Of these [four], ... air. The order of explanatory-statement follows exactly the order of production. The organs of intelligence (buddhi) are particularized [forms] of the [personality-substance (ahamkara)] which is characterized as having the feeling-of-personality, and which has satva as its dominant [aspect]. But the organs of action [are particularized forms of the personality-substance] which has rajas as its dominant [aspect]. Whereas the central-organ (manas), the essence of which is of both kinds, must be supposed to be the [particularized form of the personality-substance] which has both kinds [that is, rajas and satva] as its dominant [aspects]. And [there is an inference] on this point, that the five fine elements have the thinking-substance as their cause, because they are unparticularized [forms], like the feeling-of-personality. Moreover, being an unparticularized form is [the same as] being the cause of evolved matter; and both in the fine elements and in the feeling-of-personality there is nothing particularized.—After grouping them together he enumerates the particularized [forms] in the words, «This . . . of the aspects.» He numbers the unparticularized [forms] also with the word «six.» He groups them together and sums them up with the word «namely.» Now the prior is particularized by the subsequent. So smell itself [together with the subsequent four] has five\(^1\) characteristics; taste itself [together with the subsequent three] has four characteristics; colour itself [together with the subsequent two] has three characteristics; touch itself [with the subsequent sound] has two characteristics; sound has the characteristic of sound only. «But of what are these six unparticularized [forms] the effect?» In reply to this he says «These . . . of which we can only say that it exists.» The existent (sat) is that which is capable of actions fulfilling a purpose; having existence (sattā) is the abstract form of this. The Great Substance is that which is made of this. In other words, whatever action fulfilling a purpose there be, whether its characteristic be enjoyment [of various things] from sound downwards, or whether its characteristic be the discernment of the difference between the satva and the Self, it is all of it comprehended in the Great Thinking-substance. By saying «of whose being» he shows what it really is and denies that it is nothing at all (tuccha). This is equivalent to saying that this first mutation of primary matter is a real thing, and not an appearance (vivartta). That which is prior to these, [that is] distant in time as compared with the unparticularized [forms] which are near in time, is that of which we can only say that it is resoluble [primary-matter], the Great Substance (mahat-tattva). Remaining in this Great Being of which all that we can say is that it exists, these six unparticularized [forms],—since it is established that the effect pre-exists [in its cause],—experience [or] reach the limit of development. On the other hand, of these non-particularized which have particularized [forms] there are also the mutations of external-aspect (dharma) and of time-variation and of intensity. It is this that is the limit of development, that is, the limit of mutation of these particu-

\(^1\) See Garbe: Sāmkhya Philosophy, p. 236, note 8.
larized [forms]. Having thus mentioned the order of growth he describes the order of dissolution in the words, «reversing the process of creation.» «Reversing the process of creation» [means] becoming resolved (praliyamāna) [into primary-matter]. In other words particularized forms are resolved into their own form, that is, become non-particularized. And they remain [or] are dissolved (niḥya) in that same Great Being of which all that we can say is that it exists. And then even with the Great [Being], these unparticularized [forms] revert to unphenomenalized [primary-matter], called unresolvable because in none (a) else are they resolved (ḥā). This same [unphenomenalized primary matter] is qualified by the words, «which has neither existence nor non-existence.» Existence is that which is capable of acts fulfilling a purpose of the Self. Non-existence is worthlessness (tucchatā) as regards the purpose of the Self. That is so-described [as having neither existence nor non-existence] which is beyond-the-range of both existence and non-existence. What he means to say is this. The state when sattva and rajas and tamas are in equipoise is never of use in fulfilling a purpose of the Self. And so it is not existent. Neither does it have a worthless kind of existence like the sky-lotus. Therefore it is also not non-existent. The objector says, ‘This may be so. Still in the unphenomenalized state there are the Great [Thinking-substance] and the other [entities] in so far as these are identical with this [unphenomenalized state]. For there is no utter annihilation of the existent, or if utterly annihilated it cannot be made to grow again. For because one cannot make the non-existent grow, the Great [Thinking-substance] and the other [entities] would really exist [in the unphenomenalized state] and therefore might function as acts fulfilling the purpose of the Self [and so the unphenomenalized state might be said to exist]. Then how could you say that it has no existence?’ In reply to this he says, «from which both existence and non-existence have been removed.» [The non-existent] is a cause which [exists] beyond any existing effect. Although in the causal state the effect does exist as potential being (paktyatmanā), still in so far as it does not fulfil its peculiar purpose it is said to be non-existent. This cause does not however have an effect [worthless for the purpose of the Self] like a hare’s horns. Accordingly he says «from which non-existence has been removed.» [A cause which exists] beyond an effect that is non-existent or worthless [with regard to the purpose of the Self]. For if that were so, the effect would not be produced from this [cause] any more than the sky-lotus [would be produced from this cause]. This is the point. He brings the [topic of the] reversal of creation which has been described to a close in the words, «This . . . of these.» The word «This» points back to that which has been stated just prior to that which immediately precedes. The states beginning with that of which we can only say that it is resolvable [into primary matter], since they are effected by a purpose of the Self, are not permanent. Whereas the state which is unresolvable [into primary matter], since it is not effected by a purpose of the Self, is permanent. He gives the reason
for this in the words, «of the state unresoluble into primary matter.» But why is the purpose of the Self not a reason? In reply to this he says, «not... of the state unresoluble.» By using the object (vīśaya) [the purpose of the Self] in place of that which contains the object (vīśayin) [the unresoluble state], he partially describes the knowledge [in the Self of this state]. What he means to say is this. For this being so, it should be known that the purpose of the Self acts as a cause in the state unresoluble [into primary matter], provided the state unresoluble [into primary matter] could produce (nirvartayeta) the enjoyment of objects or the discernment of the difference between the sattva and the Self, [either of which is] a purpose of the Self. When however these two are produced, there can be no longer a state of equipoise. Therefore this [unresoluble state] is not known as a cause of the fact that the Self has a purpose. Thus the fact that the Self has a purpose is not the reason for this [unresoluble state]. He concludes with the words, «that... not.» The word iti is used in the sense of therefore.—He describes the impermanent state in the words «of the three.» In other words, that of which we can only say that it is unresoluble, the unpaticularized, and the particularized. Having shown what the divisions are, he tells what the aspects are in the words, «But the aspects.» He gives a simile in the words, «Just as Devadatta.» In case the increase or decrease of the cows, which are absolutely distinct from Devadatta, is the reason for Devadatta’s increase or decrease, how much more [in the parallel case] of the growth or decline of the [individual] phenomenalized [forms], which are not different in some respects and different in other respects from the aspects (guna). An objector asks, ‘Is then the order of production not fixed?’ No. As he says in the words, «that of which we can only say that it is resoluble.» For surely the seeds of the Nyagrodha tree do not in a single day shoot forth the Nyagrodha tree, with its dense mass of green leaves, which has absorbed in its branches and twigs a multitude of the fierce rays of the sun; but gradually, through contact with earth and water and warmth, they produce in succession sprout and leaves and stalks and stems and the rest. So here also an order¹ [of production] must be accepted in that it is established by reasoning and by verbal-communication.—How are the elements and organs formed from unpaticularized [forms]? In reply to this he says, «as has been already described» [by us] when explaining the first part of this very sutra. And if it be asked why, in the case of the particularized [forms], there is no mutation into any other entity, he replies «no... the particularized [forms].» So is it true then that the particularized [forms] actually enter into no mutations? And if that were so, would not one have to say that they are permanent? In reply to this he says, «But their.»

¹ For example, the Śāṃkhya-sūtra i. 62, and Śāṃkhya-kārikā xxii.
The object-of-sight has been explained. Now this sūtra is introduced with the intent of determining what the Seer as such is.

20. The Seer, who is nothing but [the power of] seeing, although undefiled (cūddha), looks upon the presented-idea. Who is nothing but [the power of] seeing means who is nothing but the power of seeing untouched by any qualifications. This Self becomes conscious-by-reflection (pratisamvedin) of the thinking-substance. He is not homogeneous with the thinking-substance nor utterly heterogeneous. Why [do we say that the Self] is not even heterogeneous [to the thinking-substance]? Because the thinking-substance is something that enters into mutations,\(^1\) inasmuch as an object is known or not known [according as the thinking-substance has or has not changed into the form of that thing]. And the fact that an [external] object, for instance, a cow or a water-jar, is sometimes known and sometimes not known, proves that the thinking-substance is something which enters into mutations. Whereas the fact that, in the case of the Self, its object is always known, proves that the Self does not enter into mutations. Why [do we say this]? Because it surely is not possible for the thinking-substance to be an object to the Self, and at the same time be something now comprehended and something again not comprehended [by the Self]. Hence it is proved that the Self always knows its object. And from this it follows that the Self does not enter into mutations. Moreover the thinking-substance exists for the sake of another, since it acts by combining\(^2\) causes. Whereas the Self exists for its own sake. Thus [continuing the argument], the thinking-substance is a complex of the three aspects, because it determines\(^3\) each thing (sarva-artha) [as consisting of one or another of the three aspects, that is, as pleasurable or as painful or as indifferent]. And since it consists of the three aspects (guna), it is inanimate. The Self, on the other hand, is that which later beholds the aspects [by being reflected in them]. Hence it is not homogeneous with [the

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\(^1\) Compare ii. 15, p. 135\(^\text{ii}\); ii. 18, p. 152\(^\text{ii}\); iii. 85, p. 244\(^3\); iv. 17, p. 301\(^1\); iv. 22, p. 306\(^4\); iv. 83, p. 816 (Calc. ed.).

\(^2\) Compare Mrčchakatika, act 10, verse 59 and YS. iv. 24.

\(^3\) The concept adhyavasāya is defined in the comments on Śāṅkhya-kārikā xxiii.
thinking-substance]. 'Very well] then, suppose the Self to be heterogeneous [to the thinking-substance].' [Still], it is not utterly heterogeneous. Why [do we say this]? Because though pure 1 in itself, the Self beholds the presented-ideas, that is to say, it beholds that [mutation of matter which the thinking-substance undergoes when it takes the form of an object, and] which is a presented-idea of thinking-substance (bāuddha). Looking [thus] upon this [change in the thinking-substance] the Self seems to be it [the thinking-substance], although it really is not it [the thinking-substance]. And in this sense it has been said, 2 "For the power of the enjoyer enters not into mutation nor unites [with objects]. Seeming to unite with a thing in mutation [the thinking-substance], it conforms itself to the fluctuation [which that thinking-substance undergoes]. And it is commonly termed a fluctuation of the thinking-substance in so far as it resembles (anukāramātratayā) a fluctuation of thinking-substance that has come under the influence (upagrahā) of intelligence (cāitanya)."

"The object-of-sight has been explained. Now this śūtra is introduced with the intent of determining what the Seer as such is." 20. The Seer, who is nothing but [the power of] seeing, although undefiled (cuddha), looks upon the presented-idea. He explains [the śūtra] by the words «nothing but [the power of] seeing.» The qualifications are the properties. «Untouched?» by these in this way shows the import of the words «nothing but.» An objector says, 'This may be true. If the power of seeing is without all qualifications, then [the various things] from sound downwards would not be known. For the object-of-sight cannot be something out of contact with the seeing.' In reply to this he says, «This Self.» The union (saṁkrānti) of the reflection of the Self with the mirror of the thinking-substance is itself the Self's consciousness by reflection in the thinking-substance. And so the [various things] from sound downwards become connected with the thinking-substance which has been changed into the likeness (chāya) of the power of sight. In other words, [they become] objects-of-sight. The objector says, 'This may be true. Still why is not the unity, even in the strict sense, of the thinking-substance and of the Self to be accepted? What is the use of changing it into the likeness of this [Self]?' In reply to this he says, «It is not homogeneous with the thinking-substance.» 'In this case it would be difficult for it to change into the likeness [of the Seer].' In reply to this he says, «nor

1 That is to say, unspecialized.
2 This is Pañcacikha's ninth fragment. It is quoted again in iv. 22.
utterly heterogeneous.» Of these [two], he rejects the homogeneity in the words, «not even homogeneous.» The reason [for this] he asks by saying «why?» For the heterogeneity he gives a reason which itself contains a reason, in the words, «known or not known.» Because the thinking-substance enters into mutations, it is heterogeneous. When, as we know, this [thinking-substance] changes into the form of [the various things from] sound downwards, then the object, having the distinguishing characteristics of [the various things from] sound downwards, becomes known to this [thinking-substance]; but when not so changed into the form of these [things], the object does not become known to it. And so only occasionally it assumes the forms of these [things] and enters into mutations. And the argument is [of this kind]: The thinking-substance enters into mutations; since objects are [sometimes] known and [sometimes] not known by it; just as the organ of hearing and other organs [are sometimes active and sometimes not]. And the Self proves to be of different properties to this, because the middle term [that is, always-known] is contrary to this, as he says, «always known.» The objector says, ‘This may be so. But if the Self always has its object known, then he could not be isolated.’ With this in mind, he asks, «Why [do we say this]?» He gives the answer in the words, «Because surely . . . not . . . for the thinking-substance.» In the state of restriction the thinking-substance may exist and at the same time there may be no process of apperception [by the Self]. Therefore in order to indicate the contradiction, it is said, «an object to the Self.» So the first «and» (buddhi ca) has an accumulative force and makes the thinking-substance an object; but the two remaining «ands» (viṣaya ca and grahitā ca) are to make the contradiction clear. The argument, however, is this. The Self enters not into mutation; because objects are always known to it in the conscious and emergent states¹; whatever enters into mutation does not always have its objects known; just as the organ of hearing or other [organs]. This is a negative instance of the middle term [sudā-nātaviṣayatvat]. He gives another [instance] of difference in properties in the words, «Moreover . . . for the sake of another.» For the thinking-substance, in so far as it fulfils the purpose of the Self by combining with hindrances and karma and subconscious-impressions and with objects and organs, is for the sake of another. The argument, moreover, is this: The thinking-substance is for the sake of another; because it acts by combining causes²; like a bed or a seat or an ointment. But the Self is not like that, as he says «the Self exists for its own sake.» Everything serves the purpose of the Self, but the Self serves no other. This is the point. He gives yet another [instance] of difference in properties in the words, «Thus . . . each thing.» The thinking-substance determines all things as being serene or cruel or infatuated when it mutates into their forms. And these [three] are mutations of the sattva and rajas and tamas aspects. Thus

