LECTURE I

THE SCOPE OF PHILOSOPHY

§ 1. It is my object, in the present lecture, to define as clearly as possible the meaning of the term ‘Philosophy.’ To do this thoroughly will take more than one lecture; and perhaps it may be thought that I am spending too much time in talking ‘about words.’ But a discussion about words is often the most convenient way of bringing before our minds important relations of thought and fact: and it is likely to be specially instructive in dealing with a subject so full of controversy as the present. For controversy usually implies mutual misunderstanding among thinkers: and if we can agree on the meaning of cardinal terms, we shall have done much to avoid misunderstanding. If a thoroughly distinctive and comprehensive definition of the province of Philosophy could be worked out and universally accepted, its acceptance would mean that we were at least agreed on the questions that the philosopher has to ask, if not on the answers that ought to be given to them: and to ask the right questions is, as Aristotle saw, an important step towards obtaining the right answers.
Now in trying to make clear the meaning of a word, the first thing is to distinguish it from, and ascertain its relation to, words that represent cognate ideas; especially when the common usage of two words seems to indicate that their meanings are liable to be confounded. In this case the most obvious word to select for comparison is ‘Science’: since on the one hand we commonly recognise that the meanings of the two words are not the same, and yet they seem often to be used in an oddly alternative way. Compare, for example, ‘Moral Philosophy’ and ‘Ethical Science,’ ‘Political Philosophy’ and ‘Political Science,’ ‘Mental Philosophy’ and ‘Mental Science’;—in each case the two terms compared seem to be often applied indifferently to the same course of study. These instances may suggest that Philosophy is a general term for a special group of sciences;—what we call ‘Moral’ sciences. But, firstly, its use is not confined to these. The term ‘Natural Philosophy’ is still employed—though perhaps with some doubt as to its propriety—as more or less convertible with ‘Physics.’ Indeed I am told that a distinguished Professor of Physics in a northern university once commenced his lectures by laying down that ‘there are two kinds of Philosophy, Natural Philosophy and Unnatural Philosophy’; thus implying not only that Physics has a valid claim to the name of Philosophy, but that there is no other body of sound reasoning to which the term is applicable.

And, secondly, we have to observe that the usage of the term ‘Philosophy’ seems to imply that it is
not exactly—like Science—a common name for many different studies with different methods; that, though it may have different parts or branches, these must be connected by a unity of method. Thus, in speaking of 'Schools of Philosophy,' we imply that the characteristics peculiar to each school will be found in all parts of their philosophical teaching: e.g. thinkers of the 'empirical school' are supposed to form their conclusions on the basis of experience of particular facts—instead of laying as a foundation general truths—equally when they are arguing about geometrical axioms or the infinity of space and time, and when they are arguing about questions of right and wrong in conduct.

I have said enough to show that if we can obtain a satisfactory definition of Philosophy which will enable us to distinguish it clearly from Science, while at the same time explaining its close affinity to Science, we shall probably avoid some confusion of thought. To this task I now proceed; but it may be well first to explain exactly what I aim at—and hope to attain—in a process of definition.

I wish to give to the term 'Philosophy' a meaning which will be (1) clear, (2) useful—i.e. which will denote something that wants a separate name—and (3) as far as possible in conformity with common usage. Note that the last aim cannot be attained completely, so far as common usage is confused and varying: e.g. so far as Philosophy is confounded with Science. Still I think that here and in other cases we may find distinctions, vaguely and imperfectly
recognised in ordinary discourse, which when made clear and explicit will furnish the required definition. So far as usage is vague and varying, it would be futile to aim at complete uniformity with it: but in my view there is a distinction between 'Philosophy' and the subjects otherwise named which I seek to distinguish from it precisely—Science, Psychology, Epistemology, Logic, etc.—which is more or less recognised in the ordinary thought\(^1\) of educated persons and may be made clear by careful reflection.

§ 2. I will first endeavour to distinguish Philosophy from Science.\(^2\) Science is certainly a kind of

\(^1\) I say in ordinary thought; I should add 'of the present age.' The word has come down to us from the Greeks, and it is a historical inquiry of some interest to trace the changes of meaning through which the word has passed during more than two thousand years. But it would be confusing, and would render our task more difficult, to mix this historical inquiry with the search for a definition appropriate to our present thought.

\(^2\) And here I must notice a special source of divergence—and sometimes of confusion—in definitions in our subject, which arises from the influence of the German language, through translations, on English thought. Thus in Külpe's definition of Philosophy [Cf. O. Külpe: *Introduction to Philosophy* (Eng. trans.), 1897, ch. 1. This was one of the text-books recommended to his class by Professor Sidgwick.] 'Science' is used in a somewhat different meaning from that which I decide to give to the word. This is partly because the term which the translator renders Science is 'Wissenschaft'; and 'Wissenschaft' has in common German usage, at least to the best of my knowledge and judgment, a somewhat wider meaning than that which 'Science' has in English usage. For instance, I do not consider History a Science, so far as it is merely concerned with presenting particular events in chronological order: and I think this is clearly in accordance with English usage: but I believe that in German, History even in this limited view of it would be regarded as a Wissenschaft. Hence I am not surprised that Kulpe decides without hesitation that Philosophy is a 'Wissenschaft'; but I do not hold that to be a sufficient reason for regarding it as a 'Science' according to English usage.

When we speak of 'the Sciences,' we mean what is sometimes more definitely expressed as 'the special sciences'—a group of organised bodies of
knowledge: no one doubts that the geometer, physicist, botanist, has attained important knowledge that other men lack who have not studied geometry, physics, botany. Can we say the same of Philosophy?

Not, at any rate, so confidently: some would here object—pressing the derivation of the word—that Philosophy is rather a study, an inquiry, a pursuit, than a kind of knowledge. The philosopher, they would say, 'loves wisdom,' but it does not follow that he possesses, or ever will possess, what he loves. It may be that he is in pursuit of an object which continually recedes as he pursues:—an ideal whose face is

evermore unseen
And fixt upon the far sea-line.

And this view is, at any rate, not palpably unreasonable; since I shall have to admit that there is not on the chief questions of Philosophy, as I shall presently define it, any such *consensus of experts* as we find on questions of geometry, physics, botany.

general knowledge, each concerned with some part or aspect of the knowable world. This renders it in accordance with usage to follow Spencer in appropriating the term Philosophy to a study which, though in a manner *comprehensive* of all particular sciences, is not identical with any of them or even with the aggregate of them. Accordingly I shall regard Philosophy as 'in propriety' or 'by pre-eminence' aiming at such knowledge as is attainable by man of the *whose* of the apparently changing universe of things, as contrasted with the sciences which aim at general knowledge of particular kinds or elements or qualities of things and events, more or less separated off from other kinds or elements. But I allow also a wider and a looser use of 'Philosophy' and 'philosophical' as applied relatively to studies that are concerned with notions, principles, and methods that have a higher degree of generality than those of most special sciences, and thus find their application in several special sciences which in this way are connected into one system of knowledge.
The differences of philosophical schools are so great and fundamental that it would seem to be only by a polite fiction that a philosopher of one school allows a philosopher of another school to possess philosophical knowledge on the subjects that he treats: and the politeness that consents to this fiction is not universal—as it would be easy to show by quotations from very recent treatises. Candour compels me to own that philosophical knowledge, admitted to be such, is not to be obtained by following these lectures, as mathematical knowledge, e.g., might be obtained by following the lectures of my mathematical colleagues.

We may note, however, that this objection does not apply to Natural Philosophy. If the Natural Philosopher is still pursuing, we all agree that he is not hunting with an empty bag. To this consideration I shall return, as it will help us to the definition that we are seeking. Meanwhile with regard to Philosophy, in the wider sense in which the term is commonly used without qualification, we may say that, even taking it merely as a pursuit, it is certainly a pursuit of knowledge: and we may call this knowledge 'philosophical,' without deciding how far it has yet been attained, and we may try to define what it would be if we had it, what questions it would answer.

From this point of view, then, let us return to examine further the relation of philosophical knowledge to the knowledge that we call scientific. It will be convenient to begin by getting a definition of Science. In the first place scientific knowledge is
clearly systematic knowledge, or knowledge arranged and grasped in a certain order; a number of cognitions of particular facts, however accurately observed, do not constitute science so long as they remain loose and unconnected. Still knowledge may be systematised otherwise than in Science: thus History systematises our knowledge of past events by arranging them in order of time, and Geography systematises our knowledge of states, cities, rivers, mountains, etc. by giving a connected view of their positions on the surface of the globe. But neither of these arrangements is as such scientific, though scientific method may be required to work it out with accuracy and completeness. Shall we say then that Science systematises by ascertaining the causal relations of facts; that scientific knowledge is "knowledge of effects as dependent on their causes." This is largely true; still it seems too narrow a conception for the ordinary denotation of the term. 'Science,' as ordinarily used, is applied to the abstract studies of relations of quantity which we class together as pure mathematics, where causation is altogether ignored: it is applied also to such studies as Botany and Zoology, where the investigation of causes, though it certainly forms a part of these studies, is not the sole ground of their claim to be called 'sciences.' It is, partly at least, as systematising the matter studied, by arranging objects according to relations of resemblance, that Botany and Zoology have been regarded as scientific. They have been called Sciences of Classification, and

1 Hamilton, *Metaphysics*, vol. i. p. 58.
it was primarily as classificatory that they assumed the character of sciences: though all would agree that they reach a higher stage of development, so far as they become Sciences of Causation also.

To get a definition of Science applicable to all the instances named we must, I think, take the characteristic of 'generality' as the essential distinction between scientific knowledge and merely 'historical' knowledge of particular facts. The mathematical sciences deal with objects essentially general; the study of causes is a study of general laws or uniformities,—for a cause is a kind of thing which tends generally, and not merely in one particular case, to be followed by the kind of thing which we call its effect. The classificatory sciences are concerned, as their name imports, with classes—'genera' and 'species'—or general types. It is true that we largely regard knowledge of particular facts—e.g. of a new planet—as scientific knowledge; but only, I think, in view of its relation to general knowledge. Thus an uninstructed person might conceivably discover a new planet by accidentally looking through a telescope at the right time; but this observation would be unscientific, though of great value to science.

Now if we give this extended meaning to 'Science,' we see at once that some of the studies so called have no claim to be philosophical: we should not think of calling a Geometer or a Botanist—as such—a philosopher. But the case is different, as we saw, with Physics; and an examination of the difference seems
likely to help us in our search for a definition of Philosophy which shall be as far as possible consistent with the common usage of the term.

