CHAPTER IX

THE CORONATION OF SHIVAJI AND AFTER,
1674—1676

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§1. Why Shivaji wanted to be crowned.

Shivaji and his ministers had long felt the practical disadvantages of his not being a crowned king.* True, he had conquered many lands and gathered much wealth: he had a strong army and navy and exercised powers of life and death over men, like an independent sovereign. But in theory his position was that of a subject; to the Mughal Emperor he was a mere zamindār; to Ādil Shah he was the rebellious son of a vassal jāgirdār. He could not claim equality of political status with any king.

Then, again, so long as he was a mere private subject, he could not, with all his real power, claim the loyalty and devotion of the people over whom he ruled. His promises could not have the sanctity and continuity of the public

* This chapter is mainly based upon the detailed reports of the English ambassador Henry Oxinden (both Letters and Memorial or Narrative), the English interpreter Nārāyan Shenvi, and the Dutch merchant Abraham Le Febcr (of Vingurlā), preserved in Factory Records, Surat, Vols. 88 and 3, and Dutch Records, Vol. xxxiv. No. 841, of the India Office, London. These have been supplemented by Sabhāśad (82-84). 91 Q. B. sec. 83 confirms the contemporary European records in some particulars in a surprising manner. The Bombay Gazetteer (xi. 369) has pointed out that the Chitnis bakhāvar imputes to Shivaji’s coronation in 1674 the ceremonies which marked the Peshwa’s coronation of a century later! The Sanskrit poem Shiva R. R. Kalpataru has been critically used.
engagements of the head of a State. He could sign no treaty, grant no land with legal validity or an assurance of permanence. The territories conquered by his sword could not become his lawful property, however undisturbed his possession over them might be in practice. The people living under his sway or serving under his banners, could not renounce their allegiance to the former sovereign of the land, nor be sure that they were exempt from the charge of treason for their obedience to Shivaji. The permanence of his political creation required that it should be validated as the work of a sovereign.

It is also clear that the rise of the Bhonslés created much jealousy among the other Marātha families which had once been their equals in social status. These men consoled themselves by refusing to adhere to Shivaji as his servants, bragged of their being loyal subjects of Aurangzib or of Ādil Shah, and sneered at Shivaji as an upstart rebel and usurper. It was necessary to rectify his position in their eyes. A formal coronation alone could show them that he was a king and therefore their superior, and enable him to treat on equal terms with the rulers of Bijapur and Golkondā.

The higher minds of Mahārāshtra, too, had begun to look up to Shivaji as the champion of Hinduism, and wished to see the Hindu race elevated to the full stature of its political growth by the formal assertion of his position as an independent king. They longed for the Hindu Swarāj, and that implied a Hindu Chhatrapati. (Sabh. 82.)

§2. Shivaji recognized by Gāgā Bhatta as a Kshatriya.

But there was one curious hindrance to the realization of this ideal. According to the ancient Hindu scriptures, only a member of the Kshatriya caste can be legally crowned as king and claim the homage of Hindu subjects. The Bhonslés were popularly known to be neither Kshatriyas nor of any other twice-born caste, but mere tillers of the soil,
as Shivaji’s great-grandfather was still remembered to have been. How could an upstart sprung from such a Shudra (plebeian) stock aspire to the rights and honours due to a Kshatriya? The Brāhmans of all parts of India would attend and bless the coronation of Shivaji, only if he could be authoritatively declared a Kshatriya.

It was, therefore, necessary first to secure the support of a pandit, whose reputation for scholarship would silence all opposition to the views he might propound. Such a man was found in Vishweshwar, nicknamed Gāgā Bhatta, of Benares, the greatest Sanskrit theologian and controversialist then alive, a master of the four Vedas, the six philosophies, and all the scriptures of the Hindus, and popularly known as the Brahma-deva and Vyās of the modern age. After holding out for some time, he became compliant, accepted the Bhonslé pedigree as fabricated by the clever secretary Bālājī Avji and other agents of Shivā, and declared that this Rajah was a Kshatriya of the purest breed, descended in unbroken line from the Mahārāṇās of Udaipur, the sole representatives of the solar line of the mythical hero-god Rāmchandra. His audacious but courtierly ethnological theory was rewarded with a huge fee, and he was entreated to visit Mahārāshtra and officiate as high priest at the coronation of Shivā. He agreed, and on his arrival was welcomed like a crowned head, Shivā and all his officers advancing many miles from Satārā to receive him on the way.

§3. Preparations for coronation.

The preparations took many months. There was no unbroken tradition about the exact ceremonies and paraphernalia required at the coronation of an independent Hindu sovereign. The Sanskrit epics and political treatises were ransacked by a syndicate of pandits to find out the orthodox ancient precedents on these points, and agents were sent to learn the modern practice of the Rajahs of Udaipur and Amber.
Invitations had been sent to learned Brāhmans of every part of India; the report of the coming ceremony had attracted others. Eleven thousand Brāhmans, making 50,000 souls with their wives and children, were assembled at Rāigarh and fed with sweets for four months at the Rajah’s expense. The greatest forethought and organizing power must have been shown by Shiva in providing for the comfort of the numerous guests—Brāhmans, nobles, local magnates of the realm, agents of other States, foreign merchants and visitors, and poor cousins, who flocked to the ceremony. Nothing went amiss in catering to this crowd of nearly a hundred thousand men, women and children.

The daily religious ceremonies and consultations with the Brāhmans left Shivā no time to attend to other business, as the English envoy, Henry Oxinden, found to his chagrin. Shivā began by bowing to his guru Rāmdās Swāmi and his mother Jijā Bāi and receiving their blessings. The unhappy discarded first wife of Shāhji, now verging on eighty, had forgotten her husband’s neglect in the love and devotion of her son, and rejoiced to see, before she closed her eyes, that he had reached the summit of human greatness as the crowned king of the land of his birth, an irresistible conqueror, and a strong defender of the religion which was the solace of her life. Like a queen-mother of the same country born 15 centuries earlier, Gautami, the mother of the Andhra king Shri Sātakarnī, she gloried in the glory of her victorious and orthodox son.* A kind Providence seemed to have preserved her life just long enough to enable her to witness the scene of his coronation, for she died twelve days after it.

* "I am Gautami, the mother of Shri Sātakarnī (reign c. 109-155 A.D.), who shared the joys and sorrows of the people without distinction, who trampled on the pride of the warrior caste, who slew Scythians, Bactrians, and Parthians, who exterminated the Kshaharāt dynasty, established the glory of the Shātavāhan family, put an end to illicit unions among the four castes, conquered his enemy hosts in many a fight, and whose victorious banner has never been defeated." (Ep. Ind. VIII. 60.)

Then he set out on a round of worship at the most famous shrines of the land. Chiplun was visited early in May, 1674, and after adoring *Parashurām* in the great temple there, he returned to Rāigarh on the 12th. Four days afterwards he again issued forth to worship the Bhavāṇi goddess he had installed at Pratāpgarh, as the ancient Bhavāṇi of Tuljāpur was beyond his reach. To this image he presented an umbrella of pure gold, weighing one and a quarter maunds, (worth about Rs. 56,000) and many other costly gifts. Returning to Rāigarh in the afternoon of the 21st, he plunged into devotion there. Under the guidance of his family priest, Bālam Bhatta, (the son of Prabhākar Bhatta Upādhyāy), he adored Mahādev, Bhavāṇi and other local deities for many days in succession.

But one great defect had to be removed before his coronation could take place. He had to be publicly purified and "made a Kshatriya." On 28th May he performed penance for his ancestors' and his own sin of omission in not having observed the Kshatriya rites so long, and was invested by Gāgā Bhatta with the sacred thread, the distinctive badge of the twice-born castes like the "pure" Kshatriyas of Northern India. Next day he was married again to two of his surviving wives according to the *Kshatriya* manner and with the scriptural chanting which is a privilege of the twice-born castes, so as to "purify" them and make them worthy to share his coronation ritual.

The next step was to teach him the *mantra* (sacred verses) and initiate him into the rules of the Kshatriya caste. Shivaji very logically demanded that all the Vedic verses appropriate to the initiation and coronation of a true Hindu king should be chanted in his hearing, because the Kshatriyas being one of the holy "twice-born" castes, he as an admitted Kshatriya was entitled to use the Vedic mantra equally with the Brāhmans. At this there was a mutiny among the assembled Brāhmans, who asserted that there
was no true Kshatriya in the modern age* and that the Brāhmans were the only twice-born caste now surviving! Even Gāgā Bhatta was cowed by the general opposition and evidently dropped the Vedic chant and initiated the Rajah only in a modified form of the life of the twice-born, instead of putting him on a par with the Brāhmans in this respect. This purification and its sequel, the investiture with the sacred thread, were performed with "great ceremony"; a vast amount of money was distributed among the Brāhmans, Gāgā Bhatta alone getting 7,000 hun and the crowd of ordinary Brāhmans 17,000 hun. (91 Q. B. 83; Dutch Records.)

Next day, Shivā made atonement for the sins, deliberate or accidental, committed in his own life. He was separately weighed against each of the seven metals,—gold, silver, copper, zinc, tin, lead and iron,—as well as very fine linen, camphor, salt, nails (sic), nutmegs, and other spices, butter, sugar, fruits and all sorts of eatables (betel-leaves and country wine being among them.) All these metals and other articles to the weight of his body, together with a lakh of hun more, were given away to the assembled Brāhmans after the coronation.

* The following significant passage in 91 Q. B. sec. 83, suggests that Shivaji at one time thought of punishing the proud intolerant Brāhmans by removing them from lucrative secular duties like the command of armies and viceroyalties of provinces and confining them to their scriptural functions of fasting and praying. "The Maharajah learning [of the refusal of the Brāhmans to teach him the Vedic mantras], said, 'The Brāhmans are reverend men. It is not proper to appoint them royal servants. They ought not to perform any work except worshipping God.' So he removed all the Brāhmans from their posts and appointed Prabhu Kāyasthas in their places. Mōto Pant interceded for the Brāhmans."

That Shivaji was invested with the sacred thread and made a "purified Kshatriya" by Gāgā Bhatta as an indispensable preliminary to his coronation, is questioned by nobody. But I believe that he was not allowed to repeat the Gāyatri mantra ("the mother of the Vedas") as neither Sabhāsad (who wrote to please Shivaji's son), nor Dattaji Wāqnis mentions such a fact. Jēdhē merely says that on 30th May Shivaji was married "with mantras", i.e., the Vedic chant, and Nischalpuri asserts that Shivaji "received the Gāyatri uttered by his guru Gāgā at an inauspicious moment."

The Vedokta is a live issue in Marātha society even now.
But even this failed to satisfy their greed. Two of the learned Brāhmans pointed out that Shivā, in the course of his raids, had burnt cities "involving the death of Brāhmans, cows, women and children." He could be cleansed of this sin,—for a price. It was not necessary for him to pay compensation to the surviving relatives of the men and women who had perished in his sack of Surat or Kārinjā. It would be enough if he put money into the pockets of the Brāhmans of Konkan and Desh. The price demanded for this 'pardon' was only Rs. 8,000, and Shivā could not have refused to pay this trifle. (*Dutch Records*, Vol. 34, No. 841.)

§5. *Scene of Shivaji's Coronation.*

All his disqualifications having been thus removed with gold, the actual coronation was now begun. The 5th of June was the eve of the grand ceremony. That day had to be spent in self-restraint and mortification of the flesh, like the night of vigil preceding knighthood in the age of chivalry in Europe. Shivaji bathed in water brought from the holy Ganges, and gave Gāgā Bhatta 5,000 *hun* and the other great Brāhmans a hundred gold-pieces each. The day was probably spent in fasting.

Next day (6th June, 1674) the coronation itself took place. Rising very early in the morning Shivaji prepared himself by bathing amidst ceremonies intended to avert evil, worshipped his household gods, and adored the feet of Bālam Bhatta his family priest, Gāgā Bhatta, and other eminent Brāhmans, who all received gifts of ornaments and cloth.

The essential parts of a Hindu king's coronation are washing him (*abhisheka*) and holding the royal umbrella over his head (*chhatra-dhāran*.) Clad in a pure white robe, and decked with garlands of flowers, scented essence, and gold ornaments, Shiva walked to the place appointed for the bath. Here he sat down on a gold-plated stool, two feet
square and two feet high. The queen-consort, Soyā Bāi, occupied a seat on his left with the hem of her robe knotted up with his, in sign of her being his equal partner in this world and the next (saha-dharmini), as the Hindu sacred law names the wife. The heir-apparent Shambhuji sat down close behind. Then the eight ministers of his cabinet (ashta-pradīnī), who stood ready at the eight points of the horizon with gold jugs full of the water of the Ganges and other holy rivers, emptied them over the heads of the king, queen and crown-prince, amidst the chanting of hymns and the joyous music of the band. Sixteen pure-robed Brāhman wives each with five lamps laid on a gold tray, waved the lights round his head to scare away evil influences.

Then Shivaji changed his dress for a robe of royal scarlet, richly embroidered with gold, put on sparkling gems and gold ornaments, a necklace, a garland of flowers, and a turban adorned with strings and tassels of pearls, worshipped his sword, shield, bow and arrows, and again bowed to his elders and the Brāhmans. Then, at the auspicious moment selected by the astrologers, he entered the throne-room.

The hall of coronation was decorated with the 32 emblematic figures prescribed by Hindu usage and various auspicious plants. Overhead an awning of cloth of gold was spread, with strings of pearls hanging down in festoons. The floor was covered with velvet. In the centre was placed a "magnificent throne", constructed after months of continuous labour in a style worthy of a great king. Even if we reject Sabhāsād's statement that it contained 32 maunds of gold (worth 14 lakhs of Rupees), we must accept the English observer's report that it was "rich and stately". The base was evidently coated with gold plate, and so also were the eight pillars standing at the eight angles, which were further richly embellished with gems and diamonds. They supported a canopy of the richest gold embroidery from which strings of pearls were suspended in tassels and festoons, interspersed with sparkling gems. The covers of the royal seat were a grotesque combination of ancient
Hindu asceticism and modern Mughal luxury: tiger skin below and velvet on the top!

On the two sides of the throne, various emblems of royalty and government were hung from gilded lance-heads. On the right hand stood two large fish-heads of gold with very big teeth, and on the left several horses' tails (the insignia of royalty among the Turks) and a pair of gold scales, evenly balanced (the emblem of justice), on a very costly lance-head. All these were copied from the Mughal Court. At the palace gate were placed on either hand pitchers full of water covered with bunches of fresh green leaves, and also two young elephants and two beautiful horses, with gold bridles and rich trappings. These latter were auspicious tokens according to Hindu belief.

As Shivaji mounted the throne, small lotuses of gold set with jewels, and various other flowers made of gold and silver were showered among the assembled throng. Sixteen Brähman married women again performed the auspicious waving of lamps round the newly enthroned monarch. The Brähmans lifted up their voices, chanting holy verses and blessing the king, who bowed to them in return. The crowd set up deafening shouts of "Victory, victory unto Shiva-rāj!" All the instruments began to play and the musicians to sing at once. By previous arrangement the artillery of every fort in the kingdom fired salvoes of all their guns exactly at this time. The arch-pontiff Gāgā Bhatta advanced to the throne, held the royal sun-shade of cloth of gold fringed with pearls over his head, and hailed his as Shiva Chhatrapati, or Śhīva the paramount sovereign!

The Brähmans stepped forward and poured their blessings on his head. The Rajah gave away vast sums of money and gifts of every kind to them and to the assembled beggars and general public. "He performed the sixteen varieties of greater alms-giving (mahā-dān) prescribed in the sacred books of the Hindus. Then the ministers advanced to the throne and made their obeisance, and received from
his hands robes of honour, letters of appointment, and large gifts of money, horses, elephants, jewels, cloth, and arms. Sanskrit titles were ordered to be used in future to designate their offices, and the Persian titles hitherto current were abolished.” (Sabh. 83-84.)

The crown-prince Shambhuji, the high-priest Gagā Bhatta, and the prime-minister Moro Trimbak Pinglé, were seated on an eminence a little lower than the throne. The other ministers stood in two rows on the right and left of the throne. All other courtiers and visitors stood according to their ranks at proper places in a respectful attitude.

By this time it was eight o'clock in the morning. The English ambassador, Henry Oxinden, was now presented by Nirāji Pant. He bowed from a distance, and his interpreter Nārāyan Shenvi held up a diamond ring as an offering from the English to the Rajah. Shivaji took notice of the strangers and ordered them to come to the foot of the throne, invested them with robes of honour, and then sent them back.

§6. Street procession at Rāigarh.

