LECTURE III.

Third Sunday in Lent.

THE SUBJECT OF RELIGION—THE SOUL.

Ps. viii. 4.

What is man, that Thou art mindful of him?

RELIGION, we have seen, is not a sentiment, or an idea, or even a code of moral practice. It involves the establishment and maintenance of a real bond between God on the one hand and man on the other. To the perfectness of this bond, feeling, thought, and moral earnestness on the part of man, contribute elements which are indispensable to it; so that religion in itself, although beyond each of them, is dependent upon all. Its object, as we have also seen, is the Personal and Moral God. In a more first cause, in a mighty force, in an all-surveying intelligence, religion finds nothing to which it can attach itself; and systems which, like Pantheism, deny the personality of God, or, as did the old Deism, remove Him from all interest in and moral action upon the world, are thereby destructive of religion. And we have so far anticipated the matter
before us, as to observe that, whatever else may be said for or against it, Christianity satisfies those conditions of a real religion, in which these theories severally fail; and that in Christendom, the purity and spirituality of a Personal God on the one hand, and His intimate contact with us men on the other, by means of a Personal Incarnation, are fully and equally recognized. But this brings us face to face with a question of scarcely inferior importance, at least from our human and practical point of view. Religion being a real relation between man and God, it is natural and inevitable to pass from considering one of its terms to the consideration of the other. If God be the object, what is the subject of religion? What is this created being who can thus enter into relations with the high majesty of heaven? or, as the Psalmist puts it at once more reverently and more truthfully, "What is man, that Thou art mindful of him?" What is it in man which makes him capable of this exceptional relation to God, as implied in his capacity for religion?

It would be a mistake to treat the inquiry on which we are embarking as so entirely speculative that it can secure or fortify no practical results. It is easy, but unwise, in days like these to ignore the great questions which open beneath our feet as well as above our heads, under the pretence of being practical men who have neither time nor inclination for theory. No doubt, it is better to be a good man than to be a good psychologist; but an accurate notion of the real nature of the soul may contribute very materially in
such an age as ours to personal enthusiasm for practical goodness. How are you to decide whether man is capable of religion, or how far his capacity extends, until you know what, in his inmost, deepest being, man really is? In other words, this question of man's capacity for religion is substantially the question whether man be not merely a bodily organism, but also and especially a spiritual personality.

Certainly Revelation has familiarized Christians with the angels, as supramundane beings, in a very high degree capable of religion. But religion, as it comes before us on the surface of this planet, is a monopoly of man. Among the lower creatures we find nothing like it; we can discover no place for it. Man is the highest being of which these creatures have cognizance. Often, indeed, may we discover in their attachment to ourselves, in their fidelity, in their tenderness, in the true delicacy of the attention which they shew us, much that rebukes us when we reflect on the poor service that we ourselves pay to a Higher Master. But having no unseen world open to them, and being, as they are, incapable of any properly reflective thought, they are also incapable of religion, of any consciously personal relationship to the Source of all Life. Man, however, can look above and beyond this world of sense; he can enter into real communion with the Monarch of both worlds; and the secret of his doing this lies in that which, by virtue of God's bountiful gift and appointment, he himself is; it lies in the characteristic which separates him utterly from the creatures around him.
I.

What is man? What, let us ask, is this or that given man of our acquaintance, a near relation, one of ourselves? In the distance, or at first sight, a single human being is what the world chiefly associates with him; he is so much property, so much professional skill, so much political influence, so much social power, so much literary reputation, so much practical capacity for public affairs. Upon these things the public eye is wont to rest chiefly, if not exclusively; these things are labelled with this or that great name when it is repeated in conversation or in the newspapers. But they are only the accidents of any human life. They are external to it. They tell us nothing about it, nothing at least that a true appreciation of human greatness would most care to know. When do we see the man himself? We stand face to face with him; we listen to a voice; we note the peculiarities of a manner; we study the ever-varying lines of a human countenance; but we are still outside the real man. His voice, his manner, his expression, may tell us something about him; it may be a great deal; but they are not himself. We get nearer his real self, when we can observe and compare and take to pieces what he says and does; in his speech and his action, he reveals at least some portion of his character. But that which speaks and acts is beneath speech and action; it is always and necessarily invisible. The knife of no anato-
mist, however delicately wielded, can detect it in the folds of any human brain; no psychologist can draw it out into the light by an exhaustive analysis of any human thought. Underlying all the outward decorations of man's life; underlying the human face, and form, and speech, and action, although thrilling through them as if threatening ever and anon to become visible; underlying all that is most private and subtle even in secret thought, is that around which all else is gathered, and without which all else would be stripped of its significance, without which it would never have been or would cease to be.

What is man? He is, in the root and seat of his being, a person. He is that which each of us means when he says, "I." Let us turn to look at this question from within, rather than from without; for after all, it is within ourselves that we can, each for himself, only and really grapple with it. What do we mean, each of us, by "I." We mean, first of all, something distinct, utterly, profoundly distinct, from all that is not "I"; something which is conscious, as nothing else is conscious, of this deep distinctness. I think, and I know that it is only I who think; I think about myself, and I know that it is myself only about whom I only am thinking; no other self commingles with this consciousness, or I should not be myself; I am thus conscious of my own identity, and of my radical separateness from all besides. Nay, more, I can trace and assert this identity of myself with myself, this separateness of myself from all that is not myself, for a long term of past years. When the outward circum-
stances of my life were far other than they are now; when
my bodily mien was so different that none could recognize
in it the myself of to-day; when the inner companions of
my secret being were not as they have been since, so that
I had other thoughts, other feelings, other resolves than
now; yet still underlying these differences there was, deep
down at bottom, the same self, thinking, feeling, resolving
then, even as it resolves, and feels, and thinks now. And of
no one fact am I more certain, or so certain, as of this;—
that this self of the present is the self of thirty or forty
years ago; that it was then as it is now, that it is now
as it was then, a thing distinct from all else in the
universe; and a thing of which, among creatures, I alone
have actual cognizance. And as I am certain that it is
separate from all besides, and that, as long as my memory
will serve me, it has never been otherwise; so I feel at this
moment, as I always have felt, that I possess it; that its
thoughts are my thoughts; that its will is my will; that this
thought and will are not powers which come in upon me
like a flood and possess me, but that they are strictly forms
of my own activity. If I think, I choose to think; if I will,
it is I, and no other being in the universe, who does will;
my will is the exercise of a freedom, unshared by any
partner of my life; and, if I choose, indestructible.¹

¹ See, Psychologie, by Amedée Jacques, in the Manuel de Philosophie,
Hachette, 1867. In Is. xxvi. 9, the ἐγώ ἐσμαι is clearly distinguished both
from the ἐσμαι and the ἔχω; in Prov. xxxiii. 15, and Eccles. vii. 25, it is
distinguished from the ὁμός of the Speaker. In Scripture πρὸς τὴν (2 Cor.
i. 11) refers to external manifestation of the person, and ὑποστάσει (Heb. i.
Such, or, at least, something of this kind, is the sense of personality as we, each one of us, experience it. As long as we can remember, it has been at the bottom of all that we have felt, thought, and done; it has penetrated every movement of our minds and hearts; it has welded the many elements of our lives, outward and inward, moral and intellectual, spiritual and even bodily, into a consistent whole. When it is felt, our inmost being is felt; we can get no deeper than that reflective thought, than that conscious will. Here we touch, so far as we can touch, personal spirit; and it is because man is a personal spirit, or, as Scripture terms it, a being made in the image of God, that he is master of the world around him. The mere animal is not thus conscious of, and capable of reflecting on, his own existence. He lives and feels; he carries instinct forward, it may be, to the very confines of reason. But he does not comprehend his life; he does not reflect that it is he who lives; he is not conscious of remembering a line of personal existence, unshared by any other being, and threading a series of years and a long train of divergent circumstances. He does not anticipate a future.

