GLOSSARY OF TECHNICAL TERMS USED IN THE BHASA-
PARICHCHHEDA - SIDDHA'NTA MUKTAVALI.

( সংবাং-গলি অম্বাদের পৃষ্ঠার স্থান )

( II ) এই চিহ্ন দ্বারা অম্বাদের বিদ্যায় খাঁ রাখিতে হইবে।

অকারণাঙ্গপূর্বক ৫১ ও ১২২—Not caused by the quality abiding in the material cause of a thing, as the colour of a jar due to a process of heating cannot be said to be caused by the colour of its component parts.

অধোপাধি ৭৩, ১০৪ II—An upadhi or common property, other than a genus, which is cognised out of all reference to the quality which determines its application; such as প্রতিযোগিতাহ, ভাব, অধি-করণাং এ. ই. ধৰ্মের প্রকারভাব অবচেতন নহিত তাহা অধোপাধি। In these cases the upadhis are cognised without their avachhedaka, viz—প্রতিযোগিতাং, ভাব, অধি-করণাং এ. ই. রেইসিং (floating in the language of Nyaya) in the plain of consciousness, unlike in the case of common terms, where their perception is accompanied by the perception of the qualities which determine their connotation. For instance, when one cognises a man he cognises at the same time the quality or ধৰ্ম which determines its connotation, viz—man- hood or মহৃদ্যাব।
An unwarrantable extension (of a definition or principle).

A special power to produce an effect, as in 59; something which did not exist before—some peculiarity as in 176 and 186. Negation.

That which directly or indirectly helps in the production of an effect.

A thing which is different from what is sought to be proved.

A kind of proof—presumption, as when a man who is known to abstain from taking any food during the day, grows fat, the inference that he must be taking food at night, is a case of অর্থপত্তি or presumption.

Something understood.

That which is not an avaichchhedaka or a quality determining the connotation of a term.

Regress to infinitum.

When applied to an act of knowledge, it means a kind of knowledge of which the truth has not been verified by test.

Non-perception.

A supposition or a conditional statement in favour of a proposition. The proposition for instance, ‘কার্য্যাদ্বা কার্য্যে কৃতির্যত্ন্যাধিকৃতি চারি সংখ্যা তথা কৃতির্যত্ন্যাধিকৃতি ন সংখ্য’ (p. 5) is an anukul tarka with respect to the proposition, that whatever is an effect has a conscious agent for its cause.
( ১ )

अनुगृह धर्म ১১৫—
अनुगम ১০০ II—
अनुप्रेषित ১১৭—

अनुपासितի ৭—
अनुप्रेषিত ১৬৮—
अनुप्रासित ১৯১, ২০২—

Common property.
Generalisation.
Want of logic or argument, in—consistency &c.
Non-realisation, non-perception.
Non-perception.
A kind of fallacy consisting in the minor term (পক্ষ) standing for every known thing, e. g., সব বাচ্য অন্য বাচ্য, (Every thing may be expressed in words because of the fact of its being an object of proof).
Not expressed in words.
Literally—an act of knowledge succeeding the one immediately preceding it—the perception of an act of knowledge—as when after perceiving a jar one realises that he has a knowledge of the jar.—The second act of knowledge is known as an অন্য বাচ্য. In other words it is knowledge with the notion of self as knower superadded.
Perception.
Inference.
Ditto.
Ditto.

See অন্য বাচ্য.

The quality of being an “Anu-yogi”. When a thing stands to another in a particular relation (sambandha), that upon which it stands
or is supposed to stand is called অনুযোগী (Anuyogi), while it itself is called প্রতিযোগী in regard to the relation. Thus a jar standing on the ground in the relation of sanyoga (ordinary contact) is the “Pratiyogi”, and the ground is the “anu-yogi” of the relation (সংযোগ) sanyoga.

An addition, a thing understood. Failure, improbability, impossibility. Quality of a জ্ঞা which is other than an atom.

Quality of অনেকজ্ঞানবিদ or of a thing existing in more than one জ্ঞা or substance in intimate relation. The thing so existing is called অনেকজ্ঞানবিদ.

See above.

A hetu (middle term) which is (1) either more extensive than সাধা major term, or (2) not even as extensive as the same, or when it has for সাধা some thing of which no negation can be predicated. Page 102. Part I.

Error.

A final whole which does not form part of some other অবষ্যী or whole, as distinguished from the parts of a body that are no final wholes.

Superfluous—(Lit. produced by
other means—without the operation of a cause. For particular instances see pp. 25—27.