¹ This excludes the state unconscious of objects.
² Compare Sāmkhya-kārikā xvii.
it is established that the thinking-substance is a complex of the three aspects. And again the Self is not like that, as he says, «The Self, on the other hand, later beholds the aspects.» It beholds them in that it is reflected in them, but it does not become mutated into their form. He brings the discussion to a close with the word, «Hence.» «[Very well] then, suppose ... heterogeneous.» [But] it is not utterly heterogeneous [to the thinking-substance]. Why [do we say this]? Because though pure in itself, it looks upon the presented-ideas. And that this is so, is [also] stated in these [words i. 4], “At other times it takes the same form as the fluctuations [of mind-stuff].” And in this sense it has been said by Pāṇcaçikha «“For the power of the enjoyer enters not into mutation.”» [The power,] in other words, the self (ätman). And therefore it does not unite with the thinking-substance. «Seeming to unite» with the thinking-substance which is in mutation, «it conforms itself to the fluctuation» which that thinking-substance [undergoes]. An objector asks, ‘If it does not unite, how is it that it seems to unite, or how does it conform itself [to the thinking-substance] without [assuming] a fluctuation [of its own]?’ To this he replies with the words, «And it.» That thing has come under the influence of intelligence whose form has been affected (uparakta) [by intelligence]. What he means to say is this. Although the moon does not unite with the clear water, still it seems to unite [with it] in so far as its reflection unites [with the water]. Similarly in this case also, although the power of intellect (citi) does not unite [with the thinking-substance], still it seems to unite since its reflection has united [with it]. Thus the power of intellect, changed into the essence of the thinking-substance, conforms itself to the fluctuation which the thinking-substance undergoes. In this way the word «beholding» has been explained. It beholds it in the sense that it sees [itself] as resembling it.

21. The being (ätman) of the object-of-sight is only for the sake of it [the Self].

Since the object-of-sight is changed in so far as it becomes the object of the action of the Self who is so much (rūpa) seeing (drçi), <the being (ätman) of the object-of-sight,> that is to say, the object-of-sight itself (svarrūpa) exists only for the sake of the Self. But inasmuch as it is itself only so long as it has acquired its being as having the form of another, it is no [longer] seen by the Self when once it has accomplished the purpose of the Self, [of giving the Self] experience and liberation. So by escaping from itself it attains cessation; but it does not utterly cease to be.
Having stated what the Seer and the object-of-sight are, he says that the object-of-sight serves the purpose of the Self. [And this purpose is] based upon the relation characterized as being that of proprietor and property. 21. The being (ātmān) of the object-of-sight is only for the sake of it [the Self]. He explains [the sutra] in the words, «who is so much (rupa) seeing (dṛṣṭi).» Since the object-of-sight has become the object-of-action (karma-rupatā), [that is] has been changed into the object-of-experience by the experiencer [that is] the Self who is so much seeing,—therefore the being of the object-of-sight must be only for the sake of the Seer, but not for the sake of the object-of-sight. The objector asks, ‘How can the being [ātmā in dṛṣṭi-rupatā] be for the sake of this [ātmā in tadātmā] [that is, the Self]?’ In reply to this he says, «is itself.» What he means to say is this: The object-of-experience is the object-of-sight as having pleasure or pain. And pleasure and pain being co-agents or counter-agents persist as such (tattvema) only for this purpose [of acting with or against the Self]. For the [various things] from sound downwards as objects-of-sense are co-agents or counter-agents [for the Self] only because they are identical [with pleasure and pain]. And it cannot be said that they exist to be co-active or to be counter-active to themselves. For that would be a contradiction of a fluctuation with itself. Therefore by a process of elimination it is the power of intellect (citi) only for which they are co-active or counter-active. Consequently the object-of-sight is for this [Self] and not for the object-of-sight [itself]. And therefore the object-of-sight is only for the sake of it [the Self], not for the sake of the object-of-sight. Because (yat) it is itself as long as the purpose of the Self continues. And when the purpose of the Self is complete it is also completed. Accordingly he says, «But . . . it . . . itself.» But the object-of-sight itself is inert (jāda), yet it has acquired its being [that is] it is experienced as having the form of another [that is] the form of the soul (ātmān) [that is] the intelligence (cātanya). When experience and liberation have been accomplished it is no [longer] seen by the Self. [This was] the kind-of-experience,¹ the perception (anubhava) of sound and the other [perceptible] things. Liberation is the perception (anubhava) of the difference between sattva and the Self. Both these two kinds [of things, experience and liberation,] belong to the Self only who, by reason of the fact that the likeness of the Self becomes changed by the inert thinking-substance, [does know them both]. And so when experience and liberation have been accomplished for the Self, [the subservience of] the object-of-sight to the purpose of the Self is finished. Hence it is said, «when once it has accomplished the purpose of the Self.» Meanwhile he raises an objection in the words, «by escaping from itself.» He rebuts [this] with the words, «but it does not utterly cease to be.»

¹ Vijñāna Bhikṣu expands this definition and emphasizes the fact that experience is a fluctuation of the mind (sukhadukkhātmaṃkaśabdāśītīṭḥ).
Why [does it not utterly cease to be]?

22. Though it has ceased [to be seen] in the case of one whose purpose is accomplished, it has not ceased to be, since it is common to others [besides himself]. Although the object-of-sight has ceased in so far as one Self whose purpose has been accomplished is concerned, it has not ceased to be, because it is common to others besides him. Although it has ceased so far as one fortunate man is concerned, [still] it has not ceased in the case of unfortunate men, since their purpose has not been fulfilled. So for these persons it becomes the object-of-the-action of seeing and receives its form of being as having the form of another. And therefore since the power of seeing and the power by which one sees are permanent, the conjunction [of the two] is said to be from time-without-beginning. And in this sense it has been said, “The substances being in correlation from time without beginning, the external-aspects in general are also in correlation from time without beginning.”

An objector says, ‘If [the object-of-sight] is absolutely inappercceptible, how is it that it does not cease to be?’ With this in mind he asks, «Why [is this]?» In the sūtra he tells the answer beginning with the words 22 . . . whose purpose is accomplished and ending with the words since it is common to others [besides himself]. A Self whose purpose has been accomplished is of such a kind. For him the object-of-sight although it has ceased [to be seen], has not ceased [to be]. Why? Since it is common to all Selves fortunate or unfortunate. He explains [the sūtra] in the words, «one whose purpose has been accomplished.» Cessation is the absence of that by which one sees. But the object-of-sight has not ceased to be, since it is common to other Selves. Hence the nature (rūpa) of the being (atman) who is higher than the object-of-sight is intelligence (cāitanya). So (tena) here we have that [being] which is made known in the Sacred Word and the Sacred Tradition and in the Epics and Purāṇas, the unphenomenalized, the whole-without-parts, the one, the independent, all-pervasive, permanent, [and] capable of producing-all-effects. Although [the object-for-sight] is not seen by the fortunate man, since for him its effect has been accomplished, it is not, however, something not seen by the unfortunate man. For because colour is not seen by the blind man, it does not become non-existent, since it is seen by the man who has eyes. For the Self is not, like the primary cause, only one. Because its plurality is established in so far as there is the orderly arrangement of births and deaths, pleasures and

\[1\] Compare Sāṅkhya-sūtra i. 149.
pains, later kind-of-experience and release and round-of-existence; and because the passages of the Sacred Word which teach the unity [of the Self] and which contradict the other sources-of-valid-ideas, can somehow be made consistent, as partial statements, by supposing that there is no division in place or in time; and because the fact that primary matter is one and the Selves many is expressly taught by the Sacred Word itself, "One male goat [the unborn Soul] has pleasure in leaping upon the one female goat [primary matter] which is red and white and black and which brings forth many offspring like herself, while another male goat deserts her after having enjoyed her." And the meaning of this same Sacred Word is said over again by this sutra. Although the object-for-sight has ceased [to be seen], still so far as another Self is concerned it has not ceased to be. Therefore, since the power of seeing and the power by which one sees are permanent, their correlation is said to be from time-without-beginning. He states that those who have the tradition (agamin) concur with this teaching, as he says, «And in this sense it has been said.» Since the correlation of substances, in other words, of the aspects (guna), with the souls is from time without beginning, [so] in the case of the mere external aspects (guna), such as the Great [thinking-substance], there is a correlation from time without beginning. The correlation of the Great [Thinking-substance] and of the rest, one by one, although from time without beginning, is not permanent. Still it is permanent when we regard the Great [thinking-substance] and the rest as a whole, since [these external aspects] are common to the other Selves. Accordingly he says «the external-aspects in general.» The words «in general» (mātra) point out the comprehensive character [of the compound]. Hence what follows is this: Although the correlation of one Great thinking-substance has become changed so that it is past, still the correlation of one Self with another Great [thinking-substance] is not past. So [the correlation is] said to be permanent.

The intent of this sutra is to describe what the correlation itself is.

23. The reason for the apperception of what the power of the property and of what the power of the proprietor are is correlation.

The Self as proprietor becomes correlated for the purpose of sight

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1 The Pāṇḍājala Rahasyam says that the unity of all souls is only figurative. All Selves are permanent and all-pervasive. The unity is that of a collection, like that of a forest or of an army, in so far as no division is made in time or in place.

2 Čvēt. Up. iv. 5.

3 The attribution of this quotation to Pañcaśikha rests upon the authority of Viśīṇa Bhikṣu.

4 Reading purusāntarena with the Bikāner MS.
with the object-for-sight as property. That apperception of the object-for-sight which results from this correlation is experience. Whereas the apperception of what the Seer is, is liberation. Since the correlation lasts until sight is effected, sight is said to be the cause of discorrelation. Since sight and non-sight are opposite to each other, non-sight is said to be the instrumental cause of correlation. Sight in this [system] is not the cause of release; but the absence of bondage results from the absence of non-sight. This is release. Where there is sight, non-sight, which is the cause of bondage, ceases [to be felt]. Thus the perception which is sight is said to be the cause of isolation. And what is this so-called non-sight? 1. Is it the authority (adhikāra) of the aspects (guna) [over the Self]? 2. Or is it the case that, when in [the equipoised state of] the primary-cause, the mind-stuff, by which the objects are shown to the proprietor in his capacity as Seer, fails to produce [effects], there is non-sight,¹ although the property, the object-for-sight, exists? 3. Or is it that the aspects (guna) possess the intended-objects [in potential form]? 4. Or is undifferentiated-consciousness (avidyā), which, together with its own mind-stuff, has been restricted, the seed for the production of its peculiar mind-stuff? 5. Or is it the manifestation of subliminal-impressions in motion (gati) after the subliminal-impressions in equilibrium (sthitī) have dwindled away? Of which [theory] this has been said,² “The primary cause if it existed, on the one hand, in equilibrium (sthitī) only, would be a non-primary cause, because it would not cause any evolved effect. Similarly, if on the other hand it existed in motion (gati) only, it would be a non-primary cause, because the evolved effects would be permanent. And since it does act³ in both ways [equilibrium and motion] it is ordinarily termed primary substance; not otherwise. Also with regard to other supposed causes the same reasoning [applies].” 6. According to some non-sight is nothing but the power by which one sees, as the Sacred Word says, “The primary cause acts with the intent of displaying itself.” The Self capable of illuminating all illuminable

¹ Compare iv. 34.  
² Uḍaisāna Bālārāma attributes this to Pañcaśikha.  
³ Reading viṭṭi.
things does not, before the primary cause acts, see. [On the other
hand], the object-for-sight capable of making all kinds of effects is
not then [without the Self] seen. 7. According to others non-
sight is a property of both kinds also. From this point of view,
this sight, although independent of the object-for-sight, requires
a presented-idea [that is, the reflection] of the Self; and so is a
property of the object-for-sight. Similarly sight, although not
independent of the Self, still requires a presented idea in the object-
for-sight; and appears as if it were actually a property of the Self.
8. Certain others assert that non-sight is only the perception [of
things only] by sight. These are the alternatives found in the
books on this [topic of the nature of non-sight]. These many alter-
natives deal with a common subject-matter, the correlation of all
the Selves with the aspects (guna).