3, xi. 1) to the substance that underlies the appearance. There is no word in Scripture to express "person" in the sense of a self-conscious, self-determining being. Del. Bibl. Psychologie, vi. 1. Wörter's art. Seele in Wetzer and Wette; Dict. Encycl.

1 On the Likeness of God in man see Delitzsch, Biblische Psychologie, ii., § 2. The Divine Image consists in man's self-consciousness and moral freedom, τῷ ὑπὸ καὶ αὐτοψίας. Man's dominion over the earthly world is "an effluence of the Divine likeness, and not the Divine likeness itself." By means of the Resurrection even man's body attains τὴν ἐκλεξίαν τοῦ ἑνωμένου (1 Cor. xv. 49), in that it is transfigured into the image of the God-man. See the whole of this interesting section.
Neither is he free or deliberate in his exercise of will: his will is only impulsive desire or passion, unregulated by intelligence; it is not his instrument; it is his master. Being thus the slave of nature around him and of his own nature, of his own instincts, and of the force of circumstance, he never can project himself beyond nature, and so rise above it, and take the measure of it and of his own relation towards it. He is thus passive when face to face with his nature, he is thus entirely under its control, because he altogether belongs to it; because in him there is nothing which comes from a higher world, and is independent of the world of sense.¹ Accordingly the single animal is only a specimen of his kind, the individual exists only in the species: but man, besides belonging on his animal side to an animal species, yet knows himself to be, in his individual capacity, a solitary essence, personal and indivisible. With man, the animal species, the lower nature which he shares with his kind, is subordinate to the individual, because in man that which constitutes the individual, his inmost being, belongs to a separate and a higher order of existence.²

¹ Würter, art. Seele, ubi sup.
² It were to be wished, observes Delitzsch, that personality and individuality were less frequently confused in common language than they are. Personality is common to all men as such: by it men are raised above plants and beasts. Between the “thought,” feeling, instinct of the brute, and the inner life of man, who is conscious of himself, and can in thought project himself beyond himself, there is an impassable gulf. Individuality only marks off the single specimen of the kind, whether it be man or beast; it implies nothing as to his subjective life. Although this obvious distinction is not formally expressed in Scripture, it is observable that in the narrative of the creation מָחַר is used only of plants and beasts, not of man; as if
This consciousness of personal life is not to be referred to anything in man's physical constitution. Thought after all is not merely phosphorus; and psychology is not correctly described as a branch of physiology. The great Scottish thinkers of half a century ago laid much stress upon the doctrine of what they called "internal facts." By an internal fact they did not mean a fact removed from the cognizance of the five senses; because there are many purely physiological facts which might be defined in this way, as, for example, valvular action in the circulation of the blood. They meant an act of which the personal consciousness alone takes cognizance. If you lift a heavy weight, so far as the visible muscular exertion of the arm goes, that is an external fact; but the cause of this external fact is an internal fact, a determination of your will—that is, of yourself; and of this cause you alone are conscious. How your will acts upon your muscles, you cannot say; but this at least you do know, that it is your will which, by a voluntary self-determination, caused the movement of the muscles of your arm: and this internal fact is just as certain to you as the external one. Or suppose that you feel annoyance at some action of a neighbour, and reflect almost immediately that this feeling is undeserved, and fall back upon this and that consideration in order to set it aside, and succeed in doing so. Here you have three distinct internal facts; the original

to imply that man is more than an individual specimen of a kind,—that he is a person.—Bibl. Psych. iv. 1.
feeling, the bringing reason to bear upon that feeling, and
the altered state of feeling which succeeds. All of these
are strictly internal, strictly peculiar to the consciousness;
yet as appreciable by observation, and as immediately
appreciable, as any fact of physiology. There is no
necessity, exclaims the eminent thinker who suggests
this illustration, for losing ourselves "in metaphysical
hypotheses, in order to demonstrate the spirituality of
the soul, and Kant was right in throwing these old-
fashioned arguments to the winds. The spirituality of the
soul is a fact; it is a positive fact; it is a fact just as
notorious as the sunlight. Men are still inquiring, and
will probably inquire while time shall last, what matter is.
But we do practically know what spirit is, for we have
each one of us a sample of it in ourselves, that is to say,
in the thinking, feeling, determining subject which we
name 'self'."

It would be an impertinence to say that the spirituality
of the human soul "is taught in Scripture," because Holy
Scripture everywhere presupposes it, and is unintelligible
without it. But a question may be raised as to the form
in which it is taught there. Scripture sometimes appears
to exhibit human nature as composed of two elements,
sometimes as of three. Moses represents man as origina-
ting from "the combination of an immediate breathing of
God with an earthly body," and Solomon marks off

1 Saisset, L'âme et la Vie, pp. 16, 17, 18, 22.
the dust which at death must "return to the earth as it was" from "the spirit" that "shall return unto God who gave it."\(^1\) After a like manner our Lord distinguishes the true life or soul of man\(^2\) from his animal life, and the "spirit," which in His disciples was "willing," from the "flesh" that was weak;\(^3\) and in dying He resigns His Human Soul to the Father, with the words, "Into Thy hands I commend My Spirit."\(^4\) On the same ground S. Paul bids Christians glorify God both in their body and in their spirits, since both body and spirit belong to Him;\(^5\) and S. James compares faith without works to that separation between the body and the spirit which implies the death of the body.\(^6\) In these passages, man is regarded as composed of a body and of a single super-sensuous nature, which is sometimes called life or soul,\(^7\) and sometimes spirit; but elsewhere, this immaterial nature itself is subdivided into self-conscious, self-determining spirit, and animal life-power or soul. Thus S. Paul prays that the spirit, and soul, and body of the Thessalonian Christians, each part subsisting in its perfect integrity, may be preserved blameless until our Lord's second

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\(^1\) Eccles. xii. 7.  
\(^2\) S. Matt. vi. 25, οὐχὶ ἡ ψυχὴ πλεῖον ἐστί τῆς τροφῆς.  
\(^3\) S. Matt. xxvi. 41.  
\(^4\) S. Luke xxiii. 46.  
\(^5\) 1 Cor. vi. 20, see text.  
\(^6\) S. James ii. 20.  
\(^7\) "According to the usus loquendi of all the books of the Bible, ὑπὸ ἡ ψυχή, frequently denotes the entire inward nature of man." This is true even of S. Paul. If ψυχή in his writings means nothing more than "via quà corpus viget et movetur," he is at issue with S. Luke, with the Epistle to the Hebrews, and with Eph. vi. 6, Col. iii. 23, Phil. i. 27; in all of which passages the seat of moral resolve is placed in the ψυχή. Cf. Delitzsch, Bibl. Psych. iii. § 9.
coming;¹ and the word of God is described in the Epistle to the Hebrews as having, from its moral power, an analytical efficacy which separates as clearly between the spiritual and psychical elements of man's immaterial nature, as between the life of sensation and the life of motion in his corporeal nature.² Still it cannot be concluded from these two passages that man consists of three essentially distinct elements. If this language of S. Paul obliges us to see in soul and spirit something more than two distinct relations of man's inward nature, it does not imply more than two distinct departments of that nature, the higher region of self-conscious spirit and self-determining will, which belongs to man as man; and the lower region of appetite, perception, imagination, memory, which in the main is common to the undying soul of man and the perishable inmost being of the brute. Man's soul is not a third nature, poised between his spirit and his body; nor yet is it a sublimate of his bodily organization, any more than his body is a precipitate of his soul. It is the outer clothing of the spirit, one with it in essence, yet distinct in functions; the centre of man's life, psychical and animal, is his spirit.³

