value in the logical institutions of Bacon. Ifow M. Cousin establishes the point you may judge when I inform you, that, after stating that Descartes's "ut difficultates quas essem examinaturus, in tot partes dividerem, quot expediret ad illas commodius resolvendas," (Rule 2), (which you at once see is a mere general rule in the investigation of any question), is the same with the Baconian Physical Analysis, the "dissectio et anatomia mundi"—he next instructs us that the 3rd Rule of Descartes (which he terms the 4th), which counsels the progress in inquiry from the simple to the complex—"incipiendo ab aetate simplicissimis et cognitum facillimus, ut per gradus ad difficiliorum et magis compositarum cognitionem ascenderem"—that this, expressly stated by the author himself to be a rule in inquiry, is really the same with the Baconian synthesis, that art which, as M. Cousin truly defines it, "out of all the parts divided and successively examined and exhausted by analysis, reconstructs and forms a whole, a system;"—that the rule directing the mere pursuit of truth is the same with the rules that guide the now successful analyst as to the mode in which he should convert his analysis into theory. But, says M. Cousin, Bacon declares "mens humana si agat in materiem, naturam rerum et opera Dei contemplando pro modo naturae operatur et ab eadem determinatur; si ipsa in se vertatur, tanquam aranea texens telam, tum demum indeterminata est et parit telas quasdam doctrinæ tenuitata fili operisque mirabiles, sed quoad usum frivolas et inanes." Cousin translates the latter part of this admirable passage, "quand elle s'applique à l'âme elle n'aboutit qu'à des rêveries frivoles:" and this makes our great philosopher declare that observation applied to the mind can never lead to any but frivolous reveries. I suppose I need scarcely tell you that this version is a gross perversion of Bacon's purport; which was simply to discourage the preposterous efforts of the philosophy then popular to construct the physics of the external universe from ideal and arbitrary hypotheses.  

1 It may be interesting to compare the opinion of another critic with the judgment passed by Cousin. Dugald Stewart observes, "The merits of Bacon, as the Father of Experimental Philosophy, are so universally acknowledged, that it would be superfluous to touch upon them here. The lights which he has struck out in various branches of the Philosophy of Mind have been much less attended to; although the whole scope and tenor of his speculations shew, that to this study his genius was far more strongly and happily turned, than to that of the Material World. In the extent and accuracy of his physical knowledge he was far inferior to many of his predecessors; but he surpassed them all in his knowledge of the laws, the resources, and the limits of the human understanding. It would be difficult to name another writer prior to Locke whose works are enriched with so many just observations on the intellectual phenomena. Among these, the most valuable relate to Memory and
The brilliant reputation of M. Cousin can bear these spots, as well as the great name of Descartes could have stood without these exaggerated encomiums, and therefore I need not apologize for noticing them. Indeed, the powerful influence which M. Cousin must ever exercise over his readers obliges me the more strenuously to warn you that the usual catholicity of his philosophical spirit almost invariably narrows in estimating the merits and influence of Lord Bacon.

The great Englishman, then, was unquestionably a psychologist; and it is unjust to deny that his own comprehensive mind fully recognized the fertility and value of this province of inquiry. Nor surely has the influence of his views departed. The present improved state of psychology is indirectly his creation; for unquestionably it is due to the irresistible influence of the vast triumphs achieved by inductive observation in the external world. Hobbes sat by the side of Bacon himself; but, still more, Locke breathed the atmosphere of Newton. While "hypotheses non fingo" was echoing from every side of Europe, the psychologist grew ashamed of assuming passions and powers. Experience was questioned, classification began, and systems followed, which, differing abundantly from one another and from the truth, agreed, all of them, in the great principle that hearsay was no evidence in the courts of philosophy; and that nothing was to be admitted as a faculty which could not be proved as a fact.

That the speculative side of the Philosophy of Man was equally revealed to Lord Bacon, it would not be easy to establish. But neither was it disowning. Mere verbal subtleties indeed he abhorred and despised. Nor was it much to be wondered at, with a thousand barren years of them before him. But in his own statements of his philosophy truth of every kind is equally welcome. And he has not forgotten the metaphysical principles of nature and of the soul, either in his treatment of the subject of

Imagination, &c." Dissertation, i. p. 49. Of Descartes, Mr Stewart says:
"The glory of having pointed out to his successors the true method of studying the theory of Mind, is almost all that can be claimed by Descartes in logical and metaphysical science. Many important hints, indeed, may be gleaned from his works; but on the whole he has added very little to our knowledge of Human Nature." "Les mathématiques," says D'Alembert, quoted by Stewart, "font aujourd'hui la partie la plus solide et la moins contestée de la gloire de Descartes." The influence of Descartes on the Cambridge thinkers of the Restoration has not escaped Mr. Stewart, who instances John Smith, one of the "Cambridge Platonists" of that era. The Latin Orations of Barrow furnish testimony to the same effect and may have suggested Sir W. Hamilton's ill-natured and very untrue statement that Newton's discoveries were not appreciated by his Cambridge contemporaries and successors, who clung to Descartes in preference. After Newton it would be difficult to find a Cambridge Cartesian. Ed.]

Ed.]
natural theology, or in the physical and logical compartments which he has assigned to discussing the transcendant qualities and adventitious conditions of being. Circumstances however urged him to concentrate his energies where they were most demanded; and if his principal object was that of combining facts into theory, and if he did not fully penetrate the importance of vindicating the divinity of Reason, of Morality, of Love, we cannot perhaps censure him more than for not anticipating the Principia.

But though Bacon himself be acquitted, the philosophical revolution occasioned mainly by his writings may not be equally guiltless. Wisdom was not justified of her children. The great spirit of the master was confined and warped by his disciples. And from the habitual contemplation of material nature, where all facts are in themselves of equal dignity, the mind, in passing to itself, learned unconsciously to transfer the same undistinguishing level to this new and peculiar set of phenomena; and thus gradually sunk into the perilous error of seeing only a succession of appearances—sensitive, reasoning, moral, emotional—in the internal world of man; a succession of differing phenomena, indeed, for we can only recognize “succession” by difference; but a succession of phenomena not distinguished by any measure of relative importance, but the importance of mere duration and intensity. To express the same in the picture-language of imagination—as Bacon himself might have chosen to do—the student of material nature contemplates a vast and level plain, where, though there be compartments many and various, yet the only measure of distinction he recognizes is, as it were, the comparative value of the soils for purposes of utility.

[8] Bacon’s views of the relation of Religion to Philosophy (de Augm. Lib. III. 1, 2) are peculiar, and, as might have been anticipated, have called forth the censures of German historians of Philosophy (see Ritter, Gesch. d. Phil. x. p. 320, seq.). A passage which has been generally overlooked, throws an important light on this subject: “Neque enim a theologia mutuaremur, nisi etiam cum principis philosophiae conveniat.” (Lib. iv. c. 3). Of this “borrowing from theology” a very brilliant instance is furnished in the critique, from a Christian point of view, of the ancient theories of the Summum Bonum. (Ib. Lib. vii. c. 1). Ritter has the good sense to reject the preposterous opinion, revived by some recent writers, that Bacon’s Christianity was a mask assumed for the purpose of conciliating the theologians. But the profound theological views opened out in divers places by Bacon he has not found it within his scope to notice. How much, for instance, of the so-called “internal evidence” is condensed in the following pregnant sentence of the chapter last cited: “Nulla, omnibus seculis, reperta est vel lex vel disciplina, quae in tantum communiois bonum exaltavit, bonum vero individuelle depressit, quantum ides Christianam: unde liquido patet, numum eundemque Deumuisse, qui creatoris leges illas nature, hominibus vero legem Christianam decidisset.” On this text, the sequel, to the end of the chapter, is an exhaustive commentary. Ed.]
the different' amounts of rent which art can exact from each;—the student of man, if he understand his task aright, should contemplate a widely diversified landscape, where, if there be some expanses of level ground, and much that yields a rich return to interest, there are also heights which join with heaven, and whose altitude must itself be included as an essential element in every scientific survey of the country. To transfer to this latter region habits derived from familiarity with the former, is obviously to render your report mutilated and imperfect. This transference has in some measure been produced by the successes of inductive science. It has created the impulse of a true psychology, but it has tended to stunt the offspring it produced. But is this the error of Bacon? is this the fault of the induction with which his name is immor-
tally linked? No, it is the weakness of his followers,—or rather, the weakness of human nature itself, which cannot bear success without urging it to extravagance.

In vindicating to the cause of the mental philosophy the name and influence of this great authority, I may fittingly terminate this long argument. When "the god" was brought upon the ancient stage, it was a sign that the drama was closing.

Permit me to recall to you the simple basis upon which I have constructed the observations which have now occupied us for nearly two lectures. The argument, which began from the foundation of the subject, was this:—that all knowledge is valuable, and that the mental philosophy is a real portion of knowledge. The major proposition we vindicated from objections; and the more zealously, because those objections are peculiarly directed against this very species of inquiry. The proof of the minor we rested upon two propositions,—that the mind is subject to laws, and that its laws are subject to discovery. The arguments for the former proposition I recapitulated when commencing the present lecture. The arguments for the latter were partly the same with those for the former (as might be expected,—for it is by the discovery of the laws, in some measure, that we know them to exist); partly derived from the phenomena of language, partly from the fact of actual progress in the pursuit; but chiefly from the very nature of the case, which exhibits the mind as possessing adequate means for effecting a series of observations of its own phe-
omena, and for reducing their multiplicity into the har-
monious unity of science. From these premisses thus based upon undeniable observation, the required conclusion seems irresistibly to flow,—that the Philosophy which has for its objects the ascertainment of the principles of the human
mind, and the statement of their value, is (in its simplest character) deserving of the attention of intelligent men. It offers itself as a contribution to the mass of knowledge; that claim is shewn to be legitimate; and such a claim, supposed legitimate, involves a title to universal reception.
LECTURE VI.

GENTLEMEN,

Were I to confine myself to the argument which has been stated and enforced in the last two lectures, I should do but scanty justice to my subject. It is an argument of weight, and properly preliminary to all others. But the advocate of mental philosophy is not content with establishing, that, as a genuine portion of science, it deserves the cultivation which is deserved by all science. Were the astronomer to vindicate his sublime and interesting pursuits by an argument which was equally applicable to the laborious classifier of animalcules, you would consider that he had coldly defended his cause; were the Philosopher of Man to share arguments with the astronomer himself, perhaps he would vindicate his calling as inadequately!

It is with this view that I proceed to assert, not only that this Science prefers claims in common with all, but that in the dignity of its object it surpasses all.

I might, upon this topic, without assuming the responsibility of a single statement of my own, and with the slight trouble which the consultation of indexes requires, enrich this hour's discourse with testimonies the most varied and brilliant from writers of every age. You cannot be ignorant how unbroken is the chain of evidence which attests the universal conviction of man, that in the Principle of Thought there lives a something essentially superior to all which in this scene of existence is connected with it. So elevating is the influence of the habitual use of the intellectual powers, that this conviction discovers itself interwoven with systems whose professed object is to discountenance it; and the secret tendency of reasoning habits continually counteracts the conclusions themselves of the reasoning. I scarcely except from this remark even that tissue of degrading sophistry which in the last century polluted a Christian age with corruptions which the worst forms of heathen speculation never equalled. By a striking coincidence of opposite tendencies, at the very moment that the French philosophers were straining every nerve to annul the distinctions of man and brute, they were en-
gaged in continual vindications of the independence and authority of reason; and the same page which argued that the watchmaker and his watch are equally mechanical arrangements and equally perishable dust, was enlivened by violent rejections against those fanatics who would dare to bar the free intelligence of man from winging its glorious ascent through all the spheres of truth. A few ounces of cerebral matter which prejudice baptizes as "the Soul," at one time, at another this marvellous dust claims the universe as its inheritance. As long as scepticism is unpopular, or at least resisted, these contradictory results are indeed inevitable; the sceptic having to flourishes the sword of reason's independence with the one hand, while the other is on the throat of this infant of the skies to choke its holy breathings for the better world.

But even apart from this necessity of position, the very tendency of philosophical habits is indirectly to increase the philosopher's exalted estimate of the mind. In fact his own interests are embarked in the intellectual vessel which he charters for the voyage of discovery. He cannot but feel that if the mind be worthless his own labours must participate in its worthlessness; few reasoners will, thus (except for the poor prize of eccentricity) abandon to contempt the chosen occupation of years; and I strongly suspect that no philosopher ever depreciated the human soul who did not reserve a secret exception for his own! These are not high motives; they are, however, human ones. But it would be unfair to assert that they stand alone, even in that lowest form of the sceptical philosophy which we are now regarding. The uniformity of the testimony which reflective science in all—even its most unworthy—modifications is found to bear to the essential dignity of the soul of man, is interwoven in the very nature of the reflective process itself. The habit of speculation, what is it but the purest form of internal freedom, and the most definite type of progress? In almost everything else subordinated to laws which we feel an incumbrance, here alone we are governed by laws which, if we perceive them at all, we perceive only as the guides and perfecters of liberty. It is true that obscurities shadow the path of progress, it is true that in this vast enigma of the Moral and Physical World truth hides itself under every form of perplexity; yet even the very defeats of the mind are triumphs; for this "reaction infers action," and to have failed in the attempt supposes the power of attempting. To him who contemplates philosophical history as the revelation of the powers and destinies of the Human Intellect—the Human Intellect which for some thirty centuries back has been the One
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Hero of all that wondrous story—to his view there is nothing but victory, and repulse itself is progress! Now, I say, that in the mind of the speculator himself, this peculiar character of intellectual activity—its superiority to bondage or subjection, and its felt capability of constant and growing development—cannot but separate itself from every other part of the thinker's experience, whatever be the strain or tendency of his thoughts. And though his aim be to write himself down to the brute, still, if he pursue that aim in the melancholy sincerity of conviction, he cannot but feel that in the very process of pursuing the unhappy conclusion he seeks, he is wandering among the high grounds of nature; that the man is there eminently man; and that, disguise or distort it as he may, to every habitual speculator the distinguishing essence of his being is to be found in his mind!

As I understand it, then, it is from motives and convictions of these various kinds, that the almost invariable attestation of reasoners of every cast to the essential dignity of the reasoning mind arises. And though in some of these cases the value of the testimony is considerably impaired by tracing its motive, yet in the last-mentioned, which is far the most important, we certainly have no right to think so. For here the rights and privileges of mind are disclosed in the practice of its faculties; the discovery is no illegitimate result of collateral prejudices; it is a conviction carrying its own evidence, and no more a prejudice than the confident belief of an eye-witness can be termed a "prejudice of sense." And I repeat, that these convictions are altogether irrespective of the express philosophical views of those who have avowedly professed or unconsciously betrayed them; except indeed as far as the opposition may be regarded as heightening the value of a conviction which thus subsists in defiance of every effort to destroy it.

That this argument of universal attestation can be derived with even greater force from the cultivators of moral excellence, I suppose it is unnecessary to remind you. If even perverted intellect is forced to recognize its own dignity, how much more completely does the noble bondsman of duty feel that his "service" is indeed "perfect freedom," and that the essence, whatever it be, in which the principle of virtue inheres is that on earth from which the next step is to heaven.

I trust you will not imagine that this question of the supreme value of the mental portion of our complex nature is one too trite to engage you. Believe me it is only very superficial thinkers who fail to perceive the fundamental
importance of correct and definite notions upon such points as these. Your views upon the very question with which I am now endeavouring to interest you, are in fact the views which will determine, or have already perhaps unconsciously determined, the side you assume in the great contest which, subsisting since the fall and to endure till the restoration, pervades every sphere of life—individual, social, political—the side of faith or of disbelief, of hope or of distrust, of charity or of selfishness. Your practical theory—from whatever source derived, and on whatever considerations founded—as to the nature, dignity, and importance of the mind you bear, is the determining element of every other practical theory whatever.

A great question here occurs, for a great authority has not yet been cited.

We are arguing a case of evidence—the uniform testimony of mental labourers to the peculiar dignity of their labour. Now, in searching for such evidences, I suppose there are few inquirers whose first impulse would not be rather to approach the oracles of ancient than of modern philosophy, or if at all the latter, those only or eminently who have drunk deepest of these primal fountains of thought. Are we then to conclude that these high conceptions of the mind belong chiefly to antiquity, and that the mighty event, which, revolutionizing the civilized world, created the distinction of modern and ancient, fails to encourage or to justify these great convictions? If so, with whatever reluctance, it is our duty, and I trust our determination, to relinquish or to modify them. But is it so?

