur. . . . The new controversy touching Hubli we have reserved for another time, . . . so that if Shivaji attempts Surat you may be somewhat the safer, though we advice you not to trust him, yet we daresay if he hath a kindness for any nation it is for the English, and we
believe he will not disturb any house where the English flag is."

But the treaty, though fully agreed on between Shivaji's envoy and the English in the third week of October, was not signed and confirmed by Shivaji himself for more than two months afterwards, as he was absent on a long campaign (O. C. 3779, 3870 and 3910.)


The English, therefore, decided to send a formal embassy to Shivaji to conclude the business, especially as his grand coronation was to take place in June 1674. Mr. Henry Oxinden was chosen for the mission, and Narayan Shenvi was sent to Raigarh (arriving there on 24th March), "to prepare business against Mr. Henry Oxinden's arrival to him." (F. R. Surat, Vol. 3, Surat Consult., 16 April, 1674.)

The story of Oxinden's mission to Shivaji, from 13th May to 16th June, is graphically told at great length in his Letters and Memorial or Narrative which also give valuable details about Shivaji's coronation, the course of the negotiations, and the final agreement.

Shivaji held out for some time on the question of restoring to their owners the ships of the English or of the inhabitants of Bombay wrecked on his coast, but on 11th June Niraj Pandit (a minister of Shivaji whom the English had engaged to act as their intermediary with his master) sent word to Oxinden that "the Rajah had granted all our demands and articles, except our money passing current in his country." On the 12th all the ministers (ashta pradhān) signed the treaty, which was formally delivered to Oxinden at Niraj Pandit's house. (F. R. Surat, Vol. 88.)

In November Shivaji's request to buy 50 great ordnance from 40 to 60 cwt. weight and 2 great brass guns, was politely declined by the English as "so public an action as that must needs provoke this king," Aurangzib. (Surat to Bombay, 13 November 1674.)
§7. English traders of Rājāpur interview Shivaji, 1675.

In the terms of the above agreement, the English factory at Rājāpur was re-opened in 1675, with some difficulty, as the following letter from the Rājāpur factors to Surat, dated 6th February 1675, shows:

"It was thought fit to send the broker with the President's letter to Annāji Pandit and the Subahdār, giving them notice of our arrival. Mr. Ward being earnest for our old house, Annāji told him that he should not have it, and that he did not care whether we stayed here or no; if we did not, his master would save 1,000 pagodas by it; and further will have it [that] the house was allowed for in that sum granted us by his master towards satisfaction for our losses. He is not only one of Shivaji's great favourites but Governor-in-Chief of all Konkan, so that we cannot settle on any place but it is under his jurisdiction." (F. R. Surat, 88.)

In March next the factors of Rājāpur had an audience with Shivaji of which a detailed and very interesting report has been preserved.

"The Rajah came on the 22nd [March] about midday, accompanied with abundance of horse and foot and about 150 palankins. So soon as we heard of his near approach, we went out of our tent and very near met him. He ordered his palankin to stand still, called us very near him, seemed very glad to see us and much pleased [that] we came to meet him, and said the sun being hot he would not keep us now, but in the evening he would send for us.

"[23rd March?] The Rajah came. He stopped his palankin and called us to him. When we were pretty near him we made a stop, but he beckoned with his hand till I was up close with him. He diverted himself a little by taking in his hand the locks of my periwig and asked us several questions; at length asked us how we liked Rājāpur and said he was informed we were not well pleased there, but bid us not be in the least dissatisfied for what [had]
passed. He would order things for the future to our full satisfaction, and that we might be sure that . . . no reasonable request we should make to him would he deny us. . . .

"The next morning [25th March] we were sent for again in the Rajah's name. We were admitted into his presence. I was placed so near him on his right hand that I could touch him. With him we continued about two hours, which was most part spent in answering many of his questions. At length we presented him our paper of desires [previously "translated into the country language"], which after had been read to him with a little pause, seriously looking on us, [he] said that it was all granted us. He would give us a farmān for all." But the siege of Phondā, which Shivaji began immediately afterwards, delayed the granting of such a farmān. (F. R. Surat, 88. Rajapur letter of 20 Apr. 1675.)


In September 1675 Mr. Samuel Austen went to Rāigarh on an embassy from Bombay to demand satisfaction for the damage done to the Company's factory at Dharangāon in Khāndesh. This Shivaji refused to pay, saying that the factory was looted by "vagabonds and scouts without order or the knowledge of his general." He, however, "after a strict debate" gave his qayl (assurance of safety) to all the English factories "to prevent like injuries." (O. C. 4106.)

But the Rājāpur damages long continued unpaid. On 19th July 1676 Surat wrote to Bombay suggesting that a "discreet and sober" Englishman with Giridhārās should be sent to dun the Rajah for the money, as Nārāyan Shenvi was dilatory.

On 11th October news was received from Nārāyan Shenvi at the Marātha Court, that Shivaji was willing to satisfy his debt to the Company in "vairats or batty," and the Council agreed to accept them if no better terms could be secured. Six days later the Surat Council in disgust
ordered the Râjâpur factory to be withdrawn, since, "so long
as that pirate and universal robber [Shivaji] lives, that hath
no regard to friend nor foe, God nor man, there can be no
security in any trade in his country." This was only a threat
to Shivaji's ministers, and the factory was dissolved only at
the end of 1682.

Early in 1677 the patience of the English seemed to
have been exhausted. Surat wrote to Bombay on 26th
January 1677, "If Shivaji still continues to baffle you, we
desire you to seize and make prize of some of his vessels
belonging to Dâbhol, Chaul or Kaliân or any other of his
ports, letting the men have their liberty and taking care
that none of the goods be embezzled or made away, for this
will be the only way to make him rightly understand
himself." The threat, however, was not carried out. The
people of Bombay were entirely dependent on Shivaji's
territory on the mainland for their fuel, timber, fresh provi-
sions, and cattle, and he could also have effectually stopped
the passage of their export merchandise across the Konkan
and Kanârâ coast-strip, the whole of which was now in his
hands. He, on his part, depended on Bombay for salt and
European manufactures.*

In January 1678, as we learn from a Surat letter, "for
Shivaji's former debt, they [i.e., the Râjâpur factors] are
forced to take betel-nuts as Shivaji's ministers will rate it
at." But even thus the indemnity was not paid. The Surat
Council, in April, May and July, express their indignation
at the deceitful fair promises of Shivaji's ministers and that
Rajah's evasion of the demands made upon him, and decide
to withdraw the factories at Kârwâr, Hubli and Râjâpur,
if matters did not improve. On 18th March 1680 Bombay
writes to Surat, "We are very glad the management of the
business with Shivaji is to your liking. He hath confirmed
all . . . A hundred khândi of betel-nut is sent us on account
of our demand for satisfaction of the two vessels lost." On

* F. R. Surat 89. At the marriage of Rajaram (15 March, 1680), he
ordered 2,000 wax-candles from Bombay. (Peshwâ's Daftar.)
the 4th April following, the Rajah died. (F. R. Surat, 89 and 108.)

Shivaji never paid the promised indemnity in full as long as he lived, and the Rājāpur factory was closed in Shambhuji's reign, in December 1682 or January 1683. (F. R. Surat, 91.)

In 1684, after Richard Keigwin, the usurping Governor of Bombay, had made a treaty with Shambhuji, the latter wrote to his subahdar of Rājāpur: “Captain Henry Gary and Thomas Wilkins, ambassadors, and Ram Sheñvi, interpreter, on behalf of the English, came to me earnestly desiring peace with me, intimating that my father Shivaji Rajah did contract to pay them 10,000 pagodas Padshahi on account of goods taken from them, of which account 3367 being paid, there remains 6633, requesting me to pay the same. . . . I have promised them to satisfy what remains unpaid of the said 10,000 pagodas.” (To be paid in kind by rebuilding the English factory-house at Rājāpur, and in cocoa-nuts, betel-nuts, &c., by degrees.) (F. R. Surat, 109.)


Portuguese India touched only a fringe of Shivaji's activities and did not influence his policy or history to any appreciable extent. The inadequacy of the small population of Portugal for maintaining a colonial empire, the suppression of the national energy during the sixty years of Spanish domination (1580—1640), the ruinous naval war with Holland (1650—1663), and the rapid moral decline of their settlers in Asia,—all made the Portuguese in India in Shivaji's time a decadent Power, anxious only to hold their own, and timidly averting an armed encounter with every other State by employing friendly appeal, patient endurance and diplomatic evasion. Their territory of Goa was then much smaller than now, as it did not include Phondā, Bicholim, Pernem or Sānquelim. But their Konkan possessions, called the Province of the North, practically
stretched from Chaul to Daman along the coast and for a short distance inland. Out of these, Bombay island was given up to the English in 1662. Immediately east of these lay the dominions of the Mughal and Adil Shah, and the conquest of them by Shivaji made the Marātha power impinge upon the Portuguese territory on the coast. But though there were occasional plunderings and skirmishes between the two, these never led to a regular war, before Shambhuji’s time.