But whatever Holy Scripture⁴ may explicitly say about

¹ 1 Thess. v. 28, ὀλκάλην ὁμόν τὸ πνεῦμα, καὶ ἡ ψυχή, καὶ τὸ σῶμα.
² Heb. iv. 12, δικνοσμον ἀχρί μερισμον ψυχῆς τα καὶ πνεύματος, ἄρμων τα καὶ μυελῶν.
³ In our own day Anton Günther revived the psychological dualism of Occam, by making the distinction between the soul and spirit in man an essential distinction; in other words, by representing each man as possessed of two souls, one the seat of reason, the other of sensation and growth.
the spiritual personality of man as a formal doctrine, it implies much more by its constant appeal to man's higher nature. From first to last it treats man as a being who, although clothed in an animal form, is essentially and in himself a spirit. It surrounds him with precepts which a self-determining spirit only can obey; with examples, of which only a reflecting spirit can enter into the force and drift; with prayers, aspirations, modes of thought and feeling, that have no meaning for a being who is not experimentally conscious of his spiritual subsistence. Especially is this observable in those Divine pages which form the inmost sanctuary of Holy Scripture; in the Life and Words of our Lord Jesus Christ. As human forms pass before Him, in the Gospel, although He is constantly relieving human want and pain, it is plain that the outward man means for Him, relatively, almost nothing, and that His eye rests persistently, exclusively, upon the man within. As we accompany Him in that brief but exhaustive study of humanity, we feel before the centurion or Pilate little or nothing of the majesty of the Roman name. Although Christ appeared when the Empire of the Cæsars was in its splendour, He speaks of the "kings of the Gentiles," in a phrase of studied vagueness; as if to suggest the utter insignificance of the highest political interests which only touch man's outward life, when they are contrasted with those higher in-

That this theory has no biblical warrant appears to have been satisfactorily shown by Delitzsch: its experimental difficulties are obvious. The Ego which thinks, reasons, wills, is, we all of us know, identical with the Ego which experiences the sensations of sight, smell, hearing, touch.
terests of the human spirit which He had come to promote. Even the greatness and authority of the successors of Aaron disappears, or recedes into the background, in the atmosphere of this exacting estimate, which knows no respect of persons; while on the other hand, at His bidding, a few obscure and illiterate Galilean peasants become respectively a S. Peter, a S. John, a S. Mary Magdalen—names which of themselves recall neither political weight nor intellectual prestige, but types of spiritual character, beautiful and majestic, upon which already eighteen centuries of progressive civilization have been forward to lavish all but the best of their reverence and their love.

It is indeed as personal spirits, tabernacling in bodily forms, that we men are capable of religion. Resolve man's higher nature into physiological sensation with Materialism, and religion becomes an absurdity. As spirits, we are linked and bound to the Father of Spirits; as spirits, we believe, we hope, we love; as spirits, we enter into the complex mystery and activities of prayer; as spirits, we take in each other that deep and penetrating interest which pierces beneath the outline of the human animal, and holds true converse with the supersensual being within. All that weakens or lowers our consciousness of being spirits, weakens in that proportion our capacity for religion; all that enhances that consciousness, as surely enlarges it.
II.

Man, then, if we track him to the centre of his being, is a spirit, whatever be the dignity and organic indispensableness of his outward form. What do we know about the origin of man's spirit, of his deepest self? We know when and under what conditions a human body comes into existence. What do we know about the origin of a human soul?

If we take account of the ancient and of the Eastern world, one of the most popular answers to this question will be found in the theory that the soul exists before the body. Sometimes this is stated without an attempt at closer definition; more frequently it takes the form of a doctrine of Metempsychosis. According to this doctrine the spiritual part of each man's being is as a forced emigrant, who has previously occupied other frames, and who may have others to inhabit hereafter; although man's inextinguishable hope suggests that an escape from this fatal cycle may be achieved by pre-eminent virtue, which will at length secure an incoaboreal immortality for the weary wanderer.¹

The Western and less systematized form of the doctrine is due to Plato. Plato, who did so much in the way of training the ancient world to realize the greatness and uniqueness of the soul, accounted for the soul's present

¹ For a recent European theory of a curiously Gnostic complexion, see "Le Lendemain de la Mort, ou la vie future selon la Science," par Louis Figuier. Paris, 1871.
and, as he deemed it, humiliating relation to the body, by saying that the soul had existed previously in another state of being, and was condemned to tenant a human frame as a kind of punishment. Plato was probably less anxious to give a complete account of the origin of the soul, than to explain the source of certain ideas which he encountered in the human mind. They occupied much of his attention, and he desired to invest them with an authority that might place them beyond the reach of popular discussion. To Plato it seemed that these ideas were relics of a higher knowledge enjoyed by the soul in some earlier stage of its being; he could account for them no otherwise, because they so transcended the poor realities of man's present experience. Thoughts which appeared to result from scientific speculation were in truth only a form of memory—memory of some bygone existence, passed in an ideal world from which the soul had fallen down into the sphere of sense and under conditions of time.¹

Plato's speculation about the soul was of deeper and more permanent interest to humanity at large, than the particular theory which led him to adopt it. It naturally found its way, in company with his other guesses, to Alexandria. It was adopted by Neo-Platonist thinkers, and even in the Jewish schools; it was taught by Philo, as well as by Plotinus; it was filtered through Essenism into the religious philosophy of the Talmud and the Cabbala;²

² Delitzsch quotes Joel, Religions philosophie der Sohar, pp. 107-109.
it entered into more than one type of Gnosticism; it appears among the other eccentricities of the eccentric Origen; it forms a link between the philosophical bishop of Cyrone, Synesius, and the outer world of Pagan thought. But it was stoutly opposed by the immense majority of Christian teachers, and was finally condemned by the collective Church, as an untenable error. For it never had any basis in Holy Scripture; not even in those writings which are historically connected with Alexandrian thought, or which have been considered, on strictly internal grounds, to have an Alexandrian colouring. To suppose that it underlies the doctrine of an original or birth-sin, as taught in the New Testament, is to forget that the great teacher of that doctrine expressly states that the consequences of the first sin devolve upon those who have not sinned after the similitude of Adam’s transgression.


2 In the Second Council of Constantinople; Hefele, Conciliengesch. ii. 772.

3 E.g., not in Wisd. viii. 19, 20, which refers to an altogether exceptional attribute or Personality. The Cabalist reference to Eccles. xii. 7, and Origen’s to Rom. ix. 11-13, Luke i. 47, Jerem. i. 5, are set aside on examining the passages. Nor are such arguments as Heb. vii. 9 to the point. The pre-existence of our Lord’s Divine Person, as taught in S. John and S. Paul, would be relevant, if those Apostles had taught the pre-existence of any one else, and if, in His case, this pre-existence did not clearly attach to a representation of His Personal Dignity as superhuman. His Human Soul was, like His Body, created in time, and in the act of creation hypostatically united to His Pre-existent Godhead.

4 Rom. v. 14, ἐπὶ τοὺς μὴ ἀµαρτῆσαντας ἐπὶ τῷ ὁµοίωµατι τῆς παραβάσεως Ἀδὰµ.
The conception of a pre-existing soul is, moreover, broadly at issue with the Scriptural account of man's creation. Holy Scripture knows of no creation of souls prior to the creation of bodies; the creation of the first man comprises the simultaneous creation of his body and his soul. Scripture carries us up to no moral act of any soul living and working before the creation of Adam's body; it traces no moral circumstance of man's present condition higher than to the sin of Adam in Paradise. It represents marriage as honourable, and the offspring of marriage as a blessing from the Lord. But these representations are inconsistent with the theory which would treat the human body, the product of marriage, as only a strange house of detention, wherein the unwilling soul is bound during a lifetime, far from its true end and home. In short, the theory of the soul's pre-existence is broadly at issue with the biblical and Christian doctrine of man, which makes man the synthesis of body and spirit: since, according to that theory, man existed in his completeness, as spirit, before he was sent to inhabit a human frame. And in this way such a theory cuts up by the roots that profound argument for the future resurrection of the body, which is suggested by the fact that the body is, under the terms of man's natural constitution, the soul's one adequate organ and instrument; it reduces the body to the rank of a temporarily indwelt shell, which might be escaped from with advantage. Nor is the verdict of our experience at issue with that of Christian
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doctrine in this particular. If we have all of us existed in some previous state of being, how is it that no living memory records any one distinct event in this presumed phase of past existence? If all traces of this supposed pre-existent life should have been blotted out from one memory, or from the majority of memories, how are we to explain their entire disappearance from all? Such universal oblivion of a great past is in fact inexplicable, except upon the extreme and violent hypothesis of a miraculous annihilation of memory in all spirits that have been heretofore united to human forms. The failure of any one memory to recall the supposed life of human souls in another sphere of being, is as unfavourable to the supposition at the bar of reason, as its other demerits must be held to be condemnatory of it in the judgment of faith.¹

But if man's soul cannot be supposed to exist, as an independent being, before the formation of his body, is it a part, the highest part, of that transmitted inheritance of life, which we receive, each one of us, from our earthly parents? Among the ancients this position was maintained most earnestly by Tertullian.² He had already broken away from the Church, and he wanted a strong psychological tenet capable of bearing him well out in the

¹ For some considerations to the contrary, see Delitzsch, Bibl. Psych. i. 1, who, however, insists that the theory in question has no Scriptural foundation.