I shall concede, then, that at first view the influences of Christianity do not appear favourable to this exalted estimate; and that it is even possible that they have indirectly tended to remove the splendour of such views from our general philosophical literature. The spirit of Christianity, so far as it is depressive and humiliating, cannot certainly be said to present lofty portraiture of man in those very same words and sentences in which it is engaged convicting or condemning him. And if there be any speculator who descends into his laboratory of speculation, from an exclusive study of these words and sentences, it is not only possible, but probable, or certain, that impressions thus received will manifest themselves among his subsequent processes of thought. And in this way the effects complained of as discoverable in general literature may be granted as true; and accounted for as natural; and this, without any slight to either Religion or Philosophy; with some censure, perhaps, of those who contemplate both too narrowly.
Christianity, however, possesses a double aspect, and Literature is a word of wide signification; and contemplating both in their fulness, I have no doubt you will perceive how real is the testimony which the highest of all authorities lends to the conclusion I have been so anxious to establish as to the peculiar dignity of the Mind—the subject of our studies. But it asks a little thought, and perhaps a little candour also.

Observe, then, that it would be unreasonable to expect from Christianity a species of attestation wholly foreign to the range and purpose of the revelation. But if this would be unreasonable to expect, it is one degree more unreasonable to build an argument on the absence of that which it was unreasonable to expect. This is the simplest general reply (and the best where it is inconvenient to descend to special inquiry) to the objection to our conclusion derived from the absence in the Christian revelation of testimonies to the dignity of the INTELLECTUAL powers of man. Granting the assumption, whether true or false, to be true, I reply, that it would be strange indeed if a revelation expressly, and (for all we can see) exclusively, concerned with the moral and spiritual man, were to waste its momentous influences in supplying those intellectual excitement which were beyond its aim, and which nature will always be found of itself adequate to supply. . . . Turn then to the objection derived from the spirit of its MORAL views of humanity as a lowly and dependent nature. Can we derive, it is asked, any support to an assertion of mental dignity out of elements so unpromising as these? Gentlemen, they form its strongest support. In truth, to what a height does this marvellous system elevate the nature to which it proffers these lowly counsels! How inapplicable would they be to any but the most exalted! How majestic is the dependence which is dependence on a God! how lofty the humility which bows only to Heaven!

But further,—you are to remember, that beyond the moral man of antiquity, this Faith proposes itself as creating another, a SPIRITUAL man. Now, though it be true that most discussions concerning this spiritual nature, by habitually excluding from their own sacred region every inferior topic, separate their spiritual philosophy from all the other departments of mental speculation or science; yet, as, whatever be the process of this supernatural agency, the mind is certainly its subject, so all which is believed and established of the former should really be set to the account of the privileges and dignities of the latter. In this high and mysterious point of view, which realizes the expression of St Peter, and makes a portion of mankind
literally "partakers of the divine nature," I suppose it will scarcely be denied that Christianity justifies the loftiest conceptions which philosophy can form as to the essential or acquired greatness of the human mind.

But why should I pause upon this? The fundamental doctrine of Christianity is one which exalts human nature to a degree even more prodigious. The assumption of that nature by the Creator of it brings us to a point where conception absolutely fails—where the light of imagination goes out—where language moves without ideas—where all is lost in one vast and vague emotion of awe at the contemplation of ourselves! awe at the glimpse this amazing story gives us of the immeasurable importance of our human nature in the system and counsels of the universe! This doctrine, and all it brings with it, are exclusively Christian. Though it seems to me, the more I consider it as a subject of speculation, to be the very perfection of reason, and to take its position with the most symmetrical beauty at the head of all religious truth, it does not appear to have been ever anticipated as a tenet among the imaginary creeds of antiquity—at least (for we must not forget a sort of monstrous caricature-semblance in some of the follies of the Indian mythology) in any sense or purpose at all similar to those of the revealed doctrine. The common mythology of Paganism and Christianity, indeed, exhibits an apparent and momentary agreement in this union of the divine and human natures; for the gods of Greece and Rome were exaggerated forms of humanity; and it may perhaps be asked, whether, if we reject the testimony which pagan deifications offer to the dignity of the human spirit, we have any right to seize with such earnestness the similar testimony afforded by this article of the Christian faith? We reply (even apart from the very different value of the two authorities—the inspiration of God revealing His mighty purposes, and the folly of man pursuing his poor delusions), that there is no real similarity in the cases as to that point which alone concerns the argument. The argument is, that Christianity attests the priceless value of the human nature in publishing the assumed manhood of a God. The case alleged to be similar must therefore be found to propose as a doctrine the two members of the union, respectively real and complete. But, properly understood, there is no God in the Pagan incarnation. The divine element is wanting. The idolatrous worshipper of deified humanity did not unite deity to man, but substituted man in the place of deity. Now, to degrade the conception of God is not to elevate that of man; and hence, even if the anthropomorphism of Paganism had been true, it would have
failed in adding a particle of testimony to our assertion of the dignity of the human spirit. While on the contrary, Christianity, incorporating in the history and fortunes of humanity the genuine God undefrauded of one ray of his attributes, lifts the manhood thus consecrated by the presence and inhabitancy of the Godhead; and, as a consequence of this communion of the natures, actually exalts the human essence by every lineament of grandeur which it adds to the divine!

The evidence, then, which the faith bears to this point, instead of being doubtful, or hostile, is express and favourable: instead of clouding, it illuminates the prospect of humanity, and thence allows us to give to our cultivation of the Science of Mind every motive that can be derived from believing our subject to be of the highest importance, and believing it on the highest conceivable authority.

I have now concluded, I hope so as to satisfy your convictions, such comments as I thought it useful to offer upon the evidence borne by systems inspired and uninspired, to the dignity of the essence whose laws you are to study. And with this appeal to authority I should, content myself, were there not one peculiar attribute of mind which from its character of surpassing greatness it would be impossible to omit in any review of its claims. You of course anticipate that I allude to its immortality. Upon this subject the decisive information of revealed religion has reversed the course of argument. Antiquity argued the immortality of Spirit from its dignity; I, on the contrary, have to remind you of the dignity on the assumption of the immortality.

The general proposition, that that which is immortal in its nature, and immortally conscious, must to itself and in itself possess the highest rank in a world of perishables, is too obvious for detailed proof. This day, indeed, I have been chiefly engaged in endeavouring to show you the depth and value of truths which we commonly neglect as too trite for consideration, attempting that most difficult task for writer or lecturer, to interest you with views whose real importance we are constantly so apt to forget, while we are familiar to weariness with the words expressing them—the husk and shell of thought; but this portion of our argument, its great premiss once granted, no effort at explaining or impressing it, can, I believe, confirm. “Elucidation” here can only obscure; like those modifications of light which, as opticians shew us, result in absolute darkness.

It is of more consequence to observe how this great truth operates to heighten the value of our own science. It
is a weighty consideration, that there is no just conclusion here formed which is not formed to last for ever. Some of the truths of this science are in their essence eternal; others share the immortality of the soul to which they belong. We deal here with an imperishable material. That the physics of the conscious being are destined to be wholly unalterable, we do not indeed assert; but surely in some of its chief laws and principles we may fairly assume it so. And in that case reflect that a discovery now ascertained may be considered as ascertained for eternity. The laws of all the visible elements of the universe may vanish; the discoveries of science, as far as they are experimental discoveries, may yet be superseded by laws and relations of a different character, if a reason should exist to command the alteration; but, from the nature of the system to which he belongs, the principal laws of the conscious being may be presumed to be inwoven in its permanent identity, and thence to be its laws for ever. But however this may be—

and I admit that certainty is not attainable upon such a point—there assuredly is a view in which the present constituents of our immortal nature are themselves immortal. They are immortal in their consequences. Upon the moral aspect of these elements eternal results are suspended; and thus a character of eternal moment is impressed upon all scientific conclusions as to their nature and authority. Judge then with what reverential caution they should be examined! However high may be your estimate of the discovery of wisdom in the physical creation, you must not forget that in this peculiar study you traverse the selected theatre of God’s divinest operating. The special gift which is termed the Freedom of the Human Will comes to increase the unique importance of the subject, and to individualize it from all others. In the physical arrangements of inanimate nature the Divine Governor orders simply; in this alone He orders if—here only He establishes a conditional legislation and in a manner suspends Himself upon us!...All these things may teach you to acknowledge the dignity of the Human Mind, and the corresponding dignity of the science which investigates it. And with these remarks I conclude an argument, in which, if I have not been able to interest you, I implore you to attribute the defect to my weakness and not to the subject itself, which is incomparably the noblest that can occupy the thoughts of man. I earnestly hope that the minds of many here, self-evidencing their own dignity, have anticipated me, if not in the letter, at least in the spirit, of these reasonings.

Observe the position of our argument. We have now shewn that the Mental Philosophy is a science, and that it
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Dignity of Mental Science further illustrated. Its supremacy, and supervision of all particular departments of science.

Opinion. Scientific experience anterior to logical rules. Answers to objection.


is the science of the greatest of earthly subjects. Properly speaking, this is to have completed the discussion of the question; yet a few additional details may serve to adorn or illustrate our case.

You may remember that in the first Lecture which I had the honour of presenting to you, I stated the position of universal supremacy which the Science of Mind (in its most comprehensive form) occupies in relation to all other sciences. In order to assist the arrangement of your thoughts, I must remind you that everything which was then laid down belongs directly to this division of our subject; and was then introduced rather to arrest your attention from the outset, by shewing you at once the benefits of the study, than with any very precise adherence to methodical order. The supervision which the General Philosophy exercises over all the particular departments of inquiry in encouraging, restraining, directing them, was intimated; and I may add, that in many of the scientific reports of our own day its harmonizing and systematic spirit is eminently conspicuous. The miner of mathematical and chemical truth may for a long period work in the dark of a particular problem, because he knows he is in the right place for the discovery of treasure; but if new veins are to be sought and worked, the head-engineers will come above ground and survey the aspect and indications of the country.

But it may be objected to this statement, that these practical principles in the logic of inquiry are oftener collected out of the experience of discoverers than independently invented as guides to discovery. In the first place it may be answered, that as long as the objection is stated in only this comparative form (and it cannot be otherwise stated with truth), it really advances nothing which we are called upon to deny. Further, it cannot be disputed that, whenever it may have been formally stated, the logical principle itself must have tacitly existed in the mind of the first discoverer who obeyed it. In the very act of abandoning a false science for the path of just inquiry, he was himself guided by that latent logic which after ages were to extract and condense from his writings or example. But besides this, it is, upon other grounds, of eminent utility that the methods of inquiry should, however discovered, be reduced to rules. These rules, succinctly stated and constantly enforced, preserve in the minds of investigators a definite test to which appeal can rapidly be made, and impress as first principles what without such remembrances could only be derived, incidentally and precariously, from a crowd of examples and a long previous scien-
scientific experience. No one, surely, who is at all conversant with the history of modern science, can doubt that the purely logical writings which have illustrated and defended the method of induction, have powerfully aided in securing to it that happy supremacy which renders at this day the philosophic public justly intolerant of any physical inquiry of facts in which it is forsaken. Still less can any judicious inquirer doubt the influence of the purely logical treatises in which it was first adequately proposed and vindicated.

The position, origin, utility of Poetical Criticism may serve to illustrate these views of this part of logic, which is indeed the criticism of inquiry. It is most true that the rules of poetical criticism are usually collected from the examples which genius has spontaneously offered; yct it is most certain that the silent criticism of taste operated in the poet's original performance, and still more manifest, that it is of utility, that the direction of his splendid course should be mapped down in its principal points as a guiding chart to subsequent voyagers; that what in him was the almost unconscious instinct of taste should become to future ages the definite rules and decisions of judgment. If this be of unquestionable advantage in the case of criticism, I suppose the same or greater value can scarcely be refused to the analogous systems of logic. It is true that both this logic and this criticism are in some measure framed as the "physical" conclusions of a wide induction; but surely their practical utility as lights to guide the path of future invention is not diminished by a circumstance which only adds strength and certainty to their declara-

Besides these considerations, which both answer objections and illustrate the subject itself, there is one additional characteristic belonging to the logic, and to the criticism, and indeed to all the practical maxims whatever, that are deduced from our science; it is this, that the student con-

nually receives the maxims in connexion with their rea-

sons. They come as the last inferences from a long train of preceding proofs; a position which, whether they be maxims of reasoning, taste, action, or manners, is pecu-

liarly calculated to ensure not merely correct principles but permanent and comprehensive ones. The rules are premised to be as permanent as their causes, and at the same time to receive all modifications which their causes justify. By being rooted deep among the first laws of the mind, they acquire a strength which secures them from being shaken by the blasts of passion or prejudice; at the same time that by being constantly referred to their causes they vary as these vary; and are thus at once resolute.
against every wrong impulse and flexible to every right one, a combination of qualities unattainable by any means but this scientific analysis of practice. How beautiful is it to see the maxims of daily life, like so many isolated physical laws, reduced under the sovereignty of a few mental principles,—the Newton of the market-place finding facts for his philosophy in every transitory attitude of our human nature!

Maxims, and other such aphoristic principles, of speculation or practice, when not thus systematically deduced, are liable, though true, to two evils, either to be received with suspicion, or to be received with an exaggerated and unmerited approbation. 1st, Aphorisms are peculiarly liable, though true, to be rejected by accidental prejudices, and this for the simple reason, that they contain nothing calculated to meet the prejudice. Stray truths of this form, cast in among a heap of unwelcoming prejudices, fall upon an unprepared soil, and have nothing in them capable of tempering it; being unable, therefore, to grapple with this ungenial mould, they wither at once; or, to change the comparison, they are like those hypertrophic masses that sometimes grow into connexion with the animal body, but which being unvisited by the circulation, and having little or no dependence upon the general system of the frame, gradually loosen their feeble hold, and detach themselves almost unnotice from the limb they but encumbered. I have said, 2ndly, that maxims separated from their metaphysical proofs, are apt to impose on the reader by an undue appearance of depth and importance. This may be accounted for without much difficulty. Truths are valued in proportion to their universality and their novelty; that is to say, of truths equally universal the value is as the novelty, and of truths equally novel the value is in proportion to the universality of their application. The appearance of both is possessed by the maxim. For as to novelty, if the various premisses were given (that is, if the maxim were changed into the inference) we should at once perceive how much we had really known of the matter in hand,—"really known," I say, for it is certain that these premisses must have been all actually under our observation and knowledge, or we could not have instantaneously acknowledged the force of the conclusion. The conclusion (which is the maxim) is the only part of the whole which we did not know before; instead of being (as we are apt to imagine in its detached state on the page of Swift or La Rochefoucauld) a proposition as wholly novel as the qualities of some new-found metal, we find it (in its inferential position) only the
condensed form of familiar truths. On the other hand, as to the illusive universality of maxims: this form of boundless applicability which they affect, and which causes so much of our admiration of them, is really in few or no cases strictly admissible. Now this delusion would be impossible, and the admiration which is founded on it therefore suspended, if the maxim were introduced at the close of the reasoning which justified it; for then the conclusion would be qualified and limited by the extent of the premisses. I do not know whether you have ever observed that the most prolific maxim-makers in the world are men in a passion. Nothing short of universal propositions satisfy them. This is not merely that the mind has no time to pause upon exceptions, but that anger refuses to admit them. Rochefoucauld, anatomising mankind's poor virtues, in his study commences his terrible catalogue with the dexterous salvo of a "souvent;" La Rochefoucauld in a rage would have sternly refused quarter to any fraction of humanity, and found the vices of a world little enough to supply fuel for his frenzy.

I ought to add to these explanations of the illusive excellences of aphoristic writing, the deception produced by reading a number of them successively. The mind usually estimates the depth of any remark by the distance of that remark (supposed true) from its own conclusions on the same subject: and therefore the less it can discover its own depth, the greater will appear the depth of the author studied. Now in the rapid and dazzling succession of thoughts wholly detached from each other, the reader has not time to form or settle his own conclusions; the watrs of the intellect are too disturbed to allow of his seeing their natural depth; and all which is lost to his own powers is transferred to those of his author. I need not remind you that writers of great systematic clearness and continuity flatter the intellect of a reader into the opposite delusion, and lose a portion of their fame as thinkers from their excellence as expositors. What confirms this explanation of the illusory value produced by the rapidity of the succession is this, that a maxim-writer who perpetually changes his subject impresses us with a higher estimate of the profundity of his observations than one who divides his book into chapters and heads,—La Rochefoucauld, for instance, than La Bruyère; or than La Rochefoucauld himself in that edition (of Amelot de la Houssaye, I think,) in which his maxims are classified by subjects. The deception, I may observe, is not at all unlike that produced by the rapid manoeuvres of legerdemain, in which the power of evading the detec-
tion of the spectator depends on the incapability of the mind to pursue as fast as the practised organs of the juggler move.