When the presentations were over, the Rajah descended from his throne, mounted his best horse, decked with gorgeous trappings, and rode to the Jagadishwar temple. There he mounted the finest elephant in his stable, dressed out most splendidly for the occasion, and then rode through the streets of the capital in full military procession, girt round by his ministers and generals, with the two royal banners, Jari-patākā and Bhagwé-jhānda, borne aloft on two elephants walking in front, while the generals and regiments of troops followed with their respective flags, artillery and bands. The citizens had decorated their houses and roads in a manner worthy of the occasion. The housewives waved lighted lamps round him and showered fried rice, flowers, holy grass, &c., on his head. After visiting the various temples on Rāigarh hill and offering adoration with presents at each of them, he returned to the palace.
On the 7th began a general distribution of gifts to all the assembled envoys and Brāhmans and of alms to the beggars, which lasted twelve days, during which the people were also fed at the king's expense. The more distinguished pandits and sannyāsins were not included in this alms-giving, as these ordinary men got only 3 to 5 Rupees and the women and children a Rupee or two each.

A day or two after the coronation the monsoon burst, the rain set in with violence, and the weather continued wet for some time, to the intense discomfort of the assembled crowd. On the 8th, Shivaji took a fourth wife without any state or ceremony. This was evidently a renewal of his marriage with one of his former wives, but performed with the full Kshatriya rites to which he had now become entitled.* (Letter of Oxinden, 27 May; Oxinden's Memorial under date 8 June.)

After the coronation was over, Jijā Bāi died on 18th June, in the fulness of years and happiness, leaving to her son her personal property worth 25 lakhs of hun, "some say more". When the period of mourning for her was over, Shivaji sat on the throne a second time on 24th September. (Dutch Records, S. R. Kalpataru. Shīvāpur Yādi.)

§7. Shivaji's second enthronement.

A full account of Shivaji's second coronation only three months after his wellknown first formal enthronement, has been found in a recently discovered Sanskrit manuscript, the Shiva-rāj-Rājyāvishek-Kalpataru. This book unfolds a sordid tale of monkish greed and sectarian bitterness among the Brahmans. In it a famous Tāntrik high-priest named Nishchal Puri Goswāmi boastfully describes why and how

* Jedhé S. says that the marriage was celebrated with [Vedic] mantras, on 30th May, i.e., two days after Shivaji was invested with the sacred thread, and we shall not be wrong in supposing that Shivaji made these late marriages in order to assert publicly his right as a 'twice-born' to hear the Vedic mantras!
the Rajah performed this second ceremony under his influence. This is the story:—

Gagā Bhatta, the director of Shivaji's first coronation rites, was a follower of the Vedic system of Hindu theology and the patron of Brahmins belonging to that school, while Nishchal was the champion of the (Bengali) Tāntrik school, and the two differed as Jew from Gentile. So, the first coronation was performed according to the Vedic ritual and only Vedic Brahman beggars benefited from the golden shower of the Rajah's bounty at the ceremony,—while the Tāntrik mendicants sent by Nishchal to share the royal alms were driven away with abuse.

Gagā Bhatta (as charitably described by Nishchal) was an idiot; he made a wrong astronomical calculation and thus performed the coronation on a day when the malignant stars were in the ascendant. He made the king worship only the Vedic gods and scornfully ignored the spirits and goblins adored in the Tantra. The coronation thus conducted ended, when lo! a miracle. A number of the most unaccountable mishaps took place (some of them before it! ! !): the queen-consort Kāshi Bāi, the Queen-mother Jijā Bāi, the commander-in-chief Pratāp Rao, all died within a short space of time. A meteor fell. Immediately after the king had left the coronation-hall, a piece of timber hit Gagā Bhatta's nose,—unquestionably an act of divine retribution for his having made Shivaji believe that Nishchal was not "worthy of being bowed to"—and, what mattered most, of getting a half share of the purse of 7,000 gold pieces presented by the king to Gagā! This favoured high priest’s sin had infected his assistant Bālam Bhatta, on whose head the wooden lotus of a pillar in the hall tumbled down. Other evil portents had taken place during the coronation: As Shivā was mounting the steps of the throne, some unlucky wretch sneezed at the south-eastern corner (where the Fire-god dwells); the Crown Prince lost two pearls from his necklace; the sword placed before Shivā for worship fell out of its scabbard; when the king as a part of
the ritual shot an arrow the seal dropped out of his hand; the minister Dattāji tumbled down to the ground. Shivā and the public alike were puzzled and alarmed by these mischances for which no earthly cause could be found. Then Nishchal had his revenge on Gāgā; he sent a disciple (malla, i.e., a ruffianly Nāgā chelā) to the Rajah to explain that these evil portents (like the pranks of the poltergeist as known in Europe) were due to the idiot Gāgā Bhatta’s omission to propitiate with puja and sacrifice* the gods of the Tantra, such as the ten Mahāvidyās, the spirits dwelling in the hill, the soil, the gate-posts, the throne, and the eight points of the horizon, and these had made their wrath felt in the above ways.

This unearthly evidence conclusively proved that the Vedic gods could not protect their votaries so much as the Tāntrik devils could hurt, and that the carnivorous monks were more potent magicians than the grass-eating priests who professed the Vedic cult! Shivā, like the shrewd practical man that he was, decided to woo both of these supernatural hosts,† for how could one be certain as to who really rules over that undiscovered country from whose bourne no traveller returns? Therefore, Nishchal Puri found Shivaji now ‘falling at his feet’ and begging him to conduct a Tāntrik coronation for him. This was done on 24th September and every grade of goblins was satisfied with due offerings. Its natural corollary followed; there was another shaking of the king’s pagoda-tree by the

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* Bali, the Sanskrit word used here, means either (1) offerings of dry grain, such as rice, or (2) animal sacrifice, such as goats and buffaloes. Animal sacrifice is an integral part of Tāntrik worship. In the Deccan there was the immemorial custom of consecrating a king’s visit to a fort by slaughtering a buffalo at the gate and washing his elephant’s feet with its blood before he entered it. A French officer of Bussy’s corps saw this done in 1750 when Salābat Jang entered Golkonda fort with his escort. (Paris ms. tr. by me in Islamic Culture.)

† The Jārejā Rajput Rao of Cutch, ‘when he appears in public, alternatingly worships God in a Hindu pagoda and a Muhammadan mosque.’ (J. Burnes, Visit to the Court of Sinde and a History of Cutch. 1839, p. xiv.)
Brahmans,—this time the Tāntrik and Vedic mendicants mingling together in a tumultuous crowd and giving a foretaste of the rabble of Brahman beggars who used to invade the Punā of the Peshwās every year to get the Shrāvan alms and terrorise the city by their insolent and riotous conduct!

Another mishap, mentioned by Nishchal Puri, was that the temple on Pratāpgarh caught fire and many costly horses and one elephant were burnt there in consequence. The Shivāpur Yādi says that “lightning struck the temple on Pratāpgarh on 25 Sept. 1675,”—i.e., one full year after the Tāntrik coronation. If this information is correct, then the Tāntrik rites were clearly as futile for averting evil as the Vedic pujā, for all the money that Nishchal Puri had wheedled out of Shivaji and all his boasting.

§8. Cost of the Coronation.

The total cost of the coronation, including the sums distributed in gifts and alms, is put down by Sabhāsad at the incredible figure of one krore and 42 lakhs of hun. The Dutch merchant Abraham Le Feber, writing from Vingurla only four months after the event, quotes the popular report that “this ceremony and distribution of largess cost 150,000 pagodas”. He evidently means the money spent in the 12 days’ general alms-giving from the 7th to the 18th of June, and not the special gifts to the ministers and other officers, Brahmans and priests. But even when all these are taken into account, together with the price of the throne and ornaments made for the occasion and the cost of feeding the assemblage, the total expenditure cannot be put higher than 10 lakhs of hun or fifty lakhs of Rupees.

§9. Loot of Bahādur Khan’s camp and extensive contest with the Mughals.

The coronation exhausted Shivaji’s treasury and he was in need of money to pay his troops. It was, therefore,
necessary for him to be out on raid immediately afterwards (F. R. Surat, 88, Nicolls to Surat, 14 Oct., 1674.)

His first movement was against Bahādur Khan. As early as May 1674 it was the talk of the Marātha Court that Dilir Khan, whom they feared most, having been recalled by the Emperor, the Mughal forces in the Deccan were commanded by Bahādur Khan alone, whom they despised and whose “quarters they intended to beat up after the rains”. The blow was struck much sooner, at the very height of the monsoons. Towards the middle of July, a body of 2,000 Maratha light cavalry, made a false demonstration and lured Bahādur Khan some 50 miles away from his cantonments at Pedgāon, while a second force, 7,000 strong, swooped down by another route on his defenceless camp, carried away a krore of Rupees in booty and 200 fine horses collected for presentation to the Emperor, and burnt all his tents. (F. R. Surat 88, Oxinden to Surat, 21 May; Vol. 87, Surat to Bombay, 1 Aug., 1674.)

The state of war with Bijapur continued, though languidly. A general of that State, probably Rustam-i-Zamān II., lay with his army on the Ghāts near Kolhāpur (July), ready to descend into Konkan and wrest Rājāpur from the Marāthas. In August, September and October Marātha bands spread northwards into the Koli country, giving repeated alarms to the port of Surat. But a body of three to four thousand Bhils of Rāmnagar held the jungles and passes through that State and opposed the Marāthas, who vainly offered them a bribe of one lakh of Rupees for a safe passage (middle of October 1674).*

Shortly afterwards the baffled Marātha army, after provisioning their forts in that region, marched away to join Shivā near Aurangabad, and Surat breathed freely again. They had found an easier prey in another quarter. Late in October, a large army commanded by Shivaji in person

advanced into the Deccan plateau, skirted Bahādur Khan's
camp, which was "hotly alarmed," looted several towns
near Aurangabad, and then burst into Baglānā and
Khāndesh, where they continued for more than a month
(Nov. to middle of Dec.) Among other places they pillaged
and burnt Dharangāon (10 m. north of Erāndol) and its
English factory. Qutb-ud-din Khan Kheshgi bravely opposed
the raiders, but his small force was routed with the loss of
3 to 4 hundred men, and he fled to Aurangabad for refuge.
(F. R. Surat 87, Surat to Bomb. 28 Oct., 1664 ; Vol. 107,
Bomb. to Surat 2 Nov., 1674 ; Dungom to Surat, 10 Dec.;
O. C. 1062.)

It was probably on his return from this raid that
Shivā encamped near Junnar, but a shot from a 22 feet
narrow-bore gun on the walls of Shivner killed a Rajah of
his army and caused the prompt retreat of the Marāthas.*

At the end of January 1675, a band of 3,000 Marātha
cavalry under Dattāji roved in the Kolhāpur district. The
town of Kolhāpur saved itself by paying 1,500 hun, and
Shongāon (near Gargoti, about 30 miles south of Kolhāpur)
500 hun. In the middle of February, a Mughal force crossed
the Ghāts, fell on the town of Kaliān, burnt the houses (in-
cluding those of many Khojās) and then quickly retired,
after which the Marāthas re-occupied the place. (F. R.
Surat 88, Rajapur to Surat. 6 Feb.; Vol. 107, Bomb. to Surat,
27 Feb., 1675.)

§10. Shivaji's false negotiations with Bahādur Khan, 1675.

Shivaji next opened delusive peace negotiations with
Bahādur Khan, who eagerly swallowed the bait, as he was
weary of the war and at his wits' end how to guard all parts
of his viceroyalty against such a mobile and elusive enemy.
For nearly three months (March-May) Shivā kept the

* Fryer (i. 338) says that it happened 'some four months before' the
22nd of May, 1675, and that the shot was hurled 2 kos off.
Mughals in play, by feeding false hopes of a peace.* His real motives were to gain respite from Mughal attacks in order to provision his forts, to get money out of Ādil Shah by the threat of an alliance with the Mughals for the invasion of Bijapur and to secure his northern frontier during the siege of Phondā.

It was proposed that Shivaji would cede 17 of his forts to Aurangzib and send his son Shambhuji with a contingent to serve under the Mughal subahdār, while the Emperor would create Shambhuji a commander of six thousand horse, and grant Shivā all the country on the right bank of the Bhimā. The negotiations were deliberately spun out. Shivā “demurred to sending his son to the Mughal general until he had better security for his safety.” Bahādur Khan reported the terms to the Emperor, who sent in reply a farmān accepting them and pardoning Shivā’s past misdeeds. Then the viceroy sent messengers asking Shivaji to receive the farmān and deliver the forts. But by this time (July 1675), Phondā had been captured. Shivaji now threw off the mask and dismissed the Mughal envoys with taunts, saying, “What pressure have you succeeded in putting on me that I should seek peace with you? Go hence quickly, or you will be disgraced.”

Bahādur Khan, ashamed at being thus outwitted and anxious to cover his foolish credulity and diplomatic defeat by some striking success, hurriedly made an agreement with the Bijapuri wazir Khawās Khan (October) for a joint war on Shivā. Aurangzib approved of the idea, and is said to have offered to give up one year’s tribute from Bijapur if that State heartily co-operated with his viceroy in a concerted attack on Shivā from two sides. But the overthrow of Khawās Khan and the usurpation of the regency by Bahlol Khan (11th Nov.) spoiled this plan, and soon afterwards the

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* False overtures of peace with the Mughals in 1675; F. R. Surat 107, Bomb. to Surat, 27 Feb. 1675; O. C. 4077; Vol. 88, Surat to Bomb. 15 June and 17 July, also Letters from J. Child, 7 August; Dil. 194—195; B. S 401—2, M. A. 142 (7 July, 1675).
Mughals were drawn into the whirlpool of faction-fights at the Adil-Shahi Court. (B.S. 445.)

Meantime, while the Mughal viceroy was being lulled into inactivity by these peace overtures, and Shivā was hastening to the siege of Phondā, he captured Kolhāpur (March) but failed to take Rāibāgh. A little later another division of his army ranged far eastwards, plundering Bijapur and Golkondā territories, especially Yadagiri and two towns near Haidarabad, “bringing away a great deal of riches besides many rich persons” held to ransom. At the same time his men robbed Cuncolim and Veroda* in the Portuguese territory (middle of April.) The other Marātha activities in the latter half of this year will be described in the chapter on South Konkan and Kanārā.

§11. War with the Mughals renewed. Union with Bijapur.

In November, Bahādur Khan, on being sharply censured by Aurangzib, marched to Kaliān, and pressed Shivā hard in North Konkan. In January next (1676), a Marātha band spread near Aurangabad, but Bahādur with light equipment and no tent, made a rapid march from Pedgāon, defeated the rovers near Lāsur, 28 miles from the capital, and drove them back towards Junnar. (O. C. 4139; Dil. 140.)

At this time Shivā was taken seriously ill, and passed the next three months on the sick-bed at Satārā. His perfect recovery was announced at the end of March, after which he removed to Panhālā. The Marāthas looted Athni, 43 m. west of Bijapur, in April. The civil war that had broken out between the Deccani and Afghan parties at Bijapur, was Shivaji’s opportunity. Early in May we hear of his having sent out “4,000 horse that ranges up and down, plunders and robs without any hindrance or danger.” (F. R. Surat,

* F. R. Surat 88, Rajapur to Surat 1 April, Karwar to Surat 22 April, 1675.
Vol. 89, Rajapur to Surat, 11 Jan. and 9 May 1676; O. C. 4202.)

In May, his prime-minister Moro Trimbak drove the Rajah of Rāmnagar out of his country and took Pindol* and Painecah within three days' march of Surat. But the monsoons being at hand, he left 4,000 men to garrison the district and retired with the rest of his army to Rāigarh at the end of the month. (F. R. 89, Surat to Bomb., 27 May and 1 June 1676.)

On 31st May Bahādur Khan opened a vigorous and long campaign against Bijapur, where the Afghan faction had seized the Government. This act drove the new regent Bahlol Khan into the arms of Shivā, and in July we have the report of a peace between them having been concluded through the mediation of the Golkondā minister Mādana. The terms of this treaty were that the Adil-Shahi Government would pay Shivā 3 lakhs of Rupees down as a contribution and one lakh of hun annually as subsidy for protection against the Mughals, and confirm him in the possession of the country bounded on the east by the Krishnā, including the Kolhāpur district. But the union was shortlived, as no policy could be durable in a State ravaged by civil war and subject to almost daily changes of authority. Shivaji hardly minded the rupture of this subsidiary alliance; his gaze was fixed elsewhere; and in January next (1677), he set out on the greatest expedition of his life, the invasion of the Eastern Karnātak. (B.S. 450-470; F. R. Surat 89, Rajapur to Surat, 24 July 1676.)

