BOOK SECOND

MEANS OF ATTAINMENT
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It has been stated what the yoga is of one whose mind is concentrated. [This sūtra] gives the start to the problem [which considers] how even one whose mind-stuff is emergent may be concentrated (yukta) in concentration (yoga).

1. Self-castigation and study and devotion to the Iśvara are the Yoga of action.

Yoga is not perfected in him who is not self-castigated. Impurity—which is variegated with subconscious-impressions (vāsanā), from time without beginning, coming from the hindrances and from karma,—and into which [the meshes of] the net of objects have [therefore] found entrance, is not reduced (saṁbhedam āpadyate) except by «self-castigation.» This is the use¹ of self-castigation. And this [kind of self-castigation], not being inhibitory to the undisturbed calm of the mind-stuff, is therefore deemed [by great sages] to be worthy of his (anena, the yogin's) earnest attention. «Recitation» is the repetition² of purifying formulae such as the Mystic Syllable (prāṇava) or the study of books on Liberation. «Devotion to the Iśvara» is the offering³ up of all actions to the Supreme Teacher or the renunciation of the fruit of [all] these [actions].

If it be objected that the First Book described yoga with its means [and] with its subordinate divisions [and] with its results, and that no reason remains why a Second Book should be begun, he replies in the words «has been stated.» For in the First Book practice and passionlessness were described as means to yoga. And since these two, for one whose [mind-stuff] is emergent, do not instantly come into being, he stands in need of the means taught in the Second Book in order to purify the sattva. For by these he quite purifies the sattva and performs the protective ordinances and daily

¹ Similarly i. 41, p. 85⁶ (Calc. ed.).
² See ii, 44 and compare Liṅga Pur. viii. 39.
³ Contrast this with i. 23 and see also Liṅga Pur. viii. 40.
cultivates practice and passionlessness. The state of being concentrated is the state of being undistracted.—How could even a man whose mind-stuff is emergent be, because concentrated (yukta) by the means which are to be taught, a yogin? This is the meaning. From among those observances which are to be described, having made a selection [of some] as being rather more serviceable to the beginner, the author of the Sūtras first of all teaches [what] the yoga of action [is].

1. Self-castigation and study and devotion to the Iśvara are the Yoga of action. Action which is itself yoga is the yoga of action since it is a means-of-effecting yoga. Therefore, in the Viṣṇu Purāṇa, in the dialogue between Khāṇḍikya and Keṣidhvaja, starting with the passage, ‘At first the yogin who is [just] beginning to apply himself is called a novice (yoga-yuj),’ self-castigation and recitation and the like are set forth. With the words «in him who is not self-castigated» he shows by a negative instance that self-castigation is a means. By the words «from time without beginning» he shows that self-castigation has a subsidiary function which is serviceable as a means [of attaining yoga]. Variegated by reason of the subconsciously-impressions, from time without beginning, coming from hindrances and from karma, [and] therefore that in which [the meshes of] the net of objects have found entrance, that is, inserted themselves, impurity, which is the excess of rajas and tamaś, is not thoroughly reduced without self-castigation. Reduction is the thorough thinning out of that which was closely woven.—The objection is raised: ‘Even if we have recourse to self-castigation, still—in so far as it causes disorders of the humours—it is hostile to yoga; how then is it a means [to attain] this [yoga]?’ In reply to this he says, «And this» [kind].» Self-castigation should be performed only so long as it does not bring on a disorder of the humours. This is the meaning. «Such as the Mystic Syllable» that is, such as, the Hymn to the Puruṣa [RV. x. 90] or the Rudra-mañḍala or a Brāhmaṇa or the like from the Vedas, or the Brahma-pāryāṇa from the Puruṣas.—Iśvara, that is, the Supreme Teacher, the Exalted,—to him. With regard to Whom this hath been said, “Whatever I do, whether auspicious or inauspicious, whether intentionally or unintentionally, all that is committed unto Thee. Moved by Thee I do [it all].”—Renunciation of the fruit of [all] these [actions] is doing the actions without attachment to the fruit [thereof]. And with regard to this it hath been said, “You are concerned with actions only and never with fruits. Do not be one whose motive is the fruit of actions. Nor let your attachment be to inaction.”

1 VP. vi. 7. 33. See also Nrāṇidiya Pur. xlviii.
2 Literally, is serviceable by being a means, upayātā-upapayoginam.
3 As opposed, for instance, to VP. ii. 11.
4 Compare i. 30, p. 67¹ (Calc. ed.).
5 This seems to refer to the Čatarudriya-
homamantras, Taittiriya-saṁhitā iv. 5, Vājasaneyi-saṁhitā x–i, Kāthaka xvii.
6 Refers perhaps to Viṣṇu Purāṇa i. 15.
7 Vījñāna Bhikṣu calls this smṛti.
8 Bhagavad Gītā ii. 47.
Now this yoga of action is—

2. For the cultivation of concentration and for the attenuation of the hindrances.
For when the yoga of action is given earnest attention, it cultivates concentration; attenuates the hindrances to an extreme degree; [and] will make the hindrances, when they are extremely attenuated, disqualified for propagation, like seeds burned by the fire of Elevation (prasamkhya). But the subtile insight, which is the discriminative discernment between the sattva and the Self, untouched by the hindrances because they are so much attenuated, with its task finished, will be ready for inverse-propagation 1 (pratiprasava). In order to mention the purpose of this [yoga of action] he introduces the sutra with the words «For the.»

2. For the cultivation of concentration and for the attenuation of the hindrances. It is objected that if the yoga of action alone is able to attenuate the hindrances, then there is no need of Elevation. To this he replies with the words «the extremely attenuated.» The yoga of action operates only for the extreme attenuation, but not for the sterilization of the hindrances, but Elevation [operates] for the sterilization of those [hindrances]. The words «like burned seeds» indicate that the burned seeds of winter rice [and the hindrances] are of the same kind in so far as both are sterile. The objector says, 'This may be true. But if Elevation alone can disqualify the hindrances from propagation, then there is no need for their attenuation.' In reply to this he says, «of these.» For if the hindrances are not attenuated, the discriminative discernment between the sattva and the Self, submerged (grasta) by mighty foes, is incapable even of uprising, still less of sterilizing them. But when the hindrances are quite thinned out and impotent, [the discernment], although in opposition to them, does, with the aid of passionlessness and of practice, finally arise. And when the discernment which is nothing more than the [sense] of the difference between the sattva and the Self is finally arisen, it is un-touched by them,—that is, not overwhelmed by them,—for just so long as it is not touched [by them]. «The subtile insight» is so-called, because its object is subtile inasmuch as its object is beyond the range of the senses. «Will be ready for inverse-propagation,» that is, for resolution. Why? Because its task is finished. [In other words,] that is said to be of this kind by which, acting as a cause, the task of giving starts to the effects of the aspects (guna) has been finished.

1 Compare ii. 2, p. 107a; ii. 10, p. 120a; ii. 27, p. 167a; iii. 50, p. 285a; iv. 34, p. 319a (Calc. ed.).
2 Deussen's excellent rendering of this word is Verinnerlichung.
Now what are these\(^1\) hindrances and (vā) how many are they?

3. Undifferentiated-consciousness (avidyā) and the feeling-of-personality and passion and aversion and the will-to-live are the five\(^2\) hindrances.

This means that the so-called hindrances are five misconceptions [i. 8]. These when flowing out make the authority (adhikāra) of the aspects (guna) more rigid; make a mutation more stable; swell the stream of effects and causes; and, becoming interdependent upon one another for aid, bring forth the fruition of karma.

He raises a question by saying «Now» and replies [to it] by the sutra upon «Undifferentiated-consciousness.» 3. Undifferentiated-consciousness (avidyā) and the feeling-of-personality and passion and aversion and the will-to-live are the five hindrances. He explains the word «hindrances» by the words «five misconceptions.» Undifferentiated-consciousness, to begin with, is nothing but misconception. The feeling-of-personality and the others also have undifferentiated-consciousness as their material cause, [and] since they cannot exist without it, [they too] are misconceptions. And hence when undifferentiated-consciousness is destroyed, there would follow the destruction of them also. He mentions the reason why they should be destroyed, in that they are the cause of the round-of-rebirths. This he states in the word «These.» When flowing out [that is] moving\(^3\) continuously forth, «make the authority of the aspects more rigid,» that is, more powerful; [and] in consequence «make a mutation [more] stable.» For in successive forms as unphenomenalized [primary matter] and as the Great [thinking-substance] and as the personality-substance, they swell, that is, they intensify, the stream of cause and effect. He shows for what purpose they do all this in the words «one another.» The [three] fruitions of karma, distinguished [ii. 13] as being birth and length of life and kind of experience, have their purpose (artha) in the Self. That [purpose] those hindrances bring to pass, that is, accomplish. Do they accomplish this singly? He says, 'No.' But «upon one another for aid,» that is, the hindrances [aided] by the karmas, and the karmas [aided] by the hindrances.

4. Undifferentiated-consciousness (avidyā) is the field for the others whether they be dormant or attenuated or intercepted or sustained.

Of these [five], undifferentiated-consciousness is the field [or] propagative soil. The others are feeling-of-personality and the rest

\(^1\) Many MSS. omit tc.

\(^2\) Many MSS. omit pañca.

\(^3\) Compare ii. 4, p. 110\(^a\); iii. 13, p. 207\(^a\).
[of the five hindrances]. In four kinds of forms, the dormant and
the attenuated and the intercepted and the sustained.—1. Of these
[four], what is the dormant state? It is the tendency [of the
hindrances] which remain merely potential in the mind towards the
condition of seed. The awakening of that [dormant hindrance] is
the coming face-to-face with the [particular] object [which makes
that dormant hindrance manifest]. But for one who has [reached]
Elevation (prasanākhyaṇa), and whose hindrances have become
burned seed, there is not that [awakening of the hindrances] even
when he is brought face-to-face with the object [which manifests
them]. For out of what can burned seed germinate? For this
reason the fortunate (kuṭala) man whose hindrances have dwindled
away is said to be in his last\(^1\) body (caramadeha). In him only
the burned state of the seeds, the fifth stage of the hindrances [is
found], and not in other [persons]. So although the hindrances
are existent, the vitality (sāmarthya) of the seed is said to be
already burned. Accordingly, even when the object is face-to-face,
there is no awakening of these [hindrances]. Thus dormancy and
the failure of the burned seed to propagate have been described.—
2. Attenuation is now described. The hindrances, when over-
powered (upahata) by the cultivation of their opposites,\(^2\) become
attenuated.—3. When this is the case, [the other hindrances] inter-
cept [the attenuated hindrances] repeatedly, and move forth actively
again in this or that [unattenuated] form (ātmanā). In that case\(^3\)
they are called intercepted. How is this? Since [for instance]
when one is in love, no anger is felt, inasmuch as, when one is in
love, anger does not actively move forth; and love, when felt in
one direction, is by no means unfelt towards another object. When
Chāitra is known to be in love with one woman, it is not assumed
that he is out of love for other women. Rather, his love finds its
fluctuation fixed in this direction, in other directions its fluctuation
is yet to come. For this [third fluctuation] is for the moment both
dormant and attenuated and intercepted.—4. That fluctuation
which is fixed upon an object is sustained (udāra). No one of all

\(^1\) See VP. v. 10. 7 and Bh. Gītā viii. 26.
\(^2\) See ii. 33.
\(^3\) When they form a succession of tanu and atanu.
these [four] passes beyond the limits of the hindrances [and therefore all four are to be rejected]. If this is so (tarhi), what is this hindrance that is intercepted [or] dormant [or] attenuated or sustained? The answer-is-now-given (ucyate). It is exactly true [that all hindrances are forms of undifferentiated-consciousness]. But only when these [hindrances] are particularized, do they become intercepted and so on. For just as these stages cease when their opposites are cultivated, so they become manifest (abhivyakta) when [changed] into the phenomenal-form (añjana) by the operation of their phenomenalizing-conditions (vyañjaka). So all those hindrances without exception are varieties of undifferentiated-consciousness. Why is this? Since it is undifferentiated-consciousness and nothing else that pervades\(^1\) all [hindrances]. Whatever [perceptible] object is given a form by the undifferentiated-consciousness, it is that [object] which is permeated\(^2\) by the hindrances. Whenever there is a misconceived idea, they become apperceived; and when undifferentiated-consciousness dwindles, they too dwindle away.

He shows that hindrances are to be rejected in that they have their root in undifferentiated-consciousness. 4. Undifferentiated-consciousness (avidyā) is the field for the others whether they be dormant or attenuated or intercepted or sustained. When he asks ≪1. Of these [four], what is the dormant state?≫ his intention is to say that there is no proof for the real existence of hindrances, if they are not performing their peculiar purposeful activity. He tells the answer in the words ≪in the mind.≫ The hindrances may not indeed perform their purposeful activity, but in the case of the discarnate and of those [whose bodies] are resolved into primary matter, they assume the form of seed and exist merely potentially, as curds exist in milk. For other than discriminative insight there is nothing to cause the sterility of these [hindrances]. Hence the discarnate and those [whose bodies] are resolved into primary matter, who have not obtained discriminate discernment, have their hindrances dormant, until such time as [these hindrances] reach the time of their limitation. But when they reach that, since the hindrances revert once more, they come face-to-face with the various objects [of sense]. Thus these [hindrances] are those of which the basis is merely potential. In this way their potential rising [into consciousness] is described. By the words ≪tendency . . . towards the condition

\(^1\) Bālarāma says, 'Undifferentiated-consciousness is inseparably-connected with hindrances' (kleṣṇa avidyānūśīya).