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s resistance which, in his Montanist isolation, he offered to the Marcionite notion of a pre-existing soul. Of course, if the soul was generated simultaneously with the body, there was no room left for saying that it had ever existed independently; and Tertullian accordingly pressed the theory of Traducianism, as it is termed, with this object, just as in a later age S. Augustine was attracted towards it, for another reason equally independent of its intrinsic merits. If the soul was transmitted from sire to son, then it was easy to answer the Pelagian question, how original sin could be passed on together with it from Adam to his descendants. But, notwithstanding this powerful motive for accepting it, Augustine saw in the Traducianist doctrine an element of Materialism. The ordinary comparison of lighting one lamp from the flame of another, was too gross an image accurately to adumbrate the act of giving being to an immaterial consciousness. The idea of the soul which Traducianism suggests, is really derived from animal analogies, and is inapplicable to the conception of a purely spiritual and indivisible essence. The difficulty was not removed by saying that the body was not, as in the theory

1 Benusobre (Hist. Crit. de Manichaeis Amst., 1734) goes so far as to attribute a strictly Traducianist doctrine respecting the origin of the soul to S. Augustine. How keenly Augustine felt the dangers of Materialism latent in this theory appears from such passages as De Gen. ad Litt. lib. x. cap. i. 24-25. His general language is studiously undecided: cf. De Animâ et ejus orig. i. 2; iv. 2. De Lib. Arbitr. iii. c. 21, n. 59. His hesitation is the more remarkable, as Pelagius made great use of Creationism in opposing the Catholic doctrine of original sin. See his Letter to S. Jerome; Ep. 166, c. 5, 9.

2 Ep. 190, ad Opt. c. iv. n. 13, 14, 15, qu. by Wörter.
of Tertullian, the real generating agent, but only one intermediate link in the process by which a soul is engendered by parent souls. When Lactantius asked whether, on the Traducianist hypothesis, the soul of an infant was to be supposed to be derived from the father, or from the mother, or from both parents at once, he asked a question which was, in fact, fatal to the theory. It was inconceivable that a spirit, personal and indivisible, or that two spirits, should engender another spirit; because to conceive this was to attribute a purely animal process of propagation to denizens of the supersensuous world. It has been observed that children generally resemble their parents in those qualities which we describe collectively as tempera-

De opificio Dei, c. 19. Illud quoque venire in questionem potest: strumne anima ex patre, an potius ex matre, an vero ex utroque generetur. Sed ego id meo juro ab angumpi vindico. Nihil enim ex his tribus verum est, quia neque ex utroque neque ex alterutro seruntur animae corporibus. Corpus enim ex corporibus nasci potest, quoniam confertur aliquod ex utroque; de animis anima non potest, quia ex re tenui et incomprehensibili nihil potest decedere.

Delitzsch's attack upon the position that "the assumed ability of spirit to propagate itself is contrary to the dualism of nature and spirit," does not appear to be convincing. The Divine Nature being the Parent of the material as well as of the Spiritual Universe, those Eternal Truths internal to It, which are shadowed out by the Names of Father, and Son, may well be the archetypes of material rather than of spiritual facts in the universe. The Eternal Spirit Himself is "not begotten but proceeding." The הָעִנִּית עַל of Prov. viii. 24, is to be referred to the Son, Who is identical with the Wisdom of the Proverbs. The application of the metaphor of generation and birth to God's natural (Job xxxviii. 28; Ps. xc. 2; Deut. xxxii. 18) and supernatural (1 Pet. i. 3; James i. 18; 1 S. John iii. 9) creations does not warrant any inference as to a possible parental relationship between one created spirit and another. The angelic reference in Gen. vi. 1-4 is, to say the least, far too doubtful to be made the basis of an argument. But cf. Bibl. Psych. ii. § 7, sub fin.
ment, as belonging to the region of animal life-power; but that no such resemblance can be calculated on, or, where it does occur, regarded as other than purely accidental, in respect of strictly personal qualities, such as genius, or will.¹ Traducianism can undoubtedly point to great names who favour it in ancient and modern times;² and it rests on too large an area of possibilities to be rejected with anything like peremptoriness. But the general sense of the Church is now, as it has been in past times, against it; it does not seem to harmonize, at least naturally and easily, with the fixed outlines of a consistently spiritualist philosophy, or, notwithstanding the easy explanation which it affords of a doctrine of transmitted sin, to make itself really at home with such an estimate of man’s spiritual nature as is implied by the great doctrines of the Christian creed.

The other and the more generally received doctrine, is known as Creatianism. Each soul is an immediate work of the Creator: He is perpetually creating souls out of nothing, and infusing them into bodies.³ He creates each soul at the moment when the body which is destined for it enters

¹ As by Wörtel, ubi supra.
² S. Jerome, indeed, himself an earnest Creatianist, attributes Traducianism to the majority of Western teachers in his day: maxima pars occidentalium, Ep. 78, ad Marcell; but in antiquity Tertullian stands out almost alone in his unaltering decision. Augustine hesitates. Of modern Traducianists, Delitzsch among Lutherans, and Klee among Roman Catholic writers, are perhaps the greatest.
³ Quotidie Deus operatur animas et in corpora mittit nascentium. S. Jerome; adv. Ruf. Apol. xvi. 1, 3. Traducianism he thinks absurd: Satis videndi qui patant animas cum corporibus seri, et non a Deo sed a corporum parentibus generari. Qu. by Klee, Dogm.
really and properly on its inheritance of life.\textsuperscript{1} Creatianism recognizes that sense of the immateriality of the human spirit which expressed itself falsely in the doctrine of a pre-existence, and which is so seriously compromised by Traducianism. Personal spirit, it is asserted by the Creatianist, cannot be transmitted from one created life to another, like animal vitality. Yet Creatianism recognizes the truth for which the Traducianists contended against the advocates of the soul's pre-existence, when it maintains that the soul and body are strictly contemporaneous in their origin, and that they have profound and ineradicable relations to each other.

When it pleaded against this account of the origin of the soul that it is at issue with the Scriptural representation of a Sabbath rest, which brought God's creative activity to a close,\textsuperscript{2} it is sufficient to reply that such an interpretation of the Mosaic narrative would oblige us to close our eyes to the proved fact of a later origin of new species of animals, besides being inconsistent with any adequate idea of God's providential relation to the world.\textsuperscript{3} When it is said that Creatianism, if true, would enslave God, by bidding Him give existence to an immortal spirit at the will of the adulterer, and in defiance of His own law, this objection\textsuperscript{4} does indeed reveal one peculiar malignity of sins against

\textsuperscript{1} This is apparently the drift of Peter Lombard's often-quoted maxim: Creando infundit animas Deus et infundendo creat.

\textsuperscript{2} As by Klee, Dogmatik, p. 431.

\textsuperscript{3} S. John v. 17.

