that Plato endeavours to connect the emotional part of the constitution with a system professedly providing only for the purely rational element. The baser passions are assigned to a merely bodily origin, and Fortitude and Temperance are to repress and subjugate them. The more noble are either busied in assisting the power of Reason to crush all opposition, or they are themselves the wing by which the philosophic soul rises into its appropriate world. Finally, the general desire of temporary happiness is consigned to the charge of presiding Wisdom, which, dreading its excesses, cautiously measures out its daily allowance.

I had intended to have passed from the subject of the Platonic system of morals to that of the Platonic political philosophy; but the occasion will not permit the extended discussion it would require. I shall, therefore, merely observe that the Politics of Plato are a wide but faithful development of his moral theory. He wrote two large works on the subject; one (The Republic) in which he presents the Ideal of a State then unrealized, and probably for ever to continue so; the other (The Laws), in which he undertakes to apply the principles of his ideal as far as possible to the state of his age and the world. The main political engine with Plato is Education,—education not, indeed, in the vulgar sense of elementary teaching, which he thought of little comparative moment, but education in that wide conception of it which includes the training of every faculty of mind and body from the instant of birth to maturity. His Republic is truly a large University, even to the "traveling fellows." The fault of Plato's ideal of political perfection is, that it converts the members of a state into mere machines of the public will, and, annihilating all individuality, endangers the impulse to personal excellence; overpowers the subjects of government with a legislation perhaps too private, officious, and minute; opposes the growth of the natural affections (destroying at a blow all filial and connubial relations), and leaves no room for national expansion or circumstantial alteration. The necessity under which he conceived himself of making the state the exact counterpart of the individual soul,—three castes (of governors, warriors, and artisans) answering to the triple division

14 [Repul. iv. p. 441 A: τὸ δυσοικτά ἐπικαυτή ἐπικαυτῆς δοσιματικῆς φύσει. Ed.]
15 [Thad. p. 246, fol. Ed.]
16 [As he says himself in the Repub. B. ix. 611. Ed.]
17 [The relation of the polity sketched in the Laws to the ideal or perfect state is described in Legq. B. v. p. 739. Ed.]
18 [A good critique of the Platonic State will be found towards the end of the second volume of Brandis's Handbuch. Ed.]
Lect. vi.

of Man,—undoubtedly hampered his freedom of speculation. The systematic spirit of Plato reduces everything under vast generalizations, and sees humanity, whether individual or social, under a single aspect, the loftiest of all, but uniform in its loftiness—and you require nothing more to show you how remote are the political writings of this great Thinker from the spirit of our day, than to remember the fact, that some of the principal texts of his profoundest metaphysic occur in the midst of The Republic. But with all their peculiarities—in many instances in consequence of their peculiarities—these extraordinary works maintain their interest beyond all subsequent political essays; for the union, characteristic of Plato, of sublime and comprehensive conceptions of the possibilities of moral advancement with the minutest special observation of human nature, they are still, perhaps, unequalled; nor is the literary education of any statist completed who has not made them his own.

And now, Gentlemen, as I may trust that those among you who have accompanied me through the series of these discourses with any regularity, and listened to them with any attention, have obtained a tolerable idea of the chief features of the most remarkable of all the ancient systems of philosophy, it remains that, having traversed this vast and interesting region, we pause for a moment on its borders, and, ere we leave it, endeavour to compress in a single reverted view its beauties and its defects. I have attempted to introduce the philosophy of Plato at some length to this audience, because (no doubt on account of not presenting any single available text-book) it unfortunately forms no subject of examination, except incidentally, in any department of our collegiate studies. Yet it is certain that no accuracy of knowledge in the later Grecian theories can at all compensate for imperfect acquaintance with this mighty monument of earlier speculation; the beginning, and yet the masterpiece of Grecian system. To Christian students, especially, it presents topics of perpetual interest, both from the tone of the system itself, and from the influence it has exercised over Ecclesiastical Literature in almost every age. And surely nothing can be more instructive (ought we to doubt that it was purposely provided?) than to watch the efforts of human intelligence often struggling in the very same path which Revelation came afterwards to clear of all obstruction; when it coincides, to see in it the unbiased testimony of natural reason to the supernatural communication,—when it differs or omits, to mark in every separate instance the calm unboastful superiority of the message from heaven!
I shall not occupy the short time that remains with any special discussion of the pure metaphysics of Plato. The very detail of the subject brought its own criticism with it; and the occasion does not allow recapitulation. Platonism is essentially a system of moral discipline or purification; it was in that light its Author saw it, and to that sole purpose his labours, however diversified, were dedicated. This is the point too in which false impressions of its value, of the real nature of its merits and its defects, are likely to prove of highest practical importance; and I would not wish you to leave this place under mistaken notions of either.

The merits of the Platonic practical philosophy are clear and commanding. They perpetuate the value of Platonism to this day; they unquestionably render its records among the noblest and most elevating studies that can engage a human spirit when unoccupied by the higher lessons of inspiration. These merits consist, in the immutable basis which this system assigns to the principles of moral truth, in the moral aspect under which it contemplates the creation and the Creator, in the grandeur of its conceptions of the destinies of the human soul, and in the purity of its practical morality. These are high claims to our reverential admiration; they are claims which in every age have taught the noblest and purest spirits of our race to recur with veneration to the memory of Plato. For all truths, whencesoever derived, are mutually consistent; they gladly countenance each other; and no certainty or abundance of revealed knowledge will ever place the candid mind above welcoming with joy the corroborating attestations of philosophy.

The defects of the Platonic system of humanity are not, however, less certain than its merits; and the tone of general encomium which I have so long employed in speaking of its excellences, may justify me in noticing its blemishes now. After making allowances so large on its behalf, you will not attribute to narrowness or bigotry the exceptions I am next obliged to subjoin...I am not about to enlarge upon what, perhaps, are the most ordinary articles of accusation against Plato, his gratuitous theories about the origin and fortunes of the soul, partly because the practical interest of these theories has disappeared, and partly because (according to the views already laid before you) I believe them to have been by Plato himself either accepted as probabilities only, or adopted as attractive forms of profounder metaphysical principles. I speak of points which more directly concern our own habits of thinking on subjects of the highest importance, on which Plato has often before
now misled, and may still mislead, his enthusiastic admirers.

In the first place, then, there runs through all the views of Plato a want of any distinct apprehension of the claims of divine justice in consequence of human sin. Even in his strongest references to punishment, it is still represented mainly, if not entirely, under the notion of a purificatory transition, a severe but beneficial καθαρός. This arises partly from his conception of the divine character, partly from his theory of the human soul itself. From the former, inasmuch as he considers the attribute of indignant wrath, or its results, inapplicable to Deity,—from the latter, because in considering the soul essentially in its higher elements divine, he could only look upon the misfortunes of its bodily connexion as incidental pollutions which might delay, but could not ultimately defeat its inalienable rights. He must be a very uncandid critic who can censure Plato severely for these misconceptions; but he would be a very imperfect expositor who should not mention them as such. There is probably no single point in the moral relations of the creation for which we are so entirely indebted to revelation, as this of the enormity of sin and the severity of divine judgment. Thus instructed, it is possible that the demands of divine justice may be demonstrated accordant with the antecedent notices of the moral reason; but there is a wide difference between proving a revealed principle, and discovering it before it has been revealed. We are not, then, to blame Plato severely for overlooking that mystery of divine righteousness which even the reiterated and explicit intimations of Inspiration can scarcely persuade ourselves practically to realize. But we are to censure those (and it is for this reason I mark the matter distinctly) who labour by unwarrantable glosses to dilute into the disciplinary chastenings of a wise benevolence the stern simplicity with which the Scriptures declare the awful anger of a rejected God. These teachers have abounded in every age, and in one remarkable era of our English Church history were so closely and avowedly connected with Platonism (especially in its later and more mystical forms) as to have thence derived their ordinary title.10 Gifted with extraordinary powers of abstract contemplation, and a solemn grandeur of style, they abound with noble thoughts nobly expressed, but they are all marked with the characteristic

10 [The 'Cambridge Platonists' are of course the writers meant. One of the causes of the existence of this school was mental reaction against the morose Calvinism of the Puritans by or among whom its members had been educated. They were probably saved by Plato and Plotinus from falling into the opposite extreme of high-church intolerance which prevailed after the Restoration. Ed.]
defect of Platonized Christianity—a forgetfulness, or inadequate commemoration, of the most tremendous proof this part of the universe has ever been permitted to witness of the reality of the divine hatred for sin—the fact of the Christian Atonement.

The next point in which the exclusive cultivation of Platonism may become injurious is—in its indirect discouragement of active virtue. I need not say that no moral teacher can recommend in higher terms the usual exercises of social duty; but the true influences of any moral system depend less on the duties it verbally prescribes than on the proportion it establishes between them. And no one that remembers the Platonic conception of the contemplative “philosopher” as the perfection of humanity, can hesitate in pronouncing that Plato inclines the balance to that very side to which the students of his writings, from their reflective and sedentary habits, may be supposed already but too much biased. The results of this tendency are obvious. To contemplate ideas is in a certain sense—if the soul and its ideal objects ultimately blend—to introvert the mind upon itself; to do this exclusively, or as the main excellence of man, is—if constitutional temperament combine—to endanger sinking into moral egotism, intellectual mysticism. Nor are the meditative follies of the Indian Yogi any more than the last and worst form of the tendency. The busy activity of Athenian minds and habits, perhaps, prevented Plato from clearly seeing the inevitable consequences of a system of moral discipline which perpetually represents its highest stage as one of simple contemplation; but the _aivóphiá_ of the Alexandrian school long after developed the secret genius of this element of the system, when transplanted to a more favourable soil.

Nor can it be denied, again, that Platonism is defective in those engagements for the affections which no system of human nature can omit without fatal imperfection. We saw how, in the scheme of social life advocated in the _Republic_, the whole body of domestic affections are annihilated by a single provision, the community of wives. This disregard of the original constitution of human nature is too often manifested by Plato in his projects for its advancement. Nor can it be replied, that this deficiency is remedied in the peculiar theory to which I have this day referred,—a theory which in its author’s design bears little reference to any communion of affections in the present state, but is, on the contrary, intended to hurry the mind from the present and sensible into an invisible and impalpable scene with which the human feelings cease to have an element in common. And as Platonism supplies little
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aliment for the innocent affections, it may also be added, that it does not sufficiently estimate the power of the evil ones; that in reducing the moral education to the recovery from ignorance and the distinct perception of transcendent truth, it underrates the tyranny of passion, and the still more oppressive despotism of habit, which often triumph in their most fatal vigour in minds exquisitely sensitive to moral impressions. It is in the clear apprehension of these daily experiences that Aristotle excels his master. It is in the combination of the excellences of the two with an element higher than either ever attained, that the ethics of Christianity immeasurably transcend them both.

Much, doubtless, of this practical deficiency in Platonism arose from its illustrious founder’s extravagant conceptions of the essential evil of Body in all its possible human forms. Wholly engaged with the immortal essence it imprisoned, and attributing to matter the organization of almost all which restrains that glorious stranger from soaring to its native skies, Plato was accustomed to regard with coldness and suspicion every principle which could not trace its connexion directly with the rational part of our complex constitution. To him everything was measured by an eternal standard; that which was not fit for eternity was of little consequence in time. A noble maxim, surely, but one whose application must depend on the nature of the eternity we anticipate. In proclaiming the perpetuation of the bodily organization, the Christian system has for ever dried the source of those delusive dreams of superhuman purity which proceed, more or less, upon the supposition that there is something inherently debasing in the very possession of a material frame. And when we enumerate the internal proofs which establish the fact, that this divine system never could have been the natural growth of (at least) the fashionable or popular philosophy of its time, we ought not to forget, that, so universal and so deep were these impressions of the ineffaceable malignity of body, that the earliest internal dissentients from the general creed of the Christian Church were those who could not believe it possible that an immaculate Redeemer could have been invested with an earthly body, and therefore maintained that the Divine Sufferer was but the shadowy apparition of a human frame.

After all—it must be said on behalf of Plato,—and I


20 [Aristotle, it should be remembered, speaks quite as strongly as Plato of the superiority of speculative thought (πεπτωκός) to all other forms of human energy. See Eth. N. x. c. 8. Even the much vaunted τοῦ πεξάντος ὕπατος ἄλλο πέπλος has this meaning, the opposite of that generally assigned to it by modern moralizers; πέπλος denoting not ‘practical’ but mental or speculative activity, as distinguished from the mere possession of knowledge. Ed.]
rejoice in a qualification which allows me to close this subject in that tone of sympathy and admiration in which I began it,—after all, it must in fairness be allowed,—that these errors are rather the tendencies of his system, than his own original representation of it. They were assuredly in it, but under his superintendence they did not dare to show themselves as after ages saw them. Of the truth and value of his leading principles he thought highly, but he never long resigns himself unreservedly to their guidance. Man as he ought to be, was the favourite subject of his thoughts; but man as he is, was seldom forgotten. Such was the scope of this man’s vision, such his wonderful equilibrium in even his loftiest flights, that, though the theory may lose sight of human nature, the theorist does not. But the principles—the commanding ideas—were too expansive for any control but his own; he was sober amidst excitement that made others insane. His spirit, practical and speculative at once, enabled him to combine what others could only catch in fragments; ideas that he governed, governed inferior men. In that realm of new and vast conceptions which he had made his own, Plato might be compared to some mighty conqueror (to him, for example, of the succeeding generation) who founds a single empire of many discordant nations, and, during his own life, keeps it together by the mastery of his personal genius—endowing the whole with the spirit and character of one unbroken monarchy; but at whose death the combining pressure is lost, the vast aggregate falls asunder, the dissolved confederates return by degrees into the diversity of their national character, and dynasties, without number originate out of the fragments of one.

I shall here close the subject. I trust next term to carry you farther in the history of Grecian speculation.
FOURTH SERIES.

LECTURE I.

ON THE SUCCESSORS OF PLATO. THE ACADEMY.

GENTLEMEN,

With the close of my last address to you from this place I brought to a conclusion the philosophy of Plato. I entertain some hope that the discussions which I offered to your consideration on the subject of this sublime and singular system have attained the object which alone I proposed to myself in presenting them;—that they have stimulated a curiosity which I confess they were not competent adequately to satisfy; and, by inducing a few of my hearers to recur from the lecturer to his Author, have contributed to introduce some of the more advanced students of our University to the most interesting and attractive of all the rich relics of ancient thought. It is the peculiar, and in many respects the fortunate tendency of modern criticism, that, unsatisfied with receiving the learning of antiquity through the uncertain medium of subsequent versions and commentaries, it reverts at once to the originals, and refuses all interpretations which are not verified by them. This spirit has, in one important department of inquiry, been unquestionably carried to an unwarrantable excess, to a disregard of all the confirmations of contemporary authority and all the lights of traditional belief;—but it has as assuredly been accompanied by valuable results, in an increased knowledge of the very thoughts and expressions of the great masters of ancient lore, and in that freshness of interest which new theories of their meaning, whether right or wrong, impart to their labours and to the subjects on which those labours were expended. And, viewed merely as a means of mental discipline, there can be no doubt that an hour devoted to this independent research, is infinitely more valuable than days devoted to the patient indeed, but servile and mechanical, acquisition of a merely traditionary philosophy, however ancient or authoritative.
With regard to the writings of Plato many other considerations contribute to give value to this course of independent investigation. We possess the entire body of his recognized productions, and are, therefore, placed above the necessity of explanatory supplements; and the character which continental philosophy has for many years been assuming, leading it over the same ground which Plato trod, has more and more impressed the conviction that we see little which he did not see with equal or greater perspicuity, and that his own genuine writings may, therefore, be searched as authentic monuments of which our own age, perhaps, beyond all others, was predestined to understand the real value.

There is, probably, no student of the history of ancient speculation who has not felt a deep interest in addressing himself to examining the fortunes of the philosophy of Plato after the decease of its illustrious founder. We are prompt to conclude that its results must have been commensurate with its importance; that such a Presence could not have visited our earth without leaving behind it a long retinue of glories. That great results of Platonism do live upon the page of history is, indeed, certain; but we should be much disappointed if we expected any immediate manifestation of its power. The successors of Plato added no brilliancy to his name. They inherited the skeleton of his doctrines, but the life had disappeared; and the colouring and expression with which the frame had glowed it was beyond their power to perpetuate. Never was there in the history of philosophy an instance of so sudden an extinction. Some of the details of the Platonic teaching they preserved and transmitted; but a strange and distant element was to be incorporated with the thin cold compound before it resumed any of the warmth and expansion that marked it in the master's hands. This unfortunate result must be referred partly to the vast influence of rival systems; partly to the comparative inefficiency of teachers. In the succession of five philosophic instructors who are usually named as the chiefs of the old Academy, there is little to detain us,—nor amid all the learning which has been profusely lavished upon investigating their tenets, is there a single deduction calculated to elucidate distinctively the character of their progress or regression. The point most observable is, perhaps, to be found in the reign of Xenocrates of Chalcedon. Xenocrates, it would seem, revived the alliance of Pythagorism with Platonism. His psychology terminated in the affirmation that the soul of

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[Speusippus (Plato's nephew) Xenocrates, Polemo, Crates, and Crantor. Ed.]
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man is "a self-moving number"—a combination (as we may interpret it) of activity and proportion. Such views are opposed to all forms of materialism; and accordingly Cicero tells us "animi figuram, et quasi corpus, negavit esse." Of his theology we can scarcely furnish so favourable a report. "Deos enim octo esse dicit; quinque eos qui in stellis vagis nominantur; unum qui ex omnibus sideribus quae fixa caelo sunt, ex dispersis quasi membris simplex sit putandus Deus; septimum solem adjungit; octavamque Lunam,"—a system of divinity on which the Epicurean narrator makes certainly the justifiable comment, "qui quo sensu beati esse possint, intelligi non potest." The record of his contemporary Speusippus's opinion is even preferable to this: "Deum esse vim animalem omnium regentem, statuit." In the estimate of Cicero, the great characteristic of this earliest academy was the abandonment of the Socratic principle of hesitancy,—a singular instance of the mutability of philosophical schools. In this respect they resembled the rival school of Aristotle, which had already begun to systematize its vast masses of doctrine. "Utrique, Platonis ubertate completi, certam quamdam disciplinam formulam composuerunt, et eam quidem plenam ac refertam; illam autem Socraticam dubitationem de omnibus rebus, et nulla affirmatione adhibita consuetudinem disserendi reliquerunt." Of Polemon, of Crates, of Crantor, Cicero (a valuable authority in the history of the school to which he had eminently attached himself) delivers the same verdict,—"in vetere disciplina Platonica nil mutant." They had changed little or nothing in the formal recitation of doctrines; but everything shows how the spirit had evaporated. And what surely confirms our conviction that, with all this superficial sameness, a deep internal change must have passed through the traditions of Platonism, is the perpetual evidence of Cicero's that all these teachers "ab Aristotle nihil magno opere disseruerunt." They agreed with him in some of the formulas of their ethical instruction, and in some of the principles of their metaphysical philosophy, and they were content not to examine more deeply. A fuller appreciation of the system whose tenets they professed to represent would infallibly have committed

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8 [Arist. de An. I. 2 and 4; where Simplicius observes ξωοκρατίου δ' τῆς ψυχῆς διάτομος λόγος. Ed.]
9 [Rather, perhaps, the principle of Life and Law. Ed.]
10 [Ibid. I. 10, 20. Ed.]
13 [Ibid. I. 13, 32. Ed.]
14 [Cic. Acad. I. 4, 17. Ed.]
15 [He extends the remark to Speusippus and Xenocrates, Acad. I. 9, 34: "diligenter en qua a superioribus acceperrunt tuebantur." Ed.]
16 [De Orat. III. 18, 67. Ed.]
them with Peripateticism; nor can the disciples have evaded the opposition which the master so largely attracted, except by a more or less constant evasion of his peculiar doctrines.

