INTRODUCTION

1. Authorship of the Yoga-sūtras.—Identity of Patañjali, author of the sūtras, and of Patañjali, author of the Mahābhāṣya, not yet proved. The opinion in India and in the West that the author of the Yoga-sūtras is also the author of the great grammatical comment upon Pāṇini has not been traced definitely any farther back than to the tenth century. The Yoga-bhāṣya (about A.D. 650 to 850) makes no statement as to the authorship of the Yoga-sūtras, unless the benedictory verse at the beginning be regarded as valid proof that Patañjali wrote the sūtras. Still less is there any statement in the Yoga-sūtras about the author of the Mahābhāṣya. And conversely there is no reference in the Mahābhāṣya to the author of the Yoga-sūtras. On the other hand, there is ground for believing that the author of the Comment on Yoga-sūtra iii. 44 may have had the author of the Mahābhāṣya in mind when he quotes a certain formula and ascribes it to Patañjali. This is the only mention of Patañjali in the whole Comment. The formula is Ayustidāha ānuyava-bhedā ānu-gataḥ samūho dravyam; and although it is ascribed to Patañjali (iti Patañjaliḥ), it has not been found in the Mahābhāṣya. Nevertheless the Yoga-bhāṣya does here seem to contain an allusion, more or less direct, to the theory of the unity of the parts of concrete substances as set forth in the Mahābhāṣya. But the allusion is not direct enough to serve by itself as basis for the assertion that the Yoga-bhāṣya assumes the identity of the two Patañjalis. In other words, it does not justify us in assigning to the tradition of their identity a date as ancient as that of the Yoga-bhāṣya (eighth century). The allusion is, however, significant enough not to be lost out of mind, pending the search for other items of cumulative evidence looking in the same direction.

2. Tradition of identity of two Patañjalis not earlier than tenth century.—So far as I know, the oldest text implying that the Patañjali who wrote the sūtras is the same as the Patañjali who wrote the Mahābhāṣya, is stanza 5 of the introduction to Bhojadeva’s comment on the Yoga-sūtras, his Rājamārtanda. This I would render as follows:

Victory be to the luminous words of that illustrious sovereign, [Bhoja] Raṇa-raṇgamalla, who by creating his Grammar, by writing his comment on the Patañjalak [treatise, the Yoga-sūtras], and by producing [a work] on medicine called Rājamṛgāṇka, has—like Patañjali—removed defilement from our speech and minds and bodies.
Introduction

Bhoja’s Grammar, his comment called Rājamārtanda, and his medical treatise are all extant. The stanza must mean that Patañjali and Bhoja both maintained a standard of correct speech, Patañjali by his Mahābhāṣya and Bhoja by his Grammar; and that both made our minds clear of error, Patañjali by his Yoga-sūtras and Bhoja by his comment upon them; and that both made our bodies clear of impurities, Patañjali by his medical treatise and Bhoja by his Rājamṛgāṅka.

This certainly implies that the writer of this stanza identified Patañjali of the Yoga-sūtras with Patañjali of the Mahābhāṣya. If the writer of the stanza of the introduction is the same as the Bhojadeva who wrote the Rājamārtanda, we may note that he is called Raṇaraṇgamalla here, Mahāraṇjādhirāja in the colophon in Mitra’s edition, and Lord of Dhārā or Dvāreçvara in the colophon in the edition of Āgāçe. There were a number of Bhojadevas; but whichever of them the author of the Rājamārtanda may be, no one of them is earlier than the tenth century of our era.

The tradition of the triple activity of Patañjali as a writer on Yoga and grammar and medicine is reinforced as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Yogena cittasya, padena vacōm} \\
\text{mālam, carīrasya tu vāidyakena} \\
\text{yo' pākaret, tam pravaram muninām} \\
\text{Patañjalam prāṇjalir ānato 'smi.}
\end{align*}
\]