Thus the serving the purpose [of the Self] as the cause of correlation has been
stated. And as incidental [to this] the cause of the permanence of the primary
cause and the cause of the permanence of the correlation in general have been
stated. With the intent to describe what correlation itself is, in other words,
its special particular [nature], the sutra has come into being. 23. The
reason for the apperception of what the power of the property and of
what the power of the proprietor are is correlation. Because the object-for-
sight is for his sake, therefore the Self, accepting the aid rendered by this
[object], becomes its proprietor. And the object-for-sight becomes his property.
And the correlation of these two which has had a merely potential arrangement
is the reason for the apperception of what the two are in themselves. This
same is made clear in the commentary in the words «The Self.» The Self
as proprietor merely by [his] pre-established harmony becomes correlated with
the object-for-sight as his property for the sake of sight. The rest is easy. An
objector says, ‘This may be true. Liberation may be said to be the apperception
of what the Seer himself may be, [that is, it may be] that by which he is
liberated. And moreover release is not the effect of means. Should this be
so, it would cease being what could be rightly called release.’ In reply to this
he says, «until sight is effected.» Until sight is effected there is a correlation
of a particular Self with a particular thinking-substance. Thus sight is said to
be the cause of discorrelation. ‘But how does correlation last until sight is
effected?’ In reply to this he says, «non-sight.» Non-sight, undifferentiated-
consciousness (avidya), is said to be the instrumental cause of correlation. He
makes clear the meaning of what he said before by saying, «in this [system]... not.» The objector says, ‘Sight may quite remove non-sight, its opposite. But
how can it remove bondage?’ In reply to this he says, «is sight.» Release has
been stated [i. 8] to be the self's (ātman) abiding in his own form as discriminated from the thinking-substance and other [substances]. And the means for effecting this is not only sight, but the removal of non-sight. This is the meaning. — In order to obtain a particular kind of non-sight as the special reason for the correlation he puts forth the following alternatives with respect to non-sight in the words, «And what is this.» 1. Assuming that [non-sight] is some positive thing (paryudāsa) 1 [not sight] he asks, «1. Is it the authority of the aspects (guna) [over the Self]?» Authority is the competency to initiate effects. For it is as the result of this that the correlation, which is the reason for the round-of-existence, is produced. — 2. Assuming that [non-sight] is a negation where there is a possibility of an affirmation (prasajya-pratiśedha), 2 he puts forth a second alternative with the word, «2. Or.» [Non-sight] is the failure, by the mind-stuff which shows objects-of-sense [to the Self], to produce either the [various things] from sound downwards or the [discrimination of] the difference between sattva and the Self. It is this that is made clear by the words, «the property.» The object-for-sight is [both] the various things from sound downwards and the difference between sattva and the Self. The primary cause is in motion only so long as it has not completed the two-fold sight. But when both kinds of sight have been accomplished, it desists [from being further in motion].— 3. On the assumption that [non-sight] is some positive thing [not sight], he puts forth the third alternative, «3. Or is it that the aspects (guna) possess the intended-objects [in potential form]?» For if the doctrine of pre-existent causes (satkārya) is established, experience and liberation are also yet to come in so far as they are [at present] indeterminable. This is the meaning.— 4. Assuming that [non-sight] is some positive thing [not sight], he puts forth the fourth alternative and asks «4. Or is it undifferentiated-consciousness (avidya) . . . ?» At the time of the reversal of creation, it is restricted together with its peculiar mind-stuff [that is to say] it is reduced to the state of equipoise in the primary cause, the seed for the production of its peculiar mind-stuff. To this extent (tena) a subconscious-impression of undifferentiated-consciousness is other than sight and is precisely what is called non-sight.— 5. Assuming that [non-sight] is some positive thing [not sight], he puts forth the fifth alternative and asks, «5. Is it . . . in equilibrium?» When the subliminal-impressions in equilibrium, [that is] existing in the primary cause, and flowing on in a succession of mutations in the equipoised [state of the primary cause], have dwindled away, there is a start given to evolved-effects (vikāra), such as the Great [thinking-substance] and the rest,—this is motion (gati). The reason for this [start given] is a subliminal-impression of the primary cause, the subliminal-impression in motion. The manifestation of it is its readiness to produce effects. He says that another theory admits the real existence of subliminal-impressions of both

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1 Compare Patañjali: Mahābhāṣya (Kielhorn’s ed.) i. 93; 101; 167; 183; 216; 319; 334; 341; ii. 338; iii. 35; and elsewhere.

2 Compare p. 24, note 2; and p. 113, note 4.
kinds in the words, «Of which [theory] this has been said» by those who deny the absoluteness of either one. Primary cause (pra-dhāna) is that by which the totality of evolved effects is put forth (pra-dhīyate) or produced.\(^1\) If this primary cause always remained in equilibrium and never in motion, then because it would not cause any evolved effect, it would not put forth anything, and would not be a primary cause (pra-dhāna). Or if it always remained in motion and never in equilibrium, then he says, «Similarly . . . in motion.» Elsewhere the reading is «for the purpose of equilibrium, for the purpose of motion»; the dative is here purposive and we must supply (draṣṭavyah) ‘only’ (eva) after it. If it did not act for the purpose of equilibrium, no evolved effect would ever cease to be. And this being so, if a thing (bhāva) exists and does not cease to be, it could not rise [again]. Thus there would be a cessation of evolution of effects altogether. And there would likewise be nothing put forth in this case and [thus] it would be a non-primary cause. Therefore its activity must be of both kinds, in equilibrium and in motion, [and] it is ordinarily termed primary substance; «not otherwise,» as when for instance the absoluteness [of either] might be assumed. This reasoning or argument applies not only to the primary cause, but also to other supposed causes, to the higher Brahman or to its illusion (māyā) or to atoms or to other [causes]. For these also if they existed in equilibrium only, would not be causes, since they do not cause evolved effects; and if existing in motion only, would not be causes, since the evolved effects would be permanent.—6. Assuming that [non-sight] is some positive thing [not sight], he puts forth a sixth alternative in the words, «nothing but the power by which one sees.» Just as in the vow of Prajāpati [Manu iv. 37], “One should not look upon the rising sun,” a mental resolution [in positive form] closely related to not looking is understood, so in this case also [of non-sight], when there is a negation of sight, a power closely related to it and based upon it is described. And this [power] in order to give birth to sight characterized by experience and so forth brings about the pre-established harmony of the Seer with the object-for-sight. On the same point he recites a [passage from] the Sacred Word, «The primary cause.» The objector says, ‘This may be true. But the Sacred Word says that the primary cause acts with the intent of displaying itself; yet it does not say that it acts as the result\(^2\) of the power by which one sees.’ In reply to this he says, «capable of illuminating all illuminable things.» Because before the primary substance acts, mere displaying of itself is not capacity as an impelling force for action. For there is no ground for this [activity] in the absence of capacity to act as impelling force. Therefore in accordance with the Sacred Word it is said that capacity is the impelling force for action.—The sixth alternative is based upon the assumption that the power by which one sees is in the primary cause.—7. The seventh alternative makes this same power reside in both kinds [the primary cause and the Self], as he says, «Non-sight . . . of both

\(^1\) Compare ii. 18, p. 144\(b\) (Calc. ed.).

\(^2\) Reading çakti, p. 160\(b\) (Calc. ed.).
kinds also.» Some say that non-sight belongs to both kinds, both to the Self and to the object-for-sight and that it is a power [or] a property of sight. An objector says, 'This may be true. We may grant this with regard to the object-for-sight, because it is the repository of all powers; but we could not grant it with regard to the Seer, because the power of perception does not reside (adhyāra) in him, for the reason that perception does not have the relation to him of part to whole (samavaya). Should that be so, he would be subject to mutation.' To this he replies, «From this point of view, this.» That non-sight might be included in the object-for-sight might be conceded, still, since the object-for-sight is unintelligent (jāda), seeing, which is an effect of a power residing in this [object-for-sight], would also be unintelligent (jāda). So sight cannot be thought as a property of this [object-for-sight], for an unintelligent [thing] has not illumination in itself. Hence sight becomes, [that is] is known as, a property of this [object-for-sight] only as based upon the presented-idea of the Seer, the self (atman), that is, upon a change into the likeness of the intelligence (caitanya). Because that which has-to-do-with-the-object (viṣayin) [that is, the power of seeing] is partially expressed by the object [that is, the object-for-sight]. The objector says, 'Even so, this perception becomes a property of the object-for-sight, but not a property of the Self.' To this he replies, «Similarly... of the Self.» It is true that it is not independent of the Self, still it does appear to become a property of the Self as based upon the presented-idea [that is] the likeness of the intelligence (caitanya) in the sattva of the thinking-substance of the object-for-sight, but it is not actually a property of the Self. What he means to say is this. In so far as there is no difference between intelligence and the thinking-substance, the external-aspects (dharma) of the thinking-substance distinctly appear (cakasati) as if they were external-aspects of intelligence, in so far as they receive the image of intelligence.—8. He describes the eighth alternative in the words, «non-sight is only the perception.» Only perception of the [various things] from sound downwards is non-sight; but not the perception of the difference between sattva and the Self. So some say. Just as the eye, although the source-of-a-valid-idea for colour, is not the source-of-a-valid-idea for taste and the other [sensations]. What follows is this: The perceptions of the [various things], of sounds and so on, have the forms of pleasure and other [forms] and imply the correlation of the Seer and the object-for-sight, in so far as it is necessary for the sake of their perfection.—Having thus put forth alternatives, and in order to accept the fourth alternative, he points-out-the-flaws in the other [seven] alternatives mentioned in the Sāṁkhya system, on the ground that they would lead to an absence of diversity in experience, since [non-sight according to the other theories] is common to all the Selves. So he says, «These... are found in the books.»
But when there is a correlation of an individual consciousness with its own thinking-substance,

24. The reason for this [correlation] is undifferentiated-consciousness (avidyā).

In other words, [undifferentiated-consciousness] is a subconscious-impression (vāsanā) from erroneous thinking. The thinking-substance pervaded (vāsita) by subconscious-impressions from erroneous thinking does not attain to the discernment of the Self, which is the goal of its actions, [and] returns again with its task yet unfulfilled. But that [thinking-substance] which terminates in the discernment of the Self attains the goal of its actions, and, its task done, and its non-sight repressed, does not, since the cause of its bondage no longer exists, return again. Some [heterodox] person ridicules this [teaching of Isolation] with the anecdote¹ of the impotent man,'He is told by his simple-minded wife,"O impotent, my wedded lord, my sister has a child; for what reason have not I?" He says to her, "When I am dead, I will beget thee a son."' Similarly, [the objector continues,] since this thinking [of the discernment], even while existing, does not make a repression of mind-stuff, what expectation is there that it will in the future make it cease to be? On this point one who is almost a master (ācāryadeśīya) says, "Is release anything but the cessation of the thinking-substance? When there is no cause of non-sight the thinking-substance ceases. And this non-sight which is the cause of bondage ceases when there is sight." Then release is nothing but the cessation of the thinking-substance. Why then is there this confusion of ideas of his² that is so much out of place?

In order to fix upon the fourth alternative he introduces the sūtra with the words, «But when there is a correlation of an individual consciousness with its own thinking-substance.» Individual (praty-āñc) in the sense that it turns

¹ See Jacob, Maxims, II. 28, 2d ed.
² Two interpretations seem justified. 1. The whole passage to the end of the comment on this sūtra would be the statement of the ācāryadeśīya. And asya would refer to the nāṣṭika. 2. The last two sentences would be that of the author of the comment and asya would refer to the ācāryadeśīya. The difference between these two would be that the latter teaches that release is only a cessation of mutations, whereas the comment teaches that release is resolution of the thinking-substance (buddher vilaya) into the primary cause.
Ending of undifferentiated-consciousness

(aṅkati) [or] gets back (prati) [or] in the opposite direction (pratiṣṭapam). A special correlation of each single Self with each single thinking-substance is the reason for the diversity between [individuals]. He recites the sūtra 24. The reason for this [correlation] is undifferentiated-consciousness (avidyā). An objector says, ‘Undifferentiated-consciousness is erroneous thinking. And the reason for this is the correlation of the Self with its own thinking-substance, just [as correlation is the reason] for experience and for liberation. For unless correlated with a thinking-substance, undifferentiated-consciousness (avidyā) does not arise. How then is undifferentiated-consciousness the reason for a particular kind of correlation?’ In reply to this he says, «a subconscious-impression from erroneous thinking.» From undifferentiated-consciousness (avidyā), even when belonging to another creation and restricted together with its own mind-stuff, a subconscious-impression exists in the primary-cause. And the primary-cause pervaded with the subconscious-impression from this [undifferentiated-consciousness] sends forth the same kind of a thinking-substance for the sake of correlation with one Self or another. Similarly in successive previous creations. And since [the series] is from time without beginning, there is no flaw in the argument. For this very reason the Self at the time of [mundane] dissolution is not released, as he says, «erroneous thinking.» When [the thinking-substance] reaches the goal of its actions [that is] the discernment of the Self, then since there is no subconscious-impression from erroneous thinking, which is the cause of bondage, the thinking-substance does not return again, as he says, «But that.» Some heterodox person makes fun of this teaching with regard to Isolation by [telling] the anecdote of the impotent man. He tells the anecdote of the impotent man by the words, «simple-minded.» The word «reason (artha)» in the expression «for what reason» signifies a ground, because a motive is also a ground. He draws the analogy with the anecdote of the impotent man in the words, «Similarly since this.» ‘This existing perception of the discernment of the difference between the aspects (guṇa) and the Self does not cause a repression of the mind-stuff; what expectation is there that the mind-stuff, when it together with its subliminal-impressions is restricted by virtue of the higher passionlessness, will cease to be? The point is that a thing has an effect when it exists; and not, when it does not exist.’ With regard to this he gives a rebuttal by means of an opinion which partially [agrees], «On this point one who is almost a master.» One who is little short¹ of a master. A master, moreover, has his characteristic given in the declaration of the Vāyu,² “One who not only collects (acinoti) the meaning of the books, but also makes the people steadfast in good conduct, and observes (ācarate) good conduct himself, he is a master (ācārya).” Release is nothing but the repression of the thinking-substance which has entered into mutations in the form of experience and of

¹ See Pāṇini v. 3. 67.
² See Vāyu Purāṇa lxxix. 2; and Liṅga Purāṇa x. 15–16.
discriminative discernment. But there is no repression of the thinking-substance as such. This [repression], moreover, takes place only after the [thinking-substance] is established in the discriminative discernment which lasts up to the Rain-cloud of [Knowable] Things (dharma-megha). Even though the thinking-substance abides as itself and nothing less, [still it does exist elsewhere]. He makes this clear by the words, «non-sight.» There is a repression of the thinking-substance when there is no non-sight [which is] the cause of bondage. And this non-sight [which is] the cause of bondage ceases as a result of sight. But as for the repression of sight, [that] is to be effected by the higher passionlessness. The point is, although the thinking-substance abides in itself and nothing less, there is release. Having cleared up the opinion which partially [agrees], he states his own opinion in the words, «Then release is nothing but the cessation of the thinking-substance.» An objector asks, 'Have you not already ¹ said that, when seeing is repressed, there results soon after a repression of the mind-stuff itself. How then can [this repression] be the result of sight?' In reply to this he says, «Why then is there this confusion of ideas of his that is so much out of place?» The meaning is this. If we were to admit ² that sight is the direct cause of the repression of the mind-stuff, then we should be subject to this rebuke. But we take our stand upon the view that discriminative sight reaches its limit of perfection when the mind-stuff is repressed and when it is subservient to the abiding of the Self in his own form, according to its degree of perfection in the cultivation of restricted concentration. How then should we be subject to this rebuke?