\textsuperscript{4} S. Augustine admits to S. Jerome that, before hearing his answer to this difficulty, he had himself solved it by dwelling on God's power and will
chastity; but it is merely an extreme illustration of the general truth, that man can only sin with God's assistance; that all sin consists in the employment of God's bounty against Himself. When, lastly, it is urged that the transmission of original sin is on this hypothesis unintelligible, it may be sufficient to say that since original sin is rather of the nature of a defect than of a positive taint, there is no difficulty in understanding how created souls did not receive a gift which had been withdrawn from the race to which they were united at their entrance into life. Upon the whole, the Creatianist theory seems to fall in with the scattered hints and with the general language of Scripture more readily than the Traducianist. It is more in harmony with the account of the creation of man, and with the general representations of God's relation of Maker to the spirit of man, which we find in the Old Testament. Especially does it seem to be borne out by the distinction which is drawn in the Epistle to the Hebrews between the "fathers of our flesh" and the "Father of spirits." These expressions discriminate with an accuracy from which there would appear to be no escape between the contribution made to the composite being of man by our heavenly to draw good out of evil in all His earthly providences. The giving being to a soul, capable of knowing and loving its Creator, is of itself a good, however it may be occasioned. Ep. ad Hieron. 166, c. 5.

1 Gen. ii. 7; Job xxxii. 4; Ps. cix. 73; Zech. xii. 1.

2 Heb. xii. 9. The contrast, Delitzsch admits, between θεος σαρκῶν και πνευμάτων, and the Divine πατήρ τῶν πνευμάτων, is physical and not ethical. "There can hardly," he remarks, "be a more classical proof-text for Creatianism." The passages which imply the organic oneness and responsibility of the race of Israel do not set this aside (vii. 5, 10). Cf. Num. xvi. 22.
I parent immediately, and that which He bestows through created channels of the gift of life. ¹

This question of the soul’s origin has carried us into a region where we have at best to deal with high probabilities; where revelation has rather hinted at the truth than unveiled it, and where reason certainly cannot pretend to dogmatize. But it is not altogether unfruitful to look at this side of our subject, even where certainty is unattainable. To do so makes us all the more thankful for certainty, when we know that it is within our reach. After all, the difference between the Creationists and Traducianists does not raise the question whether the human soul is made by God, but only the question whether it is immediately created by Him. All that we are and have, except the evil which we have wrought, and which clings to us, comes from the One Source of Life; but if religion finds its strength in this general conviction, it is especially stimulated by the conviction that the soul is God’s immediate handiwork. The belief that the inmost being of each one of us is created as immediately by God as was that of our first parent Adam, brings each of us into a felt relationship with God, and reminds us of our obligations towards Him, more effectively than would be the case if we supposed ourselves to receive spiritual as well as corporeal life through a long series of ancestors. It is this persuasion

¹ Cf. Delitzsch on Heb. xii. 9 against Ebrard’s theory that ὑπὸ means here the natural life in opposition to the regenerate life. Had this been the sense, the phrase would have been τοὺς μὲν ἡμῶν κατὰ σάρκα ὑπάρχει. And the original Hebrew text of Numb. xvi. 22; xxvii. 16 is decisive.
which underlies Bishop Andrewes' favourite ejaculatory prayer from the Psalter, "Despise not Thine own Hands." It is not in the anatomy and faculties of the body, it is in the analysis and study of the soul, that the greatness of human life is best realized, and our indebtedness towards its Giver most deeply felt. This reflective reason; this heart, capable of a boundless expansion; this will, which may be trained to a freedom and an intensity of extraordinary power;—of what are these faculties so suggestive as of the knowledge, love, and service due to that Being of Beings Who is the End, as He is the Author, of this centre of complex and self-controlling life?

III.

Man, then, is a spirit; and, as it would seem, he is, as such, immediately created by God. The gravest question yet remains: What is his destiny? Whatever may be said of the importance of questions bearing on the soul's origin, no reflecting man will deny the interest of all that bears upon its future. It is true that even this question is ostentatiously set aside on the ground of its being unpractical to discuss it. "The dead," it is argued, "do not return to tell us their experience. What then can be known certainly of that which befalls them? We may
hope, or we may conjecture; we may desire, or despair; we may dogmatize in the air, and make creeds of our aspirations; but would it not be better to confine ourselves to subjects that are well within the range of our experience, and where sure results are attainable, than to waste time and sympathy upon that which belongs really and only to the realm of fancy?"

This way of treating the subject is possible and not uncommon among young men and women in good health, who have never known a heartache; and in the pages of clever serials, where readers are carried forward almost unresistingly, by clear type and well-turned sentences, over the dreary wastes of sceptical thought. But the question of the eternal future is too pressing to be thus left at a distance, permanently. If religion has many enemies in the predominant tendencies of the modern world, she certainly has steady and inalienable allies in the permanent circumstances of human nature. To the most refined and cultured of ourselves, death is just as certain a contingency as it was to our rudest forefathers, and its dread solemnities enter just as penetratingly into the homes of rank and science, as into the humblest cottages in the land. Sooner or later it comes close to all of us, and the mists which hide its stern realities from our eyes roll away, and leave us face to face with them.

"They think that their houses shall continue for ever: and that their dwelling-places shall endure from one generation to another; and call the lands after their own names.
“Nevertheless man will not abide in honour: seeing that he may be compared unto the beasts that perish; this is the way of them.

“They lie in the hell like sheep, death gnaweth upon them, and the righteous shall have domination over them in the morning: their beauty shall consume in the sepulchre out of their dwelling.

“Be not thou afraid, though one be made rich: or if the glory of his house be increased;

“For he shall carry nothing away with him when he dieth: neither shall his pomp follow him.

“For while he lived he counted himself an happy man: and so long as thou doest well unto thyself, men will speak good of thee.

“He shall follow the generation of his fathers: and shall never see light.

“Man being in honour hath no understanding: but is compared unto the beasts that perish.”

This is the solemn irony of life, and from year to year we find ourselves face to face with it. Death does not move us much, when it visits those whom we do not know, or whom we know only slightly; when it only meets us as it wends its way gloomily through the crowded thoroughfare towards the distant cemetery, or as it catches our eye in the supplement of our daily newspaper. It

1 Psalm xlix. 11, 12, 14, 16–20.
does not touch us as being what it is, so long as it only produces social changes which excite our interest, while it keeps sufficiently at a distance not to wound our hearts. We drape it in phrases which treat it as a solemn abstraction. No doubt it is solemn; but so is the war lately raging in Paraguay, or a Russian campaign in Central Asia. We should speak very differently of a revolutionary struggle in the streets of London, upon the issue of which it was clearly understood that our own life and property might immediately depend. But we find that at last death comes home to us, even to us, in all the closeness of its dreadful embrace. Not, it may be, this time to ourselves: that were perhaps more bearable. The one human being whom we have loved best on earth—the parent, the husband, the wife, the child—lies before us. We see what is coming. It is very gradual, perhaps, and there are many rallies in which vital power struggles with disease, in which hope flickers up in its contest with the presentiments of reason, only to die back into a deeper despair. It is very gradual—a slow processional movement to the grave: but the end comes at last. At last a day comes to which the preceding days are as if they had not been; a day comes which lives in memory. We can no longer reckon on hours; we dare not be away even for a few minutes, lest we should be too late. A change has taken place, which they know well who are familiar with death, and of which none can mistake the import. We feel, all feel, that the time is short, and a few words are said into which is compressed a life—
its most sincere thought and love—\textcolor{red}{a few assurances, messages, entreaties; no more is possible. Already, one by one, the vital powers take their leave: first speech, then movement, then hearing, then even eyesight. Still there is breathing, now rapid and deep, now weaker and intermittent; and then there comes a last breath; and we wait; and there is none after it.}

It lies before us, that loved form: only an hour ago it spoke: we speak to it now, but in vain. \textcolor{red}{We bend over it in our agony, as if it was still what it had been; but we know—what would we not give to escape from our conviction?—that neither thought nor feeling tenants it now. And the question must rise then, if it never rose before, with an urgency proportioned to the grief which asks it;—Is all really over? Has the real being, which one short hour ago thought and felt so keenly, actually and for ever ceased to be?}

