INTRODUCTORY SERIES.

LECTURE I.

GENTLEMEN,

In undertaking the important task of directing, or at least of stimulating, your studies in the general philosophy of man, I am aware that I appear before you in a character which greater abilities than I can ever hope to manifest would require courage to sustain. I enter alone and unarmed (save, as I trust, by a love of truth and a simple desire of diffusing it) upon a field of contest, where some of the mightiest intellectual leaders that the world has ever known are now only known in their prostration, a field on which a new adventurer, however humble his pretensions, exposes himself therefore to the scorn of assailants who would depreciate either his subject or himself, who either believe that what Locke and Leibnitz failed to discover must be undiscoverable, and therefore be literally non-existent in relation to the powers of man, or (by what he admits to be a far more reasonable prejudice) that difficulties which have baffled such sagacity as theirs, can scarcely have been reserved for his vision to penetrate. It is no misemployment of your time to occupy some portion of it with a consideration of at least the former of these prepossessions. To believe a subject unworthy your attention is practically to disqualify you from attending; and as long as the importance of any branch of knowledge, or the possibility of its attainment, is questioned, the most laboured general statements of its nature and bearing may expect to be received with distrust or indifference.

Of myself I shall say little. If I have commenced by expressing my real sense of the peculiar difficulties and responsibilities of the office I have ventured to undertake, it was less in order to attest my own feelings and to solicit...
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general indulgence—for to these things I trust it would be almost superfluous to advert—than, by deepening your feelings of the importance of the subjects we are met to discuss, to impress upon you, as hearers, the part which it becomes you to perform in such a capacity. It would little interest you to be told that your professor must, for the present, be content to come before you with the rapid results of brief and disturbed reflection—the fragmentary speculations of occasional leisure; and that with the defects of a preparation so cursory, not he is to be charged, but the circumstances of a calling before whose demands—arduous, constant, and imperative—even the duties of this chair, urgent as they are, sink into comparative unimportance. As little would it interest you to learn that the grateful acknowledgments which his feelings prompt towards those who have placed him in it, only augment the diffidence under which he labours as to his powers of justifying their choice; that if he is relieved from the hazards of a contrast with able predecessors, yet the very fact that he is so relieved, only serves to remind him how naturally it will be expected, that a choice thus singular should be met by merits correspondingly unique;—nay, that in the unavoidable tendency of all hearers to comparisons, he is perhaps saved from such a contrast with a line of immediate predecessors only to be contrasted with the favourites of each hearer's studies and experience, with the philosophic ancestry of ages, with the congregated luminaries of every country and every time. These are considerations which, however momentous to your lecturer, are of little moment to you. It would not, indeed, be judicious or warrantable to insist on them. To enlarge on my own convictions of responsibility would be to suppose that they could be questioned; to suggest to you a spirit of indulgence would equally be to suppose you in peril of forgetting what is assuredly the simplest, and ought to be the least laborious of human obligations.

Gentlemen, the matter becomes of more importance when I pass from the Lecturer to his subject. Let us then endeavour to define, before proceeding to any detailed investigations, What is the subject we are to consider? What are its claims upon your attention? What are the difficulties or encouragements of the study? And what the requisites for its profitable pursuit? Such considerations are indeed better estimated at the close of a course than at the commencement of it, better appreciated as deductions from the student's experience than as preliminaries to it: yet even now they may tend, by exalting our conceptions of the subject—to awaken, and by defining
its aims—to direct attention. This study, which involves the logic of all other studies, has also a logic, and, I will add, an ethic of its own. The general laws of all inquiry undergo some striking modifications in their application to the study of man; and the moral habits which are demanded in all the researches of truth, become peculiarly tested in the management of this. I may perhaps, then, indulge the hope, that the few preliminary investigations which I purpose to premise, may in some measure serve as the same rapid education for this philosophy which this philosophy itself is for universal science.

During some seven or eight Lectures of the present term it is my intention to discuss these preparatory topics. For the STYLE in which the discussion may be conducted perhaps the best mode of securing your indulgence would be to explain its purpose. That purpose is determined by the capabilities of the machinery which is put into my hands to work. There are two ways by which the thoughts and feelings of a single mind may be made the thoughts and feelings of many:—by writing and by speech. Now though writing be only a series of signs of speech, it possesses one great and exclusive advantage—its parts are not merely successive in one sense, but co-existent in another: and hence, any point of a written argument may be reproduced at pleasure in all its original vividness, while no point of a spoken communication is capable of reappearance except in the fainter form of remembrance,—every such exertion of remembrance being not only a withdrawal of attention from the present (which the written document also requires), but a positive and irrecoverable loss of whatever the present may be conveying (which the written document preserves for inspection). This distinction, then, at once establishes the difference of object in establishing the difference of capabilities between the book and the lecture. In books we address the thoughtful reflection of the solitary student in language suitable to the peculiar advantages which books alone possess,—that of enabling him to go back upon his progress, to count its steps, and (if attention ever flags, or the difficulty of the argument require it) to bring up his arrears without any present loss. The necessary deficiency of oral instruction ought (as I conceive) to make its object in a great measure different, and its style altogether so. The one case of the experimental sciences excepted, its true utility will ever be less the communication of new and profound truth, if that truth require a long course of reasoning, than the production of an interest, the creation of a taste, the stimulus given to the circulation of
thought. You will understand, then, that my purpose will be not merely to deliver truth, but also by any means that occur to me to make it generally acceptable; and I request, once for all, that the execution may be measured by the declared object,—an object which makes the endeavour to interest your fancy and your feelings as real and necessary a part of my duty as the direct communication of truth itself.

The subject of Mental Philosophy may be considered in two lights, and approached by two corresponding roads of access;—it may be regarded as it is the beginning, or as it is the end, of all human studies. These two opposite yet harmonizing aspects of the subject we will now consider at some length;—contrasted in their nature and of very different degrees of practical utility, they nevertheless serve to reflect on each other a reciprocal illumination which distinguishes each by enlightening both.

I. Setting out from the MIND ITSELF, as the great receptacle at once and instrument, both of knowledge and of activity, we may consider it as the sole original substance of all the diversified phenomena of the intellectual and the voluntary life. We may regard science and action as its remote product and creature; or rather we may neglect the product in the process of production. In this view of the relation of things, the human soul is contemplated as the starting-point, not as the goal of knowledge,—as its initial requisite, not as its final attainment. The mind is regarded as a simple nature, which, while preserving a perpetual identity with itself, evolves from its own essence (of course under certain exterior conditions) all the varieties of scientific truth. Placed in apposition with external nature, it begins to labour upon all around it by its own inherent and mysterious activity; mingling itself with nature it transforms and assimilates it to its own likeness, and the result is—a mechanical system of the universe, a system of quantitative science or mathematics, a system of optics or acoustics, a system (when, among the number of its evolutions, in a manner externalizing its own nature, the machine, at once engine and material, labours on itself) of intellectual and moral principles! In like manner (in continuance of this view of the Mind and its Philosophy) the Imagination and the Emotions are considered to simply reveal themselves in the creation of Poetry: the world of Nature which, by the agency of Reason, was just now elevated into the dignity of a scientific order, is now, by this portion of the same versatile essence, either employed—its positions and relations being altered—as the material of new structures, or—remaining itself unaltered—becomes
charged with all the emotions of the mind itself; thus giving occasion, as we shall hereafter see, to the two great divisions of the poetical genius and its manifestations. From generation to generation this varied activity, in all its different directions and intensities, goes on unabated; until at length it reaches its existing point (whatever that may be), and all that is, at this hour, registered in books, as well as all that has been but inwardly conjectured—the verified discoveries and the faint suspicions of philosophy, the recorded visions of poetry, and the unrecorded but incessant poetry of hope and remembrance in every age—all are only the different attitudes assumed by this one unchanged yet ever-changing essence.

In this view, then, Gentlemen, the Philosophy of the Mind is to be regarded as the first step of science; because it is the observation and theory of that without which science cannot exist. In the logical relationship of the sciences it holds this position; and in this view unquestionably its study would actually be the first undertaken by a Being of a superior world descending to contemplate and scrutinize the attainments of ours. Let me illustrate a thought which may illustrate others.

Let us imagine (imaginary suppositions are admissible in scientific discussions when they enter not as hypotheses for the reason, but as pictures for the fancy) a Being possessing such enlargement of capacity as to command in his sensitive and intellectual scope a vast range of the habitable worlds of the universe; and enabled, by concentrating attention, to study any particular individual of the splendid group, even as we are able to fix attention upon a single field in an expanded landscape. That such a conception is not without plausibility sufficient for its purpose, those will concede who remember that we ourselves actually stand in a very similar relation to the little worlds of animated nature which the microscope can discover in every drop of water. Such a Being as I have supposed philosophizing upon worlds, would probably deem no object more worthy of immediate investigation than the several proportions of knowledge, attainable by each of these divisions of the intelligent universe. But such a study, if conducted as we study the literary history of countries, would be a tedious, uncertain, and, to the gifted spirit we are accompanying, a superfluous, process. He enters upon the special investigation of each with a wide general induction formed from all. Such a Being, already informed, by contemplating his gigantic scheme of analogy, of the several degrees and capacities of intellect, would have already learned to pronounce on their relative possibilities of
attainment. His sole or chief inquisition would be into the psychology of each nation of intelligences; and in its psychology he would see, in a manner, its whole attainments involved. Each species of intellects would of course labour upon the field of external knowledge exposed to its view, and the actual acquirements would vary as it varied; but yet—the laws and the limits of investigation, as general formulas, should be sought in the respective psychologies alone. To confirm the truth of this representation we might ask whether in this world of ours, where the field of knowledge is the same to so many species of animals, the sphere of attainment is not invariably determined by the mental elevation. Knowledge is the product of Mind into Nature; and where one element remains the same, the knowledge evolved will be directly as the other. If then such a Being as we have been supposing were to fix his curiosity upon our world, the volumes he would first open in order to collect the general outlines of his information would be—not the records of our academies of science, not the physics of Newton nor the mathematics of Lagrange, brilliant but partial glimpses of our Reason—nor yet the endless tomes of our poetry and romance, a still more circuitous path to his purpose,—but (if he could find any to be trusted) the simple catalogue of our common faculties, in which he would see potentially present every truth that Reason ever mastered, and every image that fancy ever unveiled to the poetical idolatry of mankind.

II. But though it be conceivable that the philosophy of the human mind might present itself in this its logical priority as the first and principal object of speculation to the reason of a comprehensive observer, there is also another and a very different path by which the same great subject may enter the field of thought. If in the method just described it be assumed as the first, it may also be arrived at as the last term of science. While the accomplished observer we have imagined, comprehending from the eminences of a higher intelligence a compass of prospect denied to man, might demand it as the simple prerequisite for all his general conclusions as to man's susceptibilities of knowledge and of power; it reveals itself to the humbler faculties of man himself only at the close of a long course of researches. Let us pursue the steps of the discovery,—the true genesis of philosophy. If your guide on the way shall appear to deviate from his object, he will trust to your candour not to decide, until you are in a position to compare the point of attainment with the direction of the journey. As the mind is first aroused
to consciousness by sensation, it continues for a long period to maintain the direction it has originally received; and the understanding is the last thing understood by itself. Solicited by necessity, and then aroused by wonder, and then stimulated by curiosity, and then perhaps rewarded by unexpected discovery, the faculties are at first wholly engaged by the vivid and exciting world around them. That the infancy of science resembles in this respect the infancy of nature, seems to be a fact unquestioned by all its judicious historians; and the exceptions, to which we may hereafter refer, will be seen not to disturb the real sovereignty of the principle. The world is all to man at first; he forgets that in truth he is all to the world. The soul, essentially a foreigner in the earthly sphere of sense, may at least be permitted to indulge the curiosity of a foreigner also. Were I appointed to plead its cause instead of to investigate its history, I might remind you on its behalf, that among its earliest developments of scientific energy have been those which seem to beat against the outer wall of its dwelling; and that astronomy, the science of the remotest realms of the sensible universe, has preceded the classification of earths and the systems of vegetable and animal nature. The stars which seem to glitter on the confines of the world of sight, are the earliest objects of its contemplation; and the adoration that at length mistakes them for their Maker is but the melancholy resource of an imagination exhausted in the effort to pass beyond them. May we not say of the soul at this crisis of its history, that just so a prisoner confined for a time in a narrow cell, at first eagerly assails the outer door of his gloomy abode, watches each sparkle of light that seems to gleam from without through its crevices, and at last—finding all unavailing—retires with a sigh to the corner of his dungeon, and, as his eyes contract to their situation, becomes by degrees reconciled to the darkness.

To continue the history of intellectual development,—cursory, because only with a view to after conclusions,—from observations of outward nature more or less accurately collected and disposed in a rude symmetry, the mind frames its first hasty edifices of natural science; edifices destined themselves to be but the materials or the scaffolding of a future and better architecture. Circumstances probably of casual utility first suggest the important abstraction, by which, neglecting the particularities of material things, it regards them as all existing in place, and as admitting accurate admeasurement of their mutual distances; and then as existing in space, and capable of
measurement in their three dimensions. The conceptions of space and figure as an object of science being once obtained, they are not likely to remain unfruitful; more especially as demanding no further aid from sensible observation these abstractions meet the favourite tendencies of the meditative genius. Hence originate the mathematical sciences, the unparticipated creation, and thence the chief glory of human reason; sciences in which the infinite variety of relations secures perpetual novelty; and in which the elementary simplicity of the notions which these relations modify entails on all their consequences their own incomparable distinctness. Happy, if born out of physical necessities as to their historical use, and out of sensible perceptions as their metaphysical condition, these daring sciences had not too long abandoned their humble parents; until, at perhaps the greatest æra of human reason, under the guidance of modern genius, the brilliant wanderer (who in the last flights of the Alexandrian school had, under the auspices of Proclus and his followers, almost disappeared in the densest clouds of metaphysical speculation) was once more reclaimed, deductive sagacity restored to inductive observation, the abstractions of pure space once more bound to their physical concretes, and the soul and body of natural science united in one immortal frame.

Now, Gentlemen, observe to what point we have followed the progresses of the scientific genius; and observe also at what point the limits of these double energies of observation and reasoning already appear to be inexorably set. For it is one of the paradoxes of the human mind, that amongst its earliest efforts it reaches its farthest limits; the geometry of a schoolboy is conversant with subjects that the geometry of Laplace cannot overpass. The early mind has not indeed explored the immeasurable riches of the intervening country; but nevertheless it has truly reached its boundaries. In physical inquiry we perceive that our primitive investigator has observed the constant successions of many phenomena, and has imagined much, doubtless, that he has not observed: in Mathematics he has detected many relations of figures, and found them to be different aspects of the same extensions; many relations of numbers, and found them to be different expressions for the same number. For some time, doubtless, the pursuit of knowledge is so ardent that the pursuer is lost in his object; and the object, diffusing and enlarging to the view, seems itself to comprehend all things. The very confusion of the vast and shifting prospect dazzles and bewilders, but fixes and fascinates the eye. The mind is not yet worthy of a philosophy. Even if a moment's
reflection were at this time to revert from the extent of the prospect to the structure of the intellectual organ that beholds it, and in a relative sense creates what it beholds, we can easily imagine that the result, disclosing so much weakness with so much strength, would at first appear humiliating and repulsive. Admitted to a glimpse of the interior of the temple of nature, the early naturalist stands at the portals, astonished by its vastness, and appalled (as yet) by its mysterious gloom; far from suspecting that he is himself the noblest object in the edifice, he only aspires timidly to borrow respect from his position, not to confer it, to lose his petty individuality in the immensity of things, and become, in a manner, a portion of all around him. Gentlemen, long before the achievements of inductive science had illustrated the mind itself with the very light it was casting upon nature, there was a higher philosophical accuracy in the inspired computation of the Psalmist. If he, in his early astronomy, "considers the heavens, the work of the fingers" of God, and asks, "What is man," that he can become an object of affection and care to the Architect of a universe, it is not that he may place man below these splendid, but inanimate structures; his argument—prophetic purport apart—is not directed to sink man below nature, but to exalt God above man and nature. Setting the human reason far beneath that Divine reason which formed it and all things, he argues the beneficence of the Godhead in affirming the elevation of man, and glorifies the Author of Nature in exalting its interpreter. "Thou madest him to have dominion over the works of thy hands; thou hast put all things under his feet!"

But, Gentlemen, that recoil from the outward to the inward world which man, of his own definite will, might perhaps remain for ever without effecting, (similar to that reverse passage from the inward to the outward, which a great French metaphysical critic of the last century—and I perfectly agree with him—has called an instinct plus sûr que la raison même), this retreat of the observer upon himself is at last effected by the spontaneous course of reason. May I here request your special attention to a train of observation which will reward the very small exertion it requires.

It may be conceived that in the mind of some sagacious and ample genius, a review is held of all its actual attainments. I am, for the sake of distinctness and brevity, ascribing to a single mind what, you will readily apprehend, is, in point of fact, the gradual process and combined result of many minds. At first, perhaps,
such a mind reflects upon that portion of its knowledge which holds the pre-eminence in utility and in accuracy,—its knowledge of the mutual distances and positions of material objects, its various devices for ascertaining them, for measuring their size, and computing their numbers. These reflections from their very nature have concern with abstract magnitude, being independent of all varieties of sensible structure. By an easy process of successive analysis the mind of our reflector passes from results to elements, from propositions proved to those definitions which, as geometrical data, state the simplest conceptions and combinations of figure, or as names of numbers, the infinite variety of repeated units. The inquirer pauses. Can the human mind advance no farther? Gentlemen, the geometrical can advance no farther. The science of related magnitudes is arrived at the limits of its dominion. Reduced to its definitions, it resigns its office; content with investigating the relations of extensions and numbers, it relinquishes to a superior authority the presiding ideas of extension and number themselves.

Perplexed by this unexpected limitation, the mind we are accompanying next perhaps recurs to its acquirements in the science of the mutual action and individual structure of bodies themselves. Here at least, with all plain and palpable to the senses, it may hope to escape those humbling repulses which checked its former course. Event follows after event, and body is bound to body with a definiteness and precision which leaves nothing in mystery. Clearer eyes, and an ampler field of vision, might perhaps be desirable; but scarcely a clearer or an ampler judgment. Yet stay! Event follows event; does this indeed involve no subject of speculation apart from the sensible fact? Is there no relation here detected which physical science cannot explain, because physical science presupposes it? Not only this, but the same event follows the same event. Is there no new relation inserted here which the science of nature is not to anatomize as its subject, but to revere as its parent? As the inquirer advances the prospect thickens and darkens on his view. This piece of marble, thus compact and ponderous, may, under percussion, resolve into dust. What is it that now retains these atoms of dust in union; and what is it that annihilates the union, and for a massive whole presents a heap of severed particles? An obvious analogy calls the agent Force. And what is force? Shall we style it the unknown cause of equilibrium and of motion? What then is a Cause? How has the relation arisen? And how is it thus inextricably involved in every exertion of
force? If this mass be subject to such laws, the world, nay, the universe, is but a large mass; and if this body require a cause to bind and to loose it, the universe itself must require a cause. Where then, in what reservoir, shall we deposit this great original fountain of causation? But more still; it appears that this same body, unbound by its proper forces, will dissolve in sunder,—unsupported, will fall to the earth. As the one arises from the excess of a superior force, so, doubtless, does the other. It seems then that the natural tendency of force is to produce Motion. Motion is a succession of events, and, like all successions, presupposes that relation of time which we approached so unavailingly before. But it supposes another element; it is evolved in Space; that is, it exists in that elementary nature or notion, which in our former mathematical researches we were obliged to surrender as the appanage of a higher and mightier science.

