BOOK THIRD

SUPERNORMAL POWERS
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The five indirect aids [to yoga] have been described. Fixed attention 1 is [now] to be described.

1. Binding the mind-stuff to a place is fixed-attention.

Binding of the mind-stuff, only in so far as it is a fluctuation, to the navel or to the heart-lotus or to the light within the head or to the tip of the nose or to the tip of the tongue or to other 2 places of the same kind or to an external object,—this is fixed-attention.

The First and Second Books described Concentration and the means thereto. In the Third Book the supernormal powers are to be described which are reasons for propagation of belief and which are favourable to this [concentration and its means]. These supernormal powers are to be accomplished by constraints (samyama). And constraint is the combination of fixed-attention and of contemplation and of concentration. So inasmuch as these [three] are the means of accomplishing the supernormal powers, we have here a mention of these three, in order to make known the particular quality of each as being direct aids to yoga and as contrasted with the five which are indirect aids. And with regard to these [three], fixed-attention and contemplation and concentration are in the relation of cause to effect, and the serial order 3 [of causes and effects] is specified. Therefore this order is followed in the order of the statements. Accordingly, fixed-attention is the first to be characterized. So he says

1. Binding the mind-stuff to a place is fixed-attention. He describes a place belonging to one's self by the words «to the navel.» By the words «other places of the same kind» we must understand the palate and so forth. The binding is a relation. He describes an external place by the words «or to an external.» And with an external object the mind-stuff as such cannot have a relation. So it is said, «only in so far as it is a fluctuation,» in other words, only so far as it is a perception. On this point also there is a Purāṇa, 4 "Having mastered his breath by restraint of breath and his organs by with-

1 See also ii. 29 and 53.
2 Compare Maitri Upan. vi. 20 and Garuḍa Pur. cxxxvi. 21.
3 Compare Patañjali: Mahābhāṣya i. 225*;
4 Vishnu Pur. vi. 7. 45 and Nārādiya Pur. lxvii. 21.
drawal of the senses, he should make a localization of the mind-stuff upon some auspicious support." Auspicious supports are external, Hiranyagarbha and Vasava and Prajāpati and so forth. And this has also been said, 1 "The incarnate form of the Exalted One leaves one without desire for any [other] support. This should be understood to be fixed-attention, when the mind-stuff is fixed upon this form. And what this incarnate form of Hari, on which one should ponder, let that be heard by thee, O Ruler of Men. Fixed-attention is not possible without something on which to fix it. His face is calm, his eye like the lovely lotus petal, his cheek is beautiful, the expanse of his broad forehead is resplendent [with the light of thought], the charming ornament of the ear-ring is placed under the lobes of his ears which are equal in size, his neck is [marked with three lines] like a shell of the sea, his great broad chest is marked with the Ćrīvatsa, his belly has a deep navel and broken folds, he has eight long arms or, as Vishnu, four arms, his thighs and legs are evenly placed, his excellent lotus feet [are arranged] as a mystic diagram. He is like Brahma with a stainless yellow garment, and is adorned with a diadem and with charming armlets and bracelets; he has Çārīga [Vishnu’s bow] and the discus and the mace and the sword and the conch and the rosary—upon him, Vishnu, let the yogin ponder; and, lost in him, concentrate his own mind until, O King, the fixed-attention becomes firmly fixed upon him only. While performing this or while doing, as he wills, some other action wherein his mind does not wander, he should then deem this [fixed-attention] to be perfected."

2. Focusedness of the presented idea upon that place is contemplation.

The focusedness of the presented idea upon the object to be contemplated 2 in that place, in other words, the stream [of presented ideas] of like quality unaffected by any other presented idea.

He characterizes the contemplation which is to be effected by fixed-attention.

2. Focusedness of the presented idea upon that place is contemplation. Focusedness is singleness-of-intent. The Comment is easy. On this point also there is a Purāṇa, 4 "An uninterrupted succession of presented-ideas single-in-intent upon His form without desire for anything else, that, O King, is contemplation. It is brought about by the first six aids [to yoga]."

3. This same [contemplation], shining forth [in consciousness] as the intended object and nothing more, and, as it were, emptied of itself, is concentration.

When the contemplation only shines forth [in consciousness] in the

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1 Vishnu Pur. vi. 7. 77–85 and Nārādya Pur. lxxvii. 54–62.
2 Reading vara, not kara.
3 See Garuḍa Pur. cxxxv. 28. 29.
4 Vishnu Pur. vi. 7. 89.
form of the object-to-be-contemplated and [so] is, as it were, empty of itself, in so far as it becomes identical with the presented-idea as such, then, by fusing [itself] with the nature of the object-to-be-contemplated, it is said to be concentration.

He gives the characteristic of concentration which is to be attained by concentration [in the sutra] 3. This same [contemplation] . . . . concentration. He explains [the sutra] in the words, «the contemplation only.» The words «shines forth [in consciousness] in the form of the object-to-be-contemplated» signify that it shines forth in the form of the object-to-be-contemplated and not in the form of the contemplation. That is why he says, «empty.» An objector asks, 'If it be empty, how could the object-to-be-contemplated appear?' In reply he says, «as it were.» He gives the reason for the same in the words, «by fusing [itself] with the nature of the object-to-be-contemplated.» On this point also there is a Purāṇa,1 "The knowing of this same [Vishṇu] as he is when free from two-termed-relations (kalpanā) is a completion of the contemplation by the central-organ,—this is termed concentration." A two-termed-relation (kalpanā) is a distinction between the contemplation and the object-to-be-contemplated. Concentration is free from this. This is the meaning. Keśidhvaṭa after having described to Khaṇḍikya the eight aids to yoga, sums them up by saying,2 "The soul (keśetra) has the means. Thinking is the means. It is inanimate. When [thinking] has completed its task of release, it has done what it had to do and ceases."

These same three, fixed-attention and contemplation and concentration, in one are constraint.

4. The three in one are constraint.

When having a single object the three means are called constraint.

So the technical term [now laid down] in this system for these three is constraint.

These three, fixed-attention and contemplation and concentration, are used in many places [as one]. It would be laboured to enunciate [each time] their respective technical terms. So for brevity's sake he introduces a sutra which [lays down] a technical term (paribhāṣa-sūtra) by saying «These same.»

4. The three in one are constraint. He explains [the sutra] by saying «When having a single object.» He removes a doubt as to whether [these three] are the [naturally] expressed meaning [of the word constraint] by saying «for these three.» The system (tantra) is that authoritative-book (pādra) by which yoga is systematized or expounded. «In this system» means in

1 Vishṇu Pur. vi. 7. 90 and Nārādiya Pur. lxvii. 67.
2 Vishṇu Pur. vi. 7. 92 and Nārādiya Pur. lxvii. 69.
5. As a result of mastering this constraint, there follows the shining forth of insight.
As a result of mastering this constraint there follows the shining forth of concentrated insight. Just in proportion as constraint enters the stable state, in that proportion the concentrated insight becomes clear.

He mentions the result of success in constraint, for which the means-of-attainment is practice, by saying, 5. As a result of mastering this constraint, there follows the shining forth of insight. The shining forth of insight is due to the fact that it remains in the clear stream of [the yogin who is] not overcome by other ideas. The Comment is easy.

6. Its application is by stages.
The application of it, that is, the constraint is to that stage which is next the stage already mastered. For by overleaping the next stage without having first mastered the lower stage, [the yogin] does not gain constraint in the highest stages. If he did not [gain that constraint], how could he gain the shining forth of insight? Again, the constraint of one who by the grace of the Içvara has gained a higher stage does not apply to such things as the mind-stuff’s thinking in other persons who are on the lower stages. Why is this? Since the purpose of this has been obtained from elsewhere. Yoga is itself the only spiritual guide [which can show] that this stage is next to that stage. How is this? Because it has been said to be thus,

By yoga, yoga must be known,
Yoga increaseth yoga’s store.
He who for yoga care hath shown
In yoga rests for evermore.

1 See also i. 35, p. 80^4; i. 42, p. 88^3; i. 44, p. 94^4; i. 49–51, pp. 100^7, 101^3, 102^9, 108^6; iv. 28, p. 308^9. In this system *prajñā* is psychological rather than ethical.

2 A good illustration is found in Bhāg. Pur. ii. 2, in which Viṣṇu is adored from his feet up to his smile.

3 Compare ii. 27.

4 See iii. 19.
But when applied, in what cases can this constraint have these results? In reply he says, 6. Its application is by stages. The author of the Comment particularizes [the meaning of the word] stage by saying, «of it.» Its application is to that state as yet unmastered which is next to the stage [already] mastered. When the reflective concentration, whose object is coarse, is mastered by constraint, the [next] application of constraint is to super-reflective concentration which has not yet been mastered. When this too is mastered, the application [of the restraint] is to deliberative [concentration]. Similarly, [when this is mastered], the application is to super-deliberative [concentration]. Hence in the Purāṇa,¹ when the balanced-state the object of which is coarse is perfected, then there is later introduced that concentration the object of which is subtle, in that the various weapons and ornaments are removed: “Then the wise man should ponder upon the serene form of the Exalted One, without its conch-shell and mace and discus and Čārīgha, but having its string of beads. When the fixed-attention has become stable upon this form, then he should keep in mind the form without the ornaments, especially the diadem and the armlets. The wise man should make the god to have only one limb and [should think] ‘I am he’. Then after, that he should devote himself to thought of ‘I’.” But why after having mastered a lower stage does he master a higher stage? [And] why is there not a reverse process? In reply to this he says, «without having first subjugated the lower stage, [the yogin] does not.» For a man proceeding to the Ganges from Cilahrada does not reach the Ganges unless he first get to the Meghavana. «Again of one who by the grace of the Īśvara has gained a higher stage»—why does he say this? Because the purpose of this, the success in the higher stage which comes next, has been obtained from elsewhere, that is, from the devotion to the Īśvara. For when an act has its action finished, then a means-of-attaining, which does not produce anything in particular, falls outside the function of [what can be called] a means. The objector says, ‘This may be true. It is known in a general way (āgamataḥ) what the different subordinated stages are. But how is there a knowledge of which comes after the other?’ In reply to this he says, «this stage.» Yoga which has been previously mastered is the reason for proceeding to the thinking of the yoga which comes after. This passage is to be understood by supposing that a state is equivalent to [a yoga which] contains a state.

7. The three are direct aids in comparison with the previous [five].
The same three, fixed-attention and contemplation and concentration, are direct aids to conscious concentration in comparison with the previous means, the five² beginning with the abstentions.

² Reading yamātibhyah pāśicabhyah.
But why is constraint applied in various places, and not the other five aids to yoga, although all without distinction are aids to yoga? In reply he says, 7. The three are direct aids in comparison with the previous [five]. These three means-of-attainment, inasmuch as their object is the same as [the object of the yoga] to be accomplished, are direct aids. But abstentions and the other [four] are not so. They are therefore indirect aids. These three means-of-attainment are direct aids only with reference to [yoga] conscious [of objects], but not to [yoga] not conscious [of an object]. For since [yoga] not conscious [of an object] is seedless [and has no object], it does not have the same object as these [three]. And since after these have been restricted for a long time, [unconscious yoga] arises subsequent to the higher passionlessness consisting in the undisturbed calm of perception, another name of which is the higher limit of conscious [yoga]. So he says, «The same three.»

8. Even these [three] are indirect aids to seedless [concentration].

Even these, the three direct means-of-attainment, are indirect aids to seedless yoga. Why is this? Since this latter occurs even when these are absent.

8. Even these [three] are indirect aids to seedless [concentration]. Hence that which determines the relation of direct aid to this is sameness of objects and not a mere sequence. For this [sequence] in so far as it might exist in the case of devotion to the Ṣvāra, which is an indirect aid, would make the application [of direct aid] too wide (vyabhicāra). If this is established, even this over-wideness of the characterization which would include mere sequence could not apply to this [constraint]. Therefore it is still less probable that [this] constraint would be a direct aid to [concentration] not conscious [of an object]. To show that this is so it is said, «Since this latter occurs even when these are absent.»

Now since during the restricted moments of the mind-stuff the changes of the aspects (guna) are unstable,¹ of what sort at those times is the mutation of the mind-stuff?

9. When there is a becoming invisible of the subliminal-impression of emergence² and a becoming visible of the

¹ This again is apparently a portion of the fragment of Pañcaśikha quoted in ii. 15 (p. 135¹ of the Calcutta text), to be placed before fragment 11 of Garbe. The phrase is also found at ii. 15, p. 135¹; iii. 13, p. 204²; iv. 15, p. 298¹. Compare for use of word cytta in the sense of `behaviour' ii. 38, p. 177⁴ (Calc. ed.).
² Reading abhibhavaprādurbhārdau.
subliminal-impression of restriction, the mutation of restriction is inseparably connected with mind-stuff in its period of restriction.

The subliminal-implications of emergence are external-aspects (dharma) of mind-stuff; since they do not consist of presented-ideas they are not restricted when presented-ideas are restricted. The subliminal-implications of restriction are also external-aspects of mind-stuff. <When these two [states of mind-stuff] become visible or become invisible,> [that is when] the subliminal-implications of emergence are withdrawing and the subliminal-implications of restriction are being brought into place. The period of restriction is inseparably connected with the mind-stuff. Accordingly the mutation of restriction is this periodical alteration of subliminal-implications of a single mind-stuff, because then the mind-stuff has nothing but subliminal-implications, as has been explained [i. 18] with reference to the concentration of restriction.