The conflict between Shivaji and the Portuguese arose out of four things, namely,—

(a) The Portuguese claim to dominate the Indian seas and insistence that all Asiatic vessels plying there should take passports from them for a fee. But though they helped the Siddi of Janjirā in his earlier wars with Shivaji, they had no naval war with the Marātha king himself.

(b) The desāis of the south Ratnagiri district on being dispossessed by Shivaji, took refuge in Goa and made it a base of their operations against him, thus violating the neutrality of Portuguese territory.

(c) The interruption of trade from the upland parts to Goa (especially in rice, livestock, &c.) by Shivaji’s officers.

(d) Shivaji’s claim to chauth from the Daman villages which had once been subject to the Koli Rajahs.

But the Portuguese viceroy very wisely avoided war with him and remained strictly neutral during his wars with the Mughals and Bijāpur, though solicited by both sides to help them.

When, in 1659, Shivaji’s first few vessels, built at Bhīwandī, Kaliān and Pen, began to ply the sea, the Portuguese viceroy ordered his deputy at Bassein to hinder their voyage. But with the growth of Shivaji’s power, the Government of Goa found it politic to assume a more friendly attitude towards him. At the end of June 1659, Shivaji wrote to the Viceroy of Goa that owing to differences and disputes between himself and the Siddi of Danda and the other Abyssinians of that port, he had sent a detachment of horse
and foot against the Siddi, and he requested the Portuguese captains of Chaul and Bassein to help his forces with provisions and stop the supply of food stuff to the Abyssinians, as a mark of friendship with him. On this, the Viceroy in Council resolved to write to these captains that they should not openly give any help or show any favour to the Abyssinians of Danda, but secretly do what was possible with every precaution so that others might not know of it in any way whatever and report it to Shivaji!

Lakham Sávant and other desãis of the country immediately north of Goa, had opposed Shivaji's advance at the end of 1664, but they had been signally defeated, deprived of their lands and forced to flee to the Portuguese district of Bárdes, from which they fitted out expeditions for recovering their former possessions. (Ch. 10, §4.) The viceroy's repeated warnings to them to maintain peace had no effect, and at last on 19th November 1667, N. S., Shivaji's forces made a dash into Bárdes in order to punish these desãis. For three days they sacked various villages and carried off a large number (1600) of Portuguese subjects and cattle.* Three Padrés and some Indian Christians were beheaded by them, evidently in retaliation for the abduction and conversion of Shivaji's subjects, especially Brahmans. The viceroy complained to Shivaji against this act of war while he was maintaining amity. He sent (24th Nov. N. S.) Rāmoji Shenvi Kothāri as his envoy to the Marātha king, who replied in friendly terms. Next, Shivaji's agent Sakho Pant came to Goa and a treaty of peace was arranged, (signed by the viceroy on 5th December and sealed by Shivaji on the 11th.) Father Gonsalo Martins,

* A report written by the Franciscan monks in Goa in 1722 states, "In the year 1667, a petty prince named Shivaji of the Hindu race, entered Bárdes (territory) with a large army, for (our) having harboured at the village of Kolwâl in Bárdes, one of his (revolted) desãis named Keshav Naik. They proceeded to search for the said desai at Kolwâl and on the way put to the sword a large number of Christians whom they encountered on the way, ...... to avenge on the Portuguese the shelter given to that desai." [Da Silva Rego, Documentacao, vol. 5.]
S.J., was sent by the viceroy to Shivaji's Court to get the treaty ratified and take delivery of the released captives. It was promised in this treaty that the trade between Portuguese India and Shivaji's territory above the Ghâts would no longer be obstructed by his officers. (Pissurlencar, Antigualhas, I, 1. 120—131. Agentes da Diplomacia.)

But the desâis continued to violate the neutrality of Goa by sallying out to attack Shivaji's men, and the viceroy had to expel them from the Portuguese dominions at the beginning of June 1668.

The treaty of amity and peace with Shivaji was renewed on 10th Feb. 1670, each side agreeing to a restitution of the shipping of the other side detained by it during their recent quarrel. In addition,

(a) the viceroy removed a constant source of friction by extending to Shivaji's ships equality of treatment with Mughal vessels in the matter of granting Portuguese passes on the payment of the customary fee. The small Marâtha coastal traders (especially provision-boats) were not required to take out passes.

(b) The viceroy, who had helped the Siddi during Shivaji's grand attack on Janjirâ in 1669, now offered as a mutual friend to mediate between these two Powers and compose their quarrel. Shivaji's envoy Vittal Pandit had come to Goa to try to win Portuguese support for his master's war.

(c) Shivaji repeated his promise to forbid his officers to harass or overtax the trade between Goa and the country above the Ghâts.

(d) Shivaji agreed not to build any fort or stone-house at any place in his dominions on the Portuguese frontier unless a river separated the two States.

The Rajahs of Râmnagar (of the predatory Koli tribe) had been accustomed from early times to levy an annual blackmail from the Daman district in their neighbourhood. This money was popularly called chauth or one-fourth of the revenue, but in practice the proportion varied from
10 to 25 p. c. in the different villages, and the Rajah was known as the Chauthiā Rajah (Storia do Mogor, ii. 132.) Shivaji after his annexation of Rāmnagar (1676) demanded this payment from the Portuguese as his lawful right in succession to the Koli Rajah. The viceroy of Goa delayed giving a direct answer as long as possible, by every diplomatic device, such as calling for reports from his local officers, examining the old revenue accounts, settling the details about particular villages, &c., while at the same time he professed unbroken friendship with Shivaji and eagerness to give him every satisfaction. The negotiations were thus spun out for over two years. Shivaji's envoy Pitāmbar Shenvi, who had reached Goa in December 1677 on this mission, died next August, and was succeeded by his grandson Jivāji and later by Ganesh Sethi. At last Shivaji's patience was worn out and he threatened war, but his premature death gave the Portuguese a short respite.*

We may here add, that it is the considered opinion of Chevalier Pissurlencar that there was no forcible conversion of Hindus to Christianity in Goa territory in Shivaji's time. The Portuguese persecutions of the Hindus (mostly in the 16th century) are described in Da Cunha's Bassein and Goez. Hindu temples and Muslim mosques were demolished for building churches. But there was no forced conversion of pagans; in famine years the Catholic Fathers used to buy Hindu children from their guardians and make them converts. Particularly Hindu and Muslim orphans were considered as wards of the State, fed and brought up as Christians. When Shivaji demanded the restoration to his hands of any Hindu (particularly Brahman) boy convert,

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* I pass over the abortive negotiations of the Portuguese with the Mughals and with Shivaji from which nothing of consequence resulted. The details are given in P. S. Pissurlencar's careful and fully documented works, Portugueses e Maratas, i. Shivaji, also Antiquathas, I. i. 116-151; 62-71 (Chauth), and A. B. de Braganca Pereira in O Oriente Portugues, Nos. 24 et 25 (1939), on which I have based this section. Several treaties and letters are given in Biker, iv. Also, Pissurlencar, Agentes da Diplomacia (esp. full notes.)
at the prayer of the boy's former guardian, the Portuguese
governor declined on the ground that it was against the
rules of his State to deliver any Christian to a pagan
authority for the purpose of being made a pagan again.
This was the real cause of the friction. [Bomb. Gaz., XIV,
Thana, 32, 349; I. ii. 59.] A Portuguese book, the *Vergel
de Plantas...*, written before 1680, states that "In 1667
there were counted in Bardes, by the favour of the viceroy,
the Conde de S. Vicente, 46,450 Christians converted by
the [Franciscan] Padres of the Province of St. Thomé, and
7,000 Hindus, out of whom 4,000 have been baptised; as for
the remaining 3,000 they are labouring with great zeal for
their conversion with likely hope of success." [Pissurlencar.]
The words "favour of the viceroy" do not mean force but
only the prohibition of the sale of Hindus as slaves to other
than the Christian Fathers, who converted them.
CHAPTER XV

GOVERNMENT, INSTITUTIONS AND POLICY

1. Extent of kingdom and dependencies.
2. Revenue and hoarded treasure.
4. Council of eight ministers.
5. Army organisation.
6. Revenue system and administration.
7. Religious policy.
8. Effect of Shivaji's reign.

§1. Extent of his kingdom and dependencies.

At the time of Shivaji's death his kingdom included all the country (except the Portuguese possessions) stretching from Rāmnagar (modern Dharampur State in the Surat Agency) in the north, to Kārwār or the Gangāvati river in the Bombay district of Kanārā, in the south. The eastern boundary embraced Baglānā in the north, then ran southwards along an irregular shifting line through the middle of the Nāsik and Punā districts, and encircled the whole of the Satārā and much of the Kolhāpur districts. This tract formed what the Marāṭhi documents describe as his swarāj or 'own kingdom' and the Persian accounts as his 'old dominions' (mulk-i-qādim). Here his ownership was recognized as legally established and beyond question. A recent but permanent acquisition was the Western Karnātāk or the Kanārese-speaking country extending from Belgāum to the bank of the Tungabhadrā opposite the Bellār district of the Madras Presidency.