Why does the Physicist claim to be a Philosopher? I think, because the great interest of his study is bound up with the belief that all the phenomena he investigates—however externally diverse their character—will be found explicable by the same system of dynamical principles, the same fundamental laws of matter and motion: a belief which has a solid foundation in the great—though as yet very imperfect—success that has even now been realised in working out this explanation in different departments. For example, considering the great reach of the Law of Gravitation, it seems to me in this wider sense to some extent legitimate that the Newtonian discovery should be called 'philosophical'; and again, that 'Theoretical Mechanics' be called 'Natural Philosophy.' To call it simply 'Philosophy' is, however, misleading, as that drops out of sight the essential aim of philosophy at explaining the whole of things; except so far as Theoretical Mechanics does claim to explain mind and its phenomena as well as matter, and refusing to recognise any other kind of existence than matter thus becomes Materialistic Philosophy according to the stricter definition of the term.¹

¹ Of the untenability of Materialism I shall speak hereafter. My object now is only to point out that any thinker who holds that matter is the only reality, is according to my view consistent, and from his own point of view right in regarding the study of the most general laws of matter in motion, which used to be commonly called 'Natural Philosophy,' as being strictly Philosophy.
But if we investigate empirically the phenomena of Light, Heat, Sound, and Electricity, we find great diversity in the laws or uniformities which are ascertained by empirical observation and generalisation: *e.g.* the phenomena of the reflection and refraction of Light, of dispersion and colour, have not *prima facie* any affinity with the phenomena of electrical attraction and repulsion, conduction and insulation. And I think it would be admitted that so far as an investigator aims at verifying or enlarging our knowledge of the special phenomena of Light or Electricity, it is 'Physical Science' rather than 'Natural Philosophy' that he is pursuing. It is only so far as he aims at systematising all these special laws as different applications of the general laws of matter in motion that he has a claim to the title of philosopher.

I regard 'Philosophy' then,—if the term is used without qualification—as the study which 'takes all knowledge for its province.' To such a study the human mind would be palpably incompetent if it attempted to deal with all the facts: it therefore selects the most important. Thus if we conceive the sciences as sets of connected knowledge, and imagine them as rising from the particular to the general, we may consider these sets in their turn as connected by Philosophy at the higher end. Philosophy, therefore, deals not with the whole matter of any science, but with the most important of its special notions, its fundamental principles, its distinctive method, its main conclusions. Philosophy examines
these with the view of co-ordinating them with the fundamental notions and principles, methods and conclusions of other sciences. It may be called in this sense 'scientia scientiarum.'

The important distinction is that the Sciences concentrate attention on particular parts or aspects of the knowable world, abstracting from the rest; while it is, in contrast, the essential characteristic of Philosophy that it aims at putting together the parts of knowledge thus attained into a systematic whole; so that all methods of attaining truth may be grasped as parts of one method; and all the conclusions attained may be presented, so far as possible, as harmonious and consistent.

Perhaps some devotee of a special science may ask, "Is it worth while to do this till we have gone further in our knowledge of the parts?"

To this there is more than one answer. The most important answer I will give more fully later. Here I will say that in fact we cannot help doing it somehow. We grow up with ideas of the whole, which are continually modified as our knowledge extends: and no student of any special science ever acquiesces in having no idea of the relation of his part of knowledge to the rest. He may avoid philosophy in the sense of avoiding the attempt to make his conception of the universe as clear, precise, and systematic as possible, but that only means that he will be content with a vague, obscure, and altogether inadequate conception.

In fact, when a writer speaks of another's argu-
ments as 'unphilosophical,' he often seems to mean no more than that he profoundly disagrees with him. It would, however, be a pity to allow the word to be used in this sense: and perhaps the different schools would agree that there is an instructed and an uninstructed way of reasoning on behalf of what each school regards as sound conclusions; the characteristic of an instructed way of reasoning being that it shows an adequate knowledge of the arguments used on the other side, some apprehension of their force, and that it endeavours either to meet or to avoid those arguments. Philosophical knowledge in this sense—on points on which experts are disagreed—would be knowledge of the confusions of thought to which the human intellect is liable when it begins to speculate on the questions of Philosophy: knowledge how to state these questions so as to avoid to some extent confusions of thought: and knowledge of considerations that have some force, though not necessarily decisive force, for or against conclusions on disputed questions of Philosophy. And if Philosophy is regarded as a subject of academic teaching and study, this, I conceive, is the kind of knowledge which the teacher ought mainly to seek to convey, on subjects of controversy.

But it is evident that this acquaintance with arguments is not the kind of knowledge at which Philosophy aims, although it may be all the knowledge for which a consensus of experts can be claimed at present. So long as this is so, the notion of philosophy being a pursuit rather than a system of knowledge will maintain itself, as it has maintained itself
throughout two thousand years in which dogmatic systems have succeeded each other. This lack of a 'consensus of experts' as to the method and main conclusions of Philosophy, is, I fear, strong evidence that study of it is still—after so many centuries—in a rudimentary condition as compared with the more special studies of the branches of systematised knowledge that we call Sciences.

It ought to be the aim of all earnest students of Philosophy to remedy this defect: but no one can hope to remove suddenly and quickly so ancient and inveterate a deficiency. He can only hope to contribute somewhat towards its removal: and one way in which I hope to contribute to it in the present lectures is by fixing attention on the questions of Philosophy—since I hope it may be easier to come to approximate agreement when we try to define questions rather than answers: the knowledge we want rather than the knowledge we think we have got.

So far there is a broad and general agreement between my view and that given by Mr. Herbert Spencer in his chapter on 'Philosophy defined.' He says, 'The truths of Philosophy bear the same relation to the highest scientific truths, that each of these bears to lower scientific truths. As each widest generalisation of science comprehends and consolidates the narrower generalisations of its own division; so the generalisations of Philosophy comprehend and consolidate the widest generalisations of Science.'

But I think this statement requires qualifying and

1 First Principles, § 37.
supplementing in important respects. In proceeding to give the required qualifications and additions, it may be well to begin by answering an objection that may be taken—especially by a student of Metaphysics—to the whole view of Philosophy which Mr. Spencer holds and with which I agree so far as it is positive. It may be said:—"Any Science is concerned only with the *phenomenal*, can only claim to impart knowledge of *phenomena* to those who study it: well then, if you merely put the sciences and their results together, however successfully you combine and co-ordinate them you still have only phenomenal knowledge. Now the knowledge which Philosophy aims at is essentially different in kind from merely phenomenal knowledge: it is knowledge of the Realities behind or underlying phenomena. It therefore not only contemplates the Universe from a point of view different from that of any particular science, it contemplates an aspect entirely different from that contemplated by all sciences taken together."

It is the more important for me to notice this objection, because Mr. Spencer, with whom I am agreeing so far as my definition has yet gone, has already given it an answer with which I cannot agree. In the first five chapters of his treatise on *First Principles* he has proved to his own satisfaction that "the reality underlying appearances is totally and for ever inconceivable by us," and that, consequently, "the Philosophy which proposes to formulate Being as distinguished from appearance" is to be "repudiated as impossible." This is the doctrine which it is
common and convenient to distinguish as 'Agnosticism.' By it, as Spencer admits, Philosophy is "shut out from much of the domain supposed to belong to it"; and the domain that is left—the laws of coexistence and sequence of phenomena—is, he says, "occupied by the sciences": so that it only remains for Philosophy to "consolidate the generalisation of science." Well, this view, it will be seen, is simple and coherent: but I cannot accept it.

On the one hand, I cannot admit—because I do not find that Science can admit—that Science is not concerned with Reality, but only with appearance: on the other hand, I cannot but admit that the Universe as a whole has or may have characteristics other than those with which the Sciences, especially at any rate the Sciences recognised by Spencer, are concerned, and therefore that knowledge is possible with regard to it other than that attained by the consolidation of these Sciences. But even if I were as Agnostic as Mr. Spencer professes to be—I shall hereafter try to show that he is not altogether as Agnostic as he seems—I should not import my Agnosticism into a definition of the Scope of Philosophy. For my aim is to give a definition which all schools may accept: and my plan of attaining this is, as I have said, to define the scope of Philosophy by ascertaining the questions which it asks, rather than the right answer to these questions. Now when it is once recognised that there is a Reality underlying or behind theAppearances of which the Sciences study the laws, it is certain that the desire
of knowledge which leads men to philosophy will include the desire of knowing what can be known about this Reality: the question as to its fundamental nature and its relation [to Appearances] cannot then be excluded from the scope of Philosophy even if the question is to receive a negative answer. Indeed on this point I should appeal to Mr. Spencer's practice against his formal definition: because, as I said, this is the main question that he is discussing in the first five chapters of his First Principles.

On the other hand, to exclude the phenomena with which the Sciences are concerned from the scope of Philosophy, as some metaphysicians seem disposed to do, appears to me no less unwarrantable. For such phenomena—however much we may contrast the phenomenal with the real in a narrow sense—must be admitted to be a part of the universe of fact, and therefore a part of Reality in a wide sense. This is true even of the appearances that we commonly regard as palpably unreal. Suppose a man tells me that he saw a ghost yesterday afternoon at 5. p.m.: however convinced I am that it was a mere subjective hallucination, the apparition is none the less a real fact in the history of the mental experience of my informant. And it is of course obvious that reality of a sort must be held to belong to the world of colour and the world of sound which are in a manner common to normal human beings; and still more to the permanent material world about which Physical Science has sought and obtained knowledge. The question cannot be whether these so-called phenomena
are or have been real, but what kind of reality belongs or has belonged to them.

I exclude, then, from the scope of Philosophy neither phenomena nor ‘onta’ or realities: and therefore, instead of Spencer’s statement that Philosophy aims at generalisations which ‘comprehend and consolidate the widest generalisations of Science,’ it seems to me better to say that whereas in the study of any science we aim at knowing a part of the knowable world, contemplated in abstraction from the rest, as philosophers we aim at knowledge of the whole: and therefore at knowledge of the underlying reality, until Mr. Spencer convinces us that it is unknowable—and even then we want to know exactly how he knows it to be unknowable.

§ 3. At the same time I should like to keep Mr. Spencer’s phrase ‘completely unified knowledge’: as it expresses the difference between the mere knowledge of a number of sciences, and a really philosophical grasp of the whole body of knowledge contained in these sciences taken together. And this leads me to note a deficiency which I seem to find in Mr. Spencer’s conception of the unifying function of Philosophy. In the first of the phrases just quoted—‘comprehend and consolidate the widest generalisation of science’—too exclusive a stress seems to be laid on relations of identity or resemblance, relations of difference being too much ignored. No doubt our knowledge is in some degree ‘unified’ so far as particular truths, hitherto held separately, are comprehended in a wider generalisation: but the differences of the particular
truths will still remain, and unless the wider generalisation enables us to comprehend these differences, our knowledge will not be *completely* unified. The complete unification at which Philosophy aims must enable us to view every portion of knowledge—and every object known—as a part of a coherent whole: and in comprehending the relation of diverse parts of a whole to the whole, and to each other, systematic difference—difference essentially belonging to the nature of the whole—is as important a feature as resemblance.

This statement is perhaps hardly clear without illustration. What, it may be asked, is exactly meant by comprehending differences as 'rational' and 'systematic' and 'following from the nature of the whole'? The best way to make this clear will be to take some case in which sciences have been—as Mr. Spencer says—'unified' by the comprehension of narrower in wider generalisations. I will take the most famous case, the identification, worked out mathematically by Newton, of the fundamental laws of terrestrial with the fundamental laws of celestial motion. When men began to observe and reflect on physical phenomena, the movements of falling bodies to the earth seemed as unlike as possible to the movements of the starry heavens: the former moved in a straight line, and the latter—apart from the problem presented by the planets—were, it seemed, circular and uniform. In each case the true view of the matter was impeded by erroneous inferences from observation—in the case of terrestrial motion by the erroneous idea that heavy
bodies fall quicker than light bodies, and in the case of celestial motions by the simple and inevitable geocentric hypothesis.