With the intent to give information here about the three mutations which are to be made use of in the sutra [iii. 16], "As a result of constraint upon the three mutations," he asks, incidentally to the topic of seedless [concentration], «Now?» In the case of emergence and of yoga conscious [of objects], since there is an experience of an accumulation of various very clear mutations, there has been no introduction of the question. But in the case of restriction the mutation is not experienced. Furthermore it cannot be said that because it is not experienced it does not exist. For inasmuch as mind-stuff is made up of three aspects (guṇa), and since also the changes of the aspects are unstable, an absence of mutation even for a moment is impossible. The answer to the question is the sutra 9. . . . emergence . . . . mutation of restriction . . . . . In comparison with concentration unconscious [of any object] conscious concentration is emergence. Restriction is that which restricts. It is the undisturbed calm¹ of perception [and it is also] the higher passionlessness. There is a becoming visible and a becoming invisible of these two subliminal impressions of emergence and the subliminal impression of restriction, that is to say, the becoming invisible of the subliminal-impression of emergence and the becoming visible of the subliminal-impression of restriction. The mind-stuff which is the substance in the period of restriction, that is, on the occasion of restriction, is inseparably connected with

¹ This does not refer to samādhi in general, but only to the concentrated insight (prajñā) described in i. 47-48, which is without influence from objects and is an undisturbed succession of clarified sānkūṣa. See also i. 18, p. 47ª; ii. 27, p. 166ª (Calc. ed.); also i. 51 and the sūtras iii. 9-15.
both of these states. For the mind-stuff as substance, whether in the conscious or unconscious state, does not differ in itself in so far as subliminal impressions become visible or become invisible [within it]. An objector says, 'Just as later hindrances based upon undifferentiated-consciousness (avidyā) cease when undifferentiated-consciousness ceases, and consequently there is no need of further special effort to repress them, so the subliminal-impressions based upon ideas of emergence may cease at the very moment of the cessation of the emergence. And therefore for the repression of them there should be no need of the subliminal-impressions of restriction.' With this in view he says, «The subliminal-impressions of emergence.» The cessation of a cause in general is not a reason for the cessation of the effect. So that even if the weaver cease to be, there need be no cessation of the cloth. But with the cessation of that cause which is constitutive of the nature of the effect, there is a cessation of the effect. Now the other hindrances have been said to consist of undifferentiated-consciousness (avidyā). So with the cessation of that undifferentiated-consciousness it is right that these [hindrances] should cease. But the subliminal-impressions whose essence is presented-ideas are not such. For even if the idea be restricted for a long time, we observe a connecting recollection at the present time. Therefore even if the presented-ideas are repressed (niértti), still an accumulation of subliminal-impressions of restriction must be resorted to in order to repress these [subliminal-impressions from presented-ideas]. This is the meaning. The rest is easy.

10. This [mind-stuff] flows peacefully by reason of the subliminal-impression.
By reason of the subliminal-impression of restriction, the peaceful flow of the mind-stuff requires dexterity in the application of the subliminal-impressions of restriction. When these subliminal-impressions become weak, the subliminal-impression which has external aspects of restriction is overwhelmed by the subliminal-impression which has external aspects of emergence.

But if there be an overwhelming (abhībhavṛ) of the emergent subliminal-impressions in all respects, of what sort is the mutation with a powerful subliminal-impression of restriction? In reply to this he says, 10. This [mind-stuff] flows peacefully by reason of the subliminal-impression. Calm flowing is a flowing of a succession of restrictions only unfilled by the subliminal impressions of emergence. Why is dexterity of subliminal impressions needed, but not ordinary subliminal-impressions? In answer to this he says, «When these

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1 The sutra is an instance of dharma-parināma, as explained in the Comment on iii. 18.
2 In the text as received, tat refers to nirodha. If the variant nābhībhūyate be accepted, tat must refer, as Vācaspati points out, to vyutthāna.
subliminal impressions become weak.\textsuperscript{1} The word \textit{these (tat)} refers back to restriction. But those who have the reading \textquote{are not overwhelmed} \textquote{would refer by the word \textit{these (tad-ā)}} to emergence.

11. The\textsuperscript{1} mutation of concentration is the dwindling of dispersiveness and the uprisal of singleness-of-intent belonging to the mind-stuff. Dispersiveness\textsuperscript{2} is an external-aspect of the mind-stuff. Singleness-of-intent is an external-aspect of the mind-stuff. The dwindling of dispersiveness means that it disappears; the uprisal of singleness-of-intent means that it becomes apparent. The mind-stuff is inseparably connected with both of these as the substance [in which they inhere]. This same mind-stuff being inseparably connected with these two external-aspects which belong to itself,—the passing away [of the distributiveness] and the coming forth [of the singleness-of-intent],—becomes concentrated. This is the mutation of concentration.

He shows what the state of the mind-stuff is in the mutation of concentration conscious [of objects]. \textit{11. . . . dispersiveness . . . mutation of concentration.} Dispersiveness is distractedness. Being existent\textsuperscript{3} it does not (san na) cease to be. Dwindling is disappearing. Because a non-existent does not arise [in consciousness], an uprisal is a becoming apparent. The mind-stuff which is inseparably connected with the passing away of dispersiveness and the coming forth of singleness-of-intent, which are its external-aspects—the dispersiveness having the passing away and the singleness-of-intent having the coming forth—this mind-stuff is concentrating itself, that is, is becoming qualified as having a concentration which is to be attained in successive steps.

12. Then\textsuperscript{4} again when the quiescent and the uprisen presented ideas are similar\textsuperscript{5} [in respect of having a single object], the mind-stuff has a mutation single-in-intent. The quiescent is a previous presented idea of one whose mind-stuff is concentrated; the uprisen is a later presented-idea of the same

\textsuperscript{1} The sūtra is an instance of \textit{lakṣaṇa-parināma}, as explained in iii. 13.

\textsuperscript{2} See iv. 23.

\textsuperscript{3} If the reading be \textit{sā na}, the translation would be simpler, \textquote{It does not cease to be.}

\textsuperscript{4} According to the scheme of iii. 13 this would appear to be an instance of \textit{avasthā-parināma}.

\textsuperscript{5} The Manirabhā explains the word \textquote{alike} (\textit{tulya}) by adding \textit{ekaviṣayatvena}. 
kind as this [previous presented-idea]. But the mind-stuff of concentration is likewise inseparably connected with both. This is so until the breaking down of the concentration. This same mutation of singleness-in-intent belongs to the mind-stuff in which it resides (dharminah).

12. Then . . . a mutation . . . Then again, that is, when the serial order of the states of concentration is completed, the quiescent and the uprisen [that is] the past and the present are similar-presented-ideas, that is, similar and presented-ideas. But the similarity is a result of the singleness-in-intent. The words «of one whose mind-stuff is concentrated» indicate that the concentration is completed. The words «This is so» mean that it is single-in-intent. He tells what the limit of this is by saying «until the breaking down of the concentration» [that is] until there is a falling [of the concentration].

13. Thus, with regard to elements and to organs, mutations of external-aspect and of time-variation and of intensity have been enumerated. 
<Thus,> by the already (iii. 9) described mutations of mind-stuff in external-aspect and in time-variation and in intensity. The mutation of external-aspect in elements and organs, the mutation of time-variation and the mutation of intensity are to be understood as having been described. Of these [three] the mutation of external-aspect takes place in the substance and is the becoming invisible of the external aspect of emergence and the becoming visible of the external aspect of restriction. And the mutation of time-variation is the restriction having the three time-variations, [that is,] connected with the three time-forms (adhvan). This [restriction], one may say, puts aside the first time-form whose time-variation is yet to come, and passes into the present time-variation, without however passing out of its state as external-aspect. But in this [condition] it becomes manifest as being what it is. This is its second time-form. And it is not completely severed from past or from future time-variations.—Likewise emergence has the three time-variations; it is connected with the three time-forms. Having put aside the present time-variation it passes over into the past time-variation, without however passing out of its state as external-aspect. This is its third time-form.
Three types of mutation

And it is not completely severed from the future and the present time-variations. In the same manner, emergence, completing itself again [as a phenomenalized form], having put aside the future time-variation, and not having passed out of its state as external-aspect, passes into the present time-variation. In which [time], since this [emergence] manifests itself as it is, it obtains its functional activity. This is the second time-form of this [emergence]. And it is not completely released from past and future time-variations.

—In the same way it continues, now restriction, now emergence.— Similarly the mutation of intensity [is described]. In it, during the moments of restriction, the subliminal-impressions of restriction become powerful and the subliminal-impressions of emergence become weak. This then is the external-aspects' mutation of intensity. In these cases the substance has a mutation in its external-aspects; the external-aspects have mutation in time-variations; and the time-variations also have mutation in intensities. Consequently the changes of the aspects (guna) do not remain, even for a moment, devoid of mutations of external-aspect and of time-variation and of intensity. For (ca) the changes of the aspects (guna) are unstable.¹ And we say [hereafter in this sutra] that it is of the very nature of the aspects to cause activity.—Thus we have to understand the three-fold mutation [of external-aspect and of time-variation and of intensity] in the case of elements and organs, because there is the distinction between the substance and the external-aspects. But in the strict sense there is but a single mutation. For the external-aspect is nothing more than the substance itself. Since it is merely an evolved form of the substance amplified in the form of an external-aspect. In such cases there is within the substance an alteration of the condition of the present external-aspect with regard to past and future and present time-forms. There is no alteration of the matter. Just as by dividing a plate of gold there is an alteration of its condition, in so far as it is altered; [but] there is no alteration of the gold. An opponent objects as follows, 'A substance is nothing over and above the

¹ Once more this appears to be quoted from fragment 11 of Pañcaśikha in its completest form. Compare above, p. 134, note, and p. 208, note.
external-aspects [which as properties depend upon it]. For [a sub-
stance] cannot pass beyond its [own] previous existence. If, again,
[substance] were a something present in all its external-aspects, but
different from them, then it would come to be known\(^1\) (viparivarteta)
as a something itself absolutely unchanged, although connected\(^2\)
with a series of changes [in the external-aspects].\(^3\) But this, [he
replies, involves] no weakness [in our position]. [And] why [not]? 
Because we do not maintain an absolute\(^3\) unity. [The fact is that
all] this world passes out of the state of a phenomenalized [individual] form.\(^4\) And this we say because [we are bound to]
deny that [the world] is permanent [in the sense of not entering
into mutations]. Again [the world of things] continues to exist
even after it has passed out [of phenomenalized individual existence].
For [we are obliged] to deny its annihilation. On being refunded
[into its primary cause by the dissolution of the coarse elements,] it
[the world takes on] a subtle form. And by reason of this subtle
form it becomes unperceived. An external-aspect\(^5\) in the
mutation of time-variation exists really in [all three] time-forms.
[It is said to be] past [that is] having the past time-variation,
though not completely severed from future and present
time-variations. [So too it is said to be] future [that is] having the
future time-variation, though not completely severed from present
and past time-variations. [So also it is said to be] present [that
is] having a present time-variation, though not completely severed
from past and future time-variations. Take the case of a man
enamoured of one particular woman—he has not thereby lost his
sexual feeling for the rest of women-folk. Here the difficulty is

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1 Compare abhiṣeṣṇa-cakṣi-parivṛtta iii. 17, p. 223\(^1\) (Calc. ed.).
2 The word viparivarteta implies a series of changes in some subordinate and
additional thing, or some added property in the unchanged thing. Compare
parivarstanam in Sarva-darçana-samgraha (Anandūgama Sanskrit Series),
page 8, line 8 from below.
3 This word is discussed in Patañjali:

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Mahābhāṣya I. 180\(^9\), 207\(^10\), 266\(^22\) (Kiel-
horn).
4 This nyakti is the condition of the thing when so changed as to be manifest to
our consciousness, that is, when we can observe the effects it brings about.
5 In the Yoga system the dharma is real; in the Vedānta it is unreal (visvarta).
The dharma is constantly changing into another thing; but involves the
concept of permanence.
External-aspect, time-variation, intensity

brought forward by others 'that since all three time-variations are [thus said to be] connected with everything that is in the mutation of time-variation, it must follow (prāpnoti) that the time-forms are confounded.' We meet this objection thus (tasya pariḥāra). What is termed the common nature of things as external-aspects cannot be brought into existence [at our pleasure]. The common nature [as external aspect] exists [independently] and therefore in regard to it the distinctions of time-variations must be maintained. Thus it must not be said that the common nature of this or that thing exists only in the present time. Because if this were so, the mind-stuff could never become subject to passion [for a certain object]. For anger [against some other object being by supposition now present in the mind-stuff], desire would not move actively forth. Moreover it is not possible for the three time-variations to belong simultaneously to one and the same [individual] phenomenalized form. But what is possible is the presentation (bhāva) in successive times of its phenomenal¹ [form] by the operation of the conditions-which-phenomenalize (vyañjaka) it. Thus it has been said,² "The [outer] forms [when developed to] a high degree and the [inner] fluctuations [when developed to] a high degree oppose each other; but the generic forms co-operate with [these when developed to] a high degree." Hence [time-variations] are not confounded. To take an example. When we say absolutely (eva) that passion for a certain thing has shown itself, [we do not mean] that at that time [passion] for another object is non-existent; [but we mean that passion for another object] continues to be present [in the mind-stuff] though in a generic [unphenomenalized] form. Hence it [the passion] for that [other object] exists at that time (tadā tatra tasya bhāva). A similar [explanation can be given] in the case of time-variation [also]. The three time-forms do not belong to the substance but to the external-aspects. These [external-aspects] have a time-variation or do not have a time-variation. And as entering into various intensities are known by different names [which imply] an alteration of intensity but not of matter. Thus