This is cited in Čivārāma’s commentary on the Vāsavadattā (ed. Bibl. Ind., p. 239), which Aufrecht assigns to the eighteenth century. The stanza occurs also in some MSS. just before the opening words of the Mahābhāṣya (Kielhorn’s ed., vol. I, p. 503)—that is, not under circumstances giving any clue to its date. We may add that an eighteenth-century work, the Patañjalicarita (v. 25, ed. of Kāvyamālā, vol. 51), vouches for Patañjali’s authorship in the fields of Yoga and medicine in the following gītī stanza:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Śūtrāṇi yogaçaṭestre} \\
\text{vāidyakaṣṭre ca vārtikāni tataḥ} \\
\text{kṛtvā Patañjalimuniḥ} \\
\text{procārayām āsa jagad idam trātum.}
\end{align*}
\]

As to the precise medical work of which Patañjali was the author or with which he had to do, all three stanzas leave us uninformed. Not so the following stanza from the introduction to the commentary on Caraka, composed by Cakrapāṇi, who (according to Jolly’s book on Medicine in Bühler’s Grundriss, p. 25) wrote about 1060:

\[
\begin{align*}
Patañjala-Mahābhāṣya-Carakapratisamskṛtāih \\
\text{muno-vāk-kāyadosānaṁ hantre 'hipataye namah.}
\end{align*}
\]
Introduction

This agrees in sense with the other stanzas, and in addition informs us that Patañjali's medical work consisted in a revision (pratisamśkrita) of the great compendium of Caraka. Accordingly, the Bhoja-stanza appears to be the oldest external evidence thus far at hand for the tradition as to the identity of the two Patañjalis, and this tradition is not older than the tenth century, a thousand years and more after Patañjali the author of the Mahābhāṣya.

3. The identification of the two Patañjalis not confirmed by a comparison of philosophical concepts.—Inconsistent use of terminology and conflicting definitions of concepts in the case of a single writer of two books are frequently explained by the fact that quite distinct subjects are discussed in the different works. In other cases the subject under discussion is the same and such an explanation of the inconsistency does not hold. An instance of the latter is the discussion of the nature of substance (dravya) in the Yoga-system and in the Mahābhāṣya. In the commentary on Yoga-sūtra iii. 44 we have the following definition, "A substance is a collection of which the different component parts do not exist separately (āyuṣṭasisddha āvyaya-bhedā āvyagutāḥ samāśaḥ dravyaṁ iti Patañjaliḥ)," and the definition is attributed to Patañjali as being consistent with his sūtras. This quotation is of the most technical kind and is in the same style as the Nyāya-sūtras. A similar use of language, for instance, is found in Nyāya-sūtra ii. 1. 32 (Vizianagaram edition, p. 798). On the other hand this phrase is not to be found in the Mahābhāṣya, which however does repeatedly analyse the concept of substance. And, what is more important, nothing so precise as the formula attributed (iii. 44) to Patañjali is found in the Yoga-sūtras themselves. Yet substance is partially defined in Yoga-sūtra iii. 14, "A substance (dharmin) conforms itself to quiescent and uprisen and indeterminable external-aspects (dharma)." In this terminology dharmin and dharma of the Yoga-sūtra are substitutions for dravya and guṇa of the Mahābhāṣya. In neither case is the description of substance discriminating. Yet such as it is, the difference is very slight. In the Mahābhāṣya it is substance, we are told, which makes the difference in weight between iron and cotton of the same bulk and dimension (Mahābhāṣya, Kielhorn's edition, vol. II, p. 36619); and it is that which causes the difference between penetrability and impenetrability. Or again it is that which does not cease to be, even when a succession of properties appears within it (vol. II, p. 36623). Of what kind then is this form of being (tattva)? The answer is that when the various reds and other properties of a myrobalan fruit, for instance, successively appear within it, we have the right to call it a substance. In short a substance is a concretion of properties (guṇa-samudravo dravyum
Introduction

iti, Kielhorn, vol. II, p. 366\(^{26}\)); or, as it is put elsewhere, it is a collection of properties (gra\-samud\(\text{\={a}}\)-ya) such that the various states (bh\(\text{\={a}}\)-va) depend upon it (II. 200\(^{14}\)). This collection is loosely paraphrased as being a group (sa\(\text{\={m}}\)-gh\(\text{\={a}}\)) or mass (sa\(\text{\={m}}\)-\(\text{\={u}}\)-ha, II. 356\(^{6}\)).