Concomitant circumstances which are not to be confounded with causes.

Mutual exclusion or ‘negation’ as it is called. As in the sentence ‘ঘটঃ পটান’ [ A jar is not a cloth ], ‘ঘট’ and ‘পট’ are said to be mutually excluded, or in the language of Nyaya, পটভেদ [ or the অনোহাতাব of পট—ভেদ and অনোহাতাব being synonymous terms] exists in ঘট. The particle ‘ন’ ( no ) is indicative of অনোহাতাব.

Limited dimension.

Proximity in time and space.

A smaller class—species.

Salvation.

The doctrine of Apurva (or something which did not exist before) or special merit or demerit which is supposed to inhere in the soul as the result of good or bad acts, and which brings in reward or punishment in future birth.

The mental necessity which gives rise to the notion of number, and which is expressed by the proposition—’This is one, this is one.’ &c.

Non-existence in or exclusion from everything else; such as the
attribute নীলাচ্ছন্ন or blueness is termed an অপোহ ধর্ম because it is excluded from all things which are not blue. [তত্ত্বার্থত্ত্ব অপোহঃ].

False knowledge. That which is qualified or determined by some attribute.

A quality or attribute which determines the special characters of a thing. Thus when a danda (or a stick) becomes the hetu (cause) of a jar (ঝুঁ), it is dandatva— an attribute belonging to danda, which determines its special character as hetu or cause. It is an attribute which is common to all tandas or sticks, besides being co-extensive with the causality which inheres in the danda (hetu). It therefore differentiates the causality of danda from its all other aspects. It is represented by the addition of the suffix া to the word which represents the thing, of which the special character has to be determined or distinguished.

Thus in the present instance, it is the character of danda (stick) as "hetu" or cause that has to be differentiated from the other characters that it may possess, and the fact is expressed by saying that dandatva is the avachchhedaka of
betu or causality. In the same way the danda may be a *viseṣhya* (subject) or a *viseṣhana* (predicate); and in that case ḍhaṅḍa becomes the avachchhedaka of its character as *viseṣhya* or *viseṣhana* or in the language of Nyaya – विशेषताबहुज्ञक or विशेषणताबहुज्ञक. In the above instances the special character of ḍhaṅḍa as ḍhang, विशेष or विशेषण, or in the language of Nyaya हेतुता, विशेषता, or विशेषणता inheres in ḍhaṅḍ and ḍhaṅḍa becomes the avachchhedaka of the same. And the special characters, such as हेतुता etc. are said to be अवच्छिन्न (limited) or determined by घटक. Characterised or determined.

A part, also propositions in a syllogism—not used in this sense in the text.

A whole as distinguished from अवयव or part.

One who denies the existence of a whole as distinct from a collection of parts or atoms.

One who considers an अवयव or a whole as something distinct from a mere collection of parts or atoms.

Which must be admitted.

Obstructed.

Not existing or present in something.
Not pervading, a thing of which the presence is limited by time and space.

Inadequate extension, said of a definition which fails to apply to any of the things defined.

Impact or collision which leads to sound.

Suppression.

A thing which is not destroyed by the destruction of its אֶאָשָׂה or seat of manifestation—as sound.

A perception which is independent of the sense, as the perception of a class from the perception of an individual belonging to the class.

The same as 'a transitory' (trisvamsa).

Transcendent connection. In all acts of perception, there must be some sort of connection between the organs of sense and the objects perceived by those organs. And when ordinary 'connections' of the nature of sanyoga (contact), samavaya etc., are not possible, as when after the perception of a jar in one place one comes to have a knowledge of all jars, or after the perception of a man in one place one comes to have a knowledge of all human beings wherever they may happen to exist—the connection between the organs
of sense and the objects known, in the cases in question all jars or all human beings, is furnished by the knowledge of the jar or humanity; and this knowledge is called 'transcendent anikaarsha or connection.

A non-intimate cause, as the connection of the two parts of a jar is said to be the non-intimate cause of the jar. See the discussion on the subject on pages 23 to 26.

When applied to a hetu or the middle term of a syllogism, it means one which is not found where साध्य is found. —in other words—a hetu which is not coextensive with साध्य. See p. 102.

A kind of fallacy consisting in the hetu not being present in पक्ष, or पक्ष and साध्य being wantnig in their characteristic attributes. (See pp. 104-105).

Dependence in sense.

A substance (identified by many with ether) in which the quality known as sound inheres.