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* Pindval. 11 m. s. e. of Dharampur, in the Dharampur State, south of Surat. Painecah is probably either Panva, 5 m. w. of Pindval, or Panaj, 9 m. n. of Dharampur. (Ind. At., 24 N. E.)
CHAPTER X
SOUTH KONKAN AND KANARA

1. Kanara, its rulers and trade.
2. First raid on Rajapur &c.
5. Loot of Basrur and Karwar.
7. Shivaji and Rustam-i-Zaman.
8. His plot for seizing Goa.
9. His failure in Bijapuri Kanara.
10. Internal troubles in Kanara 1674.
11. Capture of Phonda 1675.
12. Marathas in Kanara uplands.

§1. Kanārā, its rulers and trade.

In the seventeenth century, Kanārā or the extensive country along our west coast, was held by various Hindu chieftains. North Kanārā (now included in the Bombay Presidency) owned the overlordship of Bijapur, which ruled directly over the coast-strip from Kārwār (south of Goā) to Mirjān (14°30' N. lat.), leaving the inland districts in the hands of feudatory chiefs, among whom the Nāyaks of Sundā were the most important. The portion of Kanārā that lay south of Mirjān formed a large and independent principality under the Keladi dynasty, whose capital was then at Bednur.

A Muslim officer with the hereditary title of Rustam-i-Zamān (originally Randaula Khan) was the viceroy of the south-western corner of the Bijapur kingdom. His charge extended on the west coast from Ratnagiri town, going southwards round the Portuguese territory of Goā to Kārwār and Mirjān, while landwards it included the southern part of the Ratnagiri district, Kolhāpur, Belgāum, a bit of Dhārwar and the western corner of the North Kanārā district. His seat was at Miraj. The fort of Panhāla lay within his province, but it was governed by a commandant directly under the orders of the Sultan. The viceroy admi-
nistered by means of his agents the flourishing ports of Rājāpur in the north and Kārwār in the south, through which the trade of the rich inland places flowed to Europe. In both towns the English had factories.

"The best pepper in the world is of the growth of Sundā, known in England by [the name of] Kārwār pepper, though five days' journey distant from thence." (Fryer, ii. 42.) Indeed, after the loss of Chaul, Kārwār became the greatest port of Bijapur on the west coast. "The finest muslins of western India were exported from here. The weaving country was inland, to the east of the Sahyādrīs, at Hubli (in the Dhārwar district), and at other centres, where the English East India Company had agents and employed as many as 50,000 weavers." (Bom. Gaz., xv., pt. ii. pp. 123-125.)

At Mirjān, a port twenty miles south-east of Kārwār, pepper, saltpetre and betel-nut were shipped for Surat. Gersāppā, a district annexed by Bednur, was so famous for its pepper that the Portuguese used to call its Rāṇī "the Pepper Queen." (Ibid, 333 and 124.)

In 1649 the pepper and cardamon trade of Rājāpur was the chief attraction that induced the English Company to open a factory there. Vingurlā was spoken of in 1660 as a great place of call for ships from Bataviā, Japan and Ceylon on the one side, and the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea on the other. All the ports of the Ratnagiri district did much trade also in calicoes, silks, grain and coarse lac, though pepper was their chief export, "which coming out of Kanārā is sent by sea to Persia, Surat and Europe. This country is the store-house for all its neighbours." (Bom. Gaz., x. 175.)

§2. Shivaji's first raid on Rājāpur, &c.

After the disastrous failure of Afzal Khan, Rustam-i-Zamān had marched against Shivaji (December, 1659) with 3,000 horse, but this show of hostility was made simply to save his credit with his king. The queen-regent, Bari
Sāhiba, being his enemy, he had made a secret alliance with Shivaji for self-protection. This fact was well-known to the country round, and the English factors had found proofs of it. But even if Rustam had been in earnest, he could have done little with his small army.

Shivaji had followed up his victory over Afzal’s army by pushing on to Panhālā and capturing that fort (28 Nov.). Then he entered the Ratnagiri district and began to “take possession of all the port and inland towns.” The Bijapuri governors of these places fled to Rājāpur, which was at first spared, “because it belonged to Rustam-i-Zaman, who is a friend of Shivaji.” (Rajapur to Surat, 10th December 1659, F. R. Rajapur.)

On the fall of Dābhol, its defeated governor made his escape to Rājāpur with three junk of Afzal Khan, of 450, 350 and 300 tons burden respectively. The governor of Rājāpur, by order of his master Rustam-i-Zamān, received the junk and landed their cargoes for safe-keeping. Shortly after this Shivaji encountered and routed near Panhālā, the combined armies of Rustam and Fazl Khan (the son of Afzal).* The latter, who bore the brunt of the battle, lost many of his followers, while Rustam, who had made a mere show of fighting, retreated to Hukri with slight loss, and there sat still, while the Marāthas continued to make their incursions into Adil-Shahi territory. (Rajapur to Bassein, 4 February 1660, F. R. Rajapur.)

The news of this battle greatly alarmed Rustam’s governor of Rājāpur, who took refuge in one of Afzal Khan’s junk for escaping to the open sea. Before he could start, a Marātha force appeared on the bank to seize the junk; but the governor (about 10th January) succeeded in slipping away beyond the range of the Marātha guns, with the help of the English factor Henry Revington, who for his private gain opposed the Marāthas, as will be described in Chapter 14.

* Jedhai S. states that in this battle the Marāthas captured 2,000 horses and twelve elephants. Shivapur Yādi gives the date as 28th Dec., 1659.
Shivaji condemned this attack on his ally's town of Rājāpur, dismissed Doroji, the general responsible for it. "commanded all things that his soldiers took from the townsmen [at Rājāpur] to be restored," and put Rustam-i-Zamān's agents again in possession of the town and port. (Rajapur to Surat, 20 February.)

The Dutch report states that about this time Shivā with his troops arrived within four hours' march of Vingurlā, but was driven off by the desāi of Kudal (i.e., Sāvant-Vādi), while another Marāṭha army which had penetrated to near Bijapur was forced to withdraw after being defeated in a bloody battle by the combined Bijapur and Golkondā troops (early in 1660.) (Dutch Records, Trans., Vol. 24, No. 664 and Vol. 23, No. 651.)

The Marāṭha invasion of the Ratnagiri district in Feb.-April 1661 has been described in Ch. 4 §5.

In March 1663, Rustam-i-Zamān did another friendly turn to Shivaji. Netāji Pālkar, Shivā's "lieutenant-general," had raided the imperial territory, but a large Mughal division of 7,000 cavalry pursued him so close as to force him to march 45 or 50 miles a day. Rustam met this army near Bijapur and persuaded the Mughal commander to give up the chase as "that country was dangerous for any strange army to march in, likewise promising them to go himself and follow him, by which deceit Netāji got escaped, though not without the loss of 300 horse and himself wounded." This reverse defeated Shivaji's plan of raiding North Kanārā and penetrating to the rich port of Kārwār. (F. R. Surat, 103 ; Vol. 2, 9th October.)

On 1st March 1663, Ali Adil Shah II., with all his Court, left his capital for Bānkāpur.* There they were at first denied entrance by the mother of Abdur Rahim

* F. R. Surat, Vol. 103, Giffard to Surat, 20th July, 1663. A letter from him to Surat, 30th March, says that the Adil-Shahi Court went there in fear of the Mughals who had come within five leagues of Bijapur in pursuit of Netaji. But Tarikh-i-Alī II., 160-164, (also B. S. 391) says that Ali went to Bankapur to direct the operations against the Rajah of Bednur in person.
Bahol Khan, in whose sief it lay. But the gates were soon opened to the king. Adil Shah summoned Bahol Khan, Shāhji and other officers from the Karnātak, who came by forced marches and waited on the king on the bank of the Wardā (an affluent of the Tungabhadrā.) Bahol and Shāhji were at once arrested and placed in chains (end of June 1663), but Shāhji was released in two days, though he continued to be deprived of his command for some time. The Bijapuri invasion of Kanārā had already begun. (F. R. Surat 103, Gyffard to Surat, 8th April and 20th July 1663.)

§3. Marātha conquest of South Konkan, 1663.

Shivāppā Nāyak,* who governed Bednur for forty-two years (1618-1660), first as regent and then as king, had extended his kingdom on all sides by his conquests and stretched his sway over the whole of South Kanārā, the north-western corner of Mysore, and North Kanārā up to the Gangāvati river, including the port of Mirjān. At the close of his life his ambition brought him into collision with Bijapur. He had conquered Sundā and some other forts belonging to vassals of Adil Shah and had thus come dangerously close to Bānkāpur, the fortress of asylum of the Bijapuri Sultans in the south-western corner of their kingdom. (Bom. Gaz., xv. pt. ii. pp. 122-123.)

The Sundā Rajah appealed to Bijapur and Adil Shah seized the opportunity of the death of Shivāppā and the succession of his weak son Bhadrāppā to invade Bednur in person with an overwhelming force.

* In the Persian histories of Bijapur he is styled Rajah of Mālnad, which is a Kanarese word meaning "hill country". (Mysore Gazetteer, ii. 286). Karwar letter to Surat, 18th April, 1664 says that Bhadrappa was "murdered per his Brahmans", the Portuguese account that he sickened (of small-pox) and died in a few days after making peace with Adil Shah, not without suspicion of having been poisoned. (Pissurlecar, i. 19n.) The following is the correct succession list of these kings:—On Shivāppā’s death in 1660 his brother Venkatāppā succeeded but died in 1661; then Bhadrāppā, a lad of eight, reigned till 1663, when Somasekhar came to the throne (reign 1663-1671).
Ali Adil Shah's campaign was short but vigorous and an unbroken success. Bhadrāppā Nayak could make no stand against the combined resources of the entire Bijapur kingdom; he lost Sundā, Bednur and many other forts, and was forced to make peace by restoring Sundā to its former chief and promising an indemnity of 7 lakhs of hun to Adil Shah. On 21st November the victorious Ali II. returned to his capital. (B. S. 391-395; F. R. Surat 103.)

We now turn to the activities of Shivaji in this region. While Ali was engaged in the struggle with Bednur, Shivaji had been active in South Konkan and in the north-western part of the Kanārā district. By way of Kolhāpur and Kudāl, he marched to Vingurlā (May 1663); "all the way, as he goes along. he gives his qaul (safe assurance), promising them that neither he nor his soldiers shall in the least do any wrong to anybody that takes his qaul, which promise he hitherto hath kept." (F. R. Surat, Vol. 103, Gyffard to Surat, 24th May, 1663.)

His going down the coast caused such alarm that "all the Muhammadan governors as far as Sānquelim and Bicholim were fled," and in consequence the petty robbers on the route became more active than usual. In June Shivaji returned from Vingurlā after leaving a garrison of 2,000 soldiers there. Shortly before this Shāista Khan had defeated a Marātha army, killing more than 200 men. (Ibid., Gyffard to Surat, 24th May and 22nd June, 1663. Pissurlencar, Antig. I. i. 107.)

In July the Bijapur Government ordered its governor of Phondā to join forces with the Sāvant of Vādi and other petty Rajahs and try to drive Shivaji's men out of Rājāpur and Khārépathān. But nothing was done, as "there was juggling between them, and he remained possessed of all." (F. R. Surat, 103, 20th July 1663, Vol. 86, Surat to Co., 20th November 1663.)

In punishment of Rustam-i-Zamān's secret friendship with Shivā, the Sultan dismissed him from his viceroyalty
and gave the province to Muhammad Ikhlās Khan, the eldest son of the late Khan-i-Khānān Ikhlās Khan and a brother of Khawās Khan, while Dābhol and Chiplun were given to Fazl Khan. Shivaji got final possession of Rājāpur at this time and kept it permanently in his own hands. (Ibid.)

Rustam’s agent at Kārwār fleeced the English factors there so severely that in July 1663 they were ordered by the Council at Surat to remove themselves and the Company’s goods quietly to Hubli. Adil Shah and Rustam-i-Zamān alike were sensible of the loss of revenue caused by such molestation of traders, and therefore the king sent them a farmān promising that they would be left in peace at Kārwār and would have to pay no other duties than they had formerly done. Then the factory was re-established at Kārwār. (F. R. Surat, Vol. 2, Consult., 14th August 1663.)


In 1664 the war with Bednur was renewed. Shivāppā Nāyak had died in old age, about October 1660. His son and successor, Bhadrāppā, was murdered by his Brāhmans, (1663) and an infant named Somasekhar was set up on the throne under the regency of his mother Chennāmmāji and her favourite Timmāyā Nāyak, a toddy-seller, who “by his cunning policy raised himself to be general and protector” of the realm. At this revolution Ali Adil Shah II. was so incensed that he sent his generals, Bahlol Khan and Sayyid Iliyās Sharzā Khan, to invade Bednur from two sides (April 1664.) [F. R. Surat 104, Karwar to Surat, 18th April 1664. Fryer, i. 41-42. Pissur. i. 19n.]

By this time Rustam-i-Zamān seems to have returned to favour at Court. Muhammad Ikhlās Khan was transferred from the government of Kārwār and his friends from that of Ānkolā, Shiveshwar (or Hālekot), Kādrā and other places in North Kanārā and these cities were given to three of
Rustam's sons. In August Rustam himself was ordered to go to that region with two other Bijapuri generals and try to expel Shivaji. He reached Kudāl at the end of August, but did nothing. (F. R. Surat, 104, Karwar 23rd July and Hubli 28th August, 1664.)

Any serious attack by Adil Shah on Shivaji was now rendered impossible as the Sultan's attention was diverted to Bednur, whither he wanted to march in person with 12,000 horse after the Diwāli festival (October) and cooperate with Sharzā Khan in crushing the Kanārā Rajah. Throughout the second half of 1664 the coast region was in an unhappy condition. As the English merchants write, "Deccan and all the south coast are all embroiled in civil wars, king against king and country against country, and Shivaji reigns victoriously and uncontrolled, that he is a terror to all the kings and princes round about, daily increasing in strength." (F. R. Surat, Vol. 86, Surat to Co., 26th Nov. 1664.)

Shivaji had planned to march his army down the west coast, get on board his fleet waiting at Bhatkal (14° N, the southern point of the North Kanārā district), and raid the coast towns. But Khawās Khan barred his path.

Lakham Sāvant, the chief of Kudāl, had made peace by accepting Shivaji's vassalage and ceding Kudāl to him. But he now tried to recover his own by calling in Bijapuri aid. So Adil Shah sent Khawās Khan with a small army into that district to expel Shivaji. The first encounter between them took place in October 1664. At first the negligent Khawās Khan was encircled by the Marāthas, but he called his captains together and heartened them in the midst of their despair. The Marāthas opened fire; the Bijapuris advanced to close quarters and fought a severe battle, losing Siddī Sarwār (their subahdār of Konkan, with his seat at Phondā), Shah Hazrat, Shaikh Mirān and some other high officers. After four hours of struggle the defeat of the Muslims seemed imminent, when Khawās Khan charged sword in hand; his troops followed him fearlessly in one
body; and they broke through Netaji's cavalry, some of whom carried carbines. Shivaji then broke off the engagement and fled away after losing 400 men in killed and nearly a thousand in wounded, while the Bijapuri loss was only a quarter of their enemies. (Dutch letter from Vingurla; Basatin-us-Salatin, 398-402. Pissurlencar, Antigualhas, I. i. 108-116.)

Rumour immediately exaggerated the result as a disaster to Shivaji, who was reported to have been chased and closely invested in a fort, while the casualties were swollen to six thousand men slain! This report, occurring in a Surat, factory letter of 26th November 1664, was, however, contradicted by the same source on 2nd January 1665. Lakham Sàvant immediately afterwards recovered possession of Kudal and brought Khawas Khan there.

Shivaji, however, was anything but crushed. He had only made a strategic retreat in order first to cut off a detachment coming to reinforce Khawas Khan, and then double back and crush the Khan when weakened by this blow. He had also to settle scores with an old enemy. Baji Ghorparé, jagirdar of Mudhol, was a faithful vassal of Bijapur. At the siege-camp before Jinji he had carried out his commander-in-chief's orders by arresting the refractory Shahji (1648), without, however, resorting to treachery as alleged in later Maratha stories. He used to co-operate loyally with the Adil-Shahi generals sent out to restore their king's authority over the Konkan territory usurped by Shivaji. His energy, honesty and devotion to his master made him a dangerous enemy to Shivaji. When Khawas Khan was marching to Kudal to expel Shivaji, Ghorparé came from Bijapur with his contingent of 1,500 horse to join him. But Shivaji struck the first blow and prevented the junction of his enemies. He suddenly invaded Mudhol. Baji Ghorparé, who had hurried to the defence of his jagir, was defeated and slain and 1,200 of his horses were captured. Mudhol itself was taken, and so many members of the Ghorparé family were put to death that the incident
is known as "the massacre of the Ghorparés"* (end of October.)