From the remarks before made it will be evident that aphoristic writing is employed with greatest advantage on subjects of manners, because there the suppressed proofs are remembered rapidly, being usually matter of common observation, and because in that field no one expects or requires more than a general and customary truth; this being, indeed, all which we have to guide us in our own rules of experience. In philosophy this aphoristic method is best used in stating queries and conjectures (as Newton has employed it), or in any other office preliminary to new enterprises of science. Lord Bacon's peculiar reason for selecting it, which I quoted in a former lecture—though modest indeed for him—is eminently adapted to all inferior discoverers. With him, however, to write in aphorism arose, I would say, from the predominating spirit of his inductive habits; he stated universal propositions as he stated particular facts—in lists and tables for separate rejection or separate acceptance,—strung together like a chain of experiments, where each rests on its own exclusive merits.

To a person, then, whose sole or principal object is the simple possession of truth, whether attractive or unattractive,—or rather, to whom truth can never be unattractive,—there can be little doubt that the habit of constantly descending from the great general principles of the mind to the explanation of all the practical rules of life and conduct as instances, must be peculiarly satisfactory. He must feel that every special case receives dignity when it enshrines a general principle, and that every general principle receives interest when it is capable of constantly embodying itself in actual practice.

To this most valuable attribute of Moral Science one popular objection still remains,—the everlasting burden of cursory and feeble thinkers. It is urged that the habit of investigating the reasons and origin of practice weakens the supremacy of beautiful, and happy, and beneficial illusions. The metaphysician is declared to be the iconoclast of a religion in which, though the deities be phantoms, the pleasure of the worship is at least no phantom. We reject, they cry, that wisdom where to be wise is to be miserable; the only truth we recognize is happiness! and the sovereign logic for us is that logic of the heart which shews the way to it!

To all this the simplest answer would, of course, be contained in an honest appeal to the whole Nature of
Man, which includes an element of obligation; which obligatory principle imperatively commands the pursuit of all that is right; which right must in many cases turn upon the nature of ourselves, and the scene around us,—the investigation of which, and their relations, is the investigation of Moral Truth. But a lower ground may be a more persuasive one. We affirm, then, that the mere calculator of happinesses must remember that the human being has indissoluble connexions with the past and future as well as the present; and that the great drama which exhibits the spousals of Truth and Happiness should really be contemplated as occupying a theatre far more extensive than these reasoners conceive of. In the criticism of this great work, is it fair to judge of the author's style, or of his intended dénouement, by the glance of a minute at a single scene in the midst of the intricacies of the plot? But an answer more intelligible still is found in denying the assumption made. We allege that Truth, in its discovery and its possession, conveys pleasures both nobler and more permanent than those of the illusions it banishes. Let Poetry itself declare; for Poetry is of course the recognized expression of these emotions. When the poet Campbell, in one of the most popular utterances of these childish pleasures of ignorance, contemplates the rainbow, he exclaims—

"I ask not proud philosophy
To tell me what thou art!"

Observe now whether the same object may not minister to a very opposite source of poetic pleasure.

"Nor ever yet"
says Äkenside—

"The melting rainbow's vermeil-tinctured hues
To me have shown so pleasing, as when first
The hand of Science pointed out the path
In which the sunbeams, gleaming from the west,
Fall on the watery cloud."

Such is the versatility of the poetic faculty, that it can attach itself to every form of thought; and the imagination of man has the same peculiar endowment as that which exalts his bodily constitution among animals—that of living undestroyed in every climate. Nor are harmless illusions dissolved by analysing them. We seem to see distance after a thousand perusals of Berkeley; and the illusive connexion of happiness with the past (one of the most interesting of psychological facts) remains as powerful as ever on the evening of a day spent in speculating on the cause of it. "What then," it will be asked, "is the benefit
of the speculation whose result seems so abortive? This,—
that we disarm the prejudice of any power of evil, while we
retain its power of soothing and enchanting; we preserve
the opiate that tranquillizes, while we neutralize the poison
that kills. Besides this, illusions will still be plenty for
those who love them. We widen indeed our circle of
vision as we rise in science above the surface of facts; but
for those who delight in contemplating them, clouds will
still wrap the distant, as truly as the more contracted hori-
zon; shaping themselves no less promptly into every form
which the breath of Fancy can mould, and receiving as
before every gorgeous hue which the light of Genius can
pour down to illumine them. But, above all, remember
that in Truth itself is beauty, and in the perception of it
pleasure. What spectator is not animated with delight at
the contemplation of the order and proportion of a noble
specimen of architecture? Yet all this order and propor-
tion are purely intellectual conceptions of the spectator's
mind, and as invisible to the brute as to the blind. And
such conceptions as these, coming midway between mind
and matter, may form a stepping-stone to that pleasure
still more exclusively mental which arises from contem-
plating the noble architecture of truths symmetrically
ordered, each supported by its antecedent and supporting
its successor, the remotest parts connected by reciprocal
correspondences, and all uniting into the grand single and
finished harmony which is called a science.
LECTURE VII.

GENTLEMEN,

As (contrary to my original expectation) this is the last time that I can hope for the pleasure of addressing you, it will be my object to make the present Lecture as much as possible supplementary to those which have preceded it, a receptacle for observations collateral to the principal argument; in short to make it serve the purpose of those resting-places upon a military march where stragglers are collected that have incidentally detached themselves from the steady progress of the main line. As even here, however, some regularity will tend both to my own and to your prompt intelligence of the subjects noticed, I may premise, that we shall consider, in the first place, some additional topics illustrative of the value of our present pursuits—topics derived both from the peculiar character of the age in which we live, and from the operation of metaphysical studies upon the mind independently of ages or æras. In the second place, we shall pass, by an easy transition, from the utility of this philosophy as a discipline to a cursory consideration of those difficulties which make a principal part of that utility. And, in the last place, we shall glance at the moral spirit which should direct and colour all inquiries into the nature and destinies of man. I do not offer these views as complete; my time permits me to do little more than hint and insinuate the truth. Indeed, an attempt at completeness would be vain under any circumstances. Every hour that I consider these topics—and I mention this not from personal motives, but sincerely to encourage your pursuit of them—I find the prospect they open to widen until it is almost lost in infinity.

In continuation, then, of the topic on which we were engaged for the last few lectures, the importance of the study of Universal Metaphysics, of metaphysics in each of its divisions, whether simply as the inductive physics of the consciousness, or more profoundly, as the science of the reality, extent, and value of human knowledge, (let me rather say, the value of humanity itself in all its varieties of
reasoning, emotion, action, as the great problem of the universe)—I would call your attention to the peculiar force of its claims in the circumstances of the age into which you are born, and the spirit of which you are all destined either to perpetuate or to obstruct, by your example in espousing or opposing it. It is no flattery to tell you this; the omnipotence of example is wielded by the humblest of your fellow-creatures. Every atom, even those beyond the grasp of the microscope, contributes to the force of a mass of matter in motion; and that great aggregate which we call an age or æra of history is but the enormous compound of a multitude of elements individually almost invisible. If, then, you wish to join in the spirit of the age, you must understand it in order to contribute to it; if you prefer to counteract it, you must equally understand it in order to do so effectually. Now I say that one of the dominant, perhaps indeed the dominant, characteristic of the existing age is the tendency to restless examination of the principles of all things. What are the popular subjects of discussion? In politics, the ground and origin of subordination; discussing of national wealth, the nature of wealth itself and of value ("Political Economy," as a theory, being indeed the direct growth of this spirit of analysis applied to finance); in theology, the fundamental rule of all faith and the privileges of the church as an interpreter; in logic, the final authority of reason itself; in morals, the essence of duty. Nay, we might advance into regions of thought less liable to external or accidental influences. In physics, the ultimacy of the laws of motion has been lately made the subject of disquisition (by Prof. Powell); and in pure mathematics themselves (the most remote of all studies from the operation of outward and social tendencies), inquiries into the nature of the different species of quantity which make the subject of its different branches, have attracted much interest. However you determine about cases like these, considered as instances of a common principle, cases where the chain of dependencies would seem so attenuated as to be almost imperceptible, about the former; the instances derived from the moral and political sciences, I believe you can have little difficulty in perceiving that the analytic tendency is truly the great characteristic of the public mind. How this marked and prominent character has arisen, I cannot at present pause to discuss at any length; the admission of the fact is all I require. When you reflect upon the pervading influence of all revolutions in political opinion, you will probably agree with me that in the growth of democratic principles may be found at least a leading
cause. The specific character of the polemics of republicanism is the tendency to publicity, inquiry, censure; in short, to that which, transported into the sphere of philosophy, becomes the spirit of bold examination into the principles of all things, the spirit of audacious and indefatigable analysis. Commencing in political discussion, its very spirit, that of pursuing inquiry to the utmost, must urge it through every topic with which political opinions are connected; while again, the philosophical habits in their turn powerfully react upon the practical. With how intimate a bond these opposite regions are united, it cannot be necessary to suggest either to those who honoured a former lecture with their attention, or indeed to those who are at all conversant with the writings or the history of speculations to which the present age has given birth. Such must have seen that the philosophy of human nature in any age is usually the condensed expression of that age; that it is the refined and sublimated spirit which, diluted and diffused, takes shape as the habits and manners of the people. It is the logic of the public practice; the grounds and reasons which each generation presents to the tribunal of time as its memorial and justification. The history is the philosophy in action; the philosophy, the history in speculation; they are (to borrow a scholastic metaphor) the matter and the form (or idea) of the times. The reciprocal action of these elements is powerful and perpetual; and has been more and more evidently so ever since the press has given an almost instantaneous ubiquity to thought.

From that time in popular convulsions rival principles have begun to lead parties where rival passions led before; and men have sought to maintain not only beliefs, but opinions. It was so in the great Reformation, where Christianity indeed was made the external scene of conflict, and supplied the weapons and the uniform, but where the human mind itself, panting for free thought, and the principle of authority that would perpetuate its fetters, were the real combatants. It was so in the terrible century of religious war that followed, down to the Treaty of Westphalia. It was the same contest of principles that, just as religious toleration was secured abroad, broke out on questions of government in the great civil war of England; and that was happily suspended by our Revolution. It was the same secret but burning zeal for theoretic perfection against practical deficiencies that exploded at last in the terrific volcano of the French Revolution; the most tremendous battle of principles the world ever saw, and certainly the most misguided; but still in its essence a battle of principles. I need not tell you that a similar
contest of rival principles subsists to this day; and that now, as for the last 300 years, the passions and the party-feelings are the body to which principles—be they right or wrong—are still the soul. And though the "contest for opinions" is commonly decried as the worst form of human folly, I confess I have eyes sharp enough in the detection of good, to find in even this folly an element of hope and indications prophetic of a happy future. Before I pass to reminding you of the conclusion I am drawing from these facts, I pause for a moment to shew you the nature of the influence which the press has had in producing them; and I trust that the vast importance of the subject, and its frequency as a topic of discussion, will justify the momentary digression. The easy and rapid dissemination of thoughts is the usual, the true, and in its form the most general, solution of the question; but in being thus general it is also, perhaps, somewhat vague and indistinct. It is quite obvious that rapid dissemination is, in itself, unimportant for either good or evil. A series of unmeaning combinations of the twenty-six letters of the alphabet would work no change upon mankind, though the copies were multiplied by all the presses of Europe, and transmitted by all its posts. Now, remembering that our question is founded upon a very important change—namely, the spread of contests in which great theoretical principles are involved, as contrasted with contests arising out of pure caprice or passion—we must look beyond that which in itself is inadequate to produce any change; that is, we must look to the other element of the press—the nature of the thoughts disseminated, in order to understand the influence of the dissemination. Consider then that the two modes of communicating mental influences are Writing and Speech. What is the character of written dissertation as contrasted with oratorical appeals? This, that all the accessory arts by which oratory succeeds in persuading through the feelings being excluded, a more habitual appeal to the reasoning powers becomes inevitable. Written matter tends (I speak only of tendencies on the whole) towards discussion of principles, and spoken matter towards vivid picturing of details. Thus—to draw an illustration from the combination of both—a nation governed by written speeches invariably inclines (we know the instance of a neighbouring country) towards speculative politics. The real force of the press, therefore, in raising principles into the vanguard of action, and making the Reason of things the great rallying-point in public consideration, is to be traced immediately to its power of rapid dissemination, but ultimately and chiefly to that inevitable tendency of writ-
ten thought to dwell more upon reasons and principles than upon habits and passions.

I return to the conclusion which I am anxious to impress upon your minds. If (from whatever cause) the analysis of principles both in action and speculation be the predominating character of modern times, and more peculiarly the character of the present age, an acquaintance with the ultimate laws of the mind, and with that master science which holds in its hand the last link of every chain of thought, rises from the dignity of a fine accomplishment to the intrinsic authority of a necessary and fundamental attainment. In such an age—not to be habituated to the analysis of thought, and to the investigation of the elements of political and private duty—is really as great a deficiency in general education as it would be to live as a chemist among chemists without cultivating a knowledge of the commonest processes of decomposition, or as a mechanic among mechanicians without a familiarity with the ordinary principles and instruments of dynamical effects.

The illustration which I have casually employed suggests to my recollection another cause, which I have often thought has not been without its efficacy in promoting the analytic spirit on the existence of which these remarks have been founded. I allude to the growth of the science of chemistry. It would certainly be a striking instance of the reciprocal influence of studies, and even of the influence of philosophy upon action, if it could be shewn that this science (which you will remember has the advantage of being the most familiar and popular of all) has exercised a power of this universal and pervading extent over the general mind. It seems to me that it has done so, by exemplifying and encouraging habits of indefatigable analysis; by supplying a very convenient phrasology for

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1 As an instance of the felicitous use of chemical phrases and ideas in illustrating mental science, may be cited a passage from Sir J. Mackintosh’s Dissertation on Ethical Philosophy. “Defects of the same sort” (as that of Brown, who substitutes the term “Suggestion” in place of the hitherto received “Association,” in explaining the origin of the complex emotions) “may indeed be found in the parallel phrases of most, if not all, philosophers; and all of these proceed from the erroneous but prevalent notion, that the law of Association produces only such a close union of a thought and a feeling, as gives one the power of reviving the other; the truth being, that it forms them into a new compound, in which the properties of the component parts are no longer discoverable, and which may itself become a substantive part of human nature. They supposed the condition, produced by the power of that law, to resemble that of material substances in a state of mechanical separation; whereas in reality it may be better likened to a chemical combination of the same substances, from which a totally new product arises.” Dis. Sect. vii. The term “Fusion” has accordingly been suggested as a convenient substitute for “Association,” in describing the growth of the more complex out of the simpler desires and emotions. Ed.]
these purposes (a matter in itself of no slight importance); and thus, by both stimulating and assisting the constant search for elementary principles, and the solicitude to detect in all subjects, under outward and palpable manifestations, inward and invisible constituents.

Another argument in proof of the value of these mental speculations it would be improper to pass without notice, although I may presume that your text-books have already made you familiar with it; I mean the beneficial results upon the powers of investigation and discovery which must be produced by the study of the mind as a bundle of tools, or a system of machinery, for that purpose. These advantageous results such a study may produce in two principal ways; first, by defining the limits of the faculties, and thus exhibiting in general outlines what they can and cannot attain. Locke, whose great work originated in difficulties on the subject, seems to have been peculiarly impressed with this ground of importance. I may add to his homely but most profound remarks, that as there is a general and final limitation of the faculties, within which is possible knowledge, and beyond which is certain ignorance, so there is also a relative and mutual limitation of the faculties with respect to each other, as well as to the chief subjects upon which each can be exerted. Of both these latter distributions you find a magnificent example in the great work of Lord Bacon, De Augmentis Scientiarum; an example whose defects may perhaps be best excused by observing that no subsequent attempt to reform it has been pronounced more faultless. The objection on which the Comte Destutt de Tracy enlarges, that his introductory division of the faculties into the Memory, the Imagination, and the Reason, is not elementary or ultimate, may be granted as true, and yet not injure its claims as a division both distinct and adequate. Our division of Great Britain into England, Wales, and Scotland is not less true, and for many practical purposes may be more convenient, than if we had subdivided it into all its multitude of counties or of parishes. Another objection of the same author is more important, that which denies the distinctness of the division, and urges that "there is no one branch of our knowledge—not even a single one of our judgments—to which all our intellectual faculties have not co-operated." The assertion in this form is, if these names of the faculties be used in their ordinary sense, perhaps too bold; but the principle is undeniable. It is indeed obvious that the simplest deduction of reason cannot be effected without the aid of memory; and that the operations of imagination in the production of poetry
would be equally impossible without the aid of that faculty. Memory, again, without the deductive power of reason would be nearly useless; and imagination almost as much so; while Reason itself in its march of discovery can scarcely operate without the imagination of hypotheses. Against this charge, therefore, the best answer on behalf of Lord Bacon is, I presume, to be found in appealing to his aim; which being merely practical, admitted of being attained by classifying the departments of human thought under the faculties which, in popular apprehension, seemed principally, though in metaphysical strictness they were not exclusively, engaged in them. It is true that for purely scientific purposes the animal system of Linnaeus, which includes the Man and the Bat in the same division, may be highly valuable; yet, as a basis for popular instruction in natural history, it may be doubted whether more interest may not be excited, and thence (which was Lord Bacon's direct purpose) more stimulus to increased knowledge created, by a division founded on circumstances somewhat more obvious to common observation.