The pain which is to be escaped and the cause of pain, the so-called correlation, together with their reasons, have been described. Next the higher escape (lāna) is to be described.

25. Since this [non-sight] does not exist, there is no correlation. This is the escape, the Isolation of the Seer.

Since this non-sight does not exist, there is no correlation of the thinking-substance and of the Self, in other words, a complete ending of bondage. This is the escape, the Isolation of the Seer, the unmixed state of the Self; in other words, the state in which [the Self] is not again correlated with aspects (guna). Upon the repression of the cause of pain there follows the ending of pain, the escape. Then the Self is said to be grounded ³ in his own self.

Having thus spoken of two divisions, with the intent to describe the third division, he introduces the sutra with the words, «The pain which is to be

¹ See p. 162² (Calc. ed.). MS. and the Ānandāśrama ed. (96¹⁷).
² Reading "kuruśāhī," with the Bikāner ³ Compare i. 8.
Means of attaining escape

25. Since this [non-sight] does not exist, there is no correlation. This is the escape, the Isolation of the Seer. He explains the sūtra in the word, «this.» For even in the great mundane dissolution there is no correlation. For this reason he uses the word «complete.» The words «the ending of pain, the escape» show that this is a fulfilment of the purposes of the Self. The rest has nothing obscure.

Now what is the means of attaining escape?

26. The means of attaining escape is unwavering discriminative discernment.

Discriminative discernment\(^1\) of the presented-idea of the difference between sattva and the Self. But this discernment wavers when erroneous perception is not repressed. When erroneous perception, reduced to the condition of burned seed, fails to reproduce itself (vandhya-prasava), then the flow of the presented-ideas of discrimination—belonging to the sattva, which is cleansed from rajas belonging to the hindrances, and which continues in the higher clearness [and] in the higher consciousness of being master—becomes stainless. This unwavering discriminative discernment is the means (upāya) of escape. After this, erroneous perception tends to become reduced to the condition of burned seed. And its failure to reproduce itself is the Path (mārga) to Release, the way-of-approach (upāya) to escape.

Wishing to denominate the fourth division as having the distinguishing-characteristic of the means of escape, he introduces the sūtra with the word «Now.» 26. The means of attaining escape is unwavering discriminative discernment. Even by verbal communication and by inference there is discriminative discernment. This [kind of discriminative discernment] does not, however, repress emergence or the subliminal impressions from emergence, because these two latter follow a man who has both [the verbal-communication and the inference]. Accordingly in order to repress this [emergence] he says, «unwavering.» Wavering is erroneous perception; [unwavering] is free from that. What he means to say is this. He obtains discrimination by perception derived from something heard; and he makes this logically tenable (vyavasṭhāpya) [by ideas] derived from reasonings. The discriminative discernment, which in concentration has reached the utmost perfection of cultivation for a long time, uninterruptedly, and with earnest

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\(^1\) Discussed in Sāmkhya Tattva Kāṣumudī on Kār. 51.
attention, [and which] has direct perception and has uprooted erroneous perceptions together with their subconscious impressions, [and which is thus] unwavering,—this is the means of escape. The rest of the comment is easy.

27. For him [there is] insight seven-fold and advancing in stages to the highest.
The words <for him> refer\(^1\) to him\(^2\) in whom discernment is re-uprised. The word <seven-fold> means that the insight of the discriminating [yogin], after the removal of the defilements from the covering of impurity, when no other kind of presented-idea is generated in the mind-stuff, has just seven forms, as follows.
1. The thing to be escaped has been thought out; nor need [the yogin] think it out again. 2. The reasons for the thing to be escaped have dwindled away; nor need they dwindle away again.
3. The escape is directly perceived\(^3\) by the concentration of restriction; [nor need anything beyond this be discovered].
4. The means of escape in the form of discriminative discernment has been cultivated; [nor need anything beyond this be cultivated]. So this is the four-fold final release (vimukti), belonging to insight, which may be effected. But the final release of the mind-stuff is three-fold [as follows]. 5. The authority of the thinking-substance is ended. 6. The aspects (guna), like rocks fallen from the top of the mountain peak, without support, of their own accord, incline towards dissolution and come with this [thinking-substance] to rest. And when these [aspects] are quite dissolved, they do not cause growth again, because there is no impelling-cause. 7. In this stage the Self has passed out of relation with the aspects (guna), and, enlightened by himself and nothing more,

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\(^1\) See Nyāya-Kośa, s.v. pratyāmnāya भ.
\(^2\) The Vārttika insists that <for him> is rather <for it>, and that it refers to the means of escape. It denies that the reference is to the Self since there is no mention of the Self in the previous sūtra. Bālarāma replies that the Comment expressly wishes to avoid reference to the means of escape in the previous sūtra and that it says that <for him> means <him in whom discernment is re-uprised>. This explanation is corroborated by the use of the words vivekino bhavati.
\(^3\) See i. 8 and compare iii. 16, p. 218\(^a\); iii. 18–19, pp. 230\(^a\) and 231\(^b\); iii. 26, p. 241\(^b\); iii. 51, p. 266\(^a\); and iii. 52, p. 269\(^a\) (Calc. ed.).
is stainless and isolated.—The Self beholding this seven-fold insight advancing in stages to the highest is denominated fortunate (kujala). Even when there is also the inverted generation of the mind-stuff the Self is said to be released [and] fortunate, because he has passed beyond the aspects (guna).

He describes the goal as such which belongs to discriminative discernment in the sūtra 27. For him [there is] insight seven-fold and advancing in stages to the highest. He explains [the sūtra] by saying «for him.» «In whom discernment is re-uprised», that is to say, the yogin in whom discernment is present. The word «refer» means allude. One whose mind-stuff has reached the goal of discriminative discernment, since the defilement of impurity, which is the covering of mind-stuff, has been taken off, and because no other presented-idea arises, that is to say, no presented-idea belonging to emergence of tamas or of rajas,—in him there is the insight of just the seven forms which belong to the discerning. There are different discernments according to the different objects.—The compound [advancing in stages to the highest] means those stages [or] states the end of which is perfection. Complete perfection¹ is that higher than which there is nothing. That insight [or] discriminative discernment [is advancing by stages] whose stages are advancing. These seven kinds of stages he takes up beginning with the word «as follows.» Of these [seven], from among the four stages which may be completed by a man's effort, he takes up the first with the words, «1. The thing to be escaped has been thought out.» Whatever is an effect of the primary-cause, all that is surely nothing but pain by reason of the pains due to mutations, to anxiety, and to subliminal impressions, and by reason of the opposition of the fluctuations,—and is therefore to be escaped. This has been thought out.—He shows what the advancement to the highest is in the words «nor need he think it out again.»—2. He describes the second in the words «dwindled away.» He tells what the advancement to the highest is by saying «nor . . . again.»—3. He describes the third in the words «directly perceived.» Even in the state conscious [of objects] I have discovered by perception the escape which I am to perfect in the concentration of restriction. We need to supply the words, ‘nor need anything beyond this be discovered.’—4. He describes the fourth by saying «cultivated.» The cultivated is the perfected means of escape belonging to discriminative discernment. We need to supply the words, ‘nor need anything beyond this be cultivated.’ This the four-fold final release [or] completion may be effected. And in so far as it may be effected, it is shown to be included within the efforts [of a man]. Elsewhere the reading is kāryavimuktī. This would be the final release of insight with respect to effects.—He describes the final release ² of the mind-stuff which is not to be

¹ This word (samprakāraṇa) does not occur elsewhere in the Comment nor elsewhere in Vācaspati's Explanation.

² Compare SBE. xxi. p. 31 (Lotus).
accomplished by effort, but which is to be accomplished subsequent to that which is to be attained by effort by saying “But the final release of the mind-stuff is three-fold.”—5. He describes the first [of these last three] in the words “5. The authority of the thinking-substance is ended.” In other words, the two tasks (kārya) of experience and liberation have been done. — 6. He describes the second [of these last three] in the words “The aspects.”— He shows what the advancement to the highest is in the words “And . . . they do not.”—7. He describes the third [of these last three] in the words “In this stage.” In this stage, even while alive, the Self is called fortunate [and] released, since [this] is his last body. Accordingly he says, “this.” He says that [the yogin] is not released in a figurative sense [as merely being free from his last body] in the words, “inverted generation.” Even when his mind-stuff is resolved into the primary cause, he is said to be released and fortunate, because he has passed beyond the aspects (guṇa).

When discriminative discernment is perfected there is the means of escape. And there is no perfection without the means [of attaining it]. So this [topic of the means] is begun.

28. After the aids to yoga have been followed up, when the impurity has dwindled, there is an enlightenment of perception reaching up to the discriminative discernment.

The aids to yoga are the eight which are about to be enumerated. As the result of following them up there is a dwindling or cessation of the five-sectioned [ii. 3] misconception. Upon the dwindling of this follows the manifestation of focused thinking. And in proportion as the means [of attaining discriminative discernment are followed up], so the impurity is reduced to a state of attenuation. And in proportion as it dwindles, the enlightenment of perception also, in accordance with the degree of dwindling, increases. Now this same experience a perfection reaching up to discrimi-

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1 Compare ii. 10, p. 120; ii. 24, p. 162; iii. 55, p. 274. The phrase carita-artha occurs iii. 50, p. 265 (Calc. ed.).
2 Compare āduprāṇikam ānayam i. 24, p. 59 (Calc. ed.); and for definition of āduprāṇikam iii. 55, p. 274 (Calc. ed.). See also for use of word iv. 10, p. 286.
3 Fortunate because he is free from attachment to the consequences of his own actions which are the cause [of bondage]. Because of this he is not bound. (hetuṣu karmasu phalaśāṅga-rakṣatvatām na baddhā bhavati kuca-lakā.)—This is the suggestion of the Pātañjala Rahasyaṃ. For other instances see i. 24, p. 54; ii. 9, p. 119; iv. 30, p. 314 (Calc. ed.).
4 Compare Bh. Gītā xiv. 20.
native discernment [or] up to the perception [ii. 26] which distinguishes between the aspects (guna) as such and the Self. The following up of the aids to yoga is the cause of discorrelation (viyoga) with impurity, just as an axe [is the cause of the disjunction (viyoga) of a tree] which is to be cut [from its root]. Now [the eight aids] are the cause of attaining discriminative discernment, just as right-living (dharma) is [the cause of getting] to happiness; in other ways it is not a cause.—Furthermore how many of these causes, according to the system, are there? Just nine, he¹ says, as follows, “Cause is nine-fold, rise [into consciousness] and permanence and manifestation and modification and presentation and attainment and disjunction and transformation and sustentation.” Of these [nine], 1. The cause of rise [into consciousness], [is for instance] the central-organ [as the cause] of a mental-process (vijñāna); 2. the cause of permanence: [for instance] the fact that the Self has purposes [is the cause of the permanence] of the central-organ, just as food [is the cause of the permanence] of the body; 3. the cause of manifestation [is for instance] the shining [of the Self upon a fluctuation as the cause of the manifestation] of colour, just as the perception of colour [which is in the fluctuation, is the cause which manifests the shining of the Self]; 4. the cause of modification [is for instance] another object-of-sense [which modifies] the central-organ, just as fire [is a cause which modifies] food to be cooked; 5. the cause of presentation: [for instance] the thought of smoke [is the cause of the presentation] of the thought of fire; 6. the cause of attaining: [for instance] the following up of the aids to yoga [is the cause of attaining] discriminative discernment; 7. the cause of disjunction [is for instance] the same [following up as the cause which disjoins the Self] from impurity; 8. the cause of transformation is for instance the goldsmith [as the cause which transforms] the gold. Similarly if a single presented idea of a woman has the quality of infatuation, undifferentiated-consciousness (avidyā) [is the transforming cause]; if it has the quality of painfulness, hatred [is the transforming cause]; if it has the quality of pleasurability, passion

¹ Apparently this is a sangrahacloka. Vijñāna Bhikṣu says kārikōdāni nava kāraṇāni.
[is the transforming cause]; if it has the quality of the detached attitude,¹ the recognition of the reality [is the transforming cause]; the cause of sustentation [is for instance] the body [as the cause which sustains] the sense-organs, and these [organs as the cause sustaining] this [body], [and again] the great elements [as the sustaining cause] of bodies, and these [elements] reciprocally of all [elements], since human and animal and supernormal bodies depend upon each other.—So much then for the nine causes. And these so far as possible are also to be applied to other things. But as for the following up of the aids to yoga, it comes into play as cause in two ways only, [as the cause of disjunction and as the cause of attainment].