This was the consolidated portion of his kingdom, and it formed three provinces, each under a viceroy. The northern division, including the Dāng and Baglānā, the Koli country south of Surat, Konkan north of Bombay, and the Deccan plateau or Desh southwards to Punā, was governed by Moro Trimbak Pinglé. The southern division,
which was made up of Konkan south of Bombay, Sāvantvādi and the North Kanārā coast,—formed the viceroyalty of Annāji Datto. The south-eastern division, ruled by Dattāji Pant, covered the Satārā and Kolhāpur districts of Desh and the Karnātak districts of Belgāum and Dharwar to Kopal west of the Tungabhadrā. (Sabh. 77; Parasniś MS.; a Persian MS. roll of V. K. Rājwadē; English summary by Māwjee, in J. Bo. Br. R. A. S.)

Shivaji’s latest annexation was the country extending from the Tungabhadrā opposite Kopal to Vellore and Jinji, i.e., the northern, central and eastern parts of the present kingdom of Mysore and portions of the Madras districts of Bellāry, Chittur and Arcot. His two years’ possession of them before his death was too short to enable him to consolidate his gains here, and this province was really held by an army of occupation and remained unsettled in 1680; only the forts garrisoned by him and as much of the surrounding lands as they could command, acknowledged Marātha rule.

Besides these places there was one region where the contest for mastery was still undecided at the time of his death. This was the Kanārā highlands, including the South Dharwar district and the principalities of Sundā and Bednur. Shivaji had inflicted some defeats upon the local Nawāb, a vassal of Bijapur; but Bānkāpur, the provincial capital, was still unconquered by him when he breathed his last. So also was Bednur, which merely paid him tribute.

Outside these settled or half-settled parts of his kingdom, there was a wide and very fluctuating belt of land subject to his power but not owning his sovereignty. It consisted of the adjacent parts of the Mughal empire (Mughlāi in Marāthi), which formed the happy hunting-ground of his horsemen. In these he levied blackmail (khandani, i.e., ransom, in Marāthi), as regularly as his army could repeat its annual visit to them. The money paid was popularly called chauth, because it amounted to one-fourth of the standard assessment of the land revenue.
of a place.* But as this paper assessment was always larger than the actual collection, the real incidence of the chauth was considerably more than one-fourth of what the peasants paid to their legitimate sovereign. The payment of the chauth merely saved a place from the unwelcome presence of the Marātha soldiers and civil underlings, but did not impose on Shivaji any corresponding obligation to guard the district from foreign invasion or internal disorder. The Marāthas looked only to their own gain and not to the fate of their prey after they had left. The chauth was only a means of buying off one robber, and not a subsidiary system for defence against all enemies. The lands subject to the chauth cannot, therefore, be rightly called spheres of influence.

The territory, old and new, under Shivaji contained 240 forts, out of which 111 were built by him and 79 were situated in Madras. [Sabh. 99-102; a helpful list by D. V. Kalé in Shivaji Souvenir, 1927.]

§2. His revenue and hoarded treasure.

His revenue is put by his courtier Sabhāsad at the round figure of one krore of hun, while the chauth when collected in full brought in another 80 lakhs. If these statements are correct, Shivaji's theoretical income at its highest was seven krores of Rupees. The sum actually realized was considerably less than this paper-estimate,—probably sometimes falling as low as one-tenth of it. (Sabh. p. 104; 91 Q.B. 75.)

The treasure and other valuable things left behind by Shivaji are enumerated in great detail by Sabhasad (96-97) and the Tarikh-i-Shivaji (f. 42-44.) But we cannot be sure that all the figures have been correctly copied in the MSS. of these two works that have come down to us. Moreover, the gold and silver coins were of such an immense variety of denominations countries and ages,—a faithful index to

* The best account of the origin of Chauth,—Pissurlencar, Antigualhas, I. i. 62 71.
the wide range and thorough character of Shivaji's looting campaigns,—that it is impossible to reduce the total value of his hoard to any modern currency with even tolerable accuracy. The curious reader is referred to my translation in my *House of Shivaji*, Ch. XI.

§3. **Strength of his army.**

The growth of his army is thus recorded: at the outset of his career he had 1,200 household cavalry (pāgā) and 2,000 *silāhdārs* or mercenary horsemen who provided their own arms and mounts. After the conquest of Jāvli their number was increased to 7,000 *pāgā*, 3,000 *silāhdārs* and 10,000 *Māvlé* infantry. He also enlisted 700 Pathans from the disbanded soldiery of Bijapur. After the destruction of Afzal Khan he raised his forces to 7,000 *pāgā*, 8,000 *silāhdārs*, and 12,000 infantry. At the time of his death, his army consisted of 45,000 *pāgā* (under 29 colonels), 60,000 *silāhdārs* (under 31 colonels) and one *lakh* of *Mālvé* infantry (under 36 colonels.) But T. S. states that he left 32,000 horses in his stables, besides 5,000 given to the *bārgirs*.

(Sabh. 5, 8, 23, 97-98; T. S. f. 43 b.)

The core of his army was, therefore, formed by 30 to 40 thousand regular and permanently enlisted cavalry in his own service, and about twice that number of infantry militia (*hasham*), whom he used to withdraw from the cultivation of their fields during the campaigning season only, as in England under King Alfred. The infantry garrisoning his forts were permanently recruited, though they were given fields in their neighbourhood. The number of the *silāhdārs* who hired themselves and their horses out to him varied greatly from year to year, according to his need, their expectation of plunder in the impending campaign, and the demand for their services in the neighbouring States at a particular time. In the earlier stages of his career, local chieftains with their retainers used to join him in his raids (*e.g.*, Surat in 1664) and swell his
army by the adhesion of a body of irregulars. The same thing happened in his invasion of Madras in 1677.

His elephants are numbered 1,260 by Sabhāsad, but T. S. gives 125 and Chit. 300, which are more likely figures. The camels were 3,000 (T. S.) or 1,500 (Chit.) The number of his artillery-pieces is not mentioned. Chitnis (a doubtful authority) tells us that 200 guns were kept ready for field service and the rest were placed in the forts; each field gun had some elephants and a battalion of infantry attached to it.


His earliest administrative Council, in the days of Dādāji Kond-dev, was composed of four officers only, viz., the Peshwā, the Majmuādār, the Dābir, and the Sabnis. When, in 1647, Shivā became his own master, he added a Master of the Horse (Sar-i-naubat) and a second Dābir to the above four. In 1656, after the conquest of Jāvli (which practically doubled his territory) the Council was further expanded by creating a Surnis and a Wāqnis and two distinct commanders for the infantry and cavalry arms. After his return from Agra he appointed a Lord Justice to try all suits in the kingdom according to the Sanskrit law-books. By 1674 the number of ministers had risen to eight, which continued till his death. (Sabh. 3, 5, 7-8, 55, 83-84.)

This Council of eight ministers, called the ashta pradhān, was in no sense a Cabinet. Like Louis XIV and Frederick the Great, Shivaji was his own prime-minister and kept all the strings of the administration in his own hands. The eight pradhāns merely acted as his secretaries: they had no initiative, no power to dictate his policy; their function was purely advisory when he was in a mood to listen to advice, and at other times to carry out his general instructions and supervise the details in their respective departments. It is very likely that Shivaji never interfered with the Ecclesiastical and Accounts departments, but that
was due entirely to his low caste and illiteracy. The Peshwā's position at Court was, no doubt, higher than that of the other pradhāns, because he was closer to the king and naturally enjoyed more of his confidence; but they were in no sense his subordinates. The solidarity of the British Cabinet, as well as its power, was wanting in the Marātha Council of Eight.

The eight ministers were the following:—

1. The prime-minister, (Persian title Peshwā, Sanskrit Mukhya Pradhān.) His duties were to look after the welfare of the State in general terms, to represent the king in his absence, and to keep peace among the other officers, so as to promote harmony in the administration. All royal letters and charters had to bear his seal below the king's.

2. The auditor, (Persian Majmuādar, Sanskrit Amātya.) He had to check all the accounts of public income and expenditure and report them to the king, and to countersign all statements of accounts both of the kingdom in general and of the particular districts.

3. The chronicler, (Persian Waqiā-navis, Sanskrit Mantri.) His duties were to compile a daily record of the king's doings and Court incidents, and to watch over the king's invitation-lists, meals, companions, &c., so as to guard against murder plots.

4. The superintendent, (Persian Shuru-navis, Sanskrit Sachiv.) He had to see that all royal letters were drafted in the proper style, to revise them, and to write at the head of charters the words Shuru shud, or 'Here begins'. He had also to check the accounts of the mahals and parganas.

5. The foreign secretary, (Persian Dabīr, Sanskrit Sumant.) He was the king's adviser on relations with foreign States, war and peace. It was also his duty to keep intelligence about other countries, to receive and dismiss foreign envoys, and maintain the dignity of the State abroad.

6. The commander-in-chief, (Persian Sar-i-naubat, Sanskrit Senāpāti.)
7. The ecclesiastical head, (Persian *Sadr* and *Muhatasib* joined together, Marathi *Pandit Rāo* and *Dānādhyaksha.*) It was his function to honour and reward learned Brahmins on behalf of the king, to decide theological questions and caste disputes, to fix dates for religious ceremonies, to punish impiety and heresy, and to order penances, &c. He was Judge of Canon Law, Royal Almoner, and Censor of Public Morals combined.