The second advantage which I would specify as afforded by our science to the reasoning faculties, does not regard their limitation but their use, their improvement to the highest pitch of power within the range determined by the former considerations. Valuable comments upon this most important subject are to be found scattered in a variety of authors both ancient and modern. The "technical memory" of Grey, Feinagle, and others; the copious rhetorical counsels of Aristotle, Cicero, and Bacon, for the improvement of memory and the aid of judgment; the elementary systems of Pestalozzi and other methodizers of intellectual education,—all these and such like plans and advices are founded upon those elementary laws of the mind which you are here to consider, and follow as directly from them as the structure of a telescope to augment the powers of the eye, from the laws of light and vision. It is not unlikely that if the mind were strictly subjected to an intellectual regimen, like the body and its muscular system, results as far beyond ordinary calculation might be produced. The extraordinary power sometimes generated by constant practice in particular pursuits, may assist us to some conception of the energies which are dormant in human minds only because they are not aroused by cultivation. It is true that in these cases the power greatly depends on the exclusiveness of the pursuit; for different habits of the same faculty interfere with each other's influence, and neutralize, like interfering rays of light, producing darkness; but to this I would reply, in the first
place, that this truly demonstrates the importance of turning the habit upon noble pursuits, in which case the exclusiveness would become a blessing; and in the second place, which is very important, that there are habits of so general a nature as to be universally applicable,—habits of the faculties themselves, as contrasted with habits of any special exercise of the faculties. Of these I will mention, as the most important intellectual habit I know of, the habit of attending exclusively to the matter in hand. This habit of exclusive attention I believe to be attainable in such a manner as to act altogether irrespectively of the immediate subject of attention, to fit equally to every occasion for which it is demanded. It is commonly said that genius cannot be infused by education; yet this power of concentrated attention, which belongs as a part of his gift to every great discoverer, is unquestionably capable of almost indefinite augmentation by resolute practice. It is certain indeed that it is only a part of genius. One of the most interesting of the few but precious relics of Newton's conversation is an expression imputed to him relative to his own intellectual powers. You probably know that on one occasion he is reported to have modestly said, that in all he had ever discovered he was only conscious to himself of patient contemplation, that in his perseverance lay all his power. Coming from such a man, nothing could be more beautifully characteristic of his unassuming spirit; yet I am disposed to think that Newton's experience is, so far, the experience of every discoverer. For analyse the fact. The genius that discovers unknown truths consists of two elements, a process of close attention to the point examined, and a constant supply from the hand of nature of ideas connected with it. The latter is a wholly involuntary process, the former is a voluntary effort. Newton, therefore, in common, as I think, with every inventor, could only retain a distinct consciousness of the voluntary part of the process as his own personal act; here alone he was agent; all else was executed for him by the independent revelations of nature. But though attention be only one element of scientific genius—the ear, as it were with which it listens to the harmonies of the universe,—yet you are not to forget that it is truly an indispensable element; nor that the chances of discovery increase in proportion to the strength and concentration of this faculty. For every idea is vivid in proportion to attention; and every idea suggests a greater number of related ideas in proportion to its vividness. One of the chief uses of writing, in the pro-

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8 [He says so at the commencement of his first Letter to Dr Bentley. See Bentley's Sermons, ed. Dyce, p. 203. Ed.]
cess of inquiry, is that it arrests the ideas at pleasure under
the direct inspection of the intellect; and a geometrical
diagram assists the investigation of a problem not more by
its concise collection of the conditions of the question, than
by the efficacy of the sensible object in preventing the
wanderings of the mind. This, then, I think a fair instance
of an intellectual habit of immense importance, conducting
to the most splendid results, capable of raising inferior
minds to achievements for which without it the most gifted
intellect must depend on chance; and unquestionably
attainable to every man by determined practice. And,
surely, the science which develops such truths and rules as
these is not unworthy your notice.

From this subject the transition is natural to another
very important instance of the utility of your studies in
this place: I mean their peculiar and invaluable efficacy in
sharpening the intellect. This efficacy seems to turn upon
two principal circumstances—upon the necessity which
above all other pursuits they involve, of that intense
contemplation of the point at issue, to the exclusion of all
others, to which I have just been adverting; and upon the
very nature of the subjects of metaphysical reflection and
analysis, which continually exhibit instances of differences
and resemblances so important, yet so minute, as to
exercise the mind in the constant detection of the subtlest
relations of analogy and discrepancy. The peculiar degree
in which metaphysical studies possess both these charac-
teristics, so precious in every discipline of the intellect,
will perhaps be best illustrated by a brief comparison of
them with the only pursuits which can, I suppose, be
placed in competition—the mathematical sciences. My
remarks shall be concise, as I cannot now afford time to enter
at any length into the late controversy on the subject.

The first object of discipline which I have noted—the
habit and power of intense exclusive contemplation,—will
be of course conferred by any study in proportion as that
study requires it. Now it appears to me that the very
improvements of mathematical science are constantly
diminishing its value as a discipline for contemplative
power*. Its perfection is the perfection of a language, a
language of arbitrary signs or figures which so completely
detains the subject in the easy grasp of the mind or
recalls it so promptly at pleasure, as to relieve the investi-
gator from the strong necessity of intense exertion in

* [This opinion was strongly maintained by the late Dr Whewell. An able
defence of mathematical analysis in its educational aspect will be found in the
evidence addressed to the Cambridge University Commission by the lamented
apprehending or retaining it. Now, exactly as the excellency of mathematics (its perfect language) enfeebles it as a discipline, so the misfortune of metaphysics (its imperfect language) improves it as a discipline. With respect to their comparative efficacy in producing the habit of detecting subtle resemblances or differences, I cannot but conceive in this point also the Mathematical Sciences to yield the supremacy. In the consideration of lines and numbers the smallest difference is as distinct as the vastest; the equation of one right line is as different, and perceived to be as different, from the equation of that whose conditions approach it nearest, as it is from the equation of a curve. Now in subjects of metaphysical consideration, though the differences may in point of fact be as real (for all difference is equally difference), yet the instantaneous impression may not be that of difference at all, and the perception of difference, when it does occur, may be by no means equally clear and complete. That is, we may apprehend that there is a difference, and yet not be able to pronounce in what circumstance the difference lies, until after painful and prolonged reflection. For example, between the phenomenon called a “volition” (or exertion of Will) and the phenomenon called a “desire,” between the state of mind which immediately precedes the motion of a limb or is said to move it, and the state of mind which constitutes the wish to move it, there are few reflectors who will not at first declare that there is a difference; and yet there are probably few who can enumerate and define the circumstances that establish the difference. This, indeed, is an inferiority of mathematics as a discipline to all physical sciences; for in all these alike the detection of minute differences must be more difficult than in the science of space and number; but to the metaphysical sciences the inferiority becomes peculiarly striking, because the discrepancies there are so peculiarly elusive. Hence the most valuable disciplinary parts of mathematics are those which contain the new notions and principles introductory to each new branch; for example, the opening conceptions of geometry and of algebra, and of the application of these sciences to each other, and the vast and profound principles upon which the more modern calculus is erected; and I have no doubt that a student has gained more advantage to the faculties of thought from one hour of those which he passed in thus exploring and measuring the basis of each new structure of mathematical science at which he arrived, than from a much greater expenditure of time and labour consumed in subsequently traversing some of its inner intricacies. Now
these very introductory principles are the metaphysics of the mathematics. Finally, observe upon this question, that though (as I have before remarked) general intellectual habits of attention, precision, perseverance, acuteness, are indeed truly valuable, and capable of being acquired apart from exclusive connection with a special subject of them, so as to be in a considerable degree transferable to any at pleasure, yet, as the subject upon which they are acquired will always be that upon which they are most promptly available, it is of importance that that subject should be selected from those which are of the highest and most constant utility. In this point of view I presume there can be little hesitation in or choice between, the Mathematical Sciences, which, admirable as they are, are restricted to a narrow circle of pure speculation, and beyond that magic circle of their wonders are powerless, and the science which, in being the Science of Man, contains in it the subjects, the principles, and the proper discipline, for every possible department of thought or practice.

In what has been thus argued we have shewn the superior utility of the Science of Mind as an indirect education of the intellect, altogether independently of its actual discoveries of truth. In this latter aspect, I freely admit that its rival might enjoy an apparent triumph; for assuredly the harvest of new and various truths which the mathematics have yielded is, if we number the produce, far beyond anything which moral speculation can display. But metaphysical conclusions compensate for their fœwness by their vast generality of application. Indeed in this point of view, mathematics themselves might be regarded as the result of a few convictions of the kind which metaphysics contemplate; and all real physical science as the result and creation of the first logical principles which led to it. Such principles, like heat or electricity, are more known in their consequences than in themselves; we cannot see them till they are embodied in practice, and then we give the practice all the credit which is theirs of right. Besides this, from other reasons, on these subjects above all others, we are unjust to our teachers; in the sciences of matter and relation discoveries are easily traced to their owners, but here discoveries (and those general impulses to juster thought which are better than positive discoveries), though no less real, no less perceptible, and no less valuable, are appropriated with difficulty to their respective authors. Great writers are lost in the very light they diffuse; they create a general illumination which at length destroys the solitude or the pre-eminence of their own particular glory. One principal object, indeed, of just
philosophical history is, by abstracting us from this dazzling illusion of subsequent and present time, to restore their true magnitude and splendour to the mighty spirits, whom we are forgetting while we profit by them. The sun, splendid as he appears to us, would appear still more intensely brilliant if we could contemplate him from a point beyond our atmosphere, and thus behold him burning in the midst of a firmament as black as midnight, than as we see him from our position, encompassed by those nearer masses of reflected light, whose splendour, though derived from his own, almost competes with its great original.

I shall only add (to prevent misconception) that you are not to consider that in what I have said I am regarding mathematics in themselves, but mathematics as a discipline; nor even this positively (for I do not at all question the value of their influence to a certain high degree), but comparatively, as contrasted with the speculations which form the subject of our present studies.

You perceive, then, that the very difficulties of metaphysical science constitute a chief element in its value as an intellectual discipline. This, however, must not be permitted to prevent our efforts to diminish these difficulties; for we may expect greater advantages from the improvement of our actual knowledge of man and his faculties than could ever be derived indirectly from the mere intellectual exertion to attain it; besides that we may confidently calculate that the human mind will never in this world arrive at such a pitch of knowledge as to want new and sufficient subjects on which to exercise and strengthen its powers. Indeed the matter compensates itself; for the attainment of such a stage of knowledge would render the discipline for future effort no longer necessary. You will perceive that the greatest cause of perplexity which you may expect in these studies (and the same reason explains that long continuance, frequent recurrence, and difficult removal of errors on the subject, so often charged against metaphysical philosophy, and certainly so comparatively unusual in the exacter sciences, and in the physics of the external world when once they had become sciences of observation; for there a discovery once made is a discovery for ever, there nature once conquered never rebels against her chain,) arises from the difficulty of subjecting these things to instantaneous attention and experiment, and when you have succeeded in obtaining a firm grasp of the point, the equal, or nearly equal difficulty of conveying your conviction to others in language which will speak neither more nor less.
than you wish. This double difficulty—of subject and of language—belongs, it is manifest, in a far higher degree to mental than to material science; and seems to me to explain (prejudices apart) almost the whole history of metaphysical error. The imperfection of metaphysical language, arising from its constant suggestion of unwarrantable material analogies (of which, I may observe, that the controversy on "Free Will" is a very striking example), has been noted by all our more modern writers; I shall only add (for I cannot now pause upon any subject) that in Bacon's day an error precisely opposite, or rather an opposite development of the same error, appears to have existed—a singular case of philosophical revolutions. We complain of the illegitimacy of explaining mental processes by material similitudes; he notices, as a principal idolum tribus, the "naturalium operationum ad similitudinem actionum humanarum reductio." From both these difficulties—that of subject and that of language—arises another very remarkable evil; it is this, that unwarrantable deference to the authority of names is far more prevalent in the field of human than of natural philosophy. I say it arises directly from these difficulties. It does so, just because in consequence of these imperfections of mental grasp and of language—more especially of the latter—we are always obliged in perusing an author to take so much upon trust. We naturally prefer concluding that we have not perfectly understood him, to concluding that his account of his consciousness or his convictions is erroneous. This indolent subjection of the mind (so different from our reception of a geometrical process or a chemical experiment), when exaggerated by collateral prejudices, begets that vast accumulation of traditionary folly, swelling on from generation to generation, which has so peculiarly encumbered and degraded the science of human nature. But language not only produces this deception by its imperfections, but it perpetuates it by its authority. After terms of great apparent weight have been invented and authenticated, they give a fictitious reality to imaginary entities; we cannot endure to think, after a long and arduous course of labour in mastering a complicated phraseology, that we have "toiled" so much and "caught nothing;" and, therefore, in determined self-consolation, we persuade ourselves to respect these modifications of idle breath, as if they were indeed the eternal substances of truth and nature. Hence, by degrees, a new human mind is framed, overcharged with attributes and characters that nature never recognized. It is no longer the conscious being of a certain

\[De Augm. v. cap. iii. En.\]
limited number of faculties and passions that thinks and feels in our daily experience, but an intricate and complicated being framed out of essences, accidents, positive and primitive qualities, intrinsical and extrinsical causes, actual and potential faculties, and so forth; in short, the unmingled product of that most arid of all the soils of fancy, the logical imagination! In illustration of the cause of the prevalence of these errors, I will ask you to conceive how valuable would be the supply of that which our science wants, namely, the appeal to direct and unequivocal experiment. Conceive a philosophical Frankenstein gifted with the power of creating, or of modifying, minds according to his theories; enabled, just as a mechanic takes asunder the parts of his machine, to strip his creation of its attributes, so as to fit it to all the various philosophies of knowledge, and, by examining the living result, to reduce to experimental evidence the deficiencies or the superfluities of these accounts. Is it quite certain that the human mind—the man that we know and feel—would be perfectly evolved in any one change in the succession? Much as we admire and reverence the great authors of these mighty theories, the Aristotles, Platos, Zenos, Descarteses, Lockes, Kant, &c., and great as have been their unquestionable services to the freedom and progress of thought; yet, in the darkness and difficulty of the subject, is it not sadly possible that every apparition in the series of theoretic men—thus built secundum artem—might prove an idiot? Differing as they do, and supplying each other, is it not probable that the real man, if he exist among them, can only be constructed by extracts from them all? Or, as a less ambitious speculation, imagine how rapid would be the progress of psychology in a single month, if I could introduce into this place (as the Anatomical Professor can accomplish in his lecture-room) a metaphysical “subject” to demonstrate on, with the power of appealing to its manifest structure in as perfect a security as that which the anatomist can enjoy, of neither omitting what is there, nor supposing what is not. ...Such then are the imperfections of our minds in relation to this great object of thought—ourselves; and such are some of the intellectual prejudices which obstruct the rapid and steady progress of the science. I hope I may trust to your own sagacity and interest in the subject, for maturing, enlarging, and enforcing topics which here and now I can but transiently notice.

The last subject upon which I wish to address you, and the last because I wish it to leave a deep and clear impression, has reference to the moral tone and spirit in which it becomes you to pursue the science of man. The
great principles here are, the fearless pursuit of truth, in the bright and holy confidence that all truth will ultimately right itself; the careful expulsion of all counteracting influences in study which can be traced to undue prepossession of any kind, or by whatever title consecrated; and the cultivation of a spirit of candour towards all who, whether, as you think, in truth or in error, have given, or are giving, their days in sincerity to advancing the growth of human knowledge.