Well, we all know vaguely how the erroneous view of terrestrial motions was cleared away—chiefly by Galileo; and the heliocentric substituted for the geocentric hypothesis—chiefly through the work of Copernicus—and how the marvellous industry and genius of Kepler working on the observations of Tycho Brahe had ascertained the empirical laws of the movements of planets round the sun—i.e. that they moved not in circles but in ellipses with the sun in one focus, and that each moved at such a rate as to describe equal areas of the orbit in equal times. When the knowledge of the two kinds of motion had come to this point, matters were ripe for the great identification which comprehended planetary motions as a case of the operation of the law of universal gravitation.

But, you will observe, this identification or unification did not merely point out the similarity between the two kinds of motion, but it at the same time explained the differences—explained, that is, why bodies fall to the earth approximately in a straight line, while planets go round the sun in ellipses: these *prima facie* diverse kinds of motion being both viewed as different applications of the same general laws of matter in motion.

Now take, by contrast, Mr. Spencer's great generalisation—the doctrine of Evolution. Mr. Spencer claims to comprehend the chief laws of the changes through which the world of inorganic matter has
passed in time, the laws of the world of organic life, and the laws of mental development, by comprehending them under the same great law of Evolution or 'progress from indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to definite, coherent heterogeneity.' I shall have occasion to criticise this doctrine later on: but what I now wish to point out is that however completely we may grant that certain resemblances have been made out between (1) the laws of change in inorganic and organic matter and (2) the laws of change and development of mind, the resemblance does not in the least help us to explain the differences between the world of living things and the inorganic world. The differences between mind and matter still remain unexplained by the generalisation, and present unsolved problems for philosophy, just as obstinate and perplexing, after we have admitted the evolitional doctrine, as they were before.

I say this, not because I do not think Spencer's doctrine, so far as true, of philosophical importance; but because he seems to me in any case to over-estimate the contribution made by it to the solution of the problems of philosophy. This overestimate accords with and conveniently illustrates the defect in his general definition of philosophy that I have been trying to explain.
§ 1. So far, though I have suggested an important modification of Mr. Spencer's description of the work of Philosophy, I have accepted his view of the matter on which Philosophy works: that is, I have taken this to consist of the partially systematised aggregates of knowledge which we call the sciences, regarding it as the business of philosophy to systematise these more completely. But I must now announce and explain an important divergence from his view on this latter point. 'Science' as the term is used by Mr. Spencer—and by me—means exclusively what is sometimes distinguished as 'Positive Science.' That is, according to Mr. Spencer, it 'concerns itself with the co-existences and sequences among phenomena.' I have objected to this mode of speaking, since by 'phenomenon' we mean, or may mean, 'appearance' as contrasted with 'reality': and certainly the students of science generally would not admit that they have no knowledge of real existence. But Mr. Spencer cannot mean to affirm this: the philosopher of Evolution cannot be supposed to hold that the
great process of development through time of the inorganic world, the world of organic life, and human society—which he has described in several volumes—is not a real process; that the series of changes grasped and systematically presented by the 'Synthetic Philosophy' is not a real succession of real events. I take him to mean that Science cannot thoroughly comprehend what really exists: that behind the varied complex of existences and changes with which the sciences deal there is hidden an unknowable and inscrutable 'Ultimate Reality.' This view I reserve for later discussion; meanwhile I think that, without material disagreement with Mr. Spencer, we may say that the knowledge at which the sciences aim, and which they claim to have partially attained, is knowledge of what exists or has existed or will exist.

If so, it seems clear that the matter presented by Science so defined cannot be regarded as the whole of the matter on which Philosophy has to work. For Philosophy must deal with the principles and methods of rationally determining 'what ought to be,' as distinct from the principles and methods of ascertaining what is, has been, and will be. The current use of the terms 'Moral' and 'Political' Philosophy clearly implies this department of the work of Philosophy. We cannot say that there is no such thing as Moral or Political Philosophy, without violent divergence from common thought and common usage of terms: and on the other hand we cannot say that Moral or Political Philosophy has for its business the co-ordination of the co-existences and sequences of phenomena,
without neglecting the fundamental distinction between 'what ought to be' and what actually is or appears. We must therefore, I think, give a wider scope to the term 'Philosophy' than we have hitherto given, and regard it as including in the range of its 'unifying' function not only the systems of knowledge commonly called 'sciences' or 'positive sciences,' but also the systems of knowledge or reasoned thought distinguished as Ethics, Politics, and Jurisprudence.

It would, of course, be absurd to suggest that Mr. Spencer—the author of two volumes on the 'Principles of Ethics,' which are labelled on the back 'Synthetic Philosophy'—could possibly have designed to exclude the subject-matter of Ethics from the scope of Philosophy. The question is on what terms he is willing to admit it. The full discussion of this question will naturally come when we study his system in detail. But I may here say briefly that though in one passage he speaks of Ethics as a "science dealing with the conduct of associated human beings," it is not easy to gather from his language how far he really supposes himself to treat scientifically the whole subject as he conceives it—not merely the method of ascertaining the means to what he regards as the ultimate end of right conduct, but the method of establishing the end and defining that with adequate clearness and precision. I conjecture that he does regard this as included in his scientific treatment, though I confess I have no doubt in my own mind that he does not treat this part of
the subject by any method that seems even to claim scientific character. But—whatever method we adopt—it certainly seems to me that the discussion of the ultimate end of right conduct is not concerned with 'the co-existences and sequences of phenomena.'

It will be observed that in my statements about Ethics and Politics I leave the method undefined, and therefore do not enter into the question how far it is scientific. I wish to have a comprehensive definition suitable for all schools, Intuitional as well as Utilitarian and Evolitional. At the same time, from the neutral point of view that I adopt in my search for a definition, it is important to note that there is a school of philosophers which would refuse to recognise the distinction between what is and what ought to be. Regarding Ethics, etc., as a 'descriptive, not a normative' science, they consider it the business of Ethics to study actual conduct as determined by certain laws obtaining in the social organism.

Perhaps, just as we recognise a Materialistic Philosophy, which regards Theoretical Mechanics as explaining the whole universe of the knowable, so we may recognise a Naturalistic or Positive Philosophy which, going beyond Materialism by including subjective Psychology, still refuses to allow systematic knowledge of what ought to be as such—distinguished from Positive Science as not concerned except indirectly with what is, has been, and will be—to form a part of the whole body of knowledge which it is the business of Philosophy to unify.

I quite admit that a thinker who recognises no
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object of knowledge except what exists, has existed, or will exist in time, may properly accept Spencer's definition of Philosophy: and it is perhaps convenient to label this manner of thought as 'Naturalistic' or 'Positive' Philosophy. But I do not think it clear that a thinker of this type will regard Ethics as a positive Science: but rather, perhaps, as an Art based on Biology, Psychology, and Sociology.

§ 2. I have spoken of Ethics, Politics, and Jurisprudence. The last mentioned is clearly distinguished in ordinary thought from Philosophy. There are, no doubt, philosophical jurists; but all jurists are not as such philosophers: it is recognised that a man may have a sound knowledge of law—even of the conceptions and rules of law in general, as distinct from the law of a particular state—without being at all a philosopher. The distinction between Ethics or Politics and Philosophy is not so clear: still I think that some distinction is vaguely made in ordinary thought, and might with advantage be made somewhat more explicit. It is vaguely recognised that it is the business of Ethics to supply an answer to questions as to details of duty or right conduct—so far as they are questions which it is held legitimate, and not idle, to ask—but that this is not the business of Moral or Ethical Philosophy, which is primarily concerned with the general principles and methods of moral reasoning, and only with details of conduct so far as the discussion of them affords instructive examples of general principles and method. It is commonly felt that an attempt to work out a complete system
of duties would inevitably lead us out of Philosophy into Casuistry: and that whether Casuistry is a good thing or a bad thing, it certainly is not Philosophy.

A similar distinction may, I think, be applied to Politics:—accordingly when I had to select a title for a bulky volume in which I have attempted to treat systematically the chief questions for which the statesman has to find answers, I called the book ‘Elements of Politics,’ not ‘Political Philosophy’ or ‘Political Science.’ I did not call it Political Philosophy, since it aims at determining the rules for governmental action, and for the construction of governmental organs with more fulness of detail than it belongs to Philosophy to do: nor, again, did I call it Political Science, since it is primarily concerned with polity as it ought to be, and not with polities as they are, have been, and—from as we can foresee—will be.

I think, then, that we have to recognise it as part of the business of Philosophy, to ‘unify’ the principles and methods of reasoning directed to practical conclusions, which we call ‘political’ when they refer to the constitution and action of government, and ‘ethical’ when they refer to private conduct. We may call this part or function of Philosophy ‘practical,’ as distinct from the Philosophy that seeks to unify those sciences, which we may suitably call ‘theoretical’ or ‘positive,—according as we wish to imply that the objects of scientific knowledge are real or merely phenomenal. Taking science as conversant with real existence, I shall provisionally use the term ‘theoretical.’
I may point out that by taking the notion of Practical Philosophy to include the study of the principles and methods of Ethics and Politics, we may postpone the question which of these is prior to the other. This is a question on both sides of which there are important arguments. On the one hand it is urged that man is essentially a ‘political animal’ —a member of a State or governed society, whose manner of life is necessarily determined by the position that he holds in his society: and that, as Aristotle says, the attainment of wellbeing for the State is a higher and more comprehensive end than the attainment of wellbeing for a single individual. On the other hand it may be said that any man as a rational being has relations to the Universe, and to the ordering Reason manifested by the Universe, which are prior to, and more fundamental than his relation to the political society of which he happens to be a member—especially as he is usually at perfect liberty to change it.

I shall enter further into these arguments when I come to the fuller discussion of Practical Philosophy [see Prefatory Note]. Here I only throw out this question as an illustration of the business that Practical Philosophy has to do: it has to try to establish an intelligible relation between the sphere of Ethics and the sphere of Politics. For the present, however, I take Practical Philosophy to include the study of the fundamental principles of Ethics and Politics, and therefore to be at least equivalent to what is commonly spoken of as a Moral and Political Philosophy. As such
it must be a supreme architectonic study of ultimate ends, of the principles of what ought to be. So taken it seems to hold a position in reference to Arts in general, somewhat similar\(^1\) to that which Theoretical Philosophy holds with reference to Sciences in general.

In speaking of Arts I mean—using the term in its widest sense—all departments of human activity, carried on systematically with reasoned adaptation of means to ends, for the attainment of some particular end, other than the knowledge applied in the Art. I thus include not merely handicrafts and what are distinguished as ‘Fine Arts,’ but also such professions as Medicine and Strategy. When we contemplate human life as a whole and consider the place that any one Art ought to hold in it, we see at once that some Arts are obviously subordinate to others, and these again to others still higher and more comprehensive: but when we try to make the systematisation of Arts and Ends complete, doubts and difficulties are apt to present themselves for the solution of which we require such a study as I have called Practical Philosophy.

