an end in itself, and Whether it has a career opened to it by itself, it becomes requisite to distinguish it again into the two kinds founded on the two kinds of comparison, of having and of being. The direct emotion of avarice, the love of wealth for its own sake and the passion for increasing it, are taken up into the first group of emotions of comparison, and both are subject to the same laws. Wealth is one kind of possession among many, that kind which has value in exchange, and is with the rest an object in reference to which men compare themselves with each other. The end of the comparison is to find oneself, or to become, superior to others. The emotion therefore, the tendency to compare, in itself, does not aim at a greater degree of intensity of itself; its end is something not itself, namely, superiority to others in the comparison; and the greater the difference the more marked is the superiority. Like the antipathetic emotions, then, this kind of ambition has no career. Like them also it leads of itself to injustice, and is antagonistic to goodwill and the sympathetic emotions. Only so far as it is compatible with justice can it be taken up into any teleologic scheme of the constructive reason, and a career be opened for its emotion and passion. Like indignation, the desire of possession of wealth at least, when thus subordinated to justice, and not allowed to produce illwill to others, is a motive force of conduct which is not only very deeply rooted in the organisation, being founded first of all on the desire of satisfying the natural wants, but also is indispensable to the preservation of the race in existence and well being. We must have not only necessaries but also luxuries before we can direct our attention to
the provision for moral and mental requirements. The same almost may be said of the desire of reputation, since the good opinion of others is of such enormous weight as a motive of action, witnessing thereby to the strength of the tendency to compare oneself with others, and fully justifying the view of Comte and others of the natural sociability of man; a sociability which is now found to have its roots in the original cerebral organisation, the organ of the character in the proper and strict sense of the term.

3. The emotions of the comparison of being with their passion, emulation, are not amenable in their own character to justice, as was shown in § 32, 2. They are, however, or contain a certain justice of their own, inasmuch as they endeavour to conform their estimate of their rival's character to truth, in order to compare themselves with him. Chivalrous, honourable, magnanimous, however, as these emotions and the ambition of excellence founded on them are, they do not contain their own ultimate end any more than the ambition founded on the other group. It is still the superiority, and not the interest of comparison itself, that is the purpose of the emotion. The ambitious man rejoices in the greatness of others only on condition that he knows himself superior, or has hopes of becoming so. Sometimes a man may appear to rejoice in the excellence of a person whom he has no hope of equalling; in this case he perhaps protects himself by secretly placing his pride or honour in another career; or perhaps he uses the superiority of one person to interpret to himself his own superiority to others; and it is a real pleasure to him to be convinced of the reality of superiority as
a general fact, in order that he may ward off the subtil fear that he is deluding himself with a shadow in ambitioning superiority at all. Yet this kind of ambition is not destructive of its framework, as hatred is; nor is it the antagonist of the sympathetic emotions. It may have the sympathetic emotions as the very objects of its comparison, as seen in § 67. 3. But it combines in this way with them, or with any other emotion, not antipathetic, only at the cost of a portion of its own intensity. The emulation is made mild, and the haughtiness and bitterness of rivalry are suppressed. In this way ambition is prepared for admission into the teleologic scheme of the moral sense.

4. Many of the characters which are most commonly met with in the daily intercourse of life must be referred to the special predominance of some one or more of the emotions which belong to the general type of ambition. Most of the "Characters" of Theophrastus may be referred to this head; for instance, those of the dissembler, the flatterer, the rude and the polished man, the chatterer, the scandal-monger, the boaster, the officious man, the shabby and mean man, the miser, the suspicious man, the presumptuous, the vain, the conceited. I will mention some of the subordinate types of character belonging here, which are most commonly prominent. Selfishness is a general term for the desire of having the best of everything for oneself, the particular direction being given by circumstances of bodily organisation, or of course of life and experience. Covetousness is one form of selfishness, fondness for money and tangible possessions carried up into the reflective emotions of comparison. Conceit and vanity again are often found
predominant and make a strongly marked type of character, yet a type subordinate to the general type of ambition. The passion of chivalry and honourable emulation, when combined with the love of grace and politeness of demeanour, makes the character of the perfect gentleman. Some would deny the term gentleman to any one who does not also possess strongly marked traits of goodwill or benevolence; indeed would make the sympathetic emotions the root of this character. These persons are fond of saying, that only the true Christian can be a true gentleman; and they give St. Paul as an instance, who certainly was both in the highest sense. But, as commonly used and applied, the term gentleman includes only the justice of chivalrous emulation, and this is the foundation of the character; the other element is the fruit of good breeding and education, either given or self-acquired, and consists in good taste, polished manners, and courtesy, which are the fruit of one of the modes of emotion belonging to the comparison of having, as emulation belongs to the comparison of being. Compare on this subject what Montesquieu says of honour being the principle of action in monarchies, De l’Esprit des Lois, Liv. iii. 6, 7. Wherever there is a hierarchy of social or of social and political conditions in life, there it is one of the most constantly and powerfully operative motives with every one to keep himself and his family in the condition in which he was born, or to raise them above it. "L’honneur, c’est-à-dire le préjugé de chaque personne et de chaque condition;" and again, "La nature de l’honneur est de demander des préférences et des distinctions;" and again "L’ambition est pernicieuse dans une république: elle a
des bons effets dans la monarchie; elle donne la vie à ce gouvernement.” We are but too well acquainted, in England, with the excessive action of this principle; we know but too well the desire to be distinguished from the minutely different class below, and assimilated to the minutely different class above; we need a renovation, as of a genial spring restoring the wintry earth to life and warmth, a renovation which will relax the cankering gripe of this ambition, and restore, by the substitution of more natural aims, the sense and enjoyment of independence and brotherhood.

5. Passing to another subordinate type, humility is one of the emotions of comparison of being, and when the tendency to it is strongly marked produces a character very distinctly and obviously traced, that of the humble, meek, and lowly disposition. But this emotion has no passion founded on it, since its nature is to withdraw from rivalry and emulation rather than to court them. It combines readily with goodwill and love to others, and as such is itself amiable. It is from this combination that it acquires the title of a virtue, since a low estimate of oneself, if combined with illwill to others in consequence of that estimate, is hateful. The tendency to form a low estimate of self in comparison with others seems to belong to a low degree of mental activity, since it is to acquiesce in a judgment which derives its pleasure from the small amount of burden or task which it imposes. It enables the person to acquiesce in being guided by others; it aims at peace and rest, and avoids responsibility. Hence the humble character receives its colour from the other emotions with which it may be combined. Humility in com-
bination with love is the state of mind which is meant by the term humility as the name of a Christian virtue. It may seem strange to find humility classed under the head of ambition, being as it is rather a deterrent from rivalry, which is the soul of ambition. But it must be remembered that ambition is the character formed by the passions arising from emotions of comparison, not from these emotions themselves, which are opposites to each other; the passions are envy, jealousy, and emulation; when any of these emotions are predominant, they will form subordinate types of character which may be very different from those of the passions. The emotions on the side of the comparison unfavourable to self, that is, ashamedness, admiration of externals, humility, and admiration of essentials, as already said, have no passions; the passions spring from these emotions in combination with those on the other side of the balance, favourable to self; and yet these emotions may be strongly marked, so as to serve as foundations for distinct but subordinate types of character. And what is said of humility may be said also of other subordinate forms of these emotions, either alone or in combination with others, such as self-denial, unselfishness, complaisance, submissiveness. A comparison with other persons, their possessions and faculties, is essential to all these emotions and their modifications of character; but the comparison itself does not become a passion, unless the superiority of self over others is the object of desire; and this desire is ambition.

§ 70. 1. Another type of character is founded upon pride, one branch of the emotions which arise in reflection on self alone. Reserve is the charac-
teristic of these; but the reserve of self-respect is modesty, that of pride is defiance. The emotions of reflection on self alone were described in § 30 as supposing two kinds of comparison to have taken place, first, comparison between oneself and other persons, secondly, comparison between the good and the bad features in one’s own nature or history. Everything which can possibly be considered good in oneself or favourable to oneself may become material, object, or framework, for the emotion of pride. The comparison is then, in pride, given up by the unfavourable side of it being forgotten, not purposely but spontaneously, and the favourable side alone dwelt upon; only what is good in oneself is dwelt upon, the good in others and the bad in others are equally dropped out of view; and therewith all reciprocal obligations between oneself and others denied. This kind of pride, then, has no career before it, because it is founded, by its nature, in an error, in mistake of the facts of its representational framework. It requires a comparison to exist, and it tries to eliminate all comparison; it destroys the framework which is necessary to it. It might be pictured as lopping off the bough on which it is seated. It aims both at isolation from others and at isolation from portions and parcels of itself. Yet to effect this isolation it must keep producing and reproducing in thought the objects from which it would make abstraction. The future before it is only secured by the strengthening of the natural tendency which may be due to repeated acts of indulgence; the aim of the passion is not to intensify itself, but to intensify or complete the isolation which is one element of its object.
2. But although this kind of pride has no career, the case is different with that kind of it which is self-respect, attaching to an ideal of character formed of other elements, and comparing itself constantly with its own ideal; an emotion which is noble in proportion to the nobility of the character constituting the ideal, and which shares its career. When this ideal is noble, self-respect becomes one kind of Honour, which is an essential characteristic of all excellence; the other kind of Honour being that belonging to emulation (§ 69. 4). This kind of pride consists, then, in exclusive cultivation of one's own ideal; but that ideal may include the cultivation of every virtue. Towards others the conduct of the self-respecting man will be marked by a reserved benevolence, by scrupulous justice, by attentive delicacy and politeness. "There are proud men," says Landor, "of so much delicacy that it almost conceals their pride, and perfectly excuses it." Pericles and Aspasia, cxii This kind of pride I should call self-respect. The two kinds of pride must therefore be carefully distinguished, and that only which is the passion of self-isolation denied entrance into the system of virtues.