But the time soon arrived when the results of the teaching of Plato were to manifest themselves in a more definite form. And as this vast system contained within it elements of a very opposite character, such as the genius of the founder alone was adequate to harmonize, we may expect that, when relieved from his controlling hand, these elements should evince a strong mutual repulsion. Platonism presented itself under two aspects, and so forcibly under both that it became a favourite speculation of ancient criticism to determine which was eminently characteristic of the author. Whether Plato was to be enrolled in the list of sceptical or of dogmatical philosophers,—among those who denied the possibility of assured knowledge, or those who maintained a fixed scheme of doctrine,—was perpetually agitated. You will easily understand, that the difficulty is solved by apportioning his doubts and his beliefs to different regions of the mind respectively. And according as the inquirer is chiefly busied with each, will be his verdict of the Platonic theory of knowledge;—if he be principally engaged in studying the value of the informations of sense, he will pronounce Plato a sceptic, for in the modifications of the sensitive organization we know that Plato refused to recognise any stable basis of truth; if, on the contrary, his philosophical habits lead the inquirer to meditate on the notices of the pure intellect, he will pronounce Plato the most resolute of dogmatizers, for here alone he professed to see the form of truth, the reality of being, and that with a fulness of perfection which rendered denial or hesitation impossible.

From this distinction, then, we derive the great line which separates the two chief developments of the Platonic philosophy. In speaking of them we are enabled to follow the order of time; for these developments were not contemporary, but successive. The first was nearly exhausted, when the second, and far more interesting, form commenced. The sceptical result of Platonism is exhibited in the Academic Philosophy, the immediate occupant of the School of Plato;—the doctrinal result is revealed in that singular succession of teachers who at Rome, Alexandria, and Athens, accompanied and opposed the early fortunes of the Christian faith, and who under the title of the new, or later, Platonists, have intimately associated themselves with the very name of the philosopher, and materially affected his reputation.

It is with the former of these—the Academic School—
that we are first to be engaged; and we shall consider it, according to the plan adopted in these Lectures, not in its succession of names and forms, so much as in the course and changes of its spirit.

The Academic School was an attempted compromise between scepticism and belief, with a large balance in favour of the former. Its scepticism is its prominent characteristic; and in this respect we shall now examine the rationale of its existence.

How then did the Philosophy of Plato lead to this spirit of doubt?

In what I have just now said of the Platonic view of the knowledge attainable through the machinery of sense, I have supplied the first answer to this question. To those who were resolute to refuse all mental capacities beyond those which were directly concerned in elaborating the products of the sensitive consciousness, it is obvious that the discussions of Plato furnished the sure means of unlimited scepticism, in perpetually discountenancing these impressions of sense as the possible ground of real knowledge. To a reader holding this limited creed, the founder of the vastest of systems must have appeared the most unqualified of sceptics. He cut from beneath such a reader the only ground on which that reader would consent to rest.

Again, by the very form of exposition the Platonic treatises might encourage such a spirit. The dialogue which continually invites and supposes mutual opposition, has a natural tendency to suggest the possibility of objections indefinitely prolonged. This result was heightened in the dialogues of Plato by the suppression of distinct conclusions. Compositions intended merely to stimulate meditation are seldom adapted to implant definite doctrine; and the very irony in which the Platonic Socrates loved to indulge was more calculated to suggest misgivings as to the solidity of all received systems than to replace them by any settled creed.

To this must be added the disciplinary purpose of many of the discussions conceived or recorded by Plato. The search for truth was made a matter of mental exercise. It is not the object of the chase to capture the prey so much as to prolong and vary the pursuit. This, it is true, was in the Platonic scheme of intellectual education a merely preliminary process,—the hardening of the soldier for a genuine encounter to come. But it is not to be supposed that this arrangement of subjects and methods was understood or observed when the manuscripts of Plato were circulated in one collection. Passages which were originally meant as exemplifications of mental gymnastic, were readily adopted
as the philosopher’s avowal and exhibition of the equal plausibility of every form of opinion.

And we can easily apprehend how these results were assisted by the very exaltation of the Platonic tone of thought. Truth when placed at such a height seemed to many minds unattainable; what was so lofty seemed out of sight. The multitude would readily declare, that it was as well to say, “there is no truth,” as to say, “there is truth only in ideas;” the ideal was (as so often) confounded with the imaginary. Keen and suspicious critics would say that a system so aerial was the magnificent escape of a defeated logician, and pronounce that the reality which was found only in the eternal exemplars of things was not the reality for which they were interested or contended—the realities, as they are called, of life and experience. And the upholder of the inheritance of Platonism, discouraged by the want of sympathy, would gradually discard these higher elements; the opposition of influential schools would seduce them to a lower field of conflict; and on that lower field finding little countenance from their own master, yet unwilling to surrender the great cause of the reality and fixity of Knowledge, they would occupy themselves in subtle distinctions and evasive compromises, or under a show of resistance betray the question and deny the loftier prerogative of reason altogether.

The prominent tenets of the academic succession were fixed and matured by the rivalry of Stoicism. The disposition to doubt was prepared already; but the dogmatism of the Stoic teachers precipitated it into form and firmness.

The Stoics had occupied themselves deeply with the theory of human knowledge. After much consideration, they had devised a threefold distribution of the subject; classing the varieties of assent under the titles of science, opinion, and a mediate condition of the mind which they denominated φαντασία καταληπτική; if, indeed, this last term ought not rather to be interpreted as expressing that degree of conviction which belonged to those representations of which science (ἐπιστήμη) was composed. All knowledge, in the Stoical theory, resolved itself into communications between the exterior world and the soul; the φαντ. κατάλ shaped the impression which the soul detained as solid and certain. It was against this last tenet that the hostility of the Academy was chiefly directed. The doctrine of the φαντασία καταληπτική upheld, that impressions from objects distinct from the mind itself, when accompanied by a thorough conviction of the reality, were sufficient to establish knowledge and to satisfy the legitimate demands of the reason. The Academics met this
affirmation with their ἀκαταληψία, which denied the certainty of the conformity of perceptions with their causes or objects. In this controversy the Stoics appear to have seldom grappled with the real difficulties of the case; though, it must be admitted, the small and fragmentary portions of their earlier writings which we possess, can scarcely warrant a very positive determination on this point.

But while the Academic teachers rejected the certainty of the communication between the world of reality and the soul of man, they professed, nevertheless, to admit the necessity of fixed beliefs. Accordingly they constructed (chiefly under the guidance of Carneades) that scale of probabilities which forms one of the most distinctive characteristics of the school; and which, taken together with their "acatalepsy" or refusal of absolute certainty, completes the fundamental elements of their system. The impossibility of absolute certainty, the value of high probability,—these are the dominant maxims of the Academic philosophy.

But the proportion of these elements varied at different periods of the history of the school, which stretches from the age of Plato to that of Cicero, and which critics have divided into five\(^{10}\) successions whose respective heads are considered to be (after the founder) Arcesilaus, Carneades, Philo, and Antiochus. I shall proceed to notice the principal stages of progress observable in these successions; purposely avoiding those minuter details of literary anecdote which you can easily obtain in the ordinary histories of ancient philosophy,—and endeavouring to confine your attention to the changes which affect fundamental questions. Of these the accounts are often contradictory and almost always vague; a few prominent points alone direct our course in a vast and shifting landscape.

Arcesilaus, a brother disciple of Zeno whom he was afterwards to oppose, a pupil of Pyrrho and Diodorus, first gave its peculiar character to the Academic school. His life and habits appear to have been perfectly suited to a teacher of the philosophy of indifference. It is recorded that he encouraged his disciples to desert his own teaching whenever they preferred that of any rival instructor; though it is indeed possible that this permission may have been the result of a thorough confidence in his own powers of attracting their attention,—powers which are attested by all the authorities. His blameless life was evidenced in the admission of even his opponents; his prompt and happy

\(^{10}\) [Cicero recognizes but two, others only three Academic successions—the Old, the Middle, and the New. Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. 1. 220. En.]
activity of intellect in the replies by which he discomfited them. None of the writings of Arcesilaus, however, are now extant; and the reports of the ancient critics and collectors are indecisive and perplexing as to his exact tenets.

For instance, certain passages of Sextus Empiricus and of Cicero seem to intimate that the scepticism of Arcesilaus was only apparent, and his devotion genuine to the system of Plato. "If we may believe what is related of Arcesilaus," says Sextus (*Pyr. Hypot. I. § 234), "his scepticism was only assumed; he used it as a test for his disciples; he afterwards entrusted his doctrine, which was no other than the doctrine of Plato, to those whom he had recognized as worthy to be admitted to his intimacy, and capacitated to receive his teaching." The general testimony of antiquity, however, does not strongly corroborate this representation; or, if it allow to Arcesilaus any definite scheme of tenets, overbalances them by a large weight of the declared maxims and objections of the sceptical philosophy. And Cicero himself allows that Arcesilaus had collected from the books of Plato and the discourses of Socrates this principal conclusion, "nihil esse certi quod aut sensibus aut animo percipi possit,"—and in another place assures us that Arcesilaus had severed the feeble link by which Socrates had connected doubt with certainty,—"negabat esse quidquam quod sciri posset, ne illud quidem ipsum quod Socrates sibi reliquisset". The *positive* system of Arcesilaus, I conclude, was altogether his practical system of moral life; the higher ideal theory of Plato we have no evidence that he maintained, and the probability is that he overlooked it; and against the stoical theory of irresistible belief we have his reasonings preserved,—that there can be no medium between absolute science and mere opinion, and that it is impossible to prove that perceptions may not misrepresent their objects. These things seem to show us in Arcesilaus the first complete development of the sceptical tendency of Platonism, as yet unregulated and unsystematized; accompanied by a conservation of moral propriety, derived from the authority of that great system, though supported on different grounds.

The second progressive form of the sceptical tendency is found in Carneades. Its character is systematic exposition. In the able administration of Carneades, the Academic philosophy assumed its definite form as a matured and finished theory. Carneades is the founder of the philosophy of probabilities. The great question of the day being the criterion of truth, Carneades denied the existence of any such criterion, but admitted differences in the degrees

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11 [*De Orat. III. 18, 67. Ed.*]  
12 [*Acad. I. 12, 45. Ed.*]
of assurance, and undertook to classify these differences. Of this classification some record is preserved; but we may easily believe that the philosopher carried his system into exacter details than any we possess. Truth, he held, was unattainable in absolute certainty; but we live in a world of resemblances to truth, and the practical assent of the mind must be determined by the degree of the resemblance, as far as this can be collected. You will remember that the Stoics, and the Academy in consonance with them, held that all knowledge was reducible to certain primary impressions made upon the soul by objects distinct from itself. These \( \varphi \alpha \nu \tau \alpha \sigma \alpha i \alpha i \) are the elements of all knowledge, and upon the certainty of them as representations of realities (it was thought) all certainty of all truth depends. Now the \( \varphi \alpha \nu \tau \alpha \sigma i a \) (I quote Sextus Empiricus's perspicuous statement\(^{18}\)) has a double relation—to the object causing and to the mind perceiving (\( \tau o \ \dot{\alpha} \phi \ \dot{o} \ \gamma i \nu \tau a i \), and \( \tau o \ \dot{e} \nu \ \varphi \ \gamma i \nu \tau a i \)), to the external object (\( \tau o \ \dot{e} \kappa t o s \ \upsilon \tau o \kappa e i \mu e \theta o v \ \alpha i \sigma \theta \eta t o v \)), and to the man. Hence arise two considerations or habits of the \( \varphi \alpha \nu \tau \alpha \sigma i a \),—\( \pi r \o \tau o \ \varphi \alpha \nu \tau \alpha \sigma t o v \) and \( \pi r \o \tau o \ \varphi \alpha \nu \tau \alpha \sigma i \o \iota \mu e \mu o v \). Each of these \( \sigma \chi \varepsilon \sigma e i \) or relations may be true or false, whether really or apparently. The \( \varphi \alpha \nu \tau \alpha \sigma i a \) is true in relation to the object, when it is \( \sigma i \mu \phi \omega o v o s \) or conformable; false, when \( \delta i \alpha \phi \omega o v o s \), or discordant, with it. The \( \varphi \alpha \nu \tau \alpha \sigma i a \) in its relation to the subject—to the mind—is \emph{phenomenally} or \emph{apparently} true or false (\( \dot{e} \sigma t i \ \varphi \alpha \nu o \mu e \nu e \ \alpha \lambda \eta \theta \eta s \)); and in the determination of the circumstances which govern this apparent truth or falsehood lies the value of logical criterions. Carneades then proceeds to establish his degrees of probability, as the measures of the practical belief. The first degree is that which he terms \( \pi i \theta a n \eta \ \varphi \alpha \nu \tau \alpha \sigma i a \), or \( \xi \mu \phi a s i s \); a strong persuasion of the propriety of the impression made; the second and third degrees result from comparisons of the impression with others associated with it, and with itself. You will perceive, then, that Carneades—the great representative of the Academic school—having very clearly fixed the double relation of mental apprehensions to the reality of things and to the mind itself, denies altogether the possibility of attaining any certainty on the former relation, and reduces the latter to mere subjective persuasion, to which he undertakes to assign laws and canons. The position held by Carneades,

\(^{18}\) \emph{[Adv. Math. VII. \S 166, fol. Compare Cic. Acad. ii. 6. This controversy between the Stoics and the Academy will remind the modern reader of that between Reid and Brown on the nature of Sensation and Perception. See Brown, Lecture xxv., and compare Sir W. Hamilton's critique, \emph{Discussions on Philosophy, No. II. The Theorctus of Plato was probably the source of the Academic theory; as the Cynics seem to have drawn the first outlines of the Stoical doctrine of \kappa \alpha \alpha \lambda \gamma \iota \psi \iota s. Eit.]}}
then, bears a strong resemblance to that occupied in the last century by Kant; as the ulterior development of Platonism by the school of Alexandria resembles with equal accuracy the reform of Kantism attempted by Schelling and his followers in our own day.

The moral views of the Academics, however, as presented by this teacher, contrast very unfavourably with the inflexible ethics of the German philosopher. Their logic being degraded to the estimate of probabilities, their ethics were placed upon no solid foundation of immutable certainty. The Sovereign Good was usually expressed by such formulas of vague and ambiguous purport as "the enjoyment of the gifts of Nature," "the union of virtue and happiness," and the like; and the opposition of the Stoics probably produced an undue tendency to elevate the inferior member of the combination. This, it probably was, which induced Carneades to deny the reality of all justice but that which springs from positive laws, and to adopt the degrading practice of defending every side indifferently in questions of moral casuistry. And Cicero, the avowed favourer of the Academic method of philosophy, in the greatest of his moral treatises deserted it for the spirit and teaching of the Stoics.

The character of the Academic philosophy under its most characteristic teacher, was, then, it is evident, that of moderation and compromise. Essentially sceptical, it endeavoured to evade extreme results, and thence gained the honour of a distinction from absolute scepticism to which it had only slender rights. The Academics, declares Sextus, assert reflectively; the Pyrrhonists, by mere necessity and instinct; the Academics allow degrees of probability, the Pyrrhonists pronounce all probabilities equal. But it is manifest that these differences (and others which he mentions) draw a line of distinction only between Academicism and the more extravagant forms of the Sceptical doctrines; not at all between it and any judicious system of indifferentism. It is certain that the whole spirit of the Academic school was a betrayal of the higher logic of

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14 [Cicero, Tusc. v. 30, 84. Ed.]

15 ["contra Stoicorum disciplinam ingenium ejus exarserat," says Cicero, ibid. Ed.]


17 [Cic. De Nat. D. 1, 5, 11. Ed.]

18 [Pyrrh. Hyp. i. § 225. The meaning is not very well represented in the text. Sextus alludes to the ethical difference of the two schools: ἐγαθὸν τι φασιν εἶναι ὁ Ἀκαδημικὸς καὶ κακῶν οὐχ ἄνεσις ἡμεῖς (οἱ Σκεπτικοὶ) ἀλλὰ μετὰ τοῦ πεπείθηται... ἡμῶν ἀδιακόστως ἔστεμεν τῷ βίῳ, καὶ μὴ ἀνενέργητοι ὡμέν. Ed.]
LECT. 498

ON THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

absolute truth; and a substitution for it of a system of practical beliefs claiming no higher warrant than the obvious utility of a practical adherence. And the character which his Stoic opponents applied to Arcesilaus, that of "the traitor to Platonism," was really applicable to the main body of his successors with as perfect truth.

The great value of the Academic philosophy was its clear perception of the importance of probabilities. In this field it is, in antiquity, unrivalled. And hence it became an easy resort for those men of moderate temperament who, without force or firmness of speculation sufficient to make abstract truth a practical foundation, were yet pleased to refer to philosophy the duties and conduct of ordinary life.

On the third form of Academicism I shall not detain you long. Its masters were Philo and Antiochus: its predominant character, a gradual return to the original views of the founder. This seems very discernible in the accounts given by Cicero of the force of argument with which Antiochus upheld the reality and evidence of mental perceptions; nor do I know a more interesting fragment in all the records of ancient learning than the account which this great writer gives of the views of Antiochus in the second part of the Academic Questions, from the 7th to the 11th chapters. Into Rome, which was now beginning to form the centre of intellectual exertion, the writings of Plato and Aristotle had been already imported; and the treasure was beginning to attract an eagerness of examination which, for a considerable time, superseded original invention. Eclecticism was the inevitable result, and in Cicero himself (the greatest philosophical name of the period) we see it instanced. Upon this new ground a gradual reunion of all sects commenced; the Academics began to admit the necessity of principles more definite; the Stoics, under Panætius and Posidonius, to relax the repulsive sternness of their extreme dogmas. The fermentation at length settled in a new and distinct form of philosophy where Plato was again recognized as master; but in which a portion of his philosophy long buried from the public eye was brought once more into strong and almost exclusive light.
LECTURE II.

THE SUCCESSORS OF PLATO CONTINUED.

* GENTLEMEN,

We have seen the gradual transformation of the Academic philosophy into a moderated Stoicism; in conformity with that tendency to universal union which seems to have characterized the speculations of the age immediately antecedent and subsequent to the rise of the Christian religion. It appeared as if the wisdom of heathenism, moved by a common danger, had, through all its divisions, combined against the common enemy. The reappearance of old philosophy upon a new stage naturally produced this disposition,—first to neglect original research in the study of the ample treasures already provided, and then to attempt general reconciliation of systems from the absence of that polemical ardour which perhaps personal authorship alone can give. It is true that the four great divisions of the philosophic world still preserved distinctive characters, still sent forth their respective pupils and representatives; but each imperceptibly received influences from all the rest, and the feeling grew each day more and more powerful, that certainty, if ever attainable, was only to be attained by an equitable estimate of the entire mass of thought, and a patient selection from all of the best that each could bring.

This eclectic tendency seems destined to arise at all the great pauses of the march of philosophy. When every path of escape through the tangled forest of speculation seems tried in vain, men are apt, as by a natural instinct, to collect in the centre and compare notes for some happier essay. But real eclecticism is, after all, a rare development; the fixity of its orbit is seldom undisturbed by surrounding attractions; and however impartially it begins, it usually ends in some form of unqualified partisanship. There is certainly little of this equitable indifference in that continental philosophy which claims the title in our own age; there was still less in the eclecticism of the first centuries of the Christian æra.

As, then, it was to be expected that some form of positive doctrine would eventually emerge ascendant from the general chaos, it may be worth reflecting, which form it
was likely to be, to what teaching it would bear affinity, what image and superscription it would boast to carry?

The competitors for the mastery of the age were the schools of the Epicureans, the Peripatetics, the Stoics, the Platonics. The last had, indeed, wandered widely from the prescribed injunctions of their master; but they were already shewing signs of retrocession, and the multiplication and critical revisal of his works were, at all events, likely to direct attention from the expositors to their original. The writings of Plato were there to vindicate his fame, whatever might be the perversions or inconsistencies of those who professed to bear his standard; and it was the very spirit of the Roman and Alexandrian literature of this period to lean to the ancient and disparage the new, to prize the comment in proportion to its antiquity, and the text above all.

The philosophy of Epicurus could not claim this predominant position. Its popularity was unquestioned, its adaptation to a luxurious age could not be doubted. But it was not formed to satisfy the wants of the time, however it might minister to its pleasures. It was, indeed, as it still continues to be, the tacit philosophy of the careless; and might thus number a larger army of disciples than any contemporary system. But its supremacy existed only when it estimated numbers, it ceased when tried by weight. The eminent men of Rome were often its avowed favourers, but they were for the most part men eminent in arms and statesmanship rather than the influential directors of the world of speculation. Nor could the admirable poetic force of Lucretius, or the still more attractive case of Horace, confer such strength or dignity upon the system as to enable it to compete with the new and mysterious elements now upon all sides gathering into conflict.