\(^2\) Bālarāma explains the word anuṣcāra by saying 'become inherent in' (anugatā bhavanti).
of seed» their potentiality of action is indicated. To meet the question why, in the case even of one who has discriminative discernment, hindrances are not dormant, he says, «for one who has [reached] Elevation.» «In his last body,» in other words, in his case no other body will be produced with reference to which [this] body of his could be called prior. «Not in other persons,» in other words, not in the discarnate and similar cases. An objection is raised, ‘Since there is no total destruction of any existing thing, what, we ask, becomes of the force of the magical powers of this kind of yoga? Are not the hindrances awakened when face-to-face with objects?’ In reply to this, he says, «existent.» Although the hindrances are existent, still in their state as seeds they are burned by the fire of Elevation (prasāṅkhyaṇa). This is the meaning.—2. The opposite of the hindrances is the yoga of action; by the cultivation, by the following up, of this, the hindrances become overpowered, that is, attenuated. Or we may say that thinking-focused-to-a-point (saṁyag-juñña) is the opposite of undifferentiated-consciousness; that the knowing of distinctions is [the opposite] of the feeling-of-personality; that the detached attitude (mādhyasthāya) is [the opposite] of passion and aversion; [and] that the cessation of the thought of continuance is [the opposite] of the will-to-live.—3. He describes the interception with the words «When this is the case.» Either because overcome by any one of the hindrances which moves actively forth, or because resorting excessively to objects, they intercept repeatedly and move actively forth in one form or another, that is, come into appearance (āvirbhavanti), either as the result of using aphrodisiacs and the like or as the result of the weakness of [the other hindrances] which overcome it. By the repetition he signifies the reiteration of the interruption and of the moving actively forth. Thus the difference [of this] from the afore- said dormant [hindrance] has been described. When love moves actively forth, anger which is different in kind is overpowered; or again love itself set upon one object overpowers, though like in kind, another love which is set upon a different object. This he states by the word «love.»—The fluctuation which is yet to come is to be understood as having a three-fold course according to circumstances. With this in mind he says, «For this.» The pronoun [‘this’] refers only to the hindrance from the fluctuation which is yet to come; it does not refer to Chaitra’s love, just because that [love] is intercepted.—4. He describes the sustained [hindrance] in the words «upon an object.» If some one suggests as an objection that the sustained [hindrance], since it hinders men, might be [properly] called a hindrance, but that the others do not hinder [and so can] by no means be called hindrances, he says in reply «all these [four].» They do not pass beyond the limits of the hindrances, that is, beyond the limits of the thing expressed by the word hindrance, when they become changed into the sustained state. Therefore they too are to be rejected. This is the point.—Presupposing the unity of the hindrances¹ he raises an objection in the words

¹ Literally, Presupposing a unity in so far as the quality of being a hindrance goes.
«If this is so, what.» He rebuts it by showing that although they are of the same kind in so far as they are hindrances, they are particular because of the different previously described states. This he does in the words «The answer is-now-given. It is true.» The objector says,¹ 'This may be true. The hindrances may result from undifferentiated-consciousness; still why should they cease when undifferentiated-consciousness ceases? For surely no one would suppose that a piece of cloth ceases to be, when the weaver ceases to be.' In reply to this he says «all these ... without exception.» The distinctions² are only apparently distinctions, that is to say, they do not exist separably from this [undifferentiated-consciousness]. He asks a question in the words «Why is this?» He gives the reply in the words «all [hindrances].» This same point is made clear by the word «whatever.» «Is given a form» [that is] is falsely attributed. The rest is easy.

'In the case of those who have been resolved into entities, the hindrances are dormant; for yogins, attenuated; and in case of those attached to objects, hindrances are intercepted or sustained.' This is the summarizing-stanza.³

At this point undifferentiated-consciousness itself is described.

5. The recognition of the permanent, of the pure, of pleasure, and of a self in what is impermanent, impure, pain, and not-self is undifferentiated-consciousness.

1. It is the recognition of the permanent⁴ in an impermanent effect, for example, that the earth should be perpetual, that the sky with the moon and stars should be perpetual, that celestial beings are deathless.—2. Likewise in the impure and highly repulsive⁵ body there has been the recognition of purity. And it

¹ Namely, in reply to the hedgings which in the Comment follow «It is true».
² Compare Kāv. Prak. Ullāśa iii. and the verse quoted in the comment on Appayāḍikṣita’s Kuvalayānandakārikā p. 11¹ (Nirnaya Sāg. ed., 1903):
Gaganāṁ gaganākārāṁ
sāgarah sāgaropamaṁ
Rāmarivāṇaṁ yuddhaṁ
rāmarivāṇaṁ iva.
³ Discussed in Patañjal’s Mahābhāṣya (Kielhorn’s ed.), p. 6². The application is only general here.
⁴ The parallel between this and the discussion in Āryadeva’s Catuḥṣatakā is very striking. The concept of avidyā is fundamental in the Mahāyāna. Āryadeva is said to be the pupil of Nāgarjuna; consequently he wrote a couple of centuries before Patañjali. We are indebted for this important discovery to Mahāmahopādhyāya Haraprāśād Shastri (Notes on the newly-found Manuscript Chatuḥsatika by Āryadeva, Journal Asiatic Society of Bengal, New Series, vol. vii, no. 7, 1911, p. 481).
⁵ Compare Mātrī Up. iii. 4.
Four errors of undifferentiated-consciousness

has been said, “Because of its [first] abode [and] because of its
origin [and] because of its sustenance [and] because of its exudations
[and] because of its decease and because it needs [constant]
cleaning, the learned recognize that the body is impure.” Here
the recognition of the pure in the impure is evident. If we say,
‘This girl, beautiful as the sickle of the new moon, her limbs
formed of honey and nectar, her eyes large as the petals of the
blue lotus, seeming to refresh the living world with her coquettish
glances, so that we think that she has issued forth from the moon,’—
then what could be the connexion of this [body] with that (kena)
to which it is compared? Just so it is that there is a misconceived
idea of the pure in the impure. In this way, [by showing
the recognition of the pure in the impure, one sees that there is]
the [misconceived] idea of merit where there is only demerit and of
the useful where there is only the useless.—3. Similarly [Patañjali]
will describe the recognition of pleasure in pain in the words, “By
reason of the pains of mutations and of anguish and of subliminal
impressions and by reason of the opposition of fluctuations of the
aspects (guṇa)—to the discriminating all is nothing but pain.” Un-
differentiated-consciousness is the recognition that there is pleasure
in this [pain].—4. Likewise the recognition of a self in the not-self,
either in external aids whether animate or inanimate, or in the
body as the seat of outer experience, or in the central-organ which
aids the Self,—this is the recognition of a self in the not-self. In
this sense it has been said of this, “He who counts any existing
thing, whether phenomenalized or unphenomenalized [primary
matter], as himself; or who rejoices in the success of these (tasya)
things], deeming it his own success, or who grieves at the ill-
success of these [things], deeming it his own ill-success,—these (sa)
are all unenlightened.” It is this four-fold undifferentiated-con-
sciousness which becomes the root of that unbroken-series (santāna)
of hindrances and of latent-impressions of karma together with its
fruition. And this undifferentiated-consciousness (a-vidyā), pre-

1 Compare the tale in Henry Warren’s
Buddhism in Translations, p. 297.
2 Bālarāma says ‘Such as sons or cattle or
servants or beds or seats, which are
not the self’.
3 See ii. 15.
cisely as in the case of a foe (a-mitra) or of a trackless forest (a-gospada), is to be conceived as a really existing object (vastusatta). Just as a foe (amitra) is not a negative friend [and] not something amounting to a friend, but the opposite of this [friend], a rival,—so too a trackless forest¹ (a-gospada) is not [a place] not-visitated-by-cows (gospada-abhāva), nor again is it merely a [quantity of] land which has a cow's foot as its measure, but, on the contrary, it is nothing less than a definite place, a different thing, other than these two [and the opposite of a cow's footprint]. Precisely so, undifferentiated-consciousness is not a source-of-valid-ideas nor the negation of a source-of-valid-ideas, but another kind of thinking the reverse of knowledge.

5. The recognition of the permanent, of the pure, of pleasure, and of a self in what is impermanent, impure, pain, and not-self is undifferentiated-consciousness. 1. The word effect is a qualification which serves [to indicate] the impermanence. Some indeed, deeming the elements permanent and longing to attain to the form of these, pay devotion even to these. Thus deeming the moon and sun and stars and heavenly regions permanent, in order to attain these, they pay devotion to the Paths [that is, the Way of the Fathers and the Way of the Gods] which begin with the Smoke. Similarly deeming the celestial beings, that is, the gods, to be deathless, they drink soma in order to reach their condition. For it is written [RV. viii. 48. 8], "We have drunk the soma; we have become deathless." It is this recognition of the permanent in the impermanent that is undifferentiated-consciousness. 2. Likewise in the impure and highly repulsive body—when the sentence is only half-finished he recites a stanza (gāthā) from Vyāsa² to show the repulsiveness of the body. The words are Because of its [first] abode. The abode is the mother's womb polluted by such things as urine; the seed is the mother's blood and the father's semen. The sustenance is formation into juices of the food eaten and drunk; for by it the body is held together. Exudation is sweat. And death defiles the body of even a scholarly man. Inasmuch as a bath is required after his [dead body] is touched.—An objecter might say, 'If the body is impure, there is no use in cleansing it with earth and with water.' To this he replies because it needs constant cleaning. Although the body is naturally impure, purification must be applied [to it], just as women produce fragrance [by applying] ointments

¹ This illustration occurs in Siddhānta Kāmudī, § 1060, on Pān. vi. 1. 145. The word has the two meanings given in the Comment: 1. Not-visitated (asevita); thus gospadān = aranyāni;  
² Patañjali discusses the word Vaiyāsikī in the first vārttika on iv. 1. 97.
Undifferentiated-consciousness is something positive [—ii. 5

to the body. He completes the half-finished statement by saying «Here... in the impure.» The meaning is that it is impure on the grounds stated before. He describes the recognition of purity [in the impure] by the words «the new.» «Coquetish» is that which is playful as the result of an erotic-mood. What could be the connexion of the highly repulsive body, by a highly remote (mandatama) similarity, with such a thing as the sickle of the new moon?—«In this way,» by showing the recognition of purity in the impure body of a woman. «Where there is only demerit» as in the case of murder (kīnśa), there is [the discovery of] an idea of merit in things which liberate from the round-of-rebirths. Similarly in case of a thing that is useless, such as money, because of the amount of pains [required] for getting it and keeping it, it is explained that there is [a discovery of] the idea of the useful [in the useless]. All these in that they are abhorrent are impure.—3. «Similarly... in pain.» Easy.—4. «Likewise... in the not-self.» Easy.—It was Pañcaçikha¹ who spoke of this in this way.—The “phenomenalized” [primary-matter] is the animate, such as sons or wives or cattle; the “unphenomenalized” is the inanimate, such as beds or seats or food.—«These (sa) are all unenlightened» [that is] stupid.—It is called four-fold (catuṛpadā) because it has four parts (pada), four places [where it becomes phenomenalized]. It might be objected, ‘There is also another kind of undifferentiated-consciousness which has as its object such [states] as loss of the sense of orientation or as [the sight] of the firebrand [whirled about so as to be seen as a] circle. Undifferentiated-consciousness has [therefore] an indefinite number of parts. Why then say that it is four-fold?’ In reply to this he says, «the root... of that.» There may also be of course other undifferentiated-consciousnesses, but the undifferentiated-consciousness which is the seed of the round-of-rebirths has only four parts.

An objector says, ‘Undifferentiated-consciousness (a-vidyā) might be a negative determinative ² compound (nañ-añamāsa). In which case, 1. the first member (a-) might be determinative (pradhāna), as for example, without-flies (a-makṣika); or 2. the final member might be determinative, as for example, not a-king’s officer (a-rājapuruṣa); or 3. [the compound] might have a third thing as determinative, as for example, a flyless place (amakṣika deva). This being the situation, if we suppose 1. that the first member is determinative, then undifferentiated consciousness (a-vidyā) would be understood as a negation whereon an affirmative is expected ³ (prusajja-pratissedha). And this [kind of a negation] could not be the cause of such things as the hindrances. Or if we

¹ This is the fifth fragment according to Garbe: Festgruss an Roth, 1893, p. 78. See also Garbe’s Introduction to his translation of the Śāńkhya-Tattva-Kāmudi, p. 7.
² Compare i. 6, p. 21 (Calc. ed.).
³ Pāñ. ii. 2. 6.

¹ A negative connected with a verbal stem. See Patañjali: Mahābhāṣya (Kielhorn’s ed.) i. 215, last line; 221²; 319²; 341²; iii. 35, last line. See also the discussion in Apodeva: Mīmāṃśa-nyāya-prakāsa (1906), p. 109. There is also a chapter on this in Vaiṣyākarana Bhūṣana.
suppose 2. that the final member is to be the determinative, then it is undifferentiated-consciousness that is to be particularized by the negation of something. And this [kind of] undifferentiated-consciousness would be destructive of such things as the hindrances and not the seed of them [because it would be a consciousness of the absence of something]. For it cannot be that the [member] subordinate (guna) to the determinative (pradhana) [member of the compound] should break down that determinate. Therefore in order to make sure that it does not break down the determinative, something irregular, [that is, the absence of something] must be supposed, on the other hand, to be found in the subordinate [member of the compound]. Accordingly, in order that undifferentiated-consciousness as such should not be broken down, another meaning must be given to the negative or [another] negative must be supplied. Or if we suppose, on the other hand, 3. that another thing be the determinative [to the compound], we should have to say that [undifferentiated-consciousness] is a state-of-mind (buddhi) in which knowledge (vidya) does not exist. And that could not be the seed of such things as the hindrances merely in so far as it is the absence of knowledge. For then a similar-state-of-things would also have to be admitted in the case of that [form of undifferentiated-consciousness] which is attained in the restriction when preceded by discriminative discernment, [since here too there is absence of knowledge]. Accordingly in all [these three] ways [it has been shown] that undifferentiated-consciousness is not the root of such things as the hindrances.' In reply to this he says, «And this... has.» «A really existing object» is the state of existence of a real object, that is, really existing objectivity. So in this way [it is evident] that undifferentiated-consciousness is neither 1. a negation-where-to-an-affirmative-is-expected (prasajjya-pratisedha); nor again 2. nothing but [a defective kind of] knowledge; nor even 3. is it a state-of-mind characterized as being the absence of this, [that is, knowledge]; but 4. undifferentiated-consciousness is described as being misconceived thinking, the opposite of knowledge (vidya). For the relation of word and thing is determined by conforming to the [usage of the] world. And because [according to the usage] of the world even a [compound] whose final member is determinative and which is a negative compound and which suppresses (upamardaka) the thing to be described by the last word [of the compound] is now and then found in a sense contrary to this [final member as determinative] and [at the same time] suggested by this [final member],—there is [therefore] in this case also an expressive-meaning (vrtti) in the sense of being contrary to this [knowledge].—He analyses the example «Just as a foe (a-mitra) is not.» [A foe] is not «a negative friend» nor again «... amounting to a friend.» Supply ¹ at this point [in the text] 'Some other thing, but «the approach of this, a rival.»' «So too a trackless forest» is not a negative cow's footprint, nor again is it merely a [quantity of] land which has a cow's foot as its measure; but, on

¹ It would appear that Vācaspatimīrtha did not read the words kim tu... sapatnah. ² See the discussion s.v. gospadam in Čabda-Kalpa-Druma.
the contrary, nothing less than a spacious place, the opposite [in extent] of a cow's foot and other than the two negative a-gopada [that is, 1. without footprints-of-the-cow, and 2. not-a-cow's footprint would form together the first negative cow's footprint; and 3. land covered by a cow's footprint would form the second negative cow's footprint], in fact, a different thing [altogether, the trackless forest]. He applies this to the matter in hand which he is illustrating, with the words «Precisely so.»