In order, however, to make the comparison of the dhar\(\text{\={m}}\)-in of the Yoga-s\(\text{\={u}}\)-tras with the dr\(\text{\={a}}\)-ya of the Mah\(\text{\={a}}\)-bh\(\text{\={a}}\)-\(\text{\={y}}\)-a, we must assume that the interpretation of the Yoga-s\(\text{\={u}}\)-tras, as given in the Comment, correctly represents the concept in the mind of the author of the s\(\text{\={u}}\)-tras. There might well have been a series of redactions of the works of Pata\(\text{\={n}}\)-jali, as of those of Caraka. The later interpretation, such as the formula in the Comment on iii. 44, might give us the original thought in more technical form. If this be so, we find a great similarity in the discussion of the relation of whole and parts in the two works. In the Comment on the Yoga-s\(\text{\={u}}\)-tra iii. 44 a collection (sa\(\text{\={m}}\)-\(\text{\={u}}\)-ha) is of two kinds: 1. that in which the parts have lost their distinctness, for example, ‘a tree’, ‘a herd’, ‘a grove’; 2. that in which the parts are distinctly described, for example, ‘gods and human beings.’ The second class has two subdivisions: 2\(^{a}\). one in which the distinctness of parts is emphasized, for example, ‘a grove of mangoes’; 2\(^{b}\). one in which the distinctness is not emphasized, for example, ‘a mango-grove.’ From another point of view a group is two-fold: 1. a group whereof the parts can exist separately, for example, ‘a grove’, wherein the trees exist separately from the aggregate whole; 2. a group whereof the parts cannot exist separately, for example, ‘a tree’ or ‘an atom’. The question now arises, To which of these kinds of groups does a substance belong? A substance (dr\(\text{\={a}}\)-ya) is an aggregate of generic and particular qualities (s\(\text{\={a}}\)-m\(\text{\={a}}\)-ya-v\(i\)-\(\text{\={c}}\)-\(\text{\={s}}\)-ya-samud\(\text{\={a}}\)-ya). This is the definition of substance from the point of view of its relation to its qualities. Furthermore, the substance is a group of the second subdivision of the second kind; it is ‘a collection of which the different parts do not exist separately’. This then is the resultant definition of substance according to the traditional interpretation of the S\(\text{\={u}}\)-tras.

What now is the relation of whole and parts in the Mah\(\text{\={a}}\)-bh\(\text{\={a}}\)-\(\text{\={y}}\)-a, with especial reference to the substance and its qualities? A collection (sam\(\text{\={u}}\)-d\(\text{\={a}}\)-ya) is loosely paraphrased as being a group (sa\(\text{\={m}}\)-\(\text{\={g}}\)-\(\text{\={h}}\)-\(\text{\={a}}\)) or mass (sa\(\text{\={m}}\)-\(\text{\={u}}\)-\(\text{\={h}}\)-ha, Kielhorn, vol. II, p. 356\(^{6}\)). It is, etymologically at least, a concretion of properties (gra\-\(\text{\={v}}\)-sam\(\text{\={i}}\)-dr\(\text{\={a}}\)-va II. 366\(^{26}\)). It is a collection of parts; the characteristics of the parts determine the characteristics of the whole (III. 3\(^{14}\); aya\(\text{\={v}}\)-\(\text{\={w}}\)-\(\text{\={i}}\)-\(\text{\={a}}\)\(\text{\={r}}\)\(\text{\={h}}\)-\(\text{\={d}}\)-\(\text{\={b}}\)-\(\text{\={h}}\)-\(\text{\={b}}\)-\(\text{\={h}}\)\(\text{\={i}}\)-\(\text{\={l}}\); sam\(\text{\={u}}\)-\(\text{\={d}}\)-\(\text{\={a}}\)-\(\text{\={y}}\)-\(\text{\={a}}\) ap\(\text{\={y}}\)\(\text{\={h}}\)-\(\text{\={a}}\)\(\text{\={v}}\)-\(\text{\={a}}\)\(\text{\={t}}\)\(\text{\={o}}\) bh\(\text{\={a}}\)-\(\text{\={v}}\)-\(\text{\={a}}\) I. 217\(^{16}\); I. 30\(^{26-27}\); aya\(\text{\={y}}\)-\(\text{\={a}}\)\(\text{\={r}}\)-\(\text{\={t}}\)-\(\text{\={m}}\) li\(\text{\={i}}\)-\(\text{\={g}}\)-\(\text{\={m}}\) sam\(\text{\={u}}\)-\(\text{\={d}}\)-\(\text{\={a}}\)-\(\text{\={y}}\)-\(\text{\={a}}\) \(\text{\={v}}\)-\(\text{\={c}}\)-\(\={\text{\={s}}\)-\(\text{\={k}}\)-\(\text{\={a}}\)-\(\text{\={m}}\) bh\(\text{\={a}}\)-\(\text{\={v}}\)-\(\text{\={a}}\) I. 289\(^{3}\); and I. 377\(^{11}\)). All these cases would belong to the first subdivision of the second kind of group, whereof the parts can exist separately.
Introduction