So much for the four divisions which have been described. Since discriminative discernment, the means of escape, which falls within these [four], cannot be perfected before [one follows up the means], as in the process of milking a cow: and since what is not perfected cannot be a means [to something else], he proceeds to describe the means for its perfection in the words, «When . . . perfected.» At this point the way by which the means-of-attainment, which are about to be mentioned, serve as a means for discriminative discernment is shown by the sūtra which begins with the word 28. . . . yoga and ends with the word discernment. For the aids to yoga, according to circumstances, by seen or unseen² methods, cause the impurity to dwindle away. That misconception has five sections must be understood as a partial statement, since merit and demerit, in so far as they are causes of birth and of length-of-life and of kind-of-enjoyment, are also impure. The rest is easy. Since we find that causality is multiform, what kind of causality belongs to the following up of the aids to yoga? In reply to this he says, «After the aids to yoga have been followed up.» Since it disjoins the sattva of the thinking-substance from impurity it is the cause of disjunction from impurity. He gives a simile in the words, «just as an axe.» An axe disjoins the tree to be cut from its root. The sattva of the thinking-substance, when disjoined from impurity, causes one to attain to discriminative discernment. Just as merit is [the cause of attaining] pleasure, so the following up of the aids to yoga is the cause of attaining discriminative discernment. And [it is a cause] in no other form. So he says, «Now . . . discriminative insight.» Having heard the denial in the words «in other ways . . . not,» he asks, «Furthermore how many of these?» The answer is, «Just nine.» He shows what these are by a memorial verse (kārīka), «as follows, “. . . rise [into consciousness].”» He gives an illustration

¹ Read the tale in H. C. Warren: Buddhism in Translations, p. 208. ² A visible means would be śānta; an invisible means would be śvādhyāya.
of this in the words, «Of these [nine], 1. The cause of rise [into consciousness]». 1. The central organ is the cause of the origin of a mental process because it brings out a mental process from an indeterminable stage to the present stage. 2. The cause of permanence [is for instance] the fact that the Self has purposes. The central organ rising [into consciousness] out of the feeling-of-personality lasts only so long as the two-fold purpose of the Self is not fully accomplished. When the two kinds of purposes of the Self are accomplished it passes out of permanence. Therefore the fact that the Self has purposes is the cause of the permanence of the central organ which has risen [into consciousness] out of its own cause. He gives a simile in the words, «just as food is of the body». 3. The efficient cause of perceptive thinking, the preparation (sāṁskriyā) of an object either of itself or by a sense-organ, is manifestation. The cause of this manifestation [is for instance] the shining [of the Self upon a fluctuation as the cause of the manifestation] of colour. 4. The cause of modification [is for instance] another object-of-sense [which modifies] the central organ. For just so Mrkaṇḍu, whose central organ had become concentrated, heard the fifth¹ note ripening upon the lute, and lifted up his eyes and beheld the heavenly-nymph Umloca² in the perfection of beauty and loveliness, so that he lapsed from concentration, and his central organ became attached to her. He gives an instance bearing upon the same point in the words «just as fire». For just as fire is the cause of the modification of a thing to be cooked, like rice, in such manner that a thing whose arrangement of parts was compressed becomes loosely conjoined in parts. 5. An object which is definitely existing is the cause of presentation [just as] the thought of smoke [is the cause of the presentation] of the idea of fire. What he means to say is this. The thought (jñāna) is that which is thought; and the thought of fire is fire and it is thought [that is, it is a descriptive compound].³ 6. The cause of attainment. The natural action of effects belonging to causes which are independent is [what he means by] attainment. Occasionally there is an exception to this [action of the effects, which is the] non-attainment. Just so waters whose nature it is to flow down a slope (nimna) are held back by a dam. Similarly also in this case, the sattva of the thinking-substance, which is disposed to pleasure and brightness, is by its own nature the producer of pleasure and of discriminative discernment. This is attainment. Sometimes this [attainment], because it is held back, by reason of demerit or of tamas, does not follow. When by reason of merit or of following up the aids to yoga this [holding-back] is removed, then as a reason merely of the nature of the fluctuations of the thinking-substance’s sattva when not held back by this [demerit or tamas], and in so far as it [this sattva] is the producer of this [pleasure and discernment], [this sattva] attains [them],

¹ See Raghuvāña ix. 26 and 47; Karpūra-māñjārī i. 16⁴ (HOS. vol. 4, p. 223). The seventh note of the lute resembles the cooing of the koīl.

² Compare MBh. i. 4821 = i. 123. 64.

³ The compound is not a genitive dependent (gaghitatpurīsa), but rather a descriptive (karmadhāroya).
as he will [iv. 8] say, "The efficient cause gives no impulse, but [the mutation] follows when the barrier to the evolving causes is cut, just as in the case of the peasant." Thus there is said to be a cause of attainment only with reference to the effect characterized as discriminative discernment. 7. In respect to anything subsidiary [to discriminative discernment] the same thing would be a cause of disjunction. So he says, "7. the cause of disjunction." 8. He describes the cause of transformation in the words "the goldsmith... the gold." In so far as the emphasis is upon the difference with respect to the gold, which is both different and not different from the bracelets and ear-rings and anklets, and in so far as the emphasis is upon the absence of difference [in the gold], which is not different from the bracelets and other things, there is a cause which transforms [the gold] from the bracelet [into something else]. And the goldsmith, who made the bracelet, in so far as he transforms the gold, which is [now] identical with the ear-ring, becomes the cause of transformation. Although fire [given as an example of 5. modification] is a cause of transformation with respect to the thing to be cooked, still since the difference between the substance* and the property, the rice-grains and the lump of rice, is not emphasized, therefore even though the properties come and go, still the substance persists. It is not possible therefore to say that [the fire] is a cause of transformation. For this reason it was said that the fire is a cause of modification. And accordingly there is no cross-division. Moreover it should not be supposed that the cause of transformation in the case of the substance is merely a difference in the arrangement of parts. For this would be inconsistent with the words "the goldsmith." Having made clear what the cause of outer transformation is, he illustrates the inner [cause] in the words "Similarly if a single." "Undifferentiated-consciousness (avīḍā)," that is, such a thought as 'This girl is to be loved'. The very same presented idea of a woman becomes, in the case of Chaitra, in consequence of his complete infatuation, infatuated, that is to say, dejected. For he says to himself, 'Alas! that jewel of a woman has come into the hands of that lucky Maitra, not into the hands of me, bereft (hīna) of luck.' Similarly the rival wives' hatred of her is the cause of the painfulness of the idea of [this] woman. And again the passion of her husband Maitra for her is [the cause] of the quality of pleasurability in this same idea of the woman. The recognition of the reality, that the body of the woman is a congeries of skin and flesh and fat and bones and marrow, and is impure because of its [first] abode* [and] because of its origin and the rest, becomes, in the case of the discriminating, the cause of the detached attitude [that is to say] passionlessness. 9. The cause of sustentation is that which sustains the body and organs. And in the case of the body it is the organs. For the five breaths, beginning with the vital air, are functions

1 Compare ii. 18, p. 144* (Calc. ed.).
2 Compare Patanājali: Mahābhāṣya, vol. I, p. 7 middle (Kielhorn’s ed.).
3 Compare ii. 5, p. 111†.
Eight aids to yoga

of the organs in general. For if they were not, the body would fall. Similarly in the case of the parts of the body, the flesh and the other [parts], there is the reciprocal relation of sustained and sustainer. Likewise the great elements, that is, the earth and the other [elements]; and these [elements] are in the reciprocal relation [of sustained and sustainer] in the case of bodies dwelling in the worlds of human beings or of Varuṇa or of the Sun or of the Wind (gandhavaha) or of the Moon. Thus in the case of earth, which has the qualities (guna) of odour and taste and colour and touch and sound, there are five great elements standing in the reciprocal relation of sustained and sustainer; in the case of water there are four; in the case of fire three; in the case of wind two. Furthermore animal and human and divine [bodies] stand in a relation of sustained and sustainer. Some one asks, 'How can this [reciprocal relation of sustained and sustainer] be so, if the bodies are not in the relation of holder and held?' He replies, «since human ... depend upon each other.» For the human body is sustained by the use of the bodies of tame animals and of birds and of wild animals and of plants. Similarly bodies like the tigers [are sustained] by the use of the human bodies and those of tame and wild animals and of others. And again in the same way the body of the tame animal and of the bird and of the wild animal [is sustained] by the use of plants and similar things. Likewise the divine body [is sustained] by the use of sacrifices, of goats and deer and the flesh of grouse and ghee and baked-rice-cakes¹ and branches of mango (sahakāra) and handfuls-of-darbha grass (prastara), offered by human beings. In the same way the deity also sustains human beings and the rest by granting boons and showers. Thus the dependence is reciprocal. This is the meaning.—The rest is easy.

In this [sūtra] the aids to yoga are determined.

29. Abstentions and observances and postures and regulations-of-the-breath and withdrawal-of-the-senses and fixed attention and contemplation and concentration are the eight aids.

The following up of these must be performed in succession. And what they are we shall describe.

Now with the intent of excluding either a larger or a smaller number he determines what are the aids to yoga by saying «In this [sūtra] the aids to yoga are determined.» The sūtra begins with the word 29. Abstentions and ends with the word aids. Practice and passionlessness and belief and energy and the rest [i.e., 20], both by reason of their own selves and in so far as they are indispensable, are also properly to be included among these same.

¹ Their use is described in Apastamba-Yājñī-Paribhāṣā-Sūtra xxix and xxxix (SBE, vol. xxx), and their preparation

in Çatapatha-Brāhmaṇa i. 2. 2. 1f. And again in Manu vi. 11 and vii. 21.
Of these [eight]—

30. Abstinence\(^1\) from injury and from falsehood and from theft and from incontinence and from acceptance of gifts are the abstentions.

Of these [five] abstinence from injury means the abstinence from malice towards all living creatures in every way and at all times. And the other abstentions and observances are rooted in it. In so far as their aim is the perfection of it, they are taught in order to teach it. And in this sense\(^2\) it has been said, "Surely this same brahman in proportion as he desires to take upon himself many courses-of-action,\(^3\) in this proportion refraining from heedlessly giving injury, fulfils [the abstention of] abstinence from injury in order to give it the full character of its spotlessness." Abstinence-from-falsehood (satya) means speech and mind such as correspond to the object-intended; and speech and mind corresponding to what is seen or inferred or heard.\(^4\) If speech is spoken in order that one's own knowledge may pass to some one else, it should not be deceitful or mistaken or barren of information; [then it would be abstinence from falsehood]. It should be used for the service of all; not for the ruin of creatures. And even when used thus, should it be only for the ruin of creatures, it would not be an abstinence from falsehood; it would be nothing less than wrong. In so far as there would be a false kind of merit [and] a resemblance of merit, it would become the worst of evils. Therefore let [the yogin] consider [first] what is good \(^5\) for all creatures and [then] speak with abstinence-from-falsehood.—Theft \(^6\) is the unauthorized (açāstrapūrva:ka) appropriation of things-of-value from another. While abstinence-from-theft, when free from coveting, is the refusal to do this.—Continence is control of the hidden organ of generation.—Abstinence-from-acceptance-of-gifts is abstinence-from-appropriating objects, because one sees the disadvantages in acquir-

\(^1\) This sūtra and the following are quoted in Gāḍāpāda's Bṛāya on Sāmkhyā-kārikā xxiii.

\(^2\) Similar plans of life in Bhāg. Pur. xi, second half.

\(^3\) JAOŚ. Proceedings, xi. 229.

\(^4\) Compare Liṅga Purāṇa viii. 18.

\(^5\) The principle would seem to be that a speech which does not harm any one and which does some good, although untrue, must be regarded as true. See Manu iv. 138 and viii. 188.

\(^6\) Compare Liṅga Purāṇa viii. 15.
Five abstentions

Having announced the aids [to yoga] of which the first are the abstentions and the observances, he introduces a sutra which specifies the abstentions by saying «of these [eight].» The sutra begins with the words 30. Abstinence from injury and ends with the word abstentions. He describes the aid to yoga [called] abstinence from injury by saying, «in every way.» He praises such abstinence-from-injury with the words, «And the other.» «Rooted in it» would mean that, even if these are performed without observing abstinence from injury, they are as if they had not been performed, since they are quite fruitless. This is the meaning. The following up of them has nothing as its aim but the perfection of this [abstinence-from-killing]. ‘If abstinence-from-killing has the others rooted in it, how can it be that they aim at the perfection of the abstinence-from-injury?’ To this he replies, «in order to teach it.» «Perfection» [in other words] the rise into consciousness of a thought. An objector asks, ‘This may be true. But if the others exist for the sake of knowing abstinence from injury, what need of them, since this thought comes from the other source?’ In reply he says, «its spotlessness.» If the others were not followed up, abstinence-from-injury would be defiled by falsehood and other [vices]. With reference to this same point he tells of a concurrent opinion of those-who-have-the-tradition (āgamika) in the words, «And in this sense it has been said.» Easy.—He gives the distinguishing characteristic of abstinence-from-falsehood in the words, «speech and mind such as correspond to the object-intended.» The word such (yathā) raises an expectation which is fulfilled by the words «corresponding to what is seen.» He brings this into connexion with the correlated word «corresponding-to (tathā)» in the expression «speech and mind corresponding to.» [This should be,] whenever there is a desire to say [something]. [If spoken] otherwise [than as seen], it is not abstinence-from-falsehood. This is stated with an explanation in the words «to some other person.» In order that knowledge thereof may pass to some one else, speech is spoken [or] uttered to produce knowledge similar to one’s own knowledge. If it is not deceitful [or] the cause of deceit, [it is abstinence-from-falsehood]. Just as when Droṇa the Master [MBh. vii. chap. 190] asked Yudhiṣṭhira [the king] with regard to the death of his own son Ācyavatthāman, ‘Venerable sir (āyuṣman), thou who art rich in truth, has Ācyavatthāman been slain?’ And he having in mind the elephant who had the corresponding name said, ‘It is true, Ācyavatthāman is slain.’ This is an answer which does not make Yudhiṣṭhira’s own knowledge pass to [the other person]. For his own knowledge derived from the sense-organ¹ had as its object the slaying of the elephant and this [knowledge] was not passed [to Droṇa]. But quite another knowledge, that of the slaying of the latter’s son, was formed [in Droṇa’s mind].—«Or mistaken» means due to a mistake, either

¹ Reading īndriya-janmā with the Bikaner MS. and the Bombay and Pooma editions.
at the time when one desires to say something, or at the time of determining
what the object-to-be-perceived is.—〈Barren of information〉 is barren as regards
information, as for instance an outlandish tongue is barren of information to
Aryans; or it might be purposeless, as for instance speech the utterance of
which is not meant to be uttered. For in this [latter case], although one's own
knowledge does pass to the other person, still it is exactly the opposite of making
[knowledge] pass [to another], because it was not purposed.  