8. The chief justice (Persian *Qāzi-ul-quzāt*, Sanskrit *Nyāyādhish.*) He tried civil and criminal cases according to the Hindu law and endorsed all judicial decisions, especially about rights to land, village headmanship, &c.

All these ministers with the exception of the Commander-in-chief and sometimes the Chronicler also, were of the Brāhman caste, and all of them, with the exception of the last two, had also to take the command of armies and go out on expeditions when necessary. All royal letters, charters and treaties had to bear the seals of the king and the Peshwā and the endorsement of the next four ministers, *i.e.*, other than the Commander-in-chief, the Ecclesiastical Head, and the Chief Justice.*

The actual work of State correspondence was conducted by Kāyasthas, of whom two were famous, *viz.*, Bālāji Āvji the *chitnis* and Niloji (Nilkanth Yesājī) the *munshi* or Persian secretary. The muster-rolls of the army were written and the pay-bills drawn up by a class of officers called *sabnisēs*, who corresponded to the *bakhshis* or paymasters of the Mughal army, but occupied a much lower rank.†

§5. Army organization.

We now turn to Shivaji's civil and military regulations. Every fort and outpost (*thānah*) was placed under three

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* So says Chitnis. But Oxindon's letters imply that all the ministers endorsed Shivaji's treaty with the English.
† Sabh. 84; Chitnis, 167-168; Sanads and Letters, 125-150; Bhonsalyānchē Kulāchār (1823), printed in Itihas Sangraha.
officers of equal status, viz., the havlādār, the sabnis and the sar-i-naubat, who were to act jointly. "No fort was to be left solely under a havlādār, lest a single traitor should be able to deliver it to the enemy. The havlādār and the sar-i-naubat were selected from the Marātha caste and the sabnis from the Brāhmans,"—so that one caste served as a check upon another. The stores and provisions in the forts were in charge of a Kāyastha officer called the kārkhānahnēvis, who wrote the accounts of their incoming and expenditure. In the larger forts, where the bounds were extensive, the walls were divided into five or six sections, and each of these was guarded by a special tat-sar-i-naubat. The environs of a fort were watched by men of the Parwāri and Rāmushi castes.

The havlādār of a fort was empowered to change the lower officers and to write official letters and seal them with his own seal. All letters from Government were to be addressed to him. He had to lock the fort-gates at sunset and open them at sunrise, carry the keys with himself and sleep with them under his pillow. He had to make frequent tours of inspection in and outside the fort, pay surprise visits to the sentinels, while the sar-i-naubat had to inspect the work of the patrolling parties and the night-watch. Minute written instructions were given by Shivaji for keeping in each fort munition, provisions, building-materials, and other necessary stores adequate to its size, and for keeping proper watch; and these regulations were rigidly enforced.

All soldiers, whether musketeers, spearmen, archers or swordsmen, were recruited only after a careful personal inspection by Shivaji himself and taking security for every new soldier from the men already in his service.

In the State cavalry (pāgā), the unit was formed by 25 troopers (bārgirs); over 25 men was placed one havlādār, over 5 havlādārs one jumlādār,* and over 10 jumlās or

*Chit., 81, says that there was an intermediate officer called subahdār in command of 5 jumlas, below the hazari.
1,250 men one *hazāri*. Still higher ranks were the *5-hazāris* and the supreme commander or *sar-i-naubat* of cavalry. For every twenty-five troopers there were a water-carrier and a farrier.

The *silāhdārs*, or troopers who supplied their own horses and arms, were organized on a different plan, but acted under the orders of the same *sar-i-naubat* of cavalry, and ranked lower than the *pāgā* horsemen.

In the infantry, whether fort-garrisons or Māvlé military-men, there was one corporal (*nāyak*) to every nine privates (*pāiks*); over 5 *nāyaks* one *havlālār*, over two (or three) *havlādārs* one *jumlādār*, and over 10 *jumlādārs* one *hazāri.*

There seems to have been no *5-hazāri* among the infantry, but only *7-hazāris*, over whom was the *sar-i-naubat* of infantry. Shivaji's Guard brigade of 2,000 select Māvlé infantry was splendidly equipped dressed and armed at great expense to the State. (Sabh. 56).

The *pāgā jumlādār* had a salary of 500 *hun* a year and the right to use a *palki*. Attached to him was a *majmuādār* on 100 to 125 *hun*. A *hazāri* drew 1,000 *hun* a year; under him were a *majmuādār*, a Marātha *kārbhāri* (manager or steward), and a revenue-writer (*jamā-navis*) of the Kāyastha caste, for whom 500 *hun* was assigned. The accounts of military income and disbursement had to be made up with the signature of all the four. A commander of 5,000 drew 2,000 *hun* and had the same three civil officers attached to his office. *Kārkuns* (clerks), reporters, couriers and spies were posted to every higher command down to a *hazāri*, under the orders of the *sar-i-naubat*.

An infantry *jumlādār* drew 100 *hun* a year, and had a *sabnis* (muster-writer) on 40 *hun*. A *hazāri* drew 500 *hun* and his *sabnis* 100 to 125 *hun*.

It was Shivaji's settled policy† to use his army for

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*Chit., 85, gives one jumladar over five havladars and one hazari over five jumladars.

† The method followed by the Pindharis in 1810-16, as described by a contemporary English officer, may be taken to illustrate the conduct of the
drawing supplies from foreign dominions every year. “The troops were to live in cantonments in the home territory during the rainy season (June—September.) Grain, fodder and medicines were kept in stock for the horses, and the huts of the troopers were kept thatched with grass. On the day of Dashaharā (early in October) the army should set out from the camp for the country selected by the Rajah. At the time of their departure a list was made of all the property that every man, high or low, of the army carried with himself. The troops were to subsist in foreign parts for eight months and also levy contributions. No woman, female slave or dancing-girl was to be allowed to accompany the army. A soldier keeping any of these was to be beheaded. No woman or child was to be taken captive, but only men. Cows were exempt from seizure, but bullocks might be taken for transport only. Brāhmans were not to be molested, nor taken as hostages for ransom. No soldier should misconduct himself [during a campaign.]

Eight months were to be passed in such expeditions abroad. On their return to their own frontier in Vaishākh (April) the whole army was to be searched, the property found was to be compared with the old list, and the excess was to be deducted from their salary. Any one secreting

Maratha troops in Shivaji’s time, though not of the more developed forces of the Peshwas: “Until the close of the rains and the fall of the rivers, their horses were carefully trained, to prepare them for long marches and hard work. The rivers generally became fordable by the close of the Dassera. The horses were then shod......and all that were so inclined set forth on a foray......... All were mounted, though not equally well......... The favourite weapon was a bamboo spear, from 12 to 18 feet long......... It is not surprising that a body so constituted, and moving without camp-equipage of any kind, should traverse the whole of India in defiance of the most active pursuit by regular troops along the same line of march........ As it was impossible for them to remain more than a few hours on the same spot, the utmost despatch was necessary in rifling any towns or villages into which they could force an entrance; every one whose appearance indicated the probability of his possessing money, was immediately put to the most horrid torture......... It was their common practice to burn and destroy what could not be carried away.” [Prinsep’s History of..........Marquess of Hastings, i. 58-59.]
any booty was liable to punishment on detection by the general.

The generals on their return should see the Rajah, deliver their booty in gold, silver, jewels and costly cloth to him, present their accounts, and take their dues from the Treasury. The officers and men were to be promoted or punished according to their conduct during the late campaign. Then they would again remain for four months in camp. [Sabh. 25-28.]

§6. Revenue system and administration.

"The land in every province was to be measured and the area calculated in chāvars. The measuring-rod was 5 cubits and 5 muthis (closed fists) in length. A cubit was equal to 14 tansus, and the measuring-rod was [therefore] 80 tansus long. Twenty kāthis (rods) square made a bighā and 120 bighās one chāvar. The area of each village was thus ascertained in detail. An estimate was made of the expected produce of each bighā, three parts of which were left to the peasant and two parts taken by the State.*

"New ryots who came to settle were to be given money for seeds and cattle, the amount being recovered in two or four annual instalments. The revenue should be taken in kind at harvest time."

Shivaji wanted to sweep away the middle-class of revenue farmers and come into direct relations with the cultivators. "The ryots were not subject to the authority of the zamindārs, deshmukhs, and desāis, who had no right

* Captain Robertson in 1820 and 1825 gave a different and more complicated account of Shivaji's revenue system. (Bom. Gaz., xviii. Pt. ii. pp. 321-322.) It is quite probable that the system was not so simple and uniform as Sabhasad represents it; but we do not know the Captain's authorities and have no means of testing his statement about a system founded nearly two centuries ago by a dynasty which had long passed away, and the continuity of whose tradition had been broken. A tansu was the breadth of the second and third fingers (or, in Mughal India, the breadth of 8 barley corn).
to exercise the powers of a political superior (overlord) or harass the ryots."