¹ Compare i. 11, p. 37² (Calc. ed.).
² Compare ii. 15, p. 186¹ (Calc. ed.) and the parallels given there.
the same stroke is termed one\(^1\) in the unit-place and ten in the
ten's place and a hundred in the hundred's place. So too the same
woman is called a mother and a daughter and a sister. Some
persons have objected that in the case of a thing which mutates in
intensity [the substance of the thing] must logically be held to be
\((\text{prasaṅga})\) absolutely permanent. How is this? On the ground
that it is functional activity\(^2\) of the thing which determines the
[special] time-form of the thing. Thus a thing is said to be a future
thing when it is not exerting its own activity, and a present thing
when it is thus active, and a past thing when it has ceased from
activity. Hence, say these persons, it follows that substance and
external-aspect and time-variation and intensity are all absolutely
permanent. But that [alleged] weakness, [we say], does not exist
[in our position]; for we hold that although a substrate (\(\text{guna}\)) is
permanent, its aspects (\(\text{guna}\)) suffer a variety of antagonisms.
Just as any arrangement of parts, (\(\text{saṁsthāna}\)) [which are coarse
elements,] is only an external-aspect of the imperishable subtile
elements, sound and the rest, and has a beginning and an end, so
the resoluble [into primary matter] is only an external-aspect of
the imperishable aspects (\(\text{guna}\)), the \(\text{sattva}\) and the others, and
has a beginning and an end, and to it [and to the rest] the term
evolved-form (\(\text{vikāra}\)) is applied. The following serves as an
illustration. 1. The substance clay passes from its external-aspect
in the form of a round lump of clay into another external-aspect.
And thus as an external-aspect enters into mutation in the
form of a water-jar. 2. The water-jar-form putting aside its future
time-variation assumes its present time-variation; here is the
mutation as time-variation. 3. The water-jar is every moment
undergoing oldness and newness [in its parts] and thus passes
through mutations of intensity. Thus the substance also has
another external-aspect, which is, the intensity; and the external-

\(^1\) Contrary to Mr. G. R. Kaye's opinion the
following passages show that the place-
system of decimals was known as early
as the sixth century A.D. See Āryabhaṭa
(born 476 A.D.) in his Āryabhaṭiya
(ed. Kern, 1974), p. x and 34,6; Varāha
Mihira (born 505 near Ujjain) in his
Pañcasiddhāntikā (ed. Thibaut, 1889),
p. xxx.

\(^2\) The point is that the thing is neither
produced nor destroyed, but is its
activity.
aspect has also another time-variation, which is, the intensity. There is therefore only one [kind of a] mutation of matter, though variously described [by us]. The same explanation is applicable to other things\(^1\) also. The mutations of external-aspect and of time-variation and of intensity [as here described] do not transcend the substance\(^2\) as such. Hence there is only one kind of a mutation which includes all those varieties we have described.\(^3\) What then is a mutation? It is the rise of another external-aspect in a permanent matter after an earlier external-aspect has been repressed.

As being relevant to the discussion and as being useful to further discussion he gives the divisions of the mutations of elements and of organs in the sūtra 13. Thus \ldots enumerated. He explains [the sūtra] by saying «Thus.» An objector asks, ‘It is only the mind-stuff that has been described as being in mutation, not its various kinds, the mutation of external-aspect and of time-variation and of intensity. So how can this [that has been said] be extended by analogy\(^4\) to these latter?’ In reply to this he says, «of emergence and of restriction.» Although the words external-aspect and time-variation and intensity have not been previously mentioned, it is not however true that the mutations of external-aspect and of time-variation and of intensity have not been described. This is the point in brief.—To continue. The mutation of external-aspect has been described in the words of this sūtra [iii. 9], “subliminal-impression of emergence \ldots subliminal-impression of restriction.” And in showing this mutation of external-aspect, he has at the same time indicated the mutation of time-variation, which has its locus in the external-aspect, as he says in the words, «the mutation of time-variation.» A time-variation (laksāna) is that by which a kind of time is characterized. For, characterized by this, a thing is distinguished from other things with other times connected with them. The expression, «the restriction having three time-variations» has its explanation in the words «connected with the three time-forms.» The word «time-form» is an expression for time. «This [restriction], one may say, puts aside the first time-form whose time-variation is yet to come.» Does it then go beyond its state as an external-aspect possessing a time-form? No, he says. «Without however passing out of its state as external-aspect.» That very mutation which was yet to come is now present; but the restriction [which was yet to come]

\(^1\) This would apply to the whole ṵaṁsas.

\(^2\) The mutations do not differ from the substance, but are the conditions for the self-identity of the substance.

\(^3\) For the reason that all change depends upon the dharmin which remains unchanged amid change.

\(^4\) The words atideśa, anudeśa, and ādeśa are discussed in Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya on i. 1, 56, vārt. 1, p. 133 foot (Kielhorn’s ed.).
does not [now] cease to be a restriction. This is the meaning.—Now comes his explanation of the present in the words «in which condition it becomes manifest as being what it is» in other words, in its nature\(^1\) as producing certain effects peculiar to it. «A manifestation» is a moving actively forth. This is its second time-form as compared to its first time-form which was yet to come. An objector says, ‘This may be so. But if one has reached the present after having put aside the future time-form, and after having put aside this [present] he is to reach the past, then Sir, there would be a creation and destruction of [these] time-forms. And this is not a desired result. For nothing is made to grow out of a non-existent, nor is an existent ever destroyed.’ In reply to this he says «And it is not.» The meaning is that he is not disconnected from the future and the past time-forms, inasmuch as they persist in their generic form. Having shown that the future restriction has a present time-variation, he shows that the present emergence has a past, its third form, by saying, «In the same way, emergence.» So then is the restriction alone future, and is the emergence not [future]? No. As he says, «In the same manner, now emergence.» So there is a re-existence as regards the generic form of emergence, but not as regards the [individual] phenomenalized form. For the past does not exist again.—Manifestation of itself, as it is, is the same as the fact that that which is able to produce effects becomes visible. This mutation of time-variation, as described, recurs again and again in things of this kind, as he says, «In the same way . . . now.»—He describes the mutation of intensity, which has only been pointed out by the mutation of external-aspect, by saying, «Similarly, . . . intensity.» In the case of external-aspects, the time-form of which is present, the intensity is equivalent to the presence or absence of power. And the mutation is the gradation of this [intensity] from moment to moment. He concludes this discussion by the words «In these cases.» He specifies the various mutations as having a variety of relations\(^2\) in accordance\(^3\) with the teaching of the system, as he says «In these cases the substance.» Then is this mutation of the aspects (guṣṭa) occasional? The reply is, No. As he says «Consequently.» But why is this mutation perpetual? In reply he says «For (ca) . . . unstable.» The word «For (ca)» is in the sense of cause. The «changes» are the behaviour (pracāra). Why is it just so? In reply he says «that which constitutes the aspects (guṣṭa).» «Is said to be» later in this same [sutra].—So this three-fold mutation of mind-stuff also is expounded by the author of the sutras with regard to elements and organs as he says «Thus.» This three-fold mutation is the result of the distinction between substance and external-aspects; it is based upon the distinction between the substance and the external-aspects. So we have (tatra) a mutation

\(^1\) The thing is what it is (ṛddhi) because the mutation is fulfilling a purpose. This is the essence of any individual form.

\(^2\) A saṃbandha is a relation; a saṃbandhin is a thing in relation.

\(^3\) Referring to the Pañcaśīkha's caλaṃ ca guṣṭtam, which is not, however, here expressly attributed to him. Compare p. 213, note 1.
such as a cow or a water-jar as an external-aspect of the substances earth and other elements. And the external-aspects have mutations of time-variation such as past and future and present. Again the cow or other [animal] changed into its present time-variation has mutations of intensity, such as childhood and boyhood and youth and old age. And the water-jar or other [thing] has its mutation of intensity, such as newness or oldness. — Similarly organs, which are substances, have external aspects, which are the seeing of blue or of other colours. The external aspect has the present and the other time-variations. The time-variation which has the seeing of a jewel or some other [thing] has a mutation of intensity, such as the clearness or lack of clearness [of the seeing]. This mutation, thus described, of elements and of organs, is to be understood as being based upon the distinction between the substance and its external-aspects and time-variations and intensities. But as referring to the lack of distinction between them, it is mentioned when he says «But in the strict sense.» The word «but» differentiates this from the view that they are distinct. The absolute reality of this [mutation] is asserted, but [the absolute reality] of the other [three-fold] mutation is not denied. Why? «For the external-aspect is nothing more than the substance itself.» An objector says, ‘If the external-aspect is merely an evolved form of the substance, how then should the idea prevail in the world that there is no confusion in the case of these [three] mutations?’ In reply to this he says, «in the form of an external-aspect.» The word «external-aspect» is here equivalent to external-aspect and to time-variation and to intensity. It is the substance that enters into evolved-forms through the medium of these. So the [evolved-form] is one and is also not confused with [another]. Because [the external-aspects] the medium of this [substance], although not distinct from the substance, are not confused with each other. An objector says, ‘If the external-aspects are not distinct from the substance, and if the time-forms of the substance are distinct, then since the external-aspects are not different from the substance, the external-aspects would be like a substance.’ To which he replies, «In such cases . . . of the . . . external-aspect.» The «state» means a particular arrangement-of-parts.\(^1\) Just as a plate of gold\(^2\) or of some other substance may receive a particular name and [be called] a necklace or a svastika, [so] there is an alteration only as [concerns the form of the ornaments], but the matter gold does not become something not gold, because there is no absolute distinction [between the substance and the external-aspect]. This is the intention of what he is about to say. He brings forward a Buddhist, who holds the doctrine of the absolute unity [of substance and of external-aspect], by saying, «An opponent objects as follows.» ‘For the necklace and other things thus coming into existence are external-aspects only and are real in the strict sense. But there is no such thing called “gold”, some one thing present in many external-aspects [and yet different from them]. But if it be assumed that the matter persists even in
the external-aspects which are ceasing to be, then [the matter], like the Power of Intellect (citi), would not enter into mutations, but would continue existing absolutely unchanged. The continued existence in another form means the throwing away of its own form as consisting of mutations and the exchange of this for another, the absolutely changeless. Just as the Power of Intellect (citi), although the aspects divide themselves into one alteration after another, does not relapse from its own self and remains absolutely unchanged, so likewise gold, &c., would remain absolutely unchanged,—a proposition which you do not admit. So matter is something not different from its external-aspects." This objection he refutes by saying "this, [he replies, involves] no weakness." "Why?" "Because we do not maintain an absolute unity." Had we to admit the absolute permanence of matter, as of the Power of Intellect\(^1\) (citi), then we should have lain open to this taunt. We, however, do not take our stand upon the doctrine of absolute permanence. On the contrary, we say that all these three worlds, and not merely matter, pass out of their phenomenalized individual forms, as producing effects fulfilling a purpose. Why? "For [we are bound to] deny that [the world] is permanent," on the ground of a source-of-valid-ideas. For if the water-jar were not to pass out of its [individual] phenomenalized form, then even though reduced to the condition of potsherds or of broken bits, it would be as before clearly apperceived as a water-jar and it would have to fulfil the purposes [of a water-jar]. [But this cannot be.] Consequently the three worlds are not permanent. "Very well then, suppose that [the jar] does not exist permanently in so far as it is not apperceived and does not fulfil the purposes of a water-jar, because like the sky-lotus it is illusory (tucca)." In reply to this he says, "even after it has passed out." It is not absolutely illusory existence, so that it would be absolutely impermanent. Why? Because [we are obliged] to deny its annihilation, on the ground of a source-of-valid-ideas. To explain. Whatever is illusory existence, cannot be apperceived or produce effects, quite as in the case of the sky-lotus. Whereas these three worlds are from time to time apperceived and do produce effects, [and so are not absolutely illusory existences]. Similarly we should cite as illustrations proving existence (sattvahctu) (a) capacity for rising into consciousness, (b) materiality, (c) fitness for external-aspects and time-variations and intensities and others, [which proofs] are wanting in the case of the sky-lotus or the man’s horns, which are absolutely illusory existences. Similarly [the jar] is not absolutely permanent so that it would be absolutely permanent like the Power of Intellect (citi), but on the contrary it is [only] in some respects permanent. And thus it is established that it enters into mutations. So we must understand that, in the states of the lump of clay and of the following states, the effects such as the water-jar, which are yet to come, have an existence. The objector says, "This may be true. But if an effect even after it has passed out [of individual phenomenalized existence] exists, why is it not apperceived?" The reply is, "On being refunded." "Refunded" [that is] resolved into its own