Such, Gentlemen, we may imagine to be the baffled speculations of the inquiring student of material nature at the close of his researches. Thus it is that, by slow degrees, and through the steady path of analysis, the mind is half won to itself from the world of external appearances. But even yet, perhaps, it is not prepared for that happy and systematic view of things which can alone reduce to light and order this vague and heaving chaos. Absorbed in that thoughtful reverie which such conceptions of the profoundest mysteries of nature are so apt to produce, we may represent the mind as now sinking back upon itself in the very attitude which withdraws it from the contemplation and influence of external things. The supposition is perfectly consonant to truth. The great fundamental notions which I have mentioned, space, time, causation, and so forth, are in fact the main conduits between the inner and the outer worlds; appearing to belong almost equally to both, they form the portals by which the mind enters upon nature, or retreats from nature into its own more wondrous depths. Our reflector, then, leaving these notions as they exist in the independent reality of the world and its Author, for the same notions as they exist in the perceiving mind of man, has already opened to himself the gates of psychological investigation. He summons the mind before the tribunal of its own reason; and expanding in the faithful mirror of memory all or much of its past experience, he awakes to a truth, which, however obvious when expressed, no one possessing the slightest philosophical genius, ever yet perceived for the first time in all

1 "The idea of space seems interposed between the two great worlds of matter and mind, belonging to both and neither."—Author's MSS. Ed.]
its force without an emotion of admiration. He begins to perceive all that knowledge of outward nature which he had been accustomed to regard as wholly terminating in its material objects,—as a something appertaining to the stars, the fire, the waters, or whatever else was his subject of physical inquiry,—itself silently taking its place as a part of the long train of his habitual thoughts and feelings. Not only are his conceptions of moral duty, law, and propriety, beings of the mind, but all the variety of sciences are the “secretions” of the faculties. He learns that for all which is added to sensible impressions, which, exclusively of remembrance and comparison, could not raise the impressed being to a higher rank than that of the meanest vegetable, he is solely indebted to the incessant activity of the invisible principle within him; that the mind invests the world with the intellectual chains of its own laws and relations, as it invests it with colours; and that, if all which the mind does for the world could be abstracted from all which the world does for the mind, the result would be the same as if the reader of some splendid work of philosophy or fiction, a Principia or an Iliad, were in the midst of his sympathizing enthusiasm to be struck with total fatuity, and suddenly sink to beholding an unmeaning succession of black characters upon a white surface, instead of that array of visions or speculations which the volume—like the world around it—in merely suggesting by previous mental laws, seemed itself actually to contain and produce.

Thus, Gentlemen, by faithfully following the course of a consecutive analysis, I have brought you to the same final point from which our philosopher of a higher world was enabled to set out. You now perceive how it is that the investigator of the external world learns at last to discover both (to adopt a Kantian expression) the “receptivity” and the modifying agency of his own mind; how he finds that to every branch of human knowledge, both as to its material and its process of growth, there is a definite limit beyond which it cannot pass, and at which every subordinate science yields up all further authority to the primary philosophy; and how each separate species of rational inquiry by successive resolutions into its components, attenuated, as it were, to its elements, is bound to disappear into this one first, last, and all-comprehending science. Thus is the mind to knowledge what the prima materia of the schoolmen was to the sensible world, the single substance of all its phenomena; and thus a perfect theory of the mind would be analogous (though distantly indeed) to what the coveted “science of substances” was
imagined to be, as compared with the ordinary natural philosophy of observed qualities. It teaches not indeed, as that mistaken and impossible science was expected to do, to determine, a priori, all the powers and susceptibilities of bodies; but even in its present state it can and does determine, a priori, what is the course of reasoning adapted to any possible subject, and what are the last necessary limits of discovery in any possible pursuit.

Of all these illustrations, which of course you will understand to be intended only as such, the high and noble purport is, the following simple but magnificent generalization, that there is a philosophy which is to every specific philosophy what that specific philosophy is to the individual objects of its classifications, that the sciences which theorize the world may be themselves theorized, that the subjects of their inquiry and the relations whose endless varieties they detect, may be themselves resolved into classes of subjects and classes of relations, that these classes of subjects and relations are themselves again amenable to one grand final classification, as the attributes of a single permanent substance. Gentlemen, that substance is the mind of man, and that philosophy is the philosophy of the human mind.

I trust that now you will have perceived the mutual bearing of the two directions in which I told you our philosophy might be approached. You will have perceived that the one method, beginning with the analysis of the mind, derives all the sciences from it; that the other, beginning with the sciences, derives the philosophy of mind from all of them: that the one proceeds from the centre to the circumference, the other from the circumference to the centre; that the one discovers everything in the mind; the other, the mind in everything. And it may be necessary to add, that you can easily infer, how unlikely to be chosen, in the actual history of human learning, as well as how unwise and preposterous for a being formed as man is formed, would be that former mode of synthetical inquiry which from a prior enumeration of all the faculties of the mind, would conclude as to all the varieties of its development, and all its possibilities of acquisition; how impossible is any synthesis which is not preceded by some analysis; how certainly such a speculation, if undertaken by man, would be based on an inadequate enumeration; and how, therefore, in its full extent, it must be left to those superior intelligences whom I have instanced as employing it, and who may be supposed (fortified by a vast previous experience in the natural history of minds) to
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detect, with one glance at the world and its interpreter man, the scope of his reason in its application to his scene. It is indeed a fortunate adaptation of that presiding wisdom which rules the growth of the world's reason as it does that of an individual, that that philosophy, which, as I have shewn you, is the law of laws, the classification of classifications, the ultimate term of science, should for the most part be evolved in its due place: not appearing, as an inductive philosophy, until the reason of man has sufficiently acted itself out in nature to display the diversity of subjects and relations which the theory of the mind undertakes to reduce to system.

But though assuredly I would not presume to offer to this age and audience any discussion of the theory of mind which was not essentially analytical, I have, on the present occasion, sketched its synthetical aspect likewise, because I am not now considering the method of prosecuting the subject, but the subject itself; and this double view of the science of thought, as the beginning and the end of human studies, is eminently calculated, by contrasted lights, to hold the subject in a strong and steady illumination. Shewing you that it is at once the science of which all others are cases, and the residual science which remains when all others are subtracted; it evinces, by combining both views, that you cannot pitch upon any spot, whether public or secluded, in the vast territory of human knowledge, at which you will not find yourselves at the same point, moving to and moving from this philosophy, while in the very process of the motion you are practically developing its truths.

The first conclusion to be drawn from this dominant character, which thus forms the prerogative of the metaphysical philosophy, is all but expressed in the very statement of the fact. It is a topic which we shall have hereafter to resume, but which I think it well, for purposes of immediate use, to anticipate in some degree in this place. I allude to the practical influence which our views of the principles of this science must exert over the progress of every other. Cultivated as the sciences now are, by separate detachments of labourers, this influence, I admit, becomes less prominent and perceptible; men are more engaged with the details, and less with the principles; the same hands are seldom busy at both; and I am not so bigoted to my own pursuits as not cordially to join in felicitating the world upon the change. It is the result, and it is the cause, of the multiplication of knowledge. I rejoice in the indication which such divisions and subordinations of labour afford; that the intellectual manu-
facture is thriving, and that the enlightened tastes of the age keep the market in perpetual demand. When I speak of the influences of this more abstract philosophy over the sciences, I surely do not desire that the influence should be so unnaturally aggravated as to consume those subject sciences it sways; that the government should be increased until it should have nothing to govern, and supremacy expire in its own completion! No, Gentlemen; the reciprocal security of physical and metaphysical science is in their constant union and parallel motion;—the direct grasp of the one and the comprehensive scope of the other make them the hands and the eye of philosophy; and they should consent and harmonize, and mutually impart instruction, as you will hereafter learn that these organs do! And, however I may "magnify my office," I will freely concede that I know no period of philosophical history so deplorable as that long and gloomy one (the scholastic ages) in which men, forgetting the practical developments of reason in the frivolous sophistry which they mistook for an effective study of reason's nature and properties, considered that they had done their duty as leaders of the public intellect when, by the toil of years, they had succeeded in adding a new page of verbal combinations to the barren folios of their fathers, and in contributing by the everlasting "Distinguo" a new illustration of the almost infinite divisibility of human thought! I will go farther, and add, that a period not wholly unworthy of rivalling it in this industrious perversion of the course of inquiry, and overweening estimate of purely metaphysical deduction, was that succeeding age, the earlier part of the seventeenth century, which, with transcendent merit of its own, had not escaped the inheritance of its predecessor's errors;—an age in which the ambition of each illustrious thinker to assume the sole throne of the newly-emancipated mind of Europe, urged each to attempt embracing the whole circle of knowledge, and to reject all assistance either of preceding or contemporary genius, and in which, as an inevitable consequence, there being actually no time for the tardy process of inductive collection, the metaphysics of the philosopher almost invariably determined his entire scheme of physical doctrine. Who could imagine that the question of free-will at one period has been intimately concerned in the question of a vacuum; and, more marvellous still, the moral character of the Deity involved in the phenomena of elasticity! The long line of inference which connected in logical consequence these antipodes of the world of thought, was not drawn, Gentlemen, in the brain of some dreaming schoolman; it
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Scholastic metaphysic too exclusive; Cartesian too arbitrary and ambitious.

Logic and metaphysics of an age must affect its scientific labours; though the men of the age be unconscious of such influence.

1 [I am unable to cite any passage from Leibnitz which exactly corresponds to either of the notions here attributed to him. In his Letters to Clarke (Postscript to Letter iv.) he objects to the doctrine of a vacuum, that it derogates from the Divine Perfection; and in the Confessio Naturalis (an early work), he mentions elasticity as one among the properties of bodies which demonstrate the existence of an incorporeal principle. See also his proof of Immortality, ibid. It is however quite true that Leibnitz sought to subordinate physical to moral, efficient to final causes, and that he would in the present day be pretty generally condemned for unduly extending the sphere of metaphysics. Thus, "la Physique même a quelque chose de morale et volontaire par rapport à Dieu, puisque les lois du mouvement n'ont point d'autre nécessité, que celle du meilleur." Nouveaux Essais, Liv. ii. c. xxi. § 13. See also Opp. Leibn. ed. Erdmann, p. 106, a, where he warmly approves Socrates' depreciation of physical causes in comparison of final in the Phædo; and ibid., p. 678. Epist. ad Beringium: efficiences causae pendent a finalibus, et spiritualia sunt natura priora materialibus, uti etiam nobis sunt priora cognitione, quia interius animam quam corpus perspicimus, quod etiam Plato et Cartesius notant. Ed.]
tricity of the whole body of science—do exist, those indeed only can deny who deny that the subjects of all inquiry are ultimately metaphysical subjects, and that the rules of all inquiry are ultimately logical rules; a statement, the latter member of which would be to contradict an unquestioned definition, and the former of which, even considered not as a matter of definition, but of fact, I trust you will be in no danger of admitting, after the combined synthetical and analytical investigation of the subject of the philosophy of the mind which I have had the honour of presenting to your acceptance upon this day.

Gentlemen, upon our next day of meeting I purpose, after extending the analytical discovery of this philosophy through its other departments, as poetry, history, and our personal experience, to attempt exhibiting to you the primary division of the subject; a division, in which, as I shall feel obliged to depart very widely from the philosophy now popular in these countries, I fear I shall have even more reason to require your indulgence than I have had upon the present occasion.
LECTURE II.

GENTLEMEN,

Our last meeting in this place was occupied with a general preliminary account of the nature of our subject,—an account not certainly so distinct and luminous as I trust you will have formed for your own use at the close of our researches, but serving sufficiently as an introductory and temporary guide—an outline map which you will hereafter fill and colour for yourselves. In a case like this, we must in some measure anticipate what is to come, while we cannot take full advantage of it; we must borrow from the future to illustrate the present, while yet to borrow much would be only to obscure it; and in attempting the preliminary "abscissio infiniti" which is necessary to the methodical delivery of every course of doctrine, it is often hard to avoid for a while condemning our hearers to that perplexed suspense in which it is so much easier to pronounce what a subject is not than to define what it is. The exposition of every philosophical subject must, at first and for a time, repose upon the future which is afterwards to repose upon it; content with that twilight illumination whose light is uncertain because reflected from a sun not yet arisen.

You will remember, Gentlemen, that I attempted to shew you by what processes deductive and inductive the great and dominant science of sensibility, intelligence, emotion, and action, is arrived at; how it is assumed at the beginning or detected at the end, of the long and labyrinthine journey of scientific speculation. It is, as I evinced, the prime or the ultimate science; the mystic fountain of all the streams of knowledge, or the ocean as mysterious in which their waters are lost. More especially I insisted upon the latter of these views,—the view which is best adapted to an assembly of restricted and fallible human intellects;—shewing you how in constructing the philosophy of man we achieve for all science the same lofty generalization which the sciences themselves achieve for their own respective objects; how the same resem-
blance or identity of qualities which they apprehend in
the multitude of different instances, and to which they
therefore apply a common name, is also to be discovered
in their own ultimate subjects of inquiry and processes
of inquiry, and is made amenable to the same principle
of nomenclature; how, in short, the metaphysician in-
ducts his universal laws from them, as they induct their
universal laws from external nature. So far we had pro-
ceeded, and from these views we had begun to draw some
obvious but practically important conclusions, when I was
last honoured with your attention.

But, Gentlemen, I request you particularly to observe
that when I represent our science as a generalization from
all the varieties of Natural Science, though I describe truly
I do not define adequately. Such a description, though
valuable for its present purposes, is far from doing com-
plete justice to the claims of this philosophy. In narrating
the generation of the universal science, I have derived it,
historically, from a more or less advanced physical science,
from which both in the order of time and in the order of
reasoning it naturally evolves itself. But though, certain
disturbing influences excepted, it is thus true that it is
not through the pathways of feeling and imagination that
men travel into metaphysical inquiry, yet the science whose
birth I have traced for you from the speculative reason
soon asserts a dominion coextensive with human nature
itself. I have shewn you that what is termed the Philo-
sophy of Mind is the ultimate science of Nature; you must
remember that it is also the ultimate science of Man, and
the science of man "humani nihil alienum putat." Were
the labours of the mind in the collection of facts and the
ascertainment and application of laws, or in the logical
comparison of its own conceptions, the whole story of its
activity,—were the character which Voltaire has some-
where bestowed upon Clarke (that of being a "mill for
reasoning") an adequate definition of universal humanity,
—to have proceeded thus far would be to have reached
the limits of our scope as natural philosophers of mind.
The heritage of our metaphysics would be confined to the
transcendental problems bequeathed by our mathematical
and physical sciences: a rich inheritance indeed, and a
responsible one, but not yet all that humanity has to
offer to its own reflection. The sciences—mighty monu-
ments as (even in their present state, without regard to
their future development) they unquestionably are to
the dignity of the spirit of man,—are not to be considered
as its only glory. It has assumed other positions which
demonstrate other faculties,—positions the evidence of
which is among us in a thousand forms. In its treasures of poetry and fiction it has ceased to reason, in order to imagine and to feel. Here then the science of mind addresses itself to new problems; and in the analysis of the great productions of verbal or pictorial poetry, resolves poetry into the poet acting, and, by its cautious course of successive generalizations, attains to the mental laws of imaginative agency in its relation to the production of elevating or pleasurable emotion, as it attained to the law of the gravitating force in its production of all the diversified yet consenting harmonies of the universe. The Iliad is to an Aristotelian what the planetary appearances were to a Newton; that is to say, each is equally an aggregate of phenomena which confusedly pointed to some predominating law or laws, themselves the utterance and the development of some presiding mind. All intellectual arts disclose the intellect that originates them, and are the outward portraiture of inward faculties and laws. This is true alike of creation itself, and of the secondary and subordinate creation which is denominated poetry; the Art or, to speak more correctly, the Science of Criticism is the physics of the World framed by imagination under the guidance of taste; in both, phenomena very different indeed in their nature but very similar in their scientific aspect, are resolved and classified; poetry is the “nature” of genius, and, if you will have it so, nature itself is—the poetry—or the poem—of God.

Here, then, in virtue of its systematizing authority, we have extended the domain of our philosophy beyond the region of the sciences; and we find that it traverses the fairy land of fiction and of feeling with as assured a step as that with which it marks its supremacy in the former territory;—gathering and classifying the ornamental flowers of fancy as carefully as before it classified the useful fruits of speculative truth. The facility and amusement of the investigations may indeed differ in these very different provinces, but the principle of progress to the psychological theorist is the same, whether it lie through the pleasuregrounds of imagination, or through those regions which, though containing mines of internal wealth, may perhaps be, as is always remarked of the districts rich in mineral treasures, externally desolate, rugged, and difficult of access. The science of observed nature, whether mental or material, is ever uniform with itself; the position of the mind in relation to these subjects of its inquiry admits of one mode of progress, and admits of it alone.

And the same philosophical analysis which I have described as reducing to law and order the recorded pro-
cesses of science and the recorded impulses of imagination, is obviously applicable to every other record of mental action. (I am still regarding our science in its more popular aspect, as the ultimate science not of nature but of man.) History, then, which in its widest sense may be defined as the record of "the development of things in time," and in its more restricted sense becomes the register of only human changes, is itself no more than an assortment of facts for our arrangement: a truth of boundless importance and fertility, which it has been reserved for later ages to discern, and for future ages to verify. "What species of amusement or instruction," says Mr Godwin, "would history afford us, if there were no ground of inference from moral causes to effects, if certain temptations and inducements did not in all ages and climates produce a certain series of actions?...the amusement would be inferior to that which we derive from the perusal of a chronological table, where events have no order but that of time." (Pol. Hist. I. 268.) A great principle is always first carried to excess; it rushes into the mind with a force which impels it to the opposite extreme, and across every barrier of caution; like the lightning in suddenness and brilliancy, it seems, like it too, to fill at once the whole breadth of the horizon of thought. Mr Godwin does not stand alone in modern times, in exaggerating beyond its real limits that greatest of conceptions, the philosophy of history; and the authority and ability of Frederic Schlegel have already, I fear, urged the notion to extravagance, in his views, so widely circulated abroad, of the historical development of the laws of intelligence. But, Gentlemen, the disguises of a truth must not tempt you to doubt its substantial reality; and it is one of the most valuable lessons in the ethics of philosophical inquiry, to learn how to see truth in its excesses, and to defend it even when it deserts itself. Principles, great and novel, seem, like men, to have their wild season of youth, and seldom pass to their sober application without a previous period of extravagance. And there exists a philosophy of history, though it be never destined for the perfection of our philosophy of nature; there are periods, and generally determinable periods, in the march of men and empires, though the perturbations be too intricate and their causes too minute to allow us to give these historical recurrences the accuracy of our astronomical cycles. But on the present school of philosophical history I must postpone any further comment, until our next term, when in rapidly surveying the history of philosophy itself, I shall hope to find opportunities of noticing this kindred subject. But, in addition to
all these more deliberate manifestations of nature and of man which I have presented to you as subjects for your philosophical anatomy, and subjects in two lights, both as to the matters upon which they are engaged, the truths they reveal (which terminate by resolving into the final topics and truths of metaphysics), and as to the mental procedures they call into action; in addition to these great specimens of nature and of mind which are contained in the museums of science and literature, I have finally to note another, a fourth rich material for reflective analysis with which you are provided, not by erudition, but by nature. We have detected our metaphysics where man probably first found it; in the labours of physical science searching for truth of laws and principles; we have discovered it in history recording truth of facts and events; we have found it, more latent but not more inactive, in Poetry, beautifying and transmuting both the former, and have known, or, I trust, will hereafter know, how to interpret the deep-thoughted sentence of Aristotle, φιλοσοφωτερον καὶ σπουδαστερον τοιχις ιστορίας εστίν (Poet. c. 9). But beyond all these records of "instantiae praerogativae" for your psychological inductions, we are not to forget another vast and important volume, that diary whose pages are for ever augmenting in number,—the volume of your personal experience. In that region of knowledge every man is his own historian; and in it (though, as a distinct source of attainable truths, I have placed it apart) we may all find the miniature representation of that wider historic theatre which has

A kingdom for a stage, princes to act,
And monarchs to behold the swelling scene.