An abstinence-
from-falsehood even when it has these distinguishing characteristics, if it results
in injury to another, would be a false kind of abstinence-from-falsehood, but
would not be abstinence-from-falsehood, as he says in the words, 〈If it.〉 For
example, one who practises austerities in abstinence-from-falsehood, when asked
by robbers which way the rich merchant had gone, told the way the rich merchant
had gone. 〈It should be used,〉 that is, uttered. The rest is easy.—Since an
[explanatory] negative idea depends on that of the positive he explains the
distinguishing characteristic of theft by saying, 〈Theft is the unauthorized.〉 Here
the generic idea is characterized by a qualification. This is the meaning.
Since verbal and bodily operations are preceded by mental operations, it is the
operation of mind, because it is dominant, that is mentioned in the words,
〈free from coveting.〉—He tells what continence is in the word 〈hidden.〉 For
even if his organ of generation is held in control, still if he become attached
at the sight of a woman or upon [hearing] her talk or upon touching her limbs
which are the seats of Kandarpa, he has no continence. So to exclude this case
he says, 〈the hidden organ.〉 Other organs also that are very ardent for this
[woman] are to be watched.—He tells what abstinence-from-acceptance-of-gifts
is by saying, 〈objects.〉 He mentions the disadvantage due to attachment to
these 〈objects〉 in the words [ii. 15], 〈Since passions increase because of application
to enjoyments, and the skill of the organs also increases.〉 The disadvantage
which is characteristic of injury is also expressed by the words, 〈Enjoyment is
impossible unless one has harmed some living creatures.〉 Although obtained with-
out effort, objects if unauthorized have disadvantages when one acquires them,
since the acquisition of such things is censured. And even authorized objects,
when acquired, are evidently disadvantageous, in that they must be kept and so on.
Therefore abstinence-from-acceptance-of-gifts is the refusal to appropriate them.

Now as for these [five abstentions]—

31. When they are unqualified by species or place or time
or exigency and when [covering] all [these] classes—[under
these circumstances exists] the Great Course-of-conduct.

Of these [five], abstinence-from-injury is qualified in respect of
species as follows, a catcher of fish does injury to fishes only and

2 Compare ii. 15, p. 182a (Calc. ed.).
to nothing else.—The same is qualified in respect of place, as when one says, ‘I will not slay in a holy place.’—The same is qualified in respect of time, as when one says, ‘I will not slay on the fourteenth day [of the lunar fortnight] nor on a day of good omen. —The same, in the case of one who refrains from [these] three is qualified in respect of exigency, as when one says, ‘For the sake of gods and brahmans and not otherwise I will slay.’ Likewise also in the case of the warrior who says, ‘In battle only [I will do] injury, and nowhere else.’ Abstinence-from-injury and the other [abstinences] unqualified by these species or times or places or exigencies must be kept when [covering] no less than all [these] cases. <In all [these] classes> means with regard to all [these] objects. Without exceptions in no less than all [these] classes—this is what is meant by speaking of the Great Course-of-conduct\(^1\) when [covering] all [these] stages.

<Now as for these.> The sutra begins with the words 31 . . . by species and ends with the words Great Course-of-conduct. <When [covering] all [these] classes> means of those which are found in all [these] stages which are characterized as being species and the other [three stages]. The words <Abstinence-from-injury and the other [abstinences]> mean that the definition [of the Great Course-of-conduct] must be asserted in the case of the other abstentions also. The Comment is easy.

32. Cleanliness and contentment and self-castigation and study and devotion to the Itcvara are the observances.

Of these [five], cleanliness is produced by earth or by water or the like, and by the consumption and other [requirements] with regard to pure sacrificial food. This is outer. Inner [cleanliness] is the washing away of the blemishes of the mind-stuff.—[To practise] contentment means not to covet more than the means at hand.—Self-castigation is the bearing of extremes, hunger and thirst, cold and heat, standing and sitting, stock-stillness and formal stillness, and, according to usage, courses-of-conduct such as mortifications (\(krcchra\))\(^2\) and lunar fasts\(^3\) and rigid penances.\(^4\)—Study is the

\(^{1}\) Compare Manu xii. 1–6.  
\(^{2}\) Manu xi. 106, &c.  
\(^{3}\) Manu vi. 20, &c.  
\(^{4}\) Manu xi. 213, &c.
recital of books that treat of release or the repetition of the syllable of adoration (pranava).—Devotion to the Içvara is the offering up of all actions to the Supreme Teacher. “He who rests in himself, for whom the network of perverse-considerations (vitarka) has been destroyed, whether resting upon a bed or on a seat, or wandering upon a road, would behold the destruction of the seed of the round-of-rebirths, would be permanently released, would participate in deathless delights.” With regard to which this has been said, [i. 29], “Thereafter comes the right knowledge of him who thinks in an inverse way, and the removal of obstacles.”

He expounds cleanliness and the other observances. The sūtra begins with the word 32. Cleanliness and ends with the word observances. He explains [the sūtra] by saying «cleanliness.» The words «or the like» are meant to include cow-dung and such things. Pure sacrificial food is the barley [mixed with] cow’s urine and the rest [eaten at the Çrāvañ festival]. There is a consumption and other [requirements] with regard to this [food]. «The other requirements» are meant to cover regulation of the dimensions and of the number of these morsels. Instead of saying ‘produced by the consumption and other requirements with regard to pure sacrificial food’ he says «and by the consumption and other [requirements] with regard to pure sacrificial food.» For in the effect the cause is supposed figuratively to exist.—The «stains of the mind-stuff» such as arrogance and pride and jealousy; the removal of this is cleanliness of the central-organ.—«Contentment» is the desire to take no more than is necessary for the general maintenance of life, because it follows the renunciation of what had been before one’s own property. This is its distinction [from abstinence-from-acceptance-of-gifts].—«Stock-stillness» is the absence of any indication of one’s intention even by signs; «formal stillness» is merely refraining from speech.—In the phrase «for whom the network of perverse-considerations has been destroyed» the words «perverse-considerations» will be [later ii. 88] described. And doubts and misconceptions should be added [as parts of the network]. To this extent his intention is said to be pure.—These abstentions and observances are also described in the Vishnu Purana [vi. 7. 36-87].«Wishing to reduce the mind to its proper state he should resort to abstinence from incontinence and from injury and from falsehood and from theft and from acceptance-of-gifts. A man whose self is curbed should practise study and cleanliness and contentment and self-castigation. He should also make his mind incline towards the higher Brahman. These abstentions together with

1 Compare ii. 1, p. 1066 (Calc. ed.).
2 Illustrated in Chānd. Up. i. 10. 1-11.
3 See also Nārādiya Purāṇa xlvi. 12-14.
the observances are declared to be five each. They give a special result when they are approached with a desire [for some special thing], and in the case of persons free from all desires they yield final release.”

As for these abstentions and observances,

33. If there be inhibition by perverse-considerations (vitarka), there should be cultivation of the opposites.
Whenever [in the mind] of this brahman [practising the abstentions and observances] injuries and similar [faults] arise as perverse-considerations, such as for instance, ‘I will kill him who hurts me; I will also lie; I will also appropriate his money; and I will commit adultery with his wife; and I will also make myself master of his property.’ Thus inhibited by the blazing fever of perverse-considerations, let him cultivate the opposites of these. Let him ponder, ‘Baked upon the pitiless coals of the round-of-rebirths, I take my refuge in the rules (dharma) for yoga by giving protection to every living creature. I myself after ridding myself of perverse-considerations am betaking myself to them once more, like a dog. As a dog to his vomit, even so I betake myself to that of which I had rid myself.’ Other similar [inhibitions of perverse-considerations] should be applied in the other sūtras also [upon the aids to yoga].

Since “good things are full of difficulties”, he introduces a sūtra whose object is to give advice which will prevent the possibility of exceptions to these [abstentions and observances]. So he says, «As for these abstentions and observances.» The sūtra, 33. If there be inhibition by perverse-considerations, there should be cultivation of the opposites. In the Comment upon perverse-considerations there is nothing at all that seems obscure.

34. Since perverse-considerations such as injuries, whether done or caused to be done or approved, whether ensuing upon greed or anger or infatuation, whether mild or moderate or vehement, find their unending consequences in pain and in lack of thinking, there should be the cultivation of their opposites.

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1 This phrase occurs in Manu viii. 303.
2 Compare aho vighnavatyaḥ prarthitartha

siddhayāḥ, Cākuntala, Act iii, near end; and ċalendū ṭa kalā Repub. 435 c, 497 D.
Of these [considerations], first of all, injury, since it is done or caused to be done or approved, is three-fold. Moreover, each of these is three-fold, in so far as there is greed [such as] desire for the meat or for the skin, or in so far as there is anger as when a man thinks he has been ‘hurt by that man’, or in so far as there is infatuation as when a man thinks [that what he is doing] ‘will be merit for me’. Again, since greed and anger and infatuation are three-fold as being mild and moderate and vehement, there are thus seven-and-twenty varieties of injuries. Yet again, since [these are] gentle and moderate and extreme [these are] three-fold as follows, gently mild and moderately mild and keenly mild; similarly, gently moderate and moderately moderate and keenly moderate; likewise, gently keen and moderately keen and vehemently keen. Thus injury is of one-and-eighty varieties. It is, however, innumerable because of the varieties due to specifications (niyama) and to options (vikālpa) and to aggregations (samuccaya), due to the fact that the varieties\(^1\) of those-who-breathe-the-breath-of-life are innumerable. In the same manner [the classification] is to be applied to falsehood and to the other [crimes]. Now since these perverse considerations have endless consequences in pain and in lack of thinking, one should cultivate their opposites. [In other words], there is a cultivation of those things the endless consequences of which are pain and a lack of thinking.—And to continue, he who commits an injury first of all reduces the strength of the victim, then causes him pain by falling upon him with a knife or something of the kind, [and] afterwards even deprives him of life. When once he has taken away [the victim’s] strength, his own animate or inanimate aids\(^2\) begin to have their strength dwindle away. As a result of causing pain, he himself experiences pain in hells and in [the bodies of] animals and of departed spirits and in other [forms]. As a result of uprooting [the victim] from life, he himself continues from moment to moment at the very point of departure from life. And even while wishing for death he

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\(^1\) Rāghavānanda in the Patañjala-Rahasyam attributes this quotation to Paksilavāśmin. It is found in Vātsyāyana’s Bhāṣya (Vigyan. ed. p. 1\(^7\)); and quoted, with a change in the order of words, by the Udyotakāra in the Nyāya-Vārttika (Bibl. Ind. p. 9\(^9\)).

\(^2\) See Vācaspati on ii. 15, p. 114\(^8\) (Calc. ed.).
pands laboriously since the fruition\(^1\) of pain is to be felt in a
fruition which has\(^2\) a limit [in time]. Furthermore, even if [the
effects of] injury could be somehow done away\(^3\) by merit, even
then, if he obtained happiness, it would be [on condition
that] his length-of-life be short.—In the same way, so far as
possible, [the classification] is to be applied to lying and to the
other [violations of the abstentions]. Thus pondering on that
same [painful consequence] of perverse considerations, which is
inevitable (anugata) and undesired, the yogin should not devote
his central organ to perverse considerations. As a result of the
cultivation of the opposites, the perverse considerations become
things that may be escaped.

With the intent to describe what the cultivation of the opposites is, he states
the different natures and kinds and causes and properties and results of the con-
trary-considerations, as well as the objects for the meditation on the opposites in
the sutra which begins with the words 34. . . . perverse-considerations and ends
with the words cultivation of their opposites. He explains [the sutra] with
the words, «Of these . . . injury.» Because the varieties of those-who-breathe-
the-breath-of-life are innumerable, specifications and options and aggregations
are possible with regard to injuries and the other [crimes]. In this situation,
because there is a preponderance of tamas, as a result of wrong living, a lack of
thinking also arises characterized by the four kinds of misconception [ii. 5]. So
it is that these perverse-considerations also result in lack of thinking [as well as
arise out of undifferentiated-consciousness]. For the cultivation of their oppo-
sites is precisely [the thought of] the endless consequences in pain and in lack
of thinking. By virtue of this there is a revulsion from these. This same cul-
tivation of the opposites he makes clear by the words, «of the victim.» The
victim is some tame animal. «Strength» is the energy which is the cause of the
functional activity of the body. [This] he first reduces by tying him to a sacri-
ficial post. For in this way the animal loses his spirit. The rest is very clear.

When [the perverse considerations] become for this [yogin] unsuit-
able for generation, then the power caused by this fact becomes
indicative of the yogin's perfection. For example,

\(^1\) The word vipāka is omitted in the Bikāner
and the two Kāshmir and several other
good MSS.

\(^2\) Compare the discussion in ii. 18, especially
p. 127 (Calc. ed.).

\(^3\) The better reading is avāpogata. In this
case, the injury would not be inde-
pendent fruit since it would be cast
away as a portion of the sacrifice.
35. As soon as he is grounded in abstinence from injury, his presence begets a suspension of enmity.  
[This] occurs on the part of all living creatures.  
The abstentions and observances have been described, and the escape from the exceptions to these, the perverse considerations, as a result of the cultivation of the opposites has been described. Now he makes clear the signs indicative of thorough knowledge of perfection in these various abstentions and observances which result from practice in these [latter]. By a thorough knowledge of which signs [the yogin] accomplishes what is to be done in each particular case and acts with reference to what is yet to be done, as he says, «When . . . for this [yogin].»  
35. As soon as he is grounded in abstinence from injury, his presence begets a suspension of enmity. Even [enemies] whose hostility is everlasting like horse and buffalo, mouse and cat, snake and mongoose, in the presence of the Exalted [yogin] who is grounded in abstinence from injury, conform themselves to his mind-stuff and renounce altogether their hostility.

36. As soon as he is grounded in abstinence from falsehood, actions and consequences depend upon him.  
If [the yogin] says to a man (iti), 'Be 3 thou right-living,' the man becomes right-living. If he expresses the wish (iti) 'Attain thou heaven,' the man attains heaven. What he says (vāk) comes true.  
35. As soon as he is grounded in abstinence from falsehood, actions and consequences have their residence [in him]. Actions mean right-living and wrong-living; and consequences of these are such things as heaven and hell. Dependence upon the sense that these same depend upon him. Having dependence upon him is the abstract state of this [dependence] Since such a thing happens in the case of the Exalted One's speech, [the Comment] says that actions depend upon him by saying «right-living.» He says that consequences depend upon him by saying «heaven.» «Comes true» signifies that it is not prevented.