A conditional proposition intended to eliminate the presence of error in a general rule or Vyapti; as:—If is B, then C is D—but C is not D—therefore A is not B.
Order or succession.
That which takes the place of a Tarka or a conditional syllogism is called অপারক্ষ, and that taking the place of হেতু is called অপারক্ষ; as in the tarka—"If the lake be smoky, then it must have fire,—fire and smoke are respectively called অপারক্ষ and অপারক্ষ.

See above.
Intermediate as আপারালিক সরু or intermediate acts of remembrance.
Presence; as the presence of the word ‘ষট’ in the sentence ‘ষটমানসব’ (bring the jar). The same as অষ্ট.

Falsity.
That which leads to the production of something.
The kind of সংহার which leads to the creation of something.
An act of knowledge having ego or self for its object.—Self-consciousness.
The same as নির্জীবক্ষ জ্ঞান of the Naiyayikas—an act of knowledge pertaking more of sensation than of perception—an act of knowledge in which the objects perceived cannot be distinguished from others by means of differentiating attributes (বিশেষণ).
Contiguity of words connected by sense in a sentence.
The connections between the organs of sense and the objects of perception which results in the perceptive act. [অত্যক্ষপ্রয়োজকসাঙ্গত্যঃ]

Literally an objection which is welcome or one which does not affect the argument.
Connection, as in বিযোগপ্রাণ, পুকুর, গোপপ্রাণ—connection with the objects of sense, connection with purusha or soul.

Absence, as in sentence 'গামানয়' (bring the bow) there is the উর্দ্ধ or absence of বং or jar. The same as বাতিয়েক.

That which may be perceived, as 'उत্তররथম'—a colour which is perceptible.

A cause.
An act of perception as the result of the transcendant connection known as মানিরাঙকাণ জন্ম জ্ঞান।

Explanation, reason.
Analogy.
Perception, not to be confounded with জ্ঞান (or knowledge), which in the theory of Sankhyas may be rendered by sensation. They (উপলভ্জি and জ্ঞান) are however considered identical by the Naiyayikas.
Perception.
That which leads to the perception of a thing, as rupa or colour is the upalambhaka of jaya or substance.

Knowledge.
A general property other than a jati or genus.

A piece of string having a noose at each end—a dilemma.

A decisive argument. The same as viniyogana.
The same as above.
The fact of travelling in the same company—See first foot-note on page 106, Part II.
Existing in the same place or abhidhara.

Reference to a jati (genus), ssta (quality), kripa (action), jaya (substance) etc.
Untouched by or unconnected with karana, or concepts having no real existence. (See preface page 16).
Quality abiding in a cause—the fact of beng in cause.
Produced by the qualities abiding in a cause.
One of the five kinds of भूताभास or fallacy—the same as बाध, which see. Causal activity. (In Buddhist Philosophy) the property, said to abide in a cause, actually producing an effect; as when a sprout springs from a seed, the latter is said to have that property, the absence whereof accounts for the absence of the effect (for instance, the germination of the seed stored up in the granary.) See Dinakari, pp. 98-99, Vindhyesvari Prasad's Edition.

That of which अभाब or negation is not predicable, as ज्ञेय (the state of being an object of knowledge), which abides in all things, there being nothing which cannot be made an object of knowledge.

An alternative.

A laboured, far-fetched supposition.

One holding the Buddhist doctrine of kshanabhanga, or the momentary character of all things, the doctrine being expressed in the well-known formula —'एवं संस तत्त्व नशिकं' (whatever exists is momentary or lasts only for a kshana, or a fraction of a second.
The example of pigeons simultaneously landing in a khala, or a depository of unthreshed grain, intended to illustrate the genesis of a complete act of verbal knowledge after successive acts of remembrance.

Quality.

Cumbrousness, superfluousness, said of a definition or explanation containing superfluous or unnecessary element. When, however, such superfluousness is considered necessary for the explanation of a fact, it is known as 'ফলসংক্ষেপ', or leading to ফল or result.

Perception, an act of knowledge.

Example of a sieve, intended to illustrate the process of exclusion or exhaustion, as of particles of matter through one or other of the holes of a sieve.

Genus, class.

Obstacles to classification—consi-
derations vitiating a classificatory process.

Reference to a class.

Life-sustaining energy. That which is the cause of the respiratory movement. The involuntary effort which causes the respiratory movement.

According to the Sankhya Philosophy, the change of buddhi, or intelligence, into the forms of objects of perception, such as, a jar, a cloth, &c. Sensation.