Was Mudhol sacked by Shivaji? From Kudāl where Shivaji broke off his first fight with Khawās Khan to Mudhol town, the distance is 110 miles in a straight line, with two mountain passes to be crossed on the way. It would take Shivaji’s cavalry full six days to cover this distance at a speed not destructive of their fighting freshness at the end of the march, and six days more to return. It is clear from Sabhāsad, p. 68, that Shivaji cut off Bāji Ghorparé’s relieving column of 1,500 horse somewhere in Konkan below the Ghāts, say two days’ march from Kudāl. Therefore Shivaji did not personally sack the town of Mudhol. After Bāji Ghorparé, now an old man and hopelessly outnumbered ten to one by Shivaji, had fallen in the encounter in Konkan, a detachment of Shivaji’s army probably sacked the defenceless and masterless town of Mudhol and massacred such Ghorparés as were still there.

When Shivaji, flushed with his victory over Ghorparé, came near, Lakham Sāvant advised Khawās to escape from Kudāl, as he was now hopelessly outnumbered. The Khan removed to Bāndā, setting his troops on retreat. Immediately on hearing of the break up of the Bijapuri army, Shivaji on 26th October (O. S.) sent Netāji to Bāndā with the pick of his cavalry to take Khawās by surprise. But the Khan was in no position now to stand an attack; he fled precipitately with his soldiers back to Chandargarh in the uplands (Bālāghāt.) Shivaji then burst into the district now called Sāvant-vādi, (between Ratnagiri and Goa), the numerous petty chieftains of which were feudatories of Bijapur. The greatest among them was Lakham Sāvant, the

* Sabh. 68; Jedhé S. The popular tradition (91 Q. B. sec. 66-69) is that Shivaji committed this massacre in obedience to his father’s order that if he was his true son he should avenge on Bāji Ghorpare the latter’s treachery to Shahji in 1648. The fall of the Ghorparés and Lakham Sāvant’s defeat (which immediately followed it) took place in Nov. 1664, nearly a year after Shahji’s death; they cannot be placed in 1663. Pissuriencar, Antigualhas, I. 1. 115, Dutch letter.
desāi (chief) of Kudāl, who had sided with the Bijapuri generals in these parts against Shivaji and was the first to feel Shivaji's wrath now. After resisting for a short time he escaped with his bare life into the forest, leaving his riches to the victor. Keshava Nāyak and Keshava Prabhu of Pernem and Rāwal Shenvi of Bicholim* next shared the same fate. All these defeated desāis took refuge in Goa and lived there in misery, making frequent attempts to recover their own by raising troops and organizing expeditions from the Portuguese territory against Shivaji's governors. Krishna Sāvant, a kinsman and rival of Lakham for the desāi-ship, naturally joined Shivaji and was placed by him in charge of Kudāl.

Shivaji next plundered Vingurlā, "a place of great trade, from whence he carried away vast riches." He had heard that the Dutch had accumulated great wealth by trade in their warehouse in this important port. Another town (probably Mālvan) not far from it, suffered the same fate. About this time, i.e., early in December 1664, his men looted Hubli and many other rich towns of that region, holding several eminent merchants prisoners for ransom.

* The geography of this tract in 1664 was as follows:—Leaving out a narrowing coast-strip in the south-west of the Ratnagiri district, from Malvan to Tarikhol, the inland part east of it was divided into the districts of Kudāl (north), Vādi (middle) and Bānda (south). South-west of Bānda lay Pernem, and south of the latter lay Bardes and Goa successively, with Phondā due east of Goa. North-east of Bardes and Goa lay Bicholim, with Sanquelim further to the east. Of these, only Bardes, Goa and Salsette (or the 66 maritime villages of Goa, quite distinct from Salsette near Bombay island) belonged to the Portuguese in the 17th century, while Pernem, Bicholim and Sanquelim were annexed later. For Krishna Sāvant's intrigues against Lakham S. and the latter's faithful assistance to successive Bijapur generals, see Pingulkar, farman 8-12; Sabh. 68.

Shivaji repeatedly protested to the Goa Government against the conduct of the fugitive desais and even invaded the Portuguese territory of Bardes by way of reprisal. At last the Viceroy expelled the desais from Goa in May 1668. [Pissurlencar, i. 12-25; Antíg. I. i. 116 sq.] Then Lakham Sāvant submitted to Shivaji, pleading that he was of the same Bhonsle clan. Shivaji appointed him as his salaried agent in Kudāl, under agreement not to raise forces or build forts but to serve under Shivaji's orders. [Sabh. 68; Pingulkar, farman 7, date incorrect.]
He had sent only three hundred horsemen to Hubli, but these did their work so thoroughly that the town "was little better than spoiled." The merchants who had fled at the attack were too frightened to return there soon, even after the departure of the Marāthas. The raiders were said to have been assisted by some of Rustam's soldiers; that noble, as the English remarked, had "begun to taste the sweetness of plunder [so] that in a short time he would get a habit of it." "Shiva and his scouts range all over the country, making havoc wherever he comes, with fire and sword." (F. R. Surat 104, Karwar to Surat, 6th January 1665, Taylor to Surat, 14th December 1664; Vol. 86, Surat to Karwar, 23rd March, Surat to Co., 2nd January 1665.)

On 12th March 1665, the Surat Council write: "The subjects [of Adil Shah] unanimously cry out against him for suffering Shivaji to forage to and fro, burning and robbing his country without any opposition, wherefore it is certainly concluded by all that he shares with the said rebel in all his rapines, so that the whole country is in a confused condition, merchants flying from one place to another to preserve themselves, so that all trade is lost.... The rebel Shivaji hath committed many notorious and great robberies since that of Surat, and hath possessed himself of the most considerable ports belonging to Deccan [i.e., Bijapur] to the number of eight or nine, from whence he sets out two or three or more trading vessels yearly from every port to Persia, Basra, Mocha, etc."

§5. Loot of Basrur and blackmail from Karwar, 1665.

On 8th February 1665 Shivaji left Mālvan with a fleet of 85 frigates and three large ships, sailed past Goa to Basrur,* the chief port of the Bednur kingdom, where he

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* Basrur (Sanskrit Vāṣṇava), 12 miles south of Coondāpur in the South Kanara District, was "the principal port of the Bednore Rajahs." (S. Canara Gazetteer, ii. 242). Portuguese spelling Bracolore, early English Barcelore, Hunterian Barkalur, Marathi Basnur.
was quite unexpected, so that he took immense plunder in one day. Then setting out on his return, he landed at the holy city of Gokarna, on the coast, 22 miles south of Kārwār, and took a purifying bath with all religious ceremonies before the great temple of Mahābaleshwar. From this place he marched to Ankolā (nine miles northwards) with 4,000 infantry, sending all his fleet back, with the exception of twelve frigates, which he detained for transporting his army over the rivers on his way back to North Konkan. On the 22nd he reached Kārwār. The English factors, having got early news of his coming from the spies they had sent out, put all the Company's ready money and portable goods on board a small hundred-ton ship belonging to the Imām of Maskat, then lying in the river, its captain Emanuel Donnavado promising to defend it as long as he lived or his vessel kept floating. The factors themselves took refuge in the ship. Sher Khan, a son of the late Khan-i-Khānān Khan Muhammad and a subordinate of Bahlol Khan, arrived in the town that very night, without knowing anything about Shivaji's approach. With the help of his escort of 500 men he quickly fortified himself as well as he could to protect the goods he had brought down, and sent a messenger to Shivā in the night, warning him not to enter the town as he would resist him to the utmost. Sher Khan was famous throughout the country for his valour and ruling capacity, and his chief, Bahlol Khan, was "one of the potentest men in the kingdom of Bijapur." Shivaji, therefore, shrank from provoking him, and after much discussion "condescended to go a little out of the way, and so came and encamped with his army at the mouth of the river" Kālānadi, sparing the town.

From this place he sent an enjuy to Sher Khan, asking him either to deliver the English merchants up to him or, retiring himself, permit him to revenge himself on them, "whom he styled his inveterate enemies." Sher Khan sent

* The cause of his coming to Karwar was to charter a ship of Rustam-i-Zamān's to convey Bahlol Khan's mother to Mecca.
this news to the English and desired to know their final answer, which was that they had nothing on board except powder and bullets which Shivaji might come and fetch if he thought they would serve him instead of gold. "This our answer being sent to Shivaji did so exasperate him that he said he would have us before he departed, which the governor of the town hearing, they persuaded all the merchants to agree to send him [Shivaji] a present lest he should recall his fleet, which lay on this side of Salsette." To this blackmail the English contributed £112, so as not to endanger the Company's property in Karwar, worth 8,000 hun. "With this Shivaji departed on 23rd February, very unwillingly, saying that Sher Khan had spoiled his hunting at the Holi, which is a time he generally attempts some such design."*

Thence the disappointed Maratha chief marched home northwards, reaching Bhimgarh (25 miles north-west of Kārwār) on 14th March. But soon afterwards Jai Singh's siege of Purandar and vigorous invasion of the neighbouring country called away Shivaji to the defence of his home, and Kanārā enjoyed peace for some time.


By the treaty of Purandar (12th June 1665) the Mughals left Shivaji free to annex Adil-Shahi Konkan. The affairs of Bijapur also fell into confusion at this time. Bahrol Khan died (June or July.) He had come to Bijapur from the Karnaṭak war at the king's call, but died of illness only eight days after his arrival. The Sultan being jealous of his large force, 10,000 brave Afghans, tried to sow dissension

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* Shivaji's loot of Basrur and visit to Karwar: F. R. Surat, Vol. 104. Karwar to Surat, 14th March 1665. Sabh. 70-71. The Karwar factors wrote on 28 Jan. that the great annual bathing festival (Shivaratri) would take place only eight days later at Gokarna. 4 Feb. was Krishna 14th. Shivaji missed it. He took ship for the Basrur expedition (at Mālvān) on 8 Feb. [Shivapur Y.], and bathed at Gokarna on his return from Basrur. [F. R. Surat. 104.]
among his sons and nephews. Sher Khan, a brave, able and upright man, kept them at peace. But he was soon afterwards poisoned, it was suspected, by Adil Shah, and immediately a bitter quarrel for the headship of the family broke out between the two elder sons of Bahlol Khan, while the Sultan seized some of their jāgirs. The affairs of the royal drunkard at Bijapur passed from bad to worse. (F. R. Surat 104, Karwar to Surat, 29th August 1665. *House of Shivaji*, Ch. 5.)

The Bijapuri governor of Hubli fell into disfavour at Court and the governor of Mirjān rebelled. Muhammad Ikhlās Khan, the brother of Khawās Khan, recovered Dābhol and many other places in South Konkan from the Marāthas, while the latter were busy fighting Jai Singh. But by November next Shivaji, now an ally of the Mughals, had reconquered all that country after slaying 2,000 soldiers of Muhammad Ikhlās, including several men of note. The Khan fell back on Kudāl and waited for Sharzā Khan to reinforce him. But no such aid came, as Jai Singh began his invasion of Bijapur that very month and Ikhlās Khan had to hasten from Kudāl to the defence of the capital. But Vingurlā and Kudāl continued in Bijapuri hands, while Shivaji held Rājāpur and Khārépatan. The country about Kārwār was at this time subjected to constant pillage by the soldiers of Shivaji’s garrisons there, who used to leave their forts in bands of 200 men and raid the small towns. Murtazā Beg, who had lost his fort, also took to plunder with his 200 retainers. (F. R., 29th August, 21st September and 29th November 1665 and 15th January 1666.)


In the course of Jai Singh’s war with Bijapur, Shivaji had been detached against Panhālā. His assault on that fort (16th January 1666) failed and then he went off to Khelnā. From this place he sent 2,000 men under a
Muhammadan officer to besiege Phondā.* The garrison resisted for two months (February and March) killing 500 Marāṭhas, and finally agreed to surrender in six hours. In the meantime, the Bijapuri Government had sent 5,000 horse and 1,000 foot under Siddi Masaud, Abdul Aziz (the son of Siddi Jauhar), and Rustam-i-Zamān to the Panhāla region. They formed a plan for surprising Shivaji, who lay on the top of the hill over-looking Konkan. When their Van, under Rustam, approached, he beat his drums and sounded his trumpets and thus gave his friend Shivaji timely warning to escape. But Masaud chased the Marāṭhas with 600 chosen cavalry and cut off 200 of the enemy. On the way back he intercepted Shivaji’s friendly letters to Rustam, which he immediately sent to Bijapur. At this Adil Shah wrote to Rustam that though he reluctantly pardoned this act of disloyalty, he would dismiss him unless he raised the siege of Phondā. Rustam then wrote to his agent Muhammad Khan to save Phondā by all means. This was effected by a stratagem. Muhammad Khan could get together only a small force, with which he went and sat down in a town of his master’s about three miles from Phondā, and sent word to the general of Shivaji that he had only come to look after his own country. The general suspected no stratagem, as his master and Rustam were friends. He went with his Muslim soldiery to a hill a mile off in order to say his prayers in public. Muhammad Khan seized this opportunity; he surprised and routed the soldiers left in the siege-camp, and after a long and well contested fight defeated the rest of the Marāṭha army who had hurried back from the hill. Thus the siege of Phondā was raised after the poor men in it had been driven to eat leaves for the last three days. “This business, it is generally

* First siege of Phonda: F. R.* Surat 104, “Deccan News”, following a letter from Karwar, dated 24th April 1666. Phonda, 10 m. s. s. e. of Goa city, was the westernmost frontier-fortress of Bijapur nearest to Goa, and a menace to the latter. The Portuguese, after some previous failures, annexed it in the 18th century. Pissurlencar, *Antig.* I. 1. 118.
thought, hath quite broken the long continued friendship between Rustam-i-Zamān and Shivaji. Rustam hath taken now Phondā, Kudāl, Bāndā, Sānquelim and Bicholim, five towns of note, from Shivaji." We thus see that Shivaji's possession of the extreme south of Konkan and the region of Kanārā close to Goa, was of a pulsatory character. He overran every district when he appeared in person, but when his troops were heavily engaged elsewhere or he went to a long distance from Mahārāshtra, the dispossessed local chiefs (like the desās of Kudāl harboured in Goa) and the Bijapuri officers reappeared in force and seized parts of his conquests there. This see-saw went on for years and ended only before his death.

§8. Plot to seize Goa, 1668.

Soon afterwards, on 5th March 1666, Shivaji started for the Mughal Court. For the next four years he gave no trouble to Bijapuri Konkan or Kanārā, his opponents during this interval being the Portuguese and the Siddis. The English merchants of Kārwār repeatedly speak of Shiva in 1668 and 1669 as being "very quiet" and "keeping still at Rājgarh," and of his credit as decreasing during these years of inactivity, while the "country all about was in great tranquillity." In October 1668 Shivaji made an unsuccessful attempt to conquer the territory of Goa by stratagem. He smuggled into the towns of this State 400 to 500 of his soldiers in small parties at different times and under various disguises, hoping that when their number was doubled they would suddenly rise one night, seize one of the passes, and admit him before the Portuguese could raise a sufficiently large army for their defence. But either the plot leaked out, or the Portuguese Viceroy's* suspicion was roused. He made a narrow search in all his towns, arrested the 400 or

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*The Viceroy was Conde de S. Vicente, who died on 27 Oct. 1668, and according to Gyffard's letter he detected the plot "a little before his death." Pissurleycar, Port. e Mar. i. 27. Antigu. I. 1. 192.
500 men of Shivaji at various places, and evidently extorted the truth from them. Then he sent for Shivaji’s ambassador, with his own hand gave him two or three cuffs in the ear, and turned him and the Maratha prisoners out of his territory. On hearing of it Shivaji assembled an army of 10,000 foot and 1,000 horse, threatening to invade the Bardes and Salsette districts of Goa in person. From the north of Rāja-pur he marched to Vingurlā, inspected all his forts in that quarter, “changing their men and putting in (fresh) provisions and ammunition,” and then in December returned to Rājgarh as he found “the Portuguese well prepared to give him a hot reception.” (Gyffard to Surat, 12th November and 16th December, 1668. F. R. Surat 105.)

At the beginning of 1670 came his rupture with the Mughals, which kept him busy in other quarters and prolonged the peace in Kanārā till the close of 1672, when, taking advantage of the death of Ali II., he renewed his depredations in Bijapur territory.