37. As soon as he is grounded in abstinence from theft, all jewels approach him.  
From all directions jewels approach to be his.  
37. As soon as he is grounded in abstinence from theft, all jewels approach him. Easily understood.

1 Compare Raghuvāsaça ii. 55, xiii. 50, xiv. 79 and Kṛṣṇa iii. 2.  
2 See Pāṇini ii. 4. 9 with the illustrations from the Kārikāvṛtti and the Siddhānta-kāumudi. Compare also Bāna's Kādambari p. 98* (Farab's ed.) and Čakunatala (Nir. Sāg. ed.) p. 23, two lines up.  
3 Whitney: Grammar 924.
38. As soon as he is grounded in abstinence from incontinence, he acquires energy.

By the acquisition of which the yogin increases [his] unhindered qualities. And when he is perfected he is able to transfer [his] thinking to [his] pupils.

38. As soon as he is grounded in abstinence from incontinence, he acquires energy. Energy [that is] power. By the acquisition of which he increases [or] accumulates qualities, such as minuteness, which are unhindered [that is] which have not been hindered. And when perfected he is endowed with the eight perfections of which the first is [called] tāra and also by other names such as Reasoning (āka). He is able to transfer his thinking which relates to the aids to yoga to his pupils [or] disciples.

39. As soon as he is established in abstinence-from-acceptance-of-gifts, a thorough illumination upon the conditions of birth—

—Becomes his. 'Who was I? How was I? Or what [can] this birth be? Or how [can] this [birth] be? Or what shall we become? Or how shall we become?' Such is desire to know his own condition in former and later and intermediate times becomes of itself fulfilled for him. These when he is established in the abstentions are the perfections.

39. As soon as he is established in abstinence-from-acceptance-of-gifts, a thorough illumination upon the conditions of birth. Birth is [coming into] relation with a body and with sense-organs and the rest which are particularized as belonging to some class [of beings]. There is a thorough illumination, a direct perception of the conditions [of birth] [or] of what kinds [of birth]. That is to say, a thorough knowledge of a quiescent or uprisen or indeterminable birth together with its form [of experience]. He desires to know the past in the words, ‘Who was I?’ He desires to know the different details as to origin and persistence of this same [birth] in the words, ‘How was I?’ He desires to know what the present birth itself is in the words, ‘Or what?’ Is the body made directly of elements, or is it nothing but an aggregation of elements, or is it other than these? Here also the words ‘Or how’ might be supplied. Elsewhere this is the actual reading. He desires to know the future in the words, ‘Or what shall we become?’ Here again the words ‘Or how’ are to be supplied. ‘Such . . . for him.’ The former [time] is past time;

1 See Manu xii. 28. 2 Sāṃkhya-kārikā ii. 3 The Vārt. says viṣṇu bhavati. 4 In the text of Vācaspāti katham vā apparently was lacking.
the later is future; the intermediate is the present. The existence of the self in these is a relation with a body and the rest. There is a desire to know this and from desire comes knowledge according to the maxim, “He who desires anything, does that same thing.”

We will speak with regard to observances.

40. As a result of cleanliness there is disgust at one’s own body and no intercourse with others.

As soon as there is disgust with his own body, he has begun cleanliness. Seeing the offensiveness of the body,\(^1\) he is no longer attached to the body and becomes an ascetic (yati). Moreover there is no intercourse with others. Perceiving the true nature of the body, desirous of escaping\(^2\) even his own body, even after he has washed it with earth and water and other [substances], not seeing any purity in the body, how could he have intercourse with the bodies of others absolutely unhallowed as they are?

40. As a result of cleanliness, there is disgust at one’s own body and no intercourse with others. By this [sutra] it is told what is indicative of perfection in outer cleanliness.

Furthermore [as other results],

41. Purity of sattva and gentleness and singleness-of-intent and subjugation of the senses and fitness for the sight of the self—

The word ‘arise’ completes the sentence. As a result of cleanliness there is purity of sattva; therefrom [it acquires] gentleness; from this [it acquires] singleness-of-intent; therefrom [it acquires] subjugation of the senses; and from this fitness for the sight of the self is acquired by the sattva of the thinking-substance. So to this [last] there is access, as a result of his being established in cleanliness.

He tells what is indicative of inner perfection by saying “Furthermore.”

41. Purity of sattva and gentleness and singleness-of-intent and subjugation of the senses and fitness for the sight of the self. When the defilements of

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\(^1\) Compare ii. 5, p. 113\(^a\) (Calc. ed.).

\(^2\) See Liṅga Pur. viii. 32–33.
mind-stuff are washed away, the mind-stuff comes-forth-to-sight undefiled. And as a result of freedom from defilement there is gentleness [or] transparency of sattva. In the transparent [sattvā] there is singleness-of-intent. Therefrom, by the subdual of the central-organ, there results the subdual of the sense-organs which are dependent on the central-organ. After that the sattva of the thinking-substance becomes fit for the sight of the self.

42. As a result of contentment there is an acquisition of superlative pleasure.
And in this sense it has been said,¹ “What constitutes the pleasure of love in this world and what the supreme pleasure of heaven are both not to be compared with the sixteenth part of the pleasure of dwindled craving (tṛṣṇā).”

42. As a result of contentment there is an acquisition of superlative pleasure. Superlative is that beyond which nothing more excellent exists. As was said by Yayāti² when he conferred youth upon his [father] Puru, “The wise man, casting entirely away that craving which is hard for the strong-willed to cast off and which even in the aged ages not, is filled quite full with pleasure and nothing else.” This same he shows by the words beginning «What constitutes the pleasure of love.»

43. Perfection in the body and in the organs after impurity has dwindled as a result of self-castigation.
Self-castigation in the very act of completing itself destroys the defilement from the covering of impurity. As a result of the removal of the defilement of the covering of this [impurity] there is perfection of the body, such as atomization [iii. 45]; likewise perfection of the organs, such as hearing and seeing at a distance [that is, telepathy].

He tells what is indicative of perfection of self-castigation. 43. Perfection in the body and in the organs after impurity has dwindled as a result of self-castigation. Whatever covering has the characteristics of impurity, has the qualities and so on which are effects of the tamas. «Such as atomization» would be greatness or lightness or getting [to any place]. Easy.

Compare Bhartṛhari Vāir. Cāt. 49 and Dhvanyāloka, p. 176 (Kāvyamālā ed.).

² Compare also MBh. i. 89-91 = 3577 ff.
44. As a result of study there is communion with the chosen deity.
Gods and sages and perfected men come within the range of vision of [the yogin] who has the disposition to study; and are helpful to his work.
He tells what is indicative of perfection in study. 44. As a result of study there is communion with the chosen deity. Easy.

45. Perfection of concentration as a result of devotion to the Içvara.
One whose whole nature is surrendered ¹ to the Içvara has perfection of concentration. By which [concentration] he knows as the thing really is (avaitatham) all that he desires to know, in other places and in other bodies and in other times. Thereafter his insight sees into things as they are (yaññabhūtam).
45. Perfection of concentration . . . of devotion to the Içvara. And it should not be urged that if, only as a result of devotion to the Içvara, concentration conscious [of objects] has its perfection, there is no need of the seven [other] aids. Because these [seven] by subsidiary activity, both seen and unseen, are of service to the perfection of devotion to the Içvara, and at the same time to perfection of concentration conscious [of objects]. Just as by a separation of correlations ² curds fulfil the purposes of the sacrifice and also fulfil the purposes of men. Thus if this is so, [one should not say] that fixed-attention and contemplation and concentration are not the immediate ³ aids [to yoga]. Because it is clear that these [three] (asya) are immediate aids, in so far as for the perfection of [concentration] conscious [of an object] these [three] have the same object as [concentration] conscious [of an object], whereas the other aids [which have the Içvara as object] have an object which is not this. For the devotion to the Içvara has also the Içvara as its object, and has not as its object that which is to be consciously known. Accordingly this is a mediate aid. Thus all is cleared up.—The words «sees into» are intended to show the etymology of the word «insight.»

¹ See ii. 1.
² See Jāmagī Mīmāṁsā-sūtra iv. 3. 5. 2.
³ Bālarāma defines antarañga by the words 'whatever happens immediately next to a thing is the antarañga of it'. Thus devotion to the Içvara is the last cause of the effect (antarañga sadhana) of concentration conscious of an object.
The abstentions and observances together with their perfections have been described. We have the following to say of the postures⁴ and the other [aids to yoga]. In this [sūtra, it is said]—

46. Stable-and-easy posture.

For example, the lotus-posture and the hero-posture and the decent-posture and the mystic-diagram and the staff-posture and [the posture] with the rest and the bedstead, the seated curlew and the seated elephant and the seated camel, the even arrangement, the stable-and-easy—also called, as-is-easiest—and others of the same kind.

He introduces the next sūtra with the words «The abstentions and observances have been described. We have the following to say of the postures and the other [aids to yoga].» In this [sūtra, it is said] 46. Stable-and-easy posture. Stable means motionless. That posture which is easy, which brings ease is the one intended by the sūtra. The word āsana means either that whereon a man sits [that is, a seat] or the manner in which he sits [that is, a posture].

The lotus-posture is well known.—A man settled down (sthitasya) rests one foot on the ground and the other is placed over the partially contracted knee,—this is hero-posture.—Bringing the soles of his feet near to each other close to the scrotum, he should make a hollow of his hands and place them over it in the shape of a tortoise,—this is the decent-posture.—Inserting the contracted left foot into the space between the right shin and thigh and inserting the contracted right foot into the space between the left shin and thigh,—that is the mystic diagram.—Sitting down with the great-toes placed together and with ankles placed together and stretching out upon the ground shins and thighs and feet placed together, let him practise the staff-posture.—Because there is a use of the yogic table ² (yoga-pañcaka), this is [the posture] with the rest.—Lying down with the arms stretched around the knees is the bedstead.—The curlew and the other seats may be understood by actually seeing a curlew and the other animals seated. — The two feet are contracted and pressed against each other at the heels and at the tips of

¹ Līlāgā Pur. viii. 87-90.
² An illustration of this by a native hand is given in Richard Schmidt’s Fakire und Fakirthum, to face p. 12; hero-posture faces p. 28; decent-posture faces p. 16, but diverges from this description in its details; mystic-diagram faces p. 24. The order of the illustrations does not correspond to the order of this book, and there is a vast number of fantastic and repellent additions.
³ Bālarāma says that this yogic table is a special kind of support for the arms of a yogin who is about to practise concentration. It is made of wood and is well known among udāsins by the name of ‘changan’.
the feet,—this is the even arrangement. — That arrangement in which one finds entire (śiddhāty) stability and ease,—this is the posture that is stable-and-easy. This is the one from among these [postures] which is approved by the Exalted Author of the sutras. An elaboration of this is given in the words, «as-is-easiest.»

47. By relaxation of effort or by a [mental] state-of-balance with reference to Ananta—
—[A posture] results. With these words the sentence is completed. When efforts cease the posture is completed, so that there is no agitation of the body. Or the mind-stuff comes into a balanced-state with reference to Ananta and produces the posture.

Having stated what the postures are, he tells what are the means of attaining them. 47. By relaxation of effort or by a [mental] state-of-balance with reference to Ananta. A natural effort sustaining the body is not the cause of this kind of posture which is to be taught as an aid to yoga. For if its cause were such, the preaching of it would be purposeless in that it could be naturally perfected. Therefore this natural effort does not accomplish this kind of posture which is to be taught and is contrary [to it]. For in so far as this [natural posture] is the cause of an arbitrarily chosen posture it is the destroyer of the specific kind of posture. Consequently a man, practising the specific posture as taught, should resort to an effort which consists in the relaxation of the natural effort. Otherwise the posture taught cannot be accomplished.— «Or ... with Ananta,» the Chief of Serpents, who upholds the globe of the earth upon his thousand very steadfast hoods,—[with him] the mind-stuff comes into a balanced state and produces the posture.

48. Thereafter he is unassailed by extremes.
As a result of mastering the postures he is not overcome by the extremes, by cold and heat and by the other [extremes].

He tells what is indicative of complete mastery of postures by saying 48. Thereafter he is unassailed by extremes. The Comment explains itself by a mere reading. Posture is also described in the Vishṇu Purāṇa [vi. 7. 89], "Having assumed a posture so as to possess the excellences of the decent-posture and the other [postures].”

1 Compare Bh. Gītā x. 28. Ananta is Vāsuki, the Lord of Serpents. See also MBh. i. 35. 5 ff.
49. When there is this [stability of posture], the restraint of breath cutting off the flow of inspiration and expiration [follows].

After the mastery\textsuperscript{1} of posture [follows the restraint of the breath]. Inspiration is the sipping in of the outer wind; expiration is the expulsion of the abdominal wind. Restraint of the breath is the cutting off of the flow of these two, the absence of both kinds.

After describing [postures], he shows that these precede restraint of the breath and tells the distinguishing characteristic of this [restraint of the breath].

49. When there is this [stability of posture], the restraint of breath cutting off the flow of inspiration and expiration [follows]. In the case of emission (rekaka) and inhalation (pūraka) and suspension (kumbhaka), the words «the cutting off of the flow of inspiration and expiration» give the general characteristic of restraint of the breath. To explain: when in inhalation the outer wind sipped in is held inside, there is a break in the flow of inspiration and expiration; again when in emission the abdominal wind forced out is held outside, there is also a break in the flow of inspiration and expiration. Similarly in the case of suspension also. This same is said by the Comment in the words «After the subjugation of posture.»

But this [restraint of breath] is,

50. External or internal or suppressed in fluctuation and is regulated\textsuperscript{2} in place and time and number and is protracted and subtile.