The chances for Stoicism were greater. Its dignity secured respect; its utility in an age of trial and oppression recommended it to men prepared to suffer. With such expositors as Seneca, Epictetus, Arrian, Antoninus, it would be likely rather to acquire new distinctions than to lose any of its original lustre. But Stoicism had its weak points too. Its rigid and inflexible formulas allowed of no expansion, no universality of application, no variety of form; its notion of Deity—majestic, indeed, but cold, and debased, too, in some respects by unwarrantable physical conceptions,—was ill adapted to meet the spirit of the age, which, from various causes, had acquired a theological tendency to remote and solitary abstractions.

The philosophy of Aristotle, which attracted much attention, scarcely obtained much actual influence as a dis-
tinct guide of thought. It already, indeed, began to attract to itself those masses of commentary which at length over-loaded and sunk it; the long line of Aristotelian critics begins so early as Andronicus of Rhodes, who flourished nearly a century before our era; but, exclusive of this scholastic reverence and care, its power was not largely felt. This deficiency of influence is, probably, traceable to what is, in some degree, the main excellence of the Aristotelian spirit, the exceeding moderation of it. It is traceable, also, to the kindred characteristic of this philosophy, its absence of appeals to the higher aspirations of our nature; which the age of which I speak (acted on by the influences of Christianity, and of the mystical wisdom of the eastern nations) peculiarly, and often extravagantly, demanded *.

It remains, then, that we find in the philosophy of Plato the object which alone could fully correspond to the secret sympathies of the time. And, in spite of all affectations of impartiality; in this the eclecticism of Rome and Alexandria resulted. At Alexandria, which its situation and its commerce united to elevate into the natural theatre for the enterprise, the attempt at universal conciliation was chiefly made. Its vast library, the gradual accumulation of the Ptolemies, furnished materials for the work; the enormous aggregate of wisdom depressed the spirit of original inquiry, and threw every speculative mind into the attitude of criticism. The general conviction, that on subjects of mere speculation the mind of man had done its utmost in producing these piles of thought, had, however, the beneficial result of urging many to those positive sciences in which so much remained to be done. This is a portion of the history of the literature of Alexandria which deserves, perhaps, more attention than it has ordinarily received;—it lies, however, altogether beside my present object. "The expression," observes Matter, in the preface to his valuable account of the Alexandrian writers —"the expression, 'School of Alexandria,' has of itself given rise to many incorrect opinions; it is very improper, inasmuch as it can be applied equally to the School of the Jews, of the Christians, of the Alexandrian Greeks...In fact the inquiry here relates not to 'the School,' but to numerous schools. Even those I have just named may be subdivided into many others...Demetrius Phalereus, Zenodotus, Aristarchus, &c. have founded at Alexandria

* When the philosophy of Aristotle became really the dominant philosophy of an age, these tendencies were otherwise provided for; the human mind could bear Aristotelism as a supplement to Christianity, but it would have starved upon Aristotelism alone.
schools of grammar, of criticism, of recension; Herophilus, Erasistratus, &c. schools of anatomy, of medicine; Timarchus, Aristillus, Hipparchus, and Ptolemy, schools of astronomy; Euclid, Apollonius of Perga, Diophantus, &c. schools of geometry and arithmetic; Eratosthenes and Strabo schools of geography; Ænesidemus, Sextus Empiricus, Potamon and Ammonius Saccas, schools of philosophy; the sacred interpreters, Aristobulus and Philo, Jewish schools; the emissaries of Christianity, Pantæenus, Clement of Alexandria, Christian schools. Besides this, each of the philosophical sects of ancient Greece formed a particular school or family at Alexandria. The poets themselves were distributed into pueads... Such was the diversity of intellectual exertion in the Alexandrian academies, to all of which the vast library and its appurtenances presented a common centre and a local bond of union. The Museum, indeed, of all the institutions of antiquity gives us the nearest resemblance to the modern university. The emulation, ambitious temper of the Athenian had never led him anxiously to desire, or even to conceive, this union of labour; while the very position of Alexandria,—the key at once of East and West, and receiving into its magnificent harbours the commerce of both,—seemed to mark it out as the natural emporium of the literature of the world.

Our path lies through only one region of this varied field, but it is one which became ultimately the most influential of all, and which is now almost alone remembered as the characteristic teaching of Alexandria. The sciences of pure observation, or of mathematical deduction, as they advance obliterate their own steps; each inventor absorbs his predecessor in himself, and obscures his fame in adding to his labours; the last layer of the pile hides all the rest: those of mere speculation, working by no such unvaried principle of advance, leave their great names almost unaltered by subsequent changes; their symbol is not so much a structure augmenting by additions in height, as a structure augmenting by collateral edifices of every form and order; their vast monuments of thought lie scattered over the whole field of history, and their most ancient performances are almost always as interesting, often as suggestive, sometimes as instructive, as their latest.

We must now proceed to consider the circumstances that prepared the formation of this new development of Platonism on the stage of Alexandria. Perhaps the subject may become simplified by separating the Grecian and native influences from those of foreign origin. Your attention is directed in the first instance to the former. The particulars which I shall present will probably contribute
to illustrate yet more fully those superior chances of Platonism in the contest for philosophic influence, to which I have already alluded.

We have seen through what varieties of depression the philosophy of Plato passed in the hands of his successors in the Academy. Having sunk into a system of restless disbelief in theory, and lost all its moral dignity in practice, it had at length, as if in weariness, reverted (though feebly and indecisively) to the lofty lessons of its founder.

But the interests of scepticism were in the meantime adopted and patronized by a more vigorous band. It has been held by some authorities that the succession was preserved without the loss of a single link in the original school of Pyrrho and Timon; a point difficult to be clearly established, both on account of the obscurity of the names instanced, and on account of the very genius of scepticism, which tends little to decisive systematic formation, and still less to the perpetuation of it. But however this may be, it is certain that at the period of the Christian æra, the theory of suspension and unbelief suddenly manifested itself with a vigour and completeness scarcely paralleled in any previous or subsequent age. Indeed the sceptical system seems to have been the only one at this time which convinced the freshness and variety of original thought. Pyrrho, it is probable, had furnished the example—Ænesidemus, Agrippa, and above all, Sextus Empiricus, completed the project—of systematizing all the grounds of hesitation (πρὸς ἐποχῆς). Sextus reasoned and wrote at the close of the second century, at the period when the Alexandrian school was rising into distinction. We can easily conceive, then, how this bold uncompromising advocacy of the philosophy of doubt must have urged to its farthest extremes the dogmatism of Alexandria; how this denial of the reality of knowledge in any of its departments must especially have led to that peculiar theory of the nature and prerogatives of the human reason from which, as we shall hereafter see, everything important in the Neo-Platonic system arises.

The second cause or element in the formation of this system operated not exteriorly, but within it. I have on a former occasion observed to you that the original system of Plato, as far as it depended on the teaching of previous masters, was principally due to Socrates on the one hand, to Pythagoras on the other; these ingredients being plainly distinguishable even in the compound which Plato's peculiar skill in fusing all things to one mass enabled him to present. As the Socratic principle became detached and prominent in the Academic scheme, so the Pythagorean
rose into exclusive activity in the Platonism of Alexandria: This was due partly to the taste for antiquity which belongs to an age eminently critical, partly to the desire for the guarantee of high authority in preference to the mere force of reason which the same tendencies seem usually to generate. Those who shrank from the cold and comfortless exhortations of the sceptical teachers, from that melancholy play of argument by which every security of belief and practice was successively exhibited to be successively overthrown, and who yet found it hard to accompany the pure Platonist to his heights of speculation, naturally sighed for the easy repose of authority, for authority which might at once preserve to them the form of reason, and yet base reason upon foundations deeper than its own. Now the only existing system which professed to connect itself with an authoritative antiquity was that of Plato; and this chiefly through the medium of the Pythagorean traditions. It was well known that the old Pythagorean doctrine, delivered mainly in mysterious symbols, had itself reached Italy from remote sources, and affected an almost supernatural origin. The character of the founder was itself shrouded in mystery and miracle. Strange traditions had floated down the stream of ages, it was the very genius of the time to labour to collect them; these traditions had invested a single sage of antiquity with powers and privileges beyond those of man, it was the spirit of the time to exalt these claims to canonization. It is not unlikely that in Italy many local associations would contribute to increase the charm that encompassed the name of Pythagoras. And thus a remarkable revolution was effected; Plato had received the mystical formulas of the Samian sage, to transform them as far as possible into their logical equivalents, to translate them into the language of pure intellect; the later Pythagoreans received the doctrines of Plato, to transform them back into their mystical originals. It was no longer a Platonized Pythagoras, but a Pythagorized Plato. It would appear that some teachers—as Anaxilaus of Larissa, Moderatus, Nicomachus—endeavoured to blend the traditions of Pythagoras with the physical and logical theories of Plato; that others, leaning rather to the moral and ascetic views of Pythagoras, exalted his code into a religion. Of the latter class, the name which has come down to our times with most celebrity is that of Apollonius Tyaneus. In this famous person the religious element of Pythagorism reached its highest pitch, and being supported and modified by its mysticism of numbers and figures, resulted in the imaginary physics of magic and demonology. The identity of the influences in the
Alexandrian school is proved, not only by the confession of its chief writers, with whom Pythagoras is evermore the symbol of the perfection of wisdom,—but by the complete identity of the results.—Iamblichus, and even Plotinus, presenting, in many of their practical extravagancies, only milder forms of the folly and imposture that marked the life of Apollonius.

We must not forget, however, in the enumeration of these disposing causes, that there likewise existed a body of teachers who professed to expound the genuine doctrines of Plato himself. We possess the abstract of Platonism by Alcinous, which is really a valuable aid to students of this philosophy; Apuleius of Medaura, and, still more, Maximus Tyrius, were nearly contemporary with the rise of the peculiar doctrines of the school of Alexandria. The biographer and moralist Plutarch did for the Platonism of this period all which a style eminently popular, and peculiar facility of illustration, could effect. But in truth it is not easy to appropriate these writers to a distinct class. The tendency to religious speculation is equally theirs; and to speculation of the very same character and scope. The endeavour to fortify philosophical conclusions by supposed allegories in the poetical mythology of heathenism, characterizes them all. The abdication of the labour of new invention, the weariness of the seeming fruitlessness of the old, the consequent recurrence to ancient authority, and the willingness to be deceived in anything that pretends to be such, is as observable in the Platonist Apuleius as in the Pythagorean Apollonius.

These notices may serve to indicate some of the preparatives of the Alexandrian school which pre-existed in the philosophy of the West. We must now contemplate a distinct source of influence, whose infusions of spirit and of doctrine were even more conspicuous and lasting.

There is scarcely a question in the history of literature more difficult to decide satisfactorily than the circumstances that produced a fact in itself altogether unquestionable, the introduction of Oriental ideas into the later philosophy of Greece. Some critics (as Meiners) have boldly decided that the Oriental philosophy and its influences are equally imaginary, and that the results which are ordinarily attributed to them, were the simple evolution of Platonic principles. Others, again, have recurred to India as the original centre from which all these influences radiated.

[1 Not however in Plutarch, whose Platonica Quaestiones are marked both by learning and solicitude. Another perfectly sober Platonist is the great physician Galen, whose view, however, of the relation between the doctrines of Aristotle and Plato is conceived in the eclectic or syncretistic spirit of the time. Ed.]
and have carried them through Persia to Greece and to Egypt. It is the opinion of another class of critics, that the ἀνατολικὴ διδασκαλία, the teaching of the East, consisted merely in a few detached formulas of doctrine, which were subsequently reduced into shape by the moulding and condensing power of the Grecian spirit at the period of the conquests of Alexander and after it. I confess I suspect that the enthusiasm of our later critics in favour of all which can exalt the authority and influences of the wisdom of India, has sometimes urged their sagacity to see in India, and her merchants and sages, the cause of far more than they ever effected. India has become a first cause in the history of philosophy, the ne plus ultra of the long series of successive transmissions; and the very mystery that seems to shroud her antiquities has made it easy to refer all that is inexplicable to this inexplicable source. The striking discoveries which have of late been made in the actual philosophy of the Indian literati (of which I endeavoured to give you an account on a former occasion) have quickened the ardour of living Orientalists, and led them to hope to find in this vast and ancient people the solution of all the difficult problems in the history of speculation. But though I conceive that the direct influence of India on the later Greek philosophy has been somewhat unduly magnified, I have no disposition to diminish that of the more adjacent eastern nations. Persia, above all, retains its manifest and unambiguous representatives in the whole literature of Alexandria,—influences transmitted partly by the direct agency of the visitants from each country to the other, partly through the medium of the Jewish residents of Alexandria, who had, from their well-known national relations with the Persian empire, become imbued with many of its philosophical conceptions; but mainly by those Gnostic sophists whose manifold caprices of heresy disturbed the early Christian church. The literary forgeries of an age betray its prevailing tastes; for men will not boast their possession of treasures which the public mind is not prepared to value. The compilations of the Alexandrian schools detect to the modern critic many of those favourite sources of ancient wisdom which they were wont partly to explore and partly to imagine. Among the Orphic verses (old Athenian records—for Plato mentions them—renewed and amplified by the Alexandrian professors), and the Books of Hermes, are found the oracles of Zoroaster, which, however interpolated and disguised, clearly manifest an Eastern origin, and whose very imitations palpably prove the existence of writings and traditions out of which the imitations
were constructed. These fragmentary "sentences" were first collected by Pletho at the revival of letters. In these various compilations, then, we may discern the points to which the Alexandrian mind perpetually veered. The Orphic verses represented the antiquity of Greece, the Hermetic Books passed for records of the antiquity of Egypt, the Chaldaic sentences spoke the ancient wisdom of the East; and antiquity in all three carried with it dim possibilities of Divine revelation, justified itself, and led the spirit into that repose of conviction which it coveted. But to the East, above all, the masters of learning emphatically pointed as the mysterious centre of all such wisdom as was alone worthy of the name. Nor amid all the difficulties that confessedly embarrass the research into the real learning of the East, can any candid mind observe the veneration almost universally conceded to it (as soon as authority became of any importance in philosophy), the peculiarity of its doctrines, their strong internal resemblance to each other and to the truth, the sublime character of many of them, the essentially religious character of them all, without feeling assured, that however the minuter specialties of the subject may be settled, there is that in the ancient wisdom of the Oriental tribes which irrefutably marks the country as, in some district of it, the original scene of real revelation. The sceptic may endeavour to confound the genuine record with its imitations; but how will he explain the common character of them all, a character which deepens in proportion to the very strength of the resemblance he would establish?

The principal channels through which the stream of Oriental learning entered the schools of Alexandria were the societies of the Jews, and the occasional writings and exhortations of those cultivators of a peculiar and mystical knowledge who were by the Greeks entitled Gnostics.

That impulse to reduce facts and beliefs of all kinds to recognized principles, which is the source of all genuine science, is not restricted to the phenomena of this world; it is equally and instinctively active in every department where truths are made known to the mind of man. Hence, the theology of a Divine revelation becomes subject to the same scientific activity; and as the result will vary according to the principles of the classification, systematic theology (which is this result) will take its colouring from the prominent philosophy—that is, from the recognized first principles—of the age in which it appears. A creed may remain unaltered, and yet the relations of the parts of it, so far as they are the inferences of human sagacity, may alter with the alterations of a popular philosophy.
The Christianity of Clemens Alexandrinus—even of Origen—was, in all its leading particulars, and omitting one or two private speculations too ardently urged, the Christianity of Taylor and Barrow; yet it is probable, that there is not a single page in the extensive and various works of either of the former writers which could by any adequate judge be for a moment conceived as the production of either of the latter. Clemens and Origen lived in the atmosphere of Alexandria not more than in its learning; to breathe at all, they must have breathed its air, to reason and speculate at all, they could as little have avoided to employ the forms and language it had taught them. Now what these writers did for the received theology of Christianity, when they thus viewed its frame and lineaments through the medium of a peculiar philosophy, was done in a much higher degree for Judaism by a school of Jewish writers who preceded them. Aristobulus, Philo, and Josephus, admitted all the facts and circumstances of the Old Testament; the Jewish history would remain attested by the philosophical writings of these men though the original perished, exactly as the Platonic Fathers of the Church contribute, notwithstanding all their peculiarities, to swell the stream of early tradition; but in philosophizing the facts—that is, in reducing them into the grasp of such first principles as they held—they gave them—Philo especially—a position and a colouring which drew them within the Grecian field of view, and acquired for the simple and venerable record of Moses the questionable advantage of taking rank among the numerous relics that learning had discovered, or ingenuity invented, of the early and heaven-sent philosophy of the East. Plato, said Numenius, is but Ἐλευθερία.

As the Jewish doctors contributed to the general body of thought at Alexandria their own ancient beliefs in this philosophic costume, so was the Museum indebted to another class of instructors for the dreamy mysticism of Persia and of Syria. The history of the Gnostics belongs to ecclesiastical literature, from their unhappy connexion with the early Church. They seem to have been of every form of professed religion, Jewish, Christian, and Pagan; exalting their own fantastic theology above all, and insolently intruding into every society of worshippers to transform its worship into this. And if it be warrantable to judge of the procedures of the invisible enemy of Chris-

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* [On the life and writings of this Alexandrian Jew, see Valckenaer's justly celebrated Diatribe, printed in the 4th volume of Dr Gaisford's edition of Eusebius's Preparatio Evangelica. Ed.]
tianity, as we trace those of its protecting Providence, assuredly it is no enthusiasm to affirm, that in the almost incredible absurdities of Gnosticism, supported by men of authority, learning, and acuteness, we may detect a fatuity more than is natural to man, an inspiration of evil which alone seems sufficient to account for the facts.

To these various sources of opinion transmitting their collective influences into the Platonism of the second century, must be finally added the rise and spread of Christianity itself—of Christianity which in many most important respects presented the reality, of which the theories and practices of Neo-Platonism were the pompous imitation. The celestial reality and its earthly counterpart being thus met upon an earthly theatre, it would be strange if the advantage of the ground had not given some occasional successes to the inferior combatant; but we may rejoice in the conviction that the evil of its contact was never suffered to affect any vital part, nor suffered to affect any part until the entire system of Christianity had been sufficiently matured and exemplified for all future times, to render its subsequent corruptions or exaggerations a misfortune only to the age that endured them. But this is too important a subject to commence at the close of a Lecture.

3 [Unless indeed the enemies of Christianity had more reason to deplore the fatuities of Gnosticism than its friends. Ed.]
LECTURE III.

THE NEO-PLATONISTS.

GENTLEMEN,

I PROCEED to give you some account of the mode of speculation which was patronized by the school of Alexandria. I purposely omit minuteness of details,—confining myself to the task of arresting and representing the general spirit of the system. The materials for this undertaking are ample, so ample as to perplex the student by their very extent and variety. But though ample in number and size, and various in outward form, they are singularly monotonous in spirit and substance. To master them all, is indeed a task exceeding the patience of most inquirers, not only from their extent, but from their very sameness; the mind being wearied not more by multiplicity of details than by uniformity of style and purport. The same leading thoughts occur in every conceivable shape; and the effort to disguise this internal identity results in exaggerating the obscurity that still guards from vulgar eyes the mysteries of Plotinus, Iamblichus, and Proclus.

At the close of the reign of Commodus, about the year 192, Ammonius Saccas founded his school at Alexandria. The subsequent teachers of the views which Ammonius had introduced, appeared in three different theatres, Rome, Alexandria, and Athens. Plotinus (born A.D. 205 at Lycopolis in Egypt) removed to Rome and established his school there in the reign of the Emperor Philip, about the year 244. Porphyry and Amelius followed their master to Rome, the former in the reign of Gallienus, the latter some years earlier. At the death of Plotinus, in 270, the name of Porphyry became the most eminent among the cultivators of heathen wisdom. Iamblichus and Hierocles continued the succession at its birthplace, Alexandria; Plutarchus of Athens, Syrianus, and Proclus, restored philosophy to its old Athenian haunts at the close of the fourth, and through the greater part of the fifth century. The death of Proclus is assigned to the year 485. He was succeeded by Marinus, who wrote his master's life; he by Isidorus; and he, again, by Zenodotus; and the last-

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1 [See Porphyry, Vit. Pl. c. 4, quoted by Clinton, Fast. Rom.  Ed.]
named teacher brings us to the famous epoch of Justinian's decree for closing the schools of Athens, in the year 529.

To proceed minutely into all the peculiarities of these successive teachers, would be a laborious, though perhaps not uninteresting, task. My present object is simply to catch the predominating views which seem to have given their character to the entire.

We shall first speak of their logical views, of their theory of knowledge, and the privileges of the human soul in regard to it.