Yet a collection (samudāya) is not merely an assemblage of parts, but is a unity performing functions which the parts by themselves cannot perform, for example, the blanket, the rope, the chariot, as compared with the threads, the fibres, the chariot-parts, I. 220\textsuperscript{16–23}. All these cases would belong to the second subdivision of the second kind of group, wherein the parts cannot exist separately (ayutasiddhāvayava). Such then are the different groups (samudāya).

With regard to the substance (dravya), its relation to its qualities (guna) is analogous to the relation of the parts to the group, I. 220, vārt. 11.

Just as a collection (samudāya) is characterized by its parts (avayavatmaka) III. 3\textsuperscript{14}, so the substance (dravya) is characterized by its qualities (gunaatmaka) or is a collection of qualities (guna samudāya) II. 200\textsuperscript{13}. This last formula is given tentatively as a not quite final conclusion; yet the definition is not rejected. And elsewhere, I. 411\textsuperscript{15}, II. 356\textsuperscript{17}, II. 413\textsuperscript{13}, and especially II. 366\textsuperscript{14–26}, it is accepted as a working definition. Some qualities like sound, touch, colour, and taste belong to all substances; they at least are present I. 246\textsuperscript{ff}, II. 198\textsuperscript{ff}. Nothing, however, is said about a generic-form being required to constitute a substance (dravya). At the most it is true that when one asserts the reality of a species (ākṛiti) one does not deny the reality of the substance (dravya); and conversely. For each person who makes the assertion, the reality of both is asserted. Either the species or the substance may be dominant in anything, and the other subordinate. It is only a matter of the relative emphasis in the use of words. But the word substance is used for mass of particular qualities; it is not a concretion of species and qualities, but is contrasted with species. Accordingly even if we admit that the formula ascribed to Patañjali in the Comment on iii. 13 is the correct rendering of the thought in the mind of Patañjali, the author of the Yoga-sūtra, it is not true that Patañjali, the author of the Mahābhāṣya, when speaking of a substance (dravya) means what is contained in this formula. And there is nothing here to indicate that the tradition which identifies the two Patañjalis must be correct.