The subordinate position of such Arts as aim at

\(^1\) I ought to point out that the similarity is not very close. The systematisation of the Arts by Practical Philosophy relates primarily and mainly, as we have seen, to the ends of the Arts. For the reasoned adaptation of means to ends which constitutes the greater part of any Art, so far as its method is formulated and expressed, so that it is capable of being learnt from books—this is mainly scientific reasoning taken from one or more sciences, and arranged and combined, with a view to the special purposes of the Art. I think—as I have already said—that Ethics, from the point of view of those whom we have agreed to call Naturalistic or Positive Philosophers, is likely to turn out rather an Art that combines scientific reasonings from Biology, Physiology, Psychology, and Sociology than strictly a branch of science.
the production of 'utilities fixed in material objects' —as economists say—or such immaterial utilities as conveyance, communication, victory in war, etc.,—is usually manifest. Any such Art aims at a result which is clearly only desirable as a means to some further end, the desirability of which it does not belong to this Art to investigate. It is the business of the commander-in-chief to beat the enemy: it is not his business to determine whether war ought to be begun; that is admittedly the business of the Statesman. But when we ask on what principles the statesman is to determine it—e.g. whether his ultimate end is to be the preservation or wellbeing of his own state, or the wellbeing or happiness of humanity at large—we raise questions on which the practical maxims of statesmen are apt to disagree with the prescriptions of ordinary morality: so that we seem to require Practical Philosophy to settle the conflict.

Again, there are cases where the End aimed at in an Art is not clearly a means to some further end, but claims to be good in itself without reference to anything beyond—e.g. some would affirm this of the Beauty at which the Fine Arts aim. But at any rate this Beauty is only one element and not the whole of human good: the problem therefore is still left of comparing and co-ordinating it with other elements of good. Hence we may say generally of all arts, that, regarded as departments of rational action, they are naturally subordinate to and systematised by a theory of rational action as a whole—whether of human
beings individually or of communities of human beings—such as Practical Philosophy seeks to work out.

§ 3. We have thus arrived at the conception of Practical Philosophy as a study distinct from and in a manner parallel to Philosophy as conceived by Mr. Spencer. But in insisting on the recognition of the two departments of Philosophy as fundamental and important, I do not wish to imply that there is an absolute separation between them: and that there are in reality two quite separate studies, one systematising the different sciences, and the other systematising the different ends of human action and the different sets of rules for practice, or ideals of what ought to be. On the contrary, I wish to emphasise, as the final and most important task of Philosophy, the problem of co-ordinating these two divisions of its subject-matter, and connecting fact and ideal in some rational and satisfactory manner. The problem, however, must be recognised as a very difficult one. For its solution should enable us to answer the question 'How comes it that what ought to be is not and yet ought to be?' or, negatively, 'Whence comes the existence of what ought not to be?' And any one who knows anything of the history of human thought may well despair of attaining a satisfactory answer to this question;—unless he holds firmly to the conviction that such despair, at any rate, is one of the things that ought not to be.¹

We may then provisionally recognise as distinct,

¹ See Appendix at the end of this lecture.
Theoretical Philosophy, aiming at a systematisation of Sciences, and Practical Philosophy, aiming at a complete systematisation of Arts, including Ethics and Politics. We must not, however, make the distinction between art and science too profound. Firstly, it is to be noted that Arts in the aggregate and Sciences in the aggregate do not consist respectively of entirely different knowledge, but, as we have just seen, of the same knowledge arranged or viewed differently—so far at least as the rules of Art are based on real knowledge. 1 Secondly, as Mr. Spencer observes, 2 "the Sciences become Arts to one another": i.e. some kinds of systematised general knowledge are clearly useful, and used as a means to the attainment of other knowledge. Further, all Sciences, even if not pursued for any ulterior end, may be regarded from a point of view which assimilates them to Arts. For the study of any science is a species of rational activity pursued for an end—the attainment of a particular kind of knowledge; and the question of the value and relative importance of this knowledge is a reasonable question to ask: and if it is a reasonable question to ask, it obviously belongs to Practical Philosophy to answer it, just as it belongs to Practical Philosophy to answer the corresponding question with regard to any Art.

Indeed, from this point of view Theoretical Philosophy itself seems subordinate to Practical Philosophy. For the pursuit of knowledge of the

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1 Cf. Mill's *Examination of Hamilton*, ch. xx.
whole knowable universe may, no less than the study of any special science, be regarded as a particular kind of rational activity, which has to be compared and co-ordinated with other modes of human life and action: from this point of view we consider how far such knowledge is an end in itself and how far a means to some further end, and how large a place the pursuit of it ought to occupy in the right organisation of human existence,—all which questions manifestly come within the scope assigned to Practical Philosophy.

I may illustrate this by answering the objection made by Sir W. Hamilton\footnote{Lectures on Metaphysics, vol. i. p. 113.} to the distinction which I have adopted between Theoretical Philosophy and Practical Philosophy. He says that all Philosophy is in a sense theoretical, because it is cognitive, while again all Philosophy is in a sense practical, because its end is the 'practical energy' exercised in the process of cognition. I answer by agreeing that in my conception of Practical Philosophy, I extend the notion of Practice, beyond what is customary, to include all forms of human activity—as Hamilton himself does in speaking of practical energy exercised in cognition. And thus Theoretical Philosophy is no doubt in a sense practical, because it is a department of human activity, but in this aspect it is not to be identified with Practical Philosophy, but to be subordinated to it.

The question: What is the utility of (Theoretical) Philosophy, what is the ultimate end for which we
ought to philosophise? is one that relates to Theoretical Philosophy: but it is one that belongs to Practical Philosophy to deal with. Knowledge of the right end or ends of rational action, of the manner in which different ends are to be harmonised, or subordinated one to another, is not knowledge which can be obtained by any of the positive Sciences concerned with the 'co-existences and sequences of phenomena,' or even by Philosophy regarded merely as co-ordinating these sciences: questions of ends are indeed philosophical questions: but they are questions which it belongs to Practical Philosophy or Philosophy in its practical aspect to answer.

On the other hand, from another point of view Practical Philosophy seems to be subordinate to Theoretical. Theoretical Philosophy, as above distinguished, deals with what is, not with what ought to be. But there is a sense in which what ought to be is, or we could not reason or talk about it. The thing itself which ought to be does not as such exist. It may actually exist or it may not; but the question whether it exists or not does not primarily concern Practical Philosophy. Secondarily, however, it does; because actuality proves possibility, and it is useless and therefore wrong to spend labour in efforts to realise the impossible. But what Practical Philosophy is primarily concerned with is desirability and possibility, not actuality: whether what ought to be exists or not, the idea or thought of it exists in human minds, so far as we can talk of it at all. The ideal is actual in idea. Hence all the propositions of
Practical Philosophy regarded as human thoughts or judgments or beliefs are seen to be parts of that sphere of cognisable existence with which Theoretical Philosophy is concerned.¹

From this point of view we may co-ordinate the positive sciences, regarded as systems of reasoned thoughts or judgments, with the systems of practical reasonings that constitute the different arts—including Ethics and Politics—so far as the rules of Art are reasoned rules; and may consider that the aim of Philosophy, in its widest sense, is to comprehend all rational human thought—whether it relates to ‘what is’ or to ‘what ought to be’—as one coherent whole. Observe an important change in our point of view. We began by regarding the whole of which Philosophy seeks knowledge as a whole of things; we are now led to contemplate it as a whole of thought. Theoretical Philosophy thus viewed—and made to include Practical Philosophy as subordinate—seems to become a study of the thoughts or beliefs of the

¹ To illustrate the kind of relations that, from this point of view, may be seen to exist between positive Sciences on the one hand, and studies that deal with what ought to be, I may refer to the comparison which many thinkers have held it important to make between the fundamental notions and principles of Ethics, and the fundamental notions and principles of Geometry.

Though Geometry is concerned with the relations of co-existence among things or phenomena which are objects of sense-perception, and Ethics with the determination of what ought to be, still many thinkers from earliest to latest times have discerned profound affinity between the fundamental notions of the two. E.g. when we are told that Pythagoras held that the essence of Justice was a square number, the statement appears fantastic and absurd. But when Mr. Spencer points out (Essays, ‘Genesis,’ p. 51) that the notion of ‘Equality’ which is fundamental in mathematics also underlies morals and is an essential element of the conception of Justice, we cannot but admit that the comparison may be instructive.
human mind, with a view to their complete systematization.

§ 4. This leads me to the consideration of a view of the meaning and scope of Philosophy which I have so far left on one side, the view, namely, that the 'Science of Mind' or 'of Man' is 'Philosophy Proper,' or the main part of it. I think it may be said that a generation ago this was the predominant opinion among English thinkers. In 1868 the foremost debate in English thought was between the philosophy of Sir W. Hamilton and that of J. S. Mill: and both these thinkers, in defining Philosophy, seem to take the view that I have just given. Thus Sir W. Hamilton says that "The science of mind . . . constitutes the principal and most important object of philosophy . . . constitutes in propriety, with its suite of dependent sciences, Philosophy itself": the 'dependent sciences' being, apparently, Logic, Ethics, Politics—"so far as it supposes a knowledge of man in his natural constitution"¹—and also Æsthetics, and Theology. So again J. S. Mill—with more express recognition of the social aspect of human life—takes "the proper meaning of Philosophy to be . . . the scientific knowledge of Man, as an intellectual, moral, and social being."² And this view,—which seems to blend Philosophy indistinguishably with Psychology or Sociology or both—still survives among us: indeed it seems to be implied in the term 'Mental Philo-

¹ Lectures on Metaphysics, vol. i. pp. 62, 63.
² Auguste Comte and Positivism, p. 53. This passage, which represents Mill's mature view, clearly does not distinguish Philosophy from Psychology or Sociology.
sophy' which forms a part of the title of our new chair. On the other hand it appears difficult to reconcile with the view that the aim of Philosophy is to unify or systematise the sciences; since mind is commonly regarded as the subject of a special science, Psychology, having its special place in the classification of the sciences; and a younger special science, Sociology—whose claims are less generally admitted by its elders—takes as its special subject-matter man regarded as a social being. The conflict of conceptions thus presented seems to me deserving of careful consideration.¹

Here I will only say that Psychology, viewed as a special science, has—by the admission of all but Materialists—a peculiar position among the sciences: it is at once peculiarly distinct from and peculiarly connected with all the rest. On the one hand, as Mr. Spencer says,² "under its subjective aspect, Psychology is a totally unique science, independent of, and antithetically opposed to, all other sciences whatever. The thoughts and feelings which constitute a consciousness . . . form an existence which has no place among the existences with which the rest of the sciences deal." On the other hand, however exclusively we may concentrate attention on Mind regarded as a particular kind of thing, distinct from

¹ My desire is to give a distinct meaning to each of the three terms: but a consideration of the relation of Philosophy to Sociology will carry us away from Metaphysics: whereas a consideration of the relation of Philosophy to Psychology will lead us to Metaphysics by a convenient road. Deferring Sociology, therefore, I shall treat of this latter relation in the next lecture.

² Psychology, vol. i. p. 140.
and ‘without kinship with’ the Matter with which the physical sciences are concerned, we soon find that among the most important of the phenomena of the particular human minds that we study—each one’s own or another’s—are Thoughts, Judgments, and Beliefs; and that we cannot study these without studying their objects. Hence—since everything that we know or believe to be, or to have been, and everything which we believe ought to be, not to speak of the still wider world which we regard as possible, has necessarily the characteristic of being thought about—it would seem that Psychology, however it may begin as a special science, inevitably broadens out into a study as comprehensive in its range as Philosophy, according to the widest view which we have been led to take of Philosophy. It may, indeed, be urged that the range of existence extends infinitely beyond the range of what is known—or in any way definitely thought by any finite mind—and it would be paradoxical to deny this. But it is evident that of existence as so extending, Philosophy cannot, any more than Psychology, have anything definite to say. The point at which definite thought ends, and indefinite and inadequate thought begins, is obviously the same for both studies.