3. The combination of the irascible emotions with the better kind of pride has been touched upon in § 68. 4; they will also combine with the worse kind of pride, the tendency to proud self-isolation. The resulting disposition is then morose, sullen, sulky, a disposition too well known by its name to require description. The framework of this compound emotion, which, since it is a compound one, is already a habit and disposition of character, is distinguished by the representation of some unwarranted intrusion
or encroachment on the rights of the person feeling sullen; of some intrusion on his self-isolating position. Take away the self-isolation, or take away the irascibility, either of the two elements of the compound emotion, and the emotion loses its peculiar character which we call sullenness or sulkiness.

4. It was said in § 30, 2, ad fin., that the emotion which arises in reflection on self alone was the most deeply rooted of all the reflective emotions, the staple and basis of the character, upon which all others might be conceived as engrafted. Nothing is more true; unless this emotion is strong, there can be no strength of character; it is the fountain-head of moral, that is, of reflective life, the emotion which is inseparable from reflection on self or self-consciousness; the source of de facto energy, as justice is of de jure validity. But, as we have seen, it is parted immediately into two streams, pride and self-respect, with the honour which belongs to each, and which is again different from the honour of emulation. The two characters, based respectively upon pride and upon self-respect, or which draw their life from these opposite streams, may be considered as dividing the world of character between them. The proud man is self-centred, the man of self-respect submits to revolve, as it were, round the centre of the universe, and to live his life as a part in a vast whole. The opposition between the two is the opposition between self-will and willing submission to universal laws. The latter alone is fully compatible with habits founded on the sense of justice and the moral law.

§ 71. Perhaps we ought not to omit a type or rather a class of characters which forms a prominent portion of mankind, but one not perhaps so numerous
as usually supposed, the pleasure-seekers as they are commonly called. The types already mentioned seem to exclude these, or at least to furnish no emotional foundation for them; and yet we have now gone through all the groups of reflective emotion, except those only which are imaginative as well as reflective. The fact seems to be that the class in question is a residuum; consisting of those persons who have no reflective emotion sufficiently strong to lead them into a special direction of energy, and mould their character into a special type. They are left, then, to the direction given by the preponderance of the direct emotions or of the bodily organisation, and of the pleasures which belong to their exercise or activity. They are both intellectually and emotionally sluggish; they require the stimulation of novelty in sights and sounds. They rest in wonder and curiosity, without the logical instinct. Good-tempered they often are, but incapable of lasting passion. Their characteristic is that they always want amusement; indeed amusement-seekers would be the best name for them as a class. Now we are all amusement-seekers at times; and those who never are so must have something morbid in their character; but never to want or seek anything else is a disease of a worse kind, a sort of original and incurable feebleness of mental constitution. It is clear that this type of character cannot claim any inherent promise of permanence from the interest which it has for desire, or as an object of volition, since its characteristic is, that volition does not rise to intensity in any of the objects or emotions which it embraces.

§ 72. 1. The classification of the types of character which are founded on the reflective emotions,
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not imaginative as well as reflective, being now complete, let us cast a glance back over them all generally, and consider in what way the emotions constituting these several types of character are subordinated to, and taken up into, the emotions of justice and the love of duty which constitute the highest and most central type. It is by no means an idle enquiry, what feelings and actions will combine with the moral sense, and what will not; as some might perhaps maintain, on the ground that all feelings are facts of consciousness, and have their causes and conditions in the physical functions of the organism, thus eliminating all strictly speaking de jure considerations from ethic, and leaving only de facto considerations. Yet even such persons, since they cannot overlook the facts of choice between pleasures, of procuring some in preference to others, of avoiding pains, and of instituting courses of conduct calculated for these ends, must in fact bring a certain kind of de jure considerations into the enquiry, only without including in them that particular pleasure which belongs to the moral sense; a pleasure which their mental analysis has either failed to reveal to them, or revealed as a sentiment founded solely on erroneous, perhaps theological, opinions, and destined to vanish with them. In this latter view the sense of moral right and wrong would appear to them as something "absolute" or ontological, and its claim to obedience as empty as its source fictitious. The most logical of such a school would therefore abstain from entering into any consideration of moral right or wrong; prudence or imprudence, certainly of a high order, as prudence for self or for others, is all that they would predicate
of any person or conduct. Even such praise and blame as this would be to them valid only as a fact, that is, because they are naturally impelled to give it or withhold it, just as they are naturally led to like and to dislike; and thus differences of judgment become ultimately, on this view, mere matters of taste, in which no man can judge for another. This view is incompatible with the discovery by analysis of a specific feeling founded on justice, the moral sense. All de jure considerations have their source in this specific feeling, which exists also de facto, as other feelings also do which either will or will not combine with it. This combination or non-combination with the moral sense is what makes actions and feelings morally right or wrong, and constitutes the meaning of the terms moral good and evil. If there is no moral good and no moral evil, there is no moral sense with its specific feeling of validity; but that there is such a specific feeling the analysis in Chapter ii. has sufficiently shown. The combination of other feelings with this is their moral justification. The question then is, in what way does this combination takes place.

2. The process is one of reintegration, and consists in holding together, either spontaneously or voluntarily, the total emotion and its framework, so as to see whether the latter has that equality in its parts which is the object of the emotion of justice. If it has, then the same framework is common both to the emotion of justice and to that emotion which is in question. We may feel this spontaneously or habitually, and then we are said to entertain habitually just and right feelings; or we may test it voluntarily, and then the process is one of reasoning.
The more intense an emotion is, the less are we able to analyse its framework to discover its justice or equality. The movement which supports it in the brain is then energetic or violent, and the lines of the framework faint. Its connection with other objects or frameworks also is faint by the same rule; that is, the movements which support the formal element are less strong than those which support the emotional. The emotion may in this case be just, but we cannot test its justice. Only with the gradual return to energy in the movement supporting the form or framework, can the equality or inequality be discerned, and the emotion of justice arise. Anger, cros, love, envy, jealousy, pride, emulation, covetousness, and so on, may all be so intense as to obliterate the framework, and prevent its justice or injustice from appearing in consciousness. The return to vividness of the framework, and the production of other objects in redintegration, as means or as consequences of the object in immediate view, can only proceed pari passu with the decrease in intensity of the emotion pervading this immediate object. This is the phenomenon of reasoning calming the passions; and the habit of reasoning, of increasing the energy of the movements supporting frameworks, in cases of strong emotion, may be strengthened by exercise, so as to make the emotions themselves suggest the desire for reasoning on them, and this desire increase into a volition sufficiently powerful to bring the framework into prominence at the expense of the emotion.

3. There are three ways which the reasoning may take on the overcoming or the subsidence of the emotion. If it proceeds to analysing the content of its
framework, it is a mode of teleological reasoning, and the first judgment which it passes is one of the justice or injustice, the goodness or badness of its object, as an object of the original emotion. Or it may take the direction of effective reasoning, in order to discover facts connected with the framework, either as means to procure or avoid it, or as consequences pleasant or unpleasant. The latter in both its branches is prudence or prudential reasoning; the former alone is moral, being employed to discover the ultimate nature of the emotion and its framework. Only that type of character which is founded on the love of duty will habitually and easily take the first road, or take it as the indispensable preliminary of the second, the mode of prudential reasoning. But this does not alter the fact that it is right to test emotion and conduct in this way, or that justice is the ground of moral goodness. The course is not right because it is taken by this type of character, but this type of character is good because it takes a course commanded by the love of duty. If either of the two other directions are taken, of reasoning to discover either means or consequences of a certain feeling or action, the question occurs again as to these, whether they are in accordance with justice and the moral sense; and it may happen that either the means or the consequences may be forbidden, while the action itself is permitted, by the moral sense, or that they may be permitted while the action is forbidden.

4. Three classes of elements contribute to the development of character, and combine to produce and govern it. These are, first, the external circumstances and events of life, the persons with whom one comes in contact, their feelings and actions, the
customs and laws of society, and so on; secondly, the physical changes owing to advancing age, the increase, culmination, and gradual decrease in intensity, of the movements supporting the emotional element in emotions and passions, and the corresponding changes in the redintegration of the frameworks of those emotions and passions, which tend towards the fixation of habits of thought and feeling as the time of life advances; thirdly, the innate structure of the character itself, and the force of volition, the direction of which depends upon that structure, and which reacts upon the two former groups of contributing elements. The first group is infinitely various, and different for every individual; its importance for him can hardly be overrated; an accident as it is called may change not only his whole course of life, but also the development of his character itself, so as to make him a very different man from what he would otherwise have been. The importance of this change in the individual, and generally of the individual himself, to the whole course of the world's affairs, and to the characters of those whom he may influence, is another thing; and there are two much debated questions, first, as to the amount and importance of the influence which accidental changes in circumstances and events, and secondly, as to that which personal individual character and action, exert over the course of the world's history or over mankind at large. The second group is the same, in kind, for every man, the changes due to advancing age affect all men alike, though they are modified differently by the reaction of the individual and his physical structure. The third group we have already been employed in analysing. From
our present point of view, therefore, the second and third groups constitute the normal development of the character, while the first group, consisting of the variable circumstances of life, are the deflecting element or influence, which tends to make the life and the character different from what it would be if these circumstances flowed in an even tide, the same for all men and all periods of life. It is the normal development of character in advancing age with which we are immediately engaged, abstraction made from the deflecting influence of extraordinary circumstances and events.