\(^1\) Reading citi\(qa\)kter.
cause. «A subtile form» [that is] one not capable of being seen. And hence there is no apperception of it.—Having thus substantiated the mutation of external-aspect, he substantiates the mutation of time-variation also, in so far as they are inseparably connected with each other, by saying, «in the mutation of time-variation.» The meaning is that each time-variation is inseparably connected with the two others. The objector says, ‘When one time-variation is in connexion, other time-variations are not perceived. How then[are these] connected with the former?’ In reply he says, «Take the case of a man.» For an absence of experience does not do away with that which is established by the source-of-a-valid-idea. For the very fact that this [time-variation] has been made to rise [in consciousness], is the source-of-the-valid-idea for the real existence of these [other time-variations], because a non-existent thing, such as a man’s horns, cannot be made to rise in consciousness. He sets up the objection uttered by another when he says, «Here . . . in the mutation of time-variation.» ‘If when an external-aspect is present, it is at the same time past and future, then all the three time-forms would be confounded. And if the time-forms are to be in successive times, then it would follow that the production of the non-existent [becomes possible].’ He meets the objection with the words, «We meet this objection thus.» For the existence of external-aspects in the present only is established by experience. From this it follows that [external-aspects are] in relation to earlier and to later time. [Why does it follow?] Because of course a non-existent does not come into being, nor is an existent annihilated, as he says, «Because if this were so, the mind-stuff could never.» For the mind-stuff at a time following after anger, is experienced as having the external-aspect of passion. And if passion did not exist at the time of anger, in so far as [passion] was [at that time] future, how then could [passion] rise into consciousness? And if it should not rise in consciousness, how could it be experienced? [The objector continues,] ‘Even if this be granted, why would there not still be confusion of time-forms?’ The question is [contained in the phrase,] «Moreover it is not possible.» ‘What (kim) cause is there for not confounding [the time-forms]?’ And (ca) is used in the sense of ‘but’. The answer is given in the words, «the three.» The three time-variations cannot possibly exist simultaneously. In what? In one fluctuation of mind-stuff. But in successive times it is possible for each one of the time-variations to exist in its phenomenal [form] by the operation of the conditions which phenomenalize it [the time-variation]. Since the discussion of the time-variations depends upon the things-which-have-time-variations, therefore the time-variations, in so far as they have the form of the things-which-have-time-variations, belong to [or have the same nature as (tad-vatta)] these, that is, the things-which-have-time-variations. On this same point he states his concurrence of opinion with Pañcaçaikha the Master by saying «it has been said.» This has been explained¹ before. He brings the discussion to a close by the word «Hence.» The time-forms are

¹ ii. 15, p. 135I (Calc. ed.).
not confounded in so far as external-aspects which are opposed to each other, for instance, those that have become visible and those that have become invisible, are refunded into [their own causes]. He gives an illustration in the words «To take an example.» Previously it was shown that anger must be thought to be in relation with passion. Now a passion referring to one object is shown to be in relation to a passion referring to another object. He takes up the subject referred to in the illustration by saying, «A similar [explanation] in the case of time-variation.» An objector says, 'Even when it is assumed that [the mutations] are not absolutely distinct, the distinction may yet exist. So when the external-aspect or the time-variation or the intensity alters, the substance, in that it is not distinct from them, should also alter. And it is just this that we do not accept, because it is contrary to the experience that the [permanent] substance is inseparably connected [with its own states which are impermanent].' In reply to this he says, «The three time-forms do not belong to the substance.» Because it is the external-aspects, which are distinct from it, that have the three time-forms: That it is the external-aspects which are connected with the three time-forms is made clear by the words, «These [external-aspects].» «Have a time-variation» means manifested [that is] present. «Do not have a time-variation» means unmanifested [that is] future or past. Of these [two], those-that-have-a-time-variation, when they attain to the various intensities, either to powerfulness or to weakness, are referred to as being different¹ from other intensities, but not from other matter. The word «intensity» is here used in the sense of external-aspect and of time-variation and of intensity. What he means to say is this: Now it is experience alone which determines the difference or the absence of difference between the substance and the external-aspects and the other [mutations]. Since the external-aspects and the rest are not absolutely identical with the substance, to the extent that the common nature of the external-aspect and of the other [mutations] should have the form of the substance. Nor is there absolute difference, to the extent that the common nature of external-aspects should be [as different as] horses and cows. Experience moreover although not establishing the fact that there is absolute [identity or difference], does show the substance as one² and as persisting in the external-aspects and other [mutations] which have the quality of coming into and of passing out of experience, and it does exclude the external-aspects from each other. [All] this is experienced by every one. So we conform ourselves to this experience. We are not at liberty to throw it away, and to dispose of the experiences of the external-aspects as we like. On this same point he gives an example from ordinary life in the words, «Thus the same stroke.» Just as the stroke, which in itself is precisely the same, in relation to the various positions is called a hundred and other names, so the substance, which in itself is precisely the same, is repeatedly given a name in accordance with the alteration of its external-aspect and its

¹ Reading anyatena.

² Thus the buddha theory p. 205⁴ (Calc. ed.) is partially conceded.
time-variation and its intensity. This is the meaning. To illustrate the matter he gives another simile in the words, «So too the same woman.» At this point he raises an objection, made by an opponent, by saying, «Intensity.» When there is a mutation of intensity, [that is] a mutation of external-aspect and of time-variation and of intensity, one would be involved in a fault with regard to the absolute [permanence] of the substance and of the external-aspect and of the time-variation and of the intensity. He asks, «How?» [The objector] gives the answer in the words, «On the ground that the functional-activity... the time-form.» For we can see that the functional-activity of that which is future in its time-form as belonging to curds is present as belonging to milk, because [the functional activity of the future] is shut off by this [functional-activity of the present]. For this reason when the external-aspect which has the time-variation (lakṣaṇa) of the curds, although existent in the milk, does not exert its own functional-activity, then the undertaking of the business [of the effects to be accomplished] by curdling and the other [changes], is called future. And it is called present when it is thus active; and past when it has done the business of curdling and the other [changes] and stopped. To this extent then it must follow that the substance and the external-aspects and the time-variations and the intensities, although persisting in all three times, are absolutely [permanent]. For permanence is existence at all times. And in [these] four cases, whether they exist at all times or do not exist [at all times], there is no production.¹ This much only is the time-variation (lakṣaṇa) of the absolutely permanent. And in the case of the Power of Intellect (citi-çakti) also, which is absolutely permanent, there is no other special feature. This is the point. He meets the objection in the words «But that [alleged] weakness does not exist.» There is no weakness there. Why? Because although the substrate (guṇin) is permanent, the aspects (guṇa) suffer antagonisms,² the one of [the aspects] being capable of being overcome and the others of overcoming. This is their variety. What he means to say is this: Although there is existence at all times in the case of all four, still, in so far as there is a variety in the antagonisms of the aspects (guṇa), in that the various evolved-forms of which this [variety] consists become visible or invisible, and in so far as they enter into mutations, there is no absolute [permanence]. Whereas in the case of the Power of Intellect (citi-çakti) there is no becoming visible or becoming invisible of evolved-forms which belong to itself. Thus [this] is absolutely permanent. As they say,³ «The learned call that permanent the nature of which does not perish.» That this variety of antagonisms is the cause of the variety of the evolved forms in the case of both the evolving-substance and the evolved-substance is shown by the words, «Just as.» Just

¹ If it is to exist at all times, then, like the citi-çakti, it could not be produced. Or if it is not to exist at any time, then, like the horns of a man, it could not be produced. This is Bālarāma's gloss.

² This word vimardā occurs once only in the Bhāṣya. But Vācaspati uses it four times besides this, i. 2, p. 11²; iii. 18, pp. 209₁⁵, 210₅.⁶ (Calc. ed.).

³ Compare MBh. xii. 318. 102 (= 11826).
as the arrangement of parts, as distinguished (laksana) by being a mutation of earth and of other [coarse elements], is itself merely an external aspect and has a beginning and an end, in that it becomes invisible,—[so] «sound and the rest,» the subtle elements sound and touch and colour and taste and smell, are not perishable as compared with their own products, and do not, like them, become invisible. He shows how this is in the case of the evolving-matter by the words, «so the resoluble.» «To it the term evolved-form (vikāra) is applied.» But the Power of Thought (citi-ćakti) is not subject to this kind of evolution of form. This is the point.—Having thus taken up by way of illustration both the evolved-matter and the evolving-cause, which are well enough known to thinking persons, he takes up in the case of the evolved-matter only, which is well enough known to the popular [mind], the variety of the antagonisms of the aspects (guna) which leads to variety in the mutations of external-aspect and of time-variation and of intensity, by saying, «The following serves as an illustration.» There is no necessity that the mutation of intensity should belong to time-variations only. For all [three], external-aspect and time-variation and intensity, are expressed by the word ‘intensity’. Therefore the one [kind of] mutation is intensity which is common to all. Accordingly he says, «Thus the substance only.» He gives the distinguishing-characteristic of the mutation which includes [all] by saying, «in a permanent.» The word ‘external-aspect’ is an expression for external-aspect and for time-variation and for intensity, in so far as it is that in which they inhere.

Among these [mutations],

14. A substance conforms itself to quiescent and uprisen and indeterminable external-aspects.

An external aspect is [to speak precisely] only a power of the substance as limited by its pre-established harmony [with regard to effects]. And it is known as an actual existence, of which the existence is inferred by the kind of effect which it generates, as

1 Vācaspati uses saṁsthāna as the equivalent to saṁnieca iii. 26, p. 288\(^{1}\), and iv. 18, p. 291\(^{1}\). It is applied only to collections of mahābhūta; and is sometimes not different from external form (mūrti), iii. 53, p. 272\(^{1}\), and iii. 13, p. 210\(^{2}\); or again, the parts of grains, iii. 13, p. 205\(^{4}\), iii. 15, p. 216\(^{3}\); or the parts of words, iii. 17, p. 222\(^{13}\); or of the limbs of birds, ii. 46, p. 185\(^{16}\). See also ii. 28, p. 170\(^{11}\), and iii. 26, p. 239\(^{4}\) (Calc. ed.).

2 The same entity, regarded from the side of permanence, is a mutation (pari-śāma); from the side of change is an external aspect.

3 The word yogatā is used in the sūtra ii. 53. The word yogatāra is in the sūtra ii. 41 and in the Bhāṣya, p. 182\(^{11}\) (Calc. ed.). Vācaspati uses it five times: ii. 6, p. 116\(^{6}\); ii. 23, p. 157\(^{8}\); ii. 32, p. 176\(^{6}\); iii. 14, p. 211\(^{10-11}\).
one or another [form] of the single [substance]. Of these [forms] that is called present, if it be that the external-aspect is passing through [the state] of its peculiar functional-activity. This is different from the other external-aspects both the quiescent and the indeterminable [states]. But when it has rejoined its general [or latent] form, then how could that external-aspect be distinguished from any other, since it is then of the very nature of the substance itself? There are, as every one knows, three of these external-aspects within the substance, the quiescent and the uprisen and the indeterminable. Of these the quiescent are those that have come to rest by finishing their functional-activity. The uprisen are those in active function; and these [uprisen] are immediately-contiguous (sa₂m-anantara) to the future time-variation. While the past come after the present. Why do not the present come after the past? Because there is no relation of antecedent and consequent [between them]. The relation of antecedent and consequent in the case of the future and the present ¹ is not the same as [this relation] in the case of the past ² [and of the present]. Therefore there is [no later external-aspect] immediately contiguous to the past. Consequently the future only is immediately contiguous [as being antecedent] to the present.—Now the indeterminable [external-aspects], what are they? Everything containing the essence of everything. Upon which it has been said, “That which in the various forms ³ of taste and other [subtile elements] contains the mutations of [the coarse elements of] water and of earth is found in plants; likewise [that which is mutable] in plants is found in animals, and of animals in plants.” In this sense, in so far as the common nature is not destroyed, we use the term ‘everything contains the essence of everything.’ Still, because of connexion with place and time and form ⁴ and cause, the external-aspects do not of course manifest themselves at the same time.⁵ That which passes through a

¹ The Vārttika says that this is prāyabhāva.
² In this case there is prāgadhvaṇa.
³ Compare Vācaspati’s quotation iv. 18, p. 291² from the Vāyu Pur.; and also Yogavāśīṣṭa, Utpatiṣīkaraṇa 78.
⁴ The word rūpa is used for colour and form; the word skāra for form when a dis-
⁵ The Bikāner MS. and the text of Bodās (Bom. Sanskrit Ser.), p. 134², both read upapanḍhāt.
succession of these external-aspects, whether manifested or unmanifested, and which has as its essence the generic form and the particular,\(^1\) and which is present-in-all-but-different-from-them\(^2\) (anvayin),—that is a substance. But the [Yogācāra] who holds that this world is nothing but external-aspects without [a substance] present-in-all-but-different-from-them,—for him there would be no experience. Why would this be so? [The reply is,] how could one consciousness of a subject-of-experience (bhokṛtvena) be held responsible for a deed done by another consciousness? And there would also be no memory of this [consciousness]. For there is no such thing as recollection by one consciousness of something seen by another [consciousness]. And it is the substance permanently present-in-all-but-different-from-them which, upon the recognition of a thing is recognized as participating in the alteration of the external-aspect. Consequently it is not true that [this world] is nothing more than external-aspects without [a substance] present-in-all-but-different-from-them.

He gives the distinguishing-characteristic of this substance to which the three-fold mutation belongs by the sūtra. 14. Among these [mutations] a substance conforms itself to quiescent and uprisen and indeterminable external-aspects. A substance (dharmin) is a thing that has external-aspects (dharma). And because, unless one knows the external-aspects, one cannot know the substance, he makes known what the external-aspect is in the word «pre-established-harmony.» «The substance» means a material object such as clay. «Only a power» [that is] the power of producing the dust and the lump of clay and the water-jar. This is the external-aspect,\(^3\) in so far as these are contained in this [substance] in an unphenomenalized state. This is the point. An objector says, 'In so far as these exist therein in an unphenomenalized state they may become visible from within it, but how can the capacity to fetch water [in the jar] and similar [purposeful acts], which could not have been got out of their cause [the clay], be obtained by them [that is, the finished products]?'. In reply to this he says, «as limited by its pre-established-harmony.» The power to produce the water-jar is defined as being pre-established-harmony for things which fetch water. Hence the power to fetch water and the other [purposeful] acts are also obtained by the water-jars and other things from their own cause only. Thus [the capacity to fetch water] is not accidental [with

\(^1\) Compare i. 7, p. 214, and iii. 44, p. 257\(^2\) (Calc. ed.).