"In the Nizam-Shahi, Adil-Shahi and Mughal territories annexed, the ryots had formerly been subject to patils, kulkarnis and deshmukhs, who used to do the collection work and pay what they pleased to the State, sometimes only 200 or 300 hun for a village yielding 2,000 hun as revenue. These mirāsdārs (hereditary landlords), thus growing wealthy, built forts, enlisted troops, and became powerful. They never waited upon the revenue officer of Government and used to show fight if he urged that the village could pay more to the State. This class had become unruly and seized the country. But Shivaji dismantled their castles, garrisoned the strong places with his own troops, and took away all power from the mirāsdārs. Formerly they used to take whatever they liked from the ryots. This was now stopped. Their dues were fixed after calculating the (exact) revenue of the village, and they were forbidden to build castles." (Sabh. 29-31.)

Similarly, military, fief-holders were given no political power over their tenants. "The sar-i-naubats, majmuādārs, kārkuns and the officers in the Rajah’s personal service were given assignments on the revenue (tankhā barāt) for their salary. The lands cultivated by them were subject to assessment like the fields of the ryots, and the amount of the revenue due was deducted from their pay. For the balance they got orders on the Treasury of the capital or the districts. Men serving in the army, the militia or the forts were not to be given proprietory (mokāsā) rights over any village in entirety. Their dues were to be paid either by assignment of revenue or by cash from the Treasury. None but the kārkuns had any jurisdiction over the land. All payments to the army were to be made by the kārkuns. The grant of mokāsā rights would have created disorder among the peasants; they would have grown in strength and disobeyed the Government collectors; and the growing power of the ryots would have ended in rebellion at various
places. The mokāsā-holders and the zamindārs if united would have become uncontrollable. No mokāsā was to be granted to any one.” (Sabh. 27-28.)

Over two mahals, yielding a revenue of from 75,000 to 1,25,000 hun in the aggregate, a subahdār on 400 hun and a majmuādār on 100 to 125 hun a year were appointed. The subahdār was to have a palki allowance of 400 hun. All civil and military officers with a salary of 125 hun or more were given the right to hold parasols (āftāb-gir) over their heads, with an allowance from the State for bearers. Where necessary, a subahdar was posted over a tract yielding only one lakh of Rupees. To the disturbed provinces across the frontier, a military force was sent with the collectors of blackmail. The subahdars were all Brāhmans, under the Peshwā’s supervision. (Sabh. 28 and 77.)


Shivaji’s religious policy was very liberal. He respected the holy places of all creeds in his raids and made endowments for Hindu temples and Muslim saints’ tombs and mosques alike. He not only granted pensions to Brāhman scholars versed in the Vedas, astronomers and anchorites, but also built hermitages and provided subsistence at his own cost for the holy men of Islam, notably Baba Yaqut of Keloshi (4 m. s. of Bankot on the Ratnagiri coast.) “The lost Vedic studies were revived by him. One maund of rice was (annually) presented to a Brāhman who had mastered one of the books of the Vedas, two maunds to a master of two books, and so on. Every year the Pandit Rao used to examine the scholars in the month of Shrāvan (August) and increase or decrease their stipends according to their progress in study. Foreign pandits received presents in goods, local scholars in food. Famous scholars were assembled, honoured and given money rewards. No Brāhman had occasion to go to other kingdoms to beg.” (Chit. 85, 43. Sabh. 30. 91 Q.B. 74.)
Shivaji’s spiritual guide (guru) was Rāmdās Swāmi, one of the greatest saints of Mahārāṣṭra, (born 1608, died 1681.) An attempt has been made in the present generation to prove that the Marāṭha national hero’s political ideal of an independent Hindu monarchy was inspired by Rāmdās; but the evidence produced is neither adequate nor free from suspicion.* The holy man’s influence on Shivaji was spiritual, and not political. After the capture of Satārā, (1673) Shivaji installed his guru in the neighbouring hill-fort of Parli or Sajjangarh, and guides still point out to the credulous tourist the seat on the top of Satārā hill from which Shivaji used to hold converse with the saint, across four miles of space! A charming anecdote is told, that Shivaji could not understand why Rāmdās used to go out daily on his begging tour, though his royal disciple had made him rich beyond the dreams of avarice, and that he next day placed at his feet a deed making a gift of all his kingdom to the saint. Rāmdās accepted the gift, appointed Shivaji as his vicar, and bade him rule the realm thenceforth not as an autocratic owner, but as a servant responsible for all his acts to a higher authority. Shivaji then made the red ochre-coloured robe of a Hindu sannyāsī his flag, bhagwā jhandā, in order to signify that he fought and ruled in the livery of his ascetic lord paramount, and conducted himself “as ever in his great Taskmaster’s eyes.”

§8. Effect of Shivaji’s reign.

So much for Shivaji’s regulations in theory. But in practice they were often violated except where he was personally present. Thus, the assertion of Sabhāsād and Chitnis that his soldiers had to deliver to the State every item of the booty taken by them, is contradicted by the sack of Dharangāon (1679), where the English factors were robbed of many

* Shivaji and Ramdas: Chit. 44-53, also his Shambhuji Bakhar, 5-6; Prof. Bhat’s Shivaji ani Ramdas; the publications and now-defunct monthly magazine of the Ramdasi coterie of Dhulia (notably Mr. Rajwade.)
things without these being entered in the official list of the Marātha army or credited to Shivaji’s Treasury (Ch. 14.) Shivaji could not be everywhere and at all times; hence it was impossible for him to prevent private looting by his troops and camp-followers. In the wake of the Marātha army, gangs of private robbers took to the road. The Pindhāris were the logical corollary of the Marātha soldier, to whom rape was a normal duty.

Shivaji justified his spoliation of his neighbours by saying, as he did to the Mughal governor of Surat (1672), “Your Emperor has forced me to keep an army for the defence of my people and country. That army must be paid for by his subjects.” Such a plea might have been true at the beginning of his career and in relation to Mughal territory only, but cannot explain his raids into Bijapur and Golkondā, Kanārā and Tanjore. It fails altogether as a defence of the foreign policy of the Peshwas.

But whatever might be the moral quality of the means he employed, his success was a dazzling reality. This jagirdār’s son proved himself the irrepressible opponent of the Mughal empire and all its resources. This fact deeply impressed the minds of his contemporaries in India and abroad. Aurangzib was in despair as to how he could subdue Shivā. A significant statement is made in a news-letter of his Court in 1670 that the Emperor read a despatch from the Deccan, recounting some raids of Shivā, and then “remained silent”. In the inner council of the Court he often anxiously asked whom he should next send against Shivaji, seeing that nearly all his great generals had failed in the Deccan, and Mahābat Khan irreverently replied with a sneer at Qāzi Abdul Wahāb’s influence over the Emperor, “No general is necessary. A decree from the Chief Qāzi will extinguish Shivā!” The Persian king, Shāh Abbās II., sent a letter taunting Aurangzib, “You call yourself a Padishah, but cannot subdue a mere zamindār like Shivā. I am going to India with an army to teach you your business.” [K. K. ii. 216.]
To the Hindu world in that age of renewed persecution, Shivaji appeared as the star of a new hope, the protector of the ritualistic paint-mark (*tilak*) on the forehead of the Hindus, and the saviour of the Brāhmans. [Bhushan's poems.] His Court, as later his son's, became the rallying-point of the opposition to Aurangzib. The two rivals were both supermen, but contrasts in character.
CHAPTER XVI

SHIVAJI’S ACHIEVEMENT, CHARACTER AND PLACE IN HISTORY

1. Shivaji’s policy how far traditional.
2. Causes of his failure to build an enduring State.
3. Hindrances to true nationality.
4. Neglect of the economic factor by the Marathas.
5. Excess of finesse and intrigue.
6. Character of Shivaji.
7. His genius analyzed.
8. His political ideal and difficulties.
9. His influence on the spirit.

§1. Shivaji’s policy how far traditional.

Shivaji’s State policy, like his administrative system,* was not very new. From time immemorial it had been the aim of the typical Hindu king to set out early every autumn to “extend his kingdom” at the expense of his neighbours. Indeed, the Sanskrit law-books lay down such a course as the necessary accomplishment of a true Kshatriya chief. (Manu. vii. 99-103, 182.) In more recent times it had also been the practice of the Muhammadan sovereigns in North India and the Deccan alike. But these conquerors justified their territorial aggrandizement by religious motives. According to the Qurाणic law, there cannot be peace between a Muhammadan king and his neighbouring “infidel” States. The latter are dār-ul-harb or legitimate seats of war, and it is the Muslim king’s duty to slay and plunder in them till they accept the true faith and become dār-ul-islām, after which they will become entitled to his protection.†

The coincidence between Shivaji’s foreign policy and that of a Qurाणic sovereign is so complete that both the

* For an earlier parallel and possible model, see the Adil-Shahi rules given in B. S. 348-352.
† For a detailed account and authorities, see Sarkar’s History of Aurangzib, iii. ch. 34 §1.
history of Shivaji by his courtier Krishnaji Anant and the Persian official history of Bijapur use exactly the same word, *mulk-giri*, to describe such raids into neighbouring countries as a regular political ideal. The only difference was that in theory at least, an orthodox Muslim king was bound to spare the other Muslim States in his path and not to rob or shed the blood of true believers, while Shivaji (as well as the Peshwās after him) carried on his *mulk-giri* into all neighbouring States, Hindu no less than Islamic, and squeezed rich Hindus as mercilessly as he did Muhammadans. Then, again, the orthodox Islamic king, in theory at least, aimed at the annexation and conversion of the other States, so that after the short sharp agony of conquest was over those places enjoyed peace like the regular parts of his dominion. But the object of Shivaji's military enterprises, unless his Court-historian Sabhāsad has misrepresented it, was not annexation but mere plunder, or to quote his very words, "The Marātha forces should feed themselves at the expense of foreign countries for eight months every year, and levy blackmail." (Sabh., 26.)*

Thus, Shivaji's power was exactly similar in origin and theory to the power of the Muslim States in India and elsewhere, and he only differed from them in the use of that power. Universal toleration and equal justice and protection for all his subjects were his distinctive policy in the permanently occupied portion of his realm, as we have shown elsewhere.