One of the three kinds of alaukika or, transcendent connections between the organs of sense and the objects of perception, where the connecting link is supplied by jnana or knowledge. As when a man mistakes a piece of string for a snake, the knowledge he had of snakes serves as the connecting link between the object of sense and the thing perceived, there being no real contact of the organ of vision with a snake in this case. Thus, speaking generally, all mistakes in perception of the nature referred to are cases of জানলক্ষণ সরিবর্ধ.

A conditional proposition of
which the contrary is known to be true is called 'tarka' or hypothetical inference. Thus when C is known to be not D, the inference C is D, based on the supposition -- A is B, is called a tarka. The object of the tarka is to test the accuracy of a general proposition. You want to know whether A is B, and you argue: If A is B, then C is D, but C is not D, and so A is not B.

Intention of the speaker.
A combination of three dvānukas or six atoms.

Space.
Substance.
A combination of two atoms.

Attribute.
A thing possessed of attributes.

Intermediate.
One holding the doctrine of the permanence of knowledge or self-consciousness—a Vedantist.

Instrumental cause, as a potter is said to be the instrumental cause of a jar.
A lakshana (or secondary sense)
which is so well-known as to possess the force of *sakti* or the primary sense of a word. 

*শক্তিলক্ষণ—চিরপ্রসিদ্ধলক্ষণ.*

An act of perception in which the objects perceived are unconnected with one another, without their distinguishing characteristics or attributes—the same as the অলোচনাজ্ঞান of the Sankhya philosophy. According to Hindu logicians, as there can be no perception properly so-called without the perception of *viseshanas* or distinguishing attributes— the knowledge of things without: the *vikalpas,* or *viseshanas* is *apratyaksha,* or beyond the ken of the senses. According to Buddhist philosophers, all perception properly so-called is perception without any *vikalpa* or reference to class, quality, or action, or in other words, without the characterisation of the thing perceived in any way, the characterising process being a later and a complex one, which follows the first contact of the senses with the objects of perception. (See Nyaya Manjari, Vol. I., p. 93).

The same as above.

A bull of which the body is red, the face and tail are of pale
white and hoofs and horns white, is technically known as a 'blue bull.'

An impact which does not give rise to any sound.

The thing represented by the minor term in a syllogism, as in the inference 'পর্যন্তে বিখ্যাত প্রাণ' [The mountain is fiery because it smokes]—পর্যন্ত (mountain) is পক্ষ.

Is a technical term peculiar to Hindu logic, meaning the absence of a knowledge of the thing to be inferred, coupled with the absence of a desire to perform the inferential act. cf [পর্যন্ত্যপ্রয়াতির সিদ্ধাঙ্গ: পক্ষা।] The ideas underlying the definition seem to be that in the first place there is no inference when the thing to be inferred is known, and, in the second place, even when the thing to be inferred is known there may be an inference when the desire to perform the inferential process is not absent.

The word পক্ষা as defined above must not be confounded with the quality abiding in a পক্ষ.

The same as পক্ষনিত্যতা, or presence in the পক্ষ.

Useless, that which does not lead to any result, as পক্ষ অপূর্ণ.

An antecedent negation which is
never followed by a state of existence. Pragabhava means *ante-
cedent negation*—as the pragabhava of a jar means its non-existence until such time when it comes into being. But there are things which never come into existence at all, and it is useless to admit pragabhava in their case. The existence of pragabhava in such cases is known as *panda* (fruitless) pragabhava.

The eternal word-form, supposed to underlie each word, which is a mere collection of sounds indicated by letters.

A category as in page 6, Part I, also the meaning of a word (p. 97. II.)

Distance as well as seniority in age.

An atom.

A comprehensive class including sub-classes, such as *सङ्कर*, which includes *सत्ता* (substance), *शुष्क* (quality) and *कर्म* (action); a genus.

Knowledge that a *व्यवधान* or a thing which is pervaded by something else—or which is an invariable concomitant of that thing, as smoke (*धारा*) is of fire, exists in *पक* is called पराष्ठ in Hindu logic;—as in the inference *The*
mountain is fiery’—the knowledge that smoke, which is the ঝাপা of fire, exists in the পূঁক or mountain is called পরম. It has no synonym in English and is rendered by ‘consideration’ by Dr. Roer.

( According to the Sankhyas ) the change of one substance into another—as the change of Prakriti into Mahat ( intelligence ) etc.

Things which are liable to change.

Dimension. When it is not perceptible to the senses, it is known as অণু or atom, when it is perceptible it is called মহৎ, while that which is the largest conceivable is called পরম মহৎ.