6. When the power of seeing and the power by which one sees have the appearance (iva) of being a single-self, [this is] the feeling-of-personality.

The Self is the power of seeing; the thinking-substance is the power by which one sees. The hindrance called the feeling-of-personality is a change by which these two appear to become a single essence (svarūpa). When there is any kind of failure to distinguish him who has the power of the enjoyer from that which has the power of being enjoyed, which are as distinct as possible and as unconfused as possible, enjoyment is ready at hand. But when each has recovered its own essence, there is Isolation.—How is it that [at that time there could be anything] that could be called enjoyment? In this sense it has been said,¹ "He who should fail to see that the Self is other than the thinking-substance, distinct in nature and in character and in consciousness and in other respects, would make the mistake of putting his own thinking-substance in the place of that [Self]."

Having said that undifferentiated-consciousness (avidyā) is the cause, he says that the feeling-of-personality is the effect, which [in its turn] is supreme (variśṭhā) over passion and the other [hindrances]. 6. When the power of seeing and the power by which one sees have the appearance of being a single-self, [this is] the feeling-of-personality. The seeing and that by which one sees are precisely the two powers of the two, the self and the not-self. That undifferentiated-consciousness (avidyā) which is characterized as being the perception of a self in what is the not-self, and which has the appearance of being a single intended-object, but which, in the strict sense, is not a single self,—this [avidyā] is the feeling-of-personality. Instead of saying 'of seeing and of that by which one sees', he uses the words <power of> in order to indicate the relation between them, that is, the capacity to be an enjoyer and to be objects to be enjoyed.—He elaborates the sūtra by saying «The Self.»—It might be asked, 'Why, since

¹ This is the sixth fragment of Pañcaçikha according to Garbe. Compare Bh. Gītā vi. 41.
they are perceived as identical, should they not be identical and why should [the appearance of] unity hinder the Self?" In reply he says «he who has the power of the enjoyer . . . that which has the power of being enjoyed.» He who has the power of the enjoyer is the Self; that which has the power of being enjoyed is the thinking-substance. These two are as distinct as possible. If it be asked, 'Whence comes this distinction?' the reply is, «as unconfused as possible.» Immutability and other [qualities] are the properties of the Self; mutability and other [qualities] are the properties of the thinking-substance. Thus there is no confusion. Thus by these words it is asserted that the identity, although presented-as-an-idea, is not in-the-strict-sense-real.—The words «failure to distinguish» state the fact that hindrances exist. After having given an affirmative [line of reasoning], he states a negative [line of reasoning] in the words «its own essence.» The recovery is the discriminative discernment. That another also holds this same opinion he says in the words «In this sense it has been said» by Pañcaçikha that «the thinking-substance.»—«In nature» means in its own self, which is, at all times whatsoever, pure [of aspects (guna)]; «in character» means in its detachment; «in consciousness» means in its intelligence (cāitanya); whereas the thinking-subject is impure and not detached and inanimate (jāda). Undifferentiated-consciousness (avidyā) is the mental state with regard to these two [to the effect that they are one] self. «The mistake» is a subliminal-impression generated by a previous undifferentiated-consciousness; or else it is the tamas [quality], because undifferentiated-consciousness is tamas.

7. Passion is that which dwells¹ upon pleasure.
That greed [or] thirst [or] desire, on the part of one acquainted with pleasure, ensuing upon a recollection of pleasure, for either the pleasure or for the means of attaining it, is passion.

When one feels the discrimination, such states as passion cease. So the feeling-of-personality brought to pass by undifferentiated-consciousness (avidyā) is the root (nīdāna) of such states as passion. Accordingly, directly after the feeling-of-personality he gives the distinguishing-characteristic of passion and of the rest [of the hindrances]. 7. Passion is that which dwells upon pleasure. Since memory [of pleasure] is impossible in the case of one unacquainted with pleasure, the text says «acquainted with pleasure.» Passion for a recollected pleasure ensues «upon a recollection of pleasure.» But while a pleasure is in experience there is no need of recollection. Since, however, the means for attaining pleasure are either remembered or perceived, the passion must ensue upon a recollection of pleasure. And even when the means of attaining pleasure are

¹ See the gloss sukham anuṣṭete vatayākaroti (Mañiprabhā). Compare i. 11, p. 38a (Calc. ed.). See also Vācaspati’s gloss (anukurvanti), p. 281 (Calc. ed.), and the last words of the Bhāṣya on iv. 28 with Bālarāma’s note.
perceived, it is only after remembering that one of this same kind is the source of pleasure that he infers that this one is a source of pleasure in so far as it is of the same kind. After this follows the desire. He explains the words "dwells upon" by the word "That."

8. Aversion is that which dwells upon pain. That repulsion [or] wrath [or] anger, on the part of one acquainted with pain, ensuing upon a recollection of pain, for either the pain or for the means of attaining it, is aversion.

8. Aversion is that which dwells upon pain. The words "acquainted with pain" are to be explained as [in the] previous [sutra]. He explains the words "dwells upon" by the word "that." Repulsion in the sense that it repels. The same he elaborates by synonyms, [for instance,] "wrath."

9. The will-to-live (abhiniveṣa) sweeping on [by the force of] its own nature exists in this form even in the wise.

In all living beings this craving for one's self ceaselessly rises, 'May I not cease to live! May I live!' This craving for one's self does not arise except in one in whom the experience of death resides. And from [the existence] of this [hope] the experience of other births is made clear. And this is that well-known hindrance [called] the will-to-live. This [fear of death], inconceivable as a result of either perception or inference or verbal-communication, sweeping on [by the force of] its own nature, as a vision of extermination, forces the inference that the pangs of death have already been experienced in previous births. And just as it is evident that this fear is to be found in the unspeakably stupid, so also even in the wise, who have some understanding of the prior limit [of human lives], [that is, the round-of-rebirths,] and of their final

1 Professor Deussen quotes most appositely Spinoza, Ethica iii. 13, Scholion, Amor nihil aliud est, quam laetitia concomitante idea causae externae; et odium nihil aliud, quam tristitia concomitante idea causae externae.

2 See Ruyyaka: Alāṅkārasarvasva (Kāvya-mālā 35), p. 55', interprets the word as meaning merely eo ipso or by its own nature. Compare Rāmānanda Yati in Maṇiprabhā (Benares Sanskrit Series), 1903, p. 30', vāsansāsaṅgaḥ svarasaḥ.
limit [that is, Isolation]. Why is this? Because this subconscious-impression, the result of the fear of death, is alike in both fortunate and unfortunate.

9. The will-to-live sweeping on [by the force of] its own nature exists in this form even in the wise. He discusses the meaning of the term «will-to-live» in the words «all living beings.» «This craving for one’s self» is the longing for one’s self expressed in the words «May I not cease to live,» that is, ‘May I not become non-existent,’ [and also expressed] in the words «May I live (bhīyāsam)» [that is] ‘May I be alive (jīvyāsam).’ The longing for one’s self is not possible unless the living creature have had residing in himself an experience of death. It is he only that has this craving for himself, [that is] the will-to-live, the fear of death. In the course of the discussion (prasaṅgatas) he refers by the words, «And from [the existence] of this» to a heterodox-person (nāstika) who denies that there is another birth. From the fact that the present body is being held together, it follows that there is an experience of a previous birth. In other words, a birth is a conjunction 1 [of the soul] with a body and sense-organs and feelings which are different from those of any previous [conjunction] and are characterized by the [definite location] in the collection. This [birth] is experienced [or] attained. And it is this [experience or attainment] that is made clear. How is this? In reply he says «And this is that well-known will-to-live.» Breaking off the sentence in the middle he tells of its hindering character in the word «hindrance.» This [will-to-live] is called a hindrance because it hinders, [that is] pains, living-creatures with unkindly actions and the like. He finishes what he had begun to say by the words «sweeping on by its own nature.» It has a disposition to sweep on by virtue of its own nature in the form of subconscious-impressions. But this disposition is not accidental. Even in the case of a worm just born [that is] full of pain and low in intelligence [this disposition] is not accidental. He tells the reason for this in the words «as a result of perception.» This fear of death, being inconceivable, that is, not acquired in this present (pratyudita) birth as a result of perception or inference or verbal-communication, it must be inferred that the pangs of death have been experienced in a previous birth. This is the point at issue. For even a child just born trembles at the sight of a murderous thing. And from this peculiar quivering [the child] infers the nearness (pratyāsatti) to himself of the experience of death and is found to be afraid of it. Thus we see that fear results from pain or from whatever leads to pain. Moreover in this birth he has not experienced or inferred or heard of death. So we gather that he has known only in a previous [birth] the pains [of death] or that which leads to the pain. And from this a memory of himself as he was in that condition persists. This moreover does not occur unless there be subliminal-impressions. Furthermore this subliminal-impression [cannot occur] without experience and the experience does not belong to this life. Therefore the only

1 See Ĉāmkara on Brahma-sūtra ii. 2. 23 with Ānandagiri’s gloss.
remaining alternative is [a subliminal-impression] from a pre-existent birth. Thus there was a connexion with a previous birth.—The word <so (tathā)> requires a correlative «just as.» Thus by supplying the word «just as» from the sense of the sentence, he shows, in the words «just as . . . this,» how the meaning of the sentence would be.—«In the unspeakably stupid» means in the most sluggish intelligences.—He shows [what the kind of] learning is by saying «some understanding of the prior and of the final limits [of human lives].» The limit is the end. Now the prior limit of man is the round-of-rebirths; the latter is Isolation. He by whom this has been understood from things heard or from inferences is called [one who has understanding of the prior and of the final limits].—This well-known fear exists [and] has become established in the case of the worm and of the wise man. It might be objected that in the case of the unwise fear-of-death is conceivable, but not in the case of the wise man, since [in him] it has been eradicated by knowledge. Or else if the fear-of-death has not been eradicated, it would be eternally present. With this in view he asks «Why is this?» The answer is «Because . . . it is alike.» He does not refer to the wise man who has conscious [concentration], but to him who discriminates upon the basis of things heard and of inference. This is the point.

10. These [hindrances] [when they have become] subtile are to be escaped by the inverse-propagation.¹

These five hindrances when they have become like burned seeds, after the mind which has predominated over the deeds of the yogin is resolved [into primary matter], come with it to rest. Thus the hindrances have been characterized, and of those which should be escaped, four states, the dormant and the attenuated and the intercepted and the sustained, have been shown. But ‘why is not the fifth state, which is subtile, mentioned by the author of the sūtras, inasmuch as it is in the state of burned seed?’ To this he replies, 10. These [hindrances] [when they have become] subtile are to be escaped by the inverse-propagation. It is that of course which is within the scope of the exertions of man which has been described; but the subtile is not within the scope of a man’s exertions that he might escape (hāna) [it]. It may, however, be escaped (by the inverse-propagation) [that is] by a reduction of the mind-stuff, which is an effect and which is characterized by the feeling-of-personality, to the state of its own cause, [the thinking-substance]. He explains [the sūtra] by the word «These.» Easy.

¹ Compare ii. 2, p. 107a (Calc. ed.), and the passages given above, at p. 105.
But of permanent hindrances consigned to the condition of seeds—
11. The fluctuations of these should be escaped by means of contemplation.

Those fluctuations of the hindrances which are coarse, after having been attenuated by the yoga of action, should be escaped by the Elevated (prasad mythāna) contemplation until subtilized [and] made like burned seeds. And just as a spot of coarse matter upon pieces of cloth is first shaken off and afterwards the spot of fine matter is removed with an effort and by [some appropriate] means, so coarse fluctuations are those whose opposition to hindrances is very slight, but the subtile fluctuations are those whose opposition ¹ is very great.

‘Now when the hindrances have been attenuated by the yoga of action, by directing his exertions towards what, does a man accomplish the rejection [of these hindrances]?’ In reply to this he says <But of permanent hindrances consigned to the condition of seeds.> By these words he distinguishes them from those that have been sterilized (vandhyā). He recites the sūtra. 11. The fluctuations of these should be escaped by means of contemplation. He discusses [the sūtra] in the words <of the hindrances.> Now when attenuated by the yoga of action these also may be eradicated—themselves and their effects—by reducing them to the condition of [their own] causes. [This is the] inverse propagation. Thus the coarse fluctuations have been explained.