\(^2\) See also i. 45, p. 964; iii. 18, p. 205\(^3\); iii. 44, p. 257\(^6\) (Calc. ed.).

\(^3\) Reading dharmaḥ.
regard to the substance]. This is the point.—There is another interpretation. One might be asked, 'What are substances?' The reply is, «of the substance as limited by its pre-established-harmony.» One might be asked, 'What is an external-aspect?' The reply is, «An external-aspect is only a power.» The meaning is that an external-aspect is only a pre-established-harmony belonging to these [substances]. Hence it is proven that the thing which has this [external-aspect] is the substance. Thus it becomes clear.—He describes the source-of-the-valid-idea [which proves] the real existence of these [external aspects] in the words, «And it . . . is inferred by the kind of effect which it generates.» Of the single substance in one or another form as dust or as a lump of clay or as a water-jar. This is the meaning. And it differs because there are evidently different effects. This is another way of putting it (iti yācat). It is observed [or] apperceived. With regard to these [external-aspects] he describes the difference between the lump of clay, which strikes upon [the thinking substance of] experience and is present, and the quiescent state of the clay as dust, and the indeterminable state of the clay as water-jar by saying «Of these [forms] that is called present.» If there be no difference, then the dust and the water-jar would have their functional-activity co-extensive with that of the lump of clay. This is the point. But in the case of the unphenomenalized lump of clay, the establishment of the difference, as stated above, is impossible. [This] he says in the words, «But when.» What [then] is this [difference]? By establishment of what difference will there be a differentiation? Having thus mentioned that there is [this] establishment of a difference between the external-aspects, he analyses this difference in the words, «There are, as every one knows.» The word «uprisen» means present. He now deduces the priority and the sequence of the time-forms in the words, «And these.» A question is raised in the words, «Why does not?» ‘For what reason does not the present come after the past?’ This is the meaning. The reason is, «There is no relation of antecedent and consequent [between them.]» By speaking of the object [that is, absence of antecedence and consequence] he indicates that which contains as its object [the absence of antecedence and consequence], that is to say, the non-apperception [of this object]. He shows what this same non-apperception is, in so far as its properties are opposite to those of apperception, in the words, «in the case of the future and the present.» He brings the discussion to a close with the word, «Consequently.» Consequently (tat) means for this reason. The future only is immediately contiguous as being antecedent to the present; but the past is not. The present is immediately contiguous to the past as being antecedent to it; but the indeterminable is not. Therefore it is established that the youngest of the time-forms is the past. An objector says, “This may be true. The uprisen and the past may be surmised

¹ Compare the passage at the end of the Explanation of iii. 15, “Power also is a subtile state of effects that are intensified. It is an external-aspect of the mind and it is inferred only by the experience of its coarse effects.”
to be those external-aspects which are in experience and those which have been
experienced. But external-states which are indeterminable cannot, in so far as
they are indeterminable, be surmised." With this in mind he asks, «Now ... ?»
What are the indeterminables? In what things do we look for them? To
this the answer is in the words «Everything containing the essence of every-
thing. Upon which it has been said.» This is made consistent in the words,
«... of water and of earth.» For, in the case of water which contains [the
subtile elements of] taste and colour and touch and sound, and in the case of
earth which contains odour and taste and colour and touch and sound, various
forms containing the mutations are observed as perceived in the taste and other
[subtile elements] which are found in the root and fruit and blossoms and foliage
and in the other parts of trees and creepers and shrubs. This cannot be a
mutation of earth which is not of a similar essence, or of water which is not of a
like kind. For, as it has already been consistently stated, there can be no pro-
duction of that which does not already exist. Similarly in the case of animals,
human beings and beasts tame or wild, various tastes, &c., are observed coming
from mutations of plants. For these [human beings and other animals] in eating
the fruits [and leaves] and so on acquire a rich variety of forms, &c. In the same
way, plants are observed to have a variety of forms coming from the mutations
of animals. For it is known that pomegranates become as large as coco-nuts when
sprinkled with blood. He brings the discussion to a close with the words,
«In this sense.» Thus everything, earth and water and all, contains all tastes
and other [subtile elements]. He gives the reason for this in the words, «in so
far as the common nature is not destroyed.» Because, in so far it is
recognized everywhere, that-which-is-asserted (jāti) of the common nature of
earth and of water is not destroyed. An objector says, 'If everything
contains the essence of everything, then, Sir, since everything everywhere is
always in every part close at hand, there would be a manifestation of all existences
whatsoever at one and the same time. For an effect whose cause, lacking nothing,
is close at hand, ought not long to delay.' With this in mind he says, «with place
and time.» Although everything containing the essence of everything is a cause
[of everything], still there has to be [a manifestation] 1. of that [particular]
place which belongs to a [particular] effect [of this cause]. For instance,
Kashmir is the place of the saffron-plant. Because although these [causes]
exist in Pañcāla and other countries, there is no coming actively forth 3 [of the
plant]. Accordingly there is no manifestation of the saffron-plant in a place
such as Pañcāla. 2. Likewise during the hot season, since no rain moves
actively forth, there is no manifestation of rice-plants. 3. Similarly a doe

1 Reading samukṣāmaka.
2 Compare ii. 19, p. 149; iii. 11, p. 201; iii. 13, pp. 206, 207; and asato
'snapajananāt, ii. 15, p. 132.
3 The word samudācāra occurs once only in
the Bhāṣya iii. 13, p. 207. In Viṣṇu-
spati it is the equivalent of abhiṣyakti
and occurs ii. 4, p. 111; iii. 13, p. 209; iii. 14, p. 214. Bālārāma glosses the
word vidyāmātā avirbhāva iī, p. 214, note 3 (Calc. ed.).
Reason for the order of mutations

4. In the same way, a non-meritorious person does not experience anything like pleasure, because in him no meritorious cause moves actively forth. Therefore because of connexion [or] separation by place or time or form or cause, things [that is] forms of being do not manifest themselves at the same time.—Having thus given a classification to the external-aspects, he shows that the substance is present-in-all-but-different-from-them by saying, «... which ... of these ... » The generic-form is the substance as such; the particular is the external-aspect. The meaning is that its essence is of both these kinds.—Having thus shown that the substance which is established by experience is present-in-all-but-different-from-them, he reminds the Annihilationist (vāṇaçīka), who does not assent to this and who assents to the theory of a momentary mind-stuff made of consciousness only, of the undesired contingency previously [i. 32] mentioned, and he does so in the words, «But the [Yogācāra].» [Also in the words,] «And ... upon the recognition of a thing.» For a thing observed by Devadatta is not recognized by Yājñadatta. Accordingly it is he who experiences that also recognizes.

15. The order of the sequence (krama) is the reason for the order of the mutations.

If it be possible ² that a single substance has only a single mutation, then the order is the cause of the order of the mutation. One finds, for example, clay in the form of dust, clay in the form of a lump, clay in the form of a water-jar, clay in the form of potsherds [and] clay in the form of small bits. It is in this sense that there is a sequence. 1. Whenever one external-aspect is immediately-contiguous to another external-aspect, it is [then in] sequence with it. The lump of [clay] falls away and the water-jar comes into existence. It is in such cases that a sequence in the mutation of external-aspects occurs. 2. There is a sequence in the mutation of time-variations. By reason of there being a future [time-variation] of the water-jar, there is a sequence [to it in the] present [time-variation]. Likewise by reason of there being a present [time-variation] of the lump [of clay], there is a sequence [to it in the] present

¹ Reading with Bikāner MS. ātmanāṁ.
² Reading prasakte, which represents this system. But if the reading be prasaktah (Kashmir MS. and Gaṅgādhara Śhāstri's MS.), then the word would be used as indicating that this is not possible. The form would be used as equivalent to a verbal form in -ya according to Pāṇ. i. 4. 31 with Siddh. Kāum. (Nir. Sūg., ed. 1904), p. 144, last line.
past [time-variation]. There is no sequence for the past. Why is this? When there is a relation of antecedent and sequent there is an immediate contiguity. But this relation does not occur in the case of the past. Consequently there is a sequence for two time-variations only. 3. There is none the less a sequence in the mutations of intensity, as when the oldness of a brand-new water-jar becomes evident first on its rim \(^1\) (prānte), and then manifesting itself in a sequence which conforms to the succession of moments, [finally] reaches a complete [individual] phenomenal [form]. This then is the third mutation and it is other than the external-aspect and the time-variation. These same sequences become what they are, so long as the distinction between the substance and the external-aspect holds. For the external-aspect as such also can become the substance in so far as another external-aspect is concerned. But since, strictly speaking, this same substance can be named external-aspect by virtue of attributing to it an identity with the substance, therefore this sequence shines forth in consciousness as a unit only. The external-aspects of the mind-stuff are of two kinds, those that are perceived and those that are unperceived. Of these two, the perceived have as their essence presented-ideas; those that are unperceived have as their essence real-things (vastu) only. These latter are moreover just seven; by inference the existence of [these external-aspects] as real things only is brought within reach. "Restriction: and right-living and subliminal-impressions and mutations and vitality and movement and power are external-aspects of mind-stuff excluded from sight."

15. The order of the sequence (krāma) is the reason for the order of the mutations. [A question is stated for discussion.] 'Does one substance have only one mutation characterized (lakṣaṇa) by external-aspect and time-variation (lakṣaṇa) and intensity? Or does it have many mutations characterized by external-aspect and time-variation and intensity? Of these two which seems plausible? [The answer of the objector is,] because the substance is one, the mutation is only one. For from a cause, which as such is one, there ought not to be a diversity of effects, because that diversity would have to be the result of chance.' If this be taken so, the reply is given. As a result of the order of the sequence

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1 In making a jar the rim is moulded first.
2 This seems to be a mnemonic verse by the author of the Comment. Compare iii. 18, p. 230^4 (Calc. ed.).
there is an order of the mutations. Both ordinary men and men of trained minds search out with their own eyes, in clay which is one, a sequential succession of mutating form of dust and lump and water-jar and potsherds and small bits. And the immediate succession between the dust and the lump is one thing; and that between the lump and the water-jar is another; and that between the water-jar and the potsherds is another; and that between the potsherds and the small bits is another. Whatever is sequent with respect to the one is antecedent with respect to the other. This same difference of sequences, since it does not correspond to a single mutation, leads one to conclude that there are different mutations. Moreover the clay, although a single substance, undergoes a succession of mutations in sequences following the sequence of contact (samavadhāna) with various co-operating causes which fall one after another into the sequence, and does not leave it [the succession of mutations] to chance. And as in the case of the order of the mutation of the external-aspects, so the reason for the order of the mutation of time-variations and for the order of the mutation of intensities is of the same kind as the order of the sequence. All this is made luminous in the words of the Comment, «a single substance.» On the assumption that there is an identity between the sequence and that which is in the sequence, it is said that this is its sequence, in the words, «There is none the less a sequence in the mutations of intensity.» For it is thus when rice-grains, carefully guarded in a granary by a miser, after very many years become reduced to atoms, in that the arrangement of the parts [of the grain] is likely to crumble even at a touch of the hand. Such a [condition] would not result so suddenly (akasmāl) in the case of brand-new rice-grains. Therefore in the sequence of successive moments this fact [that they are reduced to atoms] is seen to characterize those [grains] which have gotten into the sequence of very large and less large and large and minute and more minute and very minute. This same order in the sequence does depend upon the distinction between the substance and the external-aspects, as he says, «These same sequences.» Extended from the evolved-effect and up to resoluble [primary matter] there is this contingent relation of substance and external-aspects. Even [coarse elements] such as earth are external-aspects as compared with subtile elements, as he says, «the external-aspect also.» Because unresoluble [primary matter] is, strictly speaking, the only substance, it is usual to attribute identity to it. «By virtue of (taddvārena)» [that is] by virtue of having a common locus the substance would itself be an external-aspect. For this very reason there would be only one mutation, that of the substance, since external-aspects and time-variations and intensities have entered into the substance itself. If this is so, it is almost equivalent to saying that the substance is far-removed from being absolutely permanent.—While discussing the mutations of the external-aspects he also states the diversity in the kinds of external-aspects of the mind-stuff by saying «of the mind-stuff.» «Perceived» means direct perceptions; «unperceived» means indirect perceptions. Of these two,
those whose essence is presented-ideas are sources-of-valid-ideas and passions and the like. By the words «real things only» he refers to the non-illuminating character [of things]. An objector says, 'This may be so. But if unpereceived, they surely do not exist.' In reply to this he says «by inference.» These [external aspects] are so described whose existence as real things only is brought within reach by inference. The word inference (anu-māna) means the proof (māna) which comes after (anu), and, as having the same nature, verbal-communication is also [included in the term]. He brings together in a memorial-verse the seven unpereceived external-aspects by saying, «Restriction.» 1. The restriction of fluctuations is the unconscious stage [i. 51] of the mind-stuff. We come to a knowledge of it by verbal-communication and by inference as being a state in which subliminal-impressions alone remain. 2. The word «right-living» is meant to include merit and demerit. Elsewhere the reading is 'karma'. In this case also merit and demerit produced by this [right-living] would have to be understood. And these are known either by verbal-communication or by inference based upon a knowledge from an experience of pleasure or of pain. 3. But «subliminal-impression» is inferred from memory. 4. Likewise, since the aspects (guna) are three, the changes of the aspects of the mind-stuff are unstable, and so «mutation» from moment to moment is inferred. 5. Similarly «vitality» which is a kind of effort to sustain the breath. And since it is not known [to the mind], this external-aspect is inferred from expiration and inspiration. 6. Likewise «movement» of the mind (cetas) is activity, in accordance with its activity in connexion with the various senses and portions of the body, and this [activity] also is inferred from the connexion with it [that is, the mind]. 7. Similarly «power» also is a subtile state of effects that are intensified. It is an external-aspect of the mind and it is inferred only by experience of its coarse effects.