§2. *Causes of Shivaji’s failure to build an enduring State.*

Why did Shivaji fail to create an enduring State? Why did the Marātha people stop short of the final accomplish-

* "Instead of commencing with the removal of the existing government, and the general assumption of the whole authority to himself, a Maratha chieftain begins, by appearing at the season of harvest, and demanding a consideration for his forbearance in withholding the mischief he has it in his power to inflict. The visit is annually repeated, and the demand pro-
ment of their union and dissolve before they had consolidated into an absolutely compact political body?

An obvious cause was, no doubt, the shortness of his reign, barely ten years after the final rupture with the Mughals in 1670. But this does not furnish the true explanation of his failure. It is doubtful if with a very much longer time at his disposal he could have averted the ruin which befell the Marātha State under the Peshwās, for the same moral canker was at work among his people in the 17th century as in the 18th. The first danger of the new Hindu kingdom established by him in the Deccan lay in the fact that the national glory and prosperity resulting from the victories of Shivaji and Bāji Rao I. created a reaction in favour of Hindu orthodoxy; it accentuated caste distinctions and ceremonial purity of daily rites which ran counter to the homogeneity and simplicity of the poor and politically depressed early Marātha society. Thus, his political success sapped the main foundation of that success.

In the security, power and wealth engendered by their independence, the Marāthas of the 18th century forgot the past record of Muslim persecution; their social grades turned against each other. The Brāhmans living east of the Sahyādri range despised those living west of it, the men of the hills despised their brethren of the plains, because they could now do so with impunity. The head of the State, though a Brāhman, was despised by his Brāhman servants belonging to other branches of the caste—because the first Peshwā's great-grandfather's great-grandfather had once been lower in society than the Desh Brāhmans' great-grandfathers' great-grandfathers! While the Chitpāvan Brāhmans were waging a social war with the Deshastha Brāhmans, a bitter jealousy raged between the Brāhman ministers and governors and the Kāyastha secretaries. We have unmistakable traces of it as early as the reign of Shivaji. “Caste

portionally enhanced. Whatever is thus exacted is called the chauth, and the process of exaction a mulk-giri expedition.” [Prinsep's History........of the Marquess of Hastings, i. 22.]
grows by fission." It is antagonistic to national union. In proportion as Shivaji's ideal of a Hindu swarāj was based on orthodoxy, it contained within itself the seed of its own death. As Rabindranāth Tāgore remarks:

"A temporary enthusiasm sweeps over the country and we imagine that it has been united; but the rents and holes in our body-social do their work secretly; we cannot retain any noble idea long.

"Shivaji aimed at preserving the rents; he wished to save from Mughal attack a Hindu society to which ceremonial distinctions and isolation of castes are the very breath of life. He wanted to make this heterogeneous society triumphant over all India! He wove ropes of sand; he attempted the impossible. It is beyond the power of any man, it is opposed to the divine law of the universe, to establish the swarāj of such a caste-ridden, isolated, internally-torn sect over a vast continent like India."*

Shivaji and his father-in-law Gaikwār were Marāthas, i.e., members of a despised caste. Before the rise of the national movement in the Deccan in the closing years of the 19th century, a Brāhman of Mahrārāshtra used to feel insulted if he was called a Marātha. "No," he would reply with warmth, "I am a Dakshina Brāhman." Shivaji keenly felt his humiliation at the hands of the Brāhmans to whose defence and prosperity he had devoted his life. Their insistence on treating him as a Shudra drove him into the arms of Bālāji Āvji, the leader of the Kāyasthas, and another victim of Brāhmanic pride. The Brāhmans felt a professional jealousy for the intelligence and literary powers of the Kāyasthas, who were their only rivals in education and Government service, and consoled themselves by declaring the Kāyasthas a low-caste not entitled to the Vedic rites and by proclaiming a social boycott of Bālāji Āvji who had ventured to invest his son with the sacred thread. Bālāji

* From his Rise and Fall of the Sikh Power, as translated by me in the Modern Review, April 1911.
naturally sympathized with his master and tried to raise him in social estimation by engaging Gāgā Bhatta who “made Shivaji a pure Kshatriya”. The high-priest showed his gratitude to Bālājī for his heavy retainer by writing a tract [or rather two] in which the Kāyastha caste was glorified, but without convincing his contemporary Brāhmans.*

There was no attempt at well-thought-out and organized communal improvement, spread of education or unification of the people, either under Shivaji or under the Peshwās. The cohesion of the people in the Marātha State was not organic but artificial, accidental, and therefore precarious. It was solely dependent on the ruler’s extraordinary personality and disappeared when the country ceased to produce supermen among its rulers.

A Government of personal discretion is, by its very nature, uncertain. This uncertainty reacted fatally on the administration. However well-planned the machinery and rules might be, the actual conduct of the administration was marred by inefficiency, sudden changes of personnel, and official corruption, because nobody felt secure of his post or of the due appreciation of his merit. This has been the bane of all autocratic States in the East and the West alike, except where the autocrat has been a “hero as king” or where a high level of education, civilization and national spirit among the people has prevented the evil.

*Nor has he succeeded in convincing posterity. In 1916 Mr. Rajwadē, a Brahman writer, published a denial of the Kayastha claims (Chaturtha Sam. Britta), on the occasion of editing this tract. He has provoked replies, one of which, Rajwadē’s Gaga Bhatti by K. T. Gupte makes some attempt at reasoning and the use of evidence, while another, The Twanging of the Bow by K. S. Thakré, has the same tone as Milton’s Tetrachordon or Against Salmasius! This is happening in the 20th century, and yet Mr. Rajwadē and Prof. Bijapurkar (who persistently treated Shivaji’s descendants as Shudras) are nationalists, even Chauvinists.

It was with a house so divided against itself that the Puna Brahmans of the 18th century hoped to found an all-Indian Maratha empire, and there are Puna Brahmans in the 20th century who believe that the hope failed only through the superior luck and cunning of the English!
§3. Hindrances to true nationality in Shivaji's age.

The society of Shivaji's age and country was so different from our own that some straining of the historical imagination is necessary before we can understand the difficulties that he had to combat.

Land was the only stable thing in an ever-changing world, subject to the appalling outbursts of Nature's forces, which swept away man and his handiwork, and the even more violent transformations of political revolution. But the new conquerors always left the land to the old peasant because he alone could till it in that age of sparse population, and they continued the revenue collection in the hands of the old hereditary middlemen, because they alone knew the details of the locality and could ensure some payment from the land to a distant sovereign who would have found it impossible to collect his dues from each petty tiller of the soil directly. The offices in connection with land, therefore, tended to become hereditary and the contractor of revenue blossomed in time into a landowner with a permanent family claim to a portion of the yield of his village or district. Attachment to one's ancestral land was the strongest passion in that age of little trade and small scale industries. I know of a Brāhman family which migrated from the Ratnagiri district to Ahmadabad six generations ago, and no longer own an inch of land in their ancient home nor keep any business connection with it, and yet they have carefully preserved for two centuries the old title-deeds of their long-abandoned lands.

And, in that age land-rights were unsettled and perplexing by reason of the variety and complication of the personal claims to one and the same tract. Illustrations of this state of things can be found almost everywhere in the Deccan; I give the case of Sāvant-vādi as readily available in print. In this small region there was in the sixteenth century a desāi (or zamindār) of the Prabhu caste at Kudāl for collecting the revenue on behalf of the Bijapur Sultan,
with a dalvi or captain of the Rajput caste under him to lead his troops. The dalvi rebelled against his master the desāi and sought the help of a neighbouring sāvant or chief of the Marātha caste. At first the desāi suppressed the rebel with the support of his sovereign. But in the third generation an able sāvant rose to power, secured the desāi-ship of Bāndā from Adil Shah, and after extirpating most of the Prabhu desāis annexed the Kudāl pargana. But some members of the dispossessed family escaped and revived their claim to the land. Next, Shivaji stepped in to oust the sāvant! Further complications were introduced by two branches of the same family (often two brothers) fighting for the same estate and transmitting their disputes to their sons and grandsons.

Into this world of bewildering confusion of land-rights and revenue offices,—where nothing was generally known for certain or acknowledged as a clear final settlement,—Shivaji (like all other conquerors) burst as a new dissolving force. He had to give his own decision on these claims. All who lost their suits before him, all who were displaced in office by his nominees, immediately turned against him and tried to make their claims good by joining his enemies and opposing his Government. There was no national feeling, no spirit of accepting the law of the land even when honestly administered.