When a man’s exertion is [still] within the scope of the Elevation, [the author] states what the limit is in the words [beginning] <until.> He elaborates the expression <subtilized> by saying <burned.> On this same point he gives a simile in the words <And just as . . . upon pieces of cloth.> With an effort, such as by washing it [and] by some means, such as an alkaline (ksāra) mixture. The likeness between the simile and the thing to which it is compared lies merely in the fact that there is a coarseness and a subtily, but not in the [fact that they are both] removable by an effort. For this [removal] is impossible in the case of hindrances which are to be escaped by the process of inverse propagation.—Those whose opposition is very slight, which have been described, are such as have [slight] causes of destruction. Those whose opposition is very great are such as have [great] causes of destruction. And next below ² the inverse propagation as a means of attaining the destruction

² Coarse stains are removed by shaking; minute stains by washing; more minute by alkali. Hindrances which are sustained are attenuated by yoga of action; the attenuated are reduced to burned seed by Elevation; the burned seed is destroyed by inverse propagation.
of the hindrances would be the Elevation (prasādhānya). In view of this inferiority the Elevation has been called very slight.

12. The latent-deposit of karma has its root in the hindrances and may be felt in a birth seen or in a birth unseen.

In this case we have a latent-deposit of the karma of merit and of demerit propagated from lust [or] from greed [or] from infatuation [or] from anger. And this may be felt either in a birth seen, or may be felt in a birth not seen. Of these, that [latent-deposit of karma] which, in so far as there is keen intensity, proceeds from sacrificial formulae [and] from self-castigation [and] from concentration, and which is perfected by worship of the Icvara [or] of a deity [or] of a sage or magnanimous beings, has instantly its fruition as a latent-deposit of meritorious karma. Thus [for instance] when, in so far as the hindrance is keen, contempt is shown again and again to those who have sought protection in terror and in sickness and in wretchedness, or again to those magnanimous beings who castigate themselves, this [contempt] also has fruition as a latent-impression of evil karma. Just as the youth Nandiçvara passed out of the human form and was transformed into a divinity, so also Nahuṣa, Prince of the Gods, passed out from his proper mutation and was transformed into the condition of a brute. Among these [latent-deposits] there is, in the case of those who dwell in the underworlds, no latent-deposit of karma which might be felt in a birth seen [in this life]; and in the case of those hindrances which have dwindled, there is no latent-deposit of karma which might be felt in a birth unseen [that is, in another life].

'This may be true. Hindrances [are hindrances] because they hinder [and because] they are the causes of birth and of length-of-life and of kind-of-experience; and the latent impressions of karma are of this kind (tathā). But undifferentiated-consciousness (avidyā) and the other [hindrances do not hinder

1 A better reading is prabhava.
2 If mahānubhāva were a title of respect, it would precede the other members of the compound according to Pāṇ. ii. 2. 30
3 See Liṅgā Pu. viii. 48. 7-53.
4 See MBh. v. 17.
and are not such causes]. How then can undifferentiated-consciousness and the rest be called hindrances? In reply to this he says 13. The latent-deposit of karma has its root in the hindrances and may be felt in a birth seen or in a birth unseen. That for whose production and causal activity a hindrance is the root,—that [is the latent-deposit of karma]. What he means to say is this. The latent-deposit of karma which is the cause of birth and of length-of-life and of kind-of-experience has its root in undifferentiated-consciousness. So undifferentiated-consciousness and the rest are also the causes of them.—He explains the sutra with the words «In this case.» That in which all Selves in the round-of-rebirths are latent (ācērata) is 1 a latent-deposit (ācāya). The latent-deposits of karma are merit and demerit. Merit which is the cause of heaven and similar states occurs when, as a result of some desire, there is an inclination for a work which is desirable. Similarly there is demerit in such cases as when from avarice another is robbed of his money. Likewise there is nothing but demerit in such cases as when from infatuation the idea of merit directs itself to killing or something of the kind which is demerit. But there is no merit which comes from infatuation. Merit does, however, come from anger, as for instance, the case of Dhrūva 2 from anger at the slight [put upon him] by his father [Uttānapāda]. For as a result of the meritorious latent-deposits of karma which were performed in the desire to surpass his father, he obtained a position above the dwellers in regions of the sky. Demerit, however, due to anger and resulting in the murder of Brahmans is well enough known to every one. He describes the double character of this [latent-deposit] by saying «And this may be felt in a birth seen.» He describes this that may be felt in a birth seen by saying «in so far as there is keen intensity.» In their respective order he gives examples in the words «Just as Nандīvara.» The dwellers in the underworlds are those who make latent-deposits of karma as a result of which certain underworlds, such as the Cooking Pot, 3 are reached. These have no latent-deposits to be felt in a birth seen [in this life] For no human body nor any kind of mutation of it can endure such torment (vedāna) as is to be endured by them and uninterruptedly for thousands of years. The rest is easy.

13. So long as the root exists, there will be fruition from it [that is] birth [and] length-of-life [and] kind-of-experience.

While the hindrances exist, the latent-deposit of karma starts the fruition, but not so the cut root of the hindrances. Just as the

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1 This sentence is omitted in the Bikaner MS. It might well be a gloss.
2 Manu xii. 76; Bhāg. Pur. v. 25. 13; compare Jātaka, vol. iii, p. 48, no. 314.
3 VP, i. 11. 24 with the context.
grains of rice, when encased within the chaff, as seeds in an unburned condition, are fit for propagation, but neither the winnowed chaff nor seed in the burned condition is so [fit], similarly the latent-deposits of karma, when encased within hindrances, are propagative, but neither the winnowed hindrances nor seed in the condition of having been burned by the Elevation (prāsanākhyaṇa) [is propagative]. And this fruition is of three kinds, birth and length-of-life and kind-of-experience. In regard to these [three,] this is under discussion, whether 1. one karma is the cause of one birth, or whether 2. one karma gives the impulse to more than one birth. There is a second discussion as to whether 3. more than one karma projects more than one birth, or whether 4. more than one karma projects one birth. Now it is not true 1. that one karma is the cause of one birth. Why so? Because if the karma remaining over, accumulated from time-without-beginning and innumerable, and [the karma] of the present, should not have in their results an order limited [in its time], discouragement would be inflicted upon everybody. And this is prohibited. Neither 2. is one karma the cause of more than one birth. Why is this? Because if, while there were more than one karma, only one karma at a time were to be the cause of more than one birth, a lack of time for fruition would be inflicted upon the remaining karmas. And that too would be prohibited. Neither 3. is more than one karma the cause of more than one birth. Why is this? Since it is impossible that more than this one birth should occur simultaneously, it must be supposed that they occur successively. This, likewise, would involve the same difficulty as in the last [case]. The result is then 4. the diverse accumulation of latent-deposits of karma, whether of merit or of demerit, made between birth and the end of life, remains in a relation of subordinate [parts] and a dominant [part]. This is made manifest at the ending of life after growing compact by one single impulse (ekapraghāṭakena). After accomplishing death, it assumes a rigid form and causes a single birth only. And this birth receives its length from that same karma. And again in that same length-of-life from that same karma it attains to its kind-of-experience. This latent-deposit of karma since it is the
source of the birth and the length-of-life and the kind-of-experience, is said to have a three-fold fruition. Consequently [this] latent-deposit of karma is said to have [its limit in] one existence. On the other hand [a latent-deposit of karma] which is to be felt in [this] seen birth is said, since it is the cause of the kind-of-enjoyment only, to originate a single [kind of] fruition [and not a single existence]. Or, when it is the source of the length-of-the-life and the kind-of-enjoyment, it is said to originate two fruations, as for instance in the case of Nandiçvara or of Nahuṣa. But this mind-stuff like a fish-net made in different shapes on all sides and having, from time without beginning, a form-fixed (saṁmūrchita) by subconscious impressions, which are like knots, caused by the experience of the fruition of the karma from the hindrances, is spread abroad. Therefore these subconscious-impressions are said to be preceded by more than one existence. It is this particular latent-deposit of karma, however, which is said to have [its limit] in one existence. Those subliminal-impressions which produce memory\(^1\) are said to be subconscious-impressions (vāsanā) and these are said to subsist from time-without-beginning. But that latent-deposit of karma which has [its limit] in a single existence has both a fruition limited [in time] and a fruition which is without limit [of time]. Of these two [orders], the limitation [in time] (niyama), [in so far as it has its limit in one existence], belongs only to the fruition which is to be felt in a birth of [this] seen [life] and which is limited [in time]; whereas the fruition which is not to be felt in [this] seen [life] and which is without limit [of time] does not [have the limit in time which has its limit in a single existence]. Why so? Because that fruition which is not to be felt in [this] seen [life] and which is without limit [of time] has three kinds of outcome\(^2\) (gati): Either 1. it is annihilated (nāca) when this [latter] fruition is finished and become unfruitful; or 2. it is cast away (āvāpa-gamana) into the dominant karma; or 3. it may continue for a long time, subjected to the dominant karma which has a fruition limited [in time]. Of these [three], 1. the annihilation of [the karma] which is finished and become unfruitful is like the annihilation in this present

\(^1\) See iii. 18, p. 230\(^9\) (Calc. ed.).

\(^2\) Consult Çubda-Kalpa-Druma, p. 846\(^a\).
Three outcomes of karma

world of the dark karma when once the bright karma has dawned. With regard to which this has been said, "Verily indeed karmas should be known to be by twos and twos. A single mass made of merit destroys [the dark and the dark-bright] evil [mass]. Wish thou then to do well-done deeds. Right here to thee the wise make karma known."—2. Casting away into the dominant karma: with reference to which it has been said 2, "Should there be a very slight admixture of guilt in the sacrifice, it is either to be removed or to be overlooked. [Therefore this admixture is] not enough to remove the good-fortune [won by merit]. Why [not]? Because in my case there is much other good-fortune. Where then this [admixture of guilt] is cast away [into the dominant karma], even in heaven it will make only a slight reduction [of merit].”—3. When he said, 'it may continue for a long time subjected to the dominant karma which has a fruition limited [in time], how was this? [The answer is], because, in the case of the karma the fruition of which is not to be felt in [this] seen [life] and which is limited [in time], death is said to be the appropriate cause of the manifestation. Not so, however, in the case [of the karma] the fruition of which is not to be felt in [this] seen [life] and which is without limit [of time]. On the contrary, [in this latter case], karma the fruition of which is not to be felt in [this] seen [life] and which is not limited [in time], either is annihilated or is cast away or is quiescent (upāsita) in subjection [to the dominant karma] for a long time until the appropriate manifesting-conditions of the cause of the karma bring it close to its fruition. But since of this very fruition [of karma] the place or the time or the cause is none of them determinable, therefore it is that the ways of karma are [known as] mysterious and not easily discernible. Moreover, since the general rule is not broken down, even if there be exceptions,

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1 The genitive is object of apahanti according to the Vārttika, which refers to Pāṇini ii. 3. 56. Vācaspatimīra makes kṛpa-krpaṇaṇukōte an accusative object of apahanti. In this case pāpa-kasya would mean belonging to a sinful man (see p. 129a below).

2 See the careful discussion of this fragment of Pāṇaṇakṣa in Garbe's translation of the Śāṅkhya Tattva Kāmudī, 1892, p. 538, note 2. Compare also Candilya-sūtra xc (1861) and Cowell's translation (1878), p. 96.
therefore the latent-deposit of karma having [its limit in] a single existence [must] be acknowledged.

[The objector says,] 'Let this be granted. Since the latent-deposit of karma is based upon undifferentiated-consciousness (avidyā), there may result, after the production of knowledge (vidyā), a destruction of undifferentiated-consciousness, and so there might not be any subsequent latent-deposit of karma. Still the latent-deposits of karma, done previously and accumulated by the succession from time without beginning of innumerable births, being unsettled in their period of development, it would be impossible by realizing the effects to cause [these latent-deposits] to dwindle in so far as they might be experienced. Because of this it would be impossible to cut off the round-of-rebirths.' To this he replies with the sutra 13. So long as the root exists, there will be fruition from it [that is] birth [and] length-of-life [and] kind-of-experience. What he means to say is this. The result of the latent-deposit of karma is pleasure and pain, and, in so far as both birth and length-of-life have the same purpose [as the latent-deposit] and are the necessary consequence of it, [these two] are also propagated [by the latent deposit]. Moreover pleasure and pain are attached to passion and aversion. And the latter are the necessary conditions [for pleasure and pain], since pleasure and pain are not possible in the absence of these [that is, passion and aversion]. Furthermore it is impossible to say that that wherein a man is pleased or disgusted is not to him, as the case may be, either a pleasure or a pain. So this soil of the self sprinkled with the water of the hindrances becomes a field propagating the fruits of karma. Thus it is true that the hindrances co-operate with the latent-deposit of karma for producing also the after-effects of the fruits. So when the hindrances are quite cut off, [the latent-deposits] are deprived of this [aid] also. Therefore, although the latent-deposits are endless and their period of ripening is unsettled, still, when in their condition as seeds, they are burned by Elevation (prāvakhyāna), they cannot be in a position to bear fruit. The sense expressed is made clear by the Comment in the words, «While . . . exist.» With regard to this same point he gives a simile «Just as . . . the chaff.» Although they have their chaff, their condition as seed is burned by heat (seeda) and in other ways. He applies the simile to the point-to-be-illustrated by saying, «similarly.» If it be objected that the hindrances cannot be removed, because no [really] existing things are removed, he replies in the words, «nor seed in the condition of having been burned by the Elevation.» He shows the threefold character of the fruition in the words, «And this.» Fruition is that which is brought to fruition or brought to perfection by karmas. The first point-under-discussion [1. and 2.] deems the unity of karmas to be fixed and considers whether births are one or more than one. The second [3. and 4.], however, deems the manifoldness to be fixed and considers whether births are one or more than one. Thus there are four alternatives
Limits of time for fruition