4. Date of the Yoga-sūtras between A.D. 300 and A.D. 500.—If Patañjali, the author of the Mahābhāṣya, is not the author of the Yoga-sūtras, when were they written? The polemic in the Yoga-sūtras themselves against the nirālambana school of Buddhists gives the answer. Very probably in the two Yoga-sūtras iii. 14 and 15 and certainly in iv. 14 to 21 this school is attacked. The idealism of the Vijñāna-vāda is attacked in iv. 15, 16, and 17. We cannot, it is true, maintain that the Vijñāna-vāda here attacked by the Sūtra must be the idealism of Vasubandhu. But the
probability that the idealism is Vasubandhu’s is great. And the earlier limit would then be the fourth century. There surely were idealists before him, just as there were pre-Patañjala philosophers of yoga. Yet we have the great authority of Vācaspatimiśra to support the obvious probability that the school of Vijñānavādins is here combated by Patañjali. He accepts the interpretation of the Comment which introduces a Vijñānavādinaṁ Vāinācikam (p. 292\textsuperscript{17}, Calc. ed.) as being intended by the author of the Sūtra. It is true that the Sūtra itself obviously does not make explicit references to this or any other school. Still the fact remains that the Sūtra is attacking some idealist; that the Comment explicitly states the idealist’s position; and that Vācaspatimiśra identifies the idealist as being a Vijñānavādin. Elsewhere Vācaspatimiśra contrasts this school with other Buddhist schools. And the possibility that he is referring to some Vijñāna-vādu other than Vasubandhu’s is remote. If this be so, it becomes clearer why Nāgārjuna (a little before A.D. 200), the great expounder of the Čūṇya-vāda, does not, so far as we have discovered in the portion of the Mūlamadhyamika-kārikās thus far published (fasc. I–V), mention Patañjali. Yet from the Chinese translations of Nāgārjuna it is clear that he was familiar with the philosophical yoga. For example in the Chinese translation,\textsuperscript{1} made in A.D. 472, of Nāgārjuna’s Upāyakāčalāyāhṛdaya-śāstra (Nanjio, No. 1257), eight schools of philosophers and logicians are enumerated: 1. Fire-worshippers, 2. Mimāṁsakas, 3. Vaiśeṣikas, 4. Sāṁkhya, 5. Yoga, 6. Nirgranthas, 7. Monists, 8. Pluralists. There was then a philosophical school of Yoga about A.D. 200.\textsuperscript{2} Patañjali was not unknown to Buddhist writers. But there is nothing to indicate that Nāgārjuna is referring to Patañjali, the philosopher, who would then have preceded both nirālambana schools. More probably, we may suppose, he refers to some one of the authorities on Yoga, such as Jāgīśavya or Pañcačikha who are quoted in the Yoga-bhāṣya.

With regard to the later limit, a reference, if historically sound, would make it certain that Patañjali lived before A.D. 400. In the Mahāvaṁśa, chap. 37, vs. 167 (Turnour, p. 250; compare Dines Andersen, Pāli Reader, I, p. 113, st. 3), we have the words

\begin{quote}
Vihāram ekam āgamma rattīṁ Patañjali-mataṁ parivutteti.
\end{quote}

The verse refers to Buddhaghosa, who lived in the first half of the fifth

\textsuperscript{1} I am indebted to the Rev. Kentoku Hori of Tokyo for this reference.

\textsuperscript{2} Professor Jacobi has proved the existence of a philosophical Yoga system, resting upon logical inferences and not upon intuitive processes, as early as 300 B.C. (SB. der Königl. Preuss. Ak. der Wiss., 13. Juli 1911).
Introduction

century. But unfortunately the Mahāvaśsa proper, the work of Mahānāma, ends, according to the judgement of Professor Geiger, at chapter 37, verse 50, at which point also the tīkā stops. The quotation therefore belongs to the Cūlavaśsa. And if, as Professor Geiger concludes, the work of Mahānāma is to be placed in the first quarter of the sixth century, the verse in question comes later, and probably later to such a degree that its value as evidence is almost nothing. If this be so, one can easily explain how it is that Buddhaghosa in the whole Visuddhimagga and in the Āṭhasālinī makes no allusion to Patañjali.

Much more conclusive is the fact that Umāsvāti in his Tattvārthādhyagama-sūtra ii. 52 refers to Yoga-sūtra iii. 22. There can be little doubt of the reference since Umāsvāti’s Bhāṣya repeats (Bib. Ind. ed. p. 53 and 65) two of the illustrations given in the Yoga-bhāṣya, of the fire set in the dry grass and of the cloth rolled up into a ball. Other references (Tattvārthādhyagama-sūtra xii. 5 and 6 and ix. 44–46) are quite as likely allusions to ancient Jain formulae as to Patañjali. By how much Umāsvāti’s date precedes that of his commentator, Siddhasena, cannot be said until the complete text of Siddhasena is published. The date for Siddhasena is set by Professor Jacobi (ZDMG. 60. 289, Leipzig, 1906, reprint p. 8, Eine Jaina-Doctrin) at the middle or end of the sixth century. Umāsvāti precedes him; and Patañjali the philosopher would not be later than A.D. 500 and might be much earlier.