\textcolor{red}{Do you say that in presence of that passionate agony it is folly to ask for a decision which should only be dictated by the coolest, the calmest, the most unimpassioned, the most disinterested science? I answer that that agony, if it be not itself an argument, is well fitted to win a hearing for arguments to which, under ordinary circumstances, our materialistic science is deaf. Such a condition of feeling may be impatient on the one hand of a physiology which seeks for the immaterial spirit in the brain; as it cannot, on the other, enter into a metaphysical discussion of the alleged indestructibility of }
uncompounded essences. But being itself pain, mental
pain, one of the great chastening, illuminating powers of the
moral world, it is at least in a mood to understand a moral
argument. And the moral argument for our immortality is,
after all, the strongest of those upon which reason can fall
back. It is no fancy which insists that Eternal Justice
cannot close His account with any human conscience at the
moment of death; that there must be an after-world in
which the too unequal balance of suffering and happiness,
of good and evil doing during life, will be surely rectified.
We must do stern violence to the best and deepest instincts
of our better nature before the voice of this argument can
be silenced. It is a moral conviction which protests against
the Materialistic theory that the soul is but an animated
vapour which becomes extinct with the life of the bodily
frame. It equally rejects the Pantheistic dream, that what
looks like a separate personality ceases when we cease to
breathe, while the soul sinks back into some vast under-
current of boundless life, which is the fabled vital force of
the Pantheistic universe. If morality has any serious basis
in the nature of things, if it be not a dream or a con-
ventionalism, there must be a future wherein each personal
spirit will subsist under conditions which will have direct
reference to its moral and spiritual attainments here.

For if one thing is evident to a man who takes notes of
what passes within him with the lapse of time, it is that
the inward being which he contemplates as "self," is con-
tinually developing. As the years pass, whether for good
or evil, this immaterial, thinking, resolving being acquires accumulating strength and intensity. Long after the animal life of man has reached its highest point, and is fairly on the decline, the spirit feels itself sensibly growing; growing in the range of its intellectual grasp, growing in its power of will, growing in its sense of being a centre of life, unlike any of the forms of animal or vegetable life around it. Is it possible that death will abruptly put an end to this hitherto uninterrupted development? Is it possible that we thus continuously expand in all that constitutes our real human selves, only to find at the gate of death that we were nothing but brutes after all, although endowed with sensibilities and imaginations just keen enough to make us the victims, of an immense and exceptional delusion?

It is often remarked that the Bible nowhere deals with the natural immortality of the human soul as a thesis to be proved. As in the case of the soul’s spirituality, the Bible scarcely asserts, but it everywhere takes the truth

1 It is not meant that the soul of man is immortal through any internal necessity, such as might be held to belong to an uncompounded essence. In this sense God is ὁ μονός ἐκ νὠ̣ν ἀθανάσιος (1 Tim. vi. 16). In all creatures, indestructibility is a gift. It is a gift to the spirit, as distinct from the animal life-power of man. The ancients, Tatian and Justin Martyr, who protested against the Greek idea of a necessary immortality inherent in the soul, did not deny the gift of immortality, which as a matter of fact the Creator had bestowed. Just as man conceives of God, so he conceives of eternity, and longs for it. His longing shows that he is designed for an eternity; it is otherwise inexplicable. “God has placed eternity, ἐ̣̓ν ψὐ̣χής in the heart of man” (Eccles. iii. 21). It is a matter of experience; and the argumentum ad appetitum atermitatis to the reality of an eternal future is an adaptation of the Cartesian inference from the idea to the being of a God. Cf. Delitzsch, Bibl. Psych. vi. § 2.
for granted. When patriarchs and kings are said in the language of the Old Testament to be gathered to their fathers, it is not merely meant that their bones were laid in the common family resting-place. The natural scenery of Palestine probably suggested the word which described the revealed invisible home of the spirits of the dead. It was "a land of darkness, as darkness itself," the common receptacle of the "small and great," of the "servant and his master," of kings and counsellors of the earth, of prisoners and of oppressors. All were gathered there, under new conditions of life, incompatible with those earthly forms of activity which cease at death. Not that the dead are passive or unconscious. Isaiah's description of the movement of spirits in the unseen world at the descent of the spirit of the King of Babylon can hardly be resolved into poetical license; and it is observable that the heathen monarch is there together with the rulers of Israel. This doctrine of Schoel is perfectly consistent with the general truth that at death the human spirit returns to God, and that the souls of the righteous are in "His hands," in the sense of being exempted from torment. Nor is it in any way at issue with the doctrine of a bodily resurrection; which, while its early and distinct appearance in the Psalter is utterly inconsistent with the theory of

1 Ναυς is properly what is sunk deep, bent in; hence a ravine, abyss, depth. Cf. Fuerst, Lex. in voc.
2 Job x. 21. 4 Job iii. 18-19. 6 Eccles. 9, 10. 8 Is. xiv. 9, sqq.
3 Eccles. xii. 7. 5 Wisd. iii. 1.
6 Ps. xvi. 10, 11; Acts ii. 25-31. Cf. also Ps. xlix. 16; lxxiii. 23, sqq.
its being due to Eastern influences upon the Jewish Revelation at the period of the Captivity, does undoubtedly, in the later books, come very prominently into view. Apart from a popular belief in this doctrine, the imagery of Isaiah and Ezekiel would have been unintelligible to their contemporaries; and both in the dark days of the Captivity in Babylon, and in the later struggle of the Maccabees against Antiochus Epiphanes, this faith in a Resurrection sustained the oppressed against the persecutors, even the martyrs in their agony. So far as Alexandria influenced Judaism, it discouraged faith in a corporeal Resurrection. Philo, like a genuine Platonist, sees in death the emancipation of the soul from its bodily prison-house. But the ruling religious minds in Palestine at the time of Christ's appearance believed in the resurrection of our actual bodies. Such a doctrine of course implies the immortality of the soul; but the only demonstration of the truth of the soul's immortality is given in our Lord's reply to the Sadducees on the subject of the Resurrection. He argues from the title, "the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob," which God was pleased to claim in centuries long after the death of the patriarchs, that the patriarchs must still be living, because God is the God, not of the dead, but of the living. By this general statement our

1 As suggested by Julius Müller, Studd. und Kritt, 1885.
4 Dan. xii. 1-3, 13. 5 2 Macc. vii. 9, 11, 14, 28; xii. 42-45; xiv. 16
Bell, Jud. ii. 8-14. Qu. by Grimm.
7 S. Matt. xxii. 32; S. Mark xii. 27; S. Luke xx. 38.
Lord apparently implies that God does not create spiritual beings only that they may sink back into nothing. The distinctive teaching of the New Testament about the future world everywhere presupposes the soul’s immortality. If death were annihilation for all of us, or for all but the just, the descriptions of the end of the world, of the last judgment,¹ of the general resurrection,² and of the future state,³ would have no interest for any but a minority of mankind. It is the steady conviction that, in some way, we shall each and all personally subsist after death, which secures to these pages of our Bibles such universal interest.

This conviction of our immortality rests on what is for Christians an unquestioned certainty. In Christian eyes, the central fact of the world’s annals is the Resurrection of our Lord Jesus Christ from the dead. It occurred in the full daylight of history: it was attested by hundreds of witnesses.⁴ We can only deny its truth upon a priori principles, which are not merely destructive of serious belief that God is a Moral and even a Living Being, but which are also fatal to confidence in human history. The Resurrection of Christ is the guarantee of our own. The clouds which hung around the gate of death in earlier ages have rolled away.