Such indeed is the sameness of human motives and all the variety of external scenes of action, that each individual is truly a microcosm of the whole moral universe; and if, not confining ourselves to the actual experiences, we were to consider the susceptibilities, of any given human being, it might be affirmed intelligibly enough that a single individual contains within himself an undeveloped infinity of individuals, that each man is in possibility all men, and that each life renewed amid other scenes might be multiplied into a history of the world. And perhaps, were history to be considered,—or could it be constructed,—as the record of the progress of the human race towards happiness, it is with such biographies that it would mainly be concerned; for the happiness of a nation is after all only

1 ["Poetry is a thing more philosophical and weightier than history." Ed.]
the aggregate of personal happinesses, and the philosophy of its history the philosophy of personal motives. The pride of human nature seems indeed to have consecrated the same—perhaps fortunate—fallacy in its patriotism, which the reason of human nature so long admitted in its logical speculations; in each alike we have learned to invest our arbitrary genera and species with existence, to forget that the "singulars" alone possess it; and by a sort of realism of the emotions, the long predicamental line of country, province, county, family, and the rest, assume a definite being and attributes,—their interests and their honour are matter of thrilling import—to many who scarcely recognize the existence or value the happiness of any one individual included under these idolized abstractions!

There are some occasions indeed in which the connexion, or rather the identity, of these two great spheres of psychological induction—personal and historical experience—is strongly and instructively established; I allude to those instances in which we can actually detect the agency of private motives in effecting vast national changes,—instances which at once break the powerful spell, that, by separating the fields of individual and national humanity, so constantly exalts the life of past history into a certain godlike or superhuman scene, in which if individuals like ourselves are conceived at all to act, they are, as it were, dilated into the vastness of the mighty multitudes they control, and assume to themselves the magnitude of the interests they are directing. An illusion, I may add, in its general purport and effects not unlike that old and authorized dogma of the essential difference of the heavenly and earthly motions, which was one among the many reasons that left it to an Englishman of the seventeenth century to explain the theory of the universe. The instances of which I speak, though they occur oftenest under despotic governments, are least often detected there; and, accordingly, it is in the contemplation of such scenes, or in living under such constraints, that the illusion has its fullest sovereignty. There the kingly nature is not merely superior to that of ordinary men, it is of another origin and essence; it acts by peculiar laws, and owes no allegiance to the inductions of psychology. Yet there, precisely, its melancholy community of being is most firmly established; and there even the attribute of superior power may most feasibly be doubted. The Philosophy of Mind vindicates to itself the biography of courts and the history of power, in reducing power itself when most uncontrolled to the control of the invincible
laws of universal humanity. "Domination itself," says Rousseau, "is servile when it depends on opinion. You depend on the prejudices of those whom you govern by prejudices. To conduct them as you please, you must conduct yourself as they please." "Oh!" he afterwards adds, after quoting the well-known anecdote of Themistocles and his child, "what little conductors we should often discover for the greatest empires, if from the prince we could descend by degrees to the first hand that gave the impulse in secret!" (Emile, Liv. II.) A thought which might suggest a comparison of such a government to an unequal bulk of matter in mechanics, whose centre of gravity (that centre on which the whole is set to rest for support, and where its entire force is accumulated for action) lies not at either extreme, but at some point not far from the preponderating side, but secret and invisible in the interior of the mass. I introduce the comparison in order to extend it in strict adherence to our present subject; for in the machinery of public and historical affairs, even such a director as this unseen manager of empires is himself the creature of motives produced by other agents in endless variety and succession; just as the mechanical point of which I have been speaking is itself, wherever it be placed, the result of a thousand combining influences, every atom of the mass really contributing to determine it. Thus it is that there is a sort of horrible "representative" government even in the favouritism of an oriental tyranny.

But these are only one class of the innumerable cases in which history itself teaches us to identify, as subjects of philosophical contemplation, the life of individuals and of nations. And we require such ad:nomities. That it is an enormous complication of personal motives which composes the whole actual substance of the grand totalities of history, is, as a speculative truth, easily understood and admitted; but when the whole is presented, we neglect the innumerable parts: and a historical view of an empire, especially where our guide aims at elegance of style and systematic narration (such a history as Gibbon's), may be compared to the view of the natural body; in the symmetrical "effect" of the entire we forget that it is indeed an effect, that the shape is only the determining surface of masses of interwoven tissues and endless anatomical details, the visible result of which is that outward complexion of harmony and grace, whose very beauty it is to hide them. The same value is thus attached by psycho-

["Ce petit garçon que vous voyez là, disoit Thémistocle à ses amis, est l'arbitre de la Grèce ; car il gouverne sa mère, sa mère me gouverne, je gouverne les Athéniens, et les Athéniens gouvernent les Grecs." Ed.]
logical students of history to minute disclosures, which is attached by the anatomist to those rare surgical opportunities which allow the play of the living machine to be witnessed. To the tears of a certain woman many ages ago (to cite an instance from Helvetius) Europe demonstrably owes its present situation, and (I may add) the whole history of modern times, its precise development and character. If the tears of Veturia had not disarmed Coriolanus, the Volsci would doubtless have destroyed Rome; if Rome had fallen, the world would never have known that long chain of victories which in elevating a single empire changed the state of every other; modern Europe would not have triumphed over its ruins or received the impression of its powerful influences, nor, therefore, have been what it is to-day. I take the liberty of adding Helvetius's instance, that we might trace the same great results to even meaner parentage, and find, by a similar course of deduction, in the genealogy of the Capitols the ancestors in order of events to the dynasties and policies of the Caesars and the Bourbons. Minute personal agencies, then, abound in all histories; for they are, in truth, the ultimate atoms into which all the events of history are finally resolvable. The Philosophy of History, therefore (if you will allow me one more illustration), bears to the philosophy of personal experience, much the same relation which Mechanics bears to Chemistry; the one theorizes the forces and motions of the masses; the other the intimate structure of each, and the arrangement and disposition of its component particles. When the influences of private and individual minds are detected, we have the two departments united; as when the practical mechanician becomes a temporary chemist in examining the strength and structure of his materials: such records restore the unity of human nature, remind the reason of what the imagination is so apt to forget, and teach us that the history of mankind is still the history of men.

Gentlemen,—I have now won the right of reminding you with how accurate an obedience to the inductive spirit of the age, (in its own sphere so invaluable,) we have conducted our investigations of the subject of the metaphysical philosophy. Without any formal display of the external apparatus of the scholastic method of division and subdivision, which for obvious reasons of utility it is my object in this place to avoid as much as is practicable, I have exhibited to you four great fields for the cultivation of psychological inquiry. These are: the truths, subjects, and processes of science; the recorded results and processes of imagination; the facts, causes, and general laws
of history; and the treasures of direct personal experience. I have not pretended, as you will conclude or conjecture, from the style (purposely unscholastic) in which I have discussed them, to present these divisions as possessing the adequacy of a scientific distribution, but as being sufficient to suggest to you the extent and the variety of those territories over which our philosophy exerts a direct and perpetual control. It exerts such a control, I have told you, because it is the last and highest generalization from them all. Science in all its branches is, as it were, the rich and variegated tapestry which is woven upon this common ground; Poetry in its widest sense, and all its many kinds and divisions, is but the practical form of a portion of this philosophy; mankind in the grand and melancholy review of History are but performing its evolutions; and in the private experience of mere individual life, every action is an experiment, every practical rule a tacit theorem in the same universal science of the soul. I have now, therefore, described to you the philosophy of the mind—under a purely inductive aspect; that view under which it takes its place with lofty humility as the first of physical sciences, but still a physical science, above all others in the extent of its conclusions, agreeing with all in its method of obtaining and employing them.

But, Gentlemen, I should not be acting with the sincerity which forms an important article in those ethics of philosophical inquiry to which I have already alluded, if I did not confess it as my opinion that the philosophy which is now and in these countries usually designated by the title of the Philosophy of Mind, has, when rightly considered, a scope beyond the inductive inquiry of contingent truth; and that even when I ventured to describe it to you as the grand and final classification of all the varieties of all the sciences, being to them what they are to nature,—as the physics to which experimental science was itself an experiment, geometry a fact, and algebra another fact,—as including the "axiomata maxime generalia" of which the Paradise Lost might be a poetical instance, the age of chivalry a historical,—even in these representations I had not exhausted the claims and offices of philosophy. There is, Gentlemen, a region which lies beyond the scope of the popular metaphysic of our age and country, a region upon which the heavy clouds of the scholastic and mystical theology have indeed long been suffered to rest, and whose substantial existence, confounded to the common eye with the mists that encompassed it, has at last been almost rejected in rejecting them. I refer to that profound, perhaps abstruse, certainly most important department of
speculation, which is devoted to investigating the objective reality of our knowledge, and the inferences as to real and independent existences which can be concluded from the constitution and principles of our intellectual being. Such a branch of study—the second great division of the system of metaphysical inquiry which I propose to you—would include as its chief subjects those important topics, the independent reality of material substance, the reality and value of abstract truth, the absolute nature of time and space, and, above all, the real eternal and necessary existence and attributes of that great animating principle of all things which antiquity, by a noble and just analogy, entitled the soul of the universe, and whom it is given us—while by the force of irresistible convictions of His Deity we can place Him on the throne of the universe.—by the revelation of His assumed Humanity, to welcome to the almost nobler throne of the heart. All these considerations are of the kind which have been termed *a priori* reasonings, that is, reasonings which conclude the reality of certain existences from notions and convictions shewn to be inseparable from our intellectual nature, as distinguished from conclusions obtained by the aid of experience and analogy. Whether the human reason is competent to effect this vast and momentous transit from relative and subjective classification to objective and absolute reality, has in all ages been a matter of disputation. Researches of this kind, prosecuted indeed with very various success, and sometimes pursued into the boundless forests of intricate verbal distinctions with a very deplorable waste of industry, formed the great theme of metaphysical science almost until the age of Descartes, who was himself one of the most enlightened cultivators of this region of speculation. The scholastic metaphysicians, however, on whom the yoke of an external authority pressed heavily, and who, set in the close harness of ecclesiastical dogmas, were too laboriously employed dragging the ponderous chariot of the church in triumph to have opportunity for exulting in the wide champaign of speculation—were scarcely ever attracted to the profound logical questions that this branch of knowledge involves. Occasional scepticism, the great stimulant of philosophical activity, was either too feeble to rouse them to examine the basis of their enormous fabrics of ontological science, or was consumed in skirmishing among the intricacies of its outer fortifications. The great question—perpetually recurring to the few who think in metaphysics—whether reason can directly recognize the absolute, is, so far as I have ever seen, untouched in their writings. At this time the triumphs of the inductive
physics seem in these countries to have destroyed the taste for such inquiries, and when contemplated in the clear, piercing, and brilliant light of positive discovery, the din of shadows of ontology, if seen at all, seem only the gaunt and ghastly spectres of a departed philosophy, phantoms which haunted the midnight of science, and, lingering through its early dawn, have not even yet wholly vanished before its growing splendours. The majority of the chief authorities of our country in later times not only neglect this high metaphysic of absolute truth, but deny its legitimate existence. Dr Hartley only approached, Mr Hume disbelieved, Dr Reid doubted, Mr Stewart reiterated his doubts, and Dr Brown—the genius and spirit of whose philosophy is that of Hume, with the negligent morning-gown of Hume exchanged for a gorgeous and spangled court-dress—denies the possibility of a priori deduction as applied to the Deity, reduces the knowledge of mind as a substance to the evidence of memory, traces the knowledge of matter to such an application of the Humanian theory of physical sequences as I conceive contradicts the theory itself by still supposing a principle beyond it, and discourages all researches of real existence not contained in direct experience and the law of the belief of similarity of future to past, by constantly affirming that every form of knowledge must be relative to the knowing mind—a certain truth indeed within its proper limits, but one which still leaves open the further question, whether there may not be principles in the mind, forms of our intellectual consciousness, which, though, considered as a portion of consciousness, they be relative and personal, yet, considered in themselves, are the all-sufficing proofs of independent irrelative existences. Whether there be not absolute apprehension of absolute natures, as well as relative belief of relative truths: whether, by a process wholly indescribable because altogether unique, the "pure Reason" (to adopt a phrase that marks an epoch in philosophical history) does not assert its own incommunicable privileges as a revelation from the reason of the universe to man, and not as a projection of man upon the universe, a revelation present to all, appropriated by none, and bearing with it essentially a character of objective, independent, and absolute. It is with a view to this identity of the absolute reason in all minds, that the sublimest of the Latin fathers as well as one of the loftiest of philosophical speculatists (St Augustine) has spoken so constantly of the "Intus in domicilio cognitionis, nec Hebrae, nec Graeca, nec Latina, nec Barbara veritas." (Confess. II. 13.) But need I recur to the authority of that incomparable person for proofs of
the depth of that conviction of all patient uncorrupted thinkers,—that our perceptions of Truth descend upon us from on high, and that our reason is the faint but faithful shadow of the reason of God? What do you suppose gave permanence or power to the mystical numbers of Pythagoras and the realized ideas of Plato? What secret influence taught one of the subtletest of modern minds his vision of all things in God, or so long supported the idealism of the followers of Descartes? Never be induced to believe, Gentlemen, by any dexterity of sleight or sarcasm, that such diviners of truth as these, if they did go astray, went astray with a folly, which, if you believe the vulgar representations of their views, was truly grosser than the hallucinations of lunacy. Those who honour me with their attention will hear, I avow it, a very different species of criticism. I would gladly teach you to prefer contemplating the truth that gave such systems their still undestroyed charm, to resting in the errors that disfigured and embled them. I would willingly lead you to a reverence for the leaders of our human reason, even when, misled by the double fascinations of imagination and emotion, they sometimes rather wished a theory than established it. While you sternly discountenance the result of error, accustom yourselves, by tracing out its origin, to disentangle the germ of truth it invested; refute incomplete views not by rejecting but by completing them; and remember that even when, by too fondly worshipping a partial vision of truth, great thinkers have erred, a certain modified admiration is due to those very errors which flow from an excess of intellectual elevation. It is a feeling of this kind which, in despite of logical reclamations, will ever give an echo in exalted minds to the celebrated declaration of Cicero, that even an error shared with Plato was better than the truth of others. In the particular instance before us, the hypotheses of Plato, Augustine, Norris, Cudworth, Malebranche, and the rest, seem to me to have all been the sensible or imaginative forms of real truth. The inseparable conviction that reason is in its essential nature irrelative, that "states of mind" and "modifications of thought," and the rest of the vocabulary of the popular philosophers of the day, will never exhaust the mighty mysteries of absolute truth which the mind directly contemplates when it recognizes the necessity of causes and substances, and a first cause and a first substance—the conviction, often undefined but always present, that to know by the reason is to know in the God who is Himself the reason of the universe—this was the one great basis of all these various structures of philoso-
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But to enter into any actual discussion of this great question would now be premature. I confess, and with the sincere humility which becomes me in differing from my first masters in these studies, that my apprehension of the importance of the science of Real Existence, as a legitimate branch of metaphysical speculation, which was among the earliest convictions of my mind, has not diminished with its growth. Nor has my anxiety to see these profound questions established and elucidated been overcome even by the repulsive obscurity of the small portion which I have been able to penetrate of those antagonists of Kant, who, since the death of that great man, and during the latter section of his life, have been mainly engaged in discussing them; or by the seductive popularity, grace, and brilliancy of those very opposite teachers, who, by a prejudice not perhaps altogether to be regretted, reject every species of investigation which cannot be reduced to the forms of the Baconian logic, and tolerate no metaphysical science but that which our admirable Scottish cotemporaries have denominated the Inductive Philosophy of the human mind.

And, Gentlemen, while I have just now vindicated the metaphysical philosophy a class of investigations to which there is no analogy in any inductive science whatever, while I contend that we impair the majesty of the First Philosophy when we confine it to the rich but restricted field which the authors to whom I have last alluded were content to cultivate and adorn, I trust that from the manner in which I depicted the former (or psychological) division of our subject, you will acquit me of any weak or presumptuous purpose of disparaging the philosophy of induction. I am not worthy to praise it as it should be praised; yet even I can contemplate with astonishment its conquests, vast, various, and secure; that invincible caution with which it has progressively mastered territories of truth so long abandoned to a dogmatism that had subjugated everything to its authority but Nature herself; and with which, by substituting unwearied vigilance in this great warfare for the rash and rapid errors of the former tactique, this slow but triumphant method, like Fabius of old, "cunctando restituit rem." These are avowals almost superfluous in the countryman of Boyle, speaking the language of Newton.

I shall close this subject with some observations which, as not demanding much previous reflection, may fittingly be introduced in this early part of our discussions.
The first is this; that you may discover in the twofold distribution of Universal Metaphysics into the Philosophy of the Mind properly so called, and the Science of Real Existence, an analogy, not unworthy of notice, to the corresponding resolution of the complex Science of Physics into the departments of observation or experiment, and of mathematical deduction. In pure psychology, as in experimental science, we abstract in order to classify; in ontology, as in mathematics, we abstract in order to apprehend the necessary relations of our abstractions. The one is the reproduction of consciousness under the form of system; its aim is to transform it by successive simplifications from a confused aggregate of mental states into a definite catalogue of functions; as it were, to take asunder the many-coloured web of experience and lay the unravelled threads in bundles according to their colours and shades of colours, the whole web being still present, but the whole under a new form and collocation. But if we retain the whole, we retain nothing more; psychology is never wider than the consciousness it reconstructs. If it be the object of the science to be "the whole truth," it is equally its object to be "nothing but the truth." In all this its identity of aim and method with the material sciences of observation is obvious; and has been illustrated in a thousand forms by authors with whom I may presume my academical hearers sufficiently acquainted. The other division, having duly received this strict and methodized report from reflection of the entire contents of the consciousness, proceeds by the instrumentality of reason to hold judgment upon reason itself, to examine the scope and value of this rich inventory of knowledge, and to determine its relation to the eternal realities of absolute nature. The similarity of this species of inquiry (I no longer say its "identity," for the relation here detected, of the relative to the absolute, is purely sui generis), the resemblance to the mathematical sciences consists in this, that in both we search for relations not only fixed in fact but necessary in essence, which we not merely believe will, but know must, exist.