Does man's knowledge grasp the reality of things? would it remain certain even though the cognitive faculty were annihilated?—this is the question which (as I have more than once intimated) occupied so many of the Grecian speculators, and which the different sects of the ancient philosophy answered, by very different solutions indeed, but which all strove to answer by some solution or other. The sceptical philosophers, we know, denied altogether the possibility of real knowledge; and they built their denial mainly on the allegation, that though real objects apart from the soul of man may exist, it would for ever remain impossible to prove that these objects sent true or adequate representatives of themselves to the human mind. Such a fact could only, they observed, be proved by a medium which itself in turn required proof; and this process was obviously endless. But when it was urged that the truth of the impression was itself in the first instance established by the irresistible conviction of the mind, they replied by denying the universality of such convictions; by alleging the imperfection, and the errors, and (as they endeavoured to shew) the contradiction, of the senses; and, finally, by maintaining that at best this indestructible conviction was itself but a state of the sentient mind, was purely subjective, and therefore could not warrant the reality of anything beyond its own sphere. Their antagonists rejoined that this last assertion (the only one of any consequence in the pleading) was altogether unfair; inasmuch as it was of the very nature of this irresistible conviction that it did attest the reality of mental knowledge; that, consequently, the sceptical objection involved a manifest petitio principii; that the same evidence of consciousness which taught us that we have mental states or qualities of any kind, equally taught us that some of these states were of a kind to pronounce on that which is not the mind, to transcend the subjective, and grasp the real, the absolute, the eternal.

But what, then, is the relation between the reality of things and the human knowledge which represents it? How are they connected, that the latter, a form of human
thought, shall thus declare the former which is not a form of thought? What is the bond between the substance of the universe (for example) and the mental conviction that such substance is and must be? between the cause of all things and the law of the mind which necessitates its belief that such a cause exists?

We should perhaps be inclined to answer—that the Divine Artist, who constructed the soul of man, has given to it these convictions, and obliged it to believe them the evidences of corresponding realities. But such an answer as this, though commendable for its humility, and perhaps for its prudent sagacity, was not at all sufficient to content the more earnest speculators on the nature of knowledge. In the first place, they asked,—whence it was that we derived the certainty of the existence of this Divine Framer to whom we recurred in our solution; whence, but from that very faculty of knowledge which we appealed to Him to accredit? They argued, again,—that such an origin of certainty as this, degrades the entire prerogative of the human reason; that it makes it the arbitrary creation of a superior, without any essential and inherent power of authenticating truth; that it is fraught with most dangerous consequences to the great cause of the stability of moral rights and obligations;—that it might even be alleged by cavillers, that it were well for man to be deceived, to which supposition this theory would afford no satisfactory reply. By such arguments as these it was urged that the authority of human knowledge must be set upon different foundations to be of assured value. And thus the question was still triumphantly asked,—What more has man than his own beliefs, and how can his own beliefs establish the certainty of things? What connexion can be shown between the real and objective on the one hand, and the forms and modifications of the human soul on the other?

Now you will easily perceive that there are two modes of connexion supposable. The first conceives that the two regions—the real and the mental—being distinct, the former transmits representatives to the human consciousness,—that the conceptions of the mind do in some way answer to the absolute nature of things. As to the process of this mysterious correspondence, there might be various suppositions. It might be held that the mental states are the immediate effects of their objects, and they possess the connexion and internal necessitude of effect with cause; it might be held that the mental states are the images or resemblances of their objects (a plausible but deceptive form of expression common in all ages); it might be said
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that they are arranged to be consequent on their objects, without any connexion beyond this arbitrary arrangement; —a supposition which naturally glides into that of denying them to have any objects at all, and maintaining that mental states are incapable of evidencing anything beyond their own transitory existence. This last is a theory of unity in which the objective is altogether abandoned. But there is another theory of unity which is formed by preserving both objective and subjective, both nature and the mind, both the Reality of Things and the Reason which apprehends it,—and identifying them as substantially one and the same, or as two forms of one incomprehensible original. This is the second general hypothesis as to human knowledge; and in this the Platonism of Alexandria was founded or resulted, as to this the original theory of Plato always really tended. The great majority of the Grecian schools held the doctrine that the Reality is essentially distinct from the Reason that knows it; the Sceptical party held that there is no Reality at all, demonstrable; the Platonists of Alexandria decided that there is a Reality and a Reason, but that both are blended in one absolute and ineffable conjunction.

The moderation of Plato was eminently evinced in the caution with which he always hinted this form of speculation without ever actually venturing to affirm it. We perceive the speculation itself (as I formerly endeavoured to shew you) in his theory of the Coeternity of the Soul with its ideas, of the sameness of their original substance, of the final unity in which all things were involved; we equally perceive his cautious hesitancy in the distinction which to the very last he appears to intimate between the ideal object of the Reason and the Reason that contemplates them. But all this reluctance to pronounce on the ultimate question of philosophy, was abandoned by the Neo-Platonics. Stimulated by the boldness of certain oriental speculations, they affirmed that the cause of truth was lost unless the theory of unity was unreservedly admitted, and fortified their tenets by the rather ungracious measure of reviling the errors and the timidity of their Grecian master. It is the perpetual lesson of Plotinus, that the object of reason is not, cannot be, external to reason; that truth is not in the conformity of thoughts with things, but of thoughts with each other. Intelligence is at once the object conceived, the subject conceiving, and the act of conception. To rest on self, is to commune with the universe.

Such is the main principle of the Alexandrian theory of the human reason. But in the speculations of the masters
of this school these views were united with a vast mass of theological and physical hypotheses; these last being however a mere development of the former. This brings us to the second consideration,—the Alexandrian system of the Universe. As knowledge consisted in unity of the knowing and the known, so was the first principle of the Universe a mysterious unity out of which all things emanated. This principle was superessential, it was aike above Being and Intelligence. You find them here upon the road which Plato had traced, but advancing with a bold and hurried step very alien to the spirit of the great master. The second principle is pure Intelligence (nous), the third is Soul (psyche). These fill the sphere of the intelligible world, and actuate all things. There is nothing truly real but these; and these in all their forms, which are the “ideas” of Plato, are connected together by secret links that establish a sympathy between all the parts and elements of the Universe. Let us for a moment inspect more nearly this expansion of the system of Plato.

The first principle of the Universe is declared to be the One (to év). But as every existence, though single, includes a plurality, as reason (the highest of existences) involves a duality of subject and object, the One must be actually ranked above Being; it is not to be regarded as an existence, but as the ineffable fountain of existence,—a fountain which for ever yields existence, itself absolute and inexhaustible. No quality or character can be ascribed to the One, for it transcends all qualifications and speciality.

The second principle of the Universe is that which contemplates the One, and requires only it, to exist. This is the Absolute Intelligence. Thus immediately interwoven with the primal Unity, directly dependent on it, addressing itself to it, alone worthy to behold it, it is manifest that Intelligence is the first of existences, the highest essence in the world of reality and the foundation of every other. The operation of Intelligence is thought, and thought is (as we formerly saw) only conceivable as identical with its object; the principle of Intelligence, then, by the activity of thought, does actually constitute all true existences,—create and comprehend them all. All that has being, therefore, is but the infinite varieties of intelligence; the universe of real existence is but a vast aggregate of the forms—the substantial forms—of supreme Reason. Whatever is real and eternal is not the product of this

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2 [See the eighth book of the third Ennead, c. 8, p. 350, to end. Ed.]
3 [Enn. V, 4, c. 2, p. 518 F, nous kal to tauton...autós nous to prágy-mata. Ed.]
\( \nu \delta \), it is the thing itself in all the multiplicity of its aspects.

The third principle in the Plotinian Triad is the Universal Soul, which is produced by, and reposes on, Intelligence, as Intelligence derives from the original Unity. This principle of Soul seems to be described as possessing two energies; one, by which it attaches itself to Intelligence, and the other by which it becomes the active creator of the sensible universe, if indeed the latter is not implied as the result of the former. The immediate products of this universal \( \psi \nu \gamma \) are the Forms of things (εἰδή, μορφαί, λόγοι σπερματικοί); which are thought into their material receptacle (if I may so render the expressions of Plotinus) by the "intuitive" force of nature. On the nature of this material receptacle, Plotinus is nearly as indefinite as Plato. He tells us that where the creative illumination of Soul fails, darkness begins; and that even this very darkness becomes impregnated by the vivific influences of the light that invests and penetrates it. Thus it is that Soul in the very power of its weakness forms to itself a body; endows blind matter with form and thought. This very allegorical representation, however, is rendered more obscure by other representations which appear to contradict it; and which leave the reader altogether in doubt as to whether Plotinus meant or not to allow to matter any reality of existence at all. Thus it is that, in the inevitable feebleness of human speculation, systems which begin solely from mind are perplexed in accounting for its material antithesis; exactly as those which commence exclusively from matter are bewildered when they would solve the existence of the mind that arranges and governs it! The same obscurity belongs to Plotinus's account of the kindred question of moral evil, which by the eastern and Alexandrian speculators was connected with the existence and nature of matter; and which naturally shares all the difficulties and contradictions which characterize their theories of this latter mysterious essence.

Thus it was that Plotinus, reasoning down from the absolute and inconceivable Unity, attempted to construct the actual universe. The connexion being purely that of emanation, the effect pre-existing in the cause, and the cause actualized in the effect, the system was essentially Pantheistic. And as naturally it was a system of fatalistic optimism; the production and all its parts and elements were as necessary, and as determinate, as the producer.

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6 [\( \nu \delta \)] εἰκὼν νοῦ—ολοκ οὐκος νοῦ, καὶ ἐνεργεία τε ὁμνετ αὐτὸς (νοῦς) ἐκεῖνον (τού ἐνοτ ἐ τού ψιθροῦ), Ἑπ. Β. τ. 6, p. 487 f. Ed.

6 ["Matter" is the subject of the fourth book of the second Ennead. Compare Ἑπ. Ι. 8, c. 15. Ed.]
These considerations led to two characteristic results, which in their turn produced one of the chief practical extravagancies of this school. The elements of the sensible universe being all produced as developments of the Infinite Perfection, were bound together by a secret bond which suspended every one upon every other. While likewise, the principle of Soul becoming as it were arrested or incarnated in the entire material system, every visible thing was animated by this subtle essence; not only the brute creation, but that which we falsely conceive inanimate. The poetry of our own age was thus erected into a determinate philosophy; nature was literally alive through all her regions. These tenets obviously formed a philosophical basis for all the fantastic enterprizes of divination and natural magic; and the intercourse with the demons and spirits of the universe was the recognized privilege of the disciplined pupil of Alexandrian wisdom. The grossest follies of theurgy were the favourite resources of the emperor whose philosophy could not tolerate the mysteries of the Christian faith.

As Plotinus had laid the foundation of the system in his teaching at Rome, so Iamblichus continued the enterprise in its original and more congenial Alexandrian atmosphere. His function was to deepen the theological character of the philosophy, by laboriously blending it with the heathen mythology and mysteries. Porphyry (who died about 305) had done much for this project; as a measure of resistance to the victorious progress of Christianity. To meet this powerful adversary it was also necessary to appeal to the prepossessions of antiquity, to construct a kind of catholic church of philosophy, with its unbroken succession, its expansive universality, and its venerable traditions. This was a favourite notion with the Alexandrian sages. About the period of the opening of the new Athenian school, Chrysanthius, Plutarchus of Athens, and others, endeavoured to accredit the supposition of their "golden chain" (as it was called), a succession of gifted men who, they affirmed, had perpetuated from the earliest times—from those Orphic days when gods haunted the earth and gave wisdom to mankind—a single unaltered philosophy. Accordingly, all their ingenuity and research was expended on the effort to discover this precious treasure in the records of every age; the books of the philosophers held the dogmas of it, the mysteries of Greece, Egypt, were but the rites and ceremonies of this divine theology. By Proclus, the last great name among the later Platonists*, this hypothesis was

* He died, as before stated, A.D. 485.
maintained with great pomp of language and subtlety of thought. Proclus, who succeeded Syrianus at Athens (for philosophy had returned to her Grecian birthplace to expire), treated Plato very much as Philo treated Moses. Commingling all philosophies in one, he professed to study Aristotle as the grammar of Plato, and found in Plato all he wished to find. He styled himself the hierophant of the universe; and avowed his belief that he constituted the last link in that mysterious chain of interpreters of the hidden wisdom whom Hermes of old had ordained to perpetuate divine truth in the world. His claim was not disallowed; and Proclus died with the reputation of miraculous powers. In the voluminous writings of Proclus the whole genius of the system is eminently displayed;—its sublimity, its puerility, its sagacity and poverty, its daring independence and its grovelling superstition. It is not improbable that these writings were indebted to Christianity for a term that occurs with peculiar frequency in them; the term πίστις or faith, which Proclus regards as direct communion with the Infinite and Absolute and the highest faculty of the human soul. This, you will remember, is a departure from the original Platonic phrasology. This author is not content with a single Trinity; his philosophical triads recur in every page. Essence, identity, variety; being, life, intelligence; limit, illimitation, mixture; are some of the instances of this threefold partition which Proclus conceives to obtain universally through nature. But over all, he, in common with all his brother teachers, enthrones the Absolute Unity; and with them he maintains that with this Unity the soul of man is by a special faculty enabled to converse, until absorbed in the intricacy of the communion it is lost in its object, and becomes, in a manner, itself divine.

Let us now endeavour to recapitulate some of the particulars which distinguish the Alexandrian philosophy as a form of Platonism. We see, then, that the later school with peculiar force insist on the superessentiality of the Absolute One out of whom all existence and existences are projected. We observe that (doubtless to meet the Christian system) the Triad of supreme natures is asserted with a distinctness little discoverable in the genuine writings of Plato. We can observe that the habit of reasoning, not upwards, from the multitude of facts to the Unity of Laws and of the Author of Laws, but downwards, from the single and absolute, to the subordinate creation, is manifested in the Alexandrian speculativists, far more prominently than in their Grecian master. The activity of intelligences through the universe is another doctrine, Platonic indeed, but elevated to a height for which Plato never
meant it by the theologues of Alexandria. The *sympathy* of the parts of the universe is almost wholly their own; and the superstitious practices derived from it find no countenance in the spirit of elder Platonism. But none of the doctrines of the later school is more characteristic than their exaggeration of those tenets on which Plato so often and so impressively dilated, relative to the immediate intuition of the Good and the Beautiful. This conducts me, finally, to the *moral* aspects of the school of Plotinus, which were almost wholly determined by this peculiar doctrine. This connexion of the practical life with the logical tenet, may appear from the following passage of Proclus (*De Provid. et Fato*).

"There are," he declares, "after enumerating five functions of the soul,—"also five orders of knowledge." Those which are of the lowest grade seemingly deserve the name; they include things material and subject to mere compulsion. The second order addresses itself to the characters common to sensible objects, the general notions of Aristotle; it rises from variety to unity. The third order departs from this unity, dividing and resolving general notions, knowing causes, deducing consequences, &c. It embraces the mathematical sciences, beginning with the unit and the point, and thence deriving its demonstrations of complex propositions. The fourth order rises to knowledge more simple still, abandoning methods, resolutions, compositions, definitions, demonstrations; it consists in contemplative speculation (autoptic), of beings and essences, it penetrates to intelligibles. The fifth and last order, which Aristotle never reached, which Plato and preceding theologues alone have described, is a knowledge superior to the understanding, an exaltation (*μανθανεῖν*) which assimilates the soul to God Himself;—"for the like can only be known by the like:—objects sensible by the senses, scientific relations by science, intelligible by the understanding, unity by the principle of union." The attainment of this exalted state was the object of the entire philosophical discipline of the Alexandrians; which was thus only calculated for a very few among mankind, and liable to be even by them perverted into an indolent and inoperative quietism. The leaders of these schools professed to have themselves attained supernatural presences; not Plotinus only but the shrewd and inquiring Porphyry boasted to have been favoured with the actual realization of a state of the soul in which in the depths of absolute perfection it beholds and is absorbed in the very Deity it adores.

Hence the means of self-perfection were all reduced to self-denial; purification through the mastery of the body.

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1 [c. 20, p. 37, ed. Cous. En.]
The material frame became an object of disgust and detestation to the sublimated apprehensions of the Alexandrian; as interfering with the completeness of this contemplative effort. Plotinus refused to permit his picture to be taken, because it would unduly perpetuate the image of a body he deplored; and avoided all mention of the date or locality of his birth, as too dark and miserable an epoch to be remembered.

These exaggerations, which were displayed in a thousand fantastic forms, are indeed in this degree preposterous; yet we ought not to forget that they become absurd only when unbalanced by other principles and exalted into the exclusive objects of moral discipline. That bodily abstinence through all its varieties is in its measure suitable to a course of spiritual advancement, can only be denied by those who forget the closeness of the alliance which in this world subsists between the corporal frame and the conscious spirit; and the peril of the influences which the former can exert to depress and fetter its divine associate. If there be such an exercise of devotion as the contemplation of God in those attributes of His nature which we can make subjects of thought, it cannot be doubted that according to the ordinary laws of nature, certain states of the body are more favourable than others to the success of the effort. The management of the bodily frame becomes then a plain portion of Christian duty; and as such it is recognized in all the Christian Scriptures. They never derogate (with the Alexandrians) from Body in the abstract;—for they perpetuate it in the state of glory; but they do teach us to look with suspicion and jealousy upon the peculiar species of body we carry with us in the probationary state;—to mark and withstand its overweening influence, to "mortify the deeds of the body," to "keep under the body, and bring it into subjection," to "present the body a living sacrifice."

Comparison of Neo-Platonic with Christian morality.

The "shew of wisdom in neglecting the body" (for of this also the Apostles speak) which characterized the Alexandrian teachers, and which proceeded on extravagant suppositions, nowhere countenanced by inspiration, of the radical evil of the material nature itself in all and any of its forms, was—as I have said—connected with their discipline for the ἐνωσίς, or union with God by direct intuition of His substantial being. Into this interesting subject you would scarcely permit me now to enter at any length. I merely observe, then (for it is most instructive), that their view of the union with God was founded in the error common to the many forms of mysticism in all ages; the error of conceiving that spiritual connexions between God and man must be conscious connexions, felt, and known, and anticipated, and remembered, as a part of the actual series
of thought. As Christians you are bound to believe such intercourses possible and real; but as philosophic reasoners you will decide that they pass in a region of the spirit to which, though it be the basis of consciousness, consciousness cannot attain; that we must receive them in faith, and verify them not in themselves but in their results—those results which the Christian phraseology entitles the “fruits,” and “gifts,” and “witness,” of the Spirit.

But amid the errors and extravagancies to which this perversion led, surely no candid man can contemplate the peculiar design and tendency of all earthly wisdom at this very period, without regarding it as in a great measure providentially ordered. The mind of man yearned for Divine Communion, and grew extravagant through its very disappointment. The actual revelation was assuredly “the Desire of all Nations,” even though it was by so many overlooked or rejected. All human wisdom seemed at length to have paused in its exhaustion, turned to Heaven, and sighed for a voice from thence. The whole field of speculation had been traversed and explored; and though glittering spoils lay around its many labourers, the treasure which all sought was not found, the deep want of the soul of man was not met, and—as if instinctively—the whole host of earthly philosophy abandoned its position of inquiry, and in strange wild fantastic devotion asked of Heaven to give what earth had hopelessly failed to supply. Heaven had, indeed, supplied its remedy, had anticipated and answered the call; but the capricious activity of the human mind had meanwhile constructed its own device to meet it, and the broken cisterns mocked in unhappy imitation the fountain of eternal life. Christianity was, to many, lost among its counterfeits. For every Divine wonder it could narrate, a thousand mocking miracles rose around it; for every promise it could offer, ecstasies and raptures more transcendent still—the felt presence of a Deity—were boasted by its foes; its visions and prophecies were not altogether denied, but they were depreciated as the easy attainments of ordinary wisdom; and its defenders might almost become ashamed of its pure and lofty maxims, when they saw how easily they could be debased into the decorations of a fanatical imposture. But the genuine work of God was at length vindicated as His; it remained, it still remains,—the strength and consolation of thousands; while, after a faint expiring struggle, shifting from city to city,—like the ghastly spectre of Philosophy haunting her old abodes, the illusive Wisdom of Rome, Alexandria, and Athens vanished from the world, to become in a remote age the harmless object of speculative inquiry among the disciples of its celestial Rival.
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ON

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THREE LECTURES

ON THE

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THREE LECTURES.

LECTURE I.