We thus see that the matter of Philosophy is difficult to distinguish from the matter of Psychology. At the same time, I think it fundamentally important to distinguish the two studies as clearly as we can: and I propose to attempt this in the following lecture.
APPENDIX TO LECTURE II

RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY TO RELIGION

The reference to the 'problem of Evil' (p. 30) leads me to a topic which finds no place in this lecture—the relation of Philosophy to Religion. The importance of this relation, and the prominence given to it in some attempts to define the Scope of Philosophy (e.g. Wundt's, and—in a negative way—Spencer's), render it desirable that I should give my reasons for the omission.

In the first place, I may say that it was not due to any desire to depreciate the importance of Theology or to leave it on one side. On the contrary, as I have tried to indicate, the fundamental question to which Theology gives an answer—as to the relation of what is to what ought to be—represents, in my view, "the final and most important task of philosophy." And the answer which Theology gives to this question—to whatever criticisms it may be legitimately open—must be admitted, in the view of the common sense of mankind, to 'hold the field.'

I have referred to this again in Lecture IV.,¹ and what is there said will partly explain why I have omitted any discussion of the relation of Philosophy to Religion in this lecture. As I there intimate, there are two essentially distinct methods of attaining the intellectual convictions which constitute the essential framework for the play of religious emotion and the exercise of religious worship. I distinguish these methods and their results as Rational and Revelational Theology.

As to Rational Theology, it seems to me that the questions with which it deals—questions relating to the One Universal and Eternal Mind, which we conceive God to be, and His relation to the physical world and to human minds—are prima facie philosophical questions, according to my definition: i.e. they belong to the contemplation of the Universe as a whole. Rational Theology then cannot properly be placed on a par with the

¹ See below, p. 94.
special sciences, which deal separately—as has been said—with
different parts or aspects of the knowable world. And again, it
seems to me that these questions belong to that part or kind of
philosophy commonly called Metaphysics: i.e. always supposing
that in trying to answer them we rely simply on the exercise
of the human reason, and do not seek guidance from Revelation.

An objection, however, may be made to this, which I admit to
have much force. It may be urged that what I have said
applies to the conception of God with which speculative and
metaphysical reasonings have been mainly concerned; to God
conceived as the First Cause of the world; or to God as the Infinite
and Perfect Being, contrasted with the finite and imperfect beings
that we empirically know; or as the Absolute Reality in contrast
with the relative realities of which alone we are alleged to have
experience: but that it does not apply to God as the object of
religious thought and worship. God, it may be said, as so con-
templated, is thought of under a very different series or system
of notions. He is thought of as having a Righteous Will, the
content of which, so far as it relates to man, is partially appre-
hended by man under the form of rules of duty; He is thought
of as standing to human beings in a relation fitly symbolised by
the relation of a father to his children; He is thought of as
source of aid and strength in the never-ending struggle with sin
which forms an essential element of the higher moral life; finally
He is thought of as centre and sovereign of a spiritual kingdom
of which human beings are or may be members. These and
other cognate conceptions, it may be urged, constitute the real
thought-element of the common religious consciousness of man,
in his highest stage of development; and not the metaphysical
ideas of First Cause, Infinite and Absolute Being, etc. And
these common religious ideas, it may be held, should be taken
as expressing or symbolising the aspect of reality apprehended
through the religious consciousness, just as our common system
of physical ideas—our conception of the world as a coherent
aggregate of extended things occupying and moving in space of
three dimensions—expresses or symbolises the aspect of reality
apprehended through the senses. On this view the system of re-
ligious ideas would occupy a more or less co-ordinate position
with the Sciences, as a department of the whole body of partially
systematised thought, which it is the task of the philosopher to reduce, if he can, to a consistent and coherent whole.

The view which I have tried briefly to express is one to which I have every desire to do full justice. My reason for not introducing it into a lecture on the 'scope of philosophy' was not that I denied the existence of this common element of religious thought; but that I was impressed with the difficulty either of separating it sufficiently from the historical element with which it is combined in current Revelational Theologies, or if I introduced it along with this historical element, of giving any statement of it that could at all claim to rank—in respect of consensus of experts—with the positive Sciences. I by no means say that there should not be made a serious effort to overcome this difficulty: but I think it must be made, in the first instance, by theologians.
§ 1. In the present lecture I propose to examine the relation of Philosophy, viewed as the study of rational thought as a whole, to Psychology or the Science of Mind. A generation ago there was, as pointed out in the last lecture, a prevalent tendency to fuse the two studies into one, under the name of 'Mental Philosophy'; and no doubt Mind occupies a unique and central position in the known world, as that which knows or thinks of all that is known or thought of. At the same time we commonly consider minds and their states as only a part of the object of knowledge; we consider Mind a particular kind of thing, which along with the varieties of another kind of thing called Matter, makes up the world of empirically known fact. This is the view that we all take in ordinary thought and discourse, and accordingly I shall begin by assuming it; reserving for subsequent discussion the objections brought against it by Mentalists and Materialists respectively.

I have explained that my aim in trying to define the Scope of Philosophy is to obtain if possible a
definition acceptable to all schools: and that, in order to attain this, I should concentrate attention on the questions which Philosophy asks, rather than the answers to be given to them—it being easier to get the opposing schools to agree about the questions than about the answers. Perhaps on hearing this some member of my audience—acquainted with metaphysical controversy—may have thought that the distinction would turn out illusory; and that the differences of the schools would necessarily come in, in the form of putting the fundamental questions; that, in short, if you allow a metaphysician to put his questions in his own way, he can always manage—if he knows his business—to put them so that you can hardly help giving the answers he wants.

I quite admit the difficulty: but I think that it is possible to be on one's guard against it, and specially easy to be on one's guard from my metaphysical standpoint—which is speaking broadly that of what has been called since Reid the Philosophy of Common Sense or Natural Dualism. For there is this advantage in putting questions from the point of view of Common Sense: that it is, in some degree, in the minds of us all, even of the metaphysicians whose conclusions are most opposed to it—such as the extreme Sensationalist or Idealist. It is the view with which we all start when we begin to philosophise, whatever metaphysical conclusions we may ultimately adopt (Materialist, Sensationalist, or Idealist): and therefore it will be a philosophical gain to bring it as clearly as we can before the full gaze of reflective
attention, even though further consideration should lead us to abandon or modify it.

In saying this I do not mean to affirm—as some who have maintained Natural Dualism as a philosophical conclusion have affirmed—that Natural Dualism is involved in the original presentation of the objects of experience to the experiencing mind. That is a question to be reserved for subsequent discussion, on which I now express no opinion even provisionally. All I affirm is that we find it in our ordinary thought when we begin to reflect on it, nor can we by the utmost effort of memory recall a time when we did not implicitly hold it. If the belief in an external material world existing as we know it independently of our knowing it—so that our knowledge of it does not affect its existence—if this belief is the result of inference from data given originally as merely mental fact, this process of inference preceded the stage of conscious reflection. I ought further to explain that in speaking of Common Sense I do not mean entirely unscientific Common Sense, but the Common Sense of educated persons rectified by a general acquaintance with the results and methods of physical science. In the latter part of this course I shall have to go more fully into the extent and significance of this "rectification" by science of the plain man's view of matter and mind: in this lecture I only assume it in a broad and general way.

I must repeat that I do not put forward Natural Dualism now dogmatically, but only provisionally. I am quite aware that there are serious difficulties
when we try to make the view of Common Sense clear and consistent: and I do not wish to ignore them. But I think that considerable confusion arises from not trying to make it as clear as we can: especially since the distinction between Mind and Matter, which Natural Dualism takes as fundamental, must be recognised as important from any point of view. *E.g.* the difference between (1) my feelings and thoughts, and (2) what goes on in my brain when I feel and think, cannot be got rid of by saying that after all everything is consciousness: this I shall try to show later.

Let us then attempt, taking frankly this point of view, to distinguish as clearly as possible the task of Philosophy from that of Psychology. According to Common Sense or Natural Dualism, Mind—while occupying a unique position in the known world, as that which knows everything else and which therefore, as knowing subject, is at once connected and contrasted with all its known objects—is at the same time a particular thing alongside of other things: is an object or part of the object as well as the sole subject of knowledge.

Taking this view, then, we see that Mind may be considered either (1) in itself, abstracting as far as possible from Matter, or (2) in relation to Matter; and both Philosophy and Psychology must consider it in this latter relation, though primarily for different reasons: Philosophy because its task is to put all the sciences together into a systematic whole, Psychology because of the intimate connection between
mental facts and nerve-processes. I propose accordingly to consider the relation between the two studies from both points of view successively.

§ 2. Philosophy, as we have seen, is concerned with knowledge and the reasoned thought that determines action so far as rational. These are mental facts, and as such a part of the subject-matter of Psychology; but *prima facie* they are only a part. The minds empirically known to us not only think, but also have sensations; not only act in accordance with rational judgment or belief as to what is right or good, but also in conflict with such judgment or belief, under the influence of the feelings we call pleasures, pains, desires, and aversions. If the only function of the mind were to think, if the only phenomena it exhibited were thoughts, cognitions, judgments, beliefs, there would be more difficulty in distinguishing Psychology from that reflection or knowledge which —so far as pursued with the view of systematising knowledge—we have called Philosophy. So again, if the only other attribute of the mind were Rational Volition, or action for rational ends chosen as *per se* good or desirable, there would be a similar difficulty in distinguishing the part of Psychology dealing with the general principles of such volition from Practical Philosophy, which must include an exhaustive investigation of the ultimate ends or principles of Rational Volition, and of the processes of thought by which the right means to these ends are to be chosen.