If these views be correct, it may naturally be expected that as the busy experimenter, a Priestley or a Boyle, is seldom the profound mathematician, so the devoted psychologist will not generally be deeply interested in those high speculations which contemplate the relation of reason to the universe. And this parallelism is verified in the history of philosophy. You do not look for a theory of association from Spinoza or Schelling. Again, it may be expected that these divisions of metaphysical speculation
should correspond with their physical counterparts in their relative popularity with the mass of thinking men; and that the same preference which the variety and activity of the chemical discoverer obtains above the abstractions of the pure mathematician, should also belong to the inductive inquiry of consciousness, as compared with the absorbed and remote investigations of the source, scope and authority of reason.

A third scholium is this;—that as mathematics take their first rise out of abstractions from physical experience, so the ultimate researches of ontology may be observed to originate in at least a partial pre-existent psychology, and we may perceive—what we might have conjectured—that reason is not weighed in the balance until some previous attempt has been made to ascertain its shape and dimensions. The actual position of German philosophy—the great theatre of this mode of speculation—will very definitely illustrate this observation, which I introduce not as an isolated fact, but as a principle of method. The existing German schools owe their historical origin to the appearance of the *Critique of the Pure Reason*, in 1781. What was the origin of that performance, which even its despisers (who, I believe, are in this country much more numerous than its readers) must allow to have achieved an epoch in the history of the mind, if not by its merits, at least by its influence? Gentlemen, the *Critique* was in reality the genuine descendant of the early Scottish school of Reid, which was itself traceable to the alternate coincidences and controversies of the ultra-Lockians with the last brilliant remnants of the Cartesian spiritualism. Now the labours of Kant were themselves an effort—though certainly a cautious and measured effort—at vindicating the authority of reason in relation to the world it interprets; and so far as they were such they arose out of a previous psychological system, the system of Kant himself, as it grew into its enormous proportions out of his own slow and laborious classifications of the categories of reason. But the many who believe that the great professor of Königsberg betrayed the cause of human reason, will oblige me to pass to a late period. Pause then upon the daring edifices of Fichte and Schelling, and examine if the principle does not hold, that ontological systems are chronologically subsequent to philosophies of mind. These systems—at least the systems of Schelling and his followers—suppose the Kantism they oppose; that is they, for the most part, admit the logical analyses of Kant, while they despise the timidity of his restricted conclusions; that is, their ontology, be it sound or visionary, is built
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upon a pre-conceded analysis of the intellectual powers and laws; and from an antecedent formal logic originates that substantial or essential logic which directs its efforts to give to the reason itself an immediate contemplation of absolute objective being. Gentlemen, I do not now venture to decide—perhaps, under the circumstances of the case, I owe an apology for at present canvassing, at such length, the general legitimacy, or the processes, or the successes, of these efforts. They form a branch of metaphysical investigation of which the very phraseology is probably novel to many of you; and which has been (as I have already remarked) almost wholly neglected by our most influential guides in later times. I may however add that I have for my own part derived little satisfaction from the bold solution offered by the most famous of our German contemporaries—the Plotinus of this age—for the great problem of reason, and that I must agree with that cold but just decision of Dugald Stewart with which the great Scottish psychologist frowns from his presence that monster unacknowledged by consciousness, the “intellectual contemplation”, of Schelling, renewed by the master of the French eclectic school under the title of a “pure apperception:” yet I cannot consent to relinquish the vast inquiry, and I still believe that a middle course (something like that which, as far as I can collect from very imperfect sources of information, has been adopted by Bouterwek*) may be found, which shall establish the internal independ-ence of reason, in some sense its essential “objectivity.”

3 [Anschauung, (Intellectuelle as distinguished from sinnliche). Schelling thus describes the difference between his own use of this term, and that of his more cautious predecessor: "Kant ging davon aus: das Erste in unserer Erkenntniss sey die Anschauung. Daraus entstand gar bald der Satz: Anschauung sey die niedrigste Stufe der Erkenntniss." "Aber," rejoins Schelling, "sie ist das Höchste im menschlichen Geiste, dasjenige, wovon alle unsere tiefsten Erkenntnisse erst ihren Worth und ihre Realität borgen." And elsewhere: " Uns wohnt ein geheimes, wunderbares Vermögen bei, uns aus dem Wechsel der Zeit in unser Inneres, von allem, was von aussenher hinzukommt, entkleidetes Selbst zurückzuziehen, und da unter der Form der Unwandelbarkeit das Ewige in uns anzusehen. Diese Anschauung ist die innerste eigene Erfahrung, von welcher allein alles abhängt, was wir von einer übersinnlichen Welt wissen und glauben. Diese Anschauung zuerst überzeugt uns, dass irgend etwas im eigentlichen Sinne ist, während alles übrige nur erscheint, worauf wir jenes Wort übertragen." Schelling’s Philosophische Schriften, pp. 165, 208. Compare Plato, Theaet. p. 183, v. φανεται τά μήν αὐτή δί αὐτής ἡ ψυχὴ ἐπισκοπεῖν, τά δὲ δι’ τῶν τού σώματος διάμεσων—‘Αλλα μήν φανεται γε—Ποτέρων οὐν τίθη τῷ οὐσίαν;—Ἐγώ μήν ὡν αὐτή ἡ ψυχὴ καθ’ αὐτὴν ἐπισκοπεῖν. Also the context from p. 184, c. ED.]

4 [Better known as the historian of Modern Poetry and Eloquence; a popular and elegant rather than profound writer. His philosophical reputation, which is of a secondary order, is said to rest on his Apoesthktic, and his Handbook of the Philosophical Sciences (1830). Bouterwek was first a Kantian, but afterwards adopted the views of Jacobi. In his Introduction to the Philosophy of the Natural Sciences he reasserts the Physical principles of Aristotle. ED.]
and direct apprehension of absolute truth. But this is matter for future consideration, and whichever way your opinion inclines, you will at least admit that the subject deserves the honour of inquiry. I must remind you, however, for fear of misconstruction, that the force and cogency of all demonstrations of existence, as demonstrations, will remain unaltered, whether you assign them an absolute reality or only a relative and inferential truth.

On the whole, you will, I trust, agree with me as to the object of these latter remarks, that we shall best pursue that method which has been pointed out by the progressive developments of the human mind, and in our discussions in this place postpone these speculations of the higher logic until we shall have examined with some care the actual furniture of the human mind.

Here then we pause for the present, and, bound by the strict necessities of method, defer to a future period our conceptions as to that world

"To us invisible, or dimly seen,"

which lies beyond our consciousness, and of which the pure reason reveals only the bare existence and the primary attributes. On our next day we shall again return to the mind itself, and to the humbler, but perhaps safer, philosophy which classes its varieties,—a restricted subject, perhaps, if compared with the former, yet how vast if it be remembered to include every form of thought, knowledge and feeling! Leaving that mighty sphere of essential reality for our daily and less ambiguous region of experience, I might tell you with Milton,

"Half yet remains unsung, but narrower bound
Within the visible diurnal sphere;
Standing on earth, not rapt above the pole,
More safe I sing."......

On our next day of meeting, then,—after briefly summing, and more explicitly enforcing, the views which in a merely suggestive form I have adduced to-day,—I will attempt to sketch for you some of the various aspects under which the philosophy of which we have now gained the general idea, has been contemplated in various periods of the world's history. This task (a natural completion of our present topic) I shall hope at least partially to accomplish, in citing and illustrating some of the numerous titles by which it has been designated—as "Wisdom," "Philosophy," "Metaphysics," and the rest. As I am not aware of this information having been anywhere reduced to an available form, such a discussion will serve the great object which
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I still propose in these discourses,—that of constantly making them a stimulant and supplement to your own independent researches. And, at all events, these considerations, historical and philological, will possess the popular merit of being less abstruse and obscure than the subject which occupied the latter half of this lecture can ever admit of being.
LECTURE III.

GENTLEMEN,

In my last address to you, I completed the first great division of the general subject of Philosophy. I endeavoured to explain to you that I was disposed to divide it in direct reference to the objects of its consideration, that is to say, according as these objects were simple phenomena, or the great realities deducible from the existence of these phenomena; according, therefore, as its method was inductive or speculative, enumerating the facts of consciousness, or investigating existences not cognizable by, but involved in, that consciousness. The one division of the science, for example, resolves the whole internal experience into a few faculties (or ultimate modes of consciousness); it reduces all the known varieties of mental posture into phenomena of sensation, phenomena of intellect, phenomena of sentiment, phenomena of volition. The other, basing itself upon the "return" handed in by this analytical inquiry, and detecting in the phenomena it contains, or some of them, certain characters that involve realities beyond the scope of immediate consciousness, finds in the laws of the human reason—speculative and practical—a revelation of the absolute laws of the universe, and more especially the involved certainty of that Supreme causative and reasonable nature, who is the Law of Laws, and the depositor in the human mind of those principles of truth which we possess as the testimonial and manifestation of his all-containing and all-disposing existence. "Cogito ergo sum" was the well-known postulate of Descartes; to those who can reflect, "Cogito, ergo Deus est," will not appear a less cogent conclusion.

I acknowledged that in this distribution I had departed from the philosophical chart designed by our most popular authorities. To enter into any defence of such a course would be at present misplaced; the event will vindicate it, or nothing can; and I am not sorry to defer as long as possible a trial where success alone can justify revolt.
I might indeed produce countervailing authorities; but that I do not wish to occupy your time with a conflict of names where reason only should decide.

I ought to observe, however, that when I term these departments the Philosophy of the Mind, and the Philosophy of Real Existence,—or, to use the compendious Greek forms, Psychology and Ontology,—I employ this latter term in a sense considerably different from that which was so long consecrated by scholastic usage. The ontology of the schools (however we may adopt Leibnitz's well-known remark as to the general merits of these disputants) was unquestionably a very misguided and unprofitable branch of speculation. The reason is obvious,—they disjoined it too much from the anatomy of the mind itself, and consequently suffered this most sublime and interesting inquiry to lose itself in a wilderness of words. The same reason will account for the fact which I noticed in my last lecture,—that they omitted altogether, or almost altogether, the logical question, how far absolute truths and real existences can be concluded from mental states that at first appear to be wholly relative and subjective. Now in the investigation which I would propose to you under the title of Ontology, these inquiries would form, as assuredly they ought to form, a principal article of discussion. And thus the rational ontology of this school, instead of being "scientia maxime universalis circa ens, ejusque proprietates genericas, seu circa genericas rerum notiones quibus singularis comprehenduntur occupata," would form for the most part an important department of universal logic. "Logic," Gentlemen, is the science of those relations which constitute human knowledge. (As an "art" its definition flows from this, exactly as the idea of any art from its correlative science; it is the practical application of the truths which the science discloses.) Scientific or Theoretic Logic may therefore be said to consist of two departments, which, though I dislike instituting new titles, might perhaps be conveniently styled formal and substantial Logic: the former being the Logic which analyses the reason as it evolves itself in the formation of knowledge, and thus a portion of general psychology; the latter, the investigation of the connexion

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1 Among the Schoolmen, Leibnitz was most influenced by Thomas of Aquinum, though, in conformity with the spirit of the age, he rejected his Realism. See Ritter Geschichte d. Philos. xii. p. 63, and the references, to which may be added the following: Nec vereor dicere Scholasticos vetustiores nonnullis hodiernis et acumine et soliditate, et modestia, et ab inutilibus questionibus circumseptiore abstinentia longe praestare.—De Stilo Novioli, c. 37. Ed.]
between the relations formed by the mind and the reality of things, and thus constituting a principal part of the speculation, which for brevity I have included under the title of Ontology. A more extended use of this word, which has been sometimes adopted, I notice to exclude. It is that in which, all human science being considered as the science of what is or what ought to be, the former branch is designated as "ontology." This employment of the term has the weight (whatever that may be) of Lord Brougham's authority. There seems however to be no great advantage gained by disturbing established nomenclature in order to convey the old distinction of physical and ethical knowledge. The Science of Ontology, therefore, as I would define and distinguish it, comprehends investigations of every real existence either beyond the sphere of the present world, or in any other way incapable of being the direct object of consciousness, which can be deduced immediately from the possession of certain feelings or principles and faculties by the human soul.

It may be asked, why adopt this long and mystical Greek term to express a class of inquiries which you seem just now to have considered as a portion—an exalted portion doubtless, but still a portion—of Logical Science? Because though we arrive at them through conclusions of the conscious reason, and therefore through the path of Logical Science, and though the legitimacy of this transit from consciousness to absolute truth may be a fundamental question in the inquiry, yet the entire inquiry swells beyond the limits of that substantial or higher logic of which I spoke. It does so, first, because though it be within the competency of logic to establish the connexion of the phenomenal with the real, yet it is not accurately within the compass of logic to discuss the real existence itself. The higher logic and the higher physics differ in short as the common logic of physical inquiry from the subject of that inquiry. Secondly, and chiefly, because the science of logic is the theory of the relations that constitute knowledge, and the deductions of which we are now speaking are capable of being raised upon other portions of our nature besides the purely intellectual. This is a consideration of importance; and may perhaps evince that the science of Real Existence is capable of an extension beyond what is conceived by its most devoted cultivators in our age. The innovation, Gentlemen, requires your indulgence; yet I will dare to claim your attention. It is a general principle that the human mind, in all its aspects equally, supposes some corresponding counterpart of posi-
tive reality. The idea is of immense compass and importance. Regard the intellectual part: it concludes a "sufficient reason" for all things, and a final sufficient reason, which by irrefragable proof gives us the Divine Intellect. Regard the voluntary part (in combination with the reason): it claims a source of existence to all things, and finally a mightier source of existence than can be supplied by any secondary ancestry, and thus through the principle of causality (a principle of reason developed by the experience of the will) learns directly to rest in a first and Divine will. On this point a considerable number of reasoners, who admit the cogency of ontological reasoning in general, pause. But can we no further clear away the dust of sense, and expose the mirror which contains the full image of God in the soul of man? Regard the moral nature of this same mind; remembering that every original capability of the mind is equally liable to the supervening influences of cultivation, or neglect, or perversion, but that to be duly estimated it should be regarded in the state of cultivation, carefully considering that the "cultivation" of which I speak is not to add to the capability, but simply to give it brightness and prominence. Just as we judge the true purposes and beneficial tendencies of the earth, neither by the barren wilderness which neglect has produced, nor by the wild unprofitable vegetation of a field of weeds, but by the result which is evolved from the application of reason to the native capabilities of the soil. Contemplate then the moral nature, and may it not be shewn that the inherent sense of right and wrong, when brought into its full development by the high culture of education and reflection (not to speak of any higher influences), does truly establish the real existence of some superior nature—no longer Creator, but Judge—which by its own essential constitution necessarily acts by the principle thus deposed in the human mind as the perpetual testimony of the existence and agency of such a being? Hither also some few of our English and foreign guides have ventured to advance. They have granted that a Divine Judge may be inferred in the same manner as we have inferred a Divine Intellect and a Divine Will. But, Gentlemen, man does not merely reason and will,—and by the inevitable force of an instinctive deduction regard his reason and will as the counterparts of a Final Reason and Will;—nor does he merely recognize the distinctions of justice and injustice, and recognize them through the densest mists of passion and prejudice, which, like every other atmosphere, distort the direction of the light rather than destroy it: he also, by as real a susceptibility of his original
constitution, feels all the variety of passions and emotions. Shall I advance, Gentlemen, or will you dread the vulgar charge of mysticism when you accompany me in proclaiming that there is for this portion of the human spirit likewise a real and permanent object correspondent; in short, that there is an "ontology" of the emotions, whose aim is to demonstrate that they also demand and attest a scene beyond the present, and an object such as no modification of passing consciousness can supply? that by an invincible conviction each desiring heart may be made to feel the truth which each reflective intellect can prove? Thus it is that man's entire nature may be made to display the testimony of a God, and the prophecy of a future world! and that such proofs and speculations belong immediately to the science termed Ontology you will not deny, if you remember that I have already defined it as that science which undertakes to shew what inferences as to real existences, not capable of being in this world direct objects of consciousness, can be deduced immediately from the existence of certain states and functions of the human mind. I have introduced the qualifying term "immediately," in order to discriminate these conclusions from the multitude of inferences as to past and future existences which are attainable by mere analogy; and I have stated that the existences deduced by these ontological reasonings are not "capable of becoming direct objects of consciousness in our present state," in order to distinguish these convictions from those which principles equally immediate produce relative to things not present; for instance, the veracity of memory, and of that law of our mind which gives to the future a certainty not inferior in degree (though only conditional in kind) to that which the faculty of memory bestows upon the past: the law, namely, which compels our belief in the stability of nature, that is, to express plainly a matter which has often been made, perhaps, needlessly mysterious, the law which obliges us to believe that the same continues the same, and the relations of all things continue unaltered in whatever part of time or space they be considered. From such conclusions as these of memory, or of the constancy of nature, the reasonings which I have been considering at such length, are discriminated, then, in this respect, that the latter are not capable, as are the former, of being themselves, at least in the present scheme of our nature, portions of our immediate consciousness, whether past or future. This however does not in the slightest degree invalidate the certainty with which—breaking the bonds of that present scheme—the reason of man perceives beyond itself an universal reason, beyond the will
an universal cause, beyond the moral faculty a principle of
universal right, beyond the affections a scene adequate to
their expansion and an object adequate to their concen-
tration. We do no justice to the primal elements of our
human nature when we deny a place in our philosophical
systems to these vast and assured conclusions; nor is it
fitting that these majestic convictions—the topics with
which poetry adorns her pages and oratory animates her
thousands,—should be suffered to stray through the world,
without being at length claimed and reduced into the fold
of a strict and scientific method. They teach us that we
are not only formed for eternity, but actually living in
eternity; that our nature may well bear the shock of a
"change" which is in truth no change; and that much
which is yet to be known by experience is now known by
inference. We see indeed "through a glass darkly;" but
remember that though the dimness of a glass may cloud
the rich colouring and the perfect beauty of an object, it
does not hide or alter one inch of the general outline.

Gentlemen, the science which I have thus distinguished
into its two great departments, of relative phenomena and
absolute existences, which in the former view we have con-
sidered as a purely inductive philosophy, like all its bre-
thren (though more exalted in its scope than any), pati-
ently observing and constantly classifying—the prize lying
here for him who has the keenest eyes to detect and disen-
tangle from all the variety of complex thought, those cir-
cumstances of generic identity which form a basis for clas-
sification, which, again, in the latter aspect we have seen
interrogating the functions and principles thus established,
and discovering involved in them a true objective world
presided over by a mighty Spirit, who, in making our
minds the mirror of his own, has enabled us in gazing on
the mirror to refer the reflection to the reality:—this great
science, as it has been in most ages of the world cultivated
under some form or other, so it has received a great variety
of titles, many of which are still almost indiscriminately
applied to it, and some have nearly or altogether perished
with the peculiar views which produced them. A slight con-
sideration of these designations is not only recommended
by respect for antiquity, and by the natural progress of the
subject, which has now brought us to a point where we can
afford to pause, but will also, if I mistake not, be found of
considerable advantage in illustrating its general nature.
A difference of names for (apparently) the same notion
will usually be found to correspond to a difference of
aspect under which it has been viewed; and in studying
the progress of the human mind you will often find that an
explanation of terms might be made to amount to
history of philosophy.