5. Yet it is of course impossible to eliminate altogether the first group of contributing elements. All that we can do is to suppose them acting regularly and each in its turn upon the character, so that the individual has all his emotions called into play from time to time, and has experience of the joys and the sorrows which spring from each, either from their satisfaction or from their disappointment. All passions are painful when they are disappointed; for instance, love remaining while we feel the gradually increasing indifference towards us of the person loved; or anger and revenge when unsatisfied; the emotions and passions of comparison, when other persons triumph in our humiliation, as in insult and contumely; some passions are in a manner painful and uneasy even in their satisfaction, as anger and malice. Such joys and such sorrows as spring from the satisfaction or disappointment of emotions and passions are what is often meant by experience of life; and this we must suppose present in some full and regular measure, in order to imagine to ourselves the normal course of the development of character,
such as it is produced by the advance of age in combination with the original cerebral structure of the individual.

6. Supposing thus everything to be normal, all the three groups of contributing elements to be active in a certain normal proportion, is there any general law discoverable, to which the course of development conforms, and which is the expression of it? The answer results from the foregoing analysis; there is such a law and such a course; and it depends upon the difference in action between the emotional element and its representational framework, and between the physical nerve movements which respectively support them. The emotions, supported by movements which have their well-springs or centres in different parts of the cerebrum (as we have been led to imagine them), change in degree of intensity, and in the amount of framework which they will pervade, in accordance with the energy of these nerve movements, which are under the immediate influence of age or time of life, first increasing then decreasing in intensity. They are fixed and intensified by indulgence and habit; but they do not change in kind except so far as they are modified, each in its own way, in accordance with the changes of the representational framework which they pervade in the course of redintegration. The representational framework on the contrary, though equally subject to the influence of the energy of the nerve movements which support it, changes in the kind of its content with the increase of knowledge and experience. Its changes constitute a continual elaboration of organically constructed imagery, which receives the pervading emotions into itself. The formal element of this frame-
work is the condition of its elaboration and organic construction. The framework constitutes what we may call man's knowledge, the emotion man's nature; to adopt a profound distinction of Mr. Ruskin's. Accordingly the changes in knowledge make a comparatively rapid, those in emotion a comparatively slow progress. The changes in knowledge, if for the better, that is, if they have the harmony which is truth, are never lost; but are preserved not only for the life of the individual but, by means of oral and written communication, for the life of the race. Those in emotion, except such slow modifications in it as are produced by the changes in knowledge, depend upon the physical or nerve development alone, so as to be directly subject to the influence of age during the life of the individual, and incapable of being communicated to others, or to succeeding generations. The slow development indeed of the cerebral organism, including its property of hereditary transmission, carries with it the development and the transmission of emotion as a part of itself; but the development of knowledge is enabled to outstrip both, by having its particular frameworks successively fixed and destroyed, each being the means by which, and the material out of which, a succeeding one is formed. Yet there is also, throughout this formation, a part or strain which is permanent, and of slow but permanent growth, corresponding to the hereditarily transmitted emotional nature, and itself capable of hereditary transmission; I mean the logical forms of reasoning itself, and the slowly developed system of general abstract conceptions which are applicable to any new or changing object-matter of knowledge. The degrees of energy again, both in
external action and volition, follow the same law as the emotions. They depend upon the energy of the movements in the nervous organism, and not upon the stage of elaboration which has been attained in the knowledge. Every generation apparently begins life at the same point of development, both in emotion and strength of will, as the preceding generation. There is no doubt some difference, but it is so small as only to become visible when we include a long series of generations in our view; and even then perhaps it is visible only in respect of emotion, and not in respect of strength of will. This difference between emotion and framework, man's nature and man's knowledge, which is seen clearly in the field of history, has its source in every individual who contributes to make history, and is to be traced in him by a careful analysis.

7. This being the general and constant relation between emotion and framework, and between the modes of their development, it is clear that a great and constant influence must be exerted by the framework over the emotion, in consequence of its continually progressive elaboration of structure, by which it becomes more complete and more harmonious. The pleasure of harmonising its parts, of introducing equal correspondences between them, both statically and dynamically, of making means correspond to end, theory to practice, reward to merit, punishment to fault, harvest to labour, career to ambition, and so on, is the motive of all this structural elaboration of framework so far as it is voluntary and not spontaneous, and practical rather than speculative. The formal element which is contained in the framework of images, with the pleasure of equality, the pain of
inequality, which are inherent in it, is the ground of the organic harmony which is both spontaneously and voluntarily produced in its constantly growing structure. Hence, when we reflect upon past experience of life, the tendency always is to approve and cultivate those feelings which have a career before them, and those most the career of which is the longest, the most free from contradictions in itself, and the least exposed to obstacles from other feelings or external circumstances. A career is the imagined correspondence of the end to the beginning, the imagined completion and crown of a course of feeling, thought, or action. It has been shown in many instances how essential to continuance in any action is the imagination of such a career. Indeed we usually think any one senseless who perseveres in actions before which there is no career. Whenever a man does so, it is because he is either really senseless or else mastered for the time being by emotion or passion, a fact which entirely confirms our analysis.

8. Now we cannot teach or implant emotions not implanted by nature, but only cultivate what nature has implanted. Up to a certain point perhaps they may be increased in intensity by habit and indulgence, and by desuetude of other and particularly of the opposite emotions. To what extent this is possible is doubtful. But a natural deficiency in any of the cardinal emotions cannot be supplied, a natural redundance cannot be annihilated, by culture. Characters which are originally framed to feel very intensely either love, hatred, ambition or rivalry, pride or love of duty, will always strongly retain those tendencies. This is matter of daily experience. The explanation is, that these are emotional elements which
depend on original cerebral structure and function. But the representational frameworks in which these are cast are moulded by self-education, and to some extent modify the emotional elements pervading them. According to its capacities for a career, every emotion can be taken up into justice with less loss of its distinguishing emotional feeling. The several capacities of the several emotions for a career have been given above. Love and the love of duty have alone an infinite career before them; they alone perfectly fulfil and more than fulfil the demands of justice. Hence, where they exist strongly by nature they need lose nothing of their intensity by education. But where they are deficient by nature they cannot be produced by education. The love of justice may be increased by culture, for this is an emotion attached directly to the formal element, and for that reason is the standard or rather the framework into which all other emotions must be cast or reduced. It grows in intensity by habit, like the rest, and its pleasure increases with its dominion; but it is very different from the love of duty and from love itself, and the education which makes us lovers of justice cannot give that special tinge of passionate ardour which their names connote. Similar is the case of the antipathetic emotions and passions, those of comparison, and that of pride. The tendency to these is original and cannot be either implanted or uprooted by culture, however much we may reflect upon the insufficiency, the contradictions, the necessary incompleteness, of these passions. All we can do, and this is what we do naturally, is to transmute them into those forms which are their justice, into indignation, chivalrous rivalry, personal honour. But if the emo-
tions are strong by nature, they will retain, even in their transformation, the passionate ardour of that special kind which they originally had.

9. The influence of age is twofold. Up to the prime of life, the increasing vigour of all physical movements both increases the intensity of the emotion and urges forward the construction of the framework; but the predominant emotion sets the end or purpose of the construction, and moulds it in accordance with its own nature. We reason vigorously, it is true, but, since the predominant emotion guides us, we reason speculatively and effectively, and act immemorially and transcendently, more than we reason teleologically. The predominant emotion with its desired scope and career is to us unquestioned, an absolute end; and the framework, with the reasoning powers which construct it, are to us as means, dominated by the emotion. But when the prime of life is passed, and the vigour of physical movements gradually decreases, the framework and the movements which support it assume by degrees a more important position towards the emotional element. The slow but continuous growth of knowledge, embodied in and depending on movements which are habitual, and from their interconnection with each other mutually supporting and promoting, becomes now a match for the passions and emotions, bound to physical movements which decrease in vigour without being consolidated by habit and interconnection. Hence declining life aids the process of transmuting all emotions and passions into the mould of justice, by softening their intensity; until at last upon the threshold of death in extreme old age the last spark of their fire is extinguished. The normal course of
the development of character is therefore to subordinate the emotion to its framework, and, in so doing, to the law of that framework, which is harmony, equipoise, and justice.

"Poi nella quarta parte della vita
A Dio si rimarita,
Contemplando la fine che l'aspetta;
E benedice li tempi passati."