Meantime, in September 1671, Rustam-i-Zamān had broken out in rebellion against his master. He had at last been deprived of his viceroyalty and jagir for his treacherous intimacy with Shivā, the crowning act of which was the surrender of one of the king’s forts to the Marathas. And now he took up arms in the hope of intimidating the Government into reinstating him. With the underhand help of Shivaji, he occupied Bijapuri territory, yielding three lakhs of hun a year, and plundered and burnt Rāi-bāgh, completing the ruin of that city, which had been previously sacked by the Marathas. But within a month the royal troops crushed the rebellion,—the forts of Mirjān and Ānkōlā alone holding out for several months more. By the middle of 1672 Muzaffar Khan, the new Adil-Shahi viceroy of the Kanārā coast, had made peace with the rebel chiefs (Nāyakwāris) of Shiveshwar and Kadrā.*

* F. R. Surat 106, Kawar to Surat, 20th September, 31st October 1671, 26th June 1672.

The death of Ali Adil Shah II. (on 24th November 1672) was followed by the rebellion of the Rajahs of Sundā and Bednur, who invaded the Bijapur territory across their frontiers. An army under Muzaffar Khan chastised both of them (February, 1673) and wrested Sundā from its Rajah. (F. R. Surat, 106, Karwar to Co., 17th February 1673.)

This rebellion had been hardly suppressed when the Marāthas made their second incursion into the upland of Bijapuri Kanārā, sacking many forts and rich cities in that region. Their general Pratāp Rao raided Hubli,* the most important inland mart of the province, causing a loss of 7,894 hun to the English Company alone, besides the private property of the factors (early in May 1673.) The Company’s house was the first they entered and dug up, carrying away all the broadcloth in it to their general who sat in the bazar. Muzaffar Khan, however, promptly came to the scene with 4,000 cavalry and saved the town from total destruction. The Marāthas fled precipitately with what booty they had already packed up, “leaving several goods out in the streets which they had not time to carry away.” When the English at Surat complained to Shivā about the outrage, he denied that it was done by his soldiers.

At Hubli, Muzaffar missed the Marātha raiders by just one day. He was probably suspected of having entered into a secret understanding with them, like Rustam-i-Zamān, for immediately afterwards all the nobles under his command and most of his own soldiers forsook him and the Bijapur Government removed him from his viceroyalty. This drove him into rebellion and he tried to retain possession of his

* The commercial importance of Hubli can be judged from the following remarks of the English merchants:—“Hubli, the mart of our Karwar factory, where we sell and buy most of the goods that port affords us.” (F. R. Surat 87, 1st November 1673.) “Hubli, a great inroad [=inland] town and a mart of very considerable trade.” (O. C. 3779.) Maratha invasion of Kanara in 1673; F. R. Surat 3, Consult. 24th May, 10th and 9th July, Vol. 87, Surat to Persia, 1st November. O. C. 3779 and 3800. Sabhāsād, 69, has only eight lines for the events of 1673-75.
fiefs by force. The great fort of Belgaum remained in his hands and also many strong places between Goa and Kanārā (June, 1673.) Adil Shah sent a large army to reduce Belgaum in case Muzaffar declined the compromise offered to him.

In June Bahlol Khan with a large Bijapuri army held Kolhāpur and defeated the Marathas in several encounters, forcing all their roving bands to leave the Kārwār country. He also talked of invading South Konkan and recovering Rājāpur and other towns next autumn. In August he is still spoken of as “pressing hard upon Shivaji, who supplicates for peace, being fearful of his own condition.” But soon afterwards Bahlol Khan, his irreconcilable enemy, fell ill at Miraj and Shivaji’s help was solicited by the Bijapur and Golkondā Governments to defend them from a threatened Mughal invasion under Bahādur Khan (September.)*

At the end of September we find Shivaji at the head of a great army raised for “some notable attempt against the Mughal.” He also sewed 20,000 sacks of cotton for conveying the plunder he expected to seize! But on the dashaharā day (10th October), an auspicious time with the Hindus for setting out on campaigns, he sallied forth on a long expedition into Bijapuri territory, with 25,000 men, robbed many rich towns, including Bānkāpur, and then penetrated into Kanārā, “to get more plunder in those rich towns to bear the expenses of his army.” Early in December he reached Kadrā (20 miles north-east of Kārwār) with a division of 4,000 foot and 2,000 horse, and stayed there for four days. The bulk of his forces occupied a hill near Hubli. But two severe defeats at the hands of Bahlol and Sharzā Khan at Bānkāpur and Chandgarh (a fort midway between the Belgaum and Sāvant-vādi towns) respectively forced him to evacuate Kanārā quickly.†

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* O. C. 3800 and 3882; F. R. Surat 106, Bombay to Surat, 16th and 29th September 1673; B. S. 439-443; Jedhe S.
† F. R. Surat 106, Bombay to Surat, 29th September and 10th October, Vol. 88, Karwar to Surat, 17th December 1673. O. C. 3910; Fryer, ii.
§10. *Internal troubles in Kanārā, 1674.*

Though Kanārā had been freed from the Marāthas, that province enjoyed no peace. Miān Sāhib, the faujdār of Kārwār, (instigated, it was said, by Shivā), rebelled and Adil Shah had to conduct a long war before he could be suppressed. The two sides continued to fight skirmishes with varying success. In February 1674 the royal troops captured Sundā, with the rebel’s wife in it, but he held out obstinately in his other forts. By 22nd April this “long and tedious rebellion” was at last ended by the arrival of Ābu Khan, Rustam-i-Zamān II., as the new viceroy. Miān Sāhib’s followers deserted him for lack of pay; his forts (Kadrā, Kārwār, Ankolā and Shiveshwar) all surrendered without a blow, and he himself made peace on condition of his wife being released. Shivāji was then only a day’s march from Kārwār, “going to build a castle upon a very high hill, from which he may very much annoy these parts.” (F. R. Surat 88, Karwar to Surat, 14th February and 22nd April 1674. Orme, *Frag.*, 35.)

Unlike his father, the new Rustam-i-Zamān did not cultivate the friendship of the Marāthas. In August 1674 he seized a rich merchant, subject of Shivā, living at Narṣā (16 miles from Phondā) and the Marātha king prepared for retaliation. In October Rustam was summoned by Khawās Khan, the new wazir, to Bijapur; and, as he feared that his post would be given to another, he extorted forced loans from all the rich men of Kārwār and its neighbourhood that he could lay hands on, before he went away. In the last week of August, Annāji Datto passed through Kudāl with 3,000 soldiers intending to “surprise the fortress of Phondā, but Mamet Khan who was there armed himself, so that the aforesaid pandit accomplished nothing.” (F. R. Surat 88; *Dutch Rec.*, Vol. 34, No. 811.)

At Bijapur everything was in confusion, “the great

*Dutch Rec.*, Vol. 31, No. 805; *Jedhe S.* says that Sharza Khan killed Vithoji Sindhia in the month of Kartik, about November.
Khans were at difference." The worthless wazir Khawās Khan was driven to hard straits by the Afghan faction in the State. Rustam-i-Zamān II, after his visit to the capital evidently lost his viceroyalty. This was Shivaji's opportunity and he now conquered Kanārā for good. First, he befooled the Mughal viceroy Bahādur Khan by sending him a pretended offer of peace, asking for the pardon of the Mughal Government through the Khan's mediation and promising to cede the imperial forts he had recently conquered as well as the twenty-three forts of his own that he had once before yielded in Jai Singh's time. By these insincere negotiations Shivaji for the time being averted the risk of a Mughal attack on his territory and began his invasion of Bijapuri Kanārā with composure of mind.

§11. Capture of Phondā and Annexation of Kanārā coast, 1675.

In March 1675 he got together an army of 15,000 cavalry, 14,000 infantry and 10,000 pioneers with pickaxes, crow-bars and hatchets, etc.* Arriving at Rājāpur (22nd March), he spent three days there, ordering forty small ships to go to Vingurlā with all speed and there wait for fresh commands. Next he marched to his town of Kudāl, and on 8th April laid siege to Phondā, the most important Bijapuri fort near Goa. While he was prosecuting the siege, another division of his army plundered Atgiri in Adil-Shahi territory and two other large cities near Haidarābād, carrying away "a great deal of riches, besides many rich persons held to ransom."

He began the siege of Phondā with 2,000 horse and 7,000 foot, and made arrangements for sitting down before

* Invasion of Kanara and capture of Phonda (1675): F. R. Surat 88, Karwar to Surat. 14th and 22nd April, 8th and 25th May; Rajapur to Surat, 1st and 20th April; 3rd, 21st and 51st May; 5th and 14th June; B. S. 441; Orme Frag., 38, 40. Sahib. 70 (scanty). Delusive peace offer to Mughals, B. S. 445; O. C. 4077.
the fort even during the coming rainy season in order to starve the garrison into surrender. Muhammad Khan had only four months' provisions within the walls; there was no hope of relief from Bijapur or even from the Portuguese who now trembled for the safety of Goa and appeased Shivaji by promising neutrality. Rustam-i-Zamān had too little money or men to attempt the raising of the siege. But Muhammad Khan made a heroic defence, unaided and against overwhelming odds.

Shivaji ran four mines under the walls, but they were all countermined, with a heavy loss of men to him. He then threw up an earthen wall only 12 feet from the fort and his soldiers lay sheltered behind it. The Portuguese, fearing that if Shīvā took Phōndā their own Goa would be as good as lost, secretly sent ten boat-loads of provisions and some men to aid the besieged (middle of April); but these were intercepted by Shivaji, and the Viceroy of Goa disavowed the act.

The siege was pressed with vigour. By the beginning of May Shivaji had taken possession of two outworks, filled up the ditch, and made 500 ladders and 500 gold bracelets, each bracelet weighing half a seer, for presentation to the forlorn hope who would attempt the escalade.

Bahlol Khan, who was at Miraj with 15,000 troops, wanted to come down the Ghāts and relieve Phōndā, but Shīvā had barred the passages with trees cut down and lined the stockades with his men, and Bahlol, being certain of heavy loss and even an utter repulse if he tried to force them, returned to his base. His inactivity during the siege was imputed to bribery by Shīvā. At length the fort fell about the 6th of May. All who were found in it were put to the sword, with the exception of Muhammad Khan, who saved his own life and those of four or five others by promising to put into Shīvā's hands all the adjoining parts belonging to Bijapur. In fear of death the Khan wrote to the qiladārs of these forts to yield them to the Marāthas, but they at first declined. So the Khan was kept in chains.
Inäyet Khan, the faujdār of Ankolā, seized the country and forts lately held by Muhammad Khan and placed his own men in them, but he could make no stand against Shivaji whose forces were now set free by the fall of Phondā. He therefore compounded and gave up the forts for money. In a few days Ankolā, Shiveshwar (which had been besieged by 3,000 Marātha horse and some foot-soldiers since 24th April), Kārwār, and Kadrā (which alone had made a short stand), all capitulated to Shivaji, and by the 25th of May the country as far south as the Gangāvati river had passed out of Bijapuri possession into his hands.

§12. Marāthas in Kanārā uplands.

On 26th April, 1675, one of Shivā’s generals had visited Kārwār and “burnt the town effectually, leaving not a house standing,” in punishment of the fort of Kārwār still holding out. The English factory was not molested. This general, however, went back in a few days. But next month, after the fall of Phondā, the fort of Kārwār surrendered to the Marāthas.

The rainy season now put an end to the campaign. Bahlool Khan went back to Bijapur, leaving his army at Miraj. Shivā at first thought of cantoning for the rains in a fort on the frontier of Sundā, but soon changed his mind and returned to Rāigarh, passing by Rājāpur on 12th June.

A Marātha force was detached into the Sundā Rajah’s country at the end of May. “They finding no great opposition seized upon Supā and Ulavi belonging to the Rajah.” But Khizr Khan Pani (Bahlool’s lieutenant) and the Desāis in concert attacked the Marātha garrisons there, killed 300 of the men and recovered both the places. A party of Marāthas that was posted at Varhulli, 7 miles south of Ankolā, to take custom duty on all goods passing that way, was now forced to withdraw (August 1675.) (F.R. Surat 88, Rajapur to Surat, 27th August 1675.)
The dowager Rāni of Bednur had quarrelled with her colleague Timmāyā, but had been compelled to make peace with him (August), she being a mere cypher, while he held the real power of the State. The Rāni then appealed to Shivaji for protection, agreed to pay him an annual tribute, and admitted a Marātha resident at her Court. [F. R. Surat 88. 91 Q. B. sec. 65.]

The dalvi, or general of the desāi who had been the local Bijapuri governor of North Kanārā, had aided Shivaji in the conquest of that district. But now (1675), disgusted with him, the dalvi was moving about the country with a force, saying that he would restore his former master. He attacked Shivaji's guards in Kārwār town and forced them to retire to the castle. The people were in extreme misery in Shivaji's new conquests: he squeezed the desāis, who in their turn squeezed the ryots. But Bijapur was now in the grip of a civil war, the Adil-Shahi State was hastening to a dissolution, and Shivaji's possession of South Konkan and the North Kanārā district remained unchallenged till after his death. (Bom. Gaz. xv. pt. i. 128.)

But Bednur did not really become a Marātha protectorate. We learn from an English letter of 29th July, 1679, that the Rajah of Sundā and the Rāni of Bednur had sharp wars, "but the former by the assistance of Jamshid Khan has had the advantage of compelling the Rāni, on conclusion of the peace, to deliver up to him his castles of Sirsy and Serā, formerly possessed by them, as likewise the port and castle of Mirgy [=Mirjān], a little to the southward of Kārwār." (Orme MSS. 116.)
CHAPTER XI

NAVAL ENTERPRISES

1. Need of a national navy.
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3. Malvan fortifications.
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17. War with the English for Khanderi.

§1. Need of a National Navy.

Nothing proves Shivaji's genius as a born statesman more clearly than his creation of a navy and naval bases. His father had left to him only a few inland districts; but Shivaji at the very commencement of his own independent expansion, immediately after gaining the towns of Kalyan and Bhiwandi (1658) started building ships of his own in the creek below them. Three years later, when his land forces overran the South Konkan Coast, he made a survey of the sea-side down to the frontier of Goa, and embarked on a plan for building new naval bases, there and strengthening the older ones. He instinctively perceived that without the command of the coastal waters his inland territories could not be protected, nor the economic prosperity of his subjects assured.

A series of raids by foreign ships on the Konkan Coast, with their attendant atrocities, for a thousand years past, had burnt into the memory of the Maratha people the bitter truth that they were helpless if they could not defend their seaboard. In the first century of Islam, in the years 636 and
660 A.D., pirate fleets from Arabia had sacked the flourishing port of Thana. Even as late as 1530, Portuguese ships from Goa burnt the suburbs of Kalyan and took from them a large booty; in 1540 they plundered and burnt another great port, Agashi and destroyed 300 vessels lying in it.

The rich products of peninsular India were collected in the historic ports on the west coast for export to foreign countries. India's seaborne trade was in constant risk of destruction if these emporia could not be guarded against foreign raiders and the neighbouring sea could not be cleared of the hereditary pirate tribes of Kathiar and Gujrat. To our Arab and Abyssinian invaders by sea were added in the 17th century formidable gangs of European pirates working in Indian waters, mostly British by race. It was only a strong national fleet, supported by naval bases close at hand that could protect our west coast towns and the trade which was their life-blood.

Besides this need, Shivaji wisely planned to increase his State income and the wealth of his people by developing over-sea trade in Indian hands, and for this purpose a mercantile marine of his own was the first thing necessary. Why should he be content to live on the scanty land revenue of his sterile native land, while foreigners reaped a golden harvest as middlemen in the exchange of goods? A merchant fleet is also the nursery of a national fighting navy. Finally, there was the loss and insult to which the Portuguese were subjecting all Indian shipping by compelling them to buy pass-ports from the Government of Goa, for plying in the Indian Ocean, on pain of confiscation of the ships and their cargo for failure to comply with this demand. Shivaji could free his subjects from this encroachment on the freedom of the high seas, only if he could show the Portuguese that he was strong enough at sea to hit back.

Finally, according to the local law and the usage of that age, all flotsam and jetsam and the cargo of ships wrecked in the neighbouring sea belonged to the ruler of
the coast land. Only the possession of a fleet of his own could have enabled Shivaji to enforce this right.

§2. Shivaji’s Naval Bases and Docks described.

Ships of war cannot do their work unless they have well-defended bases close at hand for repair, supply of stores, and shelter during rough weather. Shivaji proved his faultless leadership by providing a number of such naval forts on the west coast, pari passu with the growth of his fighting ships and trading vessels.

All of Shivaji’s forts, whether inland or marine, were built according to one pattern. “The site chosen is usually a cliff or a spit of land more than half surrounded by the sea. The whole top of the hill or the end of the promontory is surrounded by a wall which is relieved by numerous bastions. There is a seldom more than one entrance to the fort, and this is generally the strongest part. The outer gateway is thrown forward and protected by a bastion on each side and often by a tower above. A narrow passage winding between two walls leads to the inner, gate, which is in the face of the main wall and is defended by bastions which command the approaches . . . . Inside the main wall there was generally an inner fortress or citadel (bālā qila in Persian and Marāthī), and surrounding this were the various buildings required for the accommodation of the troops, and also magazines, tanks and wells. The larger forts had generally a town or petha clustered about the base of the hill on which the fort stood.”