But we have in Feeling¹ and Feeling-prompted

¹ I use the term Feeling in the older English meaning, in which it includes
volition a peculiar subject-matter for Psychology considered as a special science, which only comes within the scope of Philosophy as the subject-matter of any other science does:—i.e. in respect of its main outlines, the fundamental ideas applicable to it, the methods of investigating it, and the chief conclusions thereby attained. Or at any rate if Philosophy has any more special concern with Feelings and Feeling-prompted volitions than I have thus indicated, it is because their special connexion with Thoughts and Reasoned Purposes has caused some confusion between the two kinds of mental fact; and has led some thinkers to regard the Feelings which undoubtedly antecede and accompany cognition as the simple elements out of which knowledge and its object—the known world—are compounded. No doubt, so far as this view—which I shall consider presently—is held, the coincidence in subject-matter between Philosophy and Psychology becomes more complete. It thus appears that the relation between Philosophy and Psychology will necessarily be somewhat different for different schools—as we have seen to be the case with the relation between Philosophy and Physics. Just as in the view of Materialists, who hold that everything knowable must be ultimately reducible to some complex kind or mode of matter in motion, Philosophy cannot be effectually and finally distinguished from Rational Physics, so far as its positive and constructive work is concerned;

what are commonly called sensations of colour and sound, as well as what are commonly called sensations of pleasure and pain.
so in the view of those who resolve everything knowable into feeling, or more widely, into the states of consciousness of particular minds, Philosophy cannot be effectually and finally distinguished from Psychology, except, again, on its negative side.¹

Such Psychological Philosophy, however, is like Materialistic Philosophy, paradoxical: in the one we have Rational Physics endeavouring to swell itself out into a Theory of the Universe as a whole, and in the other we have the Science of Mind doing the same thing. In both we have a similar divergence, but in opposite directions, from the point of view of Common Sense or Natural Dualism. Returning now to this point of view, let us pass on to contemplate the admitted common ground of Philosophy and Psychology—Thoughts, Judgments, Beliefs. I shall try to show that there are important differences between the methods and aims of the two studies in treating this common subject-matter. These differences chiefly spring from or are connected with an essential characteristic of thoughts or beliefs as investigated by Philosophy, which we have not yet noticed: viz. that they are assumed to be true and valid. This is obviously involved in the view of Theoretical Philosophy as systematising the sciences; since a science is a system of true beliefs: so far as any actual science as taught is not this, it is imperfect or spurious science. So again Practical Philosophy is in

¹ The assertion 'All is Feeling' is a philosophical, not a psychological proposition, as the assertion 'All is Matter' is a philosophical and not a physical proposition.
intention a theory of the principles of what 'really' ought to be; i.e. not of what men merely think or judge ought to be, but of what they truly so think or judge. Philosophy therefore is concerned primarily with truth, and only secondarily with error in order to distinguish it from truth, or to elicit the element of truth contained in it. Psychology on the other hand has for its function to discriminate, analyse into elements, classify, and ascertain the laws of all such beliefs or thoughts as are found among the phenomena of the particular minds observed; of the false no less than the true. For instance, in studying laws of association of ideas, the associations that lead the mind to wrong judgment and expectation are just as interesting as those that lead to right judgment and expectation; and may even sometimes be more interesting and more instructive examples of the laws of association. Indeed the characteristic of being true or untrue is not one which necessarily claims our attention—so far at least as the true or untrue beliefs are not psychological beliefs—so long as we are merely concerned with mind as the object of a special science, abstracted as far as possible from the objects of other sciences.

But further: even so far as Philosophy and Psychology are both concerned with true beliefs, still from the point of view of either study respectively these beliefs are connected and systematised in ways prima facie different. The general aim of Psychology, in the systematisation that it attempts of mental facts, is—besides classifying them,—to discover the
laws of co-existence and sequence among them: accordingly, so far as it is concerned with knowledge or true beliefs, it aims at ascertaining the order in which and the processes by which the particular minds observed actually pass from one part of knowledge to another. On the other hand, the aim of Philosophy, in dealing with the same beliefs, is to arrange them in such order as may make manifest the important permanent relations among them,—e.g. the relations of the simple to the complex, of the more general to the less general, of the fundamental principles of any science to their applications or the deductions founded on them. Relations of this latter kind are, speaking broadly, the same for all minds that think and judge truly respecting them; whereas the former may and do vary from one mind to another, and include sequences of thought other than valid or cogent inference.

In connexion with this I may observe that in my view Philosophy—so far as it does not construct its system, or aim at constructing it completely a priori—uses primarily what I may call the Dialectical Method,¹ i.e. the method of reflection on the thought which we all share, by the aid of the symbolism which we all share, language: whereas Psychology uses primarily the introspective method of observation by each of his own thoughts and feelings as his own—a group of objects of which he alone can have first-hand knowledge. I do not mean that Philosophy may not

¹ Observe that the term is used in the Platonic-Aristotelian, and not in the Hegelian sense.
use the introspective method, or that Psychology may not use the dialectical, or that the two can be completely separated. But so far as the Philosopher observes the relations of thought in his own individual mind, it is as a means to the end of ascertaining the relations of thought in a normal mind, free from the peculiarities and limitations of his own individual mind. On the other hand, so far as the Psychologist adopts the method of reflecting on the common thought of the society to which he belongs, through the symbolism of its common language, it is as a means to the end of generalisations applicable to the particular experiences of an indefinite number of particular minds. Hence we may put the difference in another form, and say that Psychology is primarily concerned with knowledge and its attainment as processes of thought belonging to particular human minds; but that Philosophy is primarily concerned with the relations of true or valid beliefs as they may be conceived to exist for an ideal mind independent—not only of the errors but —of the particularities of growth and development of particular finite minds.¹

It may, however, be suggested that—just as it is impossible properly to know the conclusion of a geometrical demonstration, without going through

¹ I do not mean that Philosophy ignores this growth and development: it is a fact of great importance about the Universe that the finite minds it includes go through processes of growth and development and attain truth by long series of steps. Still Philosophy, I conceive, is primarily concerned with the relations of the truths apprehended, as they exist in and for the most fully developed minds.
the steps of the demonstration—so, speaking more generally, it is impossible to know truth truly, unless we have arrived at it through a certain process; and that therefore the process by which the human mind has arrived at scientific or philosophical truth is an essential part—or at least introduction—to the truth known. But it is evident that in many cases of scientific truth this suggestion would be paradoxical; since an important part of the progress made in mathematics, *e.g.*, consists in the discovery of better ways of arriving at truths already known; and it would seem absurd to say that it is indispensable to a knowledge of the truth to know both these ways of arriving at it—the older and worse way as well as the newer and better way. If there is an ideal order of development of truth, it would seem therefore to be distinct from the actual order in which it has been historically developed in the progress of human civilisation. On the bearing of the investigation of the actual growth and development of human thought and belief—with which Psychology is concerned—on the investigation of its ideal order and connexion, which is the primary business of Philosophy, I shall have to speak more fully hereafter in the latter part of this course; as this is an investigation where Psychology at a certain point passes over into Sociology—or at any rate becomes Sociological Psychology.

§ 3. I now pass to compare the different ways in which the two studies are concerned with the relation of mind to the material world. It is evident that it will be an important part of the task of Philosophy
—according to the view I have taken of Philosophy
—to conceive this relation with adequate precision
and completeness. At the same time Psychology
equally cannot ignore it: for though the method of
Psychology is primarily introspective, it has in recent
times become continually more clear that the study
cannot dispense with the aid of physiological observa-
tion and reasoning.

The attempt that till recently was sometimes
made by students of mind, to mark off a department
of mental phenomena, elevated above the condition
of being accompanied by nervous change, is now, I
think, generally abandoned even by the psychologists
who are most strongly opposed to materialism. It
is generally admitted that we have overwhelming—
though to a considerable extent highly inferential—
grounds for believing that psychical facts such as
sensations, emotions, thoughts, volitions, have always
corporeal concomitants in movements of nerve-
matter. And when this is admitted, the importance
to the Psychologist of knowing all that can be known
about these corporeal concomitants is hardly to be
doubted.

On the other hand, the crude materialism or
positivism that used to push aside all results of
introspective observation has now mostly given way
before the general recognition that psychical changes
are, as objects of experience, altogether distinct from
the nervous changes that accompany them. Since
Descartes, philosophical thought has found no difficulty
in distinguishing the thinking, feeling, willing thing,
that each one of us is conscious of being, from the complex aggregate of extended solid particles which each of us calls his body. And if, neglecting the permanent, we fix our attention on the transient facts, the successive states or movements of mind and body, there is general agreement as to the profound disparity between thoughts or feelings and those nervous processes which appear to be inseparable from them, and which—in the case of Sensation—we sometimes call by the same name. As Spencer says, we are "utterly incapable of seeing or even imagining how the two are related... mind remains a something without any kinship with other things." On this ground I think Spencer's phrase, that "mind and nervous action are the subjective and objective faces of the same thing,"¹ is objectionable. For the image suggests that the manner of connexion between the two so-called 'faces' is manifest and their separation inconceivable: whereas according to Spencer's own statement the mode of connexion is occult and unimaginable, and the separation is so far from being inconceivable, that in the case of all the higher mental states we have no direct consciousness at all of the nervous change in the brain which we believe to take place as a concomitant of thought: we can only vaguely imagine it. Hence I am unable to take even this moderate step towards that extreme materialism which refuses to recognise the distinctness of physical and psychical fact. I have admitted

¹ Cf. Principles of Psychology, § 56. Cf. also Bain, Mind and Body, p. 134, "The mental fact is a two-sided fact."
that Materialism is in one sense philosophical: i.e. that it is the result of that effort after a complete systematising of knowledge which in the first lecture I called philosophy. But the *prima facie* disparate-ness of mental facts and nervous changes, the apparently total absence of kinship between them, puts in the way of any materialistic systematisation an obstacle difficult to overleap.

Indeed I think that instructed thinkers of a materialistic tendency have now ceased to try to leap over this obstacle. At the present time the important issue between such thinkers and their opponents does not relate to the nature of the double facts with which psychology deals, or to the connexion of their disparate elements, psychical and physical—which no one professes to understand—but rather to the causal *nexus* that links each successive double fact with physical or psychical antecedents or consequents. What the materialistic thinker maintains and his opponent denies is that this causal *nexus* is to be conceived as lying wholly on the physical side; and that psychical facts are merely unexplained effects or epiphenomena, and not in their turn even part-causes of physical facts; in other words, that studying the succession of psycho-physical facts—thoughts and feelings accompanied by movements in the nerve-matter of the brain—we ought to conceive the causal *nexus* of the facts as lying wholly on the physical side, and ultimately to be explained by purely physical laws.

This is a problem which is—I think we may say—
in the forefront of speculative interest at the present time, for educated persons generally, and not merely for special students of Philosophy or of Psychology: and it seems to me of great importance to distinguish the questions capable of being solved by the methods of the empirical sciences Psychology and Physiology combined, from those which carry us beyond the limits of these sciences, and therefore must be reserved for Philosophy. Now it does not fall within my plan here to inquire whether the proposition that physical changes must be wholly caused by antecedent physical changes is true or false; my point is that the question is one which cannot be solved either by Physiology or Psychology or both together regarded as purely empirical studies; and should therefore be left to Philosophy. For the question whether the psychical facts—thoughts, feelings and volitions—which in the case of ordinary conscious actions are certainly among the antecedents of physical change, have strictly speaking any causal connexion with these changes—this question cannot be determined by any physiological observation and experiment. We have to consider on the one hand the presumption arising from the continuity of the organic with the inorganic world, and of human life with other organic life so far as the operation of mechanical laws is the same in all three departments. However much stress is laid on the difference between the organic and the inorganic world, and between human and non-human life, no one seriously doubts the complete subjection of the whole physical world to the law
of gravitation and the law of conservation of energy. We have to consider on the other hand the validity of the consciousness of activity—implied in the universally accepted distinction between 'active' and 'passive' in our mental states, and especially of the consciousness of 'free' activity, which seems irresistibility forced on us by reflection on deliberate action. Then as regards this latter, we have to take Ethics into account, and the connexion of Duty and Freedom.

Hence, as I said, the problem of the exact causal nexus between the successive psycho-physical facts, with their twofold character, is one for Philosophy. It can hardly be said to be not a psychological question: I conceive, however, that the empirical psychologist may properly leave this controversy on one side, and that on the whole it is better that he should leave it to Philosophy: the empirical psychologist may content himself with tracing uniformities of co-existence and sequence among the psychical facts that he studies, taken along with their physical accompaniments and antecedents, without entering further into the question of their causation.