It will probably be found most eligible—certainly most in accordance with the usual course of modern philosophical investigation—to commence an account of the views of Aristotle, with his opinions on the nature, faculties, and destinies of the Soul. Much of the interest which belongs to such a writer—to one of such antiquity, and in many respects so unlike our modern teachers—arises from the peculiarity of his way of contemplating the subject itself; I mean, his conception of the general problem to be solved, as contrasted with particular opinions on its details. This can best be conveyed by keeping close to the original, though perhaps with some sacrifice of grace and variety. In commenting on Plato the case is different; there we are in most cases obliged to collect the great author’s principles from a vast number of distinct sources;—to gather his primary principles is itself an exercise of inductive inquiry. But Aristotle’s writings are express philosophical treatises, probably among the very earliest of their kind; they profess no other object but the didactic exposition of simple truth; and though certainly the conciseness of the style, and the utter dissimilarity to modern views of many of the arguments and propositions advanced, create much difficulty—sometimes an almost impenetrable obscurity—it does not appear that Aristotle himself ever contemplated any object but the unadorned declaration of what he conceived to be truth, or that his contemporaries found any perplexity in those reasonings which so painfully tax our powers. We must endeavour to throw ourselves into their attitude, to read with their eyes, and hear with their ears; a transformation difficult indeed, but necessary, if we would escape the narrow-minded superficiality of modern criticisms of antiquity. The best preparation for either Aristotle or Plato, but especially for the former, on account of his constant habit of historical reference, is the careful study of the few relics that remain of the ante-Socratic philosophy.
Without this, it is impossible to do justice to Aristotle as the great systematizer of Grecian speculation; we cannot measure his advance unless we know precisely where he stood. In a former Course, I believe, I noticed this special benefit to be derived from study of these neglected but most majestic fragments of the earliest philosophy of Greece; they are the rough-hewn masses, cumbrous and ungaily, but often solid, which Plato and Aristotle, Epicurus, and Zeno, employed in constructing those magnificent edifices which are still the wonder of mankind.

We will turn, then, to the treatise of Aristotle, περὶ ψυχῆς; a treatise which he regarded as a portion of his general course of physical inquiry. You must now be prepared for assertions laboriously supported, which you will probably deem unworthy of such anxious disposition; but you must not outshine Aristotle with his own light, or forget that he has himself powerfully contributed to make those propositions trite and familiar whose triteness surprises you in his pages. Aristotle at one time (in that long period of gestation which preceded the birth of the modern philosophy) exerted an influence so powerful and so universal, that everything he upheld became incorporated in the general mass of thought; and every truth he maintained we have directly from him. This influence, protracted as it is into the very philosophy of the present hour, and manifested in the common terms of philosophical language, is the great glory of Aristotle—his truest monument. Instances of this, proofs that the phraseology and recognized principles of our late and living teachers, are in a large degree such as they are, just because of this man who taught two-and-twenty centuries ago in Athens, will, I think, start up before you at nearly every step in the very subject and treatise we are about to consider.

I confess I consider this treatise a very extraordinary production. It is (with the exception of a few passages in which the author, perhaps, confounds merely logical distinctions with physical differences) a perfect specimen of fair inductive inquiry, pursued according to the legitimate method, and often with very satisfactory results. There can be no question, it must, at the time of its publication, have conveyed a vast quantity of new and well-arranged information; nor is it to be doubted, that, however we may be perplexed with some of its conclusions, and however we may be forced to admit that now and then the illustrious author escaped with pronouncing an ambiguous verdict rather than give up a difficulty, the books De Animal

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1 [On Soul, or "On the Vital Principle," under which latter title the book has recently been translated by Dr Collier. E.D.]
are the true foundation of the "inductive philosophy of the Mind."

Aristotle, who never delays at the threshold of his subject, begins with a few rapid observations on the dignity of the investigation he is about to undertake. If we value knowledge, he observes, and if we make a distinction in the objects of knowledge, either for superior exactness or superior dignity, both these characteristics meet in the ἰστορία τῆς ψυχῆς—the natural history of the Soul. Further, this species of knowledge plainly tends to elucidate all varieties of truth, especially the science of Nature; inasmuch as the soul is, as it were, the principle of living things (ὁλον ὄρχις τῶν ζωῶν). This statement marks at the very outset the wideness of significance which Aristotle imports in his use of the term Soul. You will soon see that his view extends beyond the human to the brute, and even to the vegetable creation; though of the last he speaks briefly and conjecturally. The treatise, you must remember, is itself only one of a series on the various characteristics of the animate creation. We seek, he continues, to discover the nature and essence of the soul (ψυχή καὶ ὄντα). This subject of inquiry, which modern teachers (especially after the well-known disclaimer of Locke) have generally repudiated, belonged naturally to Aristotle's conception of soul, and to the place his investigation occupied in a general course of physical instruction. It was also in some measure forced upon him by the bold assertions of the elder schools; and it corresponded, in fact, to nothing more mysterious or transcendental than our modern controversies about life and organization. Besides the inquiry as to the nature of soul, he professes further to examine its phenomena (ἵσα συμβέβηκε περὶ αὑτῆς), whether actual manifestations of the soul itself (ἰδα πίθηκ), or indirectly its results in living beings. It would not be easy to sketch the outlines of the subject with more completeness; and we must always remember that in the history of science, whatever be the success of a solution, it is no small merit to have stated the problem correctly. But in reference to the nature and faculties of this principle of Soul, he unaffectedly confesses that it is exceedingly difficult to obtain any satisfactory assurance about it. Here we observe the struggles of a powerful intellect, whose experience of scientific discovery had not been sufficiently extensive to decide his logical views. He professes some uncertainty as to the mode of proof by which the inquiry is to be regulated;—whether the essence, the τι ἐστιν, is to be ascertained in this instance as in any other, or by some peculiar process; the latter supposition increasing the difficulty of the investigation.
But even when this preliminary point has been settled—whether demonstration, or division, or any other method be adopted—other difficulties remain; the principles of different subjects are themselves different, and throw little or no light upon each other, thus the fundamental ideas of geometry and arithmetic. Aristotle next proceeds to mention the questions whose solution he conceives indispensable to a complete comprehension of the subject. They are such as these:—to what genus the Soul belongs?—is it to be entered under substance, quality, quantity, or any other of the categories? Again,—is it of those things whose being is merely potential (ἐν δυνάμει), or is it a positive principle of activity (ἐντελέχειά τις)?—is it divisible or indivisible? Are all souls of the same species (ὁμοειδεῖς)? and if not, is the distinction even generic? A question of importance, because inquirers seem altogether to restrict themselves to the soul of ἄνθρωπος. Is, then, our definition (λόγος) to describe it simply as the common principle of animated existence; or is there to be a particular one for each class—as of horse, of dog, of man, of the divine nature?—for, as to the "universal animal" (τὸ ζῷον τὸ καθόλου) of the Platonists, it is either a nonentity or a formation of the mind subsequent to observation of particulars [ἤτοι οὐδὲν ἐστὶν, ἢ ὑπότερον]. Again,—if there exist not a multiplicity of souls in the frame, but only parts of the same soul, should we first inquire into the whole or the parts? Nor is it easy to determine which of these parts—intellect, sense, and the rest—actually differ from the others. Another important point in the management of the subject is this,—should the parts of the soul, or their operations, be the first matter of examination; and if the operations, should not even their objects (τὰ αὐτηκέλευσα) take precedence of these (the αἰσθητάκων before the αἰσθητικών, &c.)? It is true that such inquiries as these do not directly answer the question, what the Soul is? but they tend to that answer. For as the knowledge of essences enables us to discover properties, so the knowledge of the latter leads us to the former; and hence it is, that every definition which does not state, or suggest, the properties of things, is merely disputative. To resume,—another most important question regards the interdependence of soul and body: it being manifest that some affections (πάθη) are dependent on body—as anger, courage, desire, and all the forms of sense;

² [De An. I. 1, § 5. This passage is noteworthy, as it involves the controversy between the Realists and Nominalists. It is not the only passage in Aristotle in which his consciousness of the problem is apparent: but I know no other which seems to pronounce so decidedly against the realistic theory. Comp. Trendelenburg's note, and see the references in note 2 to Lecture VIII. of the 2nd series. Σημ.]
—while such operations as those of intelligence seem exclusively mental. Yet even (as he sagaciously observes) if intelligence require a basis of conception (φαντασία) to work on, it would seem that to supply this requisite the material organization is demanded. The question whether soul is separable from body, will depend upon the question whether any of its operations or affections are altogether and exclusively its own; if this be not the case, we can speak of its separate properties no more than we can of those of a line or surface whose purely mathematical relations can never be exemplified in real existence. Accordingly, without here stating anything definitively with respect to the purely intellectual principle, Aristotle pronounces that there is satisfactory evidence that the passive affections are dependent on the body, and thus that they are λόγοι ἐννοιον. Hence it follows that they become a portion of the territory of the physical inquirer, who defines chiefly by the material cause, as the logician chiefly by the formal; though in truth, both these causes, as well as the final, concern the student of nature. In short—the physical inquirer is engaged with all the affections and properties inseparable from particular bodies, and considered as such; the mathematician, with properties separable not actually, but by abstraction (εἰς ἀφαίρεσις); the student of the first philosophy, with those which are actually separate existences. To the first of these classes, then, belong the passive affections of the soul.

Such are the chief topics of the introductory dissertation of Aristotle’s treatise. They are calculated to impress the difficulty and variety of the investigation; and do in reality comprise nearly all the principal psychological problems which have perplexed mankind since the days of the author. The materialist tendency of Aristotle’s views is clearly enough observable throughout; a tendency which is not very fully counteracted by his subsequent assertions (few and rather ambiguous) of the distinctness of the higher (or active) intellectual principle. But of this hereafter.

The next chapter brings us to Aristotle’s invariable preliminaries, an historical summary and discussion of the opinions of his predecessors. He observes, that all inquirers have seen that the animate differs from the inanimate in two principal characteristics, in motion and sensation (κινησις τε καὶ τῷ ἀισθάνεσθαι). And inasmuch as they conceived

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3 [Rather “imagination,” reproductive or passive, as distinguished from creative; for this is the import of φαντασία. Ed.]

4 [This phrase is explained by Philonous (ap. Trendelenb. Comm. p. 206) as equivalent to εἶναι ἐν ὑλῇ τοῦ ἐκπορευτα καὶ οὐ χωρίτα, “forms which have their being in matter, and are not separable.” Ed.]
(erroneously, according to Aristotle, for this is one of his most cherished principles) that that which moves another must itself be in motion, they pronounced the soul to be itself in this state of constant agitation. Hence Democritus and Leucippus endeavoured to apply their coarse atomic conceptions to the substance of the soul;—with whom Aristotle joins some of the Pythagoreans, who, it seems, were guilty of the same preposterous hypothesis, that the matter of the soul was the same as the restless motes in the sunbeam, though others rose a step higher, in declaring the soul to be identical only with the influence that moved these particles. Aristotle remarks that these philosophers—as well as, in a less decided degree, even Anaxagoras himself—lost sight of the fundamental distinction between the mere moving principle and the mind in its higher faculties (ψυχή and νοῦς); when he especially (Anaxagoras) proclaimed that Mind not only governed but directly moved the Universe (νοῦν κυνήγα το πᾶν). Thales, impressed with the importance of the character of motivity in the soul, attributed a soul to the magnet. In all these instances, as well as in others, we observe the universal confession of this attribute, combined in most cases with the ungrounded supposition that the mover must itself be in motion. The other class established by Aristotle, is that of those teachers who were chiefly struck by the attribute of perception and of knowledge. With these philosophers there reigned a maxim of great antiquity, whose author is probably undiscoverable,—γνῶσκεθαί δρομός δρομον,—that like is known by like; and hence they determined the nature of the soul by the number of elements they admitted in the external world. Thus Empedocles composed it of all the recognized elements. Others, struck by the intellectual capacities of the soul, and in accordance with their theory that numbers were the true principles of the Universe, applied their numerical formulas to the perceptive and cognitive powers of the mind—to intellect, science, opinion, and sense (νοῦς, ἐπιστήμη, δόξα, αἰσθήσις). And when to this they had added the capacity of originating motion, they obtained their well-known definition that the soul is a "self-moving number." Another influence affected these determinations, the conviction that the essence of the soul was removed from body; and hence those who did not unite all the elements, selected that which seemed to be most refined to incorporeality. Democritus (indirectly) pronounced for fire, Heraclitus conceived it as that exhalation (ἀναθυμίας) from which, as ever fluent, his obscure system deduced the universe. Alcmaeon, Hippo, Critias, sought it in such sub-

\[ \text{[Phys. viii. c. 5 seq. Ed.]} \]
stances as approached, in their estimation, nearest to these attributes: and even those who formed the world from contraries, assumed the same rival principles for the soul. The \nearth\ alone, Aristotle observes, except in the system of Empedocles, has not been numbered among its constituents. And thus, on the whole, the attributes apprehended in the soul have universally been motion, sense, and incorporeality (δρικυναι...κυήσει, αἰσθήσει, τῷ ἀσωμάτῳ). I need not remark to you how valuable are these scattered notices of the elder philosophers to the critical student of speculation; or how the rapid summary of Aristotle attests the great attribute of his mind—its unrivalled power of classification.

The arguments by which Aristotle, according to his usual custom, proceeds to overthrow the theories of each of his predecessors, conduct us into a world of thought so foreign to our existing habits, that I fear it would be impossible to secure them from (perhaps very undeserved) depreciation without an extent of detail and comment for which we have now no time or opportunity. He first attacks the system which finds the essential character of the soul in self-motion; by which you are here to understand—not the power of originating motion in the body, but the power of putting itself in motion—a doctrine which (as we shall hereafter see) would negative one of the main tenets of the whole Aristotelian metaphysics, the impossibility of motion being produced in any substance by its own energy. The soul does indeed move the body, but its own actual motion is only that in which it participates with the body it moves. If the soul be thus in motion, it must move either καθ' αὐτόν ἢ οὐ καθ' ἐπερον—either by a proper motion of its own, or by being in that, or attached to that, which is moved,—either as a man walks, or as he is borne in a vessel. Its motion too (which seems much the same division) will be either natural or accidental. But the former of these suppositions is not admissible. A natural or essential motion of the soul would infer the occupation of place; it would include the possibility of a violent impulse of the soul to motion and rest, which is altogether inexplicable. If it be held that the soul is moved as it moves, it must be moved by a motion of translation (φορά); it is capable then of leaving the body and returning to it, of which no instance is producible. Nor, if the soul be "essentially" motive, can it be rightly conceived moveable indirectly by some distinct object; yet this impulse κατὰ συμβεβηκός, incidentally by objects distinct from itself, is the very mode of operation to which we are most accustomed in the phenomena of sensation. Aristotle pursues
the subtle argument into the inmost intricacies of possibility, by urging, that as motion is the outgoing of the thing moved, if the soul (as is maintained by his adversaries) move itself, and therefore be itself also moved, it must issue out of its own very essence. Democritus, it appears, urged that the soul in its motions moved the body it animated; but Aristotle replies that the perpetual motion which that philosopher attributed to the soul would, on this supposition, prevent the possibility of rest;—while it is also inconsistent with the true mode of mental influences. Aristotle next enters into a refutation of the account (not dissimilar in principle to that just mentioned) given by the author of the Timaeus, of the constitution and agency of the soul of the world; a refutation perfectly justifiable, indeed, if we regard that account as intended for a literal statement, and at all events not unwarranted by the unnecessary particularity to which Plato carried his too romantic hypothesis. Modern criticism will, however, I fear, pronounce that the refutation is nearly as unintelligible as the original doctrine. It attributes, says Aristotle, magnitude to the universal soul; and thereby deprives that soul of its purely intellectual character, degrading it to the merely sensitive or concuscent principles. For intellect is essentially indivisible (διμηρησις), or if continuous, not continuous as magnitude, but like its thoughts (νοηματα), in the successive way of number. I will not delay you with the further prosecution of this part of the argument; but notice another objection which is characteristic. Aristotle denies that the operation of intellect can be symbolized by the circular motion of this general Soul; inasmuch as the act of ratiocination is not thus perpetually recurrent, but terminated at the one extreme by its principles, at the other by its conclusion; and the active exertions of intellect are similarly bounded by the end for which they are wrought.

Another theory in much vogue in the age of Aristotle was that which was principally patronized by his own pupil the musician Aristoxenus, and which pronounced the soul to be a "Harmony." This doctrine, you may remember, is also controverted by Plato in the Phaido. The harmonists alleged that the body was composed of contraries, that harmony was the "crisis and synthesis"—the temperament and conciliation, of contraries,—and that this office being performed by the soul, the soul must be truly definable as Harmony. But the soul is no composition of mixed elements, replies Aristotle; yet this alone is harmony. The soul gives motion to the frame; but what harmony originates the motion of the instrument? The health of the body may be styled its "harmony;" but the principle
of soul is more and higher than bodily sanity. Harmony implies composition and proportion of its constituents; but if we pronounce that the soul exists wherever these are discoverable in the body, we must admit not one soul but many, according to the number and variety of its different combinations. Hence, concludes Aristotle, after a cursory notice of some peculiar views of Empedocles,—"the soul can neither be a harmony, nor move in circular motion; it can be moved indirectly, and even move itself by a reflex operation, when it moves the body in which it is; in no other sense can it possess local motion." "It is not the soul that is angry, compassionates, learns, reasons; but the man by the soul," and considered as having a soul, which gives him consciousness and recollection of all organic changes;—while as to the higher intellectual principle it is essentially impassive, and undergoes the appearance of decay merely on account of the failure of its instruments.

The Pythagorean definition of the Soul—the "self-moving number"—is next transpierced by the rapid and penetrating criticism of Aristotle. To all the former objections to the actual motion of the soul, he adds a cluster of new difficulties that beset the arithmetical metaphysics of Pythagoras. The very motion of this "unit in position" will geometrically form a line! Such a unit is incapable of being more than the agent in motion, it cannot be also moved. Numbers are capable of subtraction, and thus leave a number different from the former; but the soul remains unchanged in animals that have undergone amputations. With such arguments I will not detain you. It is hard to believe that the symbolical language of Pythagoras did not carry some weightier import than the puerilities which are here so easily overthrown; but though we owe Aristotle much for his records of the old philosophy, we certainly are not much assisted by him to its illustration. His criticisms are almost without an exception depreciatory; nor does he seem to have known the enjoyment to be found in tracing truth through all her disguises of antique symbolism and mysterious proverb. In this he offers a striking contrast to the more conciliating spirit of Plato. We may however grant his concluding objection to the Pythagorean definition; that it will be found no easy task "to explain from it the affections and operations of the soul, its thoughts, sensations, pleasures, and pains."

I have already mentioned the opinion so largely entertained in remote antiquity, that "the like can only be known by its like," a maxim which Plato applied chiefly to the ultimate unity of Reason and Truth, of the Spirit of Man and the Spirit of the Universe. In the natural philo-
The philosophy of Empedocles, this principle seems to have been employed for an humbler purpose; which indeed Plato himself did not altogether disdain, though I cannot believe that he valued it much. The soul, thought the philosopher of Agrigentum, must itself be the counterpart of the external world; to comprehend that world it must be similarly constituted; it must, then, be a composition of the same form of elementary natures which surround it, mingled and actuated by the same two powers of concord and discord. Aristotle refutes this notion in his 5th chapter in a great variety of ways. There are, he urges, substances which the soul apprehends and which yet cannot be traced to these elements; or, at least, which depend on an union and proportion of these elements forming a new whole, which whole ought, therefore, according to the principle of similars, to be found in the soul. Grant that it apprehend the elements of beings by virtue of its own elementary affinity with them; ἀλλὰ τὸ σύνολον τίνι γνωριεῖ;—how shall it get to know the whole?—unless it carry within it the very proportions and combinations (λόγοι ἤ συνθέσεις) which regulate these elements. His next objection is taken from the doctrine of the categories. Real being (τὸ ὄν) comprises all these generic notions or classes:—shall the soul, then, be of a structure to correspond with them all? This is inadmissible, for the principles of these categories are mutually distinct; shall it consist only of the principles of substances? (Ὡς and έἴδος); how then shall it apprehend anything else, as the very arrangement of these categories presumes it can? Must it not become a mere quality or quantity in order to detect these classes; and how is this consistent with its substantial being? This doctrine of Empedocles is likewise inconsistent with his own maxim, that "the like suffers not from the like" (ἀπαθέω εἰναι τὸ ὑμών ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑμῶν); for his school will allow that sensation, and even intellection, are passive affections. Why also are none of the outward earthly constituents of Body endowed with these perceptive powers? Why, indeed, is not perception universal, and every portion of elementary existence capacitated to recognize itself through the universe? Nor is this system suitable to the real dignity of the intellectual, or even the vital and conscious, essence,—which stands altogether above the bondage of material elements, and the former, plainly prior to them in existence [νῦν προγενέστατος καὶ κύριος κατὰ φύσιν]. Aristotle adds a curious observation, which may remind us of the peculiarity of the philosophy we have to deal with, and serve to warn us in how different a climate of speculation we are breathing, when we open these ancient pages. If, he re-
marks, "the soul must be formed of elements, there is no need of them all in its constitution; for either member of a contrariety will discern both itself and its opposite;" adding a maxim which has become proverbial, that "by the straight we judge both itself and the crooked, for the rule is singly the test of both" [κριτής ἀμφοῖν ὁ κανόν].