To every one in that age his own fief (watan) was the only reality, the only object of a man’s lifelong endeavour, his highest reward on earth, while Fatherland (patria), if thought of at all, was felt to be an abstract idea, a non-entity. Watan could yield honour power and the pleasures of life, while patria was a mere word, a figment of the imagination.

A further hindrance to the growth of patriotism was the infinitely minute sub-division of society, which made the formation of one nation, or a compact body of men moved by community of life, thought and interests, impossible, and even inconceivable. Apart from the impassable
chasm between the Hindus and the Muslims living on the same soil and under the same rulers, the Hindus themselves were ‘split up into innumerable mutually warring (or, at best, contemptuously detached and indifferent) fragments. Not only did one caste despise and persecute another, but even among the members of the same caste there were distinctions as sharp as those marking off the Muhammadan from the Hindu or the Shudra from the Brāhman. Certain families claimed to be of nobler blood (kulin) than all others of the same caste and locality, and depressed and insulted the latter in society. The highest aim of a Hindu in that age—as even in our times,—was to elevate his own family (and often also his own sub-division of a caste) in the social scale by lavish bounty to the Brahmans and the caste elders, by hypergamy, or by a nearer approach to the practices of the highest or ‘twice-born’ castes. But the dominant families (or castes) tried to keep the newer or lower ones down at their former level of degradation by turning all the engines of social persecution against them. They took away from such daring aspirants and disturbers of the primeval stereotyped usage and custom, not only the benefit of the clergy but also all the amenities of social life and the services of the public servants of the village. This boycott or out-casting (grāmanyā) was a more terrifying penalty than death itself.

It was only human nature if the noblest members of the despised families (or castes) resented this injustice and tyranny of society and, in the bitterness of public humiliation, sought to be avenged on the persecuting church and State by going over to the enemies of their country and faith. Such action, on the part of the oppressors and the oppressed alike, is impossible where a true sense of nationality has taken root. Patriotism could not grow on the Indian soil (except among compact clans of blood-kindred like the Rajputs.) ‘The State, as an impersonal continuous being,—higher and more durable than our individual selves, could not be conceived of by the rulers of
Hindu India whose sole care was for the benefit of self and not for the good of the community as a whole.

As an acute English observer wrote in 1803: "Every Marātha prince, and every jagirdar or military chief in the [Marātha] empire, has a khazānā or collection of treasure, consisting of specie and jewels, which is lodged in a secret depository within the walls of a strong fortress, often erected for the purpose, on one of the most inaccessible mountains in his dominions. This private treasure is the first and never-ceasing object of his ambition to increase. . . . No want of money for supporting a war, even in defence of his own territory, ever induces a Marātha chief to supply the deficiency from his private treasury; the loss of which would be to him a much more grievous calamity than the subjugation of his country."*

Such were the men among whom Shivaji tried to build up his edifice of an independent national State, the men whom he had to employ as his instruments, the men to whom he had to leave his uncompleted task. The leaders were actuated by an insane pride of birth, an all-devouring jealousy about precedence, an ambition that blinded them to all consequences, an incapacity for self-subordination to law and corporate loyalty that marks the lesser breeds, a lack of political vision and of practical realism. As for the masses, they were human sheep, worthy to be led by such shepherds; their horizon was bounded by the hard conditions of their daily toil, with a simple emotional faith as their only solace.

In such conditions not even a superman can create a nation and leave an enduring State behind him. Shivaji with his transcendent genius could have barely laid their

* Asiatic Annual Register for 1803, p. 4. A recent example was that of Daulat Rao Sindhia in 1809, as described by Capt. Broughton: "While Sindhia is daily submitting to these and similar insults [from his unpaid soldiery], he possesses a privy purse of 50 lakhs; which no distress either of himself or his troops is sufficiently powerful to induce him to violate." (Letters from a Mahratta Camp, Const. ed., p. 160.)
true foundations if a long reign of internal peace had been granted to him and he had been followed by a line of worthy successors. But he lived for less than six years after his coronation, and his kingdom perished with his sons.

§4. Neglect of the economic factor by the Marāthas.

The Marātha rulers neglected the economic development of the State. Some of them did, no doubt, try to save the peasantry from illegal exactions, and to this extent they promoted agriculture. But commerce was subjected to frequent harassment by local officers, and the traders could never be certain of freedom of movement and security of their rights on the mere payment of the legal rate of duty. The internal resources of a small province with no industry, little trade, a sterile soil, and an agriculture dependent upon scanty and precarious rainfall,—could not possibly support the large army that Shivaji kept or the imperial position and world-dominion to which the Peshwās aspired.

The necessary expenses of the State could be met, and all the parts of the body-politic could be held together only by a constant flow of money from outside its own borders, i.e., by a regular succession of raids. As the late Mr. G. K. Gokhalé laughingly told me when describing the hardships of the present rigid land assessment system in the Bombay Presidency, "You see, the rate of the land revenue did not matter much under Marātha rule. In those old days, when the crop failed our people used to sally forth with their horses and spears and bring back enough booty to feed them for the next two or three years. Now they have to starve on their own lands."

Thus, by the character of his State, the Marātha’s hands were turned against everybody and everybody’s hands were turned against him. It is the very nature of a *Krieg-staat* to move in a vicious circle. It must wage war periodically

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*A Government that lives and grows only by wars of aggression.*
if it is to get its food; but war, when waged as a normal method of supply, destroys industry and wealth in the invading and invaded countries alike, and ultimately defeats the very end of such wars. Peace is death to a Krieg-staat; but peace is the very life-breath of wealth. A State founded on war, therefore, kills the goose that lays the golden eggs. To take an illustration, Shivaji's repeated plunder of Surat scared away trade and wealth from that city, and his second raid (in 1670) brought him much less booty than his first, and a few years later the constant dread of Maratha incursion entirely impoverished Surat and effectually dried up this source of supply. Thus, from the economic point of view, the Maratha State had no stable basis, no normal means of growth within itself.

§5. Excess of finesse and intrigue.

Lastly, the Maratha leaders trusted too much to finesse. They did not realize that without a certain amount of manly openness and fidelity to promises no society can hold together. Stratagem and falsehood may have been necessary at the birth of their State, but it was continued during the maturity of their power. No one could rely on the promise of a Maratha minister or the assurance of a Maratha general. Witness the long and finally fruitless negotiations of the English merchants with Shivaji for compensation for the looting of their Rajapur factory. The Maratha Government could not always be relied on to abide by their treaty obligations.

Shivaji, and to a lesser extent Baji Rao I., preserved an admirable balance between war and diplomacy. But the latter-day Marathas lost this practical ability. They trusted too much to diplomatic trickery, as if empire were a pacific game of chess. Military efficiency was neglected, war at the right moment and in the right fashion was avoided, or, worse still, their forces were frittered away in unseasonable campaigns and raids conducted as a matter of routine, and
the highest political wisdom was believed to consist in räj-karan or diplomatic intrigue. Thus, while the Marātha spider was weaving his endless cobweb of hollow alliances and diplomatic counter-plots, the mailed fist of Wellesley was thrust into his laboured but flimsy tissue of statecraft, and by a few swift and judicious strokes his defence and screen was torn away and his power left naked and helpless. In rapid succession the Nizām was disarmed, Tipu was crushed, and the Peshwā was enslaved. While Sindhiā and Holkar were dreaming the dream of the overlordship of all India, they suddenly awoke to find that even their local independence was gone. The man of action, the soldier-statesman, always triumphs over the mere scheming Machiavel. Punic perfidy never succeeds in the long run.

§6. Character of Shivaji.

Shivaji’s private life was marked by a high standard of morality. He was a devoted son, a loving father and an attentive husband, though he did not rise above the ideas and usage of his age, which allowed a plurality of wives and the keeping of concubines even among the priestly caste, not to speak warriors and kings. Intensely religious from his very boyhood, by instinct and training alike, he remained all through his life abstemious, free from vice, respectful to holy men, and passionately fond of hearing scripture readings and sacred stories and songs. But religion remained with him an ever fresh fountain of right conduct and generosity; it did not obsess his mind nor harden him into a bigot. The sincerity of his faith is proved by his impartial respect for the holy men of all sects (Muslim as much as Hindu) and toleration of all creeds. His chivalry to women and strict enforcement of morality in his camp was a wonder in that age and has extorted the admiration of hostile critics like Khāfī Khan.

He had the born leader’s personal magnetism and threw a spell over all who knew him, drawing the best elements.
of the country to his side and winning the most devoted service from his officers, while his dazzling victories and ever ready smile made him the idol of his soldiery. His royal gift of judging character was one of the main causes of his success, as his selection of generals and governors, diplomatists and secretaries was never at fault, and his administration was a great improvement on the past.