At an early period in the annals of knowledge, when
its compass was so limited as to admit of being easily
comprised within a single head, the general appellation of
"wisdom," or its equivalents, was applied to it all; and it
is in this comprehensive sense that the term was attributed
to the earliest Greek sages, to the Egyptian and Oriental
teachers of knowledge, and among them to that illustrious
monarch whose name even in fable is still the talisman of
the East, and whose title of Wise seems to have included
not merely the "understanding heart to judge the people,"
but also a large proportion of learning derived from purely
physical observation. It appears, however, to be certain
that the "wisdom" of primitive Greece was principally of
a moral and political character; and the definition of
Horace which refers the doctrine of that period to legisla-
tive prudence, and the regulation of civil life, is probably a
correct historical depiction:

Fuit hæc sapientia quondam
Publica privata segregare, sacra profanis,
Concludi prohibere vago, dare jura maritis,
Oppida moliri, leges incidere ligno.

From this prominently moral aspect of that universal
learning which was then entitled wisdom, you can easily
understand the subsequent process by which the same title
became appropriated to all investigations of the nature of
the mind and of those laws of duty which, collected from
the mind itself, are elevated by reflection into rules of
conduct to control that mind from which they originate.
Omitting for the present the investigation of the kindred
appellation σοφιστῆς, in the time of Aristotle I find the
term, if not more restricted, certainly more speculative in
its import. With him wisdom (ἡ σοφία) is the investigation
of the first elements and causes of things, including, The
Good and the reason of things, among these causes: in
his own concise words—δεῖ αἰτήν (ἡν σοφίαν, sc.) τῶν
πρῶτων ἄρχων καὶ αἰτὶ ἐλεημονείατι, καὶ γὰρ τὰ γὰρ
καὶ τὸ οὐ ἐνεκα ἐν τῶν αἰτίων ἐστίν. (Metaph. 1. 2.) As the
philosophy of Greece advanced, the Stoics, whose views,
as far as they were novel or influential, were principally of
an ethical character, again appropriated the phrase to the
conduct of life; and their "wise man" whom Horace has
so shrewdly satirized, and whom Epictetus has so sub-
lime depicted, was independent of all merely scientific
learning but that which taught him the general principles
of that universal system with which it was his duty to link
his destinies. The passive fatalism of the Stoic, however, passed away, leaving upon the high-road of that history of the soul, which one day will so far outweigh the poor chronology of empires, a mighty monument, not indeed of the wonders which the unassisted human mind can attain, but (what is scarcely less important) of all which it is competent to conceive and desire. In the subsequent use of the same word by the inspired writers of the New Testament, though we may observe an occasional reference to the merely sectarian and scholastic usage (as where it is said that "the world by wisdom knew not God"), yet the direct and chosen import is wholly moral and practical, as in the singularly beautiful description which St James gives of what he terms the wisdom from above, and which, as you all doubtless are aware, is wholly composed of its influences and operations upon the heart and affections. In modern times, however, this term, "completing the cycle of its history," seems to have reverted back to something not very unlike its original signification among the gnomics of Greece; and no one expects in the Traité de Sagesse of Charron, and still less in the conversational use of the word among ourselves, anything more, or less, than the direction of high intellectual power by high moral principle.

I may remark in passing, as a fact for those who cultivate that most curious and interesting branch of inquiry, the history of Words, that both the Greek and Latin forms of this important term have suffered an almost equal degradation in our English usage; the Greek form being, with perhaps one technical exception*, only represented by "sophist," and its derivatives, and the Latin form "sapience," "sapient," &c. being strangely enough condemned to the almost exclusive purposes of irony.

A similar extension, for similar reasons, was in the first ages given to that humbler term, "Philosophy," which has since borne so important a part in the history of human advancement. This celebrated word, which, originating in early Greece, has since visited nearly all European languages, owes it birth, according to uniform tradition, to Pythagoras of Samos, who it appears, first of all the great thinkers of old, was "wise" enough not to call himself so. "Wisdom," says his Alexandrian commentator, "is conversant about those fair things which are first, and divide, and incommixt, and always the same; by participation whereof we may call other things fair. But 'philosophy' is an imitation of that science, which likewise is

* [The academic word "Soph," as distinguished from "Freshman," is apparently meant. Ed]
an excellent knowledge, and did assist toward the reformation of manners." (Iamblich. Vit. Pyth. 59.) Surely you cannot now remain ignorant of what Wisdom and Philosophy signify! But to remove the veil of mystical language, Pythagoras's notion* was plainly this, that the title of Wisdom should be appropriated to that kind of knowledge which the Architect of the universe possessed of his own works material and moral, which he beheld as the outward image and adumbration of his own eternal mind; and that the title of Philosophy, or the aspiration after Wisdom, was suitable to the imperfect, gradual, and progressive knowledge which the human spirit is permitted to attain of the laws enacted by the Divine. This, then, may serve as an instance of the instruction which I told you was sometimes derivable from the history of a single term, and with this purpose it may be useful as well as interesting to dwell for a while upon the infancy of a title whose long career of existence has been since so famous. In the adoption of this word (combined with some slight but authentic traditional records of his doctrine) you discover two cardinal principles held and proclaimed by the illustrious founder of the Italic school. First, that the eternal mind alone deserved the title of "Wise," or perfectly intelligent; a principle which it is impossible not to connect with certain declarations in those inspired writings of which some have supposed Pythagoras may not have been wholly ignorant, but by which it is at all events easily conceivable that the oriental instructors of Pythagoras may have been indirectly, or even directly, influenced. "The Lord possessed me," says the author of the Book of Proverbs, speaking of that which we term Wisdom, "in the beginning of his way, before his works of old. I was set up from everlasting, from the beginning, or ever the earth was, &c." In this article of the Pythagorean exposition you may already perceive the faint germs* of the bolder Platonic theory of the reality and pre-existence of the Divine ideas; a coincidence between which and the inspired passage I have quoted was doubtful in the mind of Milton, when, describing the consummation of the work of creation, and after previously borrowing from this very passage one of his most daring images*, he tells us that the Divine Artist returned to

* [Qn. his biographer's? Ed.]
* The doctrine in Iamblichus is Neo-platonism, not "false" but full-blow. Pythagoras is indebted for much of his "wisdom" to the same source. Hence, doubtless, its "oriental" aspect. Ed.]
* "The golden compasses prepared
In God's eternal store." See Prov. viii. 27.
his heaven of heavens to contemplate how the new-formed world shewed

"In prospect from His throne, how good, how fair,
Answering his great Idea." vii. 557.

The second doctrine involved in the selection of this term by its inventor was not less important in relation to man than the former in relation to the Deity. It was implied in the connexion of the σοφία and φιλοσοφία, that the great object of human science was the discovery and contemplation of the order thus impressed, and because it was impressed, by the Divine nature upon the material and moral universe,—a principle which again, according as it was viewed in its speculative or its practical aspect, evolved itself in the Platonic definition of science as the contemplation of ideas, and in the Platonic criterion of moral perfection as assimilation to God. I need scarcely pause to remark what a striking example these successive modifications present of a tendency, which, in tracing the historical filiation of sects and systems, I shall hereafter have constant opportunities of noticing—the tendency which great ideas have, when once breathed abroad upon the world, to become at once more distinct in their expression, and more intense in their degree, with the progress of thought; how conjectures fructify into doctrines, speculations rise into systems, and the vague diffusive suppositions of one century harden and crystallize into the definite positions of another.

So far then for the primitive application of the term Philosophy, which, like the "Wisdom" of which it was intended as the copy and counterpart, at first involved the whole mass of knowledge which the period possessed, beyond the practical informations of immediate experience. But as science broke asunder into the sciences, and the objects of knowledge came near enough to the eye to be seen in different directions, these separate objects, and of course the separate pursuit of them, received distinct designations; and the term Philosophy, sometimes preserving its generality, stood for the habitual prosecution of any kind of learning; and sometimes contracting its range, became appropriated, as by Aristotle, to the investigation of those supreme principles which give law to all the subordinate departments of knowledge. In the former usage it stood for science universally, in the latter, for the universal science. When the term was thus unfixed you may easily imagine with what latitude it was sometimes employed; and I suppose none of you have read without a smile the definition which (at the opening of nearly the
most perfect fragment of contemplative antiquity) the
Roman philosophical orator has given us of "Philosophy;"
a definition in which we may see something more of the
orator than of the philosopher—much more of the rheso-
rician, perhaps, than of either. "Philosophy," says he,
"is the art of speaking with copiousness and elegance upon
the greatest questions." It would be doing much injus-
tice, however, to Cicero to conclude that these words
(though it cannot be denied that they are very charac-
teristic of the writer) comprise his full conception of
the objects and compass of studies which he repeatedly
describes in terms not more glowing than comprehensive.

As a general fact it may be observed that he, as well as
the other Latin writers, leans rather to the moral than
the intellectual use of the term⁵; in this practical sense of
the term (when no qualifying adjective is united with it)
Cicero has been followed almost uniformly by the long
line of authors and conversers who have spoken and
written since the classic ages.

Gentlemen, to the Platonic theory of the principles of
knowledge its great propounder seems to have given the
title of Dialectic (a term in which you trace the influences
of his Socratic education). By his rival, however, this
term was degraded to signify the logic of probabilities⁶;
and in modern times it has become synonymous with
logic in general, being perhaps more directly applied to
the arts and artifices of argumentative disputation. With
reverence to the mighty spirit of Plato, it may, I think, be
fairly said that his application of the term was the least
justifiable of the three.

⁵ [The passage runs thus in the original: "Hanc enim perfectam " philoso-
phiam semper judicavi, que de maximis questionibus copiose posset ornatique
dicere."—Tusc. Qu. i. 4, 7. The context, as well as the words themselves,
prove that this was not meant for a general definition of philosophy. Cicero
is speaking of the compatibility of philosophical with rhetorical studies, and of
the particular philosophy which, as an orator, he himself preferred. ED.]

⁶ "Tu Inventrix legum, tu magistra morum et disciplina." And in the
same book (Tusc. Qu. 5): "Est autem unus dies bene et ex praetitis tuis aetuis,
peccante immortalitati antependens!" (a thought of which we have the
religious aspect in the 84th psalm).

⁷ I think that this statement is founded on a misconception of Aristotle's
meaning in the first chapter of the Rhetoric. It would be more correct to say
that he limits dialectic to the refutation of fallacies. See Soph. Elench. ο. De-
lecticai of ἐκ τῶν διδασκόν συλλογισμοῦ διδάσκεον. "The Dialectician is one
who reasons out the contradictions implied in popular notions"—evidently a
description of the Socratic method. In this same chapter he distributes dis-
cussion (ὀ διαλέγωνος) under the four heads of didascalic (his own method),
dialectic, peirastic (arguing for exercise or trial of strength), and eristic (arguing
for victory), oddly enough making διαλέγων a branch of ὁ διαλέγωνος. In
another place, Metaph. III. 2, 30, he distinguishes dialectic from philosophy, of
which, in its highest sense, dialectic is in Plato the synonym. Compare also
Soph. Elench. c. 11.—ED.]
The Platonic "Dialectic" appears in the writings of Aristotle under the celebrated title of *Metaphysics*. For this word, under whose imposing auspices so much that is valuable, and so much that is absurd, has since been given to the world, you are, I presume, aware that we are not indebted to Aristotle himself, but to one of his ancient commentators, Andronicus of Rhodes, who is supposed to have intended by the inscription upon his manuscripts, τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικά, that the fourteen books so styled were to follow the physical treatises in the order of place and transcription, perhaps in that of study, perhaps in that of rank and dignity. It is not very certain that in any of these respects the methodizer perfectly understood the intentions of his author. From this equivocal and accidental parentage, however, subsequent ages have received a term which sometimes stands for all philosophical inquiries into the mind and its conceptions, and sometimes for every speculation, when it becomes unintelligible. Its stricter signification is still pretty much the same with its ancient one—the investigation of the causes and principles of things, as far as reason can penetrate and arrange them*. The portion of Aristotle's writings which pass under this title, have, in every age, been the peculiar study and perplexity of critics; and I have little doubt that their prolonged and almost despotic authority is a good deal traceable to the very conciseness of their oracular sentences, which, sometimes signifying everything or nothing, as the reader pleased, by a very singular contrast allowed every speculator to find his own fancies authorized by a writer who was yet the most curst, condensed, and dogmatical, the world has ever known!

To speculations of this kind the title has also been given of The First Science, (ἡ πρώτη σοφία, or φιλοσοφία,) and "The Mother Science;" the authorities of Aristotle, Descartes, and Lord Bacon, (not to speak of innumerable names of minor note) sanctioning its application, though not all to accurately the same notion. In one passage of his writings Lord Bacon conveys in his own peculiar style (certainly the most admirable combination of picturesque-ness and precision that ever was devoted to philosophical purposes!) much the same views which I have been endeavouing to convey to you of the relation in which these.

* "Prima pars philosophiae," (says Descartes in strict consonance with his peculiar method,) "est metaphysica, ubi continentur principia cognitionis, — inter quae occurrit explicatio praeicipuum Dei attributorum, immaterialiatism animarum nostrarum, necnon omnium clararum et simplicijm notionum quae in nobis reperiretur." In another place he styles Philosophy a tree whose roots are metaphysics, trunk physics, and the branches all the separate sciences. (Epist. Auth.)
LECT. III.

studies stand to all others—adopting to express them the
title we are now considering,—"Alius error est, quod post
singulas scientias et artes suas in classes distributas, mox
a plerisque universalis rerum cognitioni et philosophie prima
renunciatur; quod quidem profecti doctrinarum inimicis-
simum est. Prospectationes sunt a turribus aut locis
praelitis,—et impossibile est, ut quis exploret remotiores
interioresque scientiae alia ai gius partes, si stet super plano
ejusdem scientiae neque altioris scientiae veluti speculam
conscendat."—De Augm. I. Descartes’ use of the same
phrase, which he employs as precisely synonymous with
metaphysics, ("Haec est quae prima Philosophy, aut etiam
Metaphysica, dici potest," he says in the prefatory epistle
of his Principia,) is so constant as to make it unnecessary
to cite any particular instance. It is enough to say that
the celebrated Meditations, which, when they first appeared,
produced an impression upon the European mind only
rivalled by that of Locke’s Essay about fifty years later,
and which are still deeply worth the perusal of all who
take an interest in these pursuits, were originally published
in 1641, under the title of Meditations de Prima Philo-
phia. Descartes’ notion of this “First Philosophy” was
nearly, or wholly the same, with that of Aristotle; and
both include under it, though by a very different chain of
connexion, all abstract discussions of the existence and
attributes of the Divine nature. The Aristotelian theology
is the ultimate term of the Aristotelian physics; the Car-
tesian theology, of the Cartesian philosophy of mind:—each
arrives at the necessary existence of God, the one, through
the external world of matter and motion, seizing the great
truth of a prime Mover,—the other, from a contemplation
of the internal world of thought, pronouncing the reality
of that infinite Being whose “idea” we can neither exclude
from the mind, nor modify when there. You can easily
conceive how these very opposite aspects of the same
great truths heightened the resolute hostility of the two
schools; a hostility somewhat obtrusively expressed in
the old editions of the Principia of Descartes (that edifice

1 [Aristotle’s description of the Philosophy Prima is worth transcribing: Ει μναν αρισταρχειαν νους ταυτα αναπτυκμενος, η φυσικη δε ει εις
πρωτην ουσιονα, αδη ταυτα αναπτυκμενος, αυτη πρωτη και φιλοσοφια πρωτη,
και καθιερωμαι αυτος δε πρωτην και η πρωτη αναπτυκμενος, ει ταυτα αναπτυκμενος, αυτη πρωτη και φιλοσοφια πρωτη.
"If there is not existence apart from the compound existences in nature, physics must be the first
science. On the other hand, if we assume an immutable existence, that existence must take precedence of the former, and the corresponding science
must be the first, and because the first, a universal philosophy. The office of this philosophy must be the contemplation of substance or existence as such—
of its essence and its essential attributes." He had previously styled it Theory (τρεις δε ειτε φιλοσοφια θεωρητικα, μαθηματικη, φυσικη, θεολογικΗ). Ed.]
of sublime hypothesis!), where the bold soldier of Touraine is depicted setting his right foot upon the prostrate volumes of his master, with an inscription beneath proudly import-1.

ing that he who had solved all the miracles of nature remained himself the only unexplained miracle on earth:

Assignansque sui quaevis miracula causis,

Mirum reliquum solus in orbe fuit!

I have already given you some account of the objects which by the scholastic authors were included under the title of "Ontology," and I have, I hope not ineffectually, endeavoured to exhibit to you the more definite and important topics which I would wish under the same designation to substitute in their place. We may therefore pass to the old and convenient term which has lately been revived by many of our continental contemporaries, "Psychology," which is intended to express with perfect simplicity the investigation of the appearances and laws of the mind apart from all ulterior applications. To form an expressive contrast with Ontology, a term has been given currency by some living philosophers (philosophers are fond of triumphing over the Roman emperor's impossibility!); and though I believe the coinage has not got much circulation in this realm, it certainly passes for a legal tender in Germany. The term is Phenomenology and is cautiously expressive of its precise objects—the apparent in contrast with the real, to φαινόμενα as distinguished from to ὑπό. By the word Pneumatology was formerly intended the general science of spirit under its various subdivisions, angelic, diabolic, and spectral, as well as the living soul of man; in short, a universal spiritual physics. Although in this bold theory of the superior intelligences the positions must have been, apart from the authority of fathers and a few scriptural passages, wholly arbitrary, this difficulty did not prevent some of the schoolmen from calmly apportioning to each class its respective science; and those who left to wither in neglect the rich field of the human heart, understood perfectly the capacities of the archangel Michael, and could appropriate their separate offices to every order of the heavenly hierarchy. We are told that in the mystic volume of man's destinies there are "things which the angels desire to look into," the

8 [The word was coined, I believe, by Hegel. It is not synonymous with "psychology," rational or empirical, but is rather the science of Man as he develops himself in history; if we may venture to put that interpretation on the description of the Phänomenologie des Geistes, with which we are favoured by a recent historian of recent German philosophy: "Die Welt ist das Phänomen, und also die Wissenschaft die Phänomenlehre des sich selbst als eine Gemeinde freier Ich erscheinenden Ich: " "the science of the phenomena of the Ego appearing to itself as a community of free Ego's." Ed.]

B.
bolder curiosity of man has not only "desired" to reciprocate the knowledge, but more than once has dared to imagine it in his possession! "Pneumatology," however, to follow the fortunes of the term, rapidly became the exclusive science of the human spirit; the brother spirits being either relegated to their distinct provinces (Angelography, Daemonology, &c. &c.), or appended as a supplementary subject to the department of Natural Theology. In this sense the designation is still often employed; though as a philosophical term it has been, perhaps justly, censured as including, or insinuating, something hypothetical as to the physical nature of the mind. It is a curious example of the metaphorical and the literal use of words or ideas, that in this instance we actually possess two important and wholly dissimilar sciences, named from the same original term, the one (Pneumatics) in its literal, and the other (Pneumatology) in its figurative application: it will, perhaps, surprise you to be informed that even by so late a writer as Adam Smith the word Pneumatics was still employed to denote the science of the soul.

The authority and ability of M. Destutt-Tracy have given some limited circulation to the term "Ideology," as a title for the philosophy of the mind. When you remember what are the doctrines which this writer (a follower, though an independent one, of Condillac) labours to support, you will sympathize with the degradation of a term, which from once standing for the mysterious exemplars of the intellectual world of Plato, has sunk to serving the purposes of the philosophy of mere sensation. Indeed, the story of this famous word might form a varied and instructive tale; and in the long fortunes of the "Idea," sometimes exalted above the sphere of earth, and as invariably depressed by the very extravagance of its own ambition, the Scott of philosophical romance might find at once a hero and a moral.