From here on the field-of-operation for the constraint [reached] by the yogin who has acquired all the means for the attainment of the desired object is discussed.

16. As a result of constraint upon the three mutations [there follows] the knowledge of the past and the future.

Yogins acquire knowledge of the past and of the future as a result of constraint upon the mutations of external-aspects and of time-variations and of intensities. Fixed-attention and contemplation and concentration, three in one, has been called [iii. 4] constraint. By this [constraint] the three mutations directly experienced

7 a Compare ii. 14, p. 211a2 (Calc. ed.).
produce knowledge of the past and of the future in these [three mutations].

From this point up to the end of the [third] Book the field-of-operation for the constraint and the supernormal powers indicative of the mastery over objects will be described. Here we have first discussed as the field-of-operation for constraint, for that yogin who has appropriated to himself all the aids to yoga, just those three mutations which have been described in detail. This is in the words, 16. As a result of constraint upon the three mutations there follows the knowledge of the past and of the future. An objector asks, 'Direct-experience occurs only where there is constraint. How then can constraint upon the three mutations directly-experience the past and the future?' In reply to this he says, «By this [constraint].» When the three mutations are brought under direct-experience by this [constraint], those [time-variations] of the past and the future, inseparably-connected-with-the-mutations-yet-different-from-them, become the objects of [intuitive] knowledge. And the direct-experience of the three mutations itself has as its essence the direct-experience of the past and the future which are included in [the three mutations]. Thus there is no difference of objects in the two cases of the constraint and of the direct-experience.

1. Word and intended-object and presented-idea are confused because they are erroneously identified with each other. By constraint upon the distinctions between them [there arises the intuitive] knowledge (jñāna) of the cries of all living beings.

With regard to these [three,] voice has its function [in uttering] only the [sounds of] syllables. And the organ-of-hearing has as its object only that [emission of air] which has been mutated into a sound [by a contact with the eight places of articulation belonging to the vocal organ]. But it is a mental-process (buddhi) that grasps the word [as significant sound] by seizing 1 the letter-sounds each in turn and binding them together [into one word]. Sounds-of-syllables (vārna) do not naturally 2 aid each other, for they

1 This same point is much more elaborately discussed by Vācaspati in his Tattvābindu (Benares, 1892), on page 10 at the top, and also p. 39.

2 The question is whether the sounds one by one or collectively make the prototype (sphāta) manifest. The reply seems to be that just as the full knowledge of the real jewel does not shine out clear at the first sight, but shines out in its fullness in the final idea, the resultant of several impressions, so the sounds singly do make the prototype manifest, but do not immediately make the prototype in its perfection manifest.
cannot coexist at the same time. Not having attained-to-the-unity-of a word and not having [conveyed a definite meaning], they become audible (āris) and they become inaudible (tiras). Hence it is said that individually [letter-sounds] lack the nature of a word. On the other hand the [sounds of the] syllables one by one may be said to have the essence of a word ¹ as being filled (pracīta) with the power to furnish expressions for everything through their association with other [sounds of] syllables which also co-operate [in this result]. And so they seem to pass into a multiplicity ² of [word]-forms. A preceding [sound of a syllable] is mentally determined by the following and the following by the preceding to become-a-distinct-and-separate word. Thus a group of [sounds of] syllables follows in a sequence [of utterance] and is assigned by conventional usage to a [single] intended-object (artha). Hence though competent to indicate a great-number-of-things (sarva), a certain number of these [sounds of syllables], whatever that number may be, makes [but the one] object clear [to consciousness]. For example, g-o-h indicate [only that] thing [known as ‘cow’] with its dewlap and other specific features. Hence [also] the unity, which the mental-process makes known out of these [many sounds of syllables], determined as these are by conventional-usage by a single intended-object and seized and bound together into a fixed sequence of sounds, is the word. This unity [termed] a word is in every case the object of a single ³ mental-process and requires a single [distinct] effort [of the organs of articulation]. It is a thing not having parts, and not having a sequence ⁴ [of parts]. It does not consist of [sounds of] syllables. It is a thing of the mind, and is brought into its function by means of the presented-idea [which we retain] of the final syllable-sound [in a group of these sounds]. If a man wish to convey information to another, he must express himself by these same syllable-sounds to which the others must listen. This use of speech to which no beginning [can be

¹ Compare Tattva Bindu, p. 6² (Ben. ed.). ² A universe of meanings attached to one word. The concept vādvarīpyam is approached by Vācaspatimīśra in Śaṅk. Tatt. Kāum. on Kūrikā xv. ³ That is, a separate and distinct mental process. ⁴ Compare Patañjali Mahābhyām (Kielhorn), j. 6¹; i. 7⁵; i. 7⁶; i. 11²; ii. 12⁸; and elsewhere.
assigned] permeates the thinking-substance of the ordinary man with subconscious-impressions [which come from the syllable-sounds]. Thus as a result of common understanding (sampratipatti) [the word] is thought to be something real in itself. It is owing to our knowing what this [word] means in accordance with conventional-usage that we attempt to divide it [into sounds of syllables]. Thus we say that the seizing-in-turn-and-binding-together of this or that number of [sounds of] syllables in some such kind [of fixed sequence] is a word expressive of a single intended-object. But conventional-usage is essentially [what has been handed down] by the memory [of man]. It is a kind of erroneous identification of the word and the thing signified. So that there is a confusion of the word with the intended-object, and of the intended-object with the word. Here we see how conventional usage is a kind of erroneous identification of each with the other based upon memory. Thus it is that these [three], the word ‘cow’ and the intended-object ‘cow’ and the presented-idea ‘cow’, get confused, because erroneously identified with one another. But he who recognizes these three as quite distinct is the knower of all. Furthermore, every word has the power \(^1\) to express a [complete] sentence. Thus when we utter the word ‘tree’, we imply that it exists. For no intended-object of a word can lack existence. Similarly no action expressed [by a verb] is possible without the means-of-attaining [the action]. And so when we utter the word ‘cook-s’, certain relations which are later expressly mentioned\(^2\) are supplied to specify the meaning [by excluding other relations]. Thus we mention the man Chāitra as the agent,\(^3\) rice as the object,\(^4\) and fire as the means \(^5\) of the action [expressed by the verb ‘cook’]. We observe also that words are so constructed as to give the meaning of the sentence; thus a ‘Reader’\(^6\) is ‘one who recites Vedas’; thus if we say ‘lives’, we mean [that he] ‘keeps the breath of life.’ [And conversely] in this sentence there is a manifestation

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\(^1\) The vākyārākṣa is discussed in the Tattva Bindu, p. 16 (Benares ed.).

\(^2\) In accordance with Patañjalī Mahābhyāṣya on i. 2. 45, sūrt. 4; Kielhorn, i. 2184.

\(^3\) Pāñ. i. 4. 54 kārty.

\(^4\) Pāñ. i. 4. 49 karmā.

\(^5\) Pāñ. i. 4. 42 kārāṇa.

\(^6\) Pāñ. v. 2. 84.
of the meaning of words. But to determine whether a particular word denotes an action [described by a verb] or some relation [therewith, we must withdraw it from the sentence] and analyse its formation by making distinctions. Without such an [analysis] many a word such as bhavati or ācvaḥ or ajāpayah\(^1\) would remain ambiguous, because as regards its outer form it might be analysed either as a noun or as a verb (ākhyaṭa). There is a distinction between these words and intended-objects and presented-ideas. To illustrate this [distinction]. ‘The palace whitens’; here the action [of a verb] is meant. ‘The white palace’; here a relation is meant, [that of the quality white with the action or process which produced it]. The word is in essence both an action [denoted by a verb] and a relation, and the termination [at the end of the word] conveys these meanings of [action and of relation]. But why is this so? Because this [process of whitening] is identified with that, [its result, the quality white]; so that in conventional-usage the presented-idea [of these objects seems to be] one and the same. But the white intended-object is that which becomes the thing upon which the word and the presented-idea depend. For this [intended-object] by reason of its own intensities passes-through-evolved-forms and does not correspond to the word nor to the mental-process [which are unchanging in themselves]. Similarly the word and similarly the presented-idea do not correspond the one with the other. The word [changes] in one way; the intended-object in another way; and the presented-idea in another way. Thus there is a distinction. And so it happens that by constraint upon this distinction a yogin attains [intuitive] knowledge of the cries of all creatures.

Here is another field-of-operation for constraint stated in sūtra 17. Word . . . knowledge . . . In this [sūtra] while his intention is to explain a word as an expression of meaning, he describes first of all the object of the functional-activity of the vocal-organ by saying «In this [sūtra].» The «voice» is the organ of voice; it is that which phenomenalizes [the sounds of the] syllables and it has eight places of articulation. As is said [in the Śīkṣā 18], “There are eight places of articulation of the [sounds of the] syllables, the chest and the throat and the head and the root of the tongue and the teeth and the nose and

\(^1\) Whitney: Grammar, 2nd ed., 1042, l.
the lips and the palate." This vocal organ has its function only in uttering the sounds of the syllables as they are known to ordinary sense-perception, and not as expressive of meanings. He explains the object of the functional-activity of the organ of hearing in the words «the organ-of-hearing.» The organ-of-hearing, however, has that only as its object which is mutated in the form of a particular [sound of a] syllable, which has as its essence a particular mutation of an emission-of-air (udāna) subjected-to-contact (abhīghātin) with [the various places-of-articulation] belonging to the vocal organ. But its object is not a word-expressing-a-meaning. This is what he wishes-to-say (ity artha). He distinguishes the word-expressing-a-meaning from the [sounds of the] syllables as known to ordinary sense-perception, by saying «the word [as significant sound].» But it is the mental-process that grasps the word as expressing-meaning by seizing the letter-sounds each in turn (anu) and binding them together [into one word]. Having grasped the letter-sounds (nāda) as [the sounds of] syllables (varṇa) one by one as they are known in sense-perception, it binds them in turn [that is] afterwards so that they are made to change into a unity and we can say g-o-h [that is to say] one word. By this [mental-process] the word is grasped. Although each of the preceding mental-processes [by stages] brings each word, [so long as it] has the form of the [sounds of] syllables, into consciousness, still the word [expressing meaning] does not clearly lie [before us]. But at the last mental-act (vijñāna) it becomes clear. Thus it is said «a mental-process (buddhi) grasps the word [as significant sound] by seizing the letter-sounds each in turn and binding them together [into one word].» To [the Māṇḍūkya] who maintains that the [sounds of the] syllables in themselves express a meaning, in that a word cannot be discerned as one because the [sounds] are heterogeneous, he replies «the [sounds of the] syllables.» Now these [sounds of the] syllables must either 1. each singly (pratyeka) arouse the idea (dhi) having a word expressing meaning as its content, like a row of pegs1 upon which a bag-of-netted-cords is hung; or 2. in combination (saṃkhata) like the stones which when together hold the pot. Not, in any case, 1. the first alternative, because from the single [sound of a syllable] the sense-perception of the thing does not rise in consciousness; or because if it did proceed from a single one, the second and the third need not have been uttered. For when an action is completed, a means-of-attaining [that action] which adds nothing new cannot be counted as (nyāyātigata) a means-of-attaining. Therefore 2. the second [alternative] remains. For the stones in combination can hold up the pot, because they are there at the same time. But the [sounds of the] syllables cannot be simultaneous. Accordingly, since it cannot be that aid is reciprocally given and received, they cannot by being together arouse the idea of the meaning. These [sounds of syllables] not attaining by themselves to a single special word and therefore not conveying [the meaning], become now audible (āvis) and now inaudible (śiras). Like the iron rods [of a

1 This phrase in almost the same words occurs in Vācaspati's Tattva Bindu, p. 513.
tripod which co-operate to hold a vessel] they are not, as being each by itself, termed a word. If, however, the [sounds of the] syllables were to attain to a word as a unit by being [each by itself] identical with the word, then the defect mentioned before would not apply, as he says «On the other hand the [sounds of the] syllables one by one may be said to have the essence of a word.»—«Being filled with the power to furnish expressions for everything» [means] having an accumulation of a great number of powers to indicate [things]. For the letter ‘g’ occurs in words like gau and gana and gaura and naga expressing various meanings such as, for instance, the common-nature-of-cows. Thus [this letter] has the power to express this or that [meaning]. Likewise the letter ‘o’ occurs in words like somaḥ and cocī in words denoting the Ichara as the object-intended. This is to be said mutatis mutandis with regard to all [the letters]. Furthermore the [sound of a] syllable such as ‘g’ which co-operates1 [in one set of cases], is the very same which is associated [and] connected with [the sound of] another syllable such as ‘o’. These [sounds of the] syllables which have been so described are a general condition (bhāva) or state. Therefore they seem to pass into a multiplicity of forms [or] a plurality. But it does not actually pass into a plurality just because of [its own peculiar] state.—The preceding [sound of a] syllable, the letter ‘g’ by association with the following letter ‘o’ is thus distinguished from words like gana; and the following letter ‘o’ by association with the letter ‘g’ is distinguished from words like cocī and thus becomes determined in the mental-process which seizes each in turn and binds them together to become a distinct-and-separate word-expressive-of-the-meaning (vācaka) of the common-nature-of-the-cow, [to become] the word-prototype of the word ‘cow’. The connexion of ideas is this. [This happens in this way] because the presented-ideas of the thing cannot be effected by successive [sounds of] syllables which do not occur [in a word] in a fixed sequence. Nor, when heaven or the highest sacrificial-merit (apūrva) is to be brought to pass, is it proper to say that just as sacrifices such as the Āgneya2 co-operate (sāhitya) by means of purifications (saṁskāra), so the [sounds of the] syllables [by means of subliminal-impressions (saṁskāra)] co-operate in the production of the mental-process of the thing. [It is not proper to say this] because the argument breaks down when we apply the method of alternatives (vikalpa). Surely this subliminal-impression (saṁskāra) produced by the experience of [the sounds of the] syllables is either the one which generates memory, or it is the other, which is called sacrificial-merit3 (apūrva) and is likened to the purification (saṁskāra) by the Āgneya and similar [sacrifices]. Now first of all the second