¹ S. Matt. xxv. 31-46; Acts xvii. 31; Rom. xiv. 10; 2 Cor. v. 10; 2 Tim. iv. 1; 1 S. Pet. iv. 5.
² S. John v. 28, sqq.; Acts xxiv. 15.
³ Rom. ii. 10, viii. 18; 1 Cor. xiii. 12; 1 S. John iii. 2; Heb. x. 26, 27; Rev. xiv. 13; S. Matt. viii. 12; S. Mark ix. 43, sqq.; S. John xii. 26, xiv. 2, sqq.; xvii. 24; Rev. xxi. 7, 8.
⁴ 1 Cor. xv. 6, ἀφθη ἐπάνω πεντακοσίως διδόμενος ἐφάπαξ, εἴ δὲ ὁ πλεῖον μένουσιν ἐως ἄρτι, τινὲς δὲ καὶ ἐκαμψθησαν.
since the day of our Saviour's triumph over death; the presumptive speculations which were previously rife as to the future state have been exchanged for strong certainties. "Life and immortality have been brought to light by the Gospel." "God has begotten us again to a lively hope, by the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead." Christians are "not to sorrow as those that have no hope." Death has lost its sting, and the grave its victory.¹

Here, too, let it be noted, that although the soul is the seat of man's personal life, it is not, as has been already hinted, man in his completeness. Man is a body as well as a soul. Materialism itself has here done valuable service in correcting the exaggerations of a one-sided spiritualism. It is common, but erroneous, to speak of man's body as being related to his spirit only as is the casket to the jewel which it contains, or only as is a prisoner to the walls of his dungeon.² As a matter of fact, the personal spirit of man strikes its roots far and deep into the encompassing frame of sense, with which, from the first moment of its existence, it has been so intimately associated: in a thousand ways, and most powerfully, the body acts on the soul, and the soul on the body: They are only parted at

¹ 2 Tim. i. 10; 1 S. Pet. i. 3; 1 Thess. iv. 13; 1 Cor. xv. 55.
² The false spiritualism which is implied in these metaphors is, in modern times, at least, chiefly due to the Cartesian philosophy. Descartes held that the human soul was made only for the purposes of thought (Disc. sur la Méth. pt. 5); the animal-life of man was, as a consequence, in his judgment, merely that of an independent machine. Madame de Sévigné rallies this once popular theory "des machines qui aiment, des machines qui ont une élection pour quelqu'un, des machines qui sont jalouses, des machines qui craignent." Œuvres t iii. lett. 170.
death by a violent wrench. The spirit can indeed exist independently of the body, but this independent existence is not its emancipation from a prison-house of matter and sense; it is a temporary and abnormal divorce from the companion whose presence is needed to complete its life. Would the soul, permanently severed from the body, still be, properly speaking, man? Would it not really be some other being? Our inmost consciousness here echoes the answer of science. The body which has been so long the associate and partner of the soul’s life, the instrument of its will, the minister of its passions, mingling lower physical sensations with that higher life of thought and feeling which belongs to it, could not be altogether cast away without impairing the completeness of our being, without imperilling the continuous identity of our changeful existence.

This, then, is the true ground of the general resurrection, which is no eccentric or gratuitous miracle, but the restoration to man of that completeness of identity which is impaired by death. If the body did not rise, man would, by dying, not simply enter upon a new stage of being; he would exist as a different order or species of creature. His moral history would have changed its conditions and character. The disembodied spirit might repudiate the weaknesses or excesses of the companion with which it had finally parted company. In point of fact, all men are to rise again with their bodies, and to give account of their own works. The complex being which acted here is to be judged hereafter.
In this life the body and soul together form one composite being; each acts upon the other as well as with it. The corruptible body presseth down the soul. The passions which have their seat in the soul depict themselves upon the surface of the body. On the one hand, an Apostle reminds us that fleshly lusts war not merely against the bodily health, but against the soul.\(^1\) On the other hand, a beautiful soul illuminates the face of a S. Stephen with angelic light;\(^2\) and hereafter the bodies of the blessed will be "glorious," that is to say, translucent with the splendours of the glorified spirit.\(^3\)

IV.

Religion, in order to meet the wants of human nature, will take account of each element in man's nature: she will maintain lower relations with the bodies as well as higher relations with the souls of men. As man has, besides his unseen person, an outward and visible shape, so will religion herself provide sensible forms as well as supersensuous realities. She will exact outward as well as inward reverence, because in a being constituted like man, the one is really the condition of the other. There are bodily postures which absolutely forbid heavenly exercises to the soul: to lounge in an arm-chair is inconsistent with the tension of thought.

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\(^1\) 1 S. Pet. ii. 11.  \(^2\) Acts vi. 15.  \(^3\) 1 Cor. xv. 43.
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and will which belongs to adoration of the Most Holy. Religion, like man himself, is a beautiful spirit tabernacling in a body of sense. Her divine and immutable truths are shrouded beneath the unrivalled poetry of Bible language; her treasures of grace beneath the outward and visible signs, which meet us in sacraments. She proclaims the invisible by that which meets the eye; she heralds the eternal harmonies by a music that falls upon the ear. She certainly is not all form, for man is not a brute; but also she is not all spirit, for man is not an angel. She deals with man as being precisely what he is, and she enlists the lower faculties of his being in aid of the higher. Yet if she is true to man and to herself, she never allows her disciple to forget the unseen in the seen, the inward in the outward, the soul in the body. For religious purposes, the soul must always be incomparably of the highest importance, as being the very man himself; the man in the secret recesses of his being; the man at the imperishable centre of his life; the man as he lives beneath the Eye, and enters into relations with the Heart of his Infinite Creator.

Certainly if belief in our being personal spirits is essential to religion, and belief in the immediate creation of the soul by God is stimulating to it, belief in the soul's immortality is of yet higher religious importance. The relation between God and the soul, in which religion consists, would be little more to us than a sentiment or a literary taste, if we were persuaded that we should have taken leave of it, as we shall have taken leave of our clothes and of our books,
when we are laid in our coffins. Would religion be worth our attention as serious men, would it be anything more than a plaything, if all really ended at death? That the soul is immortal, standing in its immortality, for weal or woe, face to face with the Everlasting God;—this truth, dimly grasped by natural religion, has been wrought into the very heart and fibre of Christendom. It is taken for granted by Christian faith just as naturally as is the fact of life itself. It underlies that sense of an eternal life which good men already enjoy here, and which implies not simply a consciousness that admits of no idea of succession or time, but an immortal soul in fixed communion with an Eternal Object. It teaches man to look upon all the acts and habits which really feed and strengthen religion as a part of his preparation and outfit for eternity, to be in some sense carried with him as he crosses the heights which form his present horizon, and which shut out from his view the eternal world. And thus it has elevated and enriched human nature in a thousand ways, which we only do not sufficiently appreciate because we are so entirely accustomed to them.

Let me illustrate this by an example. Putting religion for the moment out of the question altogether, there is no doubt as to the view which a philanthropist must take of suicide, supposing it to become general, and regarding it in its influence upon society. When a popular Cyrenaeic teacher, Hagesias, advocated suicide, at Alexandria, as being the course upon which a really wise man would
resolve after comparing the sum of the pleasures of life with the sum of its misfortunes, Ptolemy felt it necessary, in the interests of good government and of society, to oblige him to close his lecture-room. But the sentiment with which suicide is practically regarded among us is not based on any mere estimate of its social bearings; still less is it looked upon only as a mode of passing out of life. The announcement that this or that well-known man had destroyed himself would create in any modern society a sensation distinct in kind from that which would be caused by the simple announcement of his death. Why is this? It is because Christianity, revealing to man as a certainty the fact of his immortality, has given a new meaning, value, solemnity to life. To live is to be on our trial, with a tremendous future immediately before us; and to shorten this trial by a voluntary act, is, apart from other and even graver aspects of such an act, felt to be altogether irreconcileable with this, the Christian estimate of life.