On the other hand I should guess that he is not much earlier. Because, for one reason, as Professor Stcherbatskoi reports, Dignāga (about A.D. 550 or earlier) seems to know nothing of him. And secondly because it is improbable that the Yoga-bhāṣya was composed very much later.

Other confirmatory evidence, somewhat later but more certain, would be the reference to Yoga-sūtra i. 33 in Māgha’s Cūṇḍālavadaśa iv. 55. Professor Hultzsch has kindly pointed out another reference at xiv. 62 of Māgha’s poem. In respect of the date of Māgha, Professor Jacobi concluded (WZKM. vol. III, p. 121 ff.) that Māgha lived about the middle of the sixth century. But Mr. Gaurishankar Ojha’s discovery of the Vasantagadha inscription dated Vikrama 682 adds new and most convincing evidence. Professor Kielhorn (Göttinger Nachrichten, philol.-histor. Klasse, 1903, Heft 2, p. 146) is of the opinion that Māgha, the grandson of a minister of the King Varma-lāta, must be placed at about the second half of the seventh century.

Still later, Gāṇḍapāda (about A.D. 700), in his comment on the Śāṅkhya-Kārikā 23, quotes Yoga-sūtra ii. 30 and 32 and names Patañjali as the author.

The conclusion would be then that Patañjali’s sūtras were written at some time in the fourth or fifth century of our era.
5. Date of the Yoga-bhāṣya between A.D. 650 and A.D. 850.—Of this the limits are easier to fix. Three pieces of evidence help us to determine the earliest limit.

**A.** The Comment could not in any case be much earlier than A.D. 350. For (at the end of iii. 53 or 52) it quotes Vārṣaganyā in the words

\[
\text{mūrti-vyavadi-jāti-bhedābhāvān nāsti mūlapūthaktvam iti Vārṣaganyā.}
\]

And again (iv. 13) the Comment quotes from छात्रवृजळासानम as follows:

\[
\text{Gūṇānāṁ paramān rūpaṁ na dṛṣṭipatham yechati}
\]
\[
\text{yat tu dṛṣṭipatham prāptaṁ tan māyevu suttucchakam.}
\]

Fortunately Vācaspatimiśra offers us the information that this is an exposition of the teaching of the Shaṭī-tantra. And furthermore, in the Bhāmati on Vedānta-sūtra ii. 1. 2. 3 (Nirṇayasaṅgara edition, 1904, p. 352, line 7 of the Bhāmati), we are told that it is Vārṣaganyā, the founder of the Yoga system, who said these words (ata eva yoga-śāstrāṇi vyutpādayītā āha eva Bhagavān Vārṣaganyāh “gūṇānāṁ paramān...”).

Thus the Comment contains two quotations from Vārṣaganyā. There is little reason to doubt that Vārṣaganyā was an older contemporary of Vasubandhu. Professor Takakusu¹ by a combination of dates centering about the Chinese translation of Paramārtha’s Life of Vasubandhu estimated that Vasubandhu lived from about A.D. 420 till 500. Professor Sylvain Lévi (Asaṅga, vol. II, pp. 1 and 2) accepted the result of these discussions. But Professor Wogihara² had conjectured that the date of Vasubandhu must be set back. An elaborate confirmation of his suggestion is now offered by Monsieur Noël Peri,³ who places the death of Vasubandhu at A.D. 350; and by Mr. B. Shiiwo,⁴ who estimates that Vasubandhu’s life was from A.D. 270 to 350. This is a return to the fourth century, the date for Vasubandhu which Bühler⁵ favoured. Accordingly the Bhāṣya must in any case be later than A.D. 350.

**B.** Another kind of evidence which helps us to determine yet more closely the earliest limit is the fact that the decimal system is used by way of

---

¹ Bulletin de l’École Française d’Extrême-Orient, 1904, tome IV, pp. 48 and 56; and JRAS. Jan. 1905, pp. 16-18 of the reprint.
⁴ “Doctor Takakusu and Monsieur Peri on the date of Vasubandhu” in the Tetsugaku Zasshi, vol. 27, Nov.-Dec., 1912. I am indebted to Mr. K. Yabuki for this.
illustration in the Comment on iii. 13. The oldest epigraphic instance of the use of the decimal system is in the Gaurjara inscription of A.D. 595. With one obscure and doubtful exception, there is no literary evidence of the use of the decimal system before Varāhamihira, who lived in the sixth century. If we consider this kind of evidence alone, it is improbable that the Comment precedes the year A.D. 500; it is probably later.