These things are not to be taught by logical reasonings. I trust that, as far as my humble influence can reach, I shall know how to teach them by my example.

As to the first, the unswerving pursuit of truth, I have before now endeavoured to shew you how little the principle is restricted by the precepts of either morals or religion, if these precepts be but rightly understood. I have remarked, how poor is the compliment which mistaken zeal pays to the economy of the universe, when it commands us to resign the occupation of penetrating or contemplating it. I cannot but pronounce that Science is indeed one part of the great Praxis of the imitation of God; for the great object of science is to gain harmonies, and He is the framer and perceiver of the final harmony of all. It may be that there is but one Law in the universe, of which all the laws of possible science are developments; but it can scarcely be denied that there is a oneness, in some sense, in the structure of the whole—for if creation have a purpose, the means must partake in the unity of the purpose—that the Creator alone contemplates this transcendent singleness and simplicity of nature from its summit; that human minds stand at various heights of elevation, and in proportion to their elevation take in less or more of the great and ultimate unity of all. The religious or moral scruple which would deny this essential holiness of science is real infidelity; because it proceeds on a tacit separation (I fear more common than we imagine) of the Physical and the Moral God of the world. Though it be not precisely perhaps the "knowledge" with which science deals, yet it is worth your while to remember the union of "knowing" and "loving" God so constant in the loftiest of the Evangelists; and to remember that when Christ himself sought a title, he declared himself "the Truth."

The second point was the exclusion of prepossessions: The great philosophical division of these moral prejudices in relation to our present subject, is into those which arise from habits of scepticism and habits of dogmatism. The one cannot tolerate any discussions of first principles through fear of leading to sceptical conclusions; and the
other cannot endure any discussion which would seem to establish lofty ones, and is perpetually working at the elementary principles. And on points (such as the controversy of Necessarianism) where there are two classes of facts, neither will bear the statement of the opposite; the fact, doubtless, being that both are mysteriously true; that we see the extremes, while the middle, where they unite, is involved in clouds. Here, again, the great office of a perfect science is to produce a reconciling harmony. Two persons at opposite sides of the base of a pyramid can perceive clearly enough that they are opposite; but as they ascend they approach; and could they but scale the summit they would find opposition to disappear, and sides to vanish in a single point.

As to the last point, the necessity of universal candour, and of the habitual distribution of this merit to all men, in these speculations above all, this great qualification is perpetually talked of, and perpetually forgotten. Men have proposed theories of benevolence in terms of polemical scorn; and, in descanting on the nature and remedies of prejudice, have ingeniously contrived to make the doctrine its own example. Is it not a sufficient proof of this perversity, that the word "Polemics," originally significant of hostility of any kind, should have become exclusively devoted to religious and moral disputation? But on this subject time will not permit me to enlarge. I can scarcely speak with impartiality upon it; for I have myself required from you, and shall still require, so much of this benevolence of criticism, as to be too interested a witness in favour of its merits. If I may judge from the past, however, I shall not be without hopes of preserving your candid consideration of my future efforts; nor without hopes—though our meetings for this term have, I confess, been small to a degree, which has disappointed my expectations,—yet of contributing some aid towards eventually creating in our University an interest in subjects which in most others are considered the noblest that can occupy and ornament the mind of man.

The next term at which my many and weighty duties of another kind may permit me to meet you, I hope to introduce you, as a further preliminary to detailed investigations, to the History of the Progress of Philosophy through ancient and modern times.
FIRST SERIES.

LECTURE I.

ON HISTORIES OF PHILOSOPHY, ANCIENT AND MODERN.

GENTLEMEN,

A CONSIDERABLE period has elapsed since I last had the honour of meeting you in this place. Many circumstances have combined to lengthen that interval, circumstances which I anxiously trust may not again unite. I know not how far I can count upon you as being even partially the same audience as I last addressed; still less can I flatter myself that you retain any very distinct impression of the views which I then proposed to your acceptance. This is, on my own part, the more to be regretted, as these views differed in many respects from the doctrines—at least, from the method and order of doctrines—popularly adopted in the philosophical literature of these countries; and were, besides, in a great degree intended as preparatory to the wider developments which I hope, if spared for this work, in my future labours to offer you. There is indeed, I believe, in the words of even the humblest labourers in the field of general philosophy, if their labours be but honest and truthful, a characteristic unity of style and thought, which, while it has the advantage of making all the efforts of the same mind mutually illustrative, often has also the disadvantage of making them mutually dependent, and of giving to each the position, not merely of a useful confirmation but of a necessary supplement, to all the rest. This is a principle which, in various degrees, extends over even the most dissimilar regions of mental exertion. The poetical, the historical, the political, the rhetorical efforts of the same intellect will almost invariably be found to bear the family-likeness of a common parentage. Thus (to take one striking example), the seventy volumes of the writings of Voltaire will be found to embrace almost every species of literary workmanship, yet there is scarcely a page of
these multiform productions which a judge of even moderate discrimination in the flavour of intellectual growths could not almost unerringly identify. How much closer this interdependence must be when the productions are of the same kind, how much closer still when they belong to a single subject—to a single course of instruction—I need not remind you. This it is which makes the solutio continui so dangerous to the general effectiveness of any progressive series of instruction. It is hard to perpetuate a common vitality in such disjoined members of an organized system. The only remedy, or palliative, for this disadvantage—which is in some degree inseparable from every course broken into fragments as our academic lectures are—will be to multiply the centres of vitality by as much as possible giving to each its own internal completeness; so that (to carry on the figure) the whole may resemble those animal systems, which, while partaking of a common organization, are also independent of section, each minute portion possessing its separate faculty of life and motion. And this it is my desire to attempt, as far as it may seem practicable to realize it.

Of the History of Philosophy, the subject to which I formerly dedicated our present discussions, it now becomes my duty to present you with some outlines. I would not be understood to offer anything more. I do not pretend to give you more than the etching of a reduced engraving, which if swelled to a size at all proportionate to the real vastness of the object, and filled up with the elaborate minuteness of touch which an object so delicate in its lights and shadowings requires for its finished portraiture, would far surpass the time and the attention which I can reasonably expect from my hearers. My end is attained if I can so far disclose to you some of the attractions of the subject as to induce you to have recourse to the original sources of information. And let me suggest to all of you who feel an interest in this history of speculation, that the more constantly you penetrate to these originals, and the less you are habituated to depend on secondary representations of their force and spirit, the more beneficial will be the intellectual exercise, and far the more secure your own convictions. To your estimation of my own labours I most freely extend the principle. It may be the usual object with literary enterprise to content its judges; I should be very sorry to imagine that I sent you away contented with what you can here obtain.

The History of Philosophy has been attempted by many hands. Indeed so extensive has been on this subject the mass of learned labour that it has given birth
to a distinct article of inquiry, with which some historians have prefaced their recitals, under the title of the "History of the History of Philosophy;" and, indeed, from the rapid daily increase of contributions to the subject in both these branches (especially among our German contemporaries) I am half inclined to apprehend that before the close of the century our sons shall find even this last history capable of producing another reflection of its own. Understood in the most general sense of the phrase, no age which has possessed philosophy has been without a history of it. In those first and feeble hours when men depended almost wholly, as in the infancy of all civilizations, upon traditional authority for the validity of their principles and the direction of their researches, philosophy itself was little more than a history of inherited beliefs. Wherever the scope of inquiry is rather the interpretation of doctrines than the interpretation of nature, the preliminary research must of course turn less upon things than tenets. This condition of mind is sometimes found to be prolonged into stages far advanced in civilization. It exists in almost every country of the East in a greater or less degree; and indeed must be discernible in all countries where the claims of Revelation and Inquiry are not understood and defined. Yet such is the unconquerable strength of the impulse to reflective inquiry when once aroused, that, as we shall see, in India, Philosophy has really manifested herself under the prudent veil of Interpretation; and systems, analogous in many respects to our own philosophic theories, conceal their daring proportions in the mystical mantle of theological commentary.

As men advance in the path of speculation, the history of doctrines becomes of less consequence. The ardour of philosophic youth, like that of the youth of nature, undervalues lessons transmitted from the past. The two great instances of such an awakening of the genuine spirit of speculation, must to us ever be the dawn of science in Greece, and its regeneration in modern Europe. These great experiments, however, differ widely and obviously in their circumstances, spirit, and history. The movement of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was essentially a "revival of letters;" its life was in the spirit which antiquity breathed into it across a thousand years; it was a revolution of imitation, collation, erudition, in which (the great religious change apart) the discovery of manuscripts held it above the discovery of systems. Accordingly, to this second birth of philosophy the remark which I have made is not at all so applicable as to its first wondrous apparition in Greece. There was little time for historical
researches, little patience for them, little regard for them, among the first bold explainers of the universe, in the islands and colonies of Greece. Among these active teachers the exercise of thought was preferred to the investigation of its previous exercise; and the field of antecedent experience was itself too narrow to be worth the trouble of cultivation. The age of the Sophists seems to have brought with it some attempts towards the systematic collection of opinions, if the work of Damastes, "Of Sophists," (of which no more than the title remains to us,) was of the historical kind. But, though subsequent ages of declining Greek literature were affluent in these digests and biographies* (most of them unhappily only preserved to us by name in the pages of Diogenes Laertius, Suidas, Athenæus, and the more learned of the Christian fathers), I do not know that we can point to any certain traces of the record of systems and the criticisms of their mutual bearing, before the time of Plato. But Plato, if he be something higher than an historian, is not an historian. His scattered notices of previous philosophers, valuable indeed as materials, are themselves, with few exceptions, too occasional and incomplete to rise to the dignity of historical detail. I am not satisfied that he can always be fully trusted; nor indeed can I easily believe that speculative tenets can have been filtered through a soil so racy and peculiar as his extraordinary mind, and arrived without a tinge from their passage. Of one illustrious person he has indeed presented us with the noblest series of memorials that the world has ever seen from any uninspired source. It is now pretty generally understood that the remark I have just made is abundantly applicable in this instance; and the exquisite art, no less than dramatic, with which the additions are incorporated into the composition of the Platonic Socrates, the skill with which the simplicity of the original character is preserved and yet the tone of the doctrines exalted, the features accurate though the complexion be heightened, may serve to make us distrust the same gifted reporter when he undertakes to tell us of Parmenides and Timæus. The true Socratic gospel is the Memorabilia of Xenophon.

The great rival of Plato also comes before us as a

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1 [Περὶ πατητῶν καὶ σοφητῶν is the title of the work, according to Suidas, who makes Damastes "a pupil of Hellenicus," and places him "before the Peloponnesian war." He is also mentioned by Strabo and others. See the Cambridge Museum Criticum, ii. p. 108. Ed.]

* Generally styled "Successions of Philosophers," "of Sects," "of Opinions," &c.—or else professing to be distinct individual lives of eminent masters.
detailler of the history of doctrines. On Aristotle's claims to veracity and candour the traditions of antiquity so vary that it is exceedingly difficult to pronounce any positive decision. By some critics and biographers whose remains have reached us, he is charged, as with many other gross immoralities, so with unfair suppressing and deliberate perversion. Some of these assailants have been thought to have gone so far* as to charge him with the literary incendiaryism of collecting and burning all the attainable writings of his predecessors, partly in order to distort them at his case, and partly to construct his own edifice out of their ruins. His defenders would not have much difficulty if all the charges against his historical justice were as chimerical as this preposterous falsehood. Aristotle speaks copiously of his predecessors; a modern writer has even termed him the true "father of the history of philosophy;" but he always cites as one who is anxiously pressing on to establish his own conclusions, and he introduces his opponents, less to partake the triumph as equals, than to grace it as captives. I will translate a few lines from the close of his first book of Metaphysics, as containing the spirit of his views of the labourers who had preceded him. They may be regarded as an abstract of his usual habits of criticism. "Thus," says he, after a long discussion of the views of Plato, Pythagoras, Empedocles, and others, "it is evident from all we have said, that the researches of all philosophers are reducible to the four principles established by us in the Physics; and that beyond these no other exists; but these researches have been carried on inaccurately; and if in one view they have anticipated us in all these principles, in another, they have not yet mentioned them. The defects of the researches of our predecessors have been sufficiently displayed, &c." You observe the two objects here proposed; first, to prove that little has been done, and then, that that little is provided for on better principles in the new system. These indeed are the objects of all systematizers, as well as of this great master of system; but this only suggests that the warning should be generalized, and that you never can receive without precautions the statements of a theorist who can march to conquest only

* Reported by Stanley as "a common report," in his day.
* [The spirited and perhaps exaggerated censure of Bacon is well-known: "Aristotelis confidentiam proinde subit mirari; qui impetu quodam pérctitum contradictorius, et bellum universae antiquitati indicens, non solum nova artium vocabula pro libitum cudendi licentiam usurpavit; sed etiam priscam omnem sapientiam extingueret et delere annus est. Adeo ut neque nominet uspiam auctores antiquos, neque dogmatum eorum mentionem ullam faciat, nisi quo aut homines perstringeret aut placita redargueret. De Augm. III. c. 4. En.]
over the ruins of the prostrate theories of his rivals. Yet, I confess, the vastly superior sagacity of criticism, as well as the superior proximity to their predecessors, which belonged to both Plato and Aristotle, as compared with the critics and compilers of the Western and Eastern empire, attach to their reports such a weight of authority, as ought perhaps to counterbalance objections as great as those I have insinuated. At all events, to those who will, and can, constantly apply due precautions, and allow judiciously for occasional purposes, prepossessions, and haste (a task unquestionably demanding much patience and practical shrewdness), to such the notices of these great masters become the most valuable historical records in the compass of ancient philosophy. I do not even except Cicero, a name which in a review of this kind cannot be omitted. Far superior to Aristotle in all the graces of style—as superior as a finished painting to a hard dry etching. superior also in his greater comparative freedom from the prepossessions of a system (though in this respect you know Cicero is far from blameless)—the difference of date between these two reporters, as counted from the first school of Greek philosophy, can never be forgotten when we speak of an age in which the invention of printing had not yet secured, almost beyond the possibilities of extinction, the genuine tenets of a master. I cannot also but express the dissatisfaction which I have always felt in perusing Cicero's statements of the doctrines of the elder Græcan schools. I cannot but persuade myself that in these criticisms there is either an absence of that patient sagacity which is essential to a well-qualified judge of the works and processes of pure thought, or else, that captious desire to exhibit, under their most uninviting aspect, all possible forms of solution to the ultimate inquiries of human reason, which is so apt to be fostered by the habits of the academic philosophy, itself an imperious master even while it disavows all mastery. At all events, there is a want of that without which our present study can never be effectively carried on, or happily, or instructively; and that is, a boundless reverence for all the sincere efforts of every honest human reason.

[To any of you who are anxious to collate Cicero's accounts of his predecessors, I may mention that I am instructed by Professor Tennemann of the publication of a work by "Gedike," a German litteratur, containing, in Latin, a well-digested collection of all the passages in his writings relative to ancient Philosophy, 2nd edit. Berlin, 1801.]

[A sufficient substitute for this work is furnished in the copious Onomasticon appended to Orelli's Cicero. Opinions differ greatly as to Cicero's
Another ancient writer, in whose remaining works (though still more deeply tinctured by his system) valuable accounts are to be found of the Grecian schools, is the celebrated sceptic Sextus Empiricus. In order to confute the dogmatists, he exposes them, and thus incidentally supplies useful confirmations or explanations to other and more direct authorities. The writings of this able assailant of reason are in other respects highly curious; and it will surprise a student who is familiar only with the sophists of his own age or language, to discover how very few of the logical difficulties of modern sceptics are at all as modern as themselves.

In considering the views of Epicurus, which fill so large a space in the chart of ancient philosophy, you will naturally have recourse to the magnificent poetical essay of Lucretius. This great poet, however, who himself possessed independent powers of philosophical speculation, cannot always be adopted as an accurate transcriber of the actual opinions of Epicurus, though perhaps, for this very reason, a safer and more impressive indicator of the views to which, by strict necessity of reason and of events, these opinions will everlastingly be found to lead.