§ 73. 1. There are two types of character still remaining to be examined, the poetic and the religious. I have postponed them to the enquiry into the normal course of development of character because, though original and implanted by nature in the cerebral structure and functions, they are also compound, springing from two natural sources not from one only, and therefore the knowledge of the course of development of character throws light upon their genesis. These types of character are the two branches of what may be called the imaginative tendency, which is never seen pure, but always appears as imagination of this or that object-matter. Now all imagination is imagination of a career, to idealise anything in imagination is to imagine an infinite career of perfection for it. Hence love and the love of duty, being the emotions which have an infinite career before them, are those which form one branch of reflective imagination; these original emotions are one source, and the naturally active disposition of intellect and emotion is the other, which in combination form the religious type of character. On the other hand, any emotion whatever may be combined with the imaginative disposition; and whatever emotion is so combined, without being so strong and absorbing as to hinder the free play of the in-
tellestual powers, becomes from that circumstance a mode of poetry. But the intellect must have no other end in view than its own satisfaction in this free play of its powers; otherwise their exercise is one of speculative or effective reasoning, not of teleological or poetical. Emotions so treated become aesthetic emotions, their beauty or sublimity is brought out in the proportions of the formal element which their frameworks contain. Hence all emotions generally and alike are the object-matter of poetry; and poetry is the completion by idealisation of these emotions, thus become aesthetic, and of their frameworks. Hence not only is this division into religion and poetry exhaustive of all ideal reflective imagination, but its line of division coincides with that between what is infinitely perfect and beautiful and what is also, in addition to this, infinitely and eternally true.

2. The poetical type of character admits of endless and most minute varieties; every shade of emotion has its corresponding poetry. Infinitely numerous degrees of intensity also, and infinitely numerous modes or proportions in the combination of intellect and feeling, are to be found in it. Two things however must here be carefully distinguished. Both religion and poetry have their false pretenders and simulators; the simulator of poetical imagination is sentimentalism. When an emotion is dwelt on for its own pleasure, as a pleasure of enjoyment and not of admiration, and imagination is occupied only in enforcing this pleasure of emotion, or in finding new situations and circumstances so as to enhance it by freshness or by contrast, then there is no activity of aesthetic emotion, and consequently no poetic ima-
imagination. Dreams and reveries usually constitute the pleasures of a character of this type, which is also of a sluggish not of an active disposition, and is most properly distinguished from the imaginative character as one of dreamy sentiment. Poetical imagination on the contrary is active, aesthetic, consisting of intellect in equal proportion with emotion; and however soft may be the images in which most pleasure is taken, the character of the poet is masculine, intellectual, and vigorous. Sentimentalism is the effeminate luxury of emotion; poetic imagination one of its most bracing exercises.

3. Hardly any man is without poetic imagination of some kind and in some degree; but only those are usually called poets who devote themselves to the expression of this imagination by means of some form of art. All action springing from emotion has its shade of emotion peculiar to it, attached to the action itself, and differing somewhat from the emotion out of which the action springs. The expression of emotion or of emotion and thought together, when guided by volition, is transcendent action combined with effective reasoning; the reasoning is about the means for the perfect expression of the emotion, and for the attainment of the peculiar pleasure attached to the expression. Language offers the readiest and the most complete material or instrument of such expression; but gesture and muscular movements generally, visible objects, and audible sounds, alike furnish such materials or instruments. The differentiation of emotion in actions expressive of feeling is not confined to poetry, but extends to all cases of expression; for instance, striking a sudden blow, taking a sudden leap, greeting friends by shaking hands, drinking
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healths, erecting triumphal arches, wearing holiday dresses, and so on. In all these cases the feeling expressed by the action is heightened and differentiated by the act, and at the moment of its completion. The emotion is, as it were, gathered up to a single point and enforced upon the actors by their action. The action by itself becomes in this way symbolic, symbolic of the feeling it expresses. The refrain in songs is of this nature, and so also is the act of singing itself, when it comes like that of Goethe's Harper,

"Ich singe wie der Vogel singt
Der in den Zweigen wohnet,
Das Lied das aus der Kehle dringt
Ist Lohn der reichlich lohnet."

So also are all public religious ceremonies, and religious acts, prayer for instance, and the celebration of the Lord's Supper among Christians. In all these the emotion is heightened and enforced in the expression of it. In religion these acts of expression constitute the cultus, the acts of worship and service; they are to the religious emotions what poetry is to poetical imagination and its emotions. Poetry as an art is nothing else than the systematic elaboration of such modes of expression for the poetic emotions; but, just as there may be a dead cultus in religion, if it is divorced from the emotions which are its spirit, so also in poetry all modes and forms of expression, however choice, are lifeless and cold, unless they spring fresh and glowing from the heart of the composer.

4. It must be remembered too that, like all reasoning processes which spring from emotion, the reasoning which determines the expression in poetry
calms the emotion which it expresses. The nerve force which supported the emotion is converted into a force supporting the redintegration of the framework; as force supporting the emotional element it is exhausted, and, when it no longer exists as motive power of the reasoning, supporting the redintegration of the framework, there will follow a reaction, as it is called; that is, the emotion will be felt with less intensity than ordinary, and perhaps so much the less as the previous tension exceeded the ordinary limit.

5. It was the different kinds of poetry that were distinguished in § 43, and classified by their springing from two modes of poetical imagination, the synthetic and the analytic. The favourite employment of these two modes is also that which distinguishes the poetic character into two main types; and this must now be shown by applying that distinction of method on the large, as before on the small, scale, by considering the structure of poems as wholes, to whichever of the three kinds, descriptive, lyrical, or dramatic, they may belong. Not the working of the poet’s mind in single passages, but his mode of treatment of a whole subject, in producing a whole poem, is now to be considered.

6. The synthetic and analytic movements, both in single passages and in whole poems, are the offspring respectively of the two intellectual tendencies distinguished in § 63, the accumulative and the constructive. For poetical emotion is the great end and mainspring of the art of poetry, common to all its kinds; and the mode in which this emotion is embodied and realised in composition depends, not on differences in the emotion itself, but on differences in
the intellectual processes in which it is involved and by which it is made apparent.

7. Poetical imagination is accordingly found to fall into two main channels; the one, founded on the synthetic and accumulative modes of reasoning, is the expression of emotion, and may perhaps be called profusive imagination; the other, founded on the analytic and constructive modes, is the exhibition of emotion, and may perhaps be called organic imagination. The first proceeds, in treating a whole subject, from the parts to a whole which they compose, the beauty of the whole being of less importance in its eyes than the impressiveness of the parts; the second proceeds from the whole to its parts, the impressiveness of which singly is of less importance than the beauty of the whole. The first evolves, the second organises, a poem. The consummate art of the first consists in producing a beautiful and organic whole by the method of evolution, as for instance in Shakespeare; that of the second in touching the chords of emotion in the details by the method of organisation, as in Æschylus.

8. The life of modern Europe is distinguished from that of ancient Greece and Rome by the greater distinctness with which we feel the import of the reflective emotions, especially those of eros, love, and religion; owing chiefly though not exclusively, in the first and second cases, to the greater freedom and equality between the sexes, in the third to Christianity. The personality of individuals, in all its newly distinguished richness and vividness, now required expression, or at least satisfaction from a similar expression on the part of others. Hence ancient and modern poetry, which in their earliest
stage were apparently similar, being the simple description in verse of the deeds of gods and heroes, have taken opposite courses in attaining their full development. The all-importance of individual emotion to the moderns made its expression the one indispensable requisite of poetry, and imprinted on their imagination its profusive character; the comparative predominance of the intellect over the emotion among the ancients directed their poetical elaboration of the same themes into the channel of organic imagination.

9. Take any masterpiece of modern poetry not didactic, and not governed by direct imitation of the Greek, and its interest will, as a rule, be found to consist in some particular, concrete, emotions or passions, as they are felt by individuals, and to have no higher or determining τὰλάτα beyond these. Take on the other hand a masterpiece of Greek or Roman antiquity, and the particular, concrete, emotions of individuals will be found to be subordinate to some general, abstract, theme of the poem or drama, and it will appear that the chief or governing aim of the poet is to exhibit this, not to express those. They become means by which the all-important abstract theme is exhibited and illustrated; as, for instance, the conflict of divine and human laws in the Antigone. Some great portion of human life and human destiny, with the passions and emotions which belong to it, is grasped from above and brought, statically as we may call it, in one great picture before the mental eye. But in modern art no abstract but an empirical portion of human life is taken from the whole, and this is exhibited in its actual complication of motives, and difference of characters, and evolution
of events; the spectator or the reader demanding at every moment some striking situation, or some vivid expression of feeling. An instance from antiquity will render this contrast sufficiently plain.

10. The theme of the so-called Marriage of Peleus and Thetis of Catullus, a poem of unsurpassed beauty and grandeur, is the glory of marriage, idealised by means of an instance in which all the circumstances of happiness are united, and which is invested with all the imagined glories of the heroic age. Those who consider the subject of the poem to be merely the marriage of Peleus and Thetis are at a loss to account for the disproportionate length of the episode, as it then appears, the story of Theseus and Ariadne.

But the truth is, that the theme of the poem, the glory of marriage, is exhibited by the two contrasted stories, which then properly assume almost equal importance. Thus, it is the very marriage bed of Peleus and Thetis which is covered with the tapestry exhibiting the story of Ariadne:

"Talibus amplissae vestis decorata figuris
Pulvinar complexa suo velabat amictu."

Thetis is given in marriage by Jupiter himself; Ariadne deserts her father’s home for Theseus. The first union receives its crown in the birth of an heroic son, Achilles; the inconstancy of mind which leads Theseus to desert Ariadne, in the second, is the cause of his own father’s death:

"Sed quali solam Theseus me mente reliquit,
Tali mente, dem, funestet seque suoque."