C. There is evidence which determines that the earliest limit of the Comment is still later, as late as the seventh century. In the stanza iv. 55 of the Chiçupālavadha by Māgha (circa A.D. 650), not only Yogasūtra i. 33 is referred to, but also the words of the avatāraṇa in the Comment. In the Comment the parikarma of the citta is enjoined. This is an uncommon term. Even if citta-parikamma might be found in Buddhist books, the fact that it here immediately precedes the quotation from sūtra i. 33, makes it almost certain that such a mixture of terminology is impossible. In fact the stanza is full of specific yoga-terms in each line to such an extent that reference to any other system, much less to some heretical book, is quite excluded. The point is then that the words citta-parikarma together with the first word of the sūtra have been wrought into the metre of the poem as one word. The poet, as we saw, probably lived in the second half of the seventh century. If this is trustworthy evidence, the Comment cannot be earlier than A.D. 650.

D. The later limit is set by the date of Vācaspatimiśra's Nyāya Index, A.D. 841—see below, page xxiii. Accordingly the date of the Bhāṣya would be somewhere between about A.D. 650 and about A.D. 850.

6. Date of Vācaspatimiśra's Tattva-vaiśāradī about A.D. 850.—In the verse at the close of his Bhāumati-nibandha, Vācaspatimiśra gives the names of his works, seven in number:

Yan Nyāya-kāññikā-Tattvasamīkṣā-Tattvabindubhiḥ
Yan Nyāya-Sāṁkhya-Yogānāṁ, Vedāntānāṁ nibandhanāṁ
Smacāsaṁ mahat puruṣaṁ, tat phalaṁ puṣkulam mayāṁ
Samarpitaḥ; athātēna priyatāṁ Parameśvarāṁ.

The Nyāya-vārttika-tātparya-ṭikā is on the Nyāya system; the Tattva-

1 See p. 78, of Bühler's Palæographie, in his Grundriss. In his Notes on Indian Mathematics (Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, July 1907, vol. III, number 7, p. 482, note 5), Mr. G. R. Kaye gives a list of epigraphical instances of the notation in which "place-value" is utilized. Most of these he thinks are worthless as evidence for the introduction of the decimal system. The same conclusion is reached in a later article (JRAS. July 1910, p. 749).
Introduction

kāumudī is on the Sāṁkhya system; the Tattva-vāiḍūrya is on the Yoga; the Nyāya-kanikā, a gloss on the Vidhi-viveka, is on the Mimāṃsā; the Tattva-bindu is on Bhaṭṭa’s exposition of the Mimāṃsā; the Tattva-samīkṣā and the Bhāmati are both on the Vedānta.

In the same verse at the end of the Bhāmati he speaks of himself as living under King Nṛga:

tasmin multē mahaniyakirtāv Cṛīman-Nṛge ‘kāri mayā nibandhaḥ.

Unfortunately there is (as Professor Lüders informs me) no epigraphical record of this king and we cannot say when or where he lived. Vācaspatimīcra was a native of Mithilā, the northern part of Tirhūt, and the latter part of his name would indicate, as Fitz-Edward Hall has pointed out, that he was a native of Gangetic Hindustan.

In the introduction to his edition of the Kusumāṇjali (Calcutta, 1864, p. x), Professor Cowell thinks that Vācaspatimīcra lived in the tenth century. Barth (Bull. des Rel. de l’Inde, 1893, p. 271) would set him at the end of the eleventh or beginning of the twelfth century. Professor Macdonell (Hist. of Sansk. Lit., p. 398) places him soon after A.D. 1100.