Among the writers who, carrying on their own processes of thought, occasionally inform us of the views of antecedent inquirers, Seneca and Plutarch are not to be overlooked. Seneca, the most elaborate of all the interpreters of the Stoical institutes, often throws the strong light of contrast upon the Epicurean school, as well as reprobrates the "Academicorum nova scientia, nihil scire." His books of Natural Questions (an amusing study to a modern Newtonian) illustrate a vast variety of points in the history of

merits as an historian of Philosophy. Some recent writers of eminence have formed a low estimate of his learning, as in particular Madiav. It is well to bear in mind that Cicero was not a mere professor, but a statesman living in the stormiest times, and an advocate in high request. This is too little remembered by the Doctores umbratrici who sit in judgment upon him. Considered as a philosophical amateur he must surely take very high rank. His acumen and power of exposition can hardly be denied, at least by those who have read the Academic Questions. At the same time it must be acknowledged that his notices of the classic age of Greek philosophy come mostly from writers of the Macedonian period, whose traditions it is his merit to have preserved. His obligations to his own teacher Antiochus are very fully investigated in Madiav’s 7th Excursus to his 2nd edition of Cicero de Finibus. Of Plato Cicero’s knowledge was limited, but, so far as it went, by no means second-hand. He had read the Phaedrus, and apparently much of the Republic and Laws; and left translations, of which fragments remain, of the Timaeus and Protagoras: but of many of the most important dialogues he makes no mention—not even, for instance, of the Theaetetus, the true fountain of the Academic scepticism. His good faith (simplicitas) in acknowledging his obligations is praised by Pliny (Praef. ad Hist. Nat.), and contrasted with the disingenuousness of other Roman writers, by whom he had found the ancients transcriptos ad verbum, nec nominatos." [Ed.]
ancient physics; the least interesting to my mind, however, because far the least rational, of all the efforts of the science of antiquity. In the science of mind, the subjects of investigation are either logical, where little is left for mere observation, or psychological, where observation is to a certain considerable degree inevitable, and always feasible, even to a single individual; but in the physical investigation of the material world (especially that part of it with which the ancients chiefly busied themselves, astronomy, and the extensive department which they termed meteorology), to theorize without vast and combined and registered observation will infallibly lead astray; the first aspect of the phenomena to an observer who does not vary his position, or multiply and diversify his trials, being usually some intricate complication in which the original laws are wrapped up under a thousand disguises—disguises which, in most cases, no effort of individual sagacity has the smallest chance of penetrating by the exercise of mere reflection. Hence it is, that while the physical conjectures of antiquity are seldom of value, except as illustrating (which they do very strikingly) the successive forms under which the imagination accommodates itself to facts, and facts to itself,—the relics of the genuine reflective science of the ancients are always deserving of reverent inspection, and even in their very errors will generally be found to present an aspect of truth.

Plutarch comes before us both as a direct and indirect recorder of the theories and sentiments of philosophic antiquity. His indirect or occasional references are principally to be met scattered through those most delightful treasuries of the gossip of Greece and Rome, his biographies. Far less generally known than these universally-popular remains, his moral writings—highly valuable for their own sake—are also of much value in an historical light. His principal direct contribution to the history of philosophy is the treatise De Placitis Philosophorum, if indeed that treatise be Plutarch's. It is a lively, superficial sketch, strongly reminding the reader—except in its moral tone, which is somewhat higher—of the graceful, unsubstantial, forms in which Philosophy was accustomed to reveal herself in the France of the last century. It cannot be omitted, however in any collection of our few ancient authorities. You will add to it the philosophic physician Galen's

4 [Interesting notices are to be found in Plutarch's controversial tracts against the Stoics and Epicureans, especially in that advers. Colotem. Also in the treatise on the Delphian Ei, and in the Questions Platonica, &c. Both the Placita Philosophorum, and the tract attributed to Galen, are now acknowledged to be spurious. Ed.]
tract on the history of philosophy; which indeed seems to be little more than a republication of the other, or a continuation of it.

The largest collection of these details, transmitted to us in a classical language, is the well-known work of Diogenes Laertius, who probably lived about the time of the Antonines. A voluminous and very miscellaneous collection, the reader of it must bring at least as much light as he receives, in order to study it with advantage. It would be ungrateful, however, to dispatch with only this negligent criticism, a collector to whom we are indebted for a vast assemblage of facts, anecdotes, and sentiments, which, but for the humble industry of Diogenes Laertius, would have been for ever lost to modern times. It has been the laborious task of many modern critics to investigate the authenticity of his narratives, and to correct his occasional precipitancy. The erudite commentary of Menage is the principal performance of this kind.

The commentary of Menage upon the biographies of Diogenes Laertius recalls naturally the beautiful treatise attributed to Origen, under the title of Philosophumena; for it was in this commentary that the world of letters was first made acquainted with some portions of that valuable relic. The anxiety which these extracts stimulated, for a completer publication, was gratified by Gronovius in the eleventh volume of his magnificent Thesaurus of Greek Antiquities (published separately in 1706 by Chr. Wolff). This composition consists of a remarkably clear compendium of the doctrines and successions of Grecian philosophy; and though written, as the introduction declares, as preliminary to a confutation of some of the more philosophical heresies of the time, is free from exaggeration.

8 [More probably in the first half of the third century. Laertius mentions both Sextus Empiricus and his successor Saturninus. The former but not the latter is mentioned by Galen, Opp. xiv. p. 663, Kühn, who died A.D. 200, and who would probably have mentioned Saturninus had he been a contemporary. This consideration has led Menage to place Laertius later than Galen. See his notes on I. I. ix. § 116. Ed.]

6 [It may seem superfluous to inform the reader that Origen's claim to the authorship of this treatise is now waived in favour of his contemporary, Hippolytus, bishop of Portus. The Philosophumena is the introductory book of a larger work in ten books, entitled Against all Heresies (usually quoted under the title Confutatio Haeresium). Of these ten the last seven were discovered nearly entire in 1842, and were not very skilfully edited in 1851 by a Frenchman, M. Miller, under the auspices of the Delegates of the Clarendon Press. The newly-discovered books are rich in quotations, and contain some new and interesting fragments of the earlier philosophers. The fidelity with which such passages are cited often contrasts somewhat ludicrously with the forced interpretation put upon them by the author, the object of whose treatise is to shew that the Christian heretics were indebted for their doctrines to Pagan authors. See Bernays's Epistola Critica, appended to the 4th volume of Bunsen's Hippolytus and his Agv. Ed.]
and misstatement to a degree not always observable in the references to Pagan philosophy by the champions of our early Christianity. The ascription of it to Origen is attended with many difficulties. In the outset the author seems to claim the honours of the episcopal office, which we know Origen never possessed. Speaking of the Apostolic spirit, he says, ὁν ἡμεῖς διάδοχοι τυχικῶν τῆς τε αὐτῆς χήρτων μετέχουμεν, ἀρχιερετεῖας τε καὶ διάδοσις καλίας, καὶ φρουρῶν τῆς Ἐκκλησίας λεευμένοι, κ.κ.λ. It is, however, barely possible, that (as Gronovius, who, as well as our own Pearson, advocates its Origenian descent, holds) the author may not have meant the highest order of the Christian ministry by these expressions; and certainly no other candidate has been shewn—Epiphanius, Aetius, Didymus, &c.—whose claims are at all more plausible than those of the learned catechist of Alexandria, to whom the manuscripts collated by Gronovius were unanimous in ascribing it.

The Epiphanius who has just been mentioned, has himself presented us with an abridged view of the Greek philosophy; and I may add, that the Christian Fathers in general (due allowance being made for their own strong prejudices against the theories they undertook to state) will be found an opulent source of information on many points connected with the subject of our present researches, more particularly the Alexandrian Clement, Eusebius, Lactantius, Origen, and Augustine.

I have now nearly exhausted the scanty store of our ancient authorities. Philostratus and Eunapius consecrated their labours to the Neo-Platonic school; and the latter wrote a work still extant, under the title of Lives of the Sophists. A very beautiful edition of this collection was published in 1822 by Boissonade (at Amsterdam), with vast critical aids and illustrations. Eunapius belonged to the latter period of the school, and furnishes some curious specimens of its extravagances. Athenæus, though a libeller in whom confidence can scarcely be placed, will deserve to be consulted, as well as the fragmentary notices of Aulus Gellius and Macrobius. The fifth century gives us the physical and ethical selections of Stobæus, of which, themselves fragments, we possess but fragments. The edition of Prof. Heeren, published at Göttingen in 1792

7 [The meaning of this word is fixed by Tertullian, as quoted by Dr Wordsworth in his well-reasoned treatise on this subject: "Dandi baptismum jus habet Summis sacerdos, qui est Episcopus." De Bapt. c. 17. Ed.]

8 [Philostratus also wrote Lives of the Sophists. This book, which is valuable to the historian of Literature, and also, though in a less degree, to the historian of Philosophy, is best read in Kayser's edition, Heidelb. 1838. Ed.]
and 1801, though I have not myself seen it, I have heard from high authority so abundantly praised that I cannot hesitate to direct to it your notice. In earlier times the prison-hours of the illustrious Grotius were consoled by critical labours upon the same precious text. Beyond these, I know not that I can offer you any further material guidance except Hesychius's treatise of the sixth, the Myriobiblion of Photius, of the ninth, and the Lexicon of Suidas belonging to the tenth century. That confused, though with all its faults valuable, repertory may be considered as the last existing depository of genuine and original classical learning; in that gloomy age the primal light expires, and the next generation arises in the dim reflected beams of exposition, criticism, and collation of the past.

From this slight sketch of the amount of our ancient originals (the primary materials for our researches) you will easily perceive that their real extent is not great. Probably to many of you this conclusion will come with some surprise. When these authorities meet you repeatedly cited in their diversity of editions on the crowded margins of learned treatises of various kinds, they acquire an illusive multiplicity. They seem to increase in actual quantity and number, as light appears to do by repeated reflections. It will at least be some compensation for the regret we feel at remembering the irreparable loss of so many interesting sources of thought as time, and war, and accident, and barbarism, and bigotry, have destroyed, if a knowledge of the limited extent of our real possessions lead you to contemplate the prospect of surveying them without the vulgar dread of being wholly lost in the labyrinth.

You will have observed, that in this list I have almost exclusively confined myself to classical authorities. My

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88 [Heeren's edition is now superseded by Gaisford's. Ed.]
99 [Hesychius of Miletus (temp. Justinian) wrote a short treatise peri τῶν ἐν παλαις διαλαμβανόμενων σοφίων, which has been edited by Orelli, Leipz. 1820. The work is in great part a mere abridgement of Laerlius, and has, in its turn, been largely used by Suidas. Some notices it contains which, according to Orelli, are not to be found elsewhere. Ed.]
10 [The date of Suidas is uncertain. Many additions seem to have been made to the original Lexicon, some of which refer to events in the eleventh century. Ed.]
11 [We must except the Commentary of Eustathius, who lived late in the 12th century. Ed.]
12 [If this enumeration of ancient sources, the Greek commentators on Aristotle should have been mentioned. Some of them, as Alexander Aphrodisias, who lived in the second and third, and Simplicius, who died in the sixth century of the Christian era, take very high rank among secondary authorities. Ed.]
reason has been, not at all that these are our only means of attaining a conception of some of those philosophies which the Greeks termed Barbaric, but that the native authorities are of so wholly distinct a character, that to have enumerated them in a common catalogue would only tend to confusion. You will easily separate the general body of authorities into the natural division which sets on one side the works themselves of the philosophers, and on the other the details regarding them or their doctrines, preserved in the writings of others. Now it is with the latter I have principally engaged you (the former being too obvious to require specification), and of the latter it may be said with almost equal truth, that all eastern philosophy belongs to it (as professing principally to record traditional dogmas), or that none does. In either case, these Oriental sources are separated from the purpose and matter of our late enumeration; in the former view of their position, as being only apparently not really historical, in the latter, as being neither one nor the other. We shall therefore reserve them for brief notice when the philosophy, whose condition we are to trace by them, shall come under inspection.

You will also perceive, from the nature of the works we have cited, that the idea of a philosophical history of philosophy does not appear to have ever come before the mind of the ancient speculatists with anything of the distinctness and force it has assumed of late years. A mere abstract of tenets, without connexion or order, without any enlightened attempt to harmonize apparent contradictions, by detecting the secret unity that reconciles them (or, what is scarcely less valuable, by detecting the principle of the error), without any comparison of analogous doctrines in different systems, without any investigation of the occasional influences of external circumstances, as political constitutions and crises, climates, habits of life,—and still more, without any attempt to trace the march of reason itself amid all the variety of its forms and dresses,—this detached unorganized enumeration seems to have been the highest conception which the ancients possessed of a history of philosophy. And yet, it would be unjust to the memory of one great man to omit the following striking passage from Hippocrates. "It is a useful study," says that acute and comprehensive thinker, "to contemplate with attention the progress of arts and sciences, and to seek carefully why it was that certain views and experiments have not succeeded in public estimation when they really deserved success, and why others have obtained celebrity without any genuine claim to it. Was it chance? Then such a chance would
deserve deep investigation." In this suggestion you recognize the spirit which should animate a general history of opinions, and a direct annunciation of one important branch of it. We shall presently see how these conceptions of the illustrious physician were revived in a form still more substantial and definite among the desideranda of Lord Bacon. As to the great leaders of the Grecian mind who have exercised so vast an empire over subsequent ages—the Platos and Aristotles—they were too busy in fortifying their own edifices of speculation to bestow any real attention upon the laws of progressive advancement before and around them, even if a mass of experience had been collected adequate to justify positive conclusions. I should rather have expected this class of inquiries to have originated among the erudite professors of Alexandria; and is it quite certain that in this respect time has not robbed us of some portion of our literary inheritance? However this may be, the great revolution of that age must have soon occupied and absorbed the attention of all speculative men; and it did, we know, ultimately exercise on pagan philosophy an influence that hurried it off into a strange supramundane region, which afforded indeed some of its most striking experiences to the history of philosophy, but was exceedingly unfavourable to the cultivation of that study itself.

It becomes now my duty to present you with some notices of the bibliography of our subject as cultivated by the erudition of modern ages. I confess, however, that I altogether despair of communicating an idea at once clear and copious of the literature of this vast department, within the limits of time to which a lecture, to retain any hold on the memory, must necessarily be restricted. I am not ashamed to add, that for a complete account of this enormous aggregate of learning (itself no small library, and every day gathering new contributions) I cannot pretend to be qualified. Many of these voluminous performances of the last fifty or sixty years I have never seen and never expect to see; many more I have now and then found occasion to refer to, and can only estimate from the degree of familiarity such transitory acquaintanceship permits. Notwithstanding this, I think I may venture to promise that I can make you acquainted, without much danger of material error, with at least the principal stages and monuments of the progress of the study. The occasion requires no more.

* I owe this quotation to M. Dégérand (in his pretty, not profound, Histoire Comparée, [T. 1. p. 118, where, however, no reference is given, Ed.])
In that great reformation of the direction of thought, which will for ever make the fifteenth century one of the most interesting in the history of humanity, the rediscovery of classical literature performed a leading part. It is of course unnecessary to dwell upon the immediate historical causes of this event: they are familiarly known to you all. While the scholastic doctors of the West were proud to devote their labours to illustrate the dark dogmas of a spurious or disguised Aristotle, consecrating their inexhaustible perseverance to the embellishment of an image whose faint and false copy of the great original came to them through the double and distorting medium of Hebrew translated from Arabic translations,—the literati of the Grecian empire,—such men as Michael Psellus the historian, Eustratius, Metochites, were still enabled to study, along with the other remains of classical literature, the profound and pregnant purport of the Stagyrite in his, and their, native tongue. But the Ottoman cloud long impending over the city of Constantine at length discharged its thunders; and the new occupant of the throne of the Comneni and Palæologi had little value for a knowledge which had not enabled its possessors to preserve their freedom, and which he found to be in them but too consistent with such habits of servility as his ruder barbarian philosophy had dignity enough to despise. Accordingly, the men of letters fled the beautiful capital of the East, ever since lost to Christendom; and brought with them the precious deposit of ages to the shores of Italy. The desolation of the East forced on the civilization of the West. Venice, Milan; above all, the brilliant commercial democracy of Florence with its Medici, received and welcomed them. I have not time to enlarge. Suffice it to say, the interpretation of antiquity became the passion of the time. Above all, its philosophy attracted attention, and the conciliation of its doctrines with the tenets of the Church became the chosen task of the chief writers of the South of Europe. This might be deemed a probable period for the prosecution of the history of Philosophy. Far from it. This was but the infancy of the modern European mind—a mighty infancy indeed, but still an infancy, and dependent. And the conception of the History of Philosophy belongs not to such a state, but to the highest and most practised vigour of the adult intellect. Besides, these venerated relics (like those of their sanctuaries) were for a time too profoundly revered to be subjected to the rude grasp of the historical dissector. But towards preparing at a distance the materials for future edifices, much, doubtless, was done. Detached dissertations, abstracts, enumerations, analyses, soon abounded.
The struggle which necessarily arose between the disciples of the recovered Aristotle and the recovered Plato, added earnestness, and therefore vigour and value, to these labours. As this active warfare, proceeded, among other critics of the progress of past and present thought, the learned Spaniard Ludovicus Vives—from the year of the discovery of America—held a distinguished place. His treatise *De Causis Corruptarum Artium* (1531), contains thoughts which three centuries have not deprived of freshness. Another of his writings, *De Inititis, Sceitis, et laudibus Philosophorum*, is more directly connected with our subject. Nothing of the kind in that age is, I believe, beyond it, but it is not beyond its age. Books on the same subject I have seen cited under the names of Chrysieus and Frisius, and dating in this 16th century; but as I have never seen the originals I cannot venture any judgment regarding them. It is quite certain however that nothing was directly contributed to the real history of Philosophy, as a systematic study, in the 15th and 16th centuries, worthy to delay its pupils in the nineteenth. The labours of this period were distinct, detached, preparatory*. Philosophy was not yet ripe for her own history: she had too vast a part to play in the coming age to find time or inclination as yet for reflecting on the laws of her own movements.