Again, the circumstance that the union of Peleus and Thetis was an union between a mortal and an immortal finds its counterpart in the advent of Bacchus.
But though old wounds may be healed, there is no future in the picture; while for Peleus and Thetis the song of the Parcae weaves into the fruition of the present the anticipated fame of their son. Yet not for a moment is the poem didactic; it has no 'moral'; it does not recommend, it exhibits and idealises, marriage. The so called 'moral,' of which the moderns are so fond, is one means of giving unity to works composed on the modern principle, unity being their great desideratum. The ancients could dispense with so dangerous an instrument.

11. Even in lyrical poems the same generalising tendency is apparent, in the classical mode of treating them. The Marriage Ode of Junia and Mallius, in Catullus, beginning "Collis o Heliconici," is an instance. Not only is this apparent in the artistic oppositional arrangement of the different sections of the ode, as they are brought out in the edition given by my friend, Mr. Robinson Ellis; but the feelings expressed are those essentially inherent in the circumstance of civilized marriage, in whatever rites it is clothed and celebrated, and the ode is one appropriate to the subject at all times and places, of permanent not transitory interest.

12. Turning to the opposite or modern mode of poetical composition, let us take Shelley’s Prometheus Unbound as an instance. Though it is dramatic in form, a form which lends itself most easily to the organic mode, it is a lyric rather than a drama, the imagination is profuse throughout. It is Shelley expressing, through the mouthpiece of his characters, his own intense feeling of the divinity of love, his triumphant anticipation of its final and eternal victory over tyranny and fear. Again, though the theme is
thus general, as well as the form dramatic, yet it is embodied in a particular history developed by particular persons; a general subject is particularised, not, as in Catullus, a particular one generalised. Both the circumstances distinguishing modern from classic art are found here, the imagination profusive, the interest particular.

13. Sometimes however, when the poet leans to the critical and organic mode of thought, only one of these circumstances is found in his work. "The Ring and the Book" of Mr. Browning is an instance. The method here is organic, consisting in the exhibiting the history under different aspects, as it is related by the different actors in it. Each of the different sections of the poem is like a distinct mass of building in architecture, which in relation with the rest contributes to compose a well-proportioned and harmonious whole. But the interest is entirely particular, centred in the special characters, and in the special history which they enact. It is a wonderful feature in the art of this poem, that each person, while throwing a new light on the action, eo ipso displays his own character as well, thus producing a Shakespearian effect by original and non-Shakespearian means.

14. Finally let us take an instance from a modern, who of all moderns stands nearest to the Greeks, in point both of organic and constructive tendency and of generality in choice of theme. Goethe's Faust is general in its theme, which is, as it seems to me, the antagonism between action and enjoyment in the aims of human life. Faust begins with action, the self-denying laborious ambition of the student, bent on the rewards of knowledge. The counter ambition of enjoyment, as summed up in love, supplies the
framework of the rest of the First Part, which seems, but only seems, to find its main theme in the history of Gretchen, because it ends with her salvation. But Faust is thus left undisposed of. In the Second Part he takes, as it were, an entirely new start in life, and, as Goethe himself has told us, necessarily on a higher or larger field. But here again it is the same antagonism between the same two ambitions, action and enjoyment, which is his fate; and he too finally receives his salvation in consequence of his having acted and hoped to the end:

"Gerettet ist das edle Glied
Der Geisterwelt vom Bosen:
Wer immer strebend sich bemüht,
Den können wir erlösen."

But here too, notwithstanding the theme being general and the form dramatic, and notwithstanding that which distinguishes it from the Prometheus Unbound, the mode of thought being critical and not lyrical, the exhibition of the subject being aimed at and not the outpouring of the poet's personal feeling,—still there remains the essentially modern characteristic that the theme, though general, is particularised, and the interest allowed to attach to the persons, actions, and characters exhibited, and to the adventures which befall them, in exclusion to that attaching to the general features of which they are types and instances. In the First Part this takes place by the absorbing interest of the story of Faust and Gretchen, in the Second Part by the superabundant imagery, and motley train of persons and things, with which Faust is surrounded.

15. Religion agrees with poetry in having an art of expression, which is the cultus. But it differs
from poetry in this, that, while fact and fiction are entirely indifferent to poetry, only truth of fact and of reasoning is contained in religion. The object or framework of the idealised religious emotions is necessarily represented as eternally true and real. But since these emotions are deeply interesting to the religious character, he will be constantly reasoning about them either speculatively or practically, for all emotion stimulates thought; and since at the same time any framework which he forms from time to time, being dependent on the degree of his intellectual knowledge, must necessarily fall infinitely short of ideal truth, his speculations about that framework must be both erroneous and numerous. The nature of that great object or framework, which for us is a Person as already said, man's relations to him, and his dealings with man, will be variously conceived; and every conception which becomes current from time to time will be pervaded by the religious emotion, and will form part of religion. Whatever in these speculations is conceived as erroneous is discarded from the religious creed as superstition; and what is superstition to one man is religion to another. An extreme, though not necessarily a gross, form of superstition is when the possibility of some transient article of creed being superstition is denied, for this is an attempt to make the finite and the transient into the infinite and the eternal. Religion is founded in the nature of man, not in his knowledge, in the permanent emotion pervading transitory frameworks. There is however a limit to the variations of the frameworks, for, since religious emotion is always reflective, the framework must always be a Person. The worship of inanimate objects is
no exception, but on the contrary furnishes the most striking instances of the law; for the fetish is personified in imagination before it is worshipped, and, in the next stage, where the stars, or sun, or tree, or river, are found to be inanimate, and the person or god separated from them, it is the person and not the star which remains as the object of the religion. The religion of Comtian Positivism also is no exception to the general law; "Le Vrai Grand Etre" or "l'Humanité" is obviously personal in the required sense of the term; though the fact that it is an invention and not a discovery, a form devised purposely in which to clothe the religious emotion, is a strong argument against its truth. Nor do I see how innovations in religion, if they are true, can ever be anything else than discoveries of that which men have been previously worshipping and previously feeling without knowing it, that is, under forms which were its inadequate expression. Superstition simulates religion as sentimentalism simulates poetic imagination. The two cases resemble each other also in this, that they are both a weakness of the mind and not a strength; sentimentalism is a weakness of the intellectual activity, superstition of the emotional; sentimentalism rests in the enjoyment of given emotions, superstition in the intellectual support given to the religious emotions by accustomed frameworks; its emotion cannot stand alone, but needs the conceptions which have become habitual to it. The most intensely religious men have the least needed such habitual conceptions, have most freely declared their transitory and non-religious nature, as, for instance, Jesus of Nazareth and Paul. When a character is of the religious type has the emotional ele-
ment less developed than the intellectual, while the habit of the intellect is accumulative rather than constructive, the resulting character is that of the fanatic or the persecutor. Examples of great ability and acuteness in effective reasoning are frequent among religious men of this type.

16. The ill-balanced character of the religious type is often at variance with the dictates of justice; he errrs in practice by the injustice of making into a law for others observances which are dictated to him by his conscience, and which have no validity except for those by whose conscience they are dictated. Justice is an universally applicable standard of right and wrong, and transgression of it cannot be re-justified on the ground of a natural and original emotion, even though that emotion be alleged to be the moral sense or the religious emotion of the individual. A moral sense in contradiction to justice is an impossibility, being a contradiction, for the moral sense is love and justice combined. The question therefore which can alone be debated between men in doubtful cases is this,—what the dictates of justice truly are, and not what can be approved to any individual's moral sense; not what he thinks just before debate, but what both parties think just after debate. The reason of this is plain. Both according to our analysis in §§ 31-37, and according to every day experience, what a man does not think just he cannot think morally right or good in conscience; for justice is one of the two elements of the moral sense, and that which gives it its validity. But, since any one may be mistaken as to what is just, he may think a thing morally right which is in truth, though not suspected by him, unjust. He
must act on his own, perhaps truly unjust, moral sense; and there is no contradiction in him, though he acts unjustly. The only contradiction is between his moral sense, with its merely apparent justice, and the moral sense of some other man, with its true justice, or justice as it truly is though not supported by the moral sense of any individual. All examination of the moral right or moral wrong of a feeling or an action is therefore examination into the justice of it; and the moral sense is determined by this examination, the examination not prejudged by the moral sense. See in reference to this point what Hegel says in his Rechtsphilosophie § 137, especially the sentence: "Was im wahrhaften Gewissen nicht unterschieden ist, ist aber unterscheidbar, und es ist die bestimmende Subjektivität des Wissens und Wollens, welche sich von dem wahrhaften Inhalte trennen, sich für sich setzen und denselben zu einer Form und Schein herabsetzen kann. Die Zweideutigkeit in Ansehung des Gewissens liegt daher darin, dass es in der Bedeutung jener Identität des subjektiven Wissens und Wollens und des wahrhaften Guten vorausgesetzt, und so als ein Heiliges behauptet und anerkannt wird, und ebenso als die nur subjektive Reflexion des Selbstbewusstseyns in sich, doch auf die Berechtigung Anspruch macht, welche jener Identität selbst nur vermöge ihres an und für sich gültigen vernünftigen Inhalts zukommt." See also his remarks against mere "subjective conviction," Überzeugung, as a criterion of moral right and wrong, in the same work § 140. e. Now although every man ought to act upon his own conviction of what is morally right, and thus conflict is unavoidable between opposite views that is right, yet we have
the promise, in the common ground of justice, which flows from the formal element in consciousness, of ultimately approximating at least to an universal agreement; a promise which is also confirmed by the fact, that the emotions and passions of men have one and the same normal course of development, as was shown in the preceding §.