Literally, a comprehensive relation.—The kind of relation in which duality (ভিন), trinity (জিন) &c. are said to inhere collectively in things denoted by the numbers 2, 3, etc.

Dimension of an atom.

A process of exhaustion or exclusion.

The name of a particular নাত্তা or nerve, the presence of the mind in which is said to be the cause of deep slumber.

Context.

Objects in an act of knowledge are called prakaras— as in the act
of knowledge— I know the jar—the jar is a prakara to the perception.
A prakara is the same as a 'বিশেষ,' with this difference that it has no reference to a perceptive act. Thus in the sentence 'ধূমবান দেশ' [A smoky country], দেশ is the बिशेष and ধূম is the बिशेष or determining attribute. But if the above be a perceptive act, both ধূম and দেশ would be called prakaras in that act.

Primordial matter, which is the material cause of the universe according to the Sankhya philosophy.
A loose combination of parts, as in a lump of cotton.
The state of being a pratibandhaka or obstruction.
Perception, knowledge.
The thing of which a negation is predicated, as for instance, a 'ষট' or jar is the pratiyogi of the negation of the jar. Also of two things connected by a relation that which is regarded as resting on another is known as the pratiyogi; and that upon which it rests is known as anuyogi in respect of that relation.
A jar, for instance, is said to rest on its component parts known as the
In the relation of *samavaya* and so it is the pratiyogi and the kapalas the anuyogi in respect of that relation.

The state of being a অতিবেগী. An attribute or ধর্শ abiding in a অতিবেগী. Thus if a ঘট be a pratiyogi—the pratiyogita would rest upon it.

That which being co-extensive with a pratiyogita limits or determines its presence; thus when a ঘট (jar) becomes a অতিবেগী—“ঘটল” becomes the অবচেষ্টক or the limiting property of the pratiyogita existing in the ঘট. For, wherever there is “ঘটল” there is the pratiyogita belonging to the ঘট. Any other attribute like ঘটলাগ (colour of the jar) could not serve as the avacchedaka, simply because of its varying character. (অতিবেগিত্বে অনন্যমানী ধর্শঃ অতিবেগিতাবচেষ্টকঃ।)

The fact of not existing in the same place as the অতিবেগী.

Perception.

Recognition.

Perception, knowledge.

The same as অসত্তি, which see.

True knowledge.

Means to the true knowledge, proof.

The quality of being an object of proof.
The [elderly] person who directs or teaches.

The [elderly] person who is directed or taught.

An ordinary act of knowledge as distinguished from "আলোকিত" (self-consciousness), or knowledge having self for its object.

The same as তর্ক, which see.

Antecedent non-existence, as of a jar before it actually comes to exist.

Limited to a particular spot, or seat of manifestation, as sound and the special qualities of the soul, which are never perceived outside their seats of manifestation.

See গৌরব.

A kind of fallacy consisting in the গাথা being absent from পক্ষ, as for instance when it is sought to be inferred that a jar while in the process of making has smell because it is made of earth (উৎপত্তি-কালীনচর্চা পক্ষানু পৃথিবীতে), the inference gives rise to a 'badha', because at the time of its production the jar is devoid of all qualities, it being a dictum of Hindu logic that
all things in the first moment of
their existence are devoid of quality.

Knowledge
As distinguished from अभाव or negation; as applied to परार्थ or category it means any one of the first six.
The quality or attribute abiding in a bhūta, or one of the five elements, known as earth, water, light (tejas), air and ether (akasa).

Visible dimension of some sort.
(Sankhya philosophy) Intelligence as the first product of Prakriti (primordial matter).
Body as a whole as distinguished from its component parts.
The state of being a primary subject, i.e., a subject which does not stand in the relation of विशेष (predicate) to some other विशेष or (subject). In the sentence, "पूम्वान पौर्णमि देश" (a smoky country), the विशेष inhabiting in देश is a primary one, because the word does not stand in the relation of a विशेष to some other विशेष, as in the sentence "पूवसंपर्क-वान्दु देश". Although विशेष in relation to देश, is a विशेष in respect to...
and is therefore not a primary
বিশেষ or subject.
The state of being a _murti_ or,
a thing having a limited dimension.
The _murtis_ are earth, water, light
( _tejas_ ) air and mind.