We arrive at the 17th century;—the century whose earlier years were illumined by Bacon and Descartes, whose later period was filled with the fame of Malebranche, Leibnitz, Newton, and Locke. Bacon, whose comprehensive and creative intelligence let few of the possibilities of human science pass, has marked with great force and beauty the proper characters of a history of this kind,—not perhaps its highest characters, but characters such as sufficiently separate his *prospectus* from anything that had been realized before his age. I allude to the description of the History of Letters which you will find in the 4th chapter of the 2nd book of his treatise *De Augmentis†*, and to another important passage in the 4th chapter of the 3rd book of the same work, on the construction of a proper collection of the *Placita*, or Cosmological Determinations of the Ancient Philosophy. I must now be content with a mere reference; but I hope hereafter to draw your attention to the passages themselves.

I will now proceed to enumerate, for your direction and

* Such (for example) as Teleius's account of the philosophy of Parmenides; Patricius's *Dimensions Peripatetica*, still considered of high authority; Melanthon's *Physics of Aristotle*, Lipsius's Stoical treatises, &c.
† See Dégérando, Tome I. p. xii. &c.
assistance, the writers upon this extensive subject who appear most to deserve your notice; beginning about the middle of the 17th century. To those who are not really interested in the attainment of accurate knowledge, such a catalogue must appear insufferably tedious, even though abbreviated to the compass which my present time necessitates: but as I will not presume that any of my auditory are of these superficial habits, I make no apology for descending to being useful. 'I can only say that such a sketch would have been to myself invaluable at the outset of my boyish studies; and I can easily believe there are others similarly circumstanced. The object here is, not to find authors, for they are innumerable; but to select a few whose value can be warranted, and which are not very difficult of attainment.

The great philosophical movement of the 17th century acted upon minds according to their previous intellectual habits and constitution. While it urged the more ambitious and less laborious to attempt achieving for themselves a name in the records of the history of reason, it turned the labours of the critic into the construction of such a history; philosophy now being, each day more and more, forcibly vindicating to itself a right equal to that of military or imperial glory, to the possession of its Livys and its Tacituses. However as the Livys and the Tacituses must be preceded by the humbler diligence of chroniclers and annalists, you most not be surprised if we commence by the collectanea of our own Stanley (the first edition dates 1655, the second edition dates 1687), under the title of a History of Philosophy. But Stanley's miscellany is rather a common-place book of anecdotes and extracts than a history. It was translated long after, in 1711, into Latin, and illustrated with notes and other additions, which render the translated form (as I understand) much superior to the original*. The book, regarded in the light in which I have presented it to you, is of real value; bringing together an immense assemblage of detached materials, and not the less valuable, doubtless, for being totally without connexion or system—a task for which in its perfection, perhaps, the age was not adequate—assuredly not the author; and the attempt to effect which would only have led to perversion, suppression, or distortion. In the year 1658 the work of Gerard John Vossius De Philosophia et Philosophorum sectis, was published by his son. It bears many marks of the great learning and ability of its compiler, many marks also of being a posthumous perform-

* Let us not, however, refuse to our countryman the honour of being the first extensive collector of the stores of antiquity.
ance. Its author's name has added more celebrity to it than it has added to the name of its author. The treatise of Duhamel, the predecessor of Fontenelle, De Consensus Veteris et Nova Philosophia, belongs to the year 1663. The writings of De Launoy, of the Sorbonne, which are many and various, will be found valuable for occasional reference, especially to those who are anxious to investigate the literary history of the middle ages. A very learned but very fanciful work of the same period may be read with some advantage if read with great caution—Theophilus Gale's Court of the Gentiles, 1677. It was the fashion of his age and school to discover in the law and history of Moses the primal fountains of all speculative knowledge; a project which, however well intended, has ever seemed to me (apart from its actual fallacy) exceedingly ill-judged. Its practical result will ever be, not at all so much to exalt the majesty of the Jewish revelation as to elevate uninspired writings to an equality with it in point of authority; and thus, while increasing its absolute, to diminish its comparative, dignity. And such precisely was the result in the similar attempts upon Platonism by Mirandula and others, at the revival of letters. Christianity was the apparent, but Plato was the real, gainer by the alliance. Very different in its value and authority is the great work of Cudworth which was published in the following year, 1678. The Intellectual System (waving a few peculiarities which detach without much difficulty from the body of the work) is of inestimable value to the careful student of philosophical doctrines. "He launched out," says one whose learning was worthy to praise Cudworth, "into the immensity of the Intellectual System, and at his first essay penetrated the very darkest recesses of antiquity, to strip atheism of its disguises, and drag up the lurking monster into day." (Warburton, Div. Leg., Pref. to Books iv. v. vi.) You will, if possible, accompany Cudworth with the learned notes of Mosheim. To pass from the English to the Gallican Church,—the Evangelical Demonstration of Huet, 1679 (which is easily attainable), contains a vast treasury of ancient learning in this department. Huet is to be read with much the same precautions as that Eusebius whose title perhaps he affected to imitate; that is to say, with due

13 [Not to be confounded with Thomas Gale of Trinity College, Cambridge, a scholar of great eminence in his day, and the editor of Opuscula Mythologica, &c. Theophilus hardly deserves the recommendation in the text. Ed.]

14 [Cudworth, though an exceedingly learned and thoughtful writer, is not to be relied on as a critic; nor indeed, until Bentley arose, was the importance of a discriminating criticism fully understood by the learned. The testimonia veterum, in which the Intellectual System is so rich, were rather counted by its author than weighed. Ed.]
and constant allowance for the writer's own opinions and prejudices. The subtle historical scepticism, and the research equally extensive and minute, of the Dictionary of Bayle (1697), gave a powerful impulse to all inquiries into the history of opinions. It has many faults, some repulsive and some dangerous; but it will ever occupy a prominent place in the history of letters, as first exemplifying on a vast scale that union of positive learning and keen inquiry, which, if it has sometimes led to consequences unhappy and unjustifiable, is also the source of everything practically valuable in the knowledge of the past.

In 1705 was published (a posthumous work too) the *History of the Various Fortunes of Metaphysics*, of James Thomasius,—a performance which judges of some weight seem to consider as forming almost an epoch in this study. Many important and pregnant remarks scattered through the writings of Leibnitz were gradually leading to notions more profound of the science of philosophical history; though the time was not yet arrived for attempting the realization of such views. Can we say that our own age has seen more than the attempt?...I must not suffer the brief *Elementa Historiae Philosophiae* of Heineccius, 1743, nor even the invaluable *Bibliotheca Graeca* of Fabricius, 1705—1728 18 (to which all subsequent writers, without exception, gratefully acknowledge their obligations), nor the History, now forgotten, of Des Landes (1730—6), to detain me from introducing you at once to the vast achievement of Brucker, a work which alone is a library, and which must ever be the groundwork of all histories of Philosophy. The first volume appeared in 1742, having been preceded (as in most of the historians of Philosophy) by many detached dissertations; among the rest an *Historia philosophica Doctrinae de Ideis*, of great research and value, which appeared in 1723. It would be impossible to exaggerate the patience, the care, and the unaffected honesty, with which Brucker has executed his immense task. His own maxim he undeviatingly followed, "Querendi sunt fontes, ubi haberi possunt, proximi." With a diligence truly German he has explored the biography of philosophers as well as their doctrines; and it would be difficult to name a circumstance concerning either transmitted to us from antiquity, which the indefatigable industry of Brucker has not gathered into the vast granary of his six quarto. But the results of this industry are too vast for ordinary appetites or ordinary digestion; and Brucker will ever be regarded rather as

18 [The best edition of Fabricius is Harles's, 1790. The *Bibliotheca Graeca* is a book which can never lose its value. ED.]
the encyclopedist than the historian of philosophy. He is referred to by all who cultivate an accurate knowledge of ancient reason; he is revered as the true father of the critical history of philosophy; he is, I can truly affirm, plundered unmercifully by the dealers in borrowed erudition (witness the Encyclopédie, whose articles on ancient philosophy are simply Brucker served up in epigrams); but it is probable that the author himself of this great digest is the only person who has ever read his work consecutively. To trace the subtle influences of ages and climes, to reduce to their laws the complicated efforts of intelligence, if destined for any age, was certainly not for Brucker's; and, perhaps, even after his learned, comprehensive, and most admirable performance, the world did not still possess more than the materials for the History of Philosophy.

To the well-known work of Montesquieu it is probable that the higher conceptions of this study which have since arisen may trace, if not their origin, at least their growth and vigour. The Spirit of Laws was a work prolific of works to come. The main ideas—the influence of circumstances upon development, and the possibility of classifying the startling varieties of political history under the simpler laws of human nature—admitted so natural an application to the kindred varieties presented in the history of reason, that we might feel surprise if such essays had not been suggested and attempted. It was for a Frenchman to generalize the external relations of humanity; to the German mind we should look for the transference of the design to its internal development. And yet, though many detached works were produced which manifested the commencement of the fermentation—innumerable dissertations on the Idea of the History of Philosophy, on its rules, design, utility,—a long period intervened before a vigorous attempt was made to realize those exalted conceptions. Meanwhile, in France the writings and the influence of Condillac, the most arbitrary and exclusive of all speculatists, were little calculated to foster the catholicity of philosophical spirit which alone can qualify for the honest and temperate survey of the long story of human reason. His own Traité de Systèmes, and similar sketches, are not histories, but arguments, not the statements of a judge, but of an advocate. The school of which Condillac was the metaphysical oracle was still less qualified for this work. To an exclusive philosophy they added the bigotry

18 [Without any desire to depreciate this or any other work of Montesquieu, I may observe that the chief value of the État des Lois to the student of ancient philosophy lies in the comparison of its method of handling the subject with those of Plato, of Aristotle in the Politic, and of Cicero in his Republic and Laws. Ed.]
of irreligion; accepting miscellaneous all historical conclusions, however mutually destructive, from which arguments could be extorted unfavourable to the Jewish and Christian revelations; and, with the arrogance of ignorance, affecting to despise every other. The Esquisse of Condorcet, which Dégérando praises, seems to me to be deficient in every requisite which could confer value upon such a work. I have, however, pleasure in recommending the learned treatise of the President Goguet, on the Origin of Laws, Arts, and Sciences. It first appeared in 1758.

D’Alembert. The beautifully written dissertation of d’Alembert prefixed to the French Encyclopédie, will, like almost everything from the pen of that exquisite artist of style, reward perusal; but in it, as in all the writings of that period, the ambition of the writer injures the precision of the investigator; and a brilliant epigram is often the Procrustes’ bed to which truth must submit to fit herself or be rejected. After many preliminary labours—those for instance of Meiners and Gurlitt—the great work of Tiedemann appeared in Germany. It was published from 1791 to 1797. The title, The Spirit of Speculative Philosophy, sufficiently indicates the superiority of its historical design to the performances we have been considering. Tiedemann was a disciple of the philosophy of Locke; and his views, it is admitted, strongly colour his historical conclusions. Tennemann, who was a Kantian, soon followed. Superior perhaps to Tiedemann in learning, he was also like him encumbered by exclusive loyalty to his philosophical master. His voluminous history was published in detached volumes from 1798 to 1820. Dégérando’s Comparative History appeared in 1804, and was republished under a much improved form in 1821. It is easily accessible, and, if not very profound, is always pleasing, amiable, equitable, and unaffected. You do not require to be reminded of the admirable Fragments of the immortal Adam Smith, edited by our late and lamented Dugald Stewart; nor of that excellent philosopher’s own Dissertation, which no one will neglect who cultivates the modern history of European reason. Finally, we arrive at Ritter and V. Cousin. Ritter is always learned, often original, often also capricious: Cousin, whose history of ancient philosophy is only brief and introductory, is vivid, systematic, sweeping, and eloquent. But the long period I have now detained you warns me to cease. Detailed criticism upon these latter writers is indeed the less necessary, as their general views of the method and object

17 [He was at least an Empiricist, and a strenuous opponent of Kant. Ed.]
of scientific history will appear in some degree represented in my next Lecture, when I shall endeavour to lay before you my views of the ideal and the prospects of the genuine History of Philosophy.

78 [The favourite History of Greek Philosophy is at present E. Zeller's, the 2nd edition of which was completed 1868. Some portions of this have been translated into English. Among English histories of Philosophy may be named those of Mr G. H. Lewes, Professor Ferrier, and Professor Maurice (Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy, ed. 2); all these shewing great ability, though written from different or opposite points of view. Ed.]
LECTURE II.

ON DEFINITIONS OF PHILOSOPHY, &C.

GENTLEMEN,

In commencing to speak of the History of Philosophy, we may be asked what we mean by "Philosophy." Let us say then that Philosophy is the science of principles—of the principles eminently of knowledge and action. This will probably serve for a definition as precise and comprehensive as any other, to those who require or value one. A logical definition is not, however, of much consequence in opening our present subject, or any subject which explains and limits itself in the course of detail. Students of the History of Philosophy will be sure to form their own definition, ideal or verbal, in the presence of facts. They will insensibly add, subtract, modify, as circumstances direct. It is thus indeed that, child and man, we gather all our ideas of the significance of our own language; experience is our prompter; and what living experience does for us, history will not fail to do, which is the image of experience. Indeed, if I were to govern myself by those who have already treated this subject at large, I should be warned to beware of definitions. The majority of their performances commence with these formal designations of the nature and limits of the subject; and I have generally observed that either the definition is inadequate, and afterwards fortunately transgressed, or that this prefatory outline is so vast, not to say indistinct, as never to be filled up in the execution of the work. Among the ancients, as Philosophy signified the pursuit of knowledge in all its forms (for in the infancy of science, as in that of art, the division of labour is not known), the history of philosophy would have been the history of every effort after the attainment of information. Among modern authors, although there is little fear of this confusion, although philosophy stands clearly apart from the brilliant array of her subject sciences, yet this very remoteness and loftiness of separation seems to leave the great object scarcely defined in the distance; each speculator is ena-
bled to see it, not as it is, but as he would have it; and the shadowy form of "Philosophy" resembles that magical apparition in the Faust of Goethe, in which each of a thousand beholders recognizes only the image of his own beloved. The excellent Brucker, whose habits of intellect were simple, straightforward, and practical, finds in philosophy the science of happiness. It is, says he, at the opening of his great repository of learning, "Studium sapientiae;" and "sapientia" is "solida cognitio veritatis circa eas res quae ad veram hominis felicitatem faciunt, et ad usum et praxim applicari possunt." This partial and limited view of philosophy could scarcely have been expected from a pupil of either of his masters, Descartes or Leibnitz. But if Brucker leans too much to the practical purposes of philosophical inquiry, his more modern countrymen seem to incline with an equally undue bias to the speculative. Philosophy is defined by Tennemann, "the efforts of reason to realize the idea of Science according to the primary laws of nature and liberty." With Jacobi it is "the science of determinate connexion independent of experience." And with all the creative and profound thinkers who have risen out of the fragments of the Kantian school, the same tendency is more or less manifested. Possessed, absorbed, by the great question of the value of human reason, they can scarcely admit the title of any philosophical discussion which does not ultimately flow into these depths of thought. Restlessly agitated by the desire to penetrate these august sanctuaries of man, of nature, and of Deity, they coldly turn aside from the slow and scanty conclusions of mere experience;—they have no real sympathy but with those who, like themselves, would prefer winging their dim way for ever over an illimitable ocean, to taking shelter in the ark of a more timid philosophy, though it could shew in its little compass a specimen of all that the daily world possessed. Better, they think it, to hope for those things than to possess these!