(vikalpa). Of these he refutes the first with the words «Now it is not true 1. that one karma is the cause of one birth.» He asks, «Why so?» He gives the answer by saying, «from time-without-beginning.» If the karma accumulated by each birth, one after another, in time without beginning, and therefore innumerable, which remains over after the karma which has been made to dwindle in each life, one after another, has been deducted, the world would feel discouragement. And this is prohibited. What he means to say is this. Since the dwindling of karma is broken-by-intervals (vīrāla), and since [karma] is produced in abundance, the latent-deposits pressing one against the other and springing up incessantly, in breathless haste, towards their own fruition,—[for this reason] even a very clever man could not determine the order of the results. Thus discouragement as regards the following up of meritorious [acts] would be inflicted [upon everybody].—He rejects the second alternative in the words «Neither 2. is one karma the cause of more than one birth.» He asks, «Why is this?» He gives the answer by saying, «of more than one birth.» If a single karma only belonging to (āhita) more than one birth is the cause of a fruition which characterizes more than one birth, then a lack of time would be inflicted upon the remaining karmas. And that too would be prohibited. Thus in so far as karma would be fruitless, there would be the likelihood that it would not be followed up. And if there would be discouragement on the ground that there is no order of fruition limited [in time] (niyata), in case one karma is to be uprooted in one life, how much more there would be in case one karma must be uprooted during more than one life. For then, since there is no chance, [one would infer] that there would be no time [in the future] for the fruition of the present karma [and thus again discouragement would follow].—He refutes the third alternative with the words, «Neither 3. is more than one karma the cause of more than one birth.» He gives the reason for this in the word, «this.» Since for those who are not yogins it is impossible that more than this one birth should occur simultaneously, it must be supposed to occur successively. For if a thousand karmas could simultaneously generate a thousand births, there would be—since a thousand karmas would have dwindled away—time for the fruition of the remainder and an order of results limited [in time]. But there is no such simultaneity of births.—Having thus rejected the three propositions, he accepts as the result of the process of elimination 4. the proposition which remains, to the effect that more than one karma is the cause of one birth, as he says in the words, «The result is . . . birth.» The compound «between-birth-and-the-end-of-life» means in the interval [that is] between the two, both birth and the end-of-life.—[This accumulation is] diverse because it gives forth results diversified by pleasures and pains. That is dominant which will give its result with absolute intensity and immediately. Whereas that is subordinate which [gives its result] after a delay. The «ending-of-life» is death. «Made manifest» by it means being brought into the presence of that which tends to produce its effects.—By one single impulse
means simultaneously. Growing compact or rolled\(^1\) together into one lump in relation to the effect to be produced [that is] the next birth, it produces one birth only and not more than one birth. And this birth is the human or some other state. «And this birth receives its length-of-life from that same karma» [would mean that] its life is limited by various periods of time. «And again in that same length-of-life from that same karma it attains to its kind-of-experience» [would mean that] a direct experience of pleasure and of pain is attained. Thus this latent-deposit of karma since it is the source of the birth and of the length-of-life and of the kind-of-experience is said to have a threefold fruition. He sums up the main statement in the words, «Consequently [this] latent-deposit of karma is said to have [its limit in] one existence.»—Having one existence is one existence. [This] compound is in accordance [with Pāṇini’s sūtra ii. i. 49] beginning with the words, “A temporal antecedent, eka, &c.” The termination [-ika] is in the sense of possession (matvarthiya).\(^2\) Thus the meaning [of the compound] is ‘one who has one existence’. Elsewhere the reading is (āikabhaṅgika). In this case the dhāk termination [-ika] in the sense of ‘existing in’ is added to the word ‘one-existence’. Then the meaning would be that its existing is limited to one birth. Thus having announced his main statement, namely, that [this] karma which [has its limit] in one existence has a three-fold fruition, he now distinguishes the three different kinds of fruition which belong to the karma that is to be felt in [this] seen birth and that is a part of this-present-world (āiḥika). By the word «seen» he refers, of course, to Nandīcyāra whose length-of-life in a human birth was cut off at eight years. [Here] was a particular kind of merit produced by a vehement method of keen intensity. This merit had two fruitions in that it was the source of the length-of-life and of the kind-of-experience. But in the case of Nahuṣa, since the length of his life had been determined by a karma which led him to the attainment of Indra’s position, there was a particular kind of demerit, leading only to a kind-of-enjoyment, by reason of the contrary [karma] coming from his striking\(^8\) Agastya with his heel. An objector asks, ‘Have the subconscious-impressions from the hindrances, like a latent-deposit of karma, their [limit] in one existence? And [if] the subconscious-impressions of the experiences of the fruition of the karma are favourable to [the pointing out of] the kind-of-experience, then a human being reduced to the body of a beast would not experience (bhūṅjita) what is proper to his species.’ In reply to this he says «the karma from the hindrances.» Having a fixed form (saṁmūrcha) means rolled together into one lump. He describes the subconscious-impression as such in order to distinguish it from

\(^1\) Vijñāna, Bhikṣu glosses the word saṁmūrcha by pravṛddhavarga (p. 106) and by upācitam or puṣṭam (p. 107).

\(^2\) Pāṇini v. 2. 115.

\(^3\) This story is given in its setting by Jacobi in his article on Agastya (Hastings: Cycl. of Rel. and Ethics, I, p. 181, line 10).
right-action (dharma) and from wrong-action by saying «subliminal-impressions which.»—In order to state certain exceptions to the general proposition [that the latent-deposit of karma] has [its limit in] a single existence he prepares the ground by saying «But that . . . which.» By the word «But» he shows that there is a distinction from the subconscious-impressions. The limitation [in time] of having [a limit in] a single existence is that which belongs only to the fruition which is to be felt in a birth of [this] seen [life] and which has a limit [in time]; whereas the fruition which is not to be felt in [this] seen [life] does not [have the limit in time which has its limit in a single existence].—Of what kind then is fruition which is not limited in time? He asks the reason in the words «Why so?» He tells the reason in the words «Because that.» First he gives one outcome (gati) in the words «is finished;» the second, in the words «dominant;» the third, in the words «has a limit [in time].» Of these three he analyses 1. the first by saying «Of these [three] . . . is finished.» Other than the karmas of the mendicant (sanyasin), which are neither bright nor dark, there are only three karmas, the dark and the bright-dark and the bright. Now in this world a latent-deposit of bright karma, to be obtained by self-castigation and by recitation and by other means, when once unrisen [in the mind,] is the annihilator of dark [karma] which has not yet given its fruit. And because there is no distinction [between the dark and the dark-bright] we must suppose [that it is the annihilator] of the many-coloured [that is, the dark-bright karma] by reason of the conjunction [of this last] with the dark part. With reference to the same the Exalted [Vyāsa] cites the Sacred Word when he says, «With regard to which this.» Verily indeed karmas [should be known to be] «by twos and twos;» that is, the dark and the dark-bright. [These the mass made of merit] destroys. Such is the construction [of the sentence]. By repeating the word «twos» he indicates that there is a very great number. In reply to the question, ‘Belonging to whom’ he says, «belonging to a sinful.» In other words, belonging to a sinful man. What is it that destroys? To this he replies, «A single mass made of merit.» Because a collection includes the units-of-the-collection (samulim). Thus the bright latent-deposit of karma is described as the third. What he means to say is this. This bright latent-deposit of karma, which is to be obtained by methods which are free from injury to others, is of such a kind, we may say, that although it is single, it destroys dark and dark-bright latent-deposits of karma, which are absolutely opposed, even when they are in great numbers.—The word «then (tal)» means therefore.—The word «Wish thou» is middle because Vedic. The rest is easy. And so we see (atra) that the power in the uprising of the bright karma is so indescribably great that it alone makes the others cease to be. But one could not say that they cease because of the pain resulting from recitations and other [right actions]. For a wrong-action (adharma) does not have, as its opposite, pain in general, but only that particular kind of pain which is
the effect of itself [that is, the wrong-action]. Now the pain resulting from recitations and other [right actions] is not their effect. [And if this pain resulting from recitations and other right actions] is supposed to be the effect of this [wrong-action], then it is needless to make [special] prescriptions of recitations and other right actions, because then these [recitations and right actions] could be produced (upātī) merely by the help of those [wrong-actions]. And if [this wrong-action] should not produce (anupātī) [the pain which results from recitations and other right actions], then the Cooking Pot [Hell] and other [pains] are [specially] prescribed,—[because the wrong-action must result in something—and] because, if [Hells and other pains] be not [specially] prescribed, these [Hells] would never be produced at all.\(^1\)

Thus all is four-square.—He analyses 2. the second outcome in the word <Dominant.> In the dominant karma, as for instance in the Jyotiṣṭoma and similar [sacrifices], that which is accessory (aṅga) [karma] to this, namely the killing of the animal, is cast away [into the dominant karma]. For there are two effects of killing and of the other [acts]: 1. since it is prescribed [by the tradition] in so far as it is accessory to the dominant [karma], it assists; 2. since killing is forbidden by the rule “Let no living being be killed”, it is needless. We see then that [killing], because it is performed as accessory to the dominant [karma] and not as being the dominant, ought not immediately [drāg] and independently of the dominant [karma] to generate its own fruition, a useless result, but that it remains rendering assistance to the dominant [karma], the fruition of which has already commenced. And while rendering assistance to the dominant karma it remains, with reference to its own effect, as seed only, and is cast away into the dominant karma. <With reference to which it has been said> by Pañcaśikha. The slight admixture of the invisible-influence (apūrva), which is the dominant [karma] resulting from the Jyotiṣṭoma and other [sacrifices], with the invisible-influence resulting from the killing of the animal and similar [acts] and producing what is not desired (anarthā),—[this admixture] may be removed. For, by doing a certain amount of penance it may be removed. Or should a man heedlessly not have gone through the penance, [the slight admixture of guilt] comes to fruition at the time of the fruition of the dominant karma. In spite of all this, whatever undesired result be generated by this [accessory invisible-influence] may be overlooked. For the fortunate (kuśala), plunging deep into the great pool of the nectar of pleasure brought near by the gathering together of merit, overlook a slight spark of

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\(^1\) Since however Hells are produced without any special prescription (vidhāna), it follows as a general rule that the consequences of wrong-actions require no special prescription. But in the case of recitations and other right-actions there is the special prescription. Therefore right-actions and the pain resulting from right-actions cannot be the consequences of wrong-actions. Not being such a consequence, the pain from right-action cannot annihilate wrong-action.
the fire of pain brought about by a very little evil. Hence [the slight admixture] is not enough or adequate to remove or to cause to dwindle good-fortune or great merit. He asks «Why [not]??» The answer is «the good-fortune.» For in the case of me, the meritorious, much other good-fortune exists, the fruition of dominant karma, beginning with the initiatory rites and ending with the donations. Where then this admixture is very slight, it will make even in heaven, the result of it, a slight commingling of pain, that is, a slight reduction from the heaven which, [although] its beginning is gained by mixed merit, is [in itself] quite untouched by pain.—He analyses 8. the third outcome in the words, «limited [in time].» The predominance here is conceived as being extremely powerful but not as having accessories. And it is powerful in so far as its fruition is without limit [of time], because there is no opportunity [for its fruition] at any one time. But in the case of [the dominant karma] the fruition of which is without limit [of time] there is a weakness, because there is an opportunity [for its fruition] at some other time. The continuance for a long time is only in ‘the condition of seed, but not as [actively] helping the dominant [karma] because this latter is independent. It is objected, ‘It has been stated that the latent-deposit of karma is by the ending-of-life-made manifest at one point of time only. Whereas now you say that it continues a long time. How then is the latter [statement] not in opposition to the previous [statement]?’ With this in mind he asks, «how was this?» He answers in the words, «not ... in [this] seen [life].» The singular number denotes a class. He determines the outcome of that which is different from this by the words, «On the contrary ... not ... in [this] seen [life].» The rest is easy.

14. These [fruitions] have joy or extreme anguish as results in accordance with the quality of their causes whether merit or demerit.

{These} [that is] birth and length-of-life and kind-of-experience. Those with merit as cause have pleasure as result; those with demerit as cause have pain as result. And just as the nature of this pain is counteractive, so for the yogin, even at the moment of pleasure in an object, there is nothing but counteractive pain.

It has been stated that karma is rooted in hindrances and that fruitions are rooted in karma. Now the question is, ‘of what are the fruitions the root, since you say that these are to be renounced?’ In reply to this he says, 14. These [fruitions] have joy or extreme anguish as results in accordance with the
quality of their causes whether merit or demerit. He explains the sūtra in the words, «These [that is] birth and length-of-life and kind-of-experience.» Although birth and length-of-life, since they precede joy and extreme anguish, do have the latter as their results,—whereas the kind-of-experience follows the rise [in consciousness] of joy and extreme anguish and in fact has its essence in the [direct] experience (anubhava) of them,—still in so far as being [directly] experienced is the same as a kind-of-experience (bhoga), we may suppose that [joy and extreme anguish] are results of the kind-of-experience only so far as they are the objects of the kind-of-experience. It is objected, 'The birth and length-of-life and kind-of-experience, which are the results of extreme anguish, are things to be rejected (heya), since they are felt to be counteractive. But why should those [fruitions] which have merit as cause be renounced? they have pleasure as their result since they are felt to be co-active (anukūta). Nor can their co-activity, which may be felt by every one, be gainsaid by even a thousand verbal communications and inferences. Moreover neither joy nor extreme anguish can exist without the other. For while joy is being received, extreme anguish, since it cannot be driven off, may also fall to one's lot, because the two have separate causes and because they have separate forms.' In reply to this he says, «And just as... this.» Although ordinary individuals, at the time when there is pleasure in objects, are not conscious of them as counteractive, still yogins are conscious of this [counteractiveness].

How can this be accounted for?

15. As being the pains which are mutations and anxieties and subliminal-impressions, and by reason of the opposition of the fluctuations of the aspects (guna),—to the discriminating all is nothing but pain.