It is convenient here to distinguish two points of view from which the relations between physical and psychical facts are to be studied, in the empirical sciences of Psychology and Sociology. We may term these respectively the Psycho-Physiological and the Biological. There is not a sharp line to be drawn between the two, but the general distinction is clear. From the former point of view we examine, as closely
as possible, the particular physical changes—primarily the movements of particles of the nervous system—which accompany, or closely precede or follow particular kinds of psychical facts, sensations, thoughts, emotions; also taking note of movements of matter outside the organism which immediately affect the nervous system, and constitute the stimuli of the organs of sense. From the Biological point of view, on the other hand, we consider the general effects of the physical conditions under which the organism lives on the development of mental faculties: e.g., we observe how the need of obtaining food and avoiding or resisting foes has developed and differentiated faculties of perception along with organs of sense, and faculties and habits of complex purposive action along with similarly complex organs for exercising force on the external world. It is with this latter kind of consideration that the sociologist is chiefly concerned: for instance, he observes how the advantages of gregariousness in the physical struggle for existence develop habits of co-operation, and communication by vocal signs or otherwise,—and ultimately the sympathy and mutual intelligence which render the mental life of man essentially a social life. For the present I shall confine myself to the Psycho-Physiological point of view.

It is hardly necessary to show in detail, how physiological knowledge—and even, to some extent, physical knowledge going beyond Physiology—is indispensable in examining the causes of psychical facts introspectively observed. We have to examine
the relation between different kinds of sensation, and processes of nervous action stimulated by the motions of inorganic matter coming into contact with the organs of sense—vibrations of the luminiferous ether with the retina of the eye, vibrations of the air with the ear, etc. We have to examine how the quantity, quality, and duration of the feeling are related first to the process of change in the nerves, and to the nature and organisation of the nervous matter to which the external stimuli are applied, and secondly to the kind, amount, and order of these stimuli. Then—when we go on to consider the laws according to which a combination of these sensations, and of secondary states which appear faintly to reproduce them, bring into being mental phenomena of a more complicated kind,—though Physiology can give us less direct aid, still it is well always to bear in mind that our psychological questions and hypotheses have physiological counterparts. Association of ideas, fusion of sensations and their images or relics into more complex states, memory, recollection, imagination, even reasoning and judgment, must be assumed to have physiological bases; the existence of which we must always keep in view, though we must bear in mind also that their specific character is unknown, and only to be vaguely conjectured. Further, Physiology will aid Psychology, not merely in the way of supplementing the results of introspective observation with a knowledge of the physical antecedents, concomitants and effects of psychological phenomena; but also more directly by
showing where to look for psychical facts—such as muscular feelings—which come into view when attention is adequately concentrated on them, but are liable to remain undistinguished in ordinary introspective observation. In view of the importance of this aid, it is difficult to limit the extent to which psychological analysis may be advanced by the progress of physiological knowledge.

In discussing the relation of Psychology to Physiology, I have incidentally illustrated the kind of questions which, in my view, belong to Philosophy as the study that aims at systematising the methods and conclusions of the special sciences. So far as this relation of Mind to Matter is concerned, the work of Philosophy in co-ordinating the sciences consists largely in preventing either confusion or collision between diverse methods, and in delineating the path of harmonious co-operation. But I have had another aim in dwelling upon this relation: I wish to bring out clearly the distinction between this and another quite different relation of Mind to Matter, which we have next to consider.

Not only is some material process—as we have overwhelming ground for believing—an invariable accompaniment of every mental process: but at the same time the mental process may be a cognition that has matter for its object. And it is important to see clearly that the movement of nerve-particles in the brain, which accompanies the transient psychical fact that we call cognition, is usually altogether different from the matter that we are thinking about. Thus:
I see that table. Here is a psychical fact—perception of table—which we believe to be related to matter in two ways; (1) to some unknown change in the matter of my brain as its immediate antecedent and concomitant, and (2) to the table as object; these are obviously two very different material facts.

I lay stress on this difference, because in psychological and philosophical discussions of Perception, there is some tendency to confound the two relations of mind to matter; and so, by mixing up the material concomitant or antecedent of cognition with its object, to fail of obtaining a clear notion of either. Thus it is sometimes said that what I 'really see' is the image on the retina, or perhaps the undulations of the luminiferous ether in contact with the eye. But reflection will show that neither of these facts is either the immediate antecedent or concomitant of vision or its immediate object. It is not its immediate antecedent or concomitant, because the nerve-process has many stages to pass through from the retina inwards before vision takes place: while, again, it is not its immediate object, because in vision I do not directly learn anything about the image on the retina of the thing seen or about the ethereal undulations: I only know these physical facts as the result, in the one case of a quite different observation, in the other case of a long process of scientific reasoning.

§ 4. We have now to observe that out of the double relation of Mind to Matter, which I have been explaining, arise the contrasted systems of (1) Materialism and (2) what is often called Idealism—
but I think it better to call it Mentalism, reserving the term Idealism, in accordance with recent usage, for a particular species of Mentalism. Materialism takes exclusive hold of one end by which mind is tied to matter, and identifies the thought or feeling with the nerve-process that accompanies it: Mentalism takes exclusive hold of the other end, and analyses matter as an object of perception and thought into mental elements. But the Materialistic resolution of mind into matter is only acceptable when we think loosely and confusedly: to the steady gaze of reflection the psychical phenomenon which it is sought to absorb into the physical always returns distinct and quite disparate from it. The Mentalistic explanation of matter in terms of mind has a much more profound and subtle plausibility. No one practised in reflective analysis can admit that what he means by a thought is a change in the grey or other matter of his brain: but it is more difficult to show that what I mean by (say) a table is anything else than an aggregate of feelings, actual or possible (i.e. ideal), and of thoughts binding the feelings together.

This analysis I now propose to examine: but before examining it, we should note that it is pursued by three different classes of thinkers to three very different kinds of result. I will briefly characterise these three classes, taking the simplest types, and overlooking intermediate shades and combinations.

The first class are not strictly to be termed
Mentalists, but rather perhaps Phenomenalists or Relativists: for though they analyse matter, as an object of perception and knowledge, into mental elements, they do not conclude that matter does not exist independently of mind, but only that we can have no knowledge of it as so existing; we can only, they hold, know how it appears to mind. The pure Mentalists go a step further and deny the existence of this unknown and unknowable matter: the ultimate reality—as they agree, in holding—is mental or psychical in its nature. But while one section of them regard reality as ultimately Feeling—reducing somehow the *relational* element in our common notion of the physical world to a secondary and derivative kind of feeling—another section holds that, so far as the Real is definitely knowable, its main or sole constituent is Thought. The former it seems best to call Sensationalists (bearing in mind that this term is sometimes used for a confused blending of sensationalistic mentalism with Materialism): for the latter—of whom Green is an example—I reserve the term Idealist.

This classification, as you will see, belongs to Philosophy rather than to Psychology. It is the business of Psychology to consider how far the transient mental fact which we call a cognition or thought of a portion of matter is capable of being analysed into elements and what these elements are: and this no doubt has a *bearing* on the question 'whether matter, as we commonly conceive it, exists independently of mind.' But it belongs to Philo-
sophy, not to Psychology, to decide this latter question.¹

In examining the analysis of our cognition or notion of matter—i.e. of matter as commonly conceived, 'phenomenal' matter—it is important to distinguish three different methods; (a) Empirical Reflective Analysis, (b) Psychogononical Analysis, and (c) Transcendental Analysis, which carries us beyond the limits of empirical Psychology. The first is used more or less by all thinkers, the use of the second is characteristic of Relativists and Sensationalists; the use of the third is peculiar to Idealists. In the present lecture I wish to concentrate attention on the results of the first two methods.

(a) Firstly, direct reflection shows us that certain percepts which in ordinary thought we regard as located in the material world, outside our bodies, are in part not definitely attached to this material world, and are at any rate not essential to our notion of matter. Thus sounds, smells, flavours are not definitely attached to any portion of matter outside

¹ It may be thought that in this and the following section I am arguing definitely the metaphysical question at issue between Mentalism and Common Sense; so that when the end of these sections is reached I conceive the question to be settled. But this would be altogether premature. The issues between Common Sense and Mentalism in different forms are among the most important and extensively discussed in modern metaphysical controversy—indeed they are only surpassed in importance by the questions that lead into Theology—and we are only now in the vestibule of metaphysics and making our way towards it. What I am here arriving at is something quite different: I am considering how far empirical Psychology, as a special science, will take us in the discussion of this controversy; and I am considering this because it seems to me that Mentalists—especially 'Psychological Philosophers'—have fallen into the mistake of supposing that it will take us further than it will.
the organism; and we can perfectly well conceive matter as flavourless, inodorous, non-resonant. In fact careful reflection leads me to distinguish—as regards (e.g.) Sound—between a sensation of sound, which so far as it is connected with any matter is connected with the nervous system of my ear and brain, and a process of material particles outside: and when this distinction is made clear, I no longer attribute Sound—as distinct from motion of material particles—to the matter outside.

The case of colour is different, as this percept is definitely extended and attached to the surface of matter: I cannot conceive colour unextended. But colour depends on light; and so much of my life is spent in the dark, that I can easily conceive a world without light or colour, in which my perception of matter would depend entirely on touch and the muscular sense: and I am helped in this conception by the physical theory of light, since the movements of the luminiferous ether which affect my optical nerves are inevitably conceived to be movements of lightless and colourless matter.

In this way reflective analysis enables me to separate from my notion of matter as it exists independently of mind what used to be called the Secondary Qualities of matter: i.e. the percepts of the special senses, taste, smell, hearing, and sight.

Then, after having gone so far, it is easy, in reflecting on such qualities as hard, soft, smooth, rough, etc., to distinguish elements which belong to
the sense of touch and the muscular sense, and which we can separate from our notion of matter as it exists outside our organism and not affecting it. Let us take the notions of 'hard,' 'soft,' 'rough,' 'smooth,' and reflect on their meaning. There is no doubt, I suppose, that we commonly regard them as attributes of various portions of matter existing in space outside our organisms: at the same time there seems no doubt that each term suggests a faint image of a particular quality of complex sensation—of touch, pressure and muscular sense combined—which I experience when one of my bodily organs, e.g. a finger, presses against a portion of matter called hard or soft, or is moved along the surface of a portion called rough or smooth. Now it seems to me that psychological reflection enables us to distinguish the quality of hardness, etc.—conceived as existing in the thing apart from any contact with our own or any other sentient organism—from the sensations of which I have spoken. I can make the distinction, because if I conceive a hard piece of inorganic matter (A) colliding with another hard piece (B) and then afterwards with a soft piece (C), the difference of its effect on each I conceive to manifest the hardness of (B) and the softness of (C); although there is no effect conceived to be produced on any sentient organism. I thus see that by 'hardness' as a quality of matter existing independently of organic feeling, I mean a tendency to preserve its form and internal structure—spatial relations—comparatively unchanged when it comes into collision with matter; and by 'softness' a
tendency to change them with comparative ease under similar circumstances.