Two kinds of _Yogaja sannikarsha_,
explained below.
The _sannikarsha_ or the connecting
link between the perceiving
organ of sense and the object per-
ceived, which is supplied by yoga
or concentration of the mind. When,
for instance, a yogi sees things
which are beyond the ken of ordinary
senses, the transcendental power
acquired by yoga supplies the connect-
ing link and is known by the term
_যোগজ সন্নিকর্ষ_.
When the yogi is so
far advanced in power as to see
things distant at pleasure, he is
known as _Yukta_, and when he sees
such things after an act of concentra-
tion of the mind he is known as
_Yunjana_, and the _sannikarsha_ as
applied to their cases are called
after them as _Yukta_ and _Yunjana_
respectively.

A word of which the sense, though
determined by usage, also follows
from its derivation, as _পত্র_, (a lotus),
where the meaning though determined by usage also follows from its derivation, signifying a thing which grows in the mud.

Capability of being perceived, as in p. 78, also fitness (compatibility) of relation of one thing to another. In the language of the text the presence of the self-same properties in a thing as are predicated of it.

A word of which the sense is determined wholly by its derivation as पक्ष (cook), which is derived from the root पक to cook with the suffix ष signifying a doer.

A word having a technical and a derivative meaning attached to it; e. g., the word ऊष्म meansa 'plant', from its derivation—a thing that is, that sprouts up by breaking open (the ground), as also a particular form of sacrifice, from usage.

As in the case of the sacrifices known as Ratri satras, or particular forms of soma sacrifice. As the vedic injunction directing performance of these sacrifices contains no reference to merit of any kind as resulting from such performance, one is led to suppose that merit to consist in pratishta
(worldly fame) from the words in praise of the sacrifices,—technically known as *arthaaveda*, running as follows:—'প্রতিষ্ঠিত্রৈবেদ যে একাং রাত্রি: উপবনতি'—[Those who perform these *rotris* (sacrifices) acquire worldly fame even in this life.] In the same way, where there is no mention of merit of any kind as accruing from the performance of a religious act, one must infer some kind of merit from the words in praise of such act, as without some sort of merit as an incentive no effort for the performance of the same is possible.

A word of which the meaning is wholly determined by usage or in the language of Nyaya, by the power abiding in the word as whole (সমুচার শক্তি), without any reference to its derivation. The meanings of words like *गो* (cow), *ब्रष* (a jar), for instance, are determined entirely by usage without any reference to derivation, their derivative meanings being 'that which goes' and 'that which has happened', respectively.

**Definition.**
Implication. The power of a word to denote something connected with its literal meaning, when the same is not sufficient to convey the intention of the speaker or writer,—or when such meaning makes the relation of words in a sentence unintelligible. Thus in the well-known sentence ‘গঙ্গায় পান’ (The milkman resides in the Ganges)—the word Ganga (Ganges) taken literally makes the relation between গঙ্গায় (in the Ganges) and পান: (milkman) unintelligible, residence in a river being an impossibility. The word পান cannot therefore be taken literally, and in the sentence in question it means by implication the bank of the Ganges,—which is connected with its literal sense—a mass of water flowing in a particular channel.

Again, in the sentence, ‘কাকেটা রক্ষা কর’ (Protect the curd from the crows), the intention of the speaker being apparently to have the curd protected from all birds or animals that are likely to eat curd, the word কাকেটা (from the crows) must by implication mean all beasts or birds that are likely to steal curd.

[ব্যঙ্গপাতকা]. Lakshana is of two kinds, Ajahatsvartha and Lakshita-
lakshana, of which in the first there is no complete abandonment of the real meaning of a word, as in कृकेड़ा, where the word means 'crows', as well as other animals likely to steal curds'; while in the second the implied sense is indirectly connected with the true sense of the word, as in the case of बिरेभ, which comes to mean a "blackbee" by reason of the fact that the ordinary word for the same (viz. भृष) is spelt with two र's. In other words, as there are two र's in the word भृष, meaning a bee, the word द्वीरेध (a word having two R's) comes to mean the thing which is indicated by a word containing two R's (see p. 107 Part II, footnote).

Law of parsimony. Simplicity as applied to a theory or definition, consisting in the explanation of the same with the fewest possible assumptions.

Ordinary intercourse (connection between the organs of sense and objects of perception), as distinguished from the alaukika or the extraordinary intercourse, under which things to be perceived need not be in immediate relation to the senses. The apprehension of all indi-
( ৩০ )

Individuals included under a genus and of all objects distant and future by yogis are instances of the latter kind of sannikarsha.

\[ \text{বাসনা সংক্রম ৫৮} \]

\[ \text{ব্যাপার} ৭৪ \]

\[ \text{ব্যাখ্যা ৮৪ তো ৯৬} \]

Deviations from a rule. As applied to a hetu (middle term) it means one which is not invariably connected with a साध (major term), being found in things from which the latter is absent (see p. 100.)