1. For every one this experience of pleasure is permeated with passion and is dependent upon animate and inanimate instruments. In this case we have a latent-deposit of karma arising from passion. Likewise also [a man] hates the instruments of pain and becomes infatuated [by the instruments of infatuation]. Thus there is also a latent-deposit made by aversion and by infatuation. And in this sense it has been said, “Enjoyment is impossible unless one has killed some living creature.” Therefore there is also the latent-deposit of karma, effected by killing, belonging to the body. Thus it has been said, “Undifferentiated-consciousness (avidyā)

1 This sūtra seems to have influenced Umāsvāti: Tattvārthādhyāga-sūtra vii. 6.
is pleasure in an object of sense. That which is the subsidence of the organs because of their satiation with enjoyments is pleasure; after there has been a craving, the failure to subside is pain. And by the application of the organs to enjoyments one cannot make one’s self free from thirst [for enjoyment]. Why is this? Since passions increase because of (anus) application to enjoyments, and the skill of the organs also increases. Therefore application to the enjoyment of pleasure is not a way of approach [to freedom from thirst for objects]. Surely one aiming at pleasure and permeated by objects is sunk in the deep bog of pain, like the man who, while in fear of the scorpion’s poison is bitten by the poisonous snake. This is the so-called painfulness of mutation; it is counteractive; even in a condition of pleasure it hinders the yogin himself.—2. Now what is the painfulness of anxiousness? Every one has the experience of anxiousness; it is permeated by aversion and is dependent upon animate and inanimate instruments. Here we have a latent-deposit of karma arising from aversion. And [a man] yearning for the instruments of pleasure, throbs in the body and in [the organs of] speech and in the central-organ (manas). Since it then aids or (ca) thwarts others by aiding them or by injuring them, it amasses right-actions and wrong-actions. This latent-deposit of karma is the result of greed and of infatuation. For this reason it is called the painfulness of anxiousness.—3. But what is the painfulness of subliminal-impressions? There is a latent-deposit of subliminal-impressions of pleasure arising from the experience of pleasure; and there is a latent-deposit of subliminal-impressions of pain arising from the experience of pain. Thus analogously (evam), while the fruition from the karmas is under experience, there is on the other hand an accumulation of a latent-deposit of karma. Thus this stream of pain from time-without-beginning, spreading wider and wider, agitates even the yogin because its essence is counteractive. Why is this? It is because a wise man is like an eyeball. Just

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1 Perhaps an allusion to the phrase sukha-khyātir avidyā (ii. 5, Cal. ed. 114).
2 Colonel Jacob (Second Handful of Popular Maxims, 2nd ed., 1909, p. 76) points out that Vācaspati uses this nyāya again in the Tátparyatikā (1898), p. 58u.
as a fine thread of wool fallen upon the eyeball by its touch gives
pain, but not so when it falls upon other parts of the body, so these
pains [from subliminal-impressions] hinder the yogin only, who is
like an eyeball, but not any other perceiver. But upon the other,
[not a yogin],—who casts off the pain received time after time
which has been brought upon him by his own karma,—and who
receives the pain cast off time after time,—and who is as it were
permeated through and through from all sides with fluctuating
mind-stuff complicated from time-without-beginning with its
subconscious-impressions,—and who under [the influence of]
undifferentiated-consciousness (avidyā) conforms [himself] to the
‘I-substance’ and to the ‘Of me-substance’ with regard to
those very things which are to be rejected,—upon him, born again
and again, the triple anguishes from both kinds of causes, both
inner and outer, sweep down. This being so, the yogin, having
seen himself and the whole multitude of creatures borne away by
this stream of pain from time-without-beginning, seeks refuge in
the focused-insight (samyag-darçana), the cause of the dwindling
of all pain.—<And by reason of the opposition of the fluctuations of
the aspects (guna),—to the discriminating all is nothing but pain.>
The aspects (guna) of the thinking-substance in the form of bright-
ness and of activity and of inertia, having become interdependent
by aid given each to the other, give rise to a presented-idea either
trivial or cruel or infatuated, [either one or the other] of just
these three aspects. “And because the changes (vyttā) of the
aspects (guna) are unstable, the mind-stuff is in rapid mutation.”
Thus we have been told.1 “The [outer] forms [when developed to]
a high degree and the [inner] fluctuations [when developed to] a
high degree oppose each other; but the generic forms co-operate
with [these when developed to] a high degree.” Thus since these
aspects (guna) have presented-ideas of pleasure and of pain and of
infatuation obtained by reliance of one [aspect] upon another, each
(sarve) [of them] has the form of each of [the others]. But the
distinction between them is due to their being either in a subordi-

1 By Pañcaçikha. Compare iii. 9 and 13, pp. 199* and 204*; iv. 15, p. 298* (Calc. ed.).
nating all is nothing but pain. So the seed out of which this huge aggregate of pain grows forth is undifferentiated-consciousness (avidyā). And the reason for the failure-of-growth (abhāva) in this [avidyā] is the focused-insight.—Just as a system of medicine has four divisions, [on] Disease [and on] Cause of Disease [and on] Health [and on] Remedy, so this system also has four divisions, [on] the Round-of-Rebirth [and on] the Cause of the Round-of-Rebirth [and on] Release [and on] the Way to Release. Of these [four], the Round-of-Rebirth with its mass of pains is that which is to be escaped; the conjunction of the primary-cause and of the Self is the cause of this which is to be escaped (heya); the final destruction of the correlation is the escape (hāna); the means of escape is focused-insight. In this [focused-insight] he who escapes—as he is in himself—can neither be accepted nor rejected (heya). For if there be a rejection (hāna), that would involve the doctrine of the extermination of him [who escapes]. And 1 if there be an acceptance [that would involve] the doctrine [that he has] a cause. And 1 by denying both [the rejection and the acceptance], we have the doctrine [that the Seer as he is in himself is] eternal. This is the focused-insight.

In order to account for this he introduces the sūtra after first asking the question, «How can this be accounted for?» The sūtra begins with the word 15... mutation and ends with the word discriminating... [The compound in the sūtra is analysed,] mutation and anxiety and subliminal-impression—these themselves are the pains—it is by these... He describes the painfulness of the pleasure in objects of sense in so far as mutations are painful by saying, «For every one this.» Pleasure is surely impossible unless it be permeated by passion. For one cannot possibly say that one finds no happiness in a thing and at the same time take pleasure in it. Moreover, since pleasure leads to action and action causes a latent-deposit of merit and demerit, there is also a latent-deposit of karma produced by passion, because a thing which does not exist cannot be produced. Under these circumstances (tādā), a man experiencing pleasure and feeling attachment to it, feels aversion towards the instruments of pain with an aversion that is in an intercepted state. Furthermore, being unable to prevent these [instruments of pain] he becomes infatuated. Thus there is also a latent-deposit of karma made by aversion and by infatuation. And there is nothing contradictory in making infatuation, whose other name is misconception, the cause of a latent-deposit of the karma of infatuation also. If it be asked,

1 Omitted in most MSS.
How can a man in love feel aversion or infatuation, since, when he is in love, aversion and infatuation are not evidently existent, he replies, «And in this sense it has been said» by us when explaining [ii. 4] hindrances with intercepted states. In this way merit and demerit have been shown as produced by sense-activities of speech and mind. Because a mental volition produced by passion, so that one wills, 'this must be done,' is also not to be distinguished from the verbal form [of the volition] in so far as it is equally desired. As they say, 'A volition with desire does not go beyond intended-objects which can be expressed by words.' He also shows a latent-deposit of karma belonging to the body in the words, «"Impossible . . . unless one has killed"». Hence authors of the Law Books say [Manu iii. 68, Viṣṇu lix. 19], “Five kinds-of-slaughter are open to the householder.” The objector says, ‘This may be true. Yet it is not fitting that a yogin should reject pleasure in objects-of-sense which can be felt by anybody. For that would be running counter to experience.’ In reply to this he says, «It has been said, “Undifferentiated-consciousness (avidyā) is pleasure in an object-of-sense”» by [us when] showing [ii. 5] that undifferentiated-consciousness is characterized by four kinds of misconceived ideas. The ancient sages (vṛddha) do not pay heed to anything merely at the first impression. There is of course, merely at the first impression (apatatas), an experience which any one can feel of pleasure which follows even after eating food mixed with sweet poison; but after a lapse of time there is no pleasure. And as such it has been shown by The Exalted [Īcvara in the Gītā xviii. 38], “After there has been contact of the sense-organs with objects, that pleasure which is at the beginning like nectar and in the course of time like poison is known to be full of rajas.” He raises a doubt by saying, «which . . . with enjoyments.» The objector says, ‘We do not accede to the statement that pleasure is the joy in objects. On the contrary, when men are not satiated and when their minds are afflicted with yearnings for one object after another, it is the very thirst itself that is the great pain. And this [thirst] does not subside unless enjoyment follow. Furthermore the full subsidence of this [thirst] is not permeated with passion and similar [states of mind]. Thus it cannot be said that this subsidence has the painfulness of mutation.’ This is the point.—«Because of their satiation» means: Because the thirst [for enjoyment] has dwindled, there is a subsidence of the organs, in other words, there is no activity [of the organs] with regard to objects-of-sense. He makes this same clear by a negative instance in the words «arising from a craving.» He rebuts an objection with the words «And . . . by the organs . . . not.» The word «because of (anu)» is used in the sense of cause. It is true that the dwindling of thirst [for objects] is the flawless pleasure. But application to enjoyment is not the cause of this [dwindling of thirst]; but it is the cause of the thirst which is just the opposite of this [dwindling of thirst]. Just as they say,2 “Lust by the enjoyment of

1 Without the flaw of vṛga.
2 See Manu ii. 94; Viṣṇu Purāṇa iv. 10. 9; Purāṇa lxvii. 17.
Pain is past and present and future

lusts never subsides; just as by the butter-oblation the flames flare up yet once again.”—The rest is without obscurity.—2. He asks a question with regard to the painfulness of anxiety in the words, «Now what?» The answer is «every one.» As everybody knows what it is, he does not make a detailed statement of it as such. And the detailed statement is analogous to that of the painfulness of mutation.—3. He asks about the painfulness of subliminal-impressions by saying «what?» He gives the answer in the words «the experience of pleasure.» For an experience of pleasure gives rise to a subliminal impression and this to a memory of pleasure; and this to a passion; and this to movements of the central-organ and of the body and of [the organ of] speech; and this [gives rise] to merit and demerit; from these [comes] the experience of fruition; from this a subconscious-impression. Thus there is a beginningless chain. Here the connexion should be understood in this way. There is a memory of pleasure and of pain according to the variation in the degree of the subliminal-impressions of pleasure and of pain; and from this comes passion and aversion; from these two come karma; from the karmas, fruition. Streaming on in this way the stream of pain hinders the yogin only, but not the other perceiver, [that is] any ordinary person, as he says in the words «Thus this from-time-without-beginning.» But the triple anguishes sweep down upon the other. This is the construction [of the sentence].—In so far as the two anguishes, that from the gods and that from the elements, are [each] external, their unity is emphasized.—Since it is a fluctuation in the mind-stuff, undifferentiated-consciousness (avidyā) is said to be «fluctuating mind-stuff.» Under [the influence of] this, «with regard to those very things which are to be rejected» [that is] with regard to the thinking-substance and the organs and the body and so on [as the ‘I’,] and with regard to wife and children [as the ‘of me’], «he conforms [himself] to the ‘I-substance’ and to the ‘Of-me-substance.’» This being the case, there is no other refuge for him than the focused-insight. So he says «This being so.» This being so, he has mentioned the extrinsic (āvatārākṣa) painfulness of the pleasure in objects as a result of mutation and of subliminal-impressions and of contact with anxiousness. He [now] indicates the intrinsic [painfulness] by saying «And by reason of the opposition of the aspects (guna).» «He explains [this part of the sutra] by saying «brightness.» Brightness and activity and inertia are the forms, in so far as they are forms of the thinking-substance, which enter into mutation. The aspects (guna) are sattva and rajas and tamas [and they] are interdependent upon each other. They give rise to either a tranquil (its essence is pleasure), or 2. a cruel (its essence is pain), or finally (eva) 3. an infatuated (its essence is dejection) presented-idea of [these] three aspects, although its form is an experience of pleasure. And not even this mutation of this [thinking-substance] having such a presented-idea as its form is fixed. Because of this he says «And because the changes of the aspects (guna) are unstable, the mind-stuff is in rapid mutation.”» It is objected, ‘[There is] one presented-idea; how can it at one time
make known tranquillity and cruelty and infatuation, which are opposed to each other? In reply to this he says, <<“The [outer] forms [when developed to] a high degree and the [inner] fluctuations [when developed to] a high degree oppose each other.”> The <<forms>> are the eight states (bhaava) beginning with right-action. The <<fluctuations>> are pleasure and so on. So in this case wrong-action, since it is in such a condition [of high development], is opposed by right-action when it is in process of fruition. Similarly with knowledge [and] with passionlessness [and] with power [as well as] with pleasure and so on their corresponding contraries are in opposition. But the generic forms, which are not actively moving forth, since they do not oppose [those which are developed] to a high degree, co-operate with those which are actively moving forth.—The objector says, ‘We know [all] this. Yet how can pleasure in objects have an intrinsic painfulness?’ In reply to this he says, <<Thus since these.>> Because the material cause [of both] is not different and because their essence is the material cause, there is also no difference in the material effects (vãdâya). ‘So then is this identity absolute? If so, the difference [between the two terms] in the attributive relations of the thinking-substance would not be possible.’ In reply to this he says, <<in a subordinate or in a dominant.>> In relation to the generic element (atman) there is subordination; in relation to the element [which is developed] to a high degree there is dominance. So both extrinsically and intrinsically (svabhãvatas) to the discriminating all is nothing, but pain. Consequently by men of insight pain should be escaped (heya). And it cannot be escaped unless its cause (middana) be escaped. Moreover it cannot be escaped unless its cause be thoroughly understood. So he shows what its radical cause is in the words, <<So . . . of this.>> That seed out of which the aggregate of pain grows forth [or] arises. He shows the reason for the extermination of this growth in the words <<And . . . in this.>> Now he shows that this system which has entered upon its activity for the sake of showing favour [i. 1] to all is similar to another system of the same kind by saying, <<Just as.>> [A system described as being of four divisions] is one of which there are the four divisions, that is, four compactly arranged parts.—It is objected, ‘Why is there not a contradiction when you said that pain is to be escaped and when you [now] describe the round-of-rebirth as something to be escaped?’ In reply to this he says <<Of these [four] . . . with its mass of pains.>> That, by doing which undifferentiated-consciousness (avidya) makes the round-of-rebirth, [that constitutes] its special form of activity which is the cause of the round-of-rebirths. This he describes in the words, <<of the primary cause and of the Self.>> He tells what liberation is in the words, <<of the correlation.>> He tells what the means of liberation are in the words, <<the means of escape.>> Some there who regard the extermination of him-who-escapes (hãty)—as he is in himself—to be liberation.