His army organization was a model of efficiency; everything was provided beforehand and kept in its proper place under a proper caretaker; an excellent spy system supplied him in advance with the most minute information about the theatre of his intended campaign; divisions of his army were combined or dispersed at will over long distances without failure; the enemy's pursuit or obstruction was successfully met and yet the booty was rapidly and safely conveyed home without any loss. His inborn military genius is proved by his instinctively adopting that system of warfare which was most suited to the racial character of his soldiers, the nature of the country, the weapons of the age, and the internal condition of his enemies. His light cavalry, stiffened with swift-footed infantry, was irresistible in the age of Aurangzib. More than a century after his death, his blind imitator Daulat Rao Sindhia continued the same tactics when the English had galloper guns for field action and most of the Deccan towns were walled round* and provided with defensive artillery, and he therefore failed ignominiously.

§7. Shivaji's genius analyzed.

The greatness of Shivaji's genius can be fully realised not from the extent of the kingdom he won for himself, nor from the value of the hoarded treasure he left behind him, but from a survey of the conditions amidst which he rose to sovereignty.

* Owen's Selections from Wellington's Desp., 284, 289.
He was truly an original explorer, the maker of a new road in mediaeval Indian history, with no example or guide before him. When he chose to declare his independence, the Mughal empire seemed to be at the height of its glory. Every local chief who had, anywhere in India, revolted against it had been crushed. For a small jagirdar's son to defy its power, appeared as an act of madness, a courting of sure ruin. Shivaji, however, chose this path, and he succeeded.

His success can be explained only by an analysis of his political genius. First and foremost he possessed that unfailing sense of reality in politics, that recognition of the exact possibilities of his time (tact des choses possibles) which Cavour defined as the essence of statesmanship. His daring was tempered and guided by an instinctive perception of how far his actual resources could carry him, how long a certain line of action or policy was to be followed, and where he must stop. For the lack of this political insight his rash son Shambhuji came to a miserable end and undid the work of Shivaji's life.

Shivaji possessed the true master's gift of judging character at sight and choosing the fittest instruments for his work. This is proved by the successful execution of his orders by his agents in his absence. Many of the distant expeditions of his reign were conducted not by himself in person but by his generals, who almost always carried out his orders according to plan. This was a novel feat in an Asiatic monarchy, where everything depends on the master's presence. It was the training gained in Shivaji's service, aided by the Marātha national character for personal independence and initiative, that enabled the disorganized Marātha people to stand up against all the resources of the mighty Aurangzib for eighteen years after the murder of Shambhuji and ultimately to defeat him, even though they had no king or capital to form the centre of the national defence.

His reign brought peace and order to his country,
assured the protection of women's honour and the religion of all sects without distinction, extended the royal patronage to the truly pious men of all creeds (Muslims no less than Hindus), and presented equal opportunities to all his subjects by opening the public service to talent irrespective of caste or creed.* This was the ideal policy for a State with a composite population like India.

His gifts were peace and a wise internal administration. The stability of these good conditions was the only thing necessary for giving permanence to Shivaji's work and ensuring national consolidation and growth. But that stability was denied to his political creation. Only his example and name remained to inspire the best minds of succeeding generations with ideals of life and government, not unmixed with vain regrets.

§8. Shivaji's political ideal and difficulties.

Did Shivaji merely found a Krieg-staat? Was he merely an entrepreneur of rapine, a Hindu edition of Alauddin Khilji or Timur?

I think it would not be fair to take this view. For one thing, he never had peace to work out his political ideas. The whole of his short life was one struggle with enemies, a period of preparation and not of fruition. All his attention was necessarily devoted to meeting daily dangers with daily expedients and he had not the chance of peacefully building up a well-planned political edifice.

In the vast Gangetic valley and the wide Desh country rolling eastwards through the Deccan, Nature has fixed no boundary to States. Here a kingdom's size changes with

* He was himself a Hindu, sincere in belief and orthodox in practice, and yet he employed a number of Muhammadan officers in the highest positions, such as Munshi Haidat (who became Chief Justice of the Mughal empire on entering Aurangzeb's service), Siddi Sambal, Siddi Misri, and Daulat Khan (admirals), besides commanders like Siddi Halal and Nur Khan. (Di. i. 100.) He gave legal recognition to the Muslim qazis in his dominions.
daily changes in its strength as compared with its neighbours. There can be no stable equilibrium among them for more than a generation. Each has to push the others as much for self-defence as for aggression. Each must be armed and ready to invade the others, if it does not wish to be invaded and absorbed by them. Where friction with neighbours is the normal state of things, a huge armed force, sleepless vigilance, and readiness to strike the first blow are the necessary conditions of the very existence of a kingdom. The evil could be remedied only by the establishment of a universal empire throughout the country from sea to sea.

Shivaji could not for a moment be sure of the Delhi Government’s pacific disposition or fidelity to treaty. The past history of the Mughal expansion into the Deccan since the days of Akbar, was a warning to him. The imperial policy of annexing the whole of South India was as unmistakable to Shivā as to Adil Shah or Qutb Shah. Its completion was only a question of time, and every Deccani Power was bound to wage eternal warfare with the Mughals if it wished to survive. Hence Shivaji lost no chance of robbing Mughal territory in the Deccan.

With Bijapur his relations were somewhat different. He could raise his head or extend his dominion only at the expense of Bijapur. Rebellion against his liege lord was the necessary condition of his being. But when, about 1662, an understanding was effected between him and the Adil-Shahi ministers, he gave up molesting the heart of the Bijapur kingdom. With the Bijapuri barons whose fiefs lay close to his dominions, he had, however, to wage war till he had wrested Kolhāpur, North Kanārā and South Konkan from their hands. In the Karnatak division, viz., the Dhārwar and Belgāum districts, this contest was still undecided when he died. With the provinces that lay across the path of his natural expansion he could not be at peace, though he did not wish to challenge the central Government of Bijapur. This attitude was changed by the death of Ali II. in 1672, the accession of the boy Sikandar Adil Shah, the faction-
fights between rival nobles at the capital, and the visible dissolution of that Government. But Shivaji helped Bijapur greatly during the Mughal invasion of 1679.

§9. His influence on the spirit.

Shivaji's real greatness lay in his character and practical ability, rather than in originality of conception or length of political vision. Unfailing insight into the character of others, efficiency of arrangements, and instinctive perception of what was practicable and most profitable under the circumstances,—these were the causes of his success in life. To these must be added his personal morality and loftiness of aim, which drew to his side the best minds of his community, while his universal toleration and insistence on equal justice for all gave contentment to all classes subject to his rule. He strenuously maintained order and enforced moral laws throughout his own dominions, and the people were happier under his sway than anywhere else.

His splendid success fired the imagination of his contemporaries, and his name became a spell calling the Marātha race to a new life. His kingdom was lost within nine years of his death. But the imperishable achievement of his life was the raising of the Marāthas into an independent self-reliant people, conscious of their oneness and high destiny, and his most precious legacy was the spirit that he breathed into his race.

The mutual conflict and internal weakness of the three Muslim Powers of the Deccan were, no doubt, contributory causes of the rise of Shivaji. But his success sprang from a higher source than the incompetence of his enemies. I regard him as the last great constructive genius and nation-builder that the Hindu race has produced. His system was his own creation and, unlike Ranjit Singh, he took no foreign aid in his administration. His army was drilled and commanded by his own people and not by Frenchmen. What he built lasted long; his institutions were looked up
to with admiration and emulation even a century later in
the palmy days of the Peshwas' rule.

Shivaji was illiterate; he learnt nothing by reading. He
built up his kingdom and Government before visiting any
royal Court, civilized city, or organized camp. He received
no help or counsel from any experienced minister or
general. But his native genius, alone and unaided, enabled
him to found a compact kingdom, an invincible army and
a practical and beneficent system of administration.

Before his rise, the Marātha race was scattered like
atoms through many Deccani kingdoms. He welded them
into a mighty nation. And he achieved this in the teeth
of the opposition of four great Powers like the Mughal
empire, Bijapur, Portuguese India, and the Abyssinians of
Janjirā. No other mediæval Hindu has shown such capacity.

Before he came, the Marāthas were mere hirelings,
mere servants of aliens. They served the State, but had no
lot or part in its management; they shed their life-blood in
the army, but were denied any share in the conduct of war
or peace. They were always subordinates, never leaders.

Shivaji was the first to challenge Bijapur and Delhi and
thus teach his countrymen that it was possible for them to
be independent leaders in war. Then, he founded a State
and taught his people that they were capable of admini-
stering a kingdom in all its departments. He has proved by his
example that the Hindu race can build a nation, found a
State, defeat enemies; they can conduct their own defence;
they can protect and promote literature and art, commerce
and industry; they can maintain navies and ocean-trading
fleets of their own, and conduct naval battles on equal terms
with foreigners. He taught the modern Hindus to rise to
the full stature of their growth.

He has proved that the Hindu race can still produce
not only jamādārs (non-commissioned officers) and chitnises
(clerks), but also rulers of men, and even a king of kings
(Chhatrapati.) The Emperor Jahāṅgir cut the Akshay Bat
tree of Allahabad down to its roots and hammered a red-hot
iron cauldron on to its stump. He flattered himself that he had killed it. But lo! within a year the tree began to grow again and pushed the heavy obstruction to its growth aside!

Shivaji has shown that the tree of Hinduism is not really dead, that it can rise from beneath the seemingly crushing load of centuries of political bondage, exclusion from the administration, and legal repression; it can put forth new leaves and branches; it can again lift its head up to the skies.