Transference of vasana or impression.

Connection of organs of sense with the objects of knowledge.

There is no synonym for this word in English. Loosely speaking, it means the non-existence of one thing without another (অবিন্যস্ত), as of smoke without fire. The definition of the word as given in Karika, p. 68 of the text, runs thus:—Vyaspti is the absence of the hetu (the thing represented by the middle term) from all things not containing साध (that represented by the predicate of the conclusion); in other words, it is the invariable concomitance of two things, of which that possessing the larger extension is called ব্যাপক and that
of smaller extension, ব্যাপ্তি. Thus, to take the well-known instance of fire and smoke, the absence of smoke from all things not containing fire is the *Vyaapti* or pervasion of fire in smoke. Here the things being of unequal extension, the fire which possesses a larger extension, is called ব্যাপক (pervading) and the smoke which is of smaller extension is called ব্যাপ্তা or thing pervaded. But they may be of equal extension in which case the *vyaapti* is called সমব্যাপ্তি or of equal extension.

Apprehension of ব্যাপ্তি or of a general rule consisting in the invariable concomitance of two things.

The thing represented by the middle term in a syllogism, as *smoke* in the syllogism—'The mountain is fiery, because it contains *smoke*.'

That which differentiates one thing from another.

That which is differentiated.

Knowledge.

Doctrine of Idealism.

One holding the doctrine of Idealism.

Conclusive.

A decisive argument.

See under পঞ্জ. 

ব্যাপ্তিগ্রহ ১০২

ব্যাপ্তা ৮৩

ব্যাপক ৫৩

ব্যাপক−*৩

বিজ্ঞান−

বিজ্ঞানবাদ ৫১

বিজ্ঞানবাদী ৫১

বিজ্ঞানবাদী ৫১

বিজ্ঞানবাদী ৫১

বিজ্ঞানবাদী ৫১

বিজ্ঞানবাদী ৫১

বিজ্ঞানবাদী ৫১

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বিজ্ঞানবাদী ৫১

বিজ্ঞানবাদী ৫১

বিজ্ঞানবাদী ৫১

বিজ্ঞানবাদী ৫১
A false knowledge, an error taking the form of certainty—as for instance, the knowledge which identifies the soul with the body. It is distinguished from the other form of error which is known as विशेष or doubt.

A proposition in which a thing and its contrary is predicated of the same subject, as the sentence ‘sound is eternal or non-eternal’.

An all-pervading substance, such as soul, akasa, time, space.

The hetu (middle term) which does not co-exist with गाय (major term) is called विक्रुण्ड or inimical.

An act of knowledge consisting of a subject, a predicate and a relation subsisting between the two—as the knowledge conveyed by the proposition ‘दत्ति पुकृष’—(the man with a stick).

One of the seven categories of the Vaiseshikas—particularly the one which serves to differentiate one atom from another.

That which specialises or distinguishes a thing, as in the sentence ‘रुद्रात्मानु परवर्त्त’ (the mountain is smoky), खृष्ण or smoke is विशेष, because it serves to distinguish the particular
mountain from others which do not contain smoke.

An object of knowledge.

The quality of being an object of knowledge.

An act of knowledge (as in Karika 65, though omitted in translation by mistake.)

Unsuccessful attempt at getting a thing.

Knowledge.

Existence in the relations of श्रवण, संबोध and सम्बंध as in 10, 11, 13 &c.
One of the two things—viz—Sakti or Laksilana, as in p 97, vol II.
Existing in the relations mentioned under श्रवण.

Relation.

Dissimilarity.

Individual, as ज्ञानवृत्ति—an act of knowledge.

Purely negative inference, i.e. a form of inference in which no positive instances are available for the support of the general proposition upon which it is based. All definitions are instances of this form of inference. See preface of vol. 1, p. 10/0

The thing denoted by a term, as the thing 'cow' is the शब्द of the term को.
The quality of being a sakya.
That which limits or fixes the
denotation of a term as পৌষ্ট of the
term পৌষ্ট. It may be rendered by the
English term "connotation."
A word used in its primary sense,
as opposed to 'সাক্ষাৎ', which is a
word used in its implied or secon-
dary sense. (See under সাক্ষাৎ.)
The relation between a word and
the thing denoted by it, being
a desire to attach a particular
meaning to a particular word. The
primary meaning of a word.
Apprehension of the primary mean-
ing of a word.
Verbal testimony or knowledge as
distinguished from perception or
inference.