1 Right-action, knowledge, passionlessness, power, and their opposites. See Sãmkhya Kûr. xl.

2 The specialized forms. See iii. 44.

3 The Yogãcåra school of Buddhists.
In this sense they say, "Like the blowing-out (nirvāṇa) of a lamp is the deliverance of this anguished (tāpin) [mind]." Others again teach that, as a result of the extermination of the hindrances with their subconscious impressions, purified mental-states (vijñāna) are produced; and that this itself is liberation. In reply to these he says, «In this [focused-insight].» In this case he first finds fault with the escape by saying, «For if there be an escape... for him.» Since no rational man ever exerts himself to exterminate himself. It is objected, 'We see some persons, all of whose pleasures are uprooted by intense disease and who drag about their bodies, as it were, laden with pain, striving to exterminate themselves.' True, he says in reply, there are a few such. But not of this kind are men living in the ordinary round-of-rebirth. [For] their lot is to enjoy diverse and strange and celestial delights. Even those [others], however, are evidently desirous of liberation. Accordingly we should not concede that liberation is the extermination of him who escapes—as he is in himself—since that would involve what is not one of the aims of man. The objector says, 'Very well then, let us say that he who escapes—as he is in himself—is something that may be accepted.' In reply to this he says, «And if there be an acceptance... the doctrine [that he has] a cause.» For if there be an acceptance [of him], then, because he would be impermanent in so far as he is an effect, he might also fall even from [his] state of liberation. For liberation is deathlessness. And [we could] not [say] that an uninterrupted succession of purified mental-states is deathless. Because the uninterrupted series, over and above the members-of-the-series (saṁtānaṁ), not being anything [perceptibly] real, does not exist; and because the members-in-the-series are not permanent. Therefore we should strive to have such a theory as [would teach that the Self as he is in himself is] eternal. For this being so, liberation (apavarga) might be [one of] the aims of men. So he says, «And by denying both.» Consequently, liberation is nothing but [the Seer] abiding in himself [i. 8]. Precisely this is the right point of view.

This same system is set forth in its four divisions.

16. That which is to be escaped is pain yet to come.

Pain past, that is, transferred beyond experience, cannot properly be called (pākṣe vartate) a thing to be escaped. And present pain in its own moment [of existence] has attained experience; so it cannot at the next moment be so changed that it can be escaped. Consequently only that pain which is yet to come is that which hinders the yogin only, who is like an eye-ball, but [this does] not [hinder] any other perceiver. Only this pain becomes so changed that it may be escaped.

1 The Bikaner MS. reads cetasa iti. Tāpin appears to be correct instead of tāpin.
2 The Mādhyamika school of Buddhists.
3 Compare ii. 15, p. 1349 (Calcutta ed.).
16. That which is to be escaped is pain yet to come. The words "yet to come" exclude the past and the present. He makes this consistent by saying "pain past." If it be objected that present pain now in experience is not to be transferred beyond experience, he replies "And present." Easy.

Therefore the cause of this same thing that is described as something to be escaped is once more specified.

17. The correlation of the Seer and the object-of-sight is the cause of that which is to be escaped.

The Seer is the Self conscious by reflection of the thinking-substance. Objects-of-sight are all external-aspects (dharma) which have struck upon the sattva of the thinking-substance. So this same object-of-sight giving its aid, like a magnet, by the mere fact of being near, becomes, by reason of its being an object-of-sight, the property of the Self, its proprietor, whose nature is seeing. It becomes changed into an object upon which experience operates,—in so far it has the nature of another. Having acquired [this new] being, although self-dependent, [it becomes] by serving one-not-itself, dependent on one-not-itself. The correlation of these two, the power of seeing and the power by which one sees, is from time-without-beginning and is effected for [two] purposes. [This correlation is] the cause of that which is to be escaped, in other words, the cause of pain. And in this sense it has also been said, "By avoidance of the cause of correlation with this [thinking-substance] the antidote for pain would be absolute." Why [would this be so]? Because we know the antidote to prevent the cause of pain. For example, we know that the liability-to-scratches inheres in the sole of the foot, the power to scratch inheres in the thorn, the prevention [of scratching] is either by not stepping with the foot upon the thorn or by stepping [upon it when the sole of the foot] is covered by a foot-protector. Whoever understands these three [scratch and cause and prevention] has begun the antidote therefor and is not exposed to the pain from scratches.

1 Compare i. 4, p. 171; ii. 18, p. 1438; iv. 17, 3007 (Calc. ed.).
2 Compare iv. 24.
Why [is this]? Because of his power to apperceive the three-fold character [of the case]. And to resume the argument (atrāpi), the sattva, the castigated, comes under the ownership of rajas, the castigator. Why [so]? Since it stands in a passive relation to the activity of the castigator. The act of castigation affects the sattva as a passive object, but does not affect the immutable and inactive Soul (kṣetrajña). [Why inactive?] Since it has objects shown to it. But if the sattva be under castigation, the Self, it appears, conforming itself to the form of this [sattva] is itself castigated along with [the sattva].

That which is to be escaped has been described. Its cause (nīdāna) is [now] described 17. The correlation of the Seer and the object-of-sight is the cause of that which is to be escaped. He tells of the Seer himself in the words «The Seer . . . conscious by reflection of the thinking-substance.» The intelligence (citi) belonging to the Self (Purusa), although it is detached, becomes conscious by reflection of the thinking-substance, and this consists in the thinking-substance being imaged (chāyā) [in the intelligence]. It is objected that ‘even if this be so, [the Self] could see the thinking-substance only, but could not see the various things (gabdādi) which are absolutely shut off [from it]’. To this he replies, «Objects-of-sight . . . the (sattva) of the thinking-substance.» When by the channel of the senses the thinking-substance enters into mutations having the forms of various things and when it is an object-of-sight, the various things, the external-aspects, are also objects-of-sight. It is objected, ‘In so far as the thinking-substance has assumed the form of these [things], it may have the form of the various things. But if, in the case of the Self, his relation to the thinking-substance be assumed, he would be mutable. Yet if there be no relation between them, how can the various things, although present in the (sattva) of the thinking-substance, be objects-of-sight? For surely an object-of-sight not in relation with the Seer cannot be called an object-of-sight.’ To this he replies, «this same object-of-sight.» All this has been given in detail by us in Book First, where we showed [i.7, p.22] that the sattva of the thinking-substance, although not in combination with intelligence (caitanya), in so far as it is absolutely clear, still, in so far as it contains the image (bimba) of the intelligence, seems to come into a balanced state [with the intelligence] and [so] experiences the various things. Hence also the Seer, enjoying within himself the pleasures and other [experiences] offered by the sattva of the thinking-substance which has entered into mutation in the form of the various things, becomes the proprietor. And the sattva of the thinking-substance [having mutations] of such a kind becomes his property. So this same sattva of the thinking-substance, containing the forms of the various things, becomes the object-of-sight; and being like a magnet, it becomes the property of the Self whose nature is seeing and who is the proprietor.
Why [is this]? He says, "the experience." Because [the sattva of the thinking-substance] is changed into an object upon which experience operates. The «experience» is the enjoyment on the part of the Self; the «operation» is the activity; the «object» is the condition of being enjoyed; because it is «changed into» this, it becomes the property [of the Self].—The objection is made, 'How can the sattva of the thinking-substance, which is luminous in itself, be the object of an experience?' In reply to this he says, «in so far as it has the nature of another.» For if the sattva of the thinking-substance were really like the intelligence (cāitanya), it would be luminous in itself. But it has acquired [this new] being, it is property (sva), it is other than intelligence (cāitanya), and inert in nature. Therefore it is the object of the experience on the part of this [intelligence]. It is objected, 'One thing is dependent upon another thing, when in some way or other it exerts itself for the sake of the other. Whereas the sattva of the thinking-substance does not in any way exert itself for the Self which is detached [from it]. And how can [the thinking-substance] be dependent on this [intelligence]? And this being so, it cannot be an object upon which [the Self] operate.' In reply to this he says, «although self-dependent.» «By serving the purpose of one-not-itself,» by serving the purpose of the Self, it becomes «dependent on one-not-itself,» dependent upon the Self. The objector says, 'This relation between the power of seeing and the power by which one sees must be either natural or accidental. If it be natural, since the two terms of the relation are permanent, the relation is one that cannot be exterminated; and this being so, the round-of-rebirth would be permanent. But if it be accidental, then in so far as hindrances and karma and its subconscious-impressions are fluctuations of the inner-organ, the former exist only so long as the inner-organ exists, and if at the same time (cā) the inner-organ is to have these as its cause, there would be the fault of mutual interdependence; and [you could not explain this fault away by bringing in a series without beginning,] because it is impossible that there should be anything from time-without-beginning at the beginning of the creation, for then the round-of-rebirth would not be produced at all. On which point it has been said, "Even in the opinion of those who think that the Self is not an agent, how can the aspects (guna) bring about the very first activity? For then karma does not yet exist. Neither is there then an erroneous idea nor passion nor hatred nor similar [hindrances]. For all these are fluctuations of the central-organ and the central-organ has not been produced at that time."' This doubt he removes by the words, «The correlation of these two, the power of seeing and the power by which one sees, is from time-without-beginning and is effected for [two] purposes.» It is true that the relation is not natural, but accidental. But it is not to be supposed that it has a beginning. For in so far as it is the result of a cause (nimitta) which is from time-without-beginning, it itself is also from time-without-beginning. Furthermore the uninterrupted succession of hindrances and karma and subconscious-impressions of these is from time-without-beginning.
And although at the time of [each] reversal of creation [this succession] has been reduced to the state of equipoise (sāmya) in the primary cause, still at the beginning of a creation it becomes again as before, just as some kinds of plants (uddhijja), reduced at the end of the rains to a state of earth, when the rains [return], assume again their proper form. More than once this has been made known previously. In so far as it brings it to growth, undifferentiated-consciousness is the cause of the correlation; in so far as it is the reason for [its] stability, the purpose of the Self is the cause. For this [conjunction] is stable by virtue of this [purpose of the Self]. It is this that is stated in the words, «affected for [two] purposes.» «And in this sense it has also been said» by Pañcaçikha.

«By conjunction with this» means by conjunction with the thinking-substance. This same is the cause of pain. By the avoidance of this [conjunction] this antidote for pain would be absolute. So what is implied is (artha) that pain results from a failure to avoid it. In connexion with this same point he states an extremely well-known simile in the words, «For example.» «A foot-protection is a sandal. An objector says, ‘Let this be granted. But if it be said that correlation with the aspects (guna) is the cause of the castigation, then we must say that the aspects (guna) are castigators. And since the action of castigating does not remain within the agent, as is the case in such an [intransitive] act as being, we must expect some other thing to be castigated. And the Self is not the passive object of this [act] as being something to be castigated, for in so far as he is immutable, it is not fitting that he should be such as to [reap] the consequences which come from actions. Therefore we come to the result that the act of castigating, which is concomitant with the thing castigated, ceases when [the thing castigated] also ceases, just as there is absence of smoke when fire is lacking.' So he says, «And to resume the argument . . . . the castigator.» It is the aspects (guna) only that are in the relation of castigated and castigator. Of these [three], sattva, because it is soft like the sole of the foot, is the object to be castigated. Whereas rajas, inasmuch as it is keen, is the castigator. This is the point. He asks, «Why [so]?» That is to say, why is sattva alone, and not the Self, the object to be castigated? He gives the answer in the words, «the sattva as a passive object.» ‘Is not then the Self castigated at all? If so, let it be the inanimate sattva that receives the castigation. What does it matter to us?’ In reply to this he says, «Since it has objects shown to it. But if the sattva be under castigation, the Self, it appears, conforming itself to the form of this [sattva] is itself castigated along with [the sattva].» The cause of its being castigated along with it that objects are shown to it and this has been explained previously [i. 4].

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1 The frog's body (maṇḍūka-deha) is used as the simile in i. 19, p. 51a (Calc. ed.).
2 This is the seventh in Garbe’s collection of Pañcaçikha’s fragments, Festgruss an Roth, p. 79.
He tells what the object-of-sight itself is.

18. With a disposition to brightness and to activity and to inertia, and with the elements and the organs as its essence, and with its purpose the experience and the liberation [of the Self],—[this is] the object-of-sight.