1 Discussed at length on p. 64 of the Tattva Bindu (Benares ed.).
2 Six sacrifices are performed in two groups; three without a break in the groups. Three on the first day after the full moon, the Āgneya, the Upīṇḍu, the Agniṣṭoma; three yāga on the first day after the new moon. All six have the name of dāryapūrṇamāsayāga.
3 Compare the discussion of the sphoṭa as analogous to the sacrifice in Čāstra Dipika i. 1. 5, p. 68; i. 2. 10, p. 127. See also Tattva Bindu, p. 60. On the intermixiture of apūrva see Čāst. Dip. ii. 1. 5, p. 200.
[of these alternatives] cannot [be admitted], because of the difficulties in the assumption. It must be assumed that this [purification] is the very same as that which follows (pūrva) sacrificial-merit. Whereas this [word-type] which is one cannot be produced by experiences of [sounds of] syllables in sequences. Since we should have to assume [the existence] of many subsidiary purifications (sāmakāra) each of the same kind [as the others]. It is this that is the difficulty. Furthermore so long as we do not know that this purification serves as a cause to make the intended-object known, it cannot be accepted as serving to produce this [meaning]. For a relation which is not known to serve the purpose of presenting the intended-object, cannot be accepted as serving [that purpose]. And, as for the subliminal-impression which is inferred from the memory which is its result, it is restricted [i.e., 11] to that object, namely, the experience which was its cause. And it is therefore not in a position to arouse a subliminal-impression which has something else, [namely, the presentation of the intended-object of that experience] as its object. For if this were so, any one having experienced any one object, would be able to know any [other] object. And it is not right to say that [sounds of] syllables which arise in the mirror of such a memory as takes its origin in the sum-total (pindā) of subliminal-impressions—produced by the experience of each syllable singly—can express meaning [because the sounds of the syllables] are recognized as belonging together. For that would involve-the-conclusion that the idea of the intended object could be produced indiscriminately (uṣṭeṣena), whether the [sounds of the syllables] be experienced in a sequence or out of a sequence or in reversed sequence. And it cannot be that this knowledge from memory can bring before itself (gocarayitum) that succession of sounds of syllables which was active in the previous experience. Hence in so far as it is not possible from the [sounds of the] syllables to have the presentation of the intended-object, it must be supposed that there is an experience \(^1\) of the word as being single which could give rise to [the presentation of the intended-object] \(^2\).

The same objection, moreover, does not apply with reference to the word. For the word is phenomenalized by [sounds of] syllables only when single and differing according to the difference \(^4\) in the effort [of articulation]. And inasmuch as the words are alike in so far as they are produced through the action of the like places [of articulation] by sounds which are the conditions—which-phenomenalize the various words each unlike the other, [the sounds] do make a word similar [to other words]. This word \([go]\) is similar to other words which have the 'g' sound, but in other respects it is dissimilar, since their dissimilarities are different in so far as the various other [syllables] are associated [with this syllable]. Because of [this] peculiarity of this [word], although it is one, and

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1 So his position is this. The sphota is a subliminal-impression in the buddhi. The buddhi forms the intended-object under the influence of the sphota.

2 The word svu evidently refers to the bracketed phrase.

3 See Patañjali: Mahabhadaya on i. 1. 9, vārt. 2, vol. i, p. 61; also on viii. 4. 48, vol. iii, p. 466 (Kielhorn).
altogether a unit (anavayava), still the sounds-of-the-syllables make it appear as a collection (sāvayava) and not as a unit. Just as a face, although it is one, with a definite colour and dimension and look, is made to appear, by [reflection in] a gem \(^1\) or a sword-blade or a mirror, to be more than one and as having more than one colour and dimension and look. But this is not so in the strict sense. Whereas the [sounds of the] syllables are parts of the partless word and are formed of the similarities and peculiarities.

Therefore the mental-process (buddhi) of this [word], in the case of a particular word, supports itself upon the word-prototype (sphoṭa) which is undivided and partless, although it seems to be divided and seems to have parts. Therefore a part, the letter ‘g’, of one particular word-prototype, the word ‘go’ cannot cause that [namely, the partless prototype] of which it [the ‘g’] is part to come forth, because of the similarity of this word-prototype with that of words like gaura. Therefore when made special-and-distinct by the letter ‘o’, it is able to cause that of which it is a part, [namely the word-prototype ‘go’] to come forth. Similarly the part which is the letter ‘o’ is also not able, because of its similarity with words like coca, to cause that of which it is a part, namely the word-prototype ‘go’, to come forth. So when made special-and-distinct by the letter ‘g’, it is able to cause [its own prototype] to come forth. And although [these two ‘g’ and ‘o’] do not naturally belong together, still through [their] subliminal-impressions they do belong together. And thus it is consistent to have the relation of qualified and qualifier between them. Nor can it be said that the two subliminal-impressions have each a different object, since the experiences whose objects were the two parts, and also the two subliminal-impressions which result from the experiences, have one word as their object. The word moreover is not distinctly (avyakta) experienced when only part of it is experienced. Whereas it is perceived distinctly by the idea which seizes the [sounds of the] syllables in turn and binds them together,—[the idea] which is produced by the subliminal-impressions which arise from the experience of the parts. This is the difference. And we find that the first indistinct experience does produce a distinct experience by arousing subliminal-impressions in a sequence [of degrees of distinctness], just as the presented-idea that the tree when seen from a distance is green \(^2\) (harita), although indistinct, leads to the distinct presented-idea of the tree. But this kind [of an idea] is impossible in an experience wherein the [sounds of the] syllables should represent intended-objects. For surely one cannot say that the [sounds of the] syllables do each singly give rise to an indistinct presented-idea of the intended-object, and ultimately to a distinct idea. For distinctness and indistinctness are restricted to cases of perceptive thinking. But [in this case] the presentation of the intended-object is to be aroused by the

\(^1\) The illustration and discussion are given more fully in the Tattva Bindu, p. 65.
\(^2\) This reading given in the analogous passage in the Tattva Bindu [p. 65] by the same author seems preferable to the reading of ‘elephant’ (hasti).
Word-prototype and syllables

sylables, and is not a perception. So if this [unperceived presentation of the intended-object] is produced by the [sounds of the] syllables, it would be produced quite clear (ṣphuta) or it would not be produced at all. But it could not be unclear. Whereas for the word-prototype you have to assume a clear or an unclear form in that there is a perception of it made distinct by sounds. So the case is not analogous [in that the word cannot be perceived unless the sounds be distinct, whereas the sounds can be distinctly perceived]. Thus the [sounds of the] syllables combined in the mental-process which seize them in turn and binds them together, and which has its origin in the organ-of-hearing, —in this, together with the subliminal-impressions generated by experience of the [sounds of the] syllables, one by one, become the word-prototype of a single word. If there should be an alteration of the sequence, [then], in so far as there might not be any special-and-distinct effort [of the organ-of-voice], giving heed to the fixed order,¹ which would set in operation the special-and-distinct effort that alone can make this [word-prototype] manifest, it would follow that there would be no manifestation of it at all. In so far as the [sounds of the] syllables conform to [this] sequence and are determined by being the conventional-usage for an intended-object they display as their object a word as-it-is-usually-understood as having parts and as having its determination by conventional-usage only.—«Whatever that number might be» means two or three, three or four, five or six. Though competent to indicate a great number of things, a certain number of these [sounds of] syllables makes but the one intended-object clear [to consciousness, for example] g-o-h [makes clear to consciousness only the one object known as ‘cow’] having its dewlap [and other specific features]. It might then be said that the [sounds of the] syllables only, in so far as they accord with conventional-usage, have expressive power, and accordingly there is no so-called word which is a unit. In reply to this he says, «Hence . . . of these.»—«Into a fixed sequence of sounds» means a sequence caused by sounds.—«Seized and bound together» are those in whose case the sequence of sounds is of that kind.—«Which the mental-process makes known» in the sense that it is made known or becomes clear by reason of the mental-process. It has been said, in harmony with the view of persons of not very fine insight, that the ‘g’ and ‘o’ and ‘h’ are determined by conventional-usage [as denoting the thing termed ‘cow’]. And this is so because, in so far as the ‘g’ and the other [sounds of syllables] are parts of this [word], they are identical with it and so express its meaning. But we are of opinion, that, as any one can see, it is a unity that is called a word which expresses a meaning. This he makes clear by saying «This unity.» The connexion [of ideas] is that this unity [termed] a word is by an ordinary mental-process believed [to be made of sounds of syllables]. Why should it be a unit? In reply to this he says «object of a single mental-process.» It is

¹ Precisely as there is a fixed sequence without break of the several sacrifices.

31 [II.0.17]
a unit since it is the object of that mental-process which is a unit in form so that one says 'g-o-h' [that is] one word. He shows what it is that makes this distinct by saying «requires a single [distinct] effort.» The effort [of articulation] which makes the word r-a-s-a distinct is different in character from that which makes the word s-a-r-a distinct (vyañjaka). This [effort] moreover is determined by the result in the form of the manifestation of the word s-a-r-a in that it begins [differently]; it has a definite succession [of sounds]; and this is the single [and distinct effort]. This it was which was required. «It is a thing without parts» because in reality it has no parts. These we only assume because of certain similarities and dissimilarities. Hence also it is «without a sequence of parts» because there it has no definite succession. An objector says, 'The [sounds of the] syllables have a definite succession, and they are parts of this [word]. How then can the word be without parts, and without a sequence of parts?' In reply to this he says «It does not consist of [sounds of] syllables.» For it does not have the [sounds of the] syllables as its parts. On the contrary the word itself, because of certain similarities and dissimilarities, is generally assumed to have the form of this or that [sound] and [so] appears in what is not its real form. For the faces as reflected in a jewel or a sword-blade or a mirror are not parts of the real face. «It is a thing of the mind» made known by the mental-process which seizes in turn and binds together [the sounds of the syllables]. «It is brought before [us]» [or] made an object by the operation (vyañpāra) of the presented-idea of the final [sound of the] syllable,—[by the operation, that is, of] the subliminal-impression [of the final syllable] together with the subliminal-impressions generated by the experience of [sounds of] the previous syllables. For it has already (adhistāt) been explained that the experience of the syllables and of the subliminal-impressions arising from them are the object of the word. The objector says, 'This may be so. But if the word-asso such (pada-tattva) has no parts or sequence or [sounds of] syllables, why is it not generally assumed to be of such a kind? For a bead of crystal, when overlaid with a coating of red-dye, does not, when that coating is removed, cease to be perceived as transparent and white. Therefore the [sounds of the] syllables are real [parts of the word].' In reply to this he says «to another.» If a man wish to convey information he must express himself by, he must utter, the very [sounds of the] syllables to which the hearers must listen. This use of speech, to which no beginning [can be assigned], depends upon words consisting of distinct syllables. And the subconscious-impression produced by it has also no beginning. The mental-process of the ordinary man (loka) is permeated [and] pervaded (vāsita) by this [subconscious-impression] and has to do with a word constructed of separate [sounds of] syllables. Thus as a result of usage, by the consensus of the elders, this word is thought of as something real in itself, as having reality in the strict sense. What he means to say is this: There is a certain thing, the limiting-condition, which is in correlation with the thing-

1 Does upakramatas mean 'which is under consideration'?
to-be-exposed-to-limiting-conditions (upadheya) and which is sometimes in correlation and sometimes out of correlation with it. Such a thing is red-dye. Now when this is out of correlation, the crystal shines forth in its natural transparent and white form. And it is quite proper [that the crystal should then shine forth]. But the presented-idea of the word,—because it is not brought into [consciousness] (anupadā) by anything other than the particular sound brought about by the particular effort [of articulation], and in so far as this [presented-idea] is always turbid with flaws of dissimilarity,—can generate the presented-idea [of the word] only as being in essence [sounds of] syllables. So how can there be the ordinary knowledge of a word when divested of its limiting conditions? As they¹ say, “Sounds because in themselves alike bring about false notions; that which makes these [sounds] apperceived is the cause of this false notion. And for those whose knowledge of words is made known by the means [which produce it, that is, the sounds of the syllables] there is an inevitable false notion. This results in an overthrow (badhā) of [all] knowledge and would cause an unceasing confusion of [all dealings] in the world.” Because the essence of a word shines out turbid with separate [sounds of] syllables, for this reason persons of not very fine insight, deeming the syllables themselves to be the word, use conventionally these very [sounds of] syllables, which have taken certain forms, with certain intended-objects, as he says «of this.» This word, although by nature (ajñanatas) a unity, is separated on the basis of the knowledge of the conventional-usage [of this word] to suit the purposes of persons whose insight is not very fine, as if its essence were separate [sounds of] syllables. He describes this separation of the word into [sounds of] syllables by saying «this or that number.» Of this or that number [that is] neither more nor less. «In some such kind» means a particular continuous sequence. «The seizing in turn and binding together» means under the influence of a single mental-process. [This is] a word expressive of a single intended-object, such as a cow. The objector says, ‘If conventional-usage is such a word expressive of a single intended-object only, then, Sir, there would be an erroneous identification of word and intended-object.’ In reply to this he says «But conventional-usage.» «Essentially . . . memory» is that which in itself is memory. For conventional-usage, merely because you can say that it prevails (kṛta), is not sufficient to define the intended-object; but it must also be remembered. What he means to say is this. In a conventional-usage which makes no difference a difference is somehow imagined. [And therefore] the genitive case is used [to denote the distinction between the word and the thing].—When one who knows the

¹ Professor Gaṅgānāth Jhū has found a reference to these same verses in the Nyāyaratnakara, a commentary on the Čolakārttika (Chaukambha Sans. Series, p. 880). Herein we find them referred to as vāyuṇkarāṇiṇī uttam.