Nor will Aristotle admit that the principle of soul is diffused through the world universally, as Thales and others hastily decided. We cannot admit soul where there is no evidence of animation, without destroying all grounds of reasoning; nor will the most resolute upholder of this fantastic theory venture to give the title of "animal" to the elements singly or in their insensible combinations. But the following argument was urged, it seems, as the strength of their case. The whole and the parts of the elements are homogeneus (ὅλον ὁμοείδες τοὺς μορίους); and since the parts are endowed with animation in animal organisms, we may conclude the whole must be so. This is of course easily answered, by reminding the objector that the principle of soul may be superadded to some matters, though not to all; but Aristotle further keenly retorts, by arguing that this allegation would infer that the soul diffused through the elements must be of literally the same kind with that in animated bodies, which is confuted by the very admission of the adversary, who cannot deny the distinction between his soul of fire or air, and the principle of life, motion, and thought.

Finally, Aristotle asserts the unity of the principle of soul. It constitutes in his view the combining power that comprehends and binds the whole organization of the frame; and as there must be such a bond until death has removed it, we shall have to seek it in an infinite series unless we stop with the soul itself as the simple and indivisible principle of unity. *And thus, he observes, the whole soul of the insect is found in each of its parts which live and move after section. The whole soul, then, is engaged in each exercise of the faculties of the soul; and wherever one faculty exists in the frame the entire is formally present, even when, as in the case of the insect, not numerically the same in each portion. You will, I think, be inclined to consider that this obscure distinction does not throw much light on the subject; this formal presence of an indivisible soul is, however, of much consequence in the Peripatetic psychology.*

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*[c. 5. § 16. ed. Trendelenburg. The maxim occurs in Euripides:

ὅδ' εν τῷ ἀλόχρῳ, κανόνι τοῦ καλοῦ μαθῶν.

II. 602. Ed.]*

*Aristotle frequently returns to the same perplexing problem, and allows*
Having thus rejected all preceding solutions of this great problem, the founder of the Lyceum has cleared the way for his own views; views which you will not expect to remove the difficulty of the question, when you remember that the very interpretation of them has been among the bitterest and most protracted controversies in the whole history of philosophy. The chief obscurity of Aristotle's account arises from his having connected it with his own dark, and often, it must be allowed, ambiguous metaphysical principles; for Aristotle, though always attached to the pursuit of truth by observation, valued the conclusions of observation mainly as they tended to illustrate these ultimate arrangements. Another cause of the obscurity of the Aristotelian definition is—its exceeding generality; a feature which you must always bear in mind in criticising its merits. Aristotle found the principle of soul wherever there was a moving organization, a perpetual succession of changes under a common form of being, and with an internal principle regulating the change. The definition was, therefore, to be framed so as to meet all the varieties of this organic condition; it was to apply to this internal principle of organic changes wherever discernible; it was to suit vegetable, animal, and rational existence. Εἰ τι κοινῶν ἐπὶ πάσης ψυχῆς δεῖ λέγειν,—and τις ἐν εἷς κοινῶτατος λόγος αὐτῆς, is his introduction to his definition. He compares it (II. 2. 1) to a geometrical definition of figure, common to all and peculiar to none. And, though I am aware that our proud conceptions of our own nature (perfectly just as regards its exclusive and special prerogatives) tolerate with impatience the notion of such an affinity in the inferior elements of our being, there can be no question but that the views of Aristotle as to a progressive chain of organic existence are verified by true scientific observation. Between organic and inorganic beings there are plain, palpable, and absolute differences,

*it ἀπόλαυσις.* (II. 2. 7). Vide Hist. Animal. iv. 7. The property itself of separate vitality and reproductive power, is a characteristic of the lowest forms of organic nature, and diminishes as we ascend in the scale. Thus (as Aristotle himself constantly observes) it is chiefly manifested in plants, in which every slip will propagate its species; it is manifested in the polypus kind most of all the animal kingdom; in worms the sections generate a head and tail, but, as I am informed, with a limit to the number of possible divisions; when we advance farther, the separative power ceases, but in the part that retains the centre of vitality the reproductive power is still strong,—thus the lobster regains its claws. This, too, gradually diminishes: and from the recovery of an entire limb, the power at length lessens in man to that *vis medicatrix* which heals a wound... In elementary animals (as they may be called from their simplicity) this independence of parts is found united with another curious property—a facility of exchanging functions among the different organs. If the polypus be turned inside out, its nutrition is performed with equal effect, by its exterior surface.
Springing from a germ and so reproducing its species; nourished by intimate combination of matter according to laws of assimilation; every part contributing to the common purpose of the whole; and after evincing a peculiar power of resisting the common laws of matter, decaying and dying after definite periods;—the organized portions of the creation are at once and easily recognized. Nor does it appear (though it has been attempted) that any real terms of continuity can be established (as in crystallization) between these separate provinces. But the case is very different when we have once arrived among organized natures. There are, indeed, decided differences between animal and vegetable beings; the powers, namely, of sensation and voluntary motion which belong to the former;—yet we know how difficult it is in the case of (for instance) the zoophyte, to determine whether any such distinctive attribute is really possessed. And it may be questioned whether the most perfectly organized brute does not differ more from the zoophyte than the latter from the sensitive plant. Aristotle, then, by what is substantially an admissible generalization, comprehended all organized beings in one vast class as gifted with a ψυχή or soul, whose different kinds or faculties (diωνίμες) distinguished the different species; each species in the ascending scale retaining the faculties that preceded it, and adding on the new ones. It was necessary, then, to construct a definition applicable to all these developments of soul; and such a definition as would also compete with those characters of substantiability and indivisibility which Aristotle thought universally recognizable in all its manifestations. Now, there are two ways of declaring the nature of a thing;—one, to reduce it to some known class; the other, professing it to be unique and irreducible, to direct the mind to observe it, by simply pointing out where and when and how it is found to exist. It was, unquestionably, a misfortune to the Aristotelian philosophy, and one of the great causes of its injurious influence on the progress of knowledge, that it too ambitiously attempted the former of these modes of communicating scientific information. You must at once perceive how this habit of reducing all things to genera already known, must inevitably confine the energies of investigation; the true business of science and its greatest glory is, as far as possible, to establish new genera, to discover modifications of being before altogether unsuspected. Afterwards it will, by these vast and simple properties, explain multitudes of phenomena; and thus verify its discovery;—but the crown still belongs to him whose sagacity has detected the new genus. It is not too much
to say, that the whole of the Baconian reform turns upon establishing this simple maxim; that the logical definition by genus and difference is not to be the great primary aim of physical science, but its subsequent and inferior application;—and, as a consequence, that the proper work of "syllogism" is also not the establishment, but the application, of the general laws of man and nature.
LECTURE II.

ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ARISTOTLE.

The object of the Aristotelian investigations, I concluded by observing, is mainly classification, the reduction of beings to previously known genera. The attempt to perform this office for the soul in Aristotle's universal sense of the word, must necessarily lead to unprofitable subtleties; even though, as in many other unprofitable pursuits of mistaken science, valuable observations may be gained on the journey. The principle that maintains life, sensation, and reason, in conjunction with an organized body, and with whose cessation these cease, is single in the world; it is plainly different from anything observable in the inanimate creation; and we may be assured that any attempt to generalize it, must terminate in some false, or ambiguous, or nugatory proposition. It is clear that it can be done only by two courses; either by quickening the inanimate world or by deadening the animate;—and, as far as I have penetrated the spirit of Aristotle, it seems to me that he had an evident, though subdued and disguised, tendency to the former;—which, for the rest, is as you know, not strange to the philosophy of antiquity. Let us now see by what means Aristotle endeavoured to fix the idea of soul among his logical assortments; premising that you will find his definition chiefly intended to apply to the inferior functions of the soul, from which he afterwards separates the supreme agency of intellect so decisively as to lead some of his interpreters to conceive that he attributed a double soul to man.

In his strong faith of the value and sufficiency of the categories, Aristotle begins with the most abstract of conceptions, in order by regular descent to obtain the due location of soul in that system of human thoughts. The most universal of ideas is τὸ εἶναι, bare existence, which comprises all the categories. Among the rest, and holding a position of great importance, it includes the notion of 

\[ \text{ουσία, or substance.} \]

Substance is either possible, with a capacity of reality, or it is that which gives reality to mere possibility, or finally it is the compound of both. In tech-

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1 \[ \text{[Lέγομεν δὴ γένος ἐν τῷ τόν δεικνύον τὴν οὐσίαν, ταύτῃ δὲ τὸ μὲν ὡς ὑπαρ. (ὅ καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν ὡς ἄπτε τὸδε τι; ἀπεραν δὲ μορφὴν καὶ εἶδος, καθ' ἶνα ἥν ἔχει λέγεται τὸδε τι; καὶ τρέτων τὸ ἐκ τούτων. \textit{De Anima}, ii. 1. 2. \textit{Ed.}]} \]
ON THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

Lect. II.

Tical language, it is either matter (ὤη) or form (μορφή, εἴδος, or λόγος) or the resultant of both in real existence—the actual natures that surround us in the universe. Now it is a characteristic of Aristotle's philosophy, that his "forms," are essentially active; our word "actual" to express reality is strictly Aristotelian, for forms alone confer reality, and they, as real, are by Aristotle conceived to consist in a state of "energy" ever active yet ever complete. Whether this conception originally arose from regarding the soul as a "form," or from purely metaphysical speculations as to the best mode of accounting rationally for the existence and laws of the universe, it is plain that it aided the construction of Aristotle's definition, and naturally led to it. Matter, then, being capacity (δύναμις), and Form being act or ἐνέργεια; Aristotle proceeds to affirm that bodies are plainly substances, and that natural bodies are universally so, as being the groundwork of all others. When to the natural body is added the possession of life, it still remains a substance, and as such cannot be confounded with or affirmed of soul; it is not the attribute of a subject but itself a subject-matter. Body, then, considered apart, is materially and potentially a natural living substance, and the soul is that which formalizes and exalts to actuality this natural living substance previously endowed with a mere susceptibility of these attributes. But we have not yet reached the entire definition. In the general notion of activity Aristotle discovers a distinction which is in various forms of very extensive application in his metaphysical philosophy. There is a principle of energy, and a direct exercise of energy; a dormant activity and an operating activity; even as there is a habitual knowledge and an immediate contemplation; or, as he otherwise illustrates it, as there is the state of sleep and the state of waking. This seems to be the previous distinction of power and act transferred to the region of energy:—thus he compares the soul shortly after, in this same respect, to ἡ δύναμις τοῦ ὄργανον, sc. the organ of sight. Now, in the nature of the case, the former of these—the source of energy—is prior to the other; it is the first conceivable state of the activity afterwards manifested. Here the soul becomes "the first energy" of the body. Further, the body, both in plants and in animals, is evidently instrumental or "organic;" a term and notion first, as far as I know, fully developed in the writings of Ari-

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2 [ὁσοι τε μάλιστ’ εἶναι δοκεῖσθαι τὰ σώματα καὶ τούτων τὰ φυσικὰ. Ib. 93. Ed.]

3 [οὐκ ἂν εἰη τὸ σῶμα ψυχῇ, ὡς γὰρ ἐστὶ τῶν καθ’ ὑποκειμένων τὸ σῶμα, μᾶλλον δὲ ὑποκειμένων καὶ ὅλη. Ib. 94. Ed.]
stotle, and for which the world is still indebted to him. And thus we gain the entire definition, so famous and so contested, which pronounces the soul universally considered, to be "the first entelechía" (or energy) "of a natural organic body, which body itself has life potentially." The soul, he adds, is not separable from the body in so far as it is the "energy" of this body; were the eye an animal the visive power would be its soul, and that power being removed, it could no longer, except homonymously, be termed an eye;—thus also, passing from part to whole, the soul is the essence of the particular organized body to which it is attached. At the close of the following chapter (II. 2. 12) he recapitulates his views succinctly. "The soul is λόγος and εἰδος, not ἰλη and ἱποκείμενον. And as substance is three-fold,—form, matter, and the compound of the two; of these matter is capacity, form is act; and as that which is made up of both is ἐνεργόν, animate, the body is not the act (ἐνέργεια) of the soul, but the soul itself is the act of a certain body. And therefore they rightly judge, that neither is the soul without the body, nor is the soul body, but (σώματος τι) something pertaining to the body...And each soul is in its own proper and peculiar body; for such is the nature of things that the ‘entelechy’ of each thing is in that particular thing which is it potentially, and thus is ever inherent in its own proper matter." All this refers to the inferior nutritive and sensitive soul only; though Aristotle (not according to his usual precision) leaves us to collect this from other passages in the same and subsequent chapters, in which he expressly declares his opinion that the νοῦς or theoretic faculty is another genus of soul, and separable, and eternal. I may here observe, that it forms no slight difficulty in determining the sense of Aristotle’s psychology, to fix in what degree he meant to include the intellectual faculty (whether passive or active) in his general descriptions of the nature and qualities of soul. Ηε perpetually meets us with—περὶ δὲ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ νοῦ ἐπεροῦ λόγος (II. 3. 10).

Such, then, is Aristotle’s effort to fix the generic character and essence of the soul. He afterwards proceeds, in the spirit of the modern method, to describe it by its properties, and with remarkable sagacity and success for his age of science. But we may pause for a moment on the investigation we have completed.

It is evident that this reduction of the notion of soul to the notions of substance, form, and energy, is of little

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scientific value; that it shares the fate of all attempts to classify that which is absolutely unique. To say that it is real substance, is merely to affirm that it has more than possible existence; to call it a form is merely to intimate that the body is more than a confused heap of undetermined capacities of being; to name it an energy of the first order, is to pronounce that it has that in faculty which subsequently appears in act. The defect, then, of the definition is this, that it adds nothing to our knowledge of the subject, and gives little or no assistance in mental classification; the merit of it, as compared with its predecessors, is, however, this—that it also assumes nothing hypothetical. It may also be observed, that Aristotle having once divided universal being into the two classes of potentiality and actuality, of matter and form, he at least allied the vital and conscious principle with the loftiest elements his scheme of existence supplied; and having established his form, causes, or principles of being, he found in the soul the noblest three—the formal, the efficient, and the final—for these he blends together as accomplished in the nature of the soul, which is at once the form, the agent, and the ultimate end, of the body it animates (II. 4. 3).

There is a distinction of perpetual recurrence in Aristotle (see Phys. I. i. 2; Eth. Nicom. I. 4), between that which is clearest in the nature of things and that which is clearest to our apprehensions; and this forms the ground of transition from his definition of the nature of the soul in itself to a description of its faculties. The animate is manifestly distinguished from the inanimate by the possession of life, which manifests itself in many various faculties. The lowest is the nutritive, possessed by the vegetable creation in common with all other living things; which world of mere vegetation is accordingly said to "live," every plant having within it this ἀρχή and δύναμις of increase in all directions. That this faculty can exist without the rest, is plain; but that the others can exist without it, is manifestly impossible, at least in things subject to death,—ἐν τοῖς θανάτοις. The animal rises above the vegetable by the attribute of sensation, διὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν; not necessarily, observes Aristotle, by that of local motion; for all admit that the animal nature truly belongs to beings altogether unable to change their place (as the whole tribe of zoophytes and adhesive shell-fish). In the sensitive faculty itself the feeling of touch is itself as separable as the nutritive function from the sensitive; being frequently possessed by animals who seem to be endowed with no other sense whatever. And this according to the scheme of progress; for touch, which includes taste as one of its species, is the
sensitive faculty most necessary for the purposes of the nutritive. With sensation, again, is necessarily connected appetite (τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν); since sensation involves the pleasurable and the painful (see III. 11. 1), and these must infer desire and aversion. Beyond these again, is the motive and the intellectual faculty*. And thus we gain a second and more intelligible definition of the soul (II. 9. 12), as being that (τὸ τοῦ) by which we live, and feel, and reason—πνεύμωσις—that is as the first principle of these faculties: always remembering, for this he perpetually impresses, that the soul is not to be considered as the matter or simple subject of these powers, but as a nature essentially active, and which by its innate efficiency, even when dormant, rules, animates, and realizes the body. We are said, he observes (II. 2. 15, 16), to be healthy by health itself as a principle, or healthy as to the body as a subject; this principle of health is as an ἐλέος, a λόγος, an ἐνέργεια of the body, inherent in it; and it is in this sense of activity, not that other of passivity, that we are to affirm that by the soul we live, and feel, and understand. The history of the soul, then, is the history of the principle that pervades organized nature; and rises by regular and distinct gradations from the lowest form of vegetable being to the mind of Aristotle himself. Nutrition and reproduction, sensation by touch, sensation by the other senses, desire and aversion, power of local motion, faint powers of memory and conception, intellect recipient and intellect active,—such are the successive regions to be surveyed and characterized by the philosopher of soul.

I need not remind you that this fine outline of physiological inquiry, thus drawn by the masterly hand of Aristotle, and comprehending the whole organized creation, has directed nearly all subsequent investigations, and in some form or other prefaces our treatises to this very day. It is difficult to say in what degree Aristotle was indebted for it to his predecessors; his powerful faculty of reproducing all antecedent learning in new forms doubtless was manifested here; and it is not improbable that Plato has lost much of his due credit by preferring his own graceful way of dialogue (in which systems of this kind can scarcely be clearly stated) to—except in one or two instances—the form of methodical exposition. But though Aristotle, who, we must remember, was the descendant of a long line of physicians, may have obtained many hints towards his arrangement, the style of the whole performance is marked

* Each step of advance implies the rest that precede it; "Aς," says Arist., "the triangle is implied in the square, so the nutritive in the sensitive faculty." (II. 3. 9.)
with characters of independent research scarcely to be mistaken.

To the vegetative principle—the first manifestation of an organic “form”—Aristotle assigns the same two leading characters which are still attributed to it,—those of alimentation of the individual, and reproduction of the species. The latter he ascribes, singularly enough, to a certain mysterious appetency of the immortal and divine, which, unable to realize itself in the perishable individual, tends to the perpetuation of the kind. As the soul is in three respects the *aivria* and *apxey* of the body;—as its formal principle of being, and the actuality of its mere capacity; as its final cause, nature working ever with an end in view, and the body being to the soul an instrument for its own purposes; as its efficient or moving cause;—so this last cause is manifested not merely in local motion, but also in the other species of motion,—those, for example, of change (*dalloiws*) and augmentation or diminution (*aichen* and *phios*). The motion of variation is instanced in sensation; the motion of augmentation in the process of nutrition. The remaining discussion of the subject of this inferior soul does not offer much matter of interest. Aristotle censures the idle hypothesis of Empedocles, that the growth of plants downward and upward depended on the principles of earth and fire respectively; and discusses the agency of heat in the business of nutrition—a notion which seems to have got currency, according to Aristotle,—and these rude conceptions are not without interest as illustrating the progress of physical science,—from the fact that fire alone, of the four supposed elements, appears to be itself capable of assimilation and increase. But though Aristotle exalts fire to the dignity of a *suvaiton*, he still contends for the disposing and moderating power of the soul. The soul or vital principle employs heat to modify aliment; as the pilot uses his own hand to move the rudder of his vessel (II. 4, § 16). Whether alimentation takes place by the operation of contraries on contraries, was another question which these early physiologists attempted to solve by supposed universal maxims; as “the impossibility of like affecting like,” &c..., Aristotle justly enough distinguishes by the period of the process; which in its early stage will present contraries, and in its final stage similars, as we are accustomed to recognize in our term “assimilation.” The philosopher’s power of distinction is next exercised upon the respective ideas of augmentation, nutrition, and generation;—the animated body possesses the first, as it is a quantity (*to tauo τo*); the second, as it is a definite substance; for the conservation of the same substance is the
purpose of nutrition; the third, as it is qualified to preserve, not the same, but the similar (οὐ τοῦ τρεφομένου, ἀλλὰ οἶον τὸ τρεφόμενον, § 13).