The sattva has the disposition to brightness; the rajas has the disposition to activity; the tamas has the disposition to inertia. These aspects (guna) with the [three] separate parts influencing each other,—with external-aspects (dharma) in conjunction or in separation,—with limitations¹-in-extent (mūrti) brought about by basing them upon an interdependence of one upon another,—with separate powers, although in subservience to each other, still unconfused,—with conformations (anupātin) according to various disparate and comparate powers,—with their presence manifested at the time when they become dominant,—with their existence, although subordinate to the dominant [aspects] yet from their functional-activity (vyāparu) inferred as included in the dominant,—with their faculties employed as effective for the purposes of the Self,—with their aid given, like that of a magnet, from the mere fact of being near,—following without any external cause after a fluctuation of any one of themselves—these aspects (guna) are denoted by the word primary-cause. And this is called <the object-of-sight.> This same object-of-sight enters into mutation as elements and as organs,—as elements such as earth and the others in coarse ² and in subtle [form]. It enters likewise into mutation as organs such as the organ-of-hearing (citra). But it is not without an impelling force. On the contrary, it acts only by accepting an impelling force. For the object-of-sight exists for the sake of the experience and the liberation of the Self. Of these [two], experience is the ascertainment of things with desirable qualities and of things with undesirable qualities so long as this [ascertainment] does not divide [the Self from the thinking-substance]. Liberation is the ascertainment³ of the

¹ Compare iii. 44, p. 254¹ (Calc. ed.).
² This refers forward to the important and peculiar definitions of coarse and subtle in iii. 44. See the illuminating words of Bālarāma in notes 1 and 2 of p. 144 (Calc. ed.).
³ Compare draṣṭur svāroppalabdhiḥ so 'pavargaha, ii. 28, p. 157² (Calc. ed.).
enjoyer himself. Thus there is no other process-of-knowing in addition to these two. And in this sense it has been said,\(^1\) "But he who in the three aspects (guna) which are agents and in the Self which is not an agent,—but which is of the same kind—in some respects and of a different kind in other respects,—sees all the produced states presented to the fourth, the witness of their action—he has no suspicion that there is another kind of knowledge [the pure intelligence]." ‘How is it that these two, experience and liberation, made by the thinking-substance and existing in the thinking-substance only, are attributed to the Self?’ Just as a victory or a defeat on the part of actual fighters\(^2\) is ascribed to their commander, for he as we know is the experiencer of the result, so bondage and release, existing in the thinking-substance only, are ascribed to the Self. For he as we know has the experience of the results of these. Bondage is of the thinking-substance only and is the failure to attain the purposes of the Self. Release is the termination of the purpose of the Self. Thus it is that processes-of-knowing and processes-of-retention and comprehensions-of-particulars\(^3\) (ūha) and removals-of-faults (apōha) and real-knowledge and the will-to-live, [all] existing in the thinking-substance, are assumed to exist in the Self. For he as we know has the experience of the results of these.

He explains the object-of-sight by the sūtra beginning with the word 18... brightness and ending with the words object-of-sight. Brightness is a portion of the sattva; it is influenced by dejection which is a quality of tamaś or by pain which is a quality of rajas. Similarly it must be understood in the case of the quality of rajas and the rest. It is this that is stated in the words «with the [three] separate parts influencing each other.» «With external-aspects (dharma) in conjunction or in separation» with [or from] the Self. As it is written [Cvet. Up. iv. 5], “One male goat [i.e., the unborn soul] has pleasure in leaping upon the one female goat [i.e. primary matter] which is

\(1\) This is Garbe's eighth fragment of Pañca-čikha. It is introduced to support the statement that experience consists in determining the nature of the gunas which have been identified with the Self. Although the three gunas are active agents, the indiscriminating man looks upon all things as the deeds of the Self, who never acts, who is different in nature from the gunas, and who merely witnesses their changes. He does not suspect the existence of an intelligence which is an insight discriminated from the gunas.

\(2\) Compare i. 24, p. 55\(^5\) (Calc. ed.).

\(3\) See Nyāya-sūtra i. 1. 40.
red and white and black and which brings forth many offspring like herself; while another male goat deserts her after having enjoyed her."—Limitations in extent, such as earth, are those which have been brought about by basing them upon interdependence of one upon another. The objector says, "This may be true. When a quiescent idea is to be produced by sattva, since rajas and tamas also, in so far as they are accessory to sattva, are the causes of this [idea], there is a power in them. If this be so (iti), and whenever rajas or tamas might be principal, then always a quiescent idea might arise, not a cruel nor an infatuated one, just as in the case when sattva was dominant." In reply to this he says, "with separate powers, although in subservience to each other, still unconfused." Let it be granted, when a quiescent idea is to be produced, that rajas and tamas are in an accessory relation, still their powers are not commingled. For the fact that their powers are not commingled may be inferred from the fact that there is no commingling of effects. Whereas effects of the quiescent and cruel and infatuated forms are seen to move actively forth in so far as their form is uncommingled. Thus it is established that the powers are unconfused. The objector says, "Suppose this be granted. If the powers are unconfused, then the aspects (guna) cannot be supposed to work harmoniously together. Evidently things whose powers are different never have effects that are produced by a harmonious working together. Threads, for instance, and lumps of earth and dry grasses do not work harmoniously together and produce a jar." In reply to this he says, "with conformations according to various disparate and comparable powers." Although the power of serving as material cause is in [a thing which is] comparable [with its effect], and not elsewhere, and although the power of serving as co-operative [cause may be] in disparate things, still when it is a water-jar that is to be generated, it is not in the power of the dry grasses to serve even as co-operative [causes], and this being so, these [grasses] do not work harmoniously with threads. This is the point. —[He analyses the compound.] Those are referred to whose character it is to conform to certain kinds of powers with regard to possible disparities and comparates.—"At the time when they become dominant." When a super-normal body is to be generated, the sattva is dominant and the rajas and tamas are accessory. Similarly when a human body is to be generated, the rajas is dominant and the sattva and tamas accessory. Likewise when an animal body is to be generated, the tamas is dominant and the sattva and rajas are accessory. Thus these aspects (guna) have their presence manifested at the time when they become dominant. In other words, they contribute to the effect in proportion as they become re-intensified. And the word «dominant» is to be taken as the abstract form of dominance¹ (bhavapradhāna).

¹ He wishes to exclude the other meaning of pradhāna, that is, primary cause. Just as 'one and two' have an abstract and a particular sense, so also this word has the sense of 'dominant' and of 'primary cause'. See Pāṇ. iii. 4. 69.
The aspects are foreign to the Self

Just as [in the phrase of Panini's sūtra i. 4. 22,] "The dual and singular are used in case of two and one," [the words two and one are] in this case to be understood as twoness and oneness; in other cases [such as of measurable numbers], they are to be understood as two and as one.—An objector says, 'At that time [of dominance], it is possible to say that the dominant exists in so far as it is in its intense form. But is there any source-of-valid-ideas [to prove] the real existence of its accessories which are not in the intense form?' In reply to this he says, «although subordinate.» Although not intensified, still, because they have no discrimination [to recognize that they are themselves inanimate], and [yet] because they do work harmoniously together,—from the mere fact of their functional-activity in so far as there is co-operation,—their existence is inferred as being included in the primary cause. The objector says, 'We may grant that the aspects (guna) have faculties and work harmoniously together, but why do they perform this [co-operation]? For surely just because one says there is a faculty, one generates no [actual] effect on the ground that there may not be any cessation in the production of effects.' In reply to this he says, «employed as effective for the purposes of the Self.» After this [purpose has been effected], when all the purposes of the Self have been ended, the aspects [afterwards] cease and produce no effects. This is what he means to say. If it be asked, 'How can a thing which does not aid the Self, use impelling force as being a purpose of the Self,' he replies «aid given merely by being near.» It is objected that 'the impeller of the aspects is a cause characterized only as being merit and demerit; but can [these aspects be made to produce effects] when impelled by the purpose of the Self?' In reply to this objection he says, «without any external cause.»—[He explains the phrase.] «The rest» [of the aspects], even «without any external-cause (pratyaya)» [or] efficient-cause (nimitta) such as merit, «following the fluctuation of any one of them,» either of sattva or of rajas or of tamas, as dominant and as being active towards the production of its own effect. In which sense he will say later [iv. 3], "The efficient-cause gives no impulse, but [the mutation] follows when the barrier to the evolving-causes is cut, just as in the case of the peasant."—The construction of the sentence is, these aspects (guna) are denoted by the word primary-cause (pradhāna). According to its derivation [the word pradhāna] is that by which the universe is produced (pradhivyate) or put forth.1 This is said to be the object-of-sight. —Having mentioned the nature of the aspects (guna) he describes the effect of this disposition in the words, «this same.» In order to establish the doctrine of the pre-existent effect (satkāryavāda), he says that a thing enters into mutation as a form of that thing, whichever it may be, that is its essence. He makes clear that its essence is elements and organs by the words beginning, «as an element.» To the words, «with its purpose the experience and

1 Compare ii. 23, p. 1594 (Calc. ed.).
the liberation, which are a part of the sūtra, he gives an introduction by saying "not without an impelling-force." He elaborates the word "experience" by saying "of these [two]." For pleasure and pain belong to the thinking-substance as such in so far as it has three aspects (guna). Because this thinking-substance enters into mutation as being of such a kind [as one that has three aspects]. There is said to be experience in so far as there is an ascertainment [of the things] as belonging to [these] qualities. Accordingly he says, "so long as undivided." And this has been made known by us more than once.—He elaborates the word "liberation" by saying "of the enjoyer." Liberation is that by which one is liberated [literally, wrenched off]. He states that there is no other impelling-force [than these two] by saying "in addition to these two."—"And in this sense it has been said" by Pañcakīkha in the words ""But he who."" An objection is raised, 'As matters of [perceptible] reality, experience and liberation are made by the thinking-substance. How are they attributed to the Self who is neither their cause nor their locus?' In reply to this he says, "These two." And that the Self is enjoyer has been explained and will be stated later [iii. 34]. But in the strict sense it is as the text says, "Bondage is of the thinking-substance only and is the failure to attain the purposes of the Self." "Thus" means in the way that experience and liberation are mentioned as being related to the Self. [So] processes of-knowing and the rest are also to be understood as being related to the Self. Of these, "the process-of-knowing" is the thinking of the intended-object as it is in itself; the process-of-retention is memory with regard to this [object]; "comprehension-of-particulars (uha)" is the maintaining (uhana) of the particulars belonging to a thing; "removal-of-faults (apoha)" is the removal for statable reasons (yukti) of particulars when falsely attributed; it is by these two only, by comprehension-of-particulars and by removal-of-faults, that the given thing is determined, that is, that there is real knowledge; and will-to-live is rejection or acceptance preceded by this determination of the reality.

This sūtra is begun with the intent of determining the various forms of the aspects (guna), the objects-of-sight.

19. The particularized and the unparticularized [forms] and the resoluble only [into primary matter] and irresoluble—primary-matter—are the divisions of the aspects (guna).

Of these [four], the elements air and wind and fire and water and earth are the particularized [forms] of the unparticularized fine

The Vārttika says istanistagunāḥ are three 'aspects' to the common use of sukhamāyikhāmāyikāṁ. This illustrates the closeness of the term guna as the term as 'quality'. Compare i. 45.
Successive developments of the aspects

elements (tānmātra) sound and touch and colour and taste and smell. Similarly the organs of the thinking-substance are ear and skin and eye and tongue and nose, and the organs of action, voice and hands and feet and organ-of-excretion and organ-of-generation. And as the eleventh the central-organ which has all kinds of things as its intended object. These are the particularized [forms] of the unparticularized [personality-substance] which is characterized as having the feeling of personality. This is the sixteen-fold mutation of the aspects (guṇa). The unparticularized [forms] are six, namely, the fine element of sound and the fine element of touch and the fine element of colour and the fine element of taste and the fine element of smell. Thus, as we know, sound and the rest with one or two or three or four or five distinguishing-characteristics are five unparticularized [forms]. And the sixth is that of which we can only say that it is the feeling-of-personality. These are the six unparticularized forms of the Great thinking-substance of whose being we can only say that it exists. That which is prior to the unparticularized [forms] is that of which we can only say that it is resoluble [primary-matter], the Great Substance (mahat-tattva). Remaining in this Great Being (ātman) of which all that we can say is that it exists, these [six] unparticularized [forms] experience the limit of development. And reversing the process of creation they remain in that same Great Being of which all that we can say is that it exists, and revert to that which has neither existence nor non-existence, from which both existence and non-existence have been removed, from which non-existence has been removed, to the unphenomenalized and unresolvable primary-cause. This [Great Being of which all that we can say is that it exists], is the [first] mutation of these aspects. And that [Being] which has neither existence nor non-existence is the mutation [of these aspects] which is unresolvable [primary cause]. So the purpose of the Self is not the reason for the unresolvable state. Since the fact that the Self has a purpose is not known (bhavati) at the beginning as the cause of the state unresolvable [into primary matter], therefore the fact that the Self has a purpose is not a cause \(^1\) of this [state].

\(^1\) See i. 45, p. 96\(^8\) (Calc. ed.).
And since that state is not effected by the purpose of the Self, it is called permanent. But at the beginning of the three states that are particularized, the fact that the Self has a purpose is known to be the cause. And this purpose is known to act as purpose and as efficient cause. Hence this state is called impermanent. But the aspects, which conform themselves to all kinds of external-aspects (dharma), neither cease to be nor come into being, but appear as if they had the properties of coming into existence and of passing out of existence by reason of the [individual] phenomenalized forms, past and yet to come, going and coming, inseparably connected with the aspects. As for example we say, 'Devadatta is poor.' Why? 'Because his cows are dying.' Since his poverty is due to the dying of his cows and not to his loss of himself, the parallel (samādhi) [to the going and coming of the phenomenalized forms as affecting the aspects (guna)] applies (sama).—That of which we can only say that it is resoluble [into primary matter] is next [in development] to that which is irresoluble [into primary matter]. Formed therein it becomes distinguished from it [as its effect], since the order [of the development of the mutations] is not transgressed. Likewise the six unparticularized [forms] formed in that of which we can only say that it is resoluble [into primary matter] become distinguished [from it]. Because the order of mutations is fixed. Similarly the elements and organs formed in these unparticularized [forms] become distinguished [from them], as has been already described. There is no other entity (tattva) beyond the particularized [forms]. So there is no mutation into any other entity beyond the particularized [forms]. But their mutation into external-aspect and time-variation and intensity are to be explained [iii. 13] later.

«This sutra is begun with the intent of determining the various forms of the aspects (guna), the objects-of-sight.» The sutra begins with the words 19. The particularized and ends with the words divisions... He mentions the particularized [forms] which are the evolved-matter (vikāra) of the unparticularized [forms] which [latter] are without the serene and cruel and infatuated characteristics—[the evolved forms], but not the [forms] evolving ' other entities (tattva). He describes the [forms] belonging to these [entities] in the words,

1 See the discussion by Vācaspati in Sāmkhya Tattva-Kāum. on Kār. iii.