The quality which has been defined
as the connection between two
things formerly unconnected, as
when a bird sits upon a hill,
there grows up a সংযোগ or con-
nection between the two. See verses
115 to 120.
Having sanyoga or connection.
Mixture.
Agreement; as applied to an act
it means success, or agreement.
with expectations—as in সংবাদ প্রতিষ্ঠা, (p. 154). Thus when a man who goes to bring fire is successful in gaining it, his act or effort is said to be সংবাদী or successful (agreeing with expectation).

Generic term for the three kinds of negation, known as প্রাগজাত (antecedent negation), ধ্রুব (destruction) and নাস্তান্ত্রিক (ordinary negation, as of a jar in a particular place).

A generic term for বেগ (force), টিথিতাপন্ত (elasticity) and ভাবন (something which is the antecedent condition of memory and recognition).

Lit. mixture—as applied to classification, it means cross division.

The genus (জাতি) abiding in substance (স্বষ্টি), quality (শৈল) and action (কর্ষ),

A 'পক্ষ' with a rival hetu (middle term) set up to prove the negation of a পাধ্য in an inference. When a man for instance argues that the mountain is fiery because it smokes, if another man wants to prove the contrary of the conclusion (the mountain is not fiery) and sets up
a rival hetu and argues—the mountain is not fiery because it contains water, the mountain would be called संप्रतिपक्ष (having a rival) in each case, and no conclusion will be possible until the falsity of either of the two inferences is proved. See foot-note, page 103 vol. I.

The relation between the organs of sense and objects of perception, which leads to the perceptive act.

See under पक्क.

Co-extensive.

Illustration as of a definition in a particular case.

Intimate relation, a relation subsisting between a whole and its component parts, 'between a' genus (जाति) and the substance, quality and action in which it inheres, and between a substance and the quality and action inhering in the same.

Standing in the relation of समवाय.

The quality of being an intimate cause (समवारि कारण).

The state of being a समवारि may mean either the state of being a pratiyogi or an anyyogi of the intimate relation (समवाय), see p. 20, foot-note no. 3.

Existing in the relation of समवाय,
generally the pratiyogi of that: relation, as a ছাগ, or jar is said to be samaveta in the kapalas (its component parts.)
An act of knowledge in which several objects are cognised at the same time.
An act of perception in which objects perceived appear as related to one another, as distinguished from the নির্বিকল্প in which the objects perceived appear as a ছাগ (a jar) and ছাগ (the genus abiding in a jar) without the one qualifying the other. In other words, it is an act of knowledge in which the objects perceived are determined by the relation in which they stand to one another. For instance, in the perception ‘বেঁকী পুঞ্জ’ (the man with a stick), the objects পুঞ্জ (stick) and পুঞ্জ appear related to one another as subject (বিশেষ্য) and predicate (বিশেষণ), the precise relation between them being সাংহার, see footnote P. 72.
Perception of co-existence.
A kind of relation or sambandha, which is identified either with the pratiyogi or with the anuyogi. For example, the negation of a jar stands on the ground in the relation
of svarupa, being identified either with the anuyogī (ground) or the pratiyogī (the negation itself).

Potential causality as distinguished from kālopātāraṅga or causality, actively in operation. For instance, a stick (<i>ਡੂ</i>) lying in a wood has the power to produce a jar, though it is not actually producing it. In the language of Nyaya it has the kālopātāraṅga of manufacturing a jar, though not kālopātāraṅga (the property of actually producing an effect).

The performance of the inferential act.

The thing to be proved, the major term in a syllogism.

Perception or knowledge of sā Daytona or the major term.

Common property or characteristic.

A kind of fallacy consisting in the hetu (the middle term) being too general, or in other words being present even where sā Daytona (the major term) is absent.

The state of being of samanādhikaran or co-existing with another.

Genus.

Knowledge of common properties or genera use as connecting
links of perception, as for instance the knowledge of the genus বস্তু, which enables a man merely by perceiving a jar to have an idea of jars in general, is a case of সাধারণ লক্ষণ or সাধারণ লক্ষণ।

Natural.

Proving of a thing which is already admitted as proved.

Sure knowledge of the thing to be inferred.

Desire for an act of inference.

Middle term in a syllogism.

Fallacy.

**N. B.** For the explanation of আদি ঝিড় on page 9 read—

The Common term for three kinds of fallacy consisting (1) in the পক্ষ being non-existent; (2) in the হেতু being not found in the পক্ষ, and (3) in the হেতুতাংশেদ containing a redundant element or property. (See footnote p. 109.)