The great cause of imperfection in Aristotle's treatment of these subjects is his unhappy preference of merely logical distinctions to physical observations. The reader perpetually laments that a sagacity so perspicacious and so universal should be wasted through half a treatise, in labouring to reconcile hasty observations of nature to arbitrary maxims previously assumed; and in applying a multiplicity of distinctions which at best can avail for little more than mere propriety of expression. Potential and real, passive and active, are the feeble keys, that, easily fitted into all the wards of nature, have yet no strength to stir the bolt. His treatise on the soul, as all his treatises, contains many valuable suggestions and many important facts; but no matter how interesting the particular discussion, the chance of a minute metaphysical distinction is ever sufficient to win him from his subject into a labyrinth of obscure and profitless disquisition; and he seems to value facts only as they may grace or illustrate these artificial classifications.

This character is too applicable to the chapter that succeeds the one on which we have been engaged. It treats of sense in general; but altogether in reference to these distinctions of which you have already had so much. Aristotle determines that sensation is motion and passion; and of all the species of motion, variation. Elsewhere he defines actual sensation with great exactness as "a motion or excitation of the soul through the body," and as thus belonging equally to both. (De Sens. i. p. 185 n.) The question next arises,—why there is no sensation of the sensitive faculties themselves? and this difficulty is solved by establishing that the aesthetically sensitive is only potential, even as the combustible has only a fitness for combustion; the sensitive, therefore, cannot feel until its power be exalted into act. This customary distinction is then elaborately reiterated, and its differences multiplied by new dissections. In passive variation there are also two species,—alteration destructive and alteration preservative, the latter of which brings the faculty into act. After insisting on these distinctions, which Aristotle seems to consider of very high importance, though till then, as he tells us, without a definite name; he proceeds to the more obvious differences of the acts of sensation and of general science. The objects and active causes of the former are external, are singular, are necessarily present (and only occasionally can be present) for the act of sensation; those of the latter
are inward, universal, and ever the property of the soul. The knowledge of things merely sensible is similarly restricted with its objects themselves: and thus the \( \alpha i\sigma \theta \eta \nu \kappa o\) is in power only until the \( \alpha i\sigma \theta \nu \tau o\) is in act; the active operation of the latter on the former is \( \alpha i\sigma \theta \eta \sigma o\), in the accomplishment of which the sensitive and the sensible quality become ultimately alike (II, 5, § 7)*.

Aristotle considers that the objects of the senses—their external causes—should first be discussed; the acts and the faculties of sense next in succession. It of course necessarily follows, that the obscurity in which the external media of sensation were in that age involved, they, as you know, forming the last and most refined subject of physical inquiry, must affect many of his conclusions with error. Yet hints of native sagacity offer themselves often to the reader, and render these pages still of interest to the historian of physical research.

The proper objects of sense, declares Aristotle, are twofold:—those which are apprehended by a single sense, and those apprehended by more, or all the senses. You will recall this division in the "Essay" of Locke. The subjects of all the senses are, motion, rest, number, figure, magnitude; of which motion is plainly sensible to touch and sight. And all the rest, he elsewhere observes, are perceivable by motion (III. I, § 5); "as magnitude by motion; as well as figure, for figure is a mode of magnitude; so also rest, as the absence of motion; number by the negation of continuity (\( \tau \eta \; \alpha \tau o\phi \alpha \varepsilon i\; \tau o\; \sigma \nu \varepsilon \chi o\nu\)); unity by every sense. And thus there is no special sense of each of these:—for it will be as we now apprehend the sweet by sight, because we have a sense of both, in which when they coincide (\( \delta t\alpha v\; \sigma \mu \mu \pi \kappa \sigma o\)) we know accordingly." See also ibid. 4. To these two classes of sensible objects is to be added a sort of sensation \( k a t a\; \sigma \mu \beta \varepsilon \beta \varepsilon \eta k o\), as when we are said to see the son of Cleon, when that he is "the son of Cleon" is really an inference from the direct object of sense. The senses are not deceived, but false conclusions may be

* In the act of sensation, Aristotle urgently maintains a distinct being for the sensible object. The ancients, says he, (III. 1, 16; see also Metaph. IX. 3,) have not correctly conceived that nothing is white or black except when seen, and that there is no sapidic quality without taste; this is true as respects act, but not as respects power. Both the sensitive and the sensible are to be understood, each of them, as existing potentially and actively; in sensation the act of both is combined into one, though still essentially different; and in this active sense hearing and sound (for instance) arise and expire together; but potentially their existence is mutually independent. And he observes that it is only in some of our senses that language supplies distinct names for the active or energising state in the \( \alpha i\sigma \theta \eta \nu \kappa o\) and the \( \alpha i\sigma \theta \nu \tau o\);—thus while we have in one case sound and hearing, we have no term answering to "vision" for the active or operative state of colour, as exciting it.
drawn from sensible appearances. The cases of deceit he states (III. c. 3)⁸. The perception of each object of proper sense is scarcely at all false (ὀλιγιστὸν ἔχουσα τὸ Ψεῦδος); the inference as to the subject of the sensible quality may be false; judgments as to the common qualities, such as motion and magnitude, still more so. This observation might lead us to expect a close analysis of the ideas ordinarily attributed to mere sense; by which the modern inquirers might have been anticipated in that detection of associated judgments which has made one of their chief titles to glory; but Aristotle pursues it little farther.

I do not purpose to present you with any detailed account of Aristotle’s views as to the objects or media of the various senses. They belong less to the history of general speculation than to that of natural philosophy. A very brief notice may, however, be not uninteresting, as illustrating the slight advance the most sagacious mind can make in such a field without patient experimental investigation.

With regard, for instance, to the object of sight, the question turns in Aristotle upon the conception of three principal subjects: colour, transparency, and light. Colour is the direct object of vision; it affects that which is actually transparent, and by means of this actually transparent medium becomes visible; it is κυντικὸν τοῦ κατ’ ἐνεργείαν διαφανοῦς. The transparent medium, then, must possess some activity of transparency, some diaphanous virtue, to effect this; and it must be when deprived of this activity that colours become invisible. Now this actuality of the transparent medium, which makes it indeed transparent, is light; which is hence described by the definition so often—and not altogether unjustly—subjected to modern ridicule, as “the act of the diaphanous considered so far forth as diaphanous.”* (§ 2.) Sound is the sonorous body in act, light is the pellucid body in act; and the latter reveals colours, as the former reveals the varieties of acuteness and gravity (II. 8, § 8). They differ, however, in this—that sound is motion and light is not (De Sens. VI. p. 675 b). Light, according to Aristotle, is not itself a body, nor the efflux of a body; for then it should occupy the very same place with the diaphanous medium; which is contradictory:—it is, “as it were, the colour of the diaphanous medium, when it is actually diaphanous by fire or the like.”

⁸ [This curious chapter seems to have been suggested by the discussions on the conditions of false opinion in the Theaetetus and Sophista. § 9 is an evident critique of p. 264 of the latter dialogue, though it seems to have escaped the notice of Prof. Bonitz, whose excellent Index to Aristotle recognizes five other references to the Sophista—more than sufficient, one would have thought, to have set at rest the question of its genuineness. Ed.]
ON THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

He proceeds to treat of sound and hearing in the same style; maintaining for both, as for all the senses, the absolute necessity of a medium. He observes that there is a reflection of both sound and light, and considers both to be the perpetual conditions of hearing and seeing; plainly enough accounts for sound by impulses of the air continued to the organ (II. 8. § 3, &c.), and seems to have had some conception of slow and rapid vibrations as causes of differences of pitch (ib. § 8); though this (affirmed by Dr Gillies, p. 50) is very doubtful in my judgment. Aristotle attempts to explain the fact of hearing by the supposition of a συμφωνία αὐτοῦ in the meatus of the ear; a notion which seems to have originated in a principle countenanced elsewhere by Aristotle, and stated by Plato in the Timeus,—that there is an internal relation between each “element” and the constitution of each organ, and the cause of the possession and privation of voice;—observations which, as all Aristotle’s physiological remarks, display wonderful vigilance and variety of observation, with an equally singular confidence in precipitate and superficial explanations.

Of smell Aristotle observes that it is our most defective sense, that air and water are its appropriate media, and that its objects are usually dry, as those of taste are eminently moist. This latter sense he considers a species of touch, and in truth only one of its numerous varieties. Nor is either taste or touch absolutely without a medium; though the objects of these senses differ from the rest in affecting at once the medium and the sense. It is, says Aristotle, as the soldier receives at once the pressure of the shield and the stroke that smites it. The real organ of both these senses is, he considers, beneath the outer surface; a faint conjecture not unlike the real truth. The objects of touch he pronounces to be the differences of body as body (διαφοράς σώματος ἐκ σώματος), in other words—the “primary qualities” of Locke. The organ holds a kind of mediate position between the extremes of its objects; and it is the excesses or deficiencies above or below this mediate intensity which it detects.

Aristotle closes this book of his treatise, by stating of the senses in general,—that they are all “recipient of sensible forms without the matter;” an assertion not absurd if understood in the author’s sense of matter and form, and not in the gross way of atomic effluxions; an assertion the substance of which is, perhaps, involved in all our ordinary admissions, that the material ground of sensible qualities is not itself directly apprehended by sense.

* [On this and the other departments of the Aristotelian psychology no student of the subject should omit to consult Mr Grote (Aristotle, Chap. xii.). Ed.]
it by the well-known comparison of the impression of the
signet on the wax;—"the wax receives the brazen or
golden seal, but not quaternus it is brass or gold; and
the sense of each object is affected by that which has colour,
or taste, or sound, yet not as each of its objects substan-
tially and materially exists, but as it is such, and according
to its formal essence". And thus though the sensorium and
the object agree, yet they differ also:—the sentient organ
may be a definite magnitude, but the sensitive faculty is
no magnitude, but a proportion and power answerable to
it. This proportion must be duly maintained between the
sense and its object; and hence excessive impulses destroy
the organs. And the reason why plants are without the
sensitive power is just this; that they are naturally without
this proportioned recipient to detach the forms of the sen-
sible objects, and are thus affected by the whole complex
material mass, when they are affected at all. And in all
similar cases, inanimate bodies are not affected by light or
darkness or sound or smell as sensible forms; but by the
bodies in which these sensible forms are conveyed;—it is
not the sound but the concussion of the air that cleaves
the tree in a thunder-storm"...§ 5. Elsewhere expressions
occur more emphatic as to the transference of these sen-
sible qualities; yet they are still essentially distinct from
any effluxion of matter. As (III. 2, § 3) "That which sees
is in a manner coloured (ἐστὶν ὡς κεχρωμάτισταί); for each
sensorium (ἀληθητήρια) is receptive of the sensible quality
without the matter; and hence when the sensibles them-
selves are absent, sensations and φαντασία remain in the
sensoria." Such are nearly the expressions of Aristotle on
this important question of the communication of the senses
with the external world. You will observe that the sen-
sible forms of which he speaks are essentially immaterial;
and certainly, whatever may be thought of the value of the
theory in any shape, are very different from the coarse
caricatures which are presented of his doctrine in many
modern publications. The "forms" of Aristotle may be
illustrated by comparing them with the "forms" of Kant,
the modern metaphysician who in every respect most

\[\text{Footnotes:}
7 [§ τοιούτῳ καὶ κατά τὸν λόγον. § 1. i.e. in virtue of its qualities, and
formal description. Ed.]
8 [The vulgar reading (retained by Bekker and Trendelenburg) of this
passage is, μέγεθος μὴ γὰρ ἐν εἰσὶν ἀληθητήριον, οὐ μὴ ὅτι ἀληθητὴ ν ἐστιν.
Simplicius reads here τῷ γε ἀληθητήτω ἐστιν.—So at least. Aldus represents.
If this is right, tr. 'The sentient organ may be a definite corporeal magnitude,
but not as it is sentient': i.e. its perceptive power is no function of its mate-
rial bulk, nor vice versa: it is an immaterial power, not a certain quantity of
matter. But probably τὸ is the right reading, the sense of which is fairly
given in the text. Ed.]

nearly resembles him. Aristotle—impressed, as all must be, with the mental character of the qualities of the external world—separated them from their material substratum, at least in conception—κατὰ λέγον, and held that from their posts in the external world they, and they exclusively of their "matter," held connexion with the mind, becoming in a manner one with the mind that apprehended them. And if matter be real, and the qualities of matter real, this statement cannot be thought extravagant; it is true that matter is directly perceived by no sense, and that the qualities or "forms" of matter are the subjects and furniture of the sentient soul; it is these that detach themselves from their material basis, and alone affect the sensitive principle. The view of Kant is simpler; but it recognizes, at least as regards the principal of these qualities, the same general problem, and attempts its solution in a way not dissimilar. He thought it preferable to regard the chief of these same forms as completely the issue of the mind itself, which according to its own laws invests external objects with them; they do not come to us, but we create them. His theory of forms was indeed more limited in its application to the objects of sense than that of Aristotle; being confined to the ideas of time and space;—and it was also confirmed by researches into the distinction of the evidence of experience and demonstration, of which Aristotle appears little cognizant;—but the separation of form and matter belongs to both, and is as justifiable in the one as in the other.

Aristotle proceeds to shew that there exist no senses beyond those he has enumerated. The arguments employed are scarcely worth delaying your attention; turning chiefly on the ancient notions concerning the four elements. He remarks a principal advantage in the possession of a variety of senses; that thereby we are enabled to distinguish the primary qualities of number, magnitude, motion, &c. from the secondary with which they are associated; were everything white we should not distinguish colour and extension. This is one of those pregnant observations that make us regret that Aristotle should suddenly desert the most promising investigations; after (as we should imagine) getting so admirably within view of them. He also raises the question of a consciousness distinct from the mere sensation, which you will perhaps remember has been largely discussed by a late writer. "Since," says our author, "we perceive that we see and hear, it is necessary that we be conscious of our seeing either by sight or by

9 [B. III. c. 1, § 8. Trendelenh. Ed.]
10 [Dr Thomas Brown, Lecture XI. on Consciousness. Ed.]
11 [B. III. c. 2, § 1. Ed.]
some other faculty. The sense must be conscious of itself, or there will be two sensations of the same object. Moreover, if there be this further sense of the sensation, either the process must go on to infinity, or some sensation must be conscious of itself; this, then, may as well take place at the first stage. On the other hand, arises the difficulty, that as the proper object of sight is colour, if the sight perceive itself, that self must be coloured.” To this he replies by a distinction, and by observing that there is a certain quality of colour even in the organ (as before cited); as often, stating the question better than he solves it.

The second chapter of the third book of the treatise De Anima introduces us (§ 10) to a tenet which has been considered a peculiar glory of the psychology of Aristotle—his doctrine of the common sense, to which all sensible apprehensions are supposed to be referred. Many expositors seem to consider this doctrine, as in Aristotle’s view of it, a conclusive proof of the unity and immateriality of the soul; it may however be much doubted whether this inference does not exaggerate and distort his real meaning. The “common sense” of Aristotle appears to be still a “sense,” and generically nothing more, though invested with more extensive prerogatives than any single sensitive faculty. His argument for its necessary existence is nearly this. The differences of things sensible must be apprehended by sense. Yet this detector of differences cannot be any peculiar or special sense among the five external ones; for each can but perceive its own object, and none can compare with the rest:—οὐτε κεχωρισμένος ἐνδεχεται κρίνειν. It can no more be effected by distinct senses than by distinct persons. There must then be some single faculty of sensation, the common judge of all. Nor, again, can the objects be presented to the sense in different times any more than by different organs, if a single indivisible judgment is to be pronounced: the two objects must be included in the one instantaneous judgment. Hence there must exist some common centre of sensation in which all the sensations of all the senses are received and compared. This sense must indeed include contraries, and is thus in one sense indivisible, in another capable of division. It is strange that the necessity of admitting this fact should not have suggested to Aristotle that he had no right to assimilate this faculty as a discerning faculty, in any manner to the functions of sensation. This seems to be little raised above the confusion of Condillac and the other French expositors of Locke... Aristotelianism seems to assign other

* However it may be that Aristotle merely meant to make it the general receptacle of sensations, and to attribute the discerning power to the intellect.
functions likewise to this centre of sensation. It is it which becomes singly conscious of the separate organic affections; it is it (he sometimes seems to say) which becomes cognizant of those notions which are derived from many senses—as motion, figure, and the rest; it is it also, he tells us, which is mainly affected in the state of sleep;—the sense of touch, as the universal one, he appears to associate intimately with it, and argues from hence that the true seat of this sense cannot be merely external. The sensus communis, then, is what we should in this day call the nervous centre; Aristotle's inaccurate anatomy refers it to the heart.

However difficult it be to conceive that the perception of a relation of difference should by Aristotle be ascribed to sense (whether special or general sense), the difficulty is scarcely alleviated by his subsequent affirmation of the essential distinction between intellect and sensation. This (whether reconcilable or not with the former) he strongly asserts. Many, he observes, among ἱερεία things possess the one; comparatively few the other; sense is never false in its report of its proper objects, reasoning often erroneous. Fancy again (φαντασία) is also very different from mere sensation; a truth with the obvious grounds of which it is needless to trouble you. From all the faculties that tell us of true or false, the φαντασία is plainly separated; as Aristotle, repeating some of his previous reasonings, establishes through all the spheres of sense, opinion, intellect, and science, with a minute exactness which we could gladly exchange upon this evident argument for greater clearness where it was more required.

These gradations conduct us to the last division of the Aristotelian psychology;—the intellect active, passive, speculative, and practical.

See III. 5, 10. [This can hardly have been Aristotle's meaning. Compare the treatise De Somno, c. 2. De Sensu, c. 7, 8. De Finitudine, c. 1. τῶν ἰδίων αἰσθητήρων ἐν τῷ κοινῷ ἑττὶν αἰσθητήριον, εἰς δὲ τὰς κατ' ἑνέργειαν αἰσθήσεις ἀναγκαῖαν ἀπαντᾶν. E.]

12 [De Juv. c. 3. ἀνάγκη καὶ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς καὶ τῆς θεραπευτικῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῷ καρδία τῆς ἀρχῆς εἶναι τοῖς ἑνάλοις. E.]

* Of memory, Aristotle tells us that it is founded on the φαντασία or concep tive [imaginative? E.], power, even in the remembrance of things "intelligible." He observes that recollection is guided by associative laws, in a passage which has often been quoted since modern investigations have given a peculiar interest to the topic; and distinguishing it from ἀνάμνησις or voluntary reminiscence, makes the possession of this latter faculty a prominent distinction between the human and the inferior animal creation. The book περὶ μνήμης καὶ ἀναμνήσεως is not unworthy an attentive perusal. [The second chapter of this treatise is especially interesting, as it contains §§ 7, 8) the only attempt at a theory of the so-called "association of ideas," to be found in any Greek philosopher. The student should compare Coleridge's remarks on this subject in the Biographia Literaria with those of Sir J. Mackintosh in his Dissertation on Moral Philosophy. E.]


LECTURE III.

ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ARISTOTLE.

We proceed to the consideration of Aristotle's view of the intellectual faculty—a subject of great intricacy and obscurity, from the unhappy conciseness of the author's style. For this conciseness, which is a beauty where the subject is, and properly admits of being, expounded with the exquisite exactness and regular consecution of mathematical method, becomes a most harassing tax upon attention, and a most invincible obstacle to perfect intelligibility, where the subject is new to the reader, is to be explored by observation of facts, and is liable to be viewed in a great variety of aspects. Still more is the difficulty increased, when to this conciseness of each sentence is added a most perplexing collocation of the sentences themselves; uncertain queries, positive assertions, doubts, and decisions, following each other without any discernible ground of connexion; and resembling less the finished treatise of a great writer than the loose hints and incomplete speculations of his note-book. However admirable the method of Aristotle appears in some of his writings (the Nicomachean Ethics, for example), it is certain that some of his chapters as they now stand present the most puzzling combination of brevity and prolixity—brevity in every clause, prolixity in their number and repetition—to be found in the compass of philosophical literature.