17. The religious emotion is the idealisation of two emotional constituents, love and the love of duty, or of the moral sense in its fullest acceptation. These two constituents are both visible in the religious emotion, and form two subordinate types of the character,—the character which delights chiefly in love, and that which delights chiefly in obedience. The one loves God as a friend, almost as if he were an equal; the other venerates him as a king or as a judge; the one reposes in his fatherly affection, the other in his justice and his power. Yet in both cases alike the conception is of an ideal object, enclosed in no special form of space, not visible, not tangible, nor addressing himself to any sense, but to the emotions alone, the feelings which arise only in representation, and enduring not for any particular portion but for the infinity of time. Such is the imagination which belongs to the religious emotions; religion like poetry is compounded equally of emotion and of intellect, and in their equal union there is no weakness, but rather energy and power.

18. Whichever of the two forms, love or awe, predominates in religion, one circumstance is common to both and peculiar to them, a circumstance which proves the correctness of the analysis of religion here offered. It is the intimate union and communion between man and God, an union which
exists between no other persons whatever. Towards any other person, however dear, a man is always, in the deepest feelings, "himself alone," an isolated being; he can neither be sure that he communicates his own feeling, nor that he understands theirs, even though, a rare case, there should on both sides be a continual and strong wish to do so. To whom could he or dare he tell all he feels and at all times? But this intimate union or rather oneness can and often does exist between a man and God. This shows that God is his better self, his True Ego, idealised. Hence the omniscience of God, "unto whom all hearts are open, all desires known;" hence the fact that his "service is perfect freedom;" hence those phenomena which are summed up under the Christian phrase, the working of the Holy Spirit; hence the eternal readiness of God to forgive, but only on repentance; hence the terrors of the wrath of God, from which there is no escape; hence a man does not give up his individuality, nor become a slave, by the most unreserved submission to the will of God, but in relying on God is most effectually self-reliant.

19. It should be mentioned that this fact of isolation, which is here analysed into self-consciousness withheld from communicating its thoughts or feelings to others, and from comprehending theirs, is regarded as a necessary manifestation of a free and individual entity, the Ego, by those who hypostatise the self-consciousness or the will; for instance Hegel, Rechtspolitik, §§ 91, 92, 106, Zusatz. But such an Ego offers no explanation of the fact, however well it may seem to harmonise with it. The moral judgments of conscience are one form which this
isolation assumes, which Hegel mentions, in § 106. But what shows the correctness of the analysis here offered is, that the sense of isolation is not a fixed quantity or intensity, but increases with the intensity and the rarity of the feelings in which it arises; for instance, when we think of our own death, as in Pascal’s “Je mourrai seul.” Poets and philosophers who dwell most upon uncommon and intense emotions are spoken of as treading unapproachable mountain heights of poetry or philosophy;

“The solemn peaks but to the stars we known,
But to the stars, and the cold lunar beams:
Alone the sun arises, and alone
Spring the great streams.”

It is the every-day love between man and woman that is described as one that cares not to walk

“With death and morning on the silver horns.”

And, in the judgments of conscience, we fall back most readily upon the idea of responsibility to God alone, when we act from feelings which are most difficult of explanation, or in which we expect least sympathy from others.

20. As hardly any one is without some poetic imagination, so also hardly any one is without some religion. The same may be said also of the third domain in which mental activity is entirely an end in itself, that is, of philosophy properly so called. No one is entirely without the love of knowledge about those matters which he regards as the most important, and which have therefore the greatest interest for him. But, since the love of advancing in knowledge is very much what in most men the pleasure of resting in conception as already
known and therefore true, the philosophy of most men consists in their religious creed, whatever it may be; and this creed serves them for a philosophy. Hence the antipathy of such men to philosophy itself in its genuine shape; and hence too the frequent misconception of the scope of philosophy, the notion that its chief business is to investigate the proofs of the existence and attributes of God, and other problems of what used to be called "natural religion."

§ 721. It is now necessary to turn back and contemplate these two imaginative types in connection with the normal course of development of character. The point where reflective imagination begins is a point where the current of development of character ceases to flow in one undivided channel, and branches into two streams; or where, to use another metaphor, the trunk of the tree of life divides into two great upward-going boughs, religion being one, poetry the other. Now there is little fear but that religion will be able, both de facto and de jure, to bring into subordination all other emotions and tendencies of human nature taken alone; but its ability to do so with poetry, and with emotions which may be taken into durable alliance or incorporated with poetry, is not so evident. Poetry has all emotions for its field, and renders all ideal. But there is one emotion or rather passion, which is certainly not incompatible with the moral law, which is of immense extent and power, and which is always found incorporated with poetry, the passion of eros. Poetry, being the completion of the aesthetic emotions, has all the justification which can be derived from perfection of form in the framework of its imaginative emotions. It is the complete in itself that is an other justification.
Indeed the conception of justice, properly speaking, is alien to it. From lacking justice however between man and man, it has not the claim to govern life generally, to subordinate other emotions to those incorporated with itself from time to time, or to subordinate other types of character to the poetic type. But it may seem to be incapable of subordination itself to the religious type, to be in one word its independent rival. And, being allowed this independent position de jure, it may become from its great interest, and from its extent of domain over all the emotions, supreme de facto, although not de jure, over the religious type, and keep this from exerting even its natural influence. The prevalence of the poetically imaginative type of character, and of the laws which it would establish in society, might conceivably involve the elimination of the moral law of right and wrong, and the denial by some, the forgetting by others, that there was any such distinction. The emotion which was incorporated into poetry, or which it was the main purpose of poetry to glorify and promote, would then exclude and obliterate by its increased intensity the emotions of the moral sense.

22. The emotion which is most capable of entering into such an alliance with poetry, that is, of being carried up into such a powerful degree of aesthetic and emotional imagination, is no doubt that of eros. Other emotions and passions would come in along with it, but this would be the predominant emotion, coordinating and subordinating the rest. The contest between the rival forms of imagination, which has never abated in modern Europe, seems likely to be vigorously renewed at present day, on oc-
occasion of the anarchy caused by the dissolution of old systems of legal morality. Were these systems, the only antagonist in the field, the contest might be considered as already decided. But these systems have been reared upon a foundation, which they have indeed forgotten or mistaken, but which is nevertheless theirs, the foundation of the moral law, as it has been here attempted to analyse it. The moral law of conscience and of freedom will be an adversary of far greater weight than those laws or customs of authority, with which alone the champions of poetic emotion have seemed to others, or have supposed themselves, to have to do. Indeed it is not to be thought that any of these champions have supposed themselves adversaries of the moral law, but rather its vindicators and upholders, in upholding liberty against the restrictions of authority, custom, and law. Their antagonism to it consists not in an explicit denial of its content, but in the implicit denial contained in the assertion of liberty without theoretical limitation.

23. This contest between the rival claims of religion founded on the moral law and of poetic emotion seems to me to be the point upon which, in whatever forms it may be clothed, or whatever language may be held about it, the greater part of ethical questions, the greater part of practical controversy, will henceforward turn. We know that we are to be free; the critical question is, what shall be the law of our freedom. Is it to be a freedom of indulgence in some poetic emotion, or a freedom of self-command, imposing limits on poetic as well as on other emotion; is poetic imagination with the passions which it incorporates to become, that is, a right and justified, which
it can only be by theoretical subsumption under, and practical submission to, the moral law of conscience, or, by refusing this subsumption and submission, to replace the moral law by its own non-moral emotion? This is the practical question to be solved practically by the most advanced nations, be they which they may, at the present time, the de facto supremacy of the moral law and religion founded on it, as against its rival the idealisation of the emotions generally, or indifferently, by poetic imagination; a question which in another shape is this, whether any de jure supremacy shall exist de facto at all. This is a question important in a very different way from that in which the question of Utilitarianism, or any theory of the general scope of ethic, is important. Supposing any such theory, as the utilitarian for instance, to be adopted, there yet remains the more immediately practical question to be answered, what mediate ends, what mediate commands, fill up its outline, and in what several degrees of precedence among themselves. On the utilitarian theory this question is to be determined by weighing against each other different kinds of happiness or pleasure; on the theory of a moral law, by the relations of different kinds of emotion to the law of conscience. But the contest between poetry and religion is one instance of such a balance between mediate ends or commands; an immediately practical question, demanding an answer from some theory or other, and manifesting the emptiness of whatever theory has no answer to give, drawn from its own principles.

24. The real forces, then, which are at work now, and will be more manifest from day to day, in the evolution of society, are; 1st, the idea of
religion founded on the moral law, of liberty which is the source of law; 2nd, the idea of imaginative pleasure unfettered by any law; 3rd, the idea of positive law, custom, and authority, as the source of morality. The two first are ideas of liberty, and alike opposed to the third; standing alike on the same ground, the conception of moral liberty being supreme. But upon this ground, and within these limits, they are opposed to each other, as tending the one to substitute licence for liberty, the other to maintain self-control against licence. This is the logic to which the analysis of feelings here given leads us, the mode in which it arranges for examination the phenomena of the conflict and evolution of characters in modern society. The position of civilisation at the present day is analogous to its position in Europe at the period of the Renaissance. A Reformation saved the church system not only in the north but also in the south of Europe from decay, in presence of the growing Humanism, as it has been called, of the time. The struggle between Humanism and Authority was prolonged by its decision being delayed. We are now living at a later stage of the same struggle, but with this difference from the Renaissance period, namely, with the conception, gradually acquired in the meantime, of fixed and universal laws of nature, to which all phenomena are subject, not only in the physical but also in the moral world.