With particular and special titles for the mental philosophy (such as for instance "The Theory of the Representative Faculty") I do not now concern myself; as originating out of peculiar views, the names are there a part of the systems, and only to be canvassed in canvassing them.

Among some of our contemporaries it is not unusual

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n [I know not to whom Professor Butler alludes. "Egoism" is commonly used to denote a particular theory of perception, which determines all phenomena into modifications of the conscious subject; e.g. the theory of Fichte. So applied the word is expressive enough, and hardly deserves the sarcasm in the text. It is not more barbarous than its homonym "egotism," and much less so than "egomism," which occurs in "Baxter On the Soul"
to style this philosophy "Egoism," or the "Science of Ego;" a mode of expression which aims at evaporating every particle of hypothesis in selecting a phrase of pure and extreme simplicity; but which, though often highly convenient for purposes of exposition, scarcely compensates by occasional utility for perpetual barbarism.

The phrase, Philosophy of the Mind, which has obtained so much celebrity from the victories which the Scottish School have achieved under its banner, is not liable to any strong objection. I would only repeat, that if it be understood as merely including the physiology of the consciousness as a succession of phenomena, it does not cover the amplitude of legitimate human speculation upon the theory of thought. But fortunately, as the term "Philosophy" may comprise any speculation whatever, and as "The Mind" may be regarded as directly concerned in every speculation that is busied with the human nature, or faculties, or fortunes, the phrase can always expand or contract with the purposes of the employer; and this facility, invaluable in a general title for a progressive science, will always make this designation too convenient to be forgotten.

We have now, Gentlemen, closed our rapid review of the principal titles by which men in different ages have represented to themselves the great speculation as to the constitution and destinies of their spiritual nature. I trust you agree with me that such a résumé is not either uninteresting or unprofitable. You observe in the titles chosen the aspects contemplated; you see vagueness and inaccuracy of conception uttering itself in corresponding vagueness and accuracy of expression; the well-formed figure giving its own symmetry to the dress that clothes it. But more than this, in such a review you catch glimpses of the history itself of philosophy opened in these its varying designations; a few words, when linked with the knowledge of their origin and uses, become the rallying points round which our scattered ideas cluster; and we hear in each no more a few arbitrary syllables, but the disputes and the decisions, the wisdom and the follies, of an age.

Gentlemen, having arrived at this point of progress in our introductory course, it becomes my duty to canvass the question to which I have already slightly alluded, of the importance of the study which I have been endeavouiring to describe. In our next Lecture we shall enumera-
rate some of the popular objections which prejudice has advanced against its cultivation; and we shall proceed, in the first instance, to answer them, not so much by any direct reply (which would be a tedious task) as by the more instructive method of establishing the claims of all knowledge, and of this philosophy as a real portion of knowledge. This argument, stated at length, and involving subjects of the highest moment to the welfare of humanity, (would that I could do them adequate justice, but I still rely upon your indulgence,) will form the principal topic of the next (or Monday's) discourse.
LECTURE IV.

GENTLEMEN,

After considering at some length the subject of our present studies in its two great divisions, I closed this preliminary statement in my last Lecture with a brief review of the various appellations which this philosophy has received in different ages, "Wisdom," "Philosophy," "Metaphysics," "Pneumatology," and the rest: and I did so, not only because I was not aware of any antecedent authority to which I could refer you for the information in a combined and succinct form, but also because it appeared to me that in discussing these names we were, in point of fact, obtaining rapid but useful glimpses of the position which the general subject has held in the minds of men in various stages of the history of human reason. From the whole I think you may draw a few valuable deductions; as, first, that the subject itself at a very early period attracted the notice of contemplative minds; again, that, though at first involved with every other in a common mass, it soon detached itself, and that in every successive age this separation became more decisive and complete. Thirdly, that, as it may be viewed in both a speculative and an experimental aspect, so antiquity, and the copyists of antiquity, principally adopted the former, and the present and recent ages have strongly inclined to the latter. And, fourthly, that the complete scheme of philosophical inquiry is that which combines both without impairing either, which does entire justice to the demands of human reason, and while it encourages strenuously the labours of observation, also holds open its portals to every investigation as to the value of our knowledge in the world of realities, and the legitimacy of the conclusions which pure reason can establish with regard to its own position in the universe and the being of its supreme and eternal Author.

I feel it right, however, to state, for the satisfaction of those who suspect the solidity of such speculations, and for the information of others, that as these inquiries are dissimilar in their nature, so should they be presumed psychological should be kept distinct from metaphys-
distinct in a methodical delivery of doctrine; or, if they mingle at all, that they should be connected without being confused, and appear in juxtaposition without passing into combination. Thus, those who acknowledge no science of mind but that which simply classes phenomena, will be at liberty to pause in accompanying us whenever we arrive at the close of our psychological inquiries; the supposed mysticism of ulterior disquisitions shall not affect the accuracy of these previous inductions; by keeping the subjects carefully separate we shall prevent the infection from communicating, and, adopting Lord Bacon's justification of his aphoristic method, "res nudas et apertas exhibemus, ut errores nostri notari et separari possint."

But is the study of Mind, whether relative or absolute, actually worth the labour? This is, doubtless, a question of importance at the threshold of every science. It is unworthy of the independence and authority of reason to enter upon any proposed inquiry without having some preconception of its utility or its dignity. And the question becomes still more important in entering upon mental philosophy, which, from a variety of causes, has failed in obtaining the distinction so abundantly and so justly bestowed upon the cultivation of the physical sciences of the material world. In defence of the claims of the philosophy of mind much, both of argument and eloquence, has already been displayed by writers, with whom, I suppose, I may safely count many of you familiar. The subject, however, demands its place; it is far from being exhausted; and it is my duty not to forget in consulting for the erudite tastes of some of my hearers, the equal claims of the least practised intellect among them.

The objections which are commonly professed—still more commonly insinuated—more commonly than either, felt—against the Philosophy of Man under all its many aspects, I will not now directly undertake either to canvass or refute. To establish the truth is to destroy by replacing them. I allude to those weak prejudices which regard all such discussions as in their nature either nugatory or unintelligible,—either not worth understanding, or impossible to be understood: those which discourage every appeal to the theory of the faculties by general declarations that man if he be the boast is also the riddle of the world, that the mystery of the soul is not to be solved by itself, that every inquiry into such matters, far from deserving the proud title of science, scarcely escapes the charge of presumptuous folly. Again, that the vaunted discoveries of the psychologists of modern times are obviously capable of no useful practical application; that if they be truth, which
is questionable, they are at least sterile truth; that no arts
are facilitated, no conveniences multiplied, no "fortunes
made," by these unprofitable truths; that while a fortunate
chemical analysis detecting some undiscovered metal may
secure the fame and the wealth of the humblest com-
 pounder of medicines, no one has yet heard of any analysis
of complex feelings which has ever wrought the same
charm; that much as we may say of the force of impres-
sions and the balance of the passions, and how theory can
state and arrange them, we can scarcely compare these
"dynamics" of the mind with those mightier sciences of
force and motion which at one time tell you how much an
ounce of silver would weigh upon one of Jupiter's invisible
satellites, at another, new-modelling the world by its own
detected energies, drive the hugest and densest masses
across the ocean in the face of the winds by a vapour
lighter than the wind itself! Others, again, reiterate that
our business is not to examine but to act; that we must
take truth as we find it, and feelings as we find them; that
precision is not to be sought or expected in matters of
mere practice; that a creature so volatile as man is not
really subject to any general laws whatsoever. While
another party, fearing for the effects upon the manners
and dispositions, lament that metaphysicians are prover-
bially dreamers; that habits of mental inquiry are a mis-
fortune to their owner; that their victim, if he be not made
unhappy by his gift, escapes it only by becoming, under
their influence, cold, callous, and unfeeling—regarding the
beauty of emotion as the anatomist does the symmetry
of person, not as a theme of admiration, but as a subject
of dissection; that, in short, these botanists among the
feelings destroy the flower in investigating its structure,
and sacrifice the colour and the odour in seeking to de-
termine the class and the order. Others, finally, reversing
the charge, declare with calm conviction that there is no
difficulty whatever in the science of man, that it is too
simple to require discussion or admit of hesitation. Ah,
Gentlemen, there is no folly so hopeless as that which
finds no difficulty in philosophy and penetrates all nature
with a glance!

Such are some of the objections which appear to me
still to float in the atmosphere of the public mind. These
opposing forces are not, you perceive, very consistent with
each other, and in truth suffer so much from civil dissension
as almost to excuse external hostility. Let us proceed to
silence them all by the simplicity of truth.

We claim then a place for the science of thought, first,
because it is a science. In professing to communicate
knowledge, that is, to disclose either new facts or new relations of old facts, it advances a claim which, properly understood, is perfectly free from all conceivable exception. The argument here, if methodically considered—and we cannot be too exact upon a point of so much moment—resolves itself into a syllogism of which the major proposition, or principle, states the universal value of knowledge, and the minor, or application, the claims of this philosophy to be considered as a portion of knowledge. Confused notions about both abounding in society, it would be difficult to say which of the two propositions is oftener contested, because oftener misunderstood. Let us dwell for a while upon the former. As long as the highest happiness is attainable, and made by the laws of the universe dependent upon exertion, knowledge (except in the case of a being incapable of exertion) must in itself be a blessing. Were that monstrous inconsistency possible, that the grave can be the actual termination of a being capable of entertaining the conception of an infinite God, a tenet not less absurd than it would be to maintain that the mechanism of a watch, marking as it does the progress of time, was never intended for any purpose higher than belongs to the structure of the pebble on the shore—were this the case, it would not, perhaps, be impossible to establish that ignorance might, in some cases, or in all cases, be a positive advantage in the game of happiness. But constituted as man is, a real element in an immense scheme of perfection, with his rational felicity made proportional to his dignity in this scheme, and his dignity proportional to his conscious voluntary efforts in the right direction (inversely as the opposite), and (in a world where the principles of imitation and respect are so often injurious or at least uncertain) these efforts susceptible of being safely and securely directed only in obedience to a previous knowledge of the course in which they ought to ply—in such a system of things, knowledge (whencesoever obtained) must ever be a true and genuine benefit. That is to say, if we are made to appreciate truth and to seek it, and if the universe be founded not on delusion but on truth,—the same truth which we are formed to seek,—it may then be stated as a general principle, that no scientific truth can actually be discovered by the human mind which it is not, on the whole, better should be known than not known. To suppose the contrary would be to suppose that the acquired knowledge impairs some previously received and venerated principle, or is applicable to some unlawful end. Now if the previous "principle" be intuitively or demonstratively certain, this is impossible; and if it be not, it
may be false; it may therefore legitimately be summoned to descend into the arena to vindicate its prerogatives against the invader; and whichever succumb, or whether both be reconciled, human reason is the real winner: and therefore the happiness which is built upon the right employment of that reason. And as to the application of scientific truth to the cultivation of arts injurious to the peace and happiness of mankind, surely it must be obvious that the evil in this instance is not in the possession, but the application; that the crime is not in the new-discovered relation, but in the old malice that misemploys it. The same quantity of heat which, duly disposed, warms the face of nature into all the fertile beauty of a summer noon, may be condensed into the means of boundless destruction and of indescribable torture; but who lays the evil to the charge of the element thus perverted?

It is because this general objection to the claims of all knowledge is more constantly (for reasons which I shall just now notice) advanced as a prejudice against the philosophy of mind than against any other intellectual pursuit, that I have troubled you to consider it thus far, or that I request you to continue your attention to it a few minutes longer.

The exceptions, then, to this principle of the universal value of Truth in all its provinces, are only apparent. Truths, however, differ in degrees of value, and should, if possible, be possessed in proportion to their degrees of value,—placing, of course, at the culminating point of importance those which express the relation of man to his Author, and which intimately affect the reception and influence of all others. These primary articles of knowledge, I may add, are so evidently demonstrable as to admit of being a priori pronounced incapable of subversion by any subsequent discoveries. This being granted, it will, I think, be found that wherever the communication of knowledge appears to result in evil, the evil is always attributable to the communication being incomplete; partial truth being sometimes equivalent to absolute falsehood, and often as dangerous in its results. If you draw upon paper a figure nearly approaching a circle, and tell a child that such is the figure of the world he stands on, without telling him that you have only drawn the visible projection of the real sphere, it is obvious you may communicate an impression almost as false as if you had sketched a pentagon or a square. To inform a savage that flame applied to the touch-hole of a piece of ordnance will cause its charge to be projected with enormous force, is to tell him a true and a useful fact; to neglect to add
that the gun will recoil in proportion to the violence of the
explosion, is to endanger his life by the very truth you
have told him. Were it possible (that I may apply the
principle to one of its most interesting cases) to acquaint
the peasantry of a country with the science of Newton and
the poetry of Milton and all the other splendid triumphs
of the cultivated human mind, the gift would render them
hopelessly disqualified for a life of humble labour: add to
your splendid present a knowledge as profound and
assured of the truths and precepts of Christianity, and
without one scientific proposition or noble conception
losing its real value, the ambition they might generate
becomes contemptible, the labour they might supplant is
welcomed as a duty.

But it may be retorted, that as all human knowledge
is necessarily incomplete, this statement will only prove
the danger, or the uselessness, of every acquisition of
information whatever in the present state: and that
according to our own argument, it might be better that
man should be wholly ignorant, or decline prosecuting his
progress in enlightenment, than arrive at a greater degree
of knowledge, which, since it can never be absolutely
complete, may produce an impression as false, and practical
results as pernicious, as ignorance itself. That in
the spirit of our own reasoning all is peril, and equal peril,
from the lowest stage to the highest, from absolute nesci-
ence to absolute omniscience; and that if the danger be in
the imperfection, the ploughman will not escape it by
exchanging his own partial knowledge for the partial
knowledge of a Newton or a Locke.

To this form of the objection it may be replied, that,
when we assert that the danger is in the imperfection, we
not only do not deny, but emphatically assert, that the
danger will diminish with the diminution of the imperfec-
tion; that, on the lowest ground, the danger of partial
knowledge (though, as we have insisted, it be a real danger)
is probably, on the whole, not so great as that of total
ignorance, while, on the other hand, it carries in its very
nature a principle of improvement; that both instinct (in
the affection of curiosity) and reason urge us to acknow-
ledge that the true remedy for the evils of limited informa-
tion is to widen its boundaries; and that (as, with a view
to such objections, we before laid down) the nature of the
primary moral truths is such as to govern all subsequent
acquisitions, and (something like the unshaken confidence
of a natural philosopher has in the great laws of matter and
motion) to be substantially independent of apparent
discrepancies, while from all corroborating facts or disco-
veries they willingly consent to receive strength and elucidation.

Let me conclude the discussion by condensing its principles. Knowledge is speculative, whose object is truth, or practical, whose object is the application of truth. As to speculative knowledge, its pursuit is recommended by four distinct advantages—innocence, dignity, pleasure, and possible utility. As to practical knowledge, it is either moral, as the conduct of life, or not moral, as the arts in general. The latter species is recommended by obvious actual utility. For the former there are two supposable substitutes—the principle of imitation, and the principle of habit. Both (though invaluable when regulated) are, as independent and solitary guides, liable to the fatal objection, that, while they are equally powerful for evil and for good, they possess within themselves no internal principle of right direction. This principle of direction, under whatever aspect it be considered—natural or supernatural—must be essentially a principle of knowledge. In granting, then, that it is the highest species of knowledge, we assume that it is knowledge; differing from all others not in kind, but in importance, and to be maintained in its supremacy not by superseding all its brethren, but by accompanying them all. The real lesson, then, to be derived from the objection is, not that any species of logically admissible scientific inquiry is to be discountenanced as dangerous or forbidden ground; not that the conscience, or the sense of interest, can ever justifiably pull back where the reason is anxious and able to go forward; not that truth, or the reality of God's material and moral universe, has any blemish that it is ashamed or afraid to shew the most inquisitive examiner; none of these conclusions, whose absurdity eclipses even their cowardice, but another most momentous conclusion, that it is the duty of every man who undertakes to convey knowledge, as far as he can, to convey it complete: that is to say, to infuse into the immediate elements of his communication those additional principles which direct its partial operation, to impart along with all truth the highest truth, along with every knowledge the knowledge of man's self. Here, then, Gentlemen, the path of the argument crosses into our own domain, and the objection itself only fortifies the claims of the philosophy of the human mind. The evils of misguided learning owe their origin to errors respecting the relation which human nature bears to the objects of its knowledge, and still more to errors regarding the source and nature of its real happiness. These errors can only be neutralized by opposing truths—truths which shall rectify alike its follies
as to speculation and its follies as to practice. The theory of these truths, if such a theory exist, is included in the philosophy we propose to discuss.

But this is to borrow from the future. As far as we have yet advanced, we merely claim for this philosophy the rights which belong to every science which professes to investigate and deliver truth. Holding that man possesses the same faculty of perceiving the relations of things in whatever sphere of his knowledge they exist,—holding with Cicero that "Natura cupiditatem ingenuit homini veri inveniendi,"—that "Omnia vera diligimus, id est fidelia simplicia constantia,"—we ask for the theory of all which most concerns us, the consideration which is readily conceded to the theory of Saturn's satellites, or to hypotheses as to the secret of the fructification of a fungus!

But, conceding the general principle, can we establish under the shelter of this important major proposition the claims of this philosophy? High as its objects and pretensions are, does it indeed deserve the name of Science; and is that which is proved of science universally proved implicitly of this? Here, then, as the claim is to a title, the title must be ascertained; and hence we are reduced to the necessity of more accurate definition. If we may justly define all science to be the investigation of the relations established between beings (a definition which will include the two great divisions of science—hypothesitical and real); and if we can shew that in the case under consideration there are relations "established," and relations "admitting of investigation," our "minor" proposition will be satisfactorily proved. No great expenditure of reasoning is absolutely required for either of these affirmations; yet the subject opens views of such importance that the proof and illustration of them both will occupy the remainder of this, and probably the entire of the following Lecture. To commence with the former. The mind, we assert, is subject to laws.

It will not be denied that science exists. The existence of science in any region whatsoever presupposes constancy of relations. Relations are states of a conscious mind. Therefore constancy of relations supposes constancy of states of mind. That is to say, the existence of any science of any description implies that the mind is subject to established laws; and therefore, so far, the mere existence of science implies the possibility of a science of the mind.

"But this establishes the constancy of mental laws only so far as these admitted sciences extend; leaving us in uncertainty as to the stability of the rest." The con-

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1 [De Fin. II. 15, 46. Ed.]
clusion, even with this limitation, might be shewn to extend much farther than appears obvious to a cursory observer; for in the detection and belief of truth how vast a portion of the human mind is brought into action, and in admitting the reality of discovered truths how much of the mind is, therefore, inclusively, conceded to be superior to caprice, or uncertainty, or chance! But it is safer, because simpler, to recur for this further portion to experience, and to those convictions which give its chief value to experience. The course of active human life is distributable into two great divisions, as guided by reflection, or as obedient to instinct, passion, habit and accident.