In this way I separate the elements of imaginary tactual sensation from my notion of matter conceived as 'hard,' etc., and thus distinguish in thought my notion of extended matter from my notion of tactual sensation, and conceive the former as existing apart from the latter.

At this point it may be answered, "No doubt one can think of bodies other than his own organism and of transactions between such bodies as having an objective existence, but then I inevitably think of such bodies as tangible and resisting: the content of my conception of matter cannot be separated from actual or imaginary sensations belonging to the sense of touch and the muscular sense." Now I am willing to agree with this statement up to a certain point—or rather to agree with a statement which will approach somewhat near to this. I find that when I fix my thought upon 'extended matter,' and endeavour to contemplate reflectively and definitely the fact signified by this name, imaginary sensations of my own, visual, tactual, muscular, etc., come into my thought—visual I think at least as much as tactual, but certainly both: and I have no objection to grant that I cannot while dwelling on the notion of 'extension' or 'extended matter' effectually exclude such imaginary sensations from my consciousness. So much I concede to the objector. But granting that I cannot exclude them from my contemplative consciousness, it seems to
me no less certain that I can and always do exclude them from my conception of material reality, as existing independently of my consciousness.

Just as, in reading a vivid narrative of an ancient event of historic interest—say a battle in the Peloponnesian war or a debate in the Roman Senate—I am apt to imagine myself present, and seeing and hearing what goes on: nay, if the story is vividly told, I may be even carried further in imagination and partially imagine myself one of the actors in the scene. But all this play of imagination goes on without in the least altering my conception of the historic fact: I know all the while that the men whose actions and sufferings thus excite my imaginative sympathy lived ages ago when I (so far as I know) was non-existent. Similarly when I try to conceive vividly the planetary system—as modern astronomers lead me to conceive it—emerging from the primitive nebula, I have imaginary visual sensations, and when I try to imagine its rotation, imaginary muscular sensations, but I do not for a moment suppose that there were any such sensations, at a time when, as I suppose, there were not any sentient organisms. So again, when I think (e.g.) of the attraction of gravitation operating within our Solar System: of the sun drawing the earth and being drawn by it, the earth drawing the moon and being drawn by it, I find I usually have a faint imagination of muscular effort connected with the notion of drawing or pulling: but I do not really attribute this feeling—in the
very least degree—to the sun, or the moon, or the earth.

Well, this is my answer to this line of objection. I grant a certain normal connexion between my conception no less than my perception of extended matter and real or imaginary sensations, visual, tactual, or muscular: but it is not a connexion which in any way impedes my conceiving of extended matter as it exists apart from sensation.

Accordingly I analyse the common notions of ‘hard,’ ‘soft,’ ‘smooth,’ ‘rough,’ etc., into:—(1) a sensational complex, actual or imaginary, composed of elements belonging to muscular sense as well as to the sense of touch; (2) a cognition, presentative or representative, of relational qualities of matter as it exists independently of my perception. I say ‘relational qualities,’ because the meaning of the term ‘hard’ e.g. involves a relation between the portion of matter cognised as hard and some other matter supposed to come into collision with it: but this other matter need not be a part of my or any other organism.

I admit that when I first fix my attention on the thought of extended matter, endeavouring to realise what I mean by the term, and then reflect on my state of consciousness when this endeavour is made, I find that my imaginary sensations, visual, tactual, muscular, are normally elements of my state of consciousness, and cannot be excluded. But my contention is that I do not in my ordinary thought attribute to them any representative validity: they
come in as elements of my conscious state, not as elements of my conception of material reality as existing independently of my consciousness.

Here, however, direct reflective analysis stops. There remains in our notion of matter—stripped as bare of sensational elements as direct reflective analysis can strip it—the properties which Hamilton distinguishes as 'Geometrical Solidity,' and 'Physical Solidity' or Incompressibility. I cannot separate from my notion of matter the 'necessity of trinal extension, in length, breadth, and thickness,' and I cannot conceive that the matter thus extended can be reduced to the condition of being non-extended; I must conceive it as ultimately incompressible.

(b) What I have called Psychogonical Analysis now takes up the work. It starts with the result which direct analysis yields—that the percepts of the different senses, though actually attached to our notion of matter in ordinary thought, are found to be separable from it by direct reflection, aided by physical theory: and it raises the question, How did this combination of percepts and concepts, which we can reflectively unravel, come about?

The answer is, By a process of association of percepts and images, carried on before the stage of conscious reflection and leading to the formation, after repeated occurrences of associated sense-perceptions, of the complex state of consciousness which constitutes our present conception of things as coloured, resonant, and odorous. Then further, the doctrine of evolution and heredity enables us to carry back this process
beyond the range of the individual's life. But thus carrying it back, we may be induced to carry it further than reflective analysis carries the process of separation. We may be induced to suppose that even our percepts and concepts of Extension and Solidity are similarly formed by associations of sensations of touch—with sensations of sight co-operating—and sensations of the muscular sense. In this way our whole thought of the material world may be hypothetically traced back to sensational elements.

§ 5. Now if I were giving a course of lectures on Psychology regarded as a special science, I should have some critical remarks to make on the assumptions underlying this conjectural history; in particular, it seems to me a fundamental error, in thinking of earlier mental states, to carry back hypothetically into them the clear distinctions of later thought, as the Psychogonist is liable to do. But this is not now our business: I am not concerned therefore to criticise the process of psychogonical reasoning which I have summarily given, so far as it is put forward merely as a description of the manner in which the faculty of perceiving and conceiving material things as we now do has gradually been developed, as an account i.e. of the sensational antecedents of which these perceptions and conceptions are consequents.

But this is not the conclusion that the Relativist or Sensationalist draws from this reasoning. The conclusion he draws is that these feelings are not merely antecedents of our common notion of the material world, but elements of which it is composed:
that therefore through our common notion of the material world we do not know anything at all of that world as it really is independent of our minds: we only know a complex mental fact.

Now I think that this conclusion, in the first place, is quite unwarranted by the reasoning on which it is based, and secondly, that it is palpably inconsistent with the assumptions made in that reasoning itself: The first of these points I have already argued in the parallel case of ethics: I have tried to show that in the application of psychogonical analysis to resolve moral cognition and disinterested choice into more primitive mental facts, there is a fundamental confusion between antecedents and elements. If, however, this process is unwarrantable and fallacious in dealing with ethical notions, it is doubly unwarrantable in the case of physical notions. For here inconsistency is added to fallacy. The moralist who explains away altruism into egoism, or rational choice into instinctive impulse, is not obliged,—in order to carry through the process of psychogonical explanation—to assume as actually existing at earlier stages the altruism or the rational choice to which he is leading up as the result of the development. But this is what the Relativist or Sensationalist has to do in the process by which he explains away matter into feeling. For in tracing the manner in which sensations belonging to different senses—primarily feelings of touch and feelings that attend the exercise of muscles, secondarily visual feelings—combine

to form the notion of solid matter in space of three dimensions, he does not confine himself to Psychology proper, and think only of sensation and sense regarded as psychical facts. On the contrary he brings into marked prominence the physical side of sense and sensations; indeed, he talks so much of the organs of sense, the brain, and the nerve-processes, that his explanation to ordinary readers presents itself as a materialistic explanation. This is the case (e.g.) with Spencer: he justly repudiates the idea that he is a materialist; but I always feel that the simple reader may be excused for the mistake; owing to the prominence that Spencer gives to the physiological side of the processes of development that he traces. Throughout his exposition, from first to last, the reader’s thought, being kept fixed on the organic processes preceding and accompanying mental feelings, is kept within the world of matter in space, the particles of which are conceived by him to be existing, moving and operating apart from any cognition by mind of their existence and operation:—for the developing mind contemplated is certainly not conscious of the processes going on in its brain and nervous system. How is it possible, then, that the result of this process can be to deprive of their objective validity these fundamental conceptions of space, motion, and mass which have been used throughout the process? The inconsistency seems to me flagrant and palpable.

But why, it may be asked, does not the Relativist or Sensationalist see this?
I think that his failure to see it is partly due to the want of clear and steady perception of the duality of the relation between mind and matter which I explained earlier in this lecture. Not having this duality clearly before his mind, the Relativist in thinking of matter in one relation, forgets that matter at the same time is coming into his thought on the other side: his attention and analysis are primarily occupied with the relation of mind to matter as object perceived; and the relation of mental changes to nervous changes which accompany them but are not their object—this steals into and even becomes prominent in his thought without his noticing that in contemplating this relation and tracing it through the complications which his theory involves, he is assuming real matter in real space as naively as the plain man assumes it in the case of more ordinary perceptions.

And one reason why I before laid so much stress on the indispensability, increasingly felt in Psychological study, of obtaining the aid of Physiology, is because this shows that the tendency of psychological study is in the direction of making the inconsistency of which I speak continually more prominent. The unphysiological psychologist, who lets his brain, nerves, and sense-organs drop into the background of his thought, may more easily explain away into mental elements the matter which he conceives only as object of perception. But he now represents a past stage of psychological theory: and the psychophysiological psychologist, or physiological psychologist who repre-
sents the present tendency of psychological investigation must find this explanation continually more difficult.

Perhaps it may be replied, "No doubt the physiological psychologist must assume the real existence of some kind of matter: but not of the matter ordinarily conceived and apparently perceived by the plain man. The matter which the man of science assumes is no doubt conceived to occupy space in some manner, and to change its position in space, but the duly instructed man of science recognises—what the plain man does not see, or only dimly sees—that the ultimate constitution of matter is a problem not yet solved. Whether matter consists ultimately of absolutely solid particles, or of centres of force—or possibly, as Lord Kelvin suggested, vortices in a primitive fluid, having no other properties than inertia, invariable density, and perfect mobility—these questions the judicious physicist does not pretend to answer definitely or decisively; he would even admit that every particular answer that can be given is exposed to grave difficulties. Even the law of gravitation itself, when we reflect on it, strikingly exemplifies the imperfection of our present conceptions of the world without us. *Prima facie,* it involves the notion of attractive force exercised at a distance, and not propagated through motion of particles of an intervening medium: but it has so far been found impossible to bring this into harmony with the rest of our systematised experience of the manner in which forces operate on masses. With
so great and palpable incoherence in our system of physical conceptions, is it not absurd to maintain that we know matter as it really is?"

No doubt all this, and more, might be said by a sceptical physicist against the finality of the present conceptions which science presents to us of the material world. But this is no argument for Mentalism as against Natural Dualism; unless the mentalist is prepared to contend that our conception of mind is free from similar incoherences—which few mentalists are at present hardy enough to maintain. Nor does it prove the ‘Relativity of knowledge,’ in any useful sense of the word ‘Relativity’: it only proves its imperfection. And the Natural Dualist may fairly urge that the imperfection of our physical knowledge has been continually reduced in the progress of physical science: and that this improvement has been effected, not by throwing aside the plain man’s conception of matter as a reality independent of mind, but by working on it, purging it from elements that reflection shows to be clearly subjective, and bringing it, together with the connected notions of space, force, and motion, into continually clearer consistency and closer harmony with experience. This defence of Common Sense is, I think, valid against any conclusions drawn from Psychogonical analysis; but we have yet to consider whether this or any other defence will avail against Transcendental analysis. This consideration, however, I must reserve for a subsequent lecture.¹

¹ Cf. below, pp. 81f, 91f.