These judgements rest, more or less, upon the opinion that the Rāja-vārttika, quoted by Vācaspatimīcra in his Sāṁkhya-tattva-kāumudī on Kārikā 72, was composed by, or for, Bhoja Rāja, called Raṇaraṅga Malla, King of Dharā (1018–1060). This opinion accords with the assertion of Pandit Kaśinātha Čāṣṭri Aṣṭaputra of Benares College, who assured Dr. Fitz-Edward Hall that a manuscript of the Rāja-vārttika had been in his possession several years (Hall’s edition of the Sāṁkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya, 1856, p. 33). But the visible basis for this assertion that the Rāja in question is Bhoja is not now at hand.

Similarly, Professor Pathak in his article on Dharmakīrti and Shankarācārya (see Journal of the Bombay Branch RAS., vol. XXVIII, no. 48, 1891, p. 89, and also the table in the same Journal, p. 235, no. 49, note 74) is content to rest his conclusions as to the date of Vācaspatimīcra upon the fact that Čṇibhārata, the pupil of Bodhāranyya, in his edition of the Sāṁkhya-tattva-kāumudī (Benares, Jānaprabhākara Press, 1889, p. 182), prints, in a note at the end, the word Bhoja before the word Rāja-vārttika. Thus it would appear that this vārttika is by Bhojarāja and that Vācaspatimīcra, who quotes it, must be later than Bhojarāja, that is, later than the tenth century. But we are not at all sure from other manuscript evidence that the word Bhoja should be read before the word Rāja-vārttika, and the date of this Rāja-vārttika is therefore undetermined.

1 See the beginning of the Nyāyasutroddhāraḥ by Vācaspatimīcra Cṛīnīcaspātimīcraṇa Mithil-prarasūriṇā (Harā-
Introduction

By way of contrast we now have the direct statement of Vācaspatimiśra that he finished his Nyāyasūcinibandha in the year 898. For on the first page of this appendix to the Nyāya-vārttikā, as given in the edition of the Nyāya-vārttikā in the Bibliotheca Indica, 1907, he says that he is about to compose an index for the Nyāya-sūtras

 cita\v{c}aspatimi\v{s}re\v{n}a may\v{a} s\u{a}\c{c}\u{i} vidh\u{a}\b{\b}asyate.

And in the colophon he says that he made the work for the delight of the intelligent in the year 898.

Nyāyasūcinibandha 'sāv akāri sudhiyān mude
\v{c}ita\v{c}aspatimi\v{s}re\v{n}a vasu-a\n\k{\u{n}}ka-vasu-vatsara.

It remains to determine whether this year belongs to the era of Vikramāditya or of Čālivāhana. In the introduction to his edition of Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts (Bibl. Ind., 1910), Mahāmahopādhyāya Haraprasād Śāstrī gives the date as belonging to the second era, to Čaka 988. He says (p. iii) that the author of the Apohasiddhi “takes a good deal of pains in elaborately refuting the theory of Vācaspatimiśra”, and that he does “not quote or refute Udayana, whose date is Čaka 905 = A.D. 983”. In his Notices of Sanskrit Manuscripts, second series, vol. II, p. xix, this distinguished scholar had come to the same conclusion with regard to the era to which this date of Vācaspatimiśra should be assigned. This conclusion seemed doubtful to Mr. Nilmani Chakravarti, M.A., in his valuable Chronology of Indian Authors, a supplement to Miss Duff’s Chronology of India (Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, vol. 3, 1907, p. 205). And one cannot refrain from thinking that the other era is presumably more likely for a Northern writer; and that more especially a great difficulty is created if only seven years are supposed to separate Vācaspatimiśra and Udayana. The difference between the two philosophers is of such a kind that one must assume a much longer interval between their writings. And furthermore, would it not be an extraordinary coincidence that the author of the Apohasiddhi should be so minutely familiar with the work of Vācaspatimiśra, and yet not have the dimmest sense of the existence of Udayana, the light of a new dawn in the world of Nyāya? Accordingly, the date of Vācaspati’s Nyāya-index would appear to be Sanīvat 898 = A.D. 841; and the dates of his six other works, including the Tattva-vāiçāradi, may be presumed to be not many years earlier or later. We are therefore safe in making the statement that the date of the Tattva-vāiçāradi is not far from the middle of the ninth century, or approximately A.D. 850.