First, then, how far does reflective agency infer the immutability of the mental constitution? We answer, that the whole conduct of life proceeds upon the supposition of mental laws; life is but the evolution of consciousness; and in every case where man acts with a purpose, his acts are but the expression of his knowledge that what has been will be. The detection of sameness under difference, as it is the essence of scientific sagacity, so it is the essence of practical sagacity also; but of what value would be the perception of substantial sameness under circumstantial difference, if the facts which were perceived to be the same could not be trusted to as producing continually the same results? that is, if there were not, beyond a perception of identity, a conviction of law? Now this is just as true in conscious life as in unconscious matter. Of what value would it be to have beheld (by the gifted vision of genius) the same fact of gravity appearing under different circumstances, in the elevation of the mercury in the tube and in the descent of a stone from the hand,—to have caught the one Protean fact concealing itself, at this time under the outward garb of rusted iron, at another in the phenomena of respiration,—to have found the substance of the diamond in the animal breath, so that the story of the Eastern princess whose mouth dropped diamonds as she spoke, became no longer a fiction—to have seen the prismatic spectrum and the rainbow owing allegiance to the same sovereign law—or (as is probable) the lightning of the heavens and the beating of the human heart as two results of one agent,—of what value would be these and a thousand such discoveries, if the sameness thus apprehended were only a momentary and accidental recurrence, and not known to be a permanent arrangement, arising out of original properties—that is mutual relations—with which the elements of things were at first invested by Providence, and of which properties all the course of nature is only the combination or the separation, but never the alteration? And if, passing
from speculative truth to practical application, you convert Science into Art, if the theory of latent heat takes active existence in the steam-engine, or the theory of Dioptrics in the common telescope, or the discovery of the cooling power of a metallic tissue in the safety-lamp of Davy,—it is equally, or even more, evident that the construction of the machine supposes a previous conviction of the constancy of the law. In this great traffic with nature, by which we may be said to enrich her with arts as she enriches us with materials, we embark (as in all other comerses) our industry upon the faith of her promise; and the machine or manufacture is at once the monument of our confidence and of her fidelity. Here, then, again, is the same principle of experimental science,—for a machine is nothing more than a permanent experiment; the difference not being in the thing or the process, but in their object, which in the one case is discovery, and in the other case is use. But in every case, the observation and experiment that go before discovery, the rule or the machine that come after it, there is still the conviction—unchangeable as its object is unchangeable—that the laws of Nature (like those Eastern laws of which we read in Scripture) are laws "that alter not."

Now, Gentlemen, there is an Art of more importance than any of the arts that "recreate life"—the art of life itself. "Life,"—of course I use the popular sense of the term,—is the constant exercise of practical rules similar in their discovery to those of which we have just been speaking; that is to say, it is literally the exertion and the product of an art; and to contemplate a life at its close is, in a manner, to inspect a "machine," whose parts are not coexistent but successive. The object and use of the machine thus completed is indeed hidden among the secret purposes of God, who, constituting us the mechanists of our own conduct, reserves among the deep counsels of His mighty administration the final causes which assuredly exist for the life and trial of every single being of all His creatures. There is a direct object, and there is an ultimate object. The direct object of Life is Duty; the ultimate object is that reason of existence which extends to man in common with every created thing; the former is often missed, for it is to be attained by man; the latter never, for it is the purpose of God. Our ignorance of the ultimate object of the complicated machinery of each existence does not, it must be remem-

[ Athenae

\textit{Et recreaverunt vitam legisque rogarunt.}

\textit{Lucret. VI. 3.—Ed.}]}
bered, diminish either the importance of that object, or the
fitness of the machinery to attain it, or our certainty of
that fitness; on the contrary, we are to conclude that the
ignorance is part of the fitness, since it exists. Voluntary
agents, we yet work for a purpose beyond our contempla-
tion; each is the conscious architect of a separate chamber
of an edifice whose general effect, internal dependencies,
extent, and purpose, can only be known to the one
Reason which can comprehend infinity. Leaving then,
the object of the mechanism, let us return to its formation.

Man is an artist, and constructs his rational life upon
observation. His operations in the pursuit of happiness
are experimental forms of previous knowledge, of knowl-
dedge at first obtained instinctively or accidentally, and
afterwards abridged and generalized into practical rules.
It is obvious, therefore, that the same confidence as to the
stability of fixed laws which originated the steam-engine,
the microscope, the air-pump, the thermometer, must exist
to give value to all the maxims of civil and of personal
prudence. Indeed so truly is this the case, that the very
word which is now technically employed to signify the
ground of all scientific physical knowledge—the word
"experience"—is much more frequently employed to
denote the foundation of all practical knowledge in the
affairs of life; and, in common usage, is seldom applied to
the former purpose, except, perhaps, in the sense of pro-
fessional skill, where it holds a kind of middle place
between the ground of scientific induction and the ground
of practical wisdom.

As far then as the reflective agent is concerned, there
can be no doubt that his rules, whether right or wrong, in
being rules, proceed on the tacit or expressed conviction
that the mind manifests itself under unalterable laws.
The expressions of these laws are the formulas of psycho-
logical science. The "man of the world," who would
blush—if he could blush—to be thought a sage, runs
through the whole gamut of mental philosophy in an hour,
without knowing it, just as the equilibrist, who balances
himself upon a cord, and a dozen other things upon him-
self, exemplifies half the laws of Statics without ever
having heard of the existence of Galileo or Newton.

But man does not merely reflect; his experience
includes other and apparently more uncertain elements.
Can we ascribe this stability to passions, which are the
proverbial types of instability? can we give laws to caprice
itself, or chain that "fine frenzy" of imagination which

Æstuat infelix angusto limite mundi,
within the narrow pinnfold of a metaphysical theory?
To this we reply, in the first place, that the former reasoning involves the regularity of this portion of the mental constitution. For the very experience of which we spoke is in a great measure a tacit theory of the passions. Iago excites the jealousy of the Moor with as accurate an application of means to ends as that with which an experimentalist excites the dormant electricity of his glass plate or cylinder; and an orator arranges his topics to inflame the passions of his auditors to frenzy, with the same calm reliance upon general rules of previous experience as when he aims at the nobler end of securing rational conviction. The tempest is as truly a result of atmospheric laws as the calm; and, properly understood, there is a “method” in all “madness” as well as in Hamlet’s, though the thread that links its follies be sometimes difficult to trace. Indeed, so far is the stability of the laws of passion admitted, that their changes are usually better understood than those of the reason; and for one who can judge the propriety of an argument, there are fifty who can criticise the proprieties of Shakespeare.

Of the other phenomena whose apparent irregularity exempts them from control, the real regularity is equally attested by practical experience. That there are laws of Imagination is obvious in (what Bacon would call) the “prerogative instance” of dreaming; where the modifying influence of circumstances is matter of universal remark. “Habit” is itself the name of a law. And instinctive principles of belief, though from their nature being simple and unanalysable, they are irreducible to more general laws, are yet felt above all others to be permanent in their nature, and are not less matters of science than the ultimate elements of bodies to the chemist. Strictly speaking, the whole mass of reason and action is reducible to such principles; and in this point of view the instinctive principles are not subject to law, only because they are the laws themselves.

But secondly, even though the laws of emotion, and the rest, were undiscoverable, or undiscovered, we should be entitled to conclude that they exist. We may assume higher ground than we have yet approached. Our argument is no longer experimental or analogical, but profound as human reason itself. To this point (on account of its importance, which extends far beyond our immediate subject) I request your special attention. There is a principle in the rational nature which renders it impossible not to believe that every phenomenon whatsoever has a reason for its existence and for every circumstance of its existence. To possess reason is to possess this conviction. It
is possible that higher intelligences may possess principles similar to this, but of greater compass, of which we have no conception; but they can have none that contradicts it; just as the man gifted with sight can direct his course better than the blind man by touch; yet the sight cannot contradict the touch, or make that quality not to exist which the touch feels to exist. But however the higher orders of nature may be gifted, with us the conviction of which I speak is the deepest element of the intellectual being; and though it grows in prominence as the reason is cultivated, being fullest and clearest in the scientific mind, it is truly perceptible in every mind whatsoever. I have long been in the habit of considering that the law of the stability of nature, and our confident expectation of that stability—a law which has attracted since Hume's time so great a proportion of the attention of metaphysicians—may be considered to rational and intelligent beings as truly an inferior and sensible form of the primary principle which I am now considering. I am stating an instance of a principle of (as appears to me) vast importance, namely, that instincts which under their sensible, practical, occasional form, actuate the lower animals, and man also (who really belongs to that lower stage before the birth of reason) in his infantile state, are apprehended by the reason, (that is, by the faculty in this world exclusively human) under the form of necessity and universality. A reason arising from the original nature of things is, in its essence, irrelative to time and space; and to suppose that every succession of phenomena will be invariably successive, that is, will for ever recur the same if it recur at all, is only to suppose what surely is no very mysterious assumption, that what has been reason will continue reason for ever; that if in the nature of any being there be a fitness for connexion with other beings, as long as the being exist the fitness will exist, and therefore the sequence which is, as it were, the active and outward manifestation of that fitness. The antecedent then to the rational reflector as distinguished from the lower animals, and from his own state before the birth of reason, is neither an efficient cause, nor is it a mere antecedent expected to be invariable. Our reason, refusing productive efficacy to matter, denies the one; the same reason, with as unequivocal an evidence, attests something beyond the other. A physical antecedent, as contemplated by reason, is a being in whose nature there is a fitness for being connected with its consequent, which fitness was the ground of the original arrangement, and could not have admitted of any other; and which fitness having in its essence no
relation to time or space, and therefore being of course as permanent as the being itself, produces in rational intelligences the infallible conviction that the sequence will last as long as the beings composing it exist; reason thus corroborating and justifying the persuasions of instinct. Nor is there any Necessarianism in such a doctrine farther than the Necessarianism to which I shall never refuse to subscribe—the impossibility of the Divine Power ever acting otherwise than in consonance with, and as the development of, the Divine Wisdom. It is this fitness, instinctively recognized, which is the true source of that supposed confusion of efficient and physical causation, which has so much perplexed our modern philosophers; and, perhaps, of that equally puzzling, because universal, conviction of a connexion, in some sense "necessary," between the successions of causes and effects. Y... perceive then that we extend with assurance the dominion of law and regularity not only far beyond our actual experience of its sway, but over every portion of the universe where there exists any element for it to govern. It is not merely a contingent principle of experience, but a necessary principle of reason; and, I must add, it is on this ground, and this ground alone, that we call God the God not of the visible universe, but of infinity itself; a conclusion wholly unattainable by the popular argument of "design"—for the very simple reason that no inference can overpass its premises. The revelation of reason tells us, that wherever there is being, there must be law; and wherever there is law there must be God. It empowers us to assert that if, as poets have dreamed, there be beyond the visible harmonics of the world a realm such as their "Chaos," Chaos itself, whatever we understand by the term, is but a form of order; and as directly relative to its object as the harmonious structure of an eye or an ear: and the poet who has so wondrously described it has still not left it uncontrolled, when, in words which painting never rivalled, he has depicted:

"the throne
Of Chaos and his dark pavilion spread
Wide on our wasteful deep!"

Such is our irresistible conviction of the nature of the universe. I shall only add, that your decision of this point leaves the logic of physical inquiry untouched; as, whatever be the foundation of the conviction of the permanence of nature, the conviction instinctively exists; and whatever be the ground of the connexion of events, the connexions themselves (which are the object of physical inquiry) can only be ascertained by observation. You are
not, therefore, to imagine that, in doubting the completeness and accuracy of the modern metaphysic, you are at all questioning the accuracy of the admirable logical views with which it is connected. Leaving the general principle to future discussion, I now return to its immediate application in the subject before us.

In common with every other phenomenon of nature, the successions of mental states must have their reason in the mutual suitability of the elements that compose them, therefore, their perpetual sameness of recurrence: the exception being wholly independent of our knowledge of the actual law of succession. And, just as the chemist is aware that the results of innumerable combinations can never tried—perhaps which have never yet come together in part of the whole extent of nature—are as fixed and settled in nature's counsels as those which are ever and always when they do occur, so the metaphysician is assured that the boundaries of his classifications are the boundaries of his knowledge, not those of the absolute, universal, and invariable order, which pervades the world of mind. Of the millions of intermingling waves that ripple the surface of a bay, there is not one which is more truly the creature of chance than the great tide-wave of the ocean itself. Of the innumerable modifications of feeling, which, passing rapidly over its surface, make the history of an hour in any human mind, there is not one which does not appear, disappear in introducing its successor, reappear to give place again by laws as fixed and stable as that which, during the whole succession of these superficial changes, was, probably, urging on the main current of the mind in the desire and pursuit of happiness.

Gentlemen, it thus appears that the history of Consciousness is a part of the history of nature; that, like all conceivable existences, it is subject to order regulating its successions; and that which discovers law in every thing is itself subject to law. The mind which detects a creative intelligence in every disposition of successive facts, does not refuse to add its own testimony to that great truth. The transcendent Artist who has formed this wonderful mechanism of thought, and who has purposed to direct its energies to Himself, has enabled it to do so by enabling it to recognize its own structure.

This conducts us to the not less important question—Are the Laws of Consciousness discoverable? the other element of our argument—are these laws of the conscious principle, thus assuredly existing, capable of being discovered? The reply is, that, in proving them to
exist, we have in a considerable degree established their amenability to inquiry; for a part of our proof arose from the fact that they had actually been made matter of habitual analysis. Action and conduct imply not merely the existence of laws, but the knowledge of them... Another proof is derived from the evidence of language; a medium of investigation to which I may often have occasion to invite your attention. Language, Gentlemen, is the sensible portraiture of thought, the dial-plate of the mind, and every fact, whether of change or constancy in the outward indication, marks a corresponding fact in the inward machinery. We are not without physical analogies sufficiently illustrative of this relation which the observation of language bears to the analysis of the mind. It was of importance to the theory of acoustics that the vibratory motions in sonorous masses should be accurately determined. The vibrations themselves elude the keest eyes; and from their rapidity, as well as minuteness, are beyond the reach of direct instrumental observation. How were these invisible data to be gained? The happy thought occurred (to Chladni, I think) of strewing fine sand over the vibrating plates; the sand of course assumed forms directly dependent on, and thence indicative of, the vibrations; and thus one of the most secret and exquisite operations of nature became the subject of easy ocular inspection. Now this device exactly illustrates the metaphysical uses of language. It is the sensible form of almost imperceptible facts, and snatches from the secrecy of the invisible world of mind a constant report of its processes: while in the combined investigation of different languages the indications may be compared and corrected; much as in the ingenious "principle of repetition," by which Borda has taught astronomical observers to rectify the imperfections of their instruments. Language is often indeed the embodiment of prejudices; but you are to remember that there is not a single error or prejudice which does not arise according to laws as real as truth itself, and whose analysis may not, therefore, expose these laws to view. The mistletoe is as true a result of the laws of vegetation as the oak it disfigures; and the "perturbations" of the planetary bodies are themselves elements in the stability of the system.

In every civilized language, then, there are words to be found expressive of certain familiar properties of the mind, as well as phrases expressive of many of their minuter relations, and more striking manifestations. Such are sense, reason, imagination, habit, genius, dulness, memory, contemplation, and the rest. The invention of such terms
supposes a previous observation of the great general facts which they convey; and the constant use of them in the same, or nearly the same sense, shews that that observation is currently admitted to be correct, or nearly so. The object therefore, of psychology is not to reclaim to cultivation a field suffered till now to lie fallow, but to correct and assort the produce of a field whose cultivation is as old as reason itself:—and the opposition, so often complained of between (what is termed) the vulgar and the philosopher, arises not because the one is exclusively vulgar, and the other exclusively philosophic, but because they are both philosophers, though in very different degrees; and therefore, of course, with very different results.

Our next Lecture (on Thursday) will continue, and, I hope conclude, this part of our general argument for the reality and importance of mental philosophy.
LEcT. V.

Gentlemen,

I RESUME our discussion of the susceptibility which the mind possesses of becoming the object of physical discovery. In the argument, as far as it has yet proceeded, you will easily perceive that I prolong it less for purposes of conviction than for those of illustration. The argument, as a mere argument, could be comprised in a small compass. But I am anxious that you should not only recognize the truth, but recognize the value of the truth; that, in admitting its cogency, you should feel it enlighten, as well as compel; and that the fiery darts, ignea tela, of truth's defensive warfare—like other fires—in the very process of destroying what directly opposes them, should reflect illumination on all around. It is with this intention that I have interspersed the simplicity of these reasonings with intimations of other and more remote doctrines,—intimations which the rigour of a strict method would scarcely permit, but which the sagacity of a reflective audience welcomes as its appropriate stimulant; and, however I may seem to deviate from the direct road of demonstration, it is not impossible that these deviations may be themselves the directest road to a higher goal,—that of making you familiar with the true nature and bearings of the great subject which engages our attention.

We have seen, then, that an Inductive Science of the Mind, the immediate subject of our present consideration, is demonstrably possible, from the very existence of science of any kind, and the very conception of regularity and law as applied to any subject whatsoever, which necessarily supposes a regularity of mental relations, without which the conception could never have had being. We have seen it proved from the existence of such a thing as a practical conduct of life; which has been shewn to be precisely analogous to any ordinary art, and equally to suppose the influence of laws in that region with which the art is engaged, that is to say, in the mind of man; and we have seen that the inference embraces states of mind wholly independent of reason and proverbially capricious,—nay, includes them with peculiar force, inasmuch as it is
with these and their laws that the art of life is especially concerned. The force of these proofs from experience has been corroborated by an appeal to that great instinct of reason which assigns intuitively to every phenomenon an adequate cause and reason of existence, and thence a certainty of recurrence unaffected by changes of time or space. The reality of the laws being shewn, we proceeded to establish their liability to discovery, partly from the same train of reasoning which established their existence, and partly from the indications afforded by language, in which the invention of mental terms proves the attempt to classify the properties of mind, and their perpetuation the general admission of the classification as correct, or at least as an approximation sufficiently convenient for all practical purposes. Now, where the subject, and the instruments, of investigation remain unchanged, a less perfect knowledge is a guarantee of a better, because its existence proves that there is at least no radical characteristic in the nature of the subject and of our relation to it, which would seclude it from the dominion of science, and therefore from the influence of that glorious attribute of all legitimate science, its capabilities of indefinite and perpetual improvement. Indeed, without leaving the boundaries of language itself, we may recognize striking proofs of this process of amelioration. If, as we have been maintaining, language exhibits the visible surface produced by a perpetual undercurrent of analytic thought, and in its rudest form is the rudest form of science; so, the nomenclature of any subject often may be said to give us in a condensed and portable form the main elements of its actual condition, and always rises in precision as that condition improves in scientific accuracy. So that the improvement of language is itself the constant witness of the progress of thought. And in the general intelligence of our own subject, as manifested in the use of language, you may perceive at once the testimony of this progress, and the means of furthering it:—the testimony to this progress, in the unquestionably greater precision which marks the use of terms denoting intellectual powers and processes in general society—the means of increasing this precision, in the certain though insensible influence of accurate expression. If language be the creature of mind, it is also its guide; the child of thought supplies the blindness and supports the feebleness of its parent. One of the greatest benefits of metaphysical studies upon the mass of society is to be found in this very diffusion of exact phraseology, inevitably productive of exact thinking, perhaps indeed the greatest, certainly the most universal, though
the most neglected, advantage to be obtained from the
general supervision of a great school of metaphysicians in
any country. Terms expressive of the great subjects of
reasoning are at first refined and purified in the alembics
of accurate science. Thus definite they descend among
the vulgar; and though perhaps these distinctly moulded
types of thought may at first be clumsily handled in collo-
quial usage, yet if they lose the sharpness of their outline,
they preserve at least the general correctness of their shape.
The justness infused into the public language leavens by
degrees the public mind. Thus it is that the terms of phi-
losophy become the instructors of the people; founded
upon accurate distinctions they insinuate the distinctions
which occasioned them; they are the deputies and apostles
of truth among the crowd; and, as language has been
called the mirror of the mind, so the mind in its turn may
be said to dress itself in this correct mirror of a perfect
language.