Considering the strength of the instinct of self-preservation which is naturally implanted in us, suicide shocks us as being a violent contradiction of that instinct. Yet while cases of suicide are to be found here and there, in all times and districts of history, there have been periods and places when suicide has been nothing less than a passion—

1 Since this observation was made, it has been painfully illustrated in the case of the lamented M. Prévost-Paradol.

2 Lecky, "History of European Morals," ii. 52. "Direct and deliberate suicide, which occupies so prominent a place in the moral history of antiquity, almost absolutely disappeared within the Church." Cf. pp. 40-63 of this interesting chapter,
a moralepidemic swaying the imaginations and wills of whole
classes even among educated men. In India suicide has
been for at least two thousand years the result of energetic
conviction; it is still what it was at the date of Alexander's
conquest. It is at this day the effort by which the indi-
dual would plunge into the infinite, in which it is his pre-
sumed happiness to forfeit his individuality; whether that
infinite be the supreme soul of the Brahmins, or the
Nirvâna of the Buddhists. In Greece and Rome, suicide
was a precept not of religion but of philosophy. It was
recommended by philosophies the most opposed to each
other. In Greece the great representatives of the Cynic
school, Zeno, Diogenes, and in Christian times, Peregrinus,
died by their own hands. The Cyrenaics formulated the
doctrine of suicide, as an escape from the preponderating
miseries of life. At Rome, Lucretius, the Epicurean-
poet, as well as Cato and Brutus, under Stoic influences,
destroyed themselves. The Epicurean feeling, that when
life had been made the most of for the purposes of
enjoyment it was time to end it, coincided as to its
practical result with the Stoic doctrine that the stern
effort by which man could in extremity make good his self-
mastery is a voluntary death. Of this doctrine Seneca is
the great master. Suicide is, he contends, the act by which
man asserts his rights over himself, when face to face with
the menaces and oppressions of tyranny: suicide is the door
through which liberty may retire from a world of slaves.

This doctrine especially it was which dictated suicide
on a considerable scale in the first of the three periods
when like a moral plague it has darkened the life of
Europe. During the later days of the Roman Republic,
and under the stern Cæsarism of the Empire, suicide was
recommended and practised as an escape from the political
and social evils of the time. The spirit of suicide only
fell back before the advance of the Church; and more
than three centuries after Seneca, we find S. Augustine
combating his arguments one by one in the closing books
of the treatise on the City of God. The second period
was that of the Renaissance in the sixteenth century.
Suicide had nearly disappeared during the Middle Ages;
but when educated Italy, with Leo X. at its head, had
saturated itself afresh with Paganism, it was natural that
some of the moral ideas of antiquity should reappear in
the train of so engrossing a study of its mind and style.
Philippe Strozzi, the prisoner of the Grand Duke Cosmo I.,
destroyed himself, praying God—it is an odd mixture of
Christian and Pagan creeds—that his soul may be placed
along with the soul of Cato of Utica, and of others who
have died after the same fashion. Montaigne in his essays
defends suicide elaborately; and in time it had its de-
votees in England, no less than in France and Italy. The
more positive and earnest Christianity of the seventeenth
century brought with it a more worthy appreciation of
the real seriousness of life: but in the succeeding age the
taste for suicide was renewed, not as a part of the com-
plete Pagan ideal of conduct, but as the fruit of a melan-
cholical estimate of our condition in this world, joined to impaired or decomposing religious convictions. The felt disappointments of life as a whole, the absence of fixed aims, the culture of imagination and passion without any regulating faith, the feverish indecision, the languid yet ever-growing self-idolatry, the moral atmosphere of impatience, irritation, curiosity, the mingled rapture and pain of vagrant imagination, the utter caprice and prostration of will,—these were the characteristics of a period which was impersonated by, and which recognized itself at length in Goethe. In the earnestness as well as in the levity of an irreligious age, the ordinary motives to self-destruction acquired a new and fatal force; and the growing evil was only checked by the Christian reaction which followed on the French Revolution throughout Europe; and which again restored belief in the solemnity of life by forcing men to look steadily at the eternity which succeeds it. Certainly, we have only to refer to yesterday's paper to read the account of a suicide from London Bridge. Domestic misfortunes, temporary derangement, moral despair, still count their too numerous tale of victims. But it is a simple matter of fact that belief in a future state, as taught by Christ and His Apostles, is the one adequate antidote to this weird contempt for the gift of existence—a contempt which cannot really extinguish the gift which it yet can so irretrievably curse.²

¹ _Standard_, March 19, 1870.
² On this subject the opening Essay in M. Caro's _Nouvelles Études Morales_ is full of interest; and I am indebted to it in the foregoing paragraphs.
It would be easy to shew in like manner how—sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly—Christianity has bettered the condition of the masses of mankind by making Christians feel the value of each separate life. Our Lord has done this, as no other has done it: nowhere is human life thought so highly of as where the Christian creed is sincerely believed to be absolute truth. The history of infanticide is one among other illustrations of this result of a hearty belief in immortality. The great Christian doctrines centre in, they are unintelligible apart from, faith in the value of the individual soul. The soul’s value is measured in a Christian’s judgment by the stupendous truth of the Incarnation and Death of the Everlasting Son; by the gift and energies of the Divine Spirit; by the perpetual intercession of Christ in heaven; by the grace and power of the Sacraments; by the prospects which open to faith’s eye beyond the grave—upwards into an illimitable heaven, downwards into a fathomless hell. Confronted with each of these truths, the soul confidently, yet tremblingly, feels its dignity—its priceless dignity—in the eye of its Maker. The soul feels as if, when it turns awhile from the daily round of duty to gather itself up into itself, to sink a shaft into the depths of its consciousness, there were two, and only two, beings in existence—itself and its God. To know more of Him, to love Him more, to serve Him better—this is its constant effort; and its hope and prayer is to receive day by day, in larger measures, more abundant communications of His mind and of His life. In a word, when dwelling on the soul’s nature
and destiny, man understands that religion is his highest and most reasonable field of thought and work.

It has indeed been said that the old phrase of "saving one's soul" has ceased to have much meaning for the religion of educated people in the present day. If this be indeed true, we can only rejoin, in all truth and sorrow, "so much the worse for the educated people." Whatever be a man's place in society or in letters, whatever his circumstances in this earthly scene, it remains true that, to close with the offers which Christ makes to sinners, to "work out his salvation with fear and trembling," is his one most important business here. The eternal realities do not change with our intellectual fashions; and like the laws which govern our physical frames, the spiritual rules under which men live or die are the same for all of us. The day will come when the God-fearing peasants of Devonshire or of Yorkshire will rise in judgment against the cultured irreligion of the centres of our modern civilisation: not because it is cultured, but because it is irreligion; because in the glare of its enthusiasms for the additions which it has made to the knowledge of our material home and structure, it has forgotten almost or altogether the Eternal Home beyond.

The salvation of the soul can only be treated as an old-world anachronism, when it is clear either that man has no real soul, or that it does not survive death, or that if it does survive, its condition hereafter has no reference whatever to its state and actions here. If this be really meant, it is better to say so; only, in that case, it is difficult to see what
sphere is left for religion at all. If it be not meant, then, undoubtedly, a variety of the gravest questions at once open before us, both as to what we have to be saved from, and as to the means and conditions of our salvation. Upon the first of these questions, we shall encounter in the next lecture some of the more serious differences which divide the modern world: to-day it must suffice to have insisted upon the mingled blessedness and awfulness of life. What it is to live here at all as a human being; what it is to possess or rather to be a centre of self-reflecting thought, of self-determining will, a centre of life which under some conditions will be perpetuated indefinitely;—this, when we think of it steadily and in good earnest, is, next to the spiritual sight of God Himself, the most solemn, the most shortening, the most stimulating consideration that can press upon us. Let us make much of it, in the interests both of the present and of the future, for the sake of God and truth, as well as of our own lasting happiness. Let us determine to ask ourselves again and again during the coming week, what in our inmost selves we really are, and, next, whither we are going. Let us listen to a voice which will at times find some echo in every conscience, and which bids us, in God's name, reflect that "the things which are seen are temporal, while the things which are not seen are eternal."