Consequently they are not from any Mīmāṃsā work. Possibly they may be found in the unpublished portions of the Vākyapādiya. I have not found them in the printed fascicles.
distinction between these [three] performs constraint upon this [distinction] he becomes the knower of all,—has an [intuitive] knowledge of the cries of all living beings.—Thus having analysed that unit, the word, which is without parts, although the parts are assumed to be in the [sounds of the] syllables, he says, with the intent to analyse the sentence, which has an imaginary division into parts, but which is a unit and has no parts «Furthermore, every word has the power to express a [complete] sentence.» The connexion [of ideas] is this. A word is used to convey information to another. And the other should have precisely that information conveyed to him which the words are intended to convey. And these [words] are also capable of giving that same information which deals with acceptance or [rejection (hāna) or indifference (upokṣa)]. And they do not deal (tadgocara) with the meaning (artha) of the word only, but with the meaning of the sentence. So all words must subserve the meaning of the sentence. And accordingly the meaning of the sentence is that of these [words] also. And it is for this reason that whenever a word is used alone, it is always associated with another word, and the sense follows from that word, but not from the [first] word used alone. Why? Because by itself (tamātrasya) it has no capacity. Thus it is the sentence that in all cases expresses the words; but the words do not. However, as forming parts of this [that is, the sentence], the words also have expressive power with respect to the sense of the sentence, just as with respect to the word the [sounds of the] syllables as constituting it have also expressive power. Thus then just as each single [sound of a] syllable embraces the power to express all intended-objects of words, so also each single word embraces the power to express the meaning of all sentences. This is what is expressed by the words «Furthermore, every word has the power to express a [complete] sentence. Thus when we utter the word 'tree', we imply that it exists.» The meaning is that the word 'tree' in conjunction with the implied word 'is' leads to the meaning of the sentence. Therefore as forming part of the sentence, the word 'tree' produces that meaning (tatra vartate). But if it be asked why the word 'is' is implied, the reply is «No intended-object can lack existence.» For the means for defining the meanings of words is popular-usage¹ (loka). And this popular-usage combines the meaning of the word as it is alone with the meaning 'is', and in all such cases makes the meaning of a sentence. This same [popular-usage] is the meaning of a word which cannot lack existence. Hence those ² who know the functions of words have [this] agreement-of-usage (nyavahāra), "Wherever there is no other verb, 'is' in the sense of being should be used."
—Having stated that a nominal-base ³ never lacks its action [expressed by a verb], he shows that any particular verb is never without a relation by saying «And so

¹ Compare Patañjali Mahābhāṣya i. 2. 1, vārt. 2 (Kielhorn's ed., vol. i, p. 217).
² See also for comparison Patañjali Mahā-

bhāṣya on v. 2. 94.
³ Discussed in Patañjali Mahābhāṣya on i. 2. 45.
The unity of the word

when we utter.» For when we utter the word ‘cook-s’, all relations which are suitable for association with it are implied. For this reason there is an express statement of the special relations of this [verb], and the purpose [of this statement] is to exclude other [relations]. Thus the meaning of the sentence consists in nothing but the specializing [of the relations]. Similarly although out of all relations, a word is found to stand for the meaning of the sentence; and the sentence is still more potential in the words. So he says «We observe.» But this does not mean that words like Reader, which are complete in themselves, can present a meaning so long as they are not combined with words like ‘is’. So even in the case of this word [Reader, as complete in itself], the meaning is to be assumed only in so far as it forms part of a sentence. This is the point. [An objector] says, ‘This may be true. But if the words by themselves have the expressive power of the sentence, then there is no further need of the sentence, since its meaning can be ascertained from them.’ In reply to this he says «[And conversely] in this sentence.» It has been said already that if there be a desire on the part of the speaker to convey information, the meaning of [his] words is not understood from the words alone, so long as these words are not brought into combination with other words. So then supposing the words to be separated from the sentence, a part of it, the relation or the verb, is to be explained by analysing [and] enumerating these [words], by allotting the shares to this word, the bases (pratyaya) and so on. ‘But why is so much trouble taken to go through this account [of the analysis of words]?’ In reply to this he says «Without such [an analysis].» Because of the similarity of noun and verb in such cases¹ as, ‘A water-jar is (bhavati) there’ and ‘O Lady (bhavati), give an alms’ and ‘While Your Honour (bhavati) is standing’; or similarly in such cases as ‘Thou didst go’ (acvas)’ and ‘The horse (acvas) walks’; or similarly in such cases as ‘Goat’s milk (ajupaayas) drink thou’ and ‘Thou didst conquer (ajapayas) the foes,’—because there is a likeness [in the form] of the verb and of the noun, it is ambiguous whether the words might be analysed as nouns or as verbs. And when there is no such accounting [for the form of the word, and because] when withdrawn [from the sentence] it cannot be known [whether it is a noun or a verb], how can it be analysed as a noun or as a verb?⁴ Therefore the words should be withdrawn from the sentence and analysed. But by a mere accounting [for the form of the word] there is not strictly speaking a distinction of the words [from the intended-objects and the presented-ideas]. Having thus treated the [different] kinds of words etymologically, he has the intention of telling that [in reality] there is no confusion between words and intended-objects and

¹ It would appear that Vācaspatimiśra is referring to Čloka-vārttika iv. 191.
² Or possibly, ‘Something is standing upon Your Honour (bhavati).’
³ Or ‘swell’, from root āpi or āvā.
⁴ This whole subject is discussed with much greater elaboration in another work by Vācaspatimiśra called Tattvabindu (Benares, reprinted from the Pandit, 1888). This particular passage occurs on p. 15 of that text.
presented-ideas which had got into confusion as a result of conventional-usage [which erroneously identifies one with the other], and proceeds to say «There is a distinction between these words and intended-objects and presented-ideas.» «To illustrate this [distinction]. ‘The palace whitens’; here [the word] means the action [of a verb].» For here it is quite clear that this action ‘grows white’, which is of a kind yet to be completed and which takes place by a succession [of acts], is different from the action ‘white’, which is of the completed kind. And even in those cases where both the word and the intended-object are of a completed kind, there also the word is different from the intended-object, as he says «‘The white palace’; here a relation is meant.» Here there is no case-ending expressing relation because this is expressed [by the nominative case according to Panini ii. 3. 1].—He makes the distinction between the intended-object [and the word] by saying, «in essence both an action [denoted by a verb] and a relation . . . the intended-object of which.» The meaning is that the intended-object of both these words is in essence an action [denoted by a verb] and it is in essence a relation.—He makes the distinction between the presented-idea [and the word] by saying «and the presented-idea.» The word «and» shows that the words «the intended-object of which is this [the action and relation]» are to be supplied. The word «this» is to be understood (samihdyate) as in subordination to another word [in a possessive compound]. It is so-described as being that of which the intended-object is in essence an action [denoted by a verb] and a relation because they are understood as alike. An objector asks ‘Since words and intended-objects and presented-ideas are confused, how can there be any distinction between them?’ With this in mind he asks «But why is this so?» He gives the answer by saying «Because this [process] is identified with that, [its result, the quality white].» The presented-idea which identifies them is limited by conventional-usage [which erroneously identifies them with each other]. But this presented-idea has no basis in fact. The word conventional-usage is in the locative case. This shows that conventional-usage is the cause [of the presented-idea which fails to distinguish the act of whitening and the quality white]. He states what the real fact is in the words «But the white intended-object is that which.» Intensity such as newness or oldness. «Correspond» [that is] be confused. Thus by the yogin’s constraint upon the distinctions [he knows] the cries of all living beings, tame and wild animals, creeping things, birds and the rest, even the unphenomenalized speech among them and the intended-objects [denoted by these cries] and the presented-ideas of them. So in this case constraint performed upon the presented-ideas of the things-expressed by the utterances of human beings is performed upon these [objects and words] also, since they are compare. Thus

1 Vācaspatimīśra seems to have read șabdaḥ in his text of the Comment. And this reading is also in the excellent MS. belonging to Gaṅgādhara Shāstrī.

2 Compare the phrase ṛeto  udp in Tattva Bindu, p. 1612.
18. As a result of direct-perception of subliminal impressions there is [intuitive] knowledge of previous births.

Those subliminal-impressions are of course of two kinds. 1. The causes of memory and of the hindrances in the form of subconscious impressions; 2. the causes of fruition in the form of right-living and wrong-living. These subliminal-impressions formed in previous births are, like mutation and movement and restriction and power and vitality and right-living, unperceived external-aspects of mind-stuff[iii. 15]. Constraint upon these is sufficient for direct-perception of subliminal-impressions. Moreover there is no direct experience of these, unless there be experience of place and time and cause. It is thus, therefore, as a result of [intuitive] knowledge of subliminal-impressions that the knowledge of previous births arises [in the mind] of the yogin. Precisely as in other cases there is also, as a result of the direct-perception of subliminal-impressions, a consciousness (saṁvedana) of the births of others. On this point this tale is handed down. "To the Exalted Jāigīśavya, who as a result of direct-perception of subliminal-impressions beheld the sequence of his birth-mutations in ten great creative-periods, the knowledge born of discrimination became visible. Then to him spake the Exalted Āvatya who had assumed a [coarse] body [for the purposes of this speech]. "In ten great creative-periods, forasmuch as the sattva of [thy] thinking-substance is unsuppressed [by rajas and tamas] in consequence of spotlessness, thou beholdest the pain caused by birth in hells and in the bodies of brutes; coming into existence over and over again among gods and human beings, which hast thou apperceived to be more, pleasure or pain?" Jāigīśavya¹ spake to the Exalted Āvatya. "In ten great creative-periods, forasmuch as the sattva of [my] thinking-substance is unsuppressed [by rajas and tamas] in consequence of spotlessness, I behold the

¹ See also ii. 55, p. 192, and Ācārya's Buddhacarita xii. Compare Garbe: Mondschein d. Sankhya-Wahrheit, p. 35; and Garbe: Aniruddha, p. vii.
pain caused by birth in hells and in the bodies of brutes; coming into existence over and over again among gods and human beings this I trow. Whatever [pleasure] I have passed through, all\(^1\) this is nothing but pain. The Exalted Åvataṭya spake thus: 'Are Your Worship's mastery\(^2\) over the primary-cause and the pleasure of bliss inefflable,—are these also to be counted as pain?' The Exalted Jáigíśavya spake: 'This can be called the pleasure of bliss inefflable only in comparison\(^3\) with pleasure from objects of sense; but it is nothing but pain in comparison with Isolation. Because this [bliss inefflable] is an external-aspect of the sattva of the thinking-substance and [so] has the three aspects (guna), and because a presented-idea of anything having the three aspects is counted as something to be thrown aside, the thread of desire [in the bliss inefflable] is of the nature of pain. But by the removal of the anguish of the pain of desire, this pleasure [of bliss inefflable] is undisturbed-calm,\(^4\) uninhibited, favourable in the eyes of all.'

18. As a result of direct-perception of subliminal-impressions there is [intuitive] knowledge of previous births.

For the subliminal-impressions which are produced by knowledge are the causes of memory, whereas the subliminal-impressions produced by undifferentiated-consciousness are the causes of the hindrances which begin with undifferentiated-consciousness. As to the causes of fruition. Fruition is \([ii. 15]\) birth and length-of-life and kind-of-enjoyment. The causes of it are the kinds of right-living and wrong-living. The subliminal-impressions put together in previous births are completed by their own peculiar causes. Just as a curvey (vajjana) is put together (samāskṛta) [by combining many undistinguished things] so it follows that it has been made. Mutation and movement and restriction and power and vitality are external-aspects of the mind-stuff. Likewise, the unperceived [subliminal-impressions] are external-aspects of the mind-stuff. Constraint upon these together with their attachments [of place and time and cause], whether they are something heard or inferred, is adequate to bring to pass direct perception of both kinds of subliminal impressions. And if it be asked how there can be direct perception of previous births, even if it be possible to have direct perception of these [subliminal-impressions in place, time and cause] through constraint, he replies (Moreover there is no . . . of place.) «Cause» is the previous body, the organs and the rest. Direct-perception of subliminal-impressions, with their adjuncts,\(^5\)

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\(^1\) See iv. 29, p. 318\(^5\) (Calc. ed.).
\(^2\) Bālarāma mentions as instances of attachments, mother and father or birth or country or city or time.