Vijaydurg, popularly known as Gheria, which was rebuilt by Shivaji, “is the most perfect example of a great coastal fortress, which was also a palace (or residence of a chief). It stands on a spit of land projecting into the broad estuary of a noble river (the Vāghotan), and communication with the continent was cut off by a ditch which extended across the spit. The outer walls are washed by the sea round the greatest part of their extent, and . . . . out-works
are thrown forward down to the shore.... The walls are immensely massive and lofty, and thus looking up from the landing place a triple line of most formidable defences is seen. On one side a great round tower rises from the highest part of the main wall.... From it the view is lovely and varied. In front the open sea, on one side the broad estuary, and on the other a little cove of white sand bounded by black rocky promontories. Behind, the river stretches away to the blue line of the distant ghāts." It was much strengthened by Shivaji; to whom it owes its finest features, the triple line of walls, the numerous (27) towers, and the massive interior buildings. (Bom. Gaz. I. ii. 74; X. 380.)

Suvarn-durg or Songarh is the most striking example of his island fortresses, as the lofty walls seem to rise straight out of the sea, on a low irregular island, with an area of eight acres. Great parts of the fortifications are cut out of the solid rock, and the rest are built of blocks of stone of ten or twelve feet square. Within the fort are several reservoirs and a small step-well with water enough for a large garrison. (Bom. Gaz. X. 388.)

Ratnagiri contains a series of fortifications on the high land at the west end of the north arm of the Ratnagiri harbour. The defences of the headland form an outer and an inner fort.... Shivaji added or renewed the strong wall that crests the eastern ridge south to the Lighthouse Point, and built protecting towers on two commanding points. (Ibid. 367.)

§3. Fortifications of Malvan.

"But Malvan is the most interesting and formidable of his naval forts. This base consists of a fort on the mainland and two fortified islands about a quarter of a mile from the shore, lying in a bay which is so studded with rocks and reefs that at low water it looks as if nothing larger than a rowing boat could enter. The largest of these islands, Sindhudurg, was (probably) meant by Shivaji as a place of
refuge from the main land. It is very extensive, little less than two miles round the ramparts. The walls are low, 30 feet [in height], and are on an average 12 feet thick and have about 32 towers,—generally outstanding semi-circles with fire embrasures for cannon. Narrow stair-cases lead from the inside to the top of the walls. Shivaji is said to have worked with his own hands in fortifying it, and his stone image is worshipped as an avatār in a temple in it. A smaller fortified island is called Pāndavgarh; it is said to have contained Shivaji's ship-building establishments."

The fortification of Sindhu-durg was commenced with Hindu religious rites on 25th November, 1664, and the spoils of the first sack of Surat were spent on the works. Building material and skilled workmen were secured for these works regardless of cost from places as far off as Goa, and the fort was soon completed.

"The only entrance to the bay at Malvan is by a narrow channel through the rocks and the passage from the land to the island is equally intricate. From the landing place the approach to the fort is even narrower than usual....

"A convenient station for his own ships to sail in and out was not the chief object of Shivaji in locating his naval bases. It would seem that his idea of a good harbour was a place that could not easily be got into (by an enemy). His earliest naval headquarters, at Kolaba (near Alibagh, occupied in 1660), is very badly hemmed in by rocks and reefs. Vijay-durg offers an easy entrance and safe anchorage: Jaygarh (at the mouth of the Sangameshwar river) is similar to it, and Devgarh leads to a narrow but safe channel opening into a large and perfectly land-locked harbour with very deep water." (Bom. Gaz., I. ii. 75, X. 318-340.)

To Jaygarh, with its double line of fortifications upper and lower, Shivaji added several finely constructed wells and a few habitable buildings. There were lesser naval bases with repair shops at Ratnagiri (port), Anjanwel, and Rajapur, on this coast.
§4. Sea-faring tribes of West Coast.

For manning his ships, Shivaji had the most skilful and experienced human material in India ready to his hand on the Kathiawad Gujrat and Konkan coasts. Here lived tribes, Hindu and Muslim, whose hereditary profession for centuries past had been fishing, ocean navigation, and piracy. Even in the modern age of steam shipping, the skilful long-voyage sailors known in Europe as lascars come mostly from the Khārvā, Koli and Bhādela tribes of the west coast, and to a lesser extent from the Vāgher and Mīānā (these last two being pirates by preference.) The Khārvās have Rajput, Koli and Muslim subdivisions; the Bhādelas and Vāghers are mostly Muslim by faith.

Of the Khārvās, it is said that they are among the hardiest of sailors and most skilful and daring of seamen; “they man the country craft that visit Zanzibar, Aden, and the whole coast of India, east as far as Singapore, and are also largely employed in steam-boats running between Bombay and Europe.” (Bom. Gaz., IX. pt. 1, 519-529.)

In addition to a race of hereditary expert seamen, the West Coast supplied shipwrights whose workmanship enjoyed the highest reputation in Asia. The vessels built in the Konkan dock-yards by local Indian agency without any European guidance, could compete on equal terms with those built in Portugal in that age. In 1530 “Agāshi had a rich timber trade and built ships, able to make the voyage to Europe”. “Bassein and Agāshi stood on equality with Portugal in the art of ship-building.”*

§5. Weakness of Maratha navy—its tactics.

In picturing Shivaji’s navy we must banish from our minds the idea derived from Europe of a line of men-o’-war

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A ship built at Agāshi was seized by the Portuguese and it made several voyages to Portugal. One of the ships stopped by Sir H. Middleton in 1612 was 158 ft. long, 42 ft. beam, 13 ft. deep, 1500 tons burden. One of the Dābhol ships stopped at the same time was of 1200 tons burden.
boldly sailing into the boundless open sea and defeating an opposing fleet by superior manœuvring and gunfire. The Maratha fighting vessels were meant for work in the coastal waters only; their tasks were to escort his merchant ships from port to port, or sally out of their shelter in some land-locked harbour, swoop down upon an enemy trading vessel or small fighting craft, and after dismastng capture it by boarding and hand-to-hand fight. For serving this end, their cumbrous gun-boats called ghurābs had to be towed at sea by row-boats so as to overtake the enemy, shoot off his masts and finally send a boarding party in the row-boats to capture the prize. In fact Shivaji’s sea-battles merely followed the tactics of land-fighting. Even in gun-power, his largest vessels were inferior to third-rate English or Portuguese fighting ships. He mounted only a few and small guns and the marksmanship of his gunners was poor and slow. C. Downing, who fought against Angré’s ships in 1717, notices that “not knowing how to point a piece of cannon, they did us little damage”, and again, “As soon as they came into the road, they never offered to fire at us, but sent their boats on board.” (Indian Wars, 21 and 23.)

Shivaji had no cannon-foundry, no factory for making first-class gun-powder* in his kingdom. All his naval armament and superior munitions had to be purchased from the European traders, among whom the English and the Portuguese refused to give him any aid of this kind for fear of antagonising the Mughal Government, while some Dutch or French tramp ship would sell to him in secrecy a few small guns which they probably found useless for their own need. Of course, big guns cast in India in earlier times passed into the Maratha king’s hands through his land conquests; these were stored in his forts, and some of them were laboriously transferred to his naval bases; only a few

* In 1801 we find Daulat Rao Sindhia unable to procure good gun-powder in his own dominions and ordering it from Kota and other places. Maharashtra was still further off from the supply centres of saltpetre and sulphur.
medium-sized ordnance could be mounted on his ghurābs. These antique "Museum pieces" could not compare with the modern brass-guns mounted on elevating screws, which De Boigne's French engineers cast for Mahadji Sindhia, and which excited the admiration of Lake and Wellington in 1803.

Shivaji's first object in creating a navy was to fight his eternal enemy the Siddi of Janjira and to supply escort to his mercantile marine in the coastal waters. He never wished to fight the English* who did not molest his subjects, or the Portuguese whose sole policy in that age of their decadence was to live at peace with all their Indian neighbours. His few incursions into Portuguese territory (provoked by breaches of neutrality by the Sāvants) were always ended by diplomacy. Hence the young Maratha navy never sought pitched battles at sea with any European Power. Its few battles with the Siddi fleet always ended in loss to both the sides, the tactical victory usually lying with the Abyssinians.

§6. Fighting ships, ghurābs and gallivats.

Three generations after Shivaji, Tuloji Angré's navy followed exactly the same tactics. The following description of it from the skilful pen of Orme will serve well to give us a picture of Shivaji's fighting fleet, if we make sufficient allowances for the comparative smallness, weakness in firepower and primitive methods of the Chhatrapati's navy and remember that it had roughly only one-fourth of the fighting value or efficiency of the Angré fleet which was destroyed 75 years after Shivaji's death:

"Angré's fleet consisted of ghurābs and gallivats. The ghurābs have rarely more than two masts; those of three are about 300 tons burden, but the others are not more than 150 tons. They are built to draw very little water, being

* The struggle with the English for Underi (1679) best illustrated the objectives and tactics of the Maratha fleet.
very broad in proportion to their length, narrowing from
the middle to the end, where they have a projecting prow,
covered with a strong deck, level with the main deck of the
vessel.... On the main deck under the forecastle are
mounted two pieces of cannon of nine or twelve pounders,
which point forwards and fire over the prow; the cannon of
the broadside are from six to nine pounders.

“The gallivats are large row-boats built like the ghurāb,
but of smaller dimensions, the largest rarely exceeding
seventy tons; they have two masts, of which the mizen is
very slight, the main mast bears only one sail, which is
triangular and very large.... In general the gallivats are
covered with a spar deck made of split bamboo, and these
carry only petteraroes which are fixed on swivels in the
gunnel of the vessel, but those of the largest size have a fixed
deck on which they mount six or eight pieces of cannon
from two to four pounders. They have forty or fifty stout
oars, and may be rowed four miles an hour.*

“Eight or ten ghurābs, and forty or fifty gallivats,
crowded with men, generally composed Angré’s principal
fleet, destined to attack ships.... The (enemy) vessel no
sooner came in sight of the port where the (Maratha) fleet
was lying, than they slipped their cables and put out to
sea.... If the wind was calm, the gallivats rowing towed the
ghurābs. When within cannon shot, the ghurābs attacked the
chase at a distance with their prow guns, firing first only at
the masts.... As soon as the chase was dismasted, they came
nearer and battered her on all sides until she struck; and
if the defence was obstinate, they sent a number of gallivats
with two or three hundred men in each, who boarded

* The Gujrat coast galbats had round sterns and two masts, each
carrying a lateen sail; 10 to 50 tons burden.

“Being of a sharp build, they usually sail well. These galbats were
the pirate ships of former days.” (B. Gaz., ii. 416.) In the early times
the pirates of Kolhapur and Vädi were called Malvans. from the port of
Malvan which was their nest, while the pirates of the Ratmagiri coast were
called Sanguiceros, a Portuguese form of Sangameshwar, their principal
station.” (Bom. Gaz., I. pt. 2, 88.)
sword in hand from all quarters in the same instant.”
(Orme's Indostan, 4th ed. i. 408-409.)

§7. Shivaji’s mercantile marine.

Shivaji’s trading and transport vessels included the types known as machuā, shibār, tarānd, and pagār.

Machuā—a large cargo-boat with a square sail and single mast. On the Ratnagiri coast these varied in size from one to three tons burden. Its Portuguese name Manchuā was derived from the Sanskrit word mancha, meaning the raised platform for the cargo. (Hobson-Jobson, Molesworth.) The war-man chu cas of the Portuguese fleet, however, carried 12 oars, 15 soldiers and four small guns. (Careri.)*

Shibār—a large phatimar sailing vessel, square-stered, flat-bottomed with two masts, but no deck. Phatimār is a deep narrow vessel of great speed and an excellentailer, 25—45 ft. long, 25—100 tons burden.

Tarānd—a large sailing vessel; but in the Marathi language tāramb-tarāndé is used as an indefinite term for ships. (Molesworth, 376.)

Pagār—in Marathi means a canoe well-scooped, smoothed and finished. (Molesworth, 625.) Portuguese parangue (or pangara). Used for carrying provisions. In Ratnagiri, the pagār belonged to the phatimāri class. [B. Gaz. X. 171.]

§8. The Abyssinians of the West Coast.

The expansion of Shivaji’s rule across the Western Ghāts into the coast-district of Konkan brought him into contact with the maritime Powers of our western sea-board.

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* On the Surat coast, the machua (pronounced as machhvo) was the smallest kind of craft employed in carrying on the sea-trade of the district; varying from 1½ to 8 tons burden, carrying one mast, one triangular or lateen sail, and some oars. (B. Gaz., II. 413.) But later we find machuas which were round-built, two-masted, and of 3 to 20 tons burden. (xiii, pt. ii. 717.)
Chief among these were the Siddis or Abyssinians of Janjīrā, a rocky island 45 miles south of Bombay, and guarding the mouth of the Rājpuri creek. Half a mile east of it, on the mainland stands the town of Rājpuri, and two miles south-east of the latter is the fort of Dandā on the shore of the creek. But these two are regarded as one place and formed the head-quarters of the land-possessions of the Siddis, covering much of the modern district of Kolābā. From this tract were drawn the revenue and provisions that nourished the Government of Janjīrā.

An Abyssinian colony had settled here in the 15th century. One of them secured the government of Dandā-Rājpuri under the Sultans of Ahmadnagar. But the dissolution of that monarchy and the situation of the district on the extreme frontier of the State beyond the Western Ghāts, made it easy for the Siddi to establish himself in practical independence of the central authority, so that, when the partition treaty of 1636 gave the west coast to Bijapur, that Government had to fight for years before the Siddi submitted to it; in the end a compromise was made, it recognized the Siddi chief as its representative in the district, gave him the title of a wazir, and added to his charge the whole sea-board from Nāgothnā to Bankot, on condition of his protecting Bijapur trade and Mecca pilgrims at sea.

As the Siddis formed a small military aristocracy dominating a vast alien population, their constitution provided for the rule of the ablest, and on the death of a chief not his son but the first officer of the fleet succeeded to the governorship. The Abyssinians were hardy, skilful and daring mariners and the most efficient fighters at sea among the Muslim races, while their courage and energy, joined to coolness and power of command, made them enjoy a high estimation as soldiers and administrators.

The Siddi chief of Janjīrā maintained an efficient fleet, and throughout the 17th century he was officially recognized as the admiral, at first of Bijapur and latterly of the Mughal empire. There was no native Power on the west coast that
could make a stand against him at sea. *(Bom. Gaz., xi. 434, 416.)*

To the owner of Konkan it was essential that the Siddi should be either made an ally or rendered powerless for mischief. Shivaji found that unless he created a strong navy, his foreign trade would be lost, and his subjects on the sea-coast and for some distance inland would remain liable to constant plunder, enslavement, outrage, and slaughter at the will of a band of pirates alien by race, creed and language. The innumerable creeks and navigable rivers of the west coast, while they naturally fostered the growth of rich ports and trade centres, made it imperatively necessary for their protection that their owner should rule the sea. On the other hand, the possession of Dandā-Rājpuri and its adjacent district was necessary to the owner of Janjirā for his very existence. The political separation of the two made war against the mainland an economic necessity to him.

§9. *Marātha conquests from the Abyssinians, up to 1661.*

Nothing is known accurately about the early history of the Siddis. The proceedings of the Viceroy's Council in Goa show that Siddī Ambar, Captain of Danda, was a defeated rebel against his sovereign Adil Shah in November 1640, that a Bijapuri army under Asad Khan (the son of the premier Mustafa Kh.) went with a large army in February 1642 to wrest Danda from the rebels, and that in March 1642 a rebel Fath Khan had proclaimed a puppet Nizam Shah under the title of Shahid Sultan Alauddin Padishah, as the lawful heir of the ancient dynasty, and was tyrannically seizing territories in Balaghat under his pretended authority. Eventually the Bijapur Government made peace by recognising Fath Khan as its vassal and the lord of Danda.

Shivaji had early captured the eastern part of the Kolābā district adjoining the Siddi's territory, but the latter
still held Dandā-Rājpuri and much of the neighbouring land. There were constant skirmishes between the two Powers thus occupying the eastern and western portions of the Kolābā district, but no record of them has come down to us. The Siddi had too small an army to defy the regular Marātha forces on land, and he seems to have confined himself to making raids by surprise and doing petty acts of mischief to Shivaji’s villages in that region, as is clear from the Marātha chronicler’s description of the Siddi as “an enemy like the mice in a house.”* (Sabh. 66.)