25. These new forces are however, it must still be held, not such as to change the general direction, but only partially to modify the course, of the normal development of character, and consequently of society. The sorts of laws, which assure the ulti-
mate supremacy of the moral law over other emotions, will probably assure it also over those imaginative ones which do not spring from the same source. The justice of poetry is simply consistency; the emotion adopted by imagination is the standard and limit of the justice; the enquiry whether this emotion is itself just towards other emotions, or towards other men, and the consequent testing of justice and arriving at truth in it, has no place in this mode of mental activity. If it had, this mode of mental activity would itself be or contain the moral law, would no longer be distinguished from that to which it is now opposed. The moral law, therefore, and the religion founded on it, while recognising the claims of the emotions which are bound up with poetic imagination to exert themselves, and the independence of poetic imagination itself, its autotely or right to have its End imposed solely by itself, yet imposes limits upon that exertion in two directions, and on two grounds, first, in its relations to other persons besides the person of the Subject imagining, second, in its relations to the moral law itself, which it is bound to preserve from the danger of being de facto weakened or stifled.

26. If the supremacy of the moral law could not maintain itself in the individual character, it certainly could not maintain itself in society; nor yet could it do so, were it only an exceptional case here and there, and not the great mass of mankind, in whose character the moral law were supreme. What then is meant by saying that the moral law is and ought to be supreme, in the individual character, over the tendencies which flow from poetic imagination? Let us suppose that eros in passion which is allied
with poetry. Now supremacy means not destruction or forbidding, but simply subordination, limitation, supplying a negative condition. It is not required that the two passions, eros and religion, shall be capable of existing in great strength, at the same moment, in the same mind, in order to prove that they are capable of combination, that religion does not refuse to combine with eros, but can subordinate without destroying it. If it were necessary to combine the two passions, while each was in full vigour, into a single complex state of consciousness in order to make them out compatible, they must be regarded as irreconcilable. But it is not the particular nature of the passions in question, it is the general incapacity of the mind, or of its nervous organism, to feel any two different passions strongly at the same time, which is the cause of this kind of incompatibility. This, therefore, is not the decisive circumstance; but on the contrary the decisive trial is when the passion of eros is remembered in moments of feeling the moral sense, or in moments of religion. The passion of eros thus remembered must be capable of approval by the moral sense, that is, must be capable of subsisting in consciousness without the emotion of remorse, or with that of good conscience; and so much of its accompaniments must be abandoned as cannot consist with this reflection.

27. The laws regulating external action and conduct, whether imposed by the individual upon himself, or by the concurrence of individuals upon society, must be the expression of the moral sense of the individual, or of the individuals in common, so acting as above described, and taking all circumstances, all impulses, and tendencies, into account.
FORMATION OF CHARACTER.

But since the mass of individuals never stand upon the same moral level as the greatest and best among them, the laws imposed by society never can be such as the best and greatest individual would impose upon himself, or upon society were it composed of his equals in moral matters. For them some greater legal restraint is needed, and they usually impose it more perseveringly than the moral reformer does, than those moral reformers at least who do not represent the principle of authority and custom. Their tendency is to allow insufficient liberty of action to those who draw their principles more directly from an inward source, whether it be from poetically or from religiously imaginative emotion. Here opens a field into which it is beyond the scope of the present work to enter. One thing only must be laid down as the result of the analysis hitherto conducted, namely, that only those restraints of law are morally justified which are recognised, dimly perhaps but yet undoubtedly, as good and right by the conscience of him on whom they are imposed; which are restraints therefore which he will make effort from within to obey and impose on his own will, and which are therefore regarded by him as aids to his own truer life. The law must be such that the persons on whom it is imposed shall never be able, in foro conscientiae, to lay the blame of suffering its penalties on the injustice of the law, but must lay it on their own weakness and self-indulgence.

§ 74. 1. Difference of sex has been named in § 60 among the influences external to character; but this relates only to the actions, circumstances, and feelings, determined by the rest of the bodily organism, not by the organisation of the cerebral hemispheres.
It accords with analogy to suppose that the difference of sex does not stop short here, but extends to the cerebral organisation and functions; in which case there will be differences of character natural and original to the two sexes. The foregoing analysis gives some additional support to this view, by means of the different tendencies it points out in character, to which the differences commonly observed in life between the modes of thought and feeling of men and of women may be referred. The phenomena, as commonly observed, would be explained if we suppose that in man the formal, in woman the material, element is most prominent; in man the representative framework, in woman the pervading emotion; this would be the general law or general fact, of which the remainder would be cases. The first minor fact depending upon this law is not less general in its range; it is that men are most ready at perceptions of justice, as compared to the other emotions with which justice or injustice is combined, while women are most readily struck with those other emotions in preference to justice. The charm of justice as such, or in the abstract, is rarely perceived by women. The same holds with respect to another contrast between the emotional and the intellectual, in the case of truth. Coleridge says (Table-Talk, Aug. 6, 1831) that he had known many women love the good for the good’s sake, but rarely or never the true for the truth’s sake, meaning thereby not veracity but truth in the strict sense of the term. The good is a general term for all ultimately pleasureable emotion.

2. We may trace the same fundamental difference in other groups of emotion. In love and eros women are both more sensitive and less regardful of
consequences than men. Hence arises, as will presently appear, the great charm of feminine modesty and reserve. Woman's pity, tenderness, sympathy, are proverbial. Again with regard to the antipathetic emotions, it is sometimes held that women are more unreasonable than men. Perhaps it would be true to say, that neither in love nor in hatred can they so easily make allowances for shortcomings of their friend or their enemy as men can, at least not such allowances as would be made from a comprehension of his character and position. But on the other hand they can pardon more readily without making such allowances, for this depends on a change in the emotion itself, not upon a judgment passed on its framework.

3. When we turn to the emotions which belong to the two groups of comparison and to that of reflection on self, we find them dominated by circumstances which belong chiefly if not entirely to the difference of general bodily organisation between the two sexes; which makes it difficult to determine whether anything is due to differences of character alone. Since men are by their general organisation more fitted for careers of public life and activity, upon success in which the domestic life depends, women naturally take a subordinate position; and the ways and thoughts and feelings of men in a certain manner limit their horizon. Men form a much larger part of the entire world of women than women of the world of men. Both sexes are gainers in consequence of this relation. For man is secured a home where he no longer has to combat with rivals, but can refresh himself at labour; for woman a field where her affective can be exercised.
without opposition. But this relation between the sexes immensely modifies the development of the emotions now in question, since the greater part of their objects are found in public and not in domestic life. The ambition of men and women is thus directed to widely different objects, without our being able to refer it to a cause originating in the character. Men form as it were the public of women, and women rival each other, not so much for excelling each other simply, as for excelling in those circumstances which are of importance in the eyes of men. The fundamental and distinctive characteristic of women is accordingly the desire of pleasing, which becomes a second nature, but the root of which nevertheless it is not possible to find distinctly in the character itself.

4. But, it may be objected, if the two features just mentioned, greater affectiveness and greater desire of pleasing, distinguish women in comparison with men, ought not women to be more demonstrative of these characteristics towards men, than men are towards women, whereas society shows the very reverse to be the case? For the custom of society is that, both in love and in attracting admiration of the opposite sex, it is men and not women who make the advances, and compete as it were for favour. The explanation which removes this objection will serve to show the correctness of the analysis already given. The general position of men in regard to women, stated at the beginning of the preceding paragraph, forbids women to put themselves forward or to make advances. For it may be laid down as a general rule that, in all matters of taste, of offering and accepting, the stronger part is he who has most to offer is the
one by whom the offer is made, because he feels that he has more to fall back upon if his offer is rejected, and his recognised independence saves him from the imputation of presumption. It is undignified and a want of modesty for the less independent person to put himself forward. This is seen between persons of the same sex in striking up acquaintances; it is always the person of higher standing who moves the first. Again, to take an instance from buying and selling, the buyer proposes to buy, and not the seller to sell. Sellers who hawk their wares or unduly advertise them render their wares suspected by that very act. A tradesman's dignity consists in awaiting the demand of the purchaser. The same sense of dignity and modesty renders it incumbent on women to await the advances of men, and put them to prove their merits; because men are richest in the careers of life open to them. But between married people, who are no longer strangers to each other, the laws which regulate the intercourse of strangers are abrogated, and the natural course of feelings has its full sway. Here takes place that change in the relations between man and woman, described by the indignant "Princess" in the verse,

"And play the slave to gain the tyranny."

The change is most real and important; but it is very far from being a change from slave to tyrant, or from tyrant to slave; rather it is a change which secures the freedom of both, a change from restraint to liberty.

5. Since the motives which render women retiring and undemonstrative towards men are of general force and applicability, at the same time the cir-
circumstances which bring them into action are due to general bodily organisation and not to the character alone, we may infer that, if those circumstances should be counteracted or cease to operate, and women should consequently enter as freely and as frequently as men into the various careers of public and active life, then, whatever might be the gain in other directions, the characteristics of reserve and modesty, so far as they are not due to the character alone, would tend to give place to a forwardness equal to and perhaps greater than that of men, which in itself would be a considerable loss, in depriving social life of one of its charms. And conversely, should events lead to such a general opening of public careers to women, and at the same time the qualities of specially feminine reserve and modesty not be lost, then we might infer that these qualities were the result of motives founded directly in the character itself.