Thus, the existence of language is itself the monument
of an unfinished science; its improvement, the constant
proof and instrument of a more complete one. Every
expression which conveys an act or faculty of the mind is
an indication that that act or faculty has been the object of
reflective thought, and that, even in the earliest period of
the history of reason, the wonderful machinery which
recognizes all, has not been left unrecognized by itself.
You are to remember how much this proof may be made
to include. It is not merely the names of faculties, and
the various designations which denote habits and char-
acters, that establish how universally man has been (in
some respect) his own object, and how much more deeply
he might be so. There is not a single term expressive of
action which does not attest a direct reference to mental
consciousness; and I need not remind you that some of
the most difficult researches of our science are those which
propose to discover the nature of the reference which was
made in the formation of some of these signs. The terms,
or inflexions, which we translate by the personal pronouns,
I, Thou, He,—the verb To Be,—the common auxiliaries,
may, must, ought, would, &c., (expressive of contingency,
necessity, duty, will), how close and searching was the
metaphysic which governed their creation. Every one of
them is a theory in miniature; and universal grammar is
not more truly a science of language than language is a
science of mind; the genus “pronoun” does not more
truly classify the words in a language that are suppletory
of nouns, than the particular pronouns themselves involve
and suppose an observation of the particular postures of
mind they are employed to represent. And, in truth, this
universal grammar, which must always rest rather on ideas
than on words, is just a higher form of the very same
philosophy which constructed the languages it methodizes;
and the peasant who invents an idiom for his purpose, the
particular grammarian who investigates the rules of the
peasants' vernacular tongue, and the philosophical gram-
marian who reduces to common laws the rules of all
languages, occupy positions of progressive dignity not
unlike those which the historian of astronomy would allot
respectively to Tycho Brahe, to Kepler, and to Newton.

A further, and very simple argument in proof that the
mind is not placed beyond the scope of discovery, is to be
found in the fact that the physical survey of the mind is in
a state of actual and rapid progress. A true Inductive
Psychology is a modern science; and surely its infancy is
the infancy of a Hercules. Censure and criticise individual theorists as we may, it cannot be denied that Newton
had not views as just of this division of our philosophy as
the mass of advanced students in our colleges possess at
this day; a proposition which it would not be very difficult
to establish by citations from many parts of the writings of
that wondrous man. Occasional retrogressions, occasional
failures may occur, but no candid man can contemplate the
later metaphysical history of Europe, and not perceive that,
though the waves may alternately retreat to the eye, the
great tide itself of improvement is really gaining ground.
The physics of the consciousness have taken this place
among the sciences; and; though this be not all, it is much.
It is universally felt that mind is logically a part of nature;
it is not so universally felt that it is the noblest part: but
the former step is so vast and momentous that it may pal-
litate the deficiency of the latter, to which it is the safest
preliminary, and of which, in logical method, it ought to be
the antecedent. But I pass from this argument to another
which better secures my great object of illustrating the
general subject while proving the particular question.

The most instructive argument in proof that the mind
is liable to a discovery of its laws, is derived from the
unquestionable fact, that, as there is a field for discovery
(before established), so there is an adequate organ for
effecting it. The astronomer has his stars and his telescope,
the naturalist his insect and his microscope, the optician
his light and his prism, the crystallographer his crystal and
his reflector to measure its angles, the chemist his earths
and his electric pile, the metaphysician his mind and his
faculty of attention. In before explaining that the mind
is subject to arrangements of law and order, you will
remember that, among other arguments, I proved this point from the existence of science of any kind;—I return to that argument to corroborate the present one. For, that this provision of instrumental apparatus is sufficient for all the purposes of mental observation and science, you will agree when you remember that, in point of fact, every other subject of observation must be reflected upon this mirror of consciousness before it is capable of being known. If the composition of air or water can be an object of human science, it can be so only by observations of a series of human sensations; and this observation itself, as well as these sensations themselves, are but phenomena of the conscious mind. Thus every material science is, in a manner, a science of mind, by being a science of successive sensations; and it will scarcely be denied that attention may observe the phenomena of mind, and convert them into science, when it is remembered that everything which professes to be science is built on this very supposition.

The facility with which we can apply this instrument varies, however, very considerably according to the portion of the subject investigated. In all cases equally it supposes a subject of inquiry and a process of inquiry; that is, it supposes the reproduction by the suggestive principle of a certain state of mind, and a continuous secondary process by which we keep comparing and examining it, as well as weighing its value and meaning. The facility then will vary as these operations vary, both or either of them; it will rise exactly as it is easier to reproduce, or as it is easier to examine. The processes of sensation or of voluntary effort are usually the easiest to reproduce, but they are by no means the easiest to examine. The processes of emotion, on the contrary, are exceedingly difficult accurately to reproduce; while they will probably be found not peculiarly difficult to examine. The processes of reasoning offer about the same facility or difficulty to both operations. The power of reproduction, it is obvious, depends on the power of commanding the antecedent state or states with which the required one is connected: and the power of examination will depend on the complication or the simplicity of the phenomenon examined, in relation to the examiner. It is precisely so that the naturalist's chances of discovery of the structure of some novel insect will be determined by his chances of obtaining the insect for observation, and the powers of the microscope he can employ in observing. Now in the phenomena of sensation, of voluntary effort, of reasoning, demonstrative or contingent, there is certainly no mental difficulty in securing the antecedent requisite to produce them: I say no "mental" diffi-
ulty, because any other casual and external difficulties are plainly irrelevant to the scope of our discussion. By presenting the eye to the landscape, the ear to the concert, the hand to the flame, the sensations attached to these requisites are certain to arise. Again, the unparalysed limb is certain to obey the exertion of muscular effort. And in like manner, by presenting (no longer the mere bodily organ to its material co-agent but), in a metaphorical sense, the mind to any subject of speculation, trains of reasoning will arise, which may be fixed in written signs, and which will always be certain to arise as often as the attention is directed to the signs. In all these cases, then, reproduction is easy, because not only are the laws of succession known, but these laws are available for practical purposes. But in the case of the emotions we have a very different task. Here we may indeed know, in a wide and general manner, the laws of sequence, but these laws are ill available for practical occasions. We cannot summon love, and fear, and hate, and hope, and ambition, into our closets for inspection, in all their original energy of life. At best we must be contented with dissecting their inanimate remains, as presented in the sepulchral crypts and dim recesses of memory. These wayward recusants acknowledge no allegiance to the requisitions of philosophy. Tyrants when we would reject, they are rebels when we require them. To examine fear or anger, in the ordinary sense of examination, involves a contradiction; for to be calm enough to examine the emotion would no longer be to experience it. In these cases, then, of immediate emotions, the true materials of inquiry will be, partly remembrances of our own, and partly direct observations of their workings and results in others.

I am here, perhaps, unduly anticipating a subsequent topic, yet, as I have commenced, I ought not to conclude without completing, at least, this branch of it. Passing, then, from the facility of reproduction to the facility of examination, we shall find that these qualities are not at all governed by the same law of change, that they do not increase or diminish in mutual correspondence. Examination is either analysis or pure reflection; it either simplifies phenomena or it weighs them. "Analysis" (in the science of mind) is the resolution of associations into their simple elements. It is difficult, therefore, according as the elements sought are minute, are in a state of complicated union, are presented in such a disguise as that the result of the combination assumes a form unlike the components. The next question is, of course, Where will this close and
elusive complication of minute elements occur? It will occur wherever the association has been formed at a period antecedent to observation, or to which the scope of memory does not extend; wherever the association has been constant and unbroken; wherever it has entangled in this constant union a great number of elements, i.e. as the association has been early, constant, complex. Now in some of the phenomena of sensation, or, to speak more accurately, in some phenomena of the information derived through the medium of the senses, these qualities are all eminently combined. All sensitive natures seem to have in some degree—rational natures in a very high degree—the tendency to convert things which appear into signs of things beyond them, to pass from the unimportant to the important; and you know that the great law of connexion or association forms a perpetual basis upon which this tendency can act. Language being the capital instance of this invaluable principle, we say, by a convenient metaphor, that the mind has a perpetual tendency to convert every thing into a language. Now, of all the dialects of this perpetual language, the simple sensations are the most obvious and striking. The sensations may, you will remember, be regarded under two very different aspects; positively, in themselves, as states pleasurable, or painful, or indifferent; relatively, as signs of things ulterior. It is in this latter office that the intricate combination of which I am speaking exists. The mind, conceiving the thing signified while perceiving the sign, assumes habitually that it perceives the signified; and the office of analysis is, by revealing the real process, to exhibit to the mind the history of the prejudice. Let us advance another step, and inquire, In what department of the diversified field of sensation will the language-making tendency become most observable? I answer, first, in whatever case the direct objects of the organ are discovered in the most constant and general association with subjects of importance to the mind that constructs the language, and, secondly, in whatever case the organic affections are most easily distinguishable from each other, so as to render the language unerring and precise. Now these two requisites meet very conspicuously in the instance of Vision. Its object—light in all its varieties—is usually present to us during two-thirds of our existence, and, by being reflected or otherwise modified by all kinds of solid matter in due proportion to their magnitude, shape, and distance, becomes a universal intelligen
c
ciable; the spot of the organ upon which it falls and the
shadowings of the colour, being, both of them, impressions
sufficiently definite to be never mistaken as long as the
mind, and the organ which ministers to it, are soundly
constituted—mens sana in corpore sano. Hence the eye is,
of all organs of sense, the richest depository of signs; a
privilege which becomes peculiarly conspicuous from the
fact that of all the organs it possesses perhaps the least
claim to be considered under the other aspect of the sensi-
tive frame—that is, as a medium of direct pleasure. Indeed
it is worth noting that the mere pleasure of light is most
observable in extreme infancy—exactly when it is most
required in order to urge and stimulate the organ into such
activity as may form a basis for its higher subsequent des-
tinies as the great channel of external knowledge. In this
latter office its agency is so prominent as to have made
"seeing" a metaphor for "understanding" in almost every
language, and the principal terms for the degrees, and
varieties, and, means, of knowledge to have been every-
where derived from the processes of vision—such terms as
"demonstration," "intuition," "evidence," and the rest.
And when to this process of constant interpretation, which
makes all the value of vision, is added a parallel course of
purely mental association, the case becomes sometimes
one of astonishing rapidity of combination. Take the
instance of a linguist writing a translation of a written
document,—a performance which we know is continually
accomplished with almost the velocity of thought itself.
Yet there are here no less than four successive connexions
preliminary to each word of the version. There is the
perception of a written mark, and, first, the connexion of a
sound with that sign; secondly, the connexion of an idea
with that sound; thirdly, the connexion of a sound (in the
new language) with that idea; and fourthly, the connexion
of a written sign with that sound. In this series, however,
we have set out from the acquired perception of the shape,
&c. of the original written sign, and pursued the mind
through merely its own admitted conceptions. To com-
mence the history, therefore, we must trace the genealogy
of the written version from that primitive chaos of the
mind, in which, uninformed of distance or figure, the eye
could only convey to the conscious being a vague impres-
sion of colour. We must strip it of its borrowed attributes,
and contemplate it still presenting this sensation alone, in
order to behold the mind clothing that dead element with
life, and, by a train of rapid association, converting an
indefinite impression of colour into that perception of a
written sign from which we commenced our former series.
When you cast up the heap of associations which thus
gather upon a single impression, you will easily recognize
the fact, and the cause, of the difficulty which attends the
analysis of the phenomena attributed to sensation.

I shall leave this instance as an illustration of a subject
which it would be premature to discuss at greater length.
The consideration of the difficulties which accompany the
analysis of volitions, emotions, reasonings—as well as those
which attend that pure contemplation of a thought apart
from all analytical purposes, to which I have referred—we
shall resume hereafter. I trust that you perceive, what
alone for the present I was anxious you should perceive,
that though different portions of our subject are differently
circumstanced as to facility of reproduction and examina-
tion, yet this difficulty does not at all amount to an exclu-
sion of any portion from liability to these processes of ob-
servation; at least, that we cannot assume that it does,
prior to actual trial. Far less, from these vague assertions
of the difficulty or obscurity of the subject, unfairly gene-
ralized from the fact of a few real obscurities, can suspicions
be justly entertained of its total impracticability. And the
dissolution of this prejudice leaves the ground open for the
plain and unanswerable statement, that of all species of
observation, the observation, of which attention is the
instrument and consciousness the object, is in its own
nature the most legitimate and warrantable, and that, so
far from being essentially unsusceptible of philosophical
investigation, the difficulties which attend this subject,
however discouraging, are purely incidental, and therefore
capable of continual diminution as practical skill increases.
To discover the living inhabitants of the sun, if such there
be, may be pronounced essentially impossible; to deter-
mine its rotation was scarcely to have been deemed so,
because the inquiry demanded great care in the use of the
organ which inspected, and a patient protracted course of
observation from the inquirer.

Upon this whole argument—the liability of the mind to
a discovery of its laws—the opinion of Lord Bacon, as the
oracle of inductive science, will of course be received with
respect. Lord Bacon, then, answers decidedly in the
affirmative. He saw plainly enough that wherever the
mind could reach there it could observe, and wherever it
could observe there it could induct, and wherever it could
induct there it could discover; and he knew that there was
nothing in the conscious intelligence to seclude its succe-
sions from the same influences which were capable of clas-
sifying every other attainable succession in the universe.
Whenever the true meaning of discovery was firmly grasped,
the application was universal. The stars of heaven, the flowers at your feet, the soul that scans both—observe, induct, and you know them equally. Translate a geometrical proposition to any portion of space, and it is equally true; apply the Baconian formula to any region of experience, and it remains unimpeachable. It is with regret I have to remark that the excessive spirit of system, and, I fear, the national prejudices of M. Victor Cousin, have betrayed him into a very unjustifiable misrepresentation of our great English philosopher. In order by contrast to exalt the rival glory of Descartes (which M. Cousin, as his editor and a Frenchman, is naturally solicitous to support), he asserts that the tendency of the counsels of Bacon was in such a sense and manner exclusively material, as to blight the growth of mental philosophy. So unfounded is this charge, that Bacon himself expressly declares the applicability of his method of inquiry to the construction of metaphysical, ethical, and political theories. (Nov. Org. Lib. I. Aph. 127, and De Augm. Lib. VII. cap. 3)*. And in the Nov. Org. II. 26, you will find an actual analysis of the phenomena of memory, in exemplification of the method of induction†. Nor need I cite to you his many ingenious

* "Jam enim Historiam et Tabulas Inveniendo consciusimus de frâ, Metu, et Verecundia, et simulibus; et etiam de exemplis rerum Civilium; nec minus de motibus mentalibus Memorias, Compositionis et Divisionis, Judicii, et reliquorum, quam de Calido et Frigido, aut Luce, aut Vegetatione, aut simulibus." N. O. 1. 127. And, speaking of moral investigations, (De Augm. Sc. VII. 3,) he assumes both the importance and the legitimacy of the inductive inquiry of mental phenomena. For instance in one place, "Quâ in parte debuerant Philosophi strenue et gnâviter inquirere de viribus et energiâ Consecutudinis, Excercitationis, Habito, Educationis, Imitationis, Eximiationis, Convitis, Amitiâtis, Laudis, Reprehensionis, Exhortationis, Fame, Legum, Librorum, Studiorum, et si quâ alia. Hae nunc sunt illa quæ regnânt in Moralibus."

† The 127th Aphorism commences thus: "Etiam dubitabit quisquis potius quam obiectet; utrum nos de naturali tantum philosophia, an etiam de scientiis reliquis, logiciis, ethicis, politiciis, secundum viam nostram periciendi, loquatur. At nos certe de universis hæc, quæ dicta sunt, intelligimus; atque quæmmodum vulgaris logica, quæ regit res per syllogismum, non tantum ad naturales, sed ad omnes scientiâ pertinent; ita et nostra, quæ procedit per inductionem, omnia complectorunt." In the chapter from which the second passage is cited occurs the following true and refined criticism: "Subtit admiratio Aristotelis, qui tot libros de ethicis conscriptos, affectus, ut membrum ethicæ principale, in illis non tractasse; in rhetoricis autem (quatuor scientias oratione cieri aut commoveri possunt) locum illius reperisse (in quo tamen loco de ipsis, quantum tam paucis fieri potuit, acute et bene disserit) nam disputationes ejus de voluptate et dolore huic tractatui nullo modo satisfacient; non magis quam qui de luce et lumine tantum scriberet, de particularium colorum naturâ scripsiisse diceretur: siquidem voluptas et dolor erga affectus particulares ita se habent, ut lux erga colores."

† His object is to determine, as an example of what he calls Constitutive Instabiles, the circumstances that are found to assist that faculty. After a lengthened investigation, he concludes with six specimens of these aids. I will not presume to translate them out of his own inimitable language. They are "abscessis infinitis; deductio intellectualis ad sensibile; impressio in affectu fortis; impressio in mente purâ; multitudo anarum; praespectatio."
suggestions as to the *doctrina de fădere*, or doctrine of the
laws which govern the connexion of mind and body; a
curious and important subject, in which, except the labours
of the phrenologists be received as science, little progress
has been made since his age. I might refer to his other
writings, more particularly to the wonderful little volume,
his Essays, for testimonies to the existence of the very
same spirit of mental investigation, though in these more
popular performances no longer confined within the strait
bonds of logical formularies. This is indeed only what
might be expected from a thinker, who, setting utility as
the great aim of philosophy, must have felt how important
is that science which teaches man to combine and arrange
his own experience, and out of its theorems to collect so
many rules whose utility is infinitely more extensive than
that of any material art whatever. What indeed is that
whole mass of writings, of which the *Novum Organum*
presents the result, but a series of contributions of the highest
value to those very sciences which their illustrious author
is accused of neglecting or despising? That a secret but
urgent determination to exalt, at any expense of precision,
his favourite philosopher, was at the bottom of this mis-
statement, I can scarcely doubt when I follow a little fur-
ther the brilliant course of this most eloquent professor,
and find him (*Cours de l'Histoire de la Phil. du XVIII.
Siècle*, Vol. I. p. 94, edit. 12mo.) discovering, in the plain
and unpretending rules which Descartes presents in his
*Tract. de Methodo* (general practical rules in the study of
nature), the whole substance of the minute and exquisite
directions which Bacon has so elaborately composed for
the construction of a theory. Descartes tells us that he
proposed to himself as invariable rules—as his entire code
of logical legislation—the following practical principles.
Their substance is this; 1st, to admit nothing as true which
the mind could hesitate about receiving; 2dly, to resolve
complicated difficulties into convenient parts; 3dly, to
begin with the simplest and easiest, and proceed to the
more difficult and composite; 4thly, to make a perfect
enumeration of every single particular concerned in the
question, and be sure to omit none. These are the famous
*Regulae Cartesianaec* which his Port Royal followers so highly
eulogize. That they are correct in a general sense, no one
will deny; that in the inventive mind of their great author
they were pregnant with speculations and discoveries, I
shall never question; but that, as presented to ordinary
thinkers, they contain anything either very novel in theory
or very useful in practice, I must take the liberty of doubting.
Far less can I admit that they include all that is of