Fath Khan was a brave active and able leader. In 1659, when Afzal Khan was advancing against Shivaji from the east, Fath Khan seized the opportunity of trying to recover his own. But, on hearing of the destruction of the Bijapur army (November), he retired in haste. Next year, when Ali Adil Shah II. opened a campaign against Shivaji, who was invested in Panhālā fort, Fath Khan renewed his invasion of Konkan. The Kāy Sāvant, a loyal vassal of Bijapur, co-operated with the Siddi. After an obstinate battle both the Sāvant and Bāji Rao Pāsalkar (Shivaji’s general) fell in a single combat, and both parties retreated to their bases. (Sabh. 65.)

To retrieve the position, Shivaji next sent a larger force, five to seven thousand strong, under Raghunāth Ballāl (Ātrē?) who beat the Siddi forces, captured Talā, Ghonsālā, and other forts, and wrested the sea-coast up to Dandā.† The Marāthas continued the campaign even during

*The dates relating to the struggle with the Siddis given in this section are very doubtful, as Sabhasad is never accurate in his order of events and there is no independent check on his statements here. The Shivapur Daftar Yadi says that in July 1657, Raghunath was sent to Rajpuri. This date cannot be reconciled with the other narratives, and is unsupported by Jedhe. The meaning also is not clear. An English Factory letter (1659) states, “Those that inhabit Danda-Rajpuri are pirates and rogues, and maintain vessels abroad to rob all that they master.” (Foster, 214.)

† The English merchants of Rajapur write on 10 Dec. 1659, of “Shivaji having already taken the town of Danda-Rajpuri, but not the castle.” (F. R. Rajapur.)
the rains, and after a long siege captured the fort of Dandā, and following up their success opened batteries against Janjirā itself. But their weakness in artillery defeated their attempt on this sea-girt rock. Hopeless of relief from Bijapur, the Siddi came to terms with Shivaji and formally ceded Dandā-Rājpuri. Thus, no stronghold was left to the Siddi on the mainland. (Sabh. 66.)

But this peace could not possibly last long. To the Siddi the loss of the Kolābā territory meant starvation, and, on the other hand, it was Shivā's "lifelong ambition to capture Janjirā" and make his hold on the west coast absolutely secure. Hostilities soon broke out again. The Siddis resumed their depredations on the coast, while Shivā fired upon Janjirā every year during the dry season, without being able to take that island-fortress.

The Marātha gains on the Kolābā coast were now organized into a province, and placed under an able viceroy, Vyankāji Datto, with a permanent contingent of 5 to 7 thousand men (Sabh. 66.) He defeated the Siddis in a great land-battle, totally excluded them from the mainland, improved the defences of Dandā-Rājpuri by fortifying a hill that commanded it, and built a chain of forts (such as Birwādi and Lingānā) which effectually prevented Siddi depredations in that quarter. At this the Siddis, in order to "fill their stomachs," had to direct their piracy against the villages and ports further south, in the Ratnagiri district, which had now come under Shivā's sway. The Marātha chief, therefore, realized that he must create a formidable navy and set up fortified bases along the coast, if he was to ensure the protection of his seaside districts and the conquest of Janjirā which would continue as a thorn in his side if left in enemy hands. (Sabh. 67.)

§10. The growth of Shivaji's navy.

In June 1659, Shivaji was reported to have built twenty gallivats in Kalian, Bhiwandi and Pen for the
SHIVAJI'S FLEET HOW COMPOSED

purpose of making war on the Siddi of Danda, and given charge of the fleet to Ruy Leitao Viegas, whom he ordered to secure permission from the Goa Government for these ships to proceed to the open sea through the Portuguese stations of Thana and Bassein. This permission was refused by the Viceroy's Council. Again, in August 1664, the Portuguese Captain of Chaul reported that the Maratha king had made fifty ships, out of which seven built at Upper Chaul were complete and about to put to sea. [Goa, proceedings of Viceroy's Council.]

The Marathi chronicles speak of Shivaji's fleet as consisting at its best of seven hundred vessels of various sizes and classes, such as ghurābs (gun-boats) tarāndis, tārambēs, gallivats, shibārs, pagārs, manchwās, &c. Most of these were mercantile marine belonging to the State, or supply boats. The English factory reports never put the number of his fighting vessels above 160, and usually as 60 only. They were formed into two squadrons (of 200 vessels each, if we accept the Marathi accounts), and commanded by two admirals who bore the titles of Dariā Sārang (Admiral of the Ocean) and Māi Nāyak.*

We may here record what little is definitely known about Shivaji's mercantile marine. Soon after getting possession of the ports in North Konkan, he began to engage in foreign trade on his own account. Early in January 1660 he captured at Rājāpur one of the junks of Afzal Khan and turned it to his own use. In February 1663 the English at Surat report that he was fitting out two ships of considerable burden for trading with Mocha (in western Arabia) and loading them at Jaitapur, two miles up the Rājāpur river, with "goods of considerable value which were by storms or foul weather driven upon his coast." Two years later (12th

* Sabhasad, 67, speaks of Dariā Sārang as a Musalman and of Māi Nāyak as a Hindu of the Bhandāri caste. But a Bombay letter dated 21 Nov. 1670 says, "The admiral of the [Maratha] fleet is one Ventgee Sarungee, commonly called Durrea Sarungee." Daulat Khan was an officer distinct from the Daria Sarang (Rajwade, viii. 27 and 91 Q. B., 74).
March 1665), they write that from each of the eight or nine “most considerable ports in the Deccan” that he had seized, he used to “set out 2 or 3 or more trading vessels yearly to Persia, Basra, Mocha, &c.” Again, we learn that in April, 1669, a great storm on the Kārwār coast destroyed several of his ships and rice-boats, “one of the ships being very richly laden.” (F. R. Surat, Vols. 2, 86, 105.)


The rise of the Marātha naval power caused anxiety to the Siddis, the English merchants, and the Mughal Emperor alike. On 26th June, 1664, the Surat factors report that Shivā was fitting out a fleet of 60 frigates for an attack on some unknown quarter, probably “to surprise all junks and vessels belonging to that port and to waylay them on their return from Basra and Persia,” or to transport an army up the Cambay creek (Sabarmati) for making a raid on Ahmadabad. At the end of November it was learnt that the fleet had been sent to Bhatkal, to co-operate with his army in the invasion of Kanara. The English President describes the Marātha vessels as “pitiful things, so that one good English ship would destroy a hundred of them without running herself into great danger.” In addition to the inferior size and build of their ships, the Marāthas on land and sea alike were very weak in artillery and, therefore, powerless against European ships of war. (F. R. Surat, 86.)

In February 1665, Shivaji’s fleet of 85 frigates* and three large ships conveyed his army to Basrur for the plunder of South Kanara. (Ch. 10.)

He had very early begun to plunder Mughal ships, especially those conveying pilgrims for Mecca from the port of Surat (called Dar-ul-haJJ, “the City of Pilgrimage.”) The Emperor had no fleet of his own in the Indian Ocean able

* Duff (i. 201n) suggests that by the term frigates were probably meant small vessels with one mast, from 30 to 150 tons burden, common on the Malabar coast.
to cope with the Marāthas. Early in 1665 when Jai Singh opened his campaign, in accordance with his policy of combining all possible enemies against Shivaji, he wrote to the Siddi to enter into an alliance with the Mughals. (Haft Anj., Benares Ms., 78a). Late in the same year, when Jai Singh was about to begin the invasion of Bijapur, he invited these Abyssinians to join the Mughal force, promising them mansabs.* By the Treaty of Purandar, the Mughals left the territory of Janjirā adjoining Shivā’s dominions to him, if he could conquer it. (Ibid.) Shivā also offered to attempt the conquest of Janjirā for the Emperor. (Ibid. 78b. But 91 Q. B. 51, states that Jai Singh definitely refused to make the Siddis give up Janjirā to Shivā.)

§12. Marātha attack on Janjirā fails, 1670.

In 1669 Shivaji’s attack upon Janjirā was renewed with great vigour. In the earlier months of the year the hostile armies made almost daily inroads into each other’s country and the warfare closed the roads to all peaceful traffic. In October, the Siddi was so very hard pressed and Janjirā was in such danger of being starved into surrender that he wrote to the English merchants of his “resolve to hold out to the last and then deliver it up to the Mughal.” (F. R. Surat 105, Hubli to Surat, 17 July, Bomb. to Surat, 16 Oct.)

The contest came to a crisis next year (1670.) Shivaji staked all his resources on the capture of Janjirā. Fath Khan, worn out by the incessant struggle, impoverished by the ruin of his subjects, and hopeless of aid from his suzerain at Bijapur, resolved to accept Shivā’s offer of a large sum and a rich jagir as the price of giving up Janjirā. But his three Abyssinian slaves roused their clansmen on the island

* Siddi Sambal fought on the Mughal side during the invasion of Bijapur in 1666. (A. N. 1012.) The informal connection thus established between the Emperor and the Siddis continued, as we find that during Shivaji’s siege of Janjira in 1669, Aurangzib wrote to him commanding him to withdraw from the attempt. (Bombay to Surat, dated 16 Oct., 1669, F. R. Surat, Vol. 105.)
against this surrender to an infidel, imprisoned Fath Khan, seized the Government, and applied to Adil Shah and the Mughal viceroy of the Deccan for aid. The Mughals readily agreed, and the Siddi fleet was transferred from the overlordship of Bijapur to that of Delhi, and Siddi Sambal, one of the leaders of the revolution, was created imperial admiral with a mansab and a jāgir yielding 3 lakhs of Rupees. His two associates, Siddi Qāsim and Siddi Khairiyat were given the command of Janjirā and the land dominions respectively. The Siddi fleet was taken into Mughal service on the same terms as under Bijapur. The general title of Yaqut Khan was conferred on successive Siddi admirals from this time onwards, and the government of Janjirā was separated from the admiral’s charge and placed under another Siddi, who was regarded as the second leader of the tribe and heir to the admiral’s post. Yaqut Khan was merely first among his equals. “The other Siddi captains preserved the distinct command over their own crews and dependents, and an aristocratical council determined the general welfare of this singular republic.” (Orme’s Frag. 57; K. K. ii. 224.)

This revolution at Janjirā is said by Kháfi Khan to have taken place in January or February 1671.* Shortly before it the Marātha fleet had met with a great reverse. In November 1670, Shivaji collected at Nandgāon, 10 miles north of Janjirā, 160 small vessels (under Dariā Sārāng) and an army of 10,000 horse and 20,000 foot, with full provisions for a siege, large numbers of mining tools (pick-axes, shovels and crow-bars), and victuals for 40 days. Another body

* But the date is evidently wrong. On 4th April 1674, Narayan Shenvi, the English diplomatic agent, writes from Raigarh to Bombay, “I have discoursed with Niraj Pandit concerning the peace you desired might be concluded with the Siddi Fath Khan.” (F. R. Surat, Vol. 88.) This proves (a) that Fath Khan was a Siddi and not an Afghan as stated by Kháfi Khan, and (b) that he was in power in 1674, instead of having been deposed in 1671. Here Kháfi Khan is proved by contemporary records to be unreliable. But Siddi Sambal was undoubtedly admiral of the fleet from 1671 onwards.
of 3,000 soldiers, with a great number of pioneers, was kept "ready to embark and depart with the fleet at a minute's notice." His secret design was to march to Surat by land, where the fleet would join him, and then the fort would be delivered to him on 29th November, as had been secretly agreed upon by its commandant. If he succeeded there, he intended to march on and take Broach also.

But the plan failed. The fleet left Nandgāon on 24th November and passed northwards skirting the Bombay island the next day, and Mahim on the 26th. The army under Shivaji marched in the same direction by land. But on the 26th he suddenly turned back and recalled his fleet. He had discovered that the seemingly treacherous qiladār's promise to sell the fort to him was only a trap laid for him. Quickly changing his plan, he turned to an easier and surer prey. Early in December he suddenly burst into Khāndesh and Berār and looted these provinces far and wide. During his absence on this raid, his fleet met with a defeat. In passing by Daman, his admiral had captured a large ship of that place worth Rs. 12,000 bound for Surat. The Portuguese retaliated by capturing 12 of his ships* and leaving the prizes at Bassein went in pursuit of the rest of the Marātha fleet, which, however, succeeded in escaping to Dābhol. (F.R. Surat, Vol. 105, Bomb. to Surat, 17, 21 and 28 Nov. and 17 Dec., 1670.)


Siddi Qāsim, the new governor of Janjirā, "was distinguished among his tribesmen for bravery, care of the peasantry, capacity, and cunning. He busied himself in increasing his fleet and war-material, strengthening the defences of his forts and cruising at sea. He used to remain day and night clad in armour, and repeatedly seized enemy ships, cut off the heads of many Marāthas and sent them to

* Father Navarette says, there were 15 small ships, which the Portuguese drove up to the shore and took without the expense of a grain of powder. (Orme's Frag. 207.)
Surat. (K. K., ii. 225.) His crowning achievement was the recovery of Dandā from Shivāji’s men. One night in February, 1671, when the Marātha garrison of that fort were absorbed in drinking and celebrating the Spring Carnival (Holi), Qāsim secretly arrived at the pier with 40 ships, while Siddi Khairiyat with 500 men made a noisy feint on the land-side. The full strength of the garrison rushed in the latter direction to repel Khairiyat, and Qāsim seized the opportunity to scale the sea-wall. Some of his brave followers were hurled into the sea and some slain, but the rest forced their way into the fort. Just then the powder-magazine exploded, killing the Marātha commandant and several of his men, with a dozen of the assailants. Qāsim promptly raised his battle-cry Khassu! Khassu! and shouting “My braves, be composed; I am alive and safe,” he advanced slaying and binding to the centre of the fort, where he joned hands with Khairiyat’s party, and the entire place was conquered.

Shivā had been planning the capture of Janjirā, and now he had failed to hold even Dandā! It is said that during the night of the surprise, at the moment the powder-magazine blew up, Shivā, who was 40 miles away, started from his sleep and exclaimed that some calamity must have befallen Dandā! He was, however, unable to make reprisals immediately, as his army was busy elsewhere, in the Nāsik and Baglānā districts, where the Mughal viceroy was pressing him hard. Qāsim, therefore, could easily follow up his success by capturing seven other forts in the neighbourhood. Six of them opened their gates in terror of his prowess after his grand victory at Dandā. The seventh stood a siege for a week and then capitulated on terms, which Qāsim faithlessly violated, enslaving and converting the boys and handsome women to Islam, dismissing the old and ugly women, and massacring all the men of the garrison. For some time afterwards the Marāthas were forced to stand on the defensive in their own territory. (K. K. ii. 225-228, only authority.)
These disasters fully roused Shivā. The recovery of Dandā fort became an absorbing passion as well as a political necessity, to him. To the end of his life and throughout the reign of Shambhuji, hostilities continued between the Marāthas and the Siddis, intermittently, indecisively, but with great bitterness and fury. Gross cruelty and wanton injury were practised by each side on the captive soldiers and innocent peasantry of the other, and the country became desolate. The economic loss was more keenly felt by the small and poor State of the Abyssinians than by the Marāthas, and the Siddis at times begged for peace, but did not succeed, as they were not prepared to accept Shivā’s terms of ceding their all to him.

In September 1671, Shivaji sent an ambassador to Bombay to secure the aid of the English in an attack on Dandā. But the President and Council of Surat advised the Bombay factors “not to positively promise him the grenades, mortar-pieces, and ammunition he desires, nor to absolutely deny him, in regard we do not think it convenient to help him against Dandā, which place if it were in his possession would prove a great annoyance to the port of Bombay.” (F. R. Surat, 87.)


Towards the end of 1672, Aurangzib sent a fleet of 36 vessels, great and small, from Surat to assist the Siddi of Dandā-Rājpuri by causing a diversion by sea. This squadron did Shivaji “great mischief, burning and plundering all his sea-port towns and destroying also above 500 of his vessels” (evidently trading boats).* At this time (21st December) Shivā had six small frigates, which he laid up in Bombay harbour in fear of the Mughal armada, and which the English saved from the latter by pretending that

* “Sacked and burnt Dabhol, burnt the fleet of Shivaji at Kelshi (17°55 N., near Bankot) and eight large vessels, . . . . robbed all the coast.” [Portuguese records, Pissur., i. 35-37.]
they themselves had attached them as compensation for the plunder of their Rājāpur factory in 1661. Early in January next, the Mughal fleet visited Bombay after its successful campaign against the Marāthas. At this time both Shivā and the Emperor were eagerly courting the naval help of the English in a war with the other side. But the foreign traders very wisely maintained their neutrality, though it was a "ticklish game". In the following August, however, the ship Soleil d' Orient of the new French East India Company founded by Colbert, arrived at Rājāpur and secretly sold 80 guns (mostly small pieces) and 2,000 maunds of lead to Shivā's fleet. The French gave similar help in November 1679 when they sold him 40 guns for the defence of Panhālā. (O. C. 3722; 3734. F. R. Surat 87, Surat to Co., 12 Jan., 1674; Vol. 108, Rājāpur to Surat, 30 Dec., 1679.)