The human intellect, it is well known, is divided by Aristotle into two chief departments—the intellect passive and the intellect active; or, as they might perhaps be more truly termed, in relation to his metaphysical views, the intellect potential and actual: for it is on this universal and characteristic distinction that the psychology of Aristotle, as every other portion of his philosophy, mainly turns. "Since," he declares (III. 5. 1), "in all nature there is a something which is the matter to each kind, and is all things in capacity; and another something which is the cause and efficient (αἰτίου καὶ ποιητικῶν) in the actual effecting of all things (just as art is related to its material), it is necessary that in the soul also these differences should sub-
sist. The intellect is one thing because it becomes all things, another thing considered as it produces all things—as a certain ‘habit,’ even as light; for this latter intellect is as light, which actualizes those colours which without it were only potentially colours. And this intellect is separable, unmixed, impassive, its very essence being activity¹; for the efficient ever ranks above the patient, and the principle (ἀρχή) above its matter (ἀν).” The active and patient intellect² of Aristotle, then, are manifestly that in the world of mind which the efficient cause of form and matter are in the external world. The active intellect impresses forms upon the patient, exactly as the efficient cause in the universe combines them with the recipient matter; and thus the same process is acted over in the mind of man as in the world it contemplates. Aristotle (as you must now remember) percutually illustrates his doctrine of power and act by the various states of knowledge. A man may be conceived wholly without knowledge, yet with a capacity of it; with knowledge habitual, yet not in direct exercise; and with knowledge in actual exercise of contemplation. These states exemplify the patient intellect in its original apathy, in its habitual condition, and in its formalized activity as inspired by the higher energy of the active. Aristotle gives no proof from immediate experience of consciousness—or next to none—of this duplicity of the human intellect; from the nature of the case it could indeed admit of none, for the patient intellect can as little be the object of knowledge as the materia prima; his statement altogether rests upon what he considers the self-evident universality of the principle. The same considerations that establish it in the outer, establish it in the inner world. Another analogy which confirms it, and which forms a kind of transition from the material to the mental, is the process of sensation (αἴσθησις), in which we have already seen that the two elements are carefully distinguished; the activity of the sensible object and the passivity of the organ of sense, which excited by the former accomplishes the reality of sensation. It may indeed be asked why the νοητα or “intelligibles” might not themselves, according to the spirit of Aristotle’s teaching, possess enough of this “energetic” quality to be independent of the νοος πνευματικός? It seems to me that Aristotle was on this point impressed partly by the felt activity of the intellect in the work of thought; partly pleased by the

¹ [So Simplicius understands the passage, reading τῷ οὐσίᾳ ἐν ἐνήμερα. Vulg. émægræiν, which is probably the right reading. Ed.]

² [Νοος πνευματικός, νοος πνευματικός. The latter γίνεται πάντα, the former γίνεται εἰς. See Trendelenburg’s Commentary, p. 493, fol. Ed.]
opportunity which the doctrine gave him of identifying (in the universal spirit of antiquity) the “agent intellect” in the mind with the prime efficient cause in the universe, by thus making it energize the intelligible, as that does the sensible, objects of the soul.

Aristotle accordingly treats of the patient and agent aspects of the soul together. The intellect in general must be considered as impassive (ἀπάθεια), but as recipient of forms (δεκτικόν τού ειδών), and as being such potentially as it becomes in act. As the sensitive faculty to sensible objects, so the intelligible to intelligible objects. There is here, however, (c. 4, § 3,) some variety of reading. It must be ἀμορφή—unmixed, as otherwise it could not rise superior in its comprehending power to all things, but be confined by its peculiar composition; it must be specially unmingled with the body, as if it were corporeal in its constitution it should undergo bodily modifications—as heat and cold, and should possess some definite instrument as the sense does, which Aristotle denies it. The ἀπάθεια of the sensitive and intelligent is also remarkably different in this;—that a powerful impression fatigues or destroys the sense, while the most perfect object of intellectons only strengthens and extends the intellective power;—the sensitive being bodily, but the intellect distinct from body. This noetic faculty receives and is conversant with forms of being abstracted from their particular material subjects. He, therefore, in accordance with the view I have given you, pronounces the intellect, in its passive or potential aspect, to be the τότος ειδών, or place of forms, as it had been styled by the Platonists; the region in which alone they could dwell in a state separate from matter; an expression which (as I before hinted) is literally suitable to the most celebrated philosophical system of our day. The intellect,

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2 [De An. III. c. 4. ed. Trendelenh. Ed.]
4 [The original runs thus: Καὶ εὔθει αὐτὸ λέγεσθαι τὴν ψυχήν εἶναι τότον ειδών, πλὴν ὅτι οὖσα ἐν λαῶν ἐν ψυχῇ, ὡστε ἐνελέξεια ἀλλὰ δυνάμει τα ἐνδόθε, c. 4, § 4; i.e. the Platonists would be right in affirming that "the soul is the region of forms or ideas," if they would limit the assertion to the intellective (noetic) soul—for it is there only that ideas exist, and even there not actually, but potentially. The intellect must produce (or, as we say, develop) them by its own energy. The passage, it will be seen, is more in the spirit of Kant than appears from Mr Butler’s translation, from which the reader should omit the words "in its passive os potential aspect," the Greek words which correspond referring to the ἐνδόθε, not to the mind.

It may be observed, that great obscurity hangs over the Aristotelian distinction (found, I believe, only in the De Anima) of "the passive and active soul," an obscurity which Aristotle himself nowhere clears up. Trendelenburg has attempted an explanation (in his Commentary on the De Anima, III. c. 5, § 11), which, however, is far from satisfactory. The difficulty is clearly stated by Zeller in his Philosophy of the Greeks, Vol. II. pt. 2, p. 440 seq., 2nd Ed. See also Grote, Aristotle, II. p. 231. Ed.]
however, seems assigned by Aristotle a complete supremacy over all the functions of the soul, as extracting its tribute of knowledge from each; it knows the sensible by sense, the intelligible by its own inherent power. Aristotle enters into a very abstruse disquisition to determine in what sense the intellect is to itself νοητὸς. In things “actually” intelligible, the intellect and its object become one—a result which we before saw admitted in the case of sensation. In this way, then, the intellect becomes itself its own object, as being itself intelligible ἐνεργεῖα. On the other hand, things potentially intelligible, and still immersed in matter, are not thus blended with the intellect that apprehends them. How this doctrine of the unity of the intellect and intelligible is Platonic, I need not remind you.

All this is mainly spoken of the receptive intellect, of which Aristotle in this place tells us in words which have been so often quoted and commented,—that “the intellect is potentially intelligibles, but actually none of them until it intelligize; as a page on which nothing has yet been actually written” (III. 4, 11). Of the agent intellect Aristotle adds to what I have already cited, that it incessantly is in act, our forgetfulness arising from the deficiency and corruptibility of the νοὴς παθητικής; that the former alone is separable, immortal, and eternal.

The objects of intelligence are simple ideas, as moderns call them, (τὰ ἀδιαλέπτα, “indivisibles,”) and propositions; of the latter of which truth and falsehood are the attributes, the office of intellect being to combine them into the unity of a single judgment. The indivisibility of the act and object of intelligence in its simple apprehensions is closely pursued by Aristotle. There is that which is actually undivided, and that which is impossible to be divided. Things actually undivided are quantitative or formal. The latter—as, for example, the essence of any kind of animal—are apprehended by a single instantaneous act of the mind. The former are of different sorts; as we consider the whole—or the parts,—or the parts as one with the whole; and the act of mind will be single or manifold accordingly. The other class—things which have no continuity—an instant, a point,—are apprehended only by their opposites; we know them as the privation of the contrary quality.

This whole work of intelligence depends, according to Aristotle, on sensible conceptions (οὐδὲποτε νοεὶ ἂνευ φαν-

6 [Οὐδὲν δὲ νοεὶ...οὐχ ὲν μὲν νοεὶ ὲν δὲ νοεὶ...Χαρακτῆται δὲ ἐστὶ μύνον τοῦθέν ἐπὶ ἑαυτῷ, καὶ τοιοῦ ὢν ἀθάνατον καὶ ἄθικον, c. 5, § 2. Ed.]
6 [c. 6, ad fin. Ed.]
LAST SERIES.

τάσματος ἡ ψυχή...τῇ διανοητῇ ψυχῇ τὰ φαντάσματα οἷον αἰσθήματα ὑπάρχει...τὰ εἰδὴ τὸ νοητικὸν ἐν τοῖς φαντάσμασιν"; and ultimately on sensible perceptions, of which phantasms are the images πλῆθος ἀνεφ' ἔλεγχος. So that, as he adds, he who has no sensible perceptions can neither learn nor understand anything; and the business of contemplation, the theoretic function, cannot be carried on without these φαντάσματα. Yet he could not but perceive that there appear laws and principles in our minds not obviously reducible to this standard; and he therefore subjoins the question as to these πρῶτα νοήματα which closes his 8th chapter (B. iii.), and in which, separating them from phantasms, he still seems to affirm that they cannot be entertained without them.

These φαντάσματα, which here may be called “associated conceptions,” are peculiarly important in the practical operation of the intellect, to which a separate chapter is devoted. The intellect is moved by these in the same way as sense by sensible objects; it decides them to be, not merely as the theoretic reason, true or false, but good or evil; and according to its verdict urges the will to desire or aversion. The theoretic reason terminates in knowledge; the practical, in an end or object of pursuit (τῷ τέλει), c. 10, § 2.

The entire account of the perceptive and intellective faculties of the soul is closed by the remarkable proposition (before occasionally suggested and inferred) that “the soul is in a manner all things; for things are sensible or intelligible,—αἰσθητὰ and νοητὰ; and science is in some sense its own objects, sensation its own sensibles.” If, then, the αἰσθητικὸν be thus the αἰσθητῶν, and the ἐπιστημονικὸν the ἐπιστήμων, we must at the same time perceive that this mysterious identification cannot be with the entire material things themselves; it must then be with their εἰδὴ or forms. “Wherefore the soul is as the hand; for the hand is the instrument of instruments, and the intellect is the form of forms, the sense the form of sensibles.” The soul, itself the form of the organized frame, becomes one with the forms of all nature, receives, and employs, and produces them; even as the chief instrument of that organized frame constructs, and wields, and combines itself with all other exterior organisms.

The remaining subject is the motive faculty of the soul; Aristotle presents us with two very interesting

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8 [c. 8, § 3. Ed.]
9 [c. 8, § 1. Ed.]
chapters, in which, as always in questions that border on ethical speculation, he becomes remarkably plain and perspicuous.

The motion of "augmentation" and "consumption" obviously is but a development of the nutritive faculty. The motions of respiration and other internal physical processes are postponed to subsequent distinct treatises. The power of changing the place of its limbs is the immediate subject of the present discussion. To what faculty, then, does this belong? Not to the merely "nutritive;" for this power of local motion is always ένεα τού, with an end in view, and dependent on imagination or desire, being merely compulsory when not originating in the effort to obtain or avoid. It is also not possessed by plants, which yet possess this nutritive function. Nor again does it belong to the "sensitive" faculty, as is obvious in numbers of stationary animals capable of sensation; and in which we cannot suppose that nature, οὐδέν ποιοῦσα μάτη, can have failed to supply all the requisite organs, if she has indeed supplied the power and impulse of motion. Nor can we ascribe the principle of motion to the "intellectual" power merely as such; which pronounces nothing directly about avoidance or pursuit, and has no direct reference to action (πράξεις); which, also, is often wilfully disobeyed. "We see," says Aristotle, "that he who carries with him the medical art is not healed;" so that action according to knowledge plainly depends on something else than knowledge. Nor does mere "desire" (ἀπεξεῖς) absolutely and necessarily govern motion, for we see that those who have the habit of temperance act deliberately against the solicitations of appetite, and follow reason.

A further prosecution of the analysis thus auspiciously begun would have led Aristotle into a clear perception of the peculiarity of the pure spontaneity of the voluntary effort as distinct equally from appetite and from deliberation. His object in this place seems however to have been different; at least he appears content with a lower aim. He therefore pronounces that the sources of the motions of animated beings are two, intellect practical—that is, intellect which reasons with an immediate view to action—and desire: imagination being often (and to some animals always) the substitute for the former; and even in the very agency of reason, interposing immediately before the operation of desire. He elsewhere, treating the same question,

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30 [ἐν 9, § 8. Οὐδείν ὑπερ, "does not practise as a physician," being withheld, says Simplicius, by some opposing passion, which interferes with the natural impulse of the professional man to work in his calling. Ed.]

31 [ἀπεξεῖς καὶ διάνοια πρακτική. c. 10, § 2. Ed.]
names other operations or faculties concerned in the work; and reduces them similarly (De Animal. Mot. vii.). Both these faculties work in view of an end (τέλος, ἐνεκα τιμῶν). But desire is plainly the ultimate ground of action; for the practic intellect itself and imagination tend to action only as they are animated by desire; while desire can urge to action independent of them. The desirable, which is either real or apparent attainable good, when its possession is regarded as dependent on our agency, is then the object of action. This desirable (τὸ ὅρεκτον) is manifested in many ways according to the faculties of the soul; thus in beings that have the χρόνον αἰσθησία— the sense of time—contrary desires contend, pressing the claims of the future, and mere appetite those of the present; still, however various the motives, the desirable as desirable is the prime source of action. Now, according to Aristotle's great principle, the ultimate mover must be itself unmoved; all change must originate from something itself unchangeable; nor should philosophy ever rest until it has traced up, through all the departments of scientific observation, every series of successions to its final stationary principle. In the present case, then,—animal activity,—this last immovable mover is τὸ πράκτον ἀγαθόν (practicable good); and as secondary to this, the appetitive faculty, which both moves the living being and is moved in the very act of appettition; that which is moved by this faculty is (as has been said) the animate being; and that organ by which the motion is effected is in Aristotle's physiology the heart, finally,—and in each limb its point of flexure. And even in those animals which seem to possess no sense beyond that of touch, desire must exist, since pleasure and pain exist; and a sensitive, though not a deliberative (αἰσθητική though not βουλευτική) fancy, which urges them by the mere force of the preponderating suggestion.

The subject of these chapters (De An. III. 9, 10) is further and more largely treated in the curious and interesting dissertation on the Motion of Animals, which appears, from a citation of the present treatise (vi. apud init.), to have been written subsequently to it. It is every way worthy of perusal; but it would be premature to enlarge in this place further on a subject which, in Aristotle's comprehensive mode of treating it, belongs chiefly to ethical inquiry. The operation of appetite is reduced under the syllogistic formulares (ch. vii.); it becomes the general principle in an argument. Ποτέν μοι, declares desire; this is a potable liquid, declares sense, or imagination, or judgment; the act is the conclusion. But, as he remarks,
appetite is so very prone to reason in the rapid way of enthymeme, that it is only by very minute observation we can discover it to syllogize at all.

This celebrated Treatise on the Soul is closed by some general observations on the utility and mutual relations of the different functions; some of which are necessary that the animal exist, others that it exist well and happily;—and on the complex composition of the body which the soul animates. The necessity of the functions of nutrition is obvious in a being formed for growth, vigour, and decay. Sensation is impossible, as Aristotle thinks, in perfectly simple bodies; and needless when there is no faculty capacitated to receive immaterial "forms;" it is thus not found in the vegetable creation. But in animals it is plainly indispensable for alimentation, as well as the power of local motion, in all whose proper aliment is not supplied by nature in their stationary abodes. And those endowed with intellect will also find in the power of sense-a principle requisite both for soul and body. Of the senses, touch and taste (a species of touch) are universally needed for conservation. The others, which are affected by media, belong to the more perfect stages of animality; but touch is essentially connected with very vitality; and hence, argues Aristotle, while excesses of other sensible impressions are borne without loss of life, that which injures or destroys this universal and primary sense injures or destroys life itself.

The real opinions of Aristotle as to the immortality of the human soul, have in all ages been a subject of discussion. I do not hesitate to pronounce that to me the evidence in favour of his having really held this sublime and consoling doctrine is far from satisfactory. It is impossible that if he held it, the very importance of the question, and the natural earnestness which such a conviction would bring with it,—as well as its certainty of a strong sympathetic support in the hearts of all his auditors,—should not have led to statements more decisive and unequivocal than any which the most scrupulous research can detect in his extant writings. It is not sufficient to satisfy the demands of human anxiety on this subject, that an eternity should be pronounced essential to an active intellectual principle, which itself seems described as unable to exercise any conscious energies apart from the bodily structure; a quickening essence whose very existence retreats into nothingness when it is left nothing that it can quicken. The spirit of Aristotle's physiology unquestionably is materiality; and in exalting the "active intellect" above the human bodily structure, he seems to have exalted it above humanity itself.
It is quite evident that Aristotle was (and naturally) perplexed to conceive the kind of existence that could belong to a separate reason; and has altogether evaded the consideration of it. Here a striking difference is manifest between him and Plato. Plato, perpetually regarding the intellectual principles of the universe as separate from their sensible manifestations and prior to them from all eternity, could easily imagine a state of being in which these alone might be the direct objects of the emancipated rational faculty: it was but to replace that faculty in its original state and relations to its proper objects. Reason and its objects had dwelt together from all eternity: they were both immersed in body for a brief temporary period; but it was only that they might again meet and embrace in the same eternal world to which they both inherently belonged. All this was perfectly consistent; whether true or false, it was at least beautifully harmonious. But the theory of Aristotle, which, proclaiming the eternity of the world itself, conceived the forms which the reason contemplates as naturally inseparable from matter, evidently laboured under a peculiar difficulty when it attempted to represent the reason as detached from a bodily organization, and still contemplating these objects. For though even in this state of existence, he held that the mind did habitually separate the "forms" or mental element from material things, yet this he always represented as achieved only by a series of processes in which the sensuous organization and the imagination performed a necessary part. How the reason, left to itself, was to converse with its own peculiar objects, he nowhere attempts to shew; and hence the sort of existence which he allows the active intellect after death, fades into a state of mere being—a state with which our present consciousness can scarcely find anything in any degree common.

And thus—though the portion of our human nature to which Plato positively and frequently, and Aristotle occasionally and hesitatingly, allows immortality, be really the same,—namely, the rational,—yet in their historic results, Plato has been the perpetual patron of the doctrine of human immortality, and Aristotle almost as constantly has been cited as unfriendly to this great tenet. In almost every age, it is unquestionable, the majority of his followers have spoken doubtfully of the doctrine; unless where the Aristotelic views have been forced to harmonize (however rudely) with the principles of a different system. The ancient fathers assuredly regarded Aristotle as specially perilous on this account (Euseb. Pæpar. Evang. xv. 9); and the ablest of his own commentators, in proportion as
they have escaped foreign influences, have verged to the
doctrine of utter and absolute materialism. Alexander
Aphrodisiensis (perhaps the best of his earlier expositors)
does not hesitate to maintain the doctrine on the part of his
master; and it is well known with what eagerness and
constancy the Arabian Averroes endeavoured to uphold it.
I do not speak of the professed assailants of Aristotle
(Bessarion, &c.) who of course made his views on this
question a capital article in their pleadings; but there is
no mistaking the tendency of his avowed disciples, or the
force of their admissions,—of such teachers as Pompon-
natius, and his contemporaries. I conceive it to be the
safest verdict upon this long-disputed point, to conclude
that Aristotle held, indeed, the imperishable nature of the
supreme rational principle in man; but that he held it in
such a sense as was altogether foreign to human and
earthly interests; in a sense which leaves the surviving
principle scarcely any link of connexion with the present
form of being, or with any conscious nature of any kind.
Nor, it must be conceded, has any thing, ever since his
day, been done to make an utter and absolutely unbodied
condition of soul combined with real consciousness in any
degree more easily conceivable. As far as our interests are
concerned, the Christian revelation, by asserting the res-
surrection of a bodily structure, has provided for the most
important section of future existence; and for the inter-
mediate state, the hypothesis is always possible for those
who find an insurmountable difficulty in the notion of a
purely unbodied soul, of a very refined material organism
which (like many other material agents) may be imper-
ceptible to any of our present organs of sense.

It is, indeed, scarcely possible to express the service
which has been done to human knowledge by the revelation
of this momentous truth—the recovery of the bodily organ-
ization, for the purposes of a future state. It at once
supersedes all those discussions of painful difficulty that
regard the possibility of unbodied existence in a world of
space; discussions in which every step only betrays the
confined limits of our real knowledge, and whose uncer-
ainty may best be judged from the fact that nearly all the
ancient upholders of the eternity of the pure reason of man,
have, like Plato, their chief guide, been forced to introduce
it after death into a mysterious world which transcends
space and time, and all the other forms of our present
consciousness altogether; and in which, therefore, it is
almost impossible that we should here feel any practical
interest. The ordinary escape from this course has been
the doctrine of a perpetual transmigration, by which the