6. Lastly, with regard to the poetical and religious emotions. Women often have the moral sense more intensely than men, but it is the element of love or some specific emotion, not that of justice, which then predominates. With them too the love of duty is more frequently carried up into religion; and in religion again it is the emotion of love or of veneration, not the comprehension of the framework of these emotions, that is prominent. They feel very strongly the pleasure of obedience and implicit submission to what they have once accepted as supremely good and right. These characteristics qualify women, on all points of conduct about the moral right and wrong of which there is no dispute, to be the supporters and inspirers from whom it is may derive fresh ardour
and devotion; and these points are innumerable in daily life. In poetry the union of intellect and emotion in that equal proportion which constitutes poetical imagination has rarely been displayed by women; though fancy and the expression of emotion are frequent. It is the broad grasp of teleological and constructive reasoning which seems deficient, not acuteness or quickness of intellectual perception generally. In some modes of speculative and especially in the effective branch of practical reasoning they often excel, where the ends are known, and the question is to devise the means. The lack of interest in scientific truth for its own sake, apart from the interest of the things to be known, or the persons about whom they are known, seems to explain at once the intellectual ability and the intellectual weakness of women when compared to men.

7. It is a different question altogether, and one which has not hitherto been touched here, how far the differences observed between men and women, even those which are supposed to originate in character, are the fruit of a long course of education, of habits, institutions, and modes of life, with their hereditarily transmitted results, and how far consequently they may be altered or obliterated by a permanent change in the direction of that course of education. To reach a tabula rasa, indeed, in the character of any individual, we should have to go back in its history far beyond its birth, to the point where brain begins to be distinguished from nerve in the life of the race to which the individual belongs. In other words, there is no tabula rasa met with in the individual at all. But this leaves untouched the question of the modifiability of the character at any
stage of its career. Because certain traits are referred by analysis to character, they are not therefore to be supposed immutable. The character, as well as the influences operative on it, is in a state of perpetual modification. But, when any trait has once been included in the character of the race, its chances of permanence may be considered as immensely great, compared to traits which are not so included. If there is a fundamental difference in the character of the two sexes, it would probably require, in order to obliterate it, a greater change in the direction of the course of education, of habits, institutions, and modes of life, than could be effected by human volition; for the tendencies of character would themselves operate against such a change. What we could do would be to set these tendencies of character free to act and react for themselves, unprotected, but also untramelled, by many customs and institutions which now exist.

§ 75. 1. The analysis of character which has been now attempted, imperfect as it is and erroneous as it will no doubt prove to be in too many points, nevertheless shows one thing clearly, namely, that order and system prevail in the endowments and functions of consciousness which depend on the cerebrum, as they prevail in the rest of the living and sentient organism. And it is upon an analysis, either this or such as this, that any complete and true system of rules of action, laws to guide volition in all its branches, must be based, if they are to be valid and trustworthy. But it does not follow that any such rules or laws can be deduced from the analysis alone; it follows only that the analysis supplies one of their tests. It is negative or contributive
value, showing what is not valid, and not declaring what is valid, among such laws of conduct. Yet there may be a system of rules for applying such tests, deduced from the analysis itself; there may be a Logic of Practice. And such a logic if correctly framed would be of no inconsiderable value, in guiding our judgment both of those laws and customs which already exist and of the changes which it may be proposed to introduce in them.

2. At every point of history man finds himself in presence of and surrounded by a thick growth of habits and laws, feelings and thoughts, which previous generations have bequeathed to him, and which have their roots in his own nature and modes of acting. The question is constantly recurring, What it is best to do in respect of them. Now strict and accurate observation of the course of history, of the effects of such and such habits, thoughts, and so on, supplies him with more or less general and systematic, more or less wise, rules with regard to his dealings with himself and his fellows, by dealing with these habits and thoughts. But there can be no science of these dealings (to use one word to include all its possible cases) in the strict sense of the term science, no "science of history" for example, until the nature and functions of man, in which these habits and thoughts have their root, have been analysed, and in this way the origin and nature of history, so to speak, laid bare. The science of history, that of law, and that of ethic, remain imperfect until their several systems of phenomena, known to us by observation or by experiment, are connected with their physiological basis, and with the system of states of consciousness dependent on physical structure and function.
There are three things to be done; history to be studied, character to be analysed, and the two connected together by referring history to character in the first place, and character to history, by its reaction on it, in the second. There would then arise a complete and deductive science, since we should know the agent thoroughly, together with the modes of his reaction upon a large proportion of the influences which can be operative on him; and without knowing all these influences we may have a deductive science, but not so without knowing thoroughly the nature of the agent.

3. We have now before us an attempt at the analysis of the nature of the agent, man. History in all its branches, such as law, politic, ethic, art, government, education of the young, religion, has been by others often systematically, though of course not yet exhaustively, studied. But the two have not yet been connected together. Until this shall be done, not only there is no deductive science of the history of man, but there is no deductive science of command or of practice; that is, there is no science from which can be deduced practical rules deciding what changes ought to be made in existing habits and thoughts, in particular subjects and particular cases. Yet this, it seems to many, is what Ethic specially proposes to herself to do; an expectation surely which springs from not having considered the position of ethic in all its bearings. It is now clear that an immense work has still to be performed before ethic can deduce authoritatively any practical laws of conduct whatever, namely, the work of connecting history with character. For the present, and perhaps for a long time, come, the empirical wis-
dom founded on experience, that is, on history alone. with only empirical observation of differences of character, is all that can be legitimately attempted. And thus it is upon the practical wisdom of practical men, in the popular sense of the term practical, and not upon the results of speculative analysis, that we must still place our reliance. The remainder of this work, therefore, will contain no attempt to lay down any particular rules of either social or political practice. The following Book will be merely a Logic of Practice as an Organon for testing actions, together with such illustrations of its application to history as I may be enabled to furnish.

4. Yet even such a logic, furnishing as it must at least do, the method and the framework for studying practical questions and solving practical problems, will not be without its use in their study and solution. They will assume a new shape in being brought distinctly before the mind and in having the logic applied to them, a shape which it may be hoped will render them more tractable. For in the first place it may be expected, that we shall be able to deduce from the foregoing analysis a solution of the great overshadowing question of principle debated between the Utilitarian and the Moral Law schools of ethic, the question whether the perception of duty as distinct from pleasure or happiness is or ought to be a motive in determining practical judgments. And the settlement of this preliminary and general question will almost by itself constitute the Logic of Practice, since there is no other question which is not a case falling under it; the difficulty in these subordinate cases consisting in the doubt under which head to group them, how properly the logic to them.
And as this cardinal question itself turns upon a conflict of emotions, so also it will be found do the majority of cases subordinate to it, all of which seem to have a certain justice in their favour. For instance, we may be at a loss to decide the claims of eros and the religious emotions, not only in a particular concrete case, such as might be the subject of a drama, but generally to decide which of the two ought to yield when both are present in great intensity, or whether there is any mode in which the claims of both can be satisfied, by subordinating one to the other without making the one subordinated less pleasureable. For all conflicting emotions which have justice in them are, to that extent, also conflicting duties; and it must seem that, if religion is incompatible with the satisfaction of any such emotion and such duty, religion cannot be the supremely valid emotion which it sometimes claims to be. The question then is, can religion so incorporate eros with itself as to produce a character, the energy or the life of which has greater and nobler pleasures than either of its elements taken separately or in conflict. Or take the case of questions which spring from a conflict of the law of veracity with the emotion and law of love, as when veracity will expose a friend to ruin or death; or again from conflicts of personal honour with love, as when, having been sworn to secrecy you are induced, by considering the consequences of secrecy to others, to break your promise; or again, how far profession of goodness is a means of becoming really good, how far dressing for a character tends to produce that character, how far, in general terms, habit of external action tends to produce the tone of mind from which such actions will flow na-
turally. Connected with this last case is the problem of the relation of Law to Morality, how far external restraint and command, whether of punishment, law, or public opinion, is useful and advisable to make men better in heart, according to the proverb "l'appétit vient en mangeant;" how far we are ever justified in working from without inwards instead of from within outwards. Or again, how far law may be ultimately dispensed with, and whether the tendency is to make laws more minutely circumstantial and strict, or to remove the restraint of law altogether; in short, in what true liberty consists, and by what means it is best furthered. Then there is another problem of great intricacy which receives much attention at the present moment, the claims of women to equal tasks, equal advantages, sameness of career with men. (See Mr. J. S. Mill's noble plea for freedom in his "Subjection of Women.") The problem is not solved by showing that the original character of the two sexes is different, for there are many instances of feminine men and also of masculine women, and what law is to be laid down for these cases? How distinguish them in the first place, how deal with them in the second? Nor would it be solved if we could show historically, as Mr. MacLennan's work on Primitive Marriage tends to show, that women once held the most important position in the human society as head and bond of the family, as the only known common ancestor. These are only preliminaries to the great practical question, What it is desirable to aim at for the future, or more precisely, What is the law of true liberty?

5. Such at least are some of the questions which it will be well to keep in mind while attempting the
development of a Logic of Practice, such as I propose to attempt in the following Book. I do not profess and shall not attempt to solve them, since they require the study of history to be combined with that of ethic proper. The logic however must consist in solving the main question between pleasure and duty, and in exhibiting a scheme in which the relations between them are definitively settled. Without such a question being finally answered there can be no Logic of Practice worthy of the name.

END OF BOOK I.