The difference between the English and Shivaji was utilized by Reickloff Van Goen, the Dutch commodore, who about March 1673 opened negotiations with the Marātha chief, promising him the help of the entire Dutch fleet (of 22 ships) in retaking Dandā-Rājpuri, while Shivaji was to lend 3,000 of his soldiers for a Dutch attempt to conquer Bombay. Shivaji, however, durst not trust the Dutch and continued to remain friendly to the English, though he had by this time spent a vast treasure and incurred the loss of nearly 15,000 men in his vain attacks upon the Siddi strongholds. (O. C. 3760.)

The Mughal fleet of 30 frigates, commanded by Siddī Sambal, returned from Surat to Dandā-Rājpuri, in May 1673, and after passing the south-west monsoon (June-September) there, sailed down the coast, taking many Marātha trading vessels and some ships of war. On 10th October it entered the Bombay harbour, sent landing parties to the Pen and Nāgothnā rivers, laid waste the Marātha villages opposite Bombay, and carried off many of the people. These devastations were frequently repeated. But at the end of the month, "some of Shivaji's soldiers [from
Rāigarh] surprised a parcel of the Siddi's men as they were on shore cutting the standing rice in his country, and destroyed about a hundred of them, carrying away the heads of some of the chiefest unto Shivaji.” The great cruelty practised by the Siddis on his subjects and their burning of several small towns in his territory “provoked Shivaji much”, and reprisals by him were apprehended in the Mughal dominions, especially at Surat. (O. C. 3779 and 3870.)

In February 1674, we learn from an English letter, “the war betwixt the Siddi and Shivaji is carried on but slowly, they being both weary,” and the President of Surat was requested by the Siddi “to mediate a peace between them.” (O. C. 3939.)

Next month (March 1674), however, Siddi Sambal attacked Shivaji's admiral Daulat Khan in the Sātavli river (i.e., the Muchkundi creek in the Ratnagiri district), both the admirals being wounded and the two sides losing 100 and 44 men respectively. The Marāthas were left victors, and Siddi Sambal withdrew to Harishwar, a port 21 miles south of Janjirā. In May Shivaji, who “was resolved to take that castle (Dandā-Rājpuri) let it cost him what it will,” was reported to be daily sending down more artillery, ammunition, men and money to strengthen his siege-troops. In the course of this year he reduced the whole coast of South Konkan from Rājpuri to Bardes north of Goa, but not the fort of Dandā-Rājpuri. By the end of 1672 he had already spent a vast treasure and 15,000 soldiers in his futile attacks on Janjirā. (F. R. Surat 88; O. C. 3760.)


In September 1675, we read of his making preparations for taking that fort by a land and sea attack. His fleet had by this time increased to 57 sail, of which 15 were ghurabs and the rest gallivats. The cruise of the Siddi fleet along Shivā's coast in January and February of this year had proved unsuccessful. But it returned in November with
reinforcements, and sailed down the coast to Vingurla, plundering and burning that town. Maratha squadrons from Gheria (Vijay-durg) and Rajapur took to the sea, seeking a fight, but the Siddi escaped to Janjira. (F.R. Surat 107; Bomb. to Surat, 7 Sep.; Orme, Frag., 49, 53.)

That island had been besieged by Shivâ with a great force some months earlier. The neighbouring coast was dotted with his outposts and redoubts, and he also built some floating batteries and made an attempt to throw a mole across the sea from the mainland to the island of Janjira.* The siege was raised at the end of 1675, on the arrival of the fleet under Siddi Sambal; but it was renewed next year with greater vigour than before. The Peshwa Moro Pant was sent (August, 1676) with 10,000 men to co-operate with the fleet and the former siege-troops. They felled all the wood around to make floating platforms with breastworks, from which the walls were to be assaulted.

But the attempt failed. Siddi Qâsim arrived with the Abyssinian fleet, broke the line of investment, infused life into the defence, made counter-attacks, burnt the floating batteries and forced the Marathas to raise the siege (end of December 1676.)

§16. Naval war, 1676-1680.

The rest of the struggle with the Siddis is given below in a summary form, on the basis of the English factory records.

In April 1676, Siddi Sambal, who had quarrelled with the other Siddi leaders, was removed by them from the naval command, which was given to Siddi Qâsim, with the governorship of Dandâ-Râjpuri. But Sambal still retained the Mughal fleet. He cruised along Shivaji's coast (in

* Siege of Janjira: Orme, Frag., 48, 57. A very confused and obscurely written account of this struggle is given in Shivadigujay, 192-196, and 91 Q. B. It is evident that these two works have transferred to Shivaji's reign some of the incidents of Shambhuji's sieges of Janjira in 1681 and later.
October) burning Jaitāpur (at the mouth of the Rājāpur river) in December, but was prevented from advancing further up the river and returned to Janjirā, where Qāsim had already raised the Marātha siege under Moro Pant.

Early in 1677 strict orders came from Delhi that the imperial fleet must be delivered to Qāsim. But Sambal put off obeying the order for many months, till the two rival Siddi admirals who were living in Bombay came to blows, and finally through the mediation of the English Council the quarrel was settled, and Qāsim was installed as admiral, at the end of October. Sambal in disgust transferred his services to Shivā, carrying his family and personal retainers with himself, the most notable among them being his gallant nephew Siddi Misri.

Qāsim left Bombay with the fleet in November; up to March next he cruised off the Konkan coast, making frequent landings and kidnapping the people, all of whom (including the Brāhman prisoners) he forced to do menial services of a defiling character. At the end of April 1678 he returned to Bombay to rest during the monsoons. Shivaji, wishing to avenge the degradation of his Brāhman subjects, sent his admirals Daulat Khan and Dariā Sārang with 4,000 men to Pānvel, a town opposite Bombay (July), with orders to cross the creek and burn the Siddi fleet then anchored at Mazāgon in Bombay island. But insufficiency of boats and the violence of the monsoon prevented the army from crossing, and Daulat Khan, after vainly pressing the Portuguese to allow him a passage through their territory, retired to Rāigarh. Siddī Qāsim sent his boats and plundered the Alībāgh coast.

In October 1678, Daulat Khan was sent with a large army and a mightier train of artillery than before to renew the bombardment of Janjirā; but Siddī Qāsim could not pay his men for want of remittance from Surat, and had to continue inactive in Bombay harbour.

Shivaji’s navy had by this time been increased to 20 two-masted ghurabs and 40 gallivats. “None of his harbours
admitted ships of a great size, such as were used at Surat, or by the Europeans. The (immense) traffic from port to port of the Malabar and Konkan coasts had from time immemorial been carried on in vessels of shallow burden capable of taking close refuge under every shelter of the land. The vessels for fight (on) these coasts were also built of the same small size, and trusted to the superiority of number (and not of gun-power or seaworthiness) against ships of burden in the open sea. Shivaji did not change this system in his own marine.” (Orme’s Fragments, 77-78.)

In February 1680, Qasim sallying from his anchorage in Bombay harbour burnt many villages on the Pen river and brought away a thousand captives. Then Shiva and the English made an agreement (March) not to let the Siddi fleet winter in Bombay unless they promised to observe strict neutrality. This brings the narrative down to the death of Shivaji, but the same wearisome story of abortive attacks on Janjirā by the Marathas and cruel devastation of the coast district by the Siddis continued under Shambhuji.

§17. War with the English for Khanderi Island, 1679.

The difficulty of capturing Janjirā set Shiva thinking of some other island in the neighbourhood which would afford him a naval base. His choice fell on Khanderi (‘Kennery’) a small rocky island, 1½ miles by ½ mile, situated 11 miles south of Bombay and 30 miles north of Janjirā. As early as April 1672 the people of Surat learnt of his intention to build a fort on the island. The English President at once decided to prevent it, as affecting the interests of Bombay even more than those of Surat, because no ship could enter or issue from Bombay harbour without being seen from Khanderi. (F. R. Surat 87, Surat to Bomb. 22 April; Vol. 106, 1 May 1672.)
The progress of the Marātha engineers was very slow, and in September next their fortifications were still incomplete. The English and Siddi fleets came there in concert and warned the Marāthas to stop their work. Shivaji's admirals, Daulat Khan and Māi Nāyak, finding themselves opposed to very superior forces, withdrew from the island.

At the end of August 1679, Shivā again took up the project of fortifying Khanderi,* and collected men and materials for the purpose at Chaul. He allocated one lakh of hun from the revenues of Kaliān and Chaul to be spent on the work. On 15th September we find that 150 men of Shivā with four small guns under command of Māi Nāyak are already on the island and have run up breast-works of earth and stone all around it. A request from the Deputy Governor of Bombay "to quit the place as it belonged to the island of Bombay," was declined by the Marāthas in the absence of orders from Shivaji to that effect. The English, therefore, resolved that if the occupation of the island was persisted in and the Marātha fleet under Daulat Khan came there to protect the fortifications, they would "repel them with force as an open and public enemy." (Orme MSS. 116. F. R. Surat 4, Consult., 4 and 15 Sep. 1679.)

The first encounter between the English and the Marāthas at sea took place on 19th September and ended in a reverse for the sons of the Ocean Queen. The larger English ships were still outside the Bay of Khanderi, because the soundings had not yet been taken and they could not be brought closer to the island. Lieutenant Francis Thorpe, with some shibars made a rash attempt to land on the island, "positively against orders". The Englishmen were assailed with great and small shot from the shore works. The rash drunken young officer was killed with two other men (John Bradbury and Henry Welch), several others were wounded, and George Cole and many other Englishmen were left prisoners on the island. The lieu-

* The foundation stone was laid on 27th August.
tenant's shibar was captured by the enemy, while two other shibārs escaped to the fleet in the open sea. Next day the Marāthas carried off another English shibār, Sergeant Giles timidly offering no resistance. (Orme MSS. 116.)

Early in October the Marātha fleet was got ready to go to the succour of Khanderi. The second battle with the English was fought on 18th October, 1679.* At day-break the entire Marātha fleet of more than 60 vessels under Daulat Khan suddenly bore down upon the small English squadron consisting of the Revenge frigate, 2 ghurabs of two masts each, 3 shibars and 2 manchwas,—eight vessels in all, with 200 European soldiers on board, in addition to the lascars and white sailors. The Marāthas advanced from the shore a little north of Chaul, firing from their prows and moving so fast that the English vessels at anchor near Khanderi had scarcely time to get under weigh. In less than half an hour the Dover, one of the English ghurābs, having Sergeant Mauleverer and some English soldiers† on board, with great cowardice struck its colours and was carried off by the Marāthas. The other ghurāb kept aloof, and the five smaller vessels ran away, leaving the Revenge alone in the midst of the enemy. But she fought gallantly and sank five of the Marātha gallivats, at which their whole fleet fled to the bar of Nāgothnā, pursued by the Revenge. Two days afterwards the Marātha fleet issued from the

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* A full description is given in Bombay Gaz. xiii. pt. ii. p. 478. I have followed Orme, Frag., 80-81, in addition.

† Surat Consultation, 3 December, 1679: "Sergeant Mauleverer etc., English, taken formerly by Shivaji in the Ghurab Dover, being in great want of provisions and all other necessaries.....we having duly considered, and perceiving how cowardly they behaved themselves in the time of engagement, do order them to be stricken out of the muster rolls, but that they may not wholly perish, that some small allowance be made to them for victuals only, if it can be securely conveyed to them [in the Maratha prison]." (F. R. Surat, Vol. 4.) This was in answer to a letter from Mauleverer, dated 6th November, begging for provisions, clothing and medicines for the wounded, and stating that the prisoners in the Maratha fort (Suragarh?) included 20 English, French and Dutch, 28 Portuguese, and 9 lascars. (Orme MSS. 116.)
creek, but on the English vessels advancing they fled back. Such is the inefficiency of “mosquito craft” in naval battles fought with artillery that even fifty slender and open Indian ships were no match for a single large and strongly built English vessel. At the end of November the Siddi fleet of 34 ships joined the English off Khanderi and kept up a daily battery against the island. (Orme, 81-84.)

But the cost of these operations was heavily felt by the English merchants, who also realized that they could not recruit white soldiers to replace any lost in fight, and therefore could not “long oppose him (Shivā). lest they should imprudently so weaken themselves as not to be able to defend Bombay itself, if he should be exasperated to draw down his army that way.” Moreover, during the monsoon storms the English would be forced to withdraw their naval patrol from Khanderi, and then Shivā would “take his opportunity to fortify and store the island, maugre all our designs.” So, the Surat Council wisely resolved (25th October), that the English should “honourably withdraw themselves in time,” and either settle this difference with Shivaji by means of a friendly mediator, or else throw the burden of opposing him on the Portuguese governor of Bassein or on the Siddi, and thus “ease the Hon’ble Company of this great charge.” The Surat factory itself was in danger and could spare no European soldier for succouring Bombay. (F. R. Surat 4, Consult., 25 and 31 Oct. 3, 8 and 12 Dec. 1679.)

The dreaded reprisal by Shivaji against Bombay almost came to pass. “Highly exasperated by the defeat of his fleet before Khanderi,” he sent 4,000 men to Kaliān-Bhivandi with the intention to land in Bombay by way of Thānā. The Portuguese governor of Bassein having refused to allow them to pass through his country, the invaders marched to Pānvel (a port in their own territory) opposite Trombay island, intending to embark there on seven shibars (end of October 1679.) The inhabitants of Bombay were terribly alarmed. The Deputy Governor breathed fire, but
the President and Council of Surat decided to climb down. On receiving a courteous letter from Shivaji sent by way of Rājāpur, they wrote “a civil answer, demonstrating our trouble for the occasion his people have given the English at Bombay to quarrel with him about his fortifying so insignificant a rock as Khanderi, which is not in the least becoming a prince of his eminence and qualifications; and though we have a right to that place, yet to show the candour of our proceedings, we are willing to forget what is past, and therefore have given instructions to the Deputy Governor of Bombay to treat with such persons as he shall appoint about the present differences.” The Deputy Governor was “very much dissatisfied” with this pacific tone and held that a vigorous policy of aggression against Shivā’s country and fleet would “give a speedy conclusion to this dispute, to the Hon’ble Company’s advantage.” But the higher authorities at Surat only repeated their former order that Bombay should avoid a war with Shivā and “frustrate his designs of fortifying Khanderi either by treaty or by the Siddi’s fleet assisting us to oppose him thereon.” The two English captains consulted took the same view. At the end of December the Marāthas dragged several large guns to Thāl (on the mainland) and began to fire them at the small English craft lying under Underi for stress of weather. (*Orme MSS.* 116.)

But the hope of hindering the Marātha fortification of the island without fighting proved futile, and the English ships were withdrawn (January, 1680) from Khanderi, which, after “holding out [against the Siddis and the English] to the admiration of all”, was freed from enemy vessels by the coming of the monsoons, and remained in Shivā’s hands. (*F. R.* Surat 108, Bombay to Surat, 1 Jan. 1680.)

But the Siddi occupied Underi (‘Henery’), a small island about a mile in circumference, close to Khanderi, with 300 men and 10 large guns, fortified it (9th January, 1680), and tried to silence the Marātha guns on Thāl,
Daulat Khan with his fleet came out of the Nāgothnā river and attacked Underi on two nights, hoping to surprise it, "but the Siddi's watchfulness and good intelligence from Chaul frustrated his design." On 26th January, 1680, Daulat Khan assaulted the island at three points, ready to land 2,000 men and conquer it. But after a four hours' engagement he retreated to Chaul, having lost 4 ghurābs and 4 small vessels, 200 men killed, 100 wounded, besides prisoners,* and himself severely wounded. The Siddi lost only 4 men killed and 7 wounded, but no vessel, out of a fleet of 2 large ships, five three-masted frigates, one ketch and 26 gallivats, with 700 men on board,—such was the superiority of the Abyssinian ships to the opener and more slender vessels of the Marathas. Underi continued in Siddi hands throughout Shambhuji's reign, and neutralized the Marātha occupation of Khanderi, the two islands merely bombarding each other. (*Ibid.*, also 31 January.)

* Two letters from Underi to Bombay state that Daulat Khan's fleet consisted of above 90 ghurabs and gallivats, and that he lost 137 men in killed and wounded. The letter of 28 Jan. adds, "Shivaji had threatened hard Daulat Khan that if he did not take Underi, if ever he came back to Negaon again, he would have his life." On 6th March Daulat Khan came into the town of Rajapur from the fleet, wounded in the foot. [Orme MSS. 116.]