It is external in case there is no flow [of breath] after expiration; it is internal in case there is no flow [of breath] after inspiration; it is the third [or] suppressed in fluctuation in case there is no [flow] of either kind [neither of expiration nor inspiration], as the result of a single effort [to suppress both], just as water dropped upon a very-hot stone shrivels up wherever it falls, so both at once cease to be. And each of these three is regulated in space; [each] deals with a certain amount of space. [Each] is regulated in time; in other words, defined by a limitation to a certain number of moments. [Each] is regulated in number; the first rising up [of the vital current from the navel to the palate is measured] by so

\textsuperscript{1} Many MSS. omit this word jaye and read saty āsane.
\textsuperscript{2} The Vārttika says paridrīto nīrṇīto nīyamito.
many inspirations and expirations. In the same manner, the second rising up of the checked [vital current] is measured by so many inspirations and expirations. Likewise the third. Similarly it is gentle [in method]; similarly it is moderate; similarly it is keen. Thus it is regulated by number. So then, practised in these ways, [it becomes] protracted and subtile.

He introduces the sūtra which gives the characteristics of the three particular restraints of the breath by saying, «But this.» The sūtra begins with the word 50. External and ends with the word subtile. The words «in fluctuation» are connected with each [of the three]. He refers to emission (reçaka) when he says «In case . . . expiration.» He refers to inhalation (pūraka) when he says «In case . . . inspiration.» He refers to suspension (kumbhaka) when he says «the third.» This same he makes clear when he says «in case . . . of either kind.» When by only one effort of retention there results an absence of both inspiration and expiration, and when there is not, as before, an effort to prolong a long stream of efforts of emission; but, on the other hand, just as water thrown upon a very-hot stone dries altogether and shrivels up wherever it falls, so this wind, whose nature it is to flow, when its action is restricted by a mighty effort of retention, becomes subtilized and remains in the body. [Suspension] does not inhale and so is not inhalation; does not emit and so is not emission. The words «deals with a certain amount of space» means as measured by a span, [the space between the outstretched tips of the thumb and the forefinger], by a vitasti [from the extended thumb to the tip of the little finger], or by a hand. And it is inferred as being external [in so far as it causes] motion in a blade of grass or a piece of cotton in a windless spot. Similarly if internal, it begins at the sole of the foot and extends to the head. And it is inferred by [an internal] touch light as that of an ant [moving on the body]. A moment is one quarter of the time required for the act of winking. [The wind] is defined by the limitation of a certain number of these [moments]. An instant (mātrā) is the time limited by snapping thumb and forefinger after having three times rubbed one’s own knee-pan with the hand. The first rising up (udghāta) measured by thirty-six such instants is called slow. The same [udghāta] when doubled is moderate. The same tripled, called the third, is keen. This same restraint of the breath he describes as being regulated by number in the words «by number.» The time for snapping thumb and forefinger as described is equal to the time defined by the action of inhalation and exhalation of a man in good health.¹ The rising up² which has been made the object of the action of the first rising-up is conquered [and] mastered [and] checked. It is intended [by these measures of

¹ The meaning of the word svastha might also be ‘at ease’ or ‘motionless’.
² See Kūrma Pur. ii. 11. This process is elaborated at length in most of the later books of decadent yoga. Compare also Vāyu Pur. v. 79–81.
instants to indicate] the time of a certain number of moments. [And this time is equal to] a certain number of inspirations and expirations. Thus there is a slight difference [between the two kinds of measures, between the mātrā and the inspirations and expirations]. This same [restraint of breath] when practised day by day, [increasing gradually] by a day [at a time] or by a fortnight or by a month becomes, in so far as it is made to cover an increasing number of places or of times, protracted. And in so far as it is reached by a concentration of the most extreme delicacy it is said to be subtile, but not in so far as it is weak.

51. The fourth [restraint of the breath] transcends the external and the internal object.
The external object regulated in place and time and number is transcended; the internal object regulated in the same way is transcended; in both kinds of cases [restraint] is protracted and subtile. Following after these there is no flow of either kind. This is the fourth restraint of breath. Now the third restraint of breath is without regard to objects, has no flow [of breath], is begun once only, is regulated in place and time and number, and is protracted and subtile. But the fourth,¹ because, in consequence of its mastery of the stages in order, it has made out the objects of both expiration and inspiration, after transcending both [external and internal objects], is without flow and is the <fourth> restraint of breath. This is the distinction.

Thus the three particular restraints of breath have been characterized. The fourth he characterizes with the words 51. The fourth [restraint of the breath] transcends the external and the internal object. [The Comment] explains [the sutra] in the words «place and time and number.» Transcended means cast down because its form has been mastered by practice. It is also protracted and subtile. Similarly, «Following after these» means the restraint of breath which has external and internal objects and which follows after knowledge of place and time and number. The fourth does not, like the third, arise by a single effort and instantly. But while in practice and after having reached the various stages according as it succeeds in one stage after another it proceeds as he says «in consequence of its mastery of the stages.» It is objected, 'In the repressed fluctuation also there is no flow of either. What then is [its] distinction from this [fourth]?' In reply he says, «the third.» The third does not follow after any regard paid to [objects] and is completed by a single effort.

See Liṅga Pur. viii. 111.
But the fourth is preceded by the regard paid to objects and has to be completed by many efforts. This is the distinction. The object of these two, the inhalation and the emission, is not considered; but this [object] is regarded in respect of place and time and number. This is the meaning.

52. As a result of this the covering of the light dwindles away.

In the case of the yogin who is practising restraints of breath, the karma capable of covering discriminative thinking dwindles away. What this is they tell in the words, “Having covered the sattva which is disposed to light with delusion (indrajāla) made of infatuation, [undifferentiated-consciousness] assigns the same [obscured form] to deeds which are not to be done.” Therefore by practising restraint of breath his karma which covers the light, together with its bondage to the round-of-rebirth, becomes powerless. And from moment to moment it dwindles away. And in this sense it has been said, “There is no self-castigation higher than restraint of breath; from it comes purity from defilement and the clear shining of thought.”

He describes the subsidiary purpose [served by] restraint of breath. 52. As a result of this the covering of the light dwindles away. The covering is that by which the sattva of the thinking-substance is covered, in other words, hindrances and evil. He explains [the sūtra] in the words «restraints of breath.» Thinking (jñāna) is that by which anything is thought. It is the light of the sattva of the thinking-substance. Discriminative thinking is the thinking of discrimination. For this [hindrance], since it covers discriminative thinking, is called the coverer (āvaraniya) according [to the sūtra of Panini iii. 4. 68 which says that] bhavya and geya and pravacaniya and similar forms have been shown to be used as exceptional forms in the sense of agent, just as for instance the words kopaniya and rañjaniya. So here also the affix of the future passive participle is used to denote the agent. The word «karma» connotes the merit which results from it and the hindrance which is the cause of it. On this same point he states that there is a concurrence of opinion with those who have the tradition (āgamin) in the words «What this is they tell.» Extreme infatuation is passion. Undifferentiated-consciousness (avidya) too, which is inseparable from it, is also to be understood by this word. A deed «not to be done» is wrong-living. An objector asks, ‘If restraint of the breath causes evil to dwindle, what need is there of self-castigation?’ In reply to this he says «becomes powerless.» It does not dwindle away entirely. Therefore to make it dwindle away altogether self-castigation is needed. On this point also he states that there is a concurrence of opinion with those who have the tradition (āgamin) by saying «And in this
Fixed attention and withdrawal of the senses

Manu also [vi. 72] says, "By restraints of breath one should burn up defects." And that restraint of breath is also an aid to yoga is also stated by the Vishnu Purana [vi. 7. 40-1], "But restraint of breath which masters by practice the wind called breath is to be recognized as being seeded and as seedless. When the two winds, breath (prana) and out-breath (apana) have overcome each other, that is two-fold. The third is the result of a subdual of these two."

Furthermore,

53. For fixed attentions also the central organ becomes fit.
Merely in consequence of practice in restraint of breath [the central organ becomes fit for fixed attentions] in accordance with the statement [i. 34], "Or [he gains stability] by expulsion and retention of breath."

Furthermore, 53. For fixed attentions also the central organ becomes fit. For restraint of breath steadies the central organ and makes it fit for fixed attentions.

Now what is the withdrawal of the senses?

54. The withdrawal of the senses is as it were the imitation of the mind-stuff itself on the part of the organs by disjoining themselves from their objects.
When there is no conjunction with their own objects, the organs in imitation of the mind-stuff, as it is in itself, become, as it were, restricted. When the mind-stuff is restricted, like the mind-stuff they become restricted; and do not, like the subjugation of the senses, require any further aid. Just as when the king-bee 2 flies up, the bees fly up after him; and when he settles down, they settle down after him. So when the mind-stuff is restricted, the organs are restricted. This then is the withdrawal of the senses.
The [yogin] being refined in this way by means of abstentions and other [aids], begins, for the sake [of attaining] constraint, the withdrawal of the senses. In order to introduce the sūtra giving its distinguishing characteristic he asks the question, «Now?» The sūtra begins with the word 54. . . . themselves and ends with the words withdrawal of the senses. The mind-stuff also is not in contact with the [various kinds of things], sounds and so forth,

1 Compare Naradiya Pur. xlvii. 16-17.
2 Compare Praça Up. ii. 4. Repeated below iii. 88. This is what we call queen-bee.
which bring about infatuation and attachment and anger. And because it is not in contact with them, the eye and the other organs are not in contact. This is what is called the imitation of the mind-stuff by the senses. Because, as the mind-stuff settles down upon an entity, the organs of this [mind-stuff] cannot be said to imitate the mind, since their object is always external,—therefore he says «in imitation ... as it were.» [In the compound beginning] with the word «their own (sva)» he shows by the locative case [in the word abhāve] that the reason why the mind-stuff is imitated is because of the property common [to the mind-stuff and to the organs], namely, the disjunction from their own objects of sense. He elaborates [the meaning of] the imitation by saying «when the mind-stuff is restricted.» The similarity is that the effort which causes the restriction of both is similar. Here he gives a simile 1 by saying «Just as when the king-bee.» He applies [the simile] to the thing illustrated by saying «So.» On this point also [he quotes] a sentence from the Vishnu Purana 2 [vi. 7. 48], “A man skilled in yoga, having restrained the organs attached to [the various things], sound and so forth, should make them imitate the mind-stuff, in that he is intent upon the withdrawal of the senses.” And the motive for this is shown in the same place [vi. 7. 44], “In the case of men who have become motionless, the result of that [withdrawal] is perfect mastery of the organs. A yogin with unmastered [organs] cannot accomplish yoga.”

55. As a result of this [withdrawal] there is complete mastery of the organs.
There are some who think 1. that the mastery of the organs is a lack of desire for the various things sounds and so forth. Longing (vyasana) is attachment in the sense that it puts him a long way from (vy-asyati) a good. 2. [Others think that] unforbidden experience is legitimate. 3. Others, that there may be conjunction [of the organs] with the [various things] sounds and so forth as one desires. 4. Others think that there is a subjugation of the senses when there is no passion or aversion after the thinking of the various things is without pleasure or pain. 5. Jāgīśavaya thinks that it is refusal to perceive [the various things beginning with sound] as a result of the mind-stuff’s singleness-of-intent. And as a result of this, when [the yogin’s] mind-stuff is restricted, the organs are restricted, [and] there is not as in the case of the subjugation of the other organs, any further need of

Compare iii. 38.  
2 See also Nārādiya Pur. lxvii. 19–20.
means performed with effort. But this mastery which is this singleness-of-intent is the complete [mastery].

The sūtra is explanatory of this [mastery]. 55. As a result of this [withdrawal] there is complete mastery of the organs. An objector asks, 'Are there other and incomplete masteries in comparison with which this may be called complete?' Undoubtedly, [he says in reply]. He shows what these are in the words «the various things beginning with sound.» He elaborates the same by saying «desire.» Desire is passion, attachment. According to what derivation? It is that which rejects him [or] throws him away from a good. When there is none of this, there is absence of desire, in other words, mastery.

2. He describes yet another [incomplete] mastery in the words «unforbidden.» That devotion to things which is not forbidden by the Sacred Word and other [authorities], and the absence of sense activity with regard to those things which are forbidden by these. Such is legitimate because it does not depart from the law. 3. He describes yet another [incomplete] mastery in the words «contact [of the senses] with the [various things] beginning with sound.» Contact of the organs with the [various things], sounds and so forth, as one desires. The meaning is that with regard to matters of enjoyment he is independent and not dependent on enjoyment.

4. He describes yet another [incomplete] mastery in the words, «no passion and no hatred.» Some say that it is a thinking without pleasure or pain, of the [various things], sounds and so forth, by a detached observer. 5. He describes that mastery which is approved by the author of the sūtras and is also approved by the Supreme Sage, as he says, «as a result of the mind-stuff's singleness-of-intent.» Jāgāśavya says that when the mind-stuff together with the organs is single-in-intent, there is no sense-activity with regard to [various things] beginning with sound. The [commentator] says that this is the complete mastery in the words, «But... the complete.» The word «but» distinguishes it from other masteries. For the other masteries, insofar as they are in contact with the poisonous snake¹ (dīvīṣa) of objects-of-sense (vīṣaya), do not escape the possibility of contact with the poison of the hindrances. For even a man who knows the lore of poisons and who is a perfect master of serpents does not take a serpent on his lap and quietly go to sleep. This mastery, on the other hand, from which all intermixture with objects has been removed, since [in it] there is no distrust, is called complete, as he says, «not as in the case of the subjugation of the other organs.» Although, in the case of consciousness of endeavour [ii. 15], when one organ is subdued there is still need of another effort to conquer the other organs, yet, when the mind-stuff is restricted, there is no such need of further exertion in order to restrict the other senses. This is the meaning.

¹ 'One in which poison is lying' according to the Gaṇa on Pāṇini vi. 3, 109.
Here in this Book he has taught the yoga of action and the hindrances to karma and the fruits of karma; the painfulness of these [karmas] and also the [four] divisions: a group of five subjects appertaining to yoga.


Of the Explanation of the Comment on Patañjali’s [Yoga-treatise], whose Explanation is entitled Clarification of the Entities (Tattva-Vaiśārahādi), and which was composed by the Venerable Vācaspatimīśra, the Second Book, called Specification of the Means of Attainment, is finished.