Historians of Philosophy, however, must have no predilections, and therefore no exclusive definitions. The world of thought is vaster than any system, and no school that the world has yet seen is fitted to constitute itself the arbitrary judge of all. When Buffon styled himself a mind equal to the majesty of nature, he assumed a title which

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* I take this (of Jacobi) not from actual perusal.

1 The Germans are certainly inferior, as psychologists, to the English, Scotch, and even the French. The strange materialistic mania with which some later Germans are infected seems to me as injurious to the study of pure psychology as the most high-flying idealism of a past generation. Ed.]
not only no individual, but no class of individuals, is competent to arrogate. And in this study, as one of the most valuable of its practical advantages is the liberation from exclusive prejudices, it would be peculiarly unfortunate to commence by sacrificing to one which would vitiate the entire course of investigation.

Considering, then, "Philosophy" in its widest significance, as the "Science of Principles;" and freely allowing you to interpret the definition in proportion to your knowledge of the subject, I shall proceed to consider the nature, plan, and requisitions, of a perfect history of its progress. My subsequent Lectures will be far, indeed, from realizing the ideal thus sketched; but they may occasionally assist you towards conceiving how it might be realized. And I am not without hopes that hereafter, when the plan of these courses shall allow me to descend into minuter details, I may, by extending the History of Philosophy over several successive terms, present you with labours less unworthy so great an object.

When an ordinary observer first contemplates the vast mass of thought regarding the great problems of nature, humanity, and God—which exists either actually in the mouths and minds of living men, or in the state of written record,—there is (we may conceive) scarcely any perception of distinction, either in source or aspect, between any of its mingled materials. He perceives, indeed, plainly enough, the diversity of subjects and solutions that lie before him. He sees that there is scarcely a corner of the human mind or its concerns which the light of inquiry has not visited; and on which some verdict, or a variety of verdicts, may not be discovered. He sees that the same verdict reappears in different ages, and in different forms, and in different countries; and he remembers that many important practical developments have been contemporary with these various opinions, and contemporary too with their recurrence; and he suspects, perhaps, a relation deeper than any accidental synchronism between these two orders of phenomena. He cannot also fail to remark at any given age the difference in the rate of progress of co-existing nations, all nevertheless pursuing the same path with different velocities, and in a kind of successive order; so that the state of the intellectual world reminds him of that of the physical, where at the same instant one country is at its midnight, another in its opening morn, another, in that noon beyond which it ceases to ascend, another, again, in its evening decline, and all succeeding all. In some quarters too, he sees, or seems
to see, isolated fragments of speculation or belief, that appear wholly disconnected from all around them in space or time; for which he cannot discover any origin or any posterity, which seem, like the mystical patriarch, “without father, without mother, without descent.” Here, by slow gradations, a people climb from stage to stage, to opinions which seem to satisfy their intellectual wants; there, a single powerful and comprehensive thinker seems to hold in himself the philosophic destinies of centuries, yet even he often as much creature as creator, often rather the gifted interpreter of the vague conjectures and unformed conceptions of his age, than the sole explorer of the truths on which—their editor even more than their author—his name is inseparably inscribed. He sees beneath him a mighty and fluctuating mass, the collected result of an enormous expenditure of human thought, or the product of some external influence, or the combination of both. But a mist rests upon the scene; and as yet he discerns little farther: except, indeed, it may be the prominence of a few stately structures which in various points of the intellectual landscape out-top the misty cloud that hangs upon the rest. In their outward form, too, how various is the aspect of these myriad tribes of sentiment and opinion! Sometimes they stand in panoply of proof at the close of a long file of deductions; armed at all points and defying all assailants; sometimes they meet us in august but broken fragments, the torsos of gigantic systems, all whose other members have for ever perished (thus the relics of the Eleatic doctrine); sometimes in vague aspirations where reasoning seems to have as if were evaporated in desires, fears, hopes;—sometimes, again, in the form of dogmas imperative and decided, not condescending to acknowledge the support of a reason on which they profess their right of enforcing terms and prescribing limitations. In their style and temper, the same diversity. In one teacher, the calmness of self-assured superiority; in another, the calmness of humble conviction; in a third, the restless energy of anxious proselytism; in a fourth, the absence of all character, in the cold strength of simple argument; in a fifth, a sixth, a seventh, severe and caustic bitterness—that most melancholy of all spectacles—the comrades who are embarked in the common vessel of human destiny, and under the common pressure of the tempest of human afflicting, wasting the few hours allotted to each in contests, not for the priority of service, but for the reputation of it, for the name of strength where none are strong.

Now the true object of a true philosophical history is
to reduce this vast aggregate to the methodical unity of system; to classify its varieties, and to detect (as far as may be possible) the laws of their manifestation and their recurrence. It is in a manner the psychology of the human race; and undertakes to do that for the principles that lie hid in the stores of the universal mind, which ordinary psychology undertakes to do for those which regulate the development of an individual. In this aspect alone it rises to the dignity of a science; and if completely realized, would assuredly assume rank among the highest of all.

And as a first (and remote) approximation to the great work of system, we shall distribute that vast course of human thought which I have described into three distinct streams, which in fact are constantly united, but which philosophical analysis will easily separate. However blended be these currents of thought, you will have no difficulty in considering that all meditations, beliefs, convictions, manifest themselves under the distinct forms, first, of irreflexive conceptions, the unlaboured product of the mind, without any definite act of attention or clear notion of the object in view; secondly, of reflexive conceptions, the produce of a direct search for truth, accompanied by a perfect act of attention, and a notion more or less determinate, of the object of inquiry; and thirdly, of revealed conceptions, coming altogether from an external source, and in which the mind of man is, and knows itself to be, merely recipient. These classes, especially the first and second, it is not always easy to separate in real history, so as at once to reduce any intellectual phenomenon to its proper place; but in conception they are not less individually distinct from each other, than together inclusive of the whole extent of human thought.

Now to which of these divisions belongs Philosophy and its History? The question is of some importance, because much confusion has arisen from misunderstanding, or not permanently preserving in force, the proper answer. In the history (as far as we can penetrate it) of those ancient movements of national intellect which have eventuated in Philosophy, reason rises into action, as generally from some external impulse, so without, for a considerable period, any distinct conception of the objects of its inquiry or the limitations of its powers. Now with this period the History of Philosophy, properly conceived, has no more direct concern than the physiology of human motion, in its perfect gracefulness, could have with the vague gropings of a wanderer in the dark. Again, these movements of mind in almost all the early distributions of the human family are found con-
nected with professed revelations from heaven (a strong presumption, I may observe, in favour of some original reality); and with the web of these revelations it is that the first vague conceptions of the independent mind are found to be inextricably interwoven. That is to say, the first and third of our distributions, either apart or together, are those out of which the philosophical history of every country, in its primal development, is found to emerge. But these stages, though preliminary to philosophy, are not philosophy. Now, our men of erudition, whose tendency is always to estimate every element of learning in the compound proportion of its antiquity and its difficulty of access, by constantly including this species of undefined contemplation in their notion of Philosophy, have consequently been led to include it in their histories of Philosophy; and thus have detained and perplexed their readers with speculations not only unprofitable, but absolutely irrelevant to their true subject, respecting the "Philosophy" (as they term it) of ages in which we have no reason to believe that any conception of systematic inquiry, or even of systematic hypothesis, was ever attained.

Philosophy, then, belongs (and solely belongs) to the second division of human thought. It cannot commence only when reflection has commenced, as a conscious and independent exercise of the faculties: more particularly regarded, it begins when men, in any age or country, have for the first time proposed to themselves (by analyzing the principles of their own reason and their past experience, whatever that may have been) to render a satisfactory account, of themselves, of the universe around them, of that great Being who governs both, and of the precise relations in which these terms are connected with each other. The first beginnings of these studies will of course be feeble, partial, and changeable; but wherever the independent use of reason upon them exists, there "Philosophy" exists, and not except there.

Philosophy then lies in the exercise of the reflective faculties in the investigation of first principles; and the history of Philosophy is the history of that exercise. A clear conception of this at once abridges our labour, and renders it more substantially profitable. In all cases (both of individuals and of communities, which have so many striking analogies with them) instinctive action precedes reflective analysis; and in some instances the former has been carried to extraordinary perfection, and at length raised to the height of exquisite Art, where the latter has scarcely been ever manifested. Temples are built before architecture is theorized, diseases are healed before physi-
logy is understood, sculpture is perfected before the muscular anatomy is systematized, drawing exists before perspective, poetry before criticism, music before acoustics; and in like manner, both reason and the moral nature are long in operation before the effort to comprehend them or their objects has truly arisen. There is an instinctive logic, as there is an instinctive gratitude or a natural conscience; but the history of Philosophy should as little commence with these spontaneous developments as the history of Criticism should commence with the poems of Homer. On the other hand, the reason (previous to all philosophical development) may be externally and accidentally directed to objects (especially through the channel of religious doctrines) which long afterwards become the objects of genuine speculation; but the sameness of the object no more warrants us in identifying the mental movements towards it, than it would justify us in classing the gaze of the peasant at a planet with the telescopic examination of the same body by the astronomer. It is true, the change from the irreflected or merely recipient to the reflective state may not always be immediately discernible; a portion of every detailed history of Philosophy will always be justly occupied in fixing the transition; it may be unsuccessful in detecting it, and altogether undecided as to where in this border-land the boundaries of these rival districts should be accurately drawn:—the distinction, however, is not the less real between casual and dependent opinion and independent reflective effort, and must in aim and substance be preserved as our only security from confusion and embarrassment.

Having thus, by a general analysis of the mass of human thought, cleared the particular notion of our subject from those adscititious encumbrances with which mistaken diligence has overloaded it, and endeavoured to intimate more precisely its proper scope (the efforts of self-dependent reason to define its own principles—those of the moral activity—those of the universe as a whole); we may proceed with a better chance of utility and success to a further analysis—that of the subject itself—of Philosophy considered as susceptible of a History.

In order to obtain a more comprehensive grasp of the subject we shall do well to approach it gradually and from a distance; first considering (though briefly) the conditions under which all things become appreciable, become matter of historical detail; and then passing into the peculiarities of our immediate question. For in studying the History of Philosophy, we may fairly involve the Philosophy of History. Let us begin from the depths of the purely
mathematical and purely logical sciences, and rise to the historical or contingent; thus, in their resemblances and contrasts, illustrating each by each.

(a) In all human conceptions of real existences there are two elements logically separable, the substantial and the circumstantial; the thing itself, and the relations under which it is apprehended. We speak (for example) of That which resists compression and whose points of resistance are spread through space, as of something which really exists, though we can only know of it in that relation to ourselves which is expressed in such a definition. We speak in like manner of That which thinks and feels, as of another distinct substance; though that thinking nature can only apprehend directly what it does, not what it is, and can know what it does, not what it is, and can know what it does only under similar relative or subjective conditions. In the same way, on a grander scale of thought, we may contemplate the whole universe as a vast phenomenon; under which the reason of man, by an inevitable deduction, recognizes the absolute necessity of some substantial Being, without the presupposition of which the notion of existence itself involved in every rational assertion, would be impossible. This distinction, then, of the substantial and the circumstantial,—the absolute and the relative,—seems to be involved in the very foundations of human reason.

(b) Now of the circumstantial or relative conditions under which this absolute essence manifests itself to human apprehension, some, it is plain, are mentally necessary, others mentally contingent: that is to say, some are such that to perceive at all we must perceive subject to them; others such, that to suppose them altered would involve no contradiction. Of the former are such conditions as these, that every particular existence must be referred to a definite period of time, that every particular existence must be referred to something which makes it to exist, &c.; of the latter are such as these, that events should be experienced to exist at one part of time rather than another, that events should be experienced to follow under particular orders of succession rather than any other. The former are known to be certain from mental necessity; the latter are discovered to exist from actual experience. These two orders of coexisting beliefs, wholly distinct in their nature and origin, are harmonized to each other in the complexity of the human mind by the adapting skill of the great Author of our Being.

To the second of these classes—events in their nature contingent but known to be stable, which forms the domain...
lect. II.

of the Natural or Inductive Sciences—must be added a third. As we have passed from apprehensions of truth felt to be necessary and immutable, to apprehensions of truths felt to be contingent but fixed; so we now pass from these events contingent but fixed, to events conceived as contingent but unfixed. This third department includes all events, on whatever laws dependent, which are (and so long as they are) considered as casual or accidental influences and connexions. In this class are, then, involved all facts whose laws of occurrence are either themselves unknown, or are though partially known, yet suspended upon conditions which are undetermined or indeterminable.

That all the course of human perception consists of apprehensions of these three kinds, it is, I suppose, unnecessary to delay you in establishing. But that which the mind does for nature, the history of knowledge does for the mind itself. It converts the knowledge of truth into itself a new truth, and registers the story of knowledge as a series of phenomena rich with the most valuable materials for the observation and classification of the inductive inquirer. And this it does under exactly the same circumstantial conditions as we have just seen to be applicable to every other mode of investigation and degree of knowledge. It regards the apprehension, or successive apprehensions of truth, as themselves manifestations (like all else) of that absolute will which as First Cause, that absolute existence which as Prime Substance, sustains the universe; it perceives them as produced in time and through space; it states their ordered succession; and finally, it notes those accompanying circumstances which, not as yet reduced under definite law, it leaves to future inquirers to methodize and arrange. All history, to be true, must be based upon facts; to be profitable, must be systematized by induction. Let us then briefly examine both, with reference to our subject. Let us no longer speak of history in general, or of the history of knowledge in particular; but of the History of Philosophy especially, as concerns the collection of its facts, and the establishment of its laws.

(a) As regards, then, the History of Philosophy, properly so called, what will be the elements of inquiry in the collection of its facts? The first and most natural distribution should be this twofold arrangement. It should, on the one hand, collect and combine the scattered rudiments of pure reflective truth or error in every age; expounding (as far as is at once discernible) their internal connexion; it should, on the other, trace the interwoven order of circumstantial events which may illustrate their external fortunes. That this double line of inquiry is really
necesary, as regards the origin and propagation of error, will perhaps be readily conceded; but as concerns the history of truth, men are not so promptly inclined to admit its necessity. If truth, when presented to man, must as truth command his assent, from the universal identity of the mental constitution, it is conceived to derogate from the reality and the dignity of truth, to represent its success as dependent on circumstances not inherently connected with it. Now it is, indeed, certain that all truths are mutually consistent; that every separate problem, if solvable, has one truth for its solution; and that this truth, if fully and fairly brought before the mind, both as to its grounds and its deductions, must inevitably be known for what it is. But truth, though in itself thus sublimely uniform, does not manifest this uniformity in its apparition among mankind. When it becomes (so to speak) incarnated in human history, it suffers from the weakness of its position; and that which in its nature is one changeless reality, seems to shiver into a thousandfold diversity. The history of Truth does not suppose truth itself to be multiple; but it supposes the circumstances, degrees, and aspects of its manifestation, to be multiple. It is the office of the science of truth to investigate truth as it is in itself; it is the office of the history of Truth to investigate truth as it appears to man. The one finds real unity in the diversity of things; the other often finds superficial diversity in the unity of truth. And this statement, as it is applicable to all histories of the particular sciences, so is it peculiarly applicable to the history of the science of the first principles of nature and man;—which, indeed, is the reason why I have inserted a representation general in its bearing, in this particular division of the subject.

To illustrate this point (the apparent diversity of real truth), on which the possibility or utility of a history of Philosophy so much depends, let us venture to classify some of its most general cases. Truth, indeed, of all kinds, specially the true theory of man and nature, is one. But this single truth (which of course comprehends an extensive series of propositions) may, 1st, be expressed in a diversity of forms; may, 2ndly, be joined with a variety of other propositions not evident or not true; may, 3dly, be only partially seen as to greater or less degrees of it; may, 4thly, be seen by different observers in different parts exclusively; may, 5thly, (though seen entire as to its actual elements) be yet so apprehended and stated as to destroy the proportion between the parts and to give undue weight to some. If you conceive the constant
application of these formulæ to the fortunes of philosophical truth, you can have no difficulty in perceiving how the actual unity of truth does not at all contradict the possibility of a perpetual diversity of its manifestations.

As to the complete enumeration of facts, then, the history of Philosophy includes the full statement of doctrines held, and the full statement of circumstances influencing their fortunes. And to accomplish this first task of such a history, you will readily perceive, requires no common endowments of industry, of learning, and of critical sagacity. I pass to the second and higher office of the historian of Philosophy,—the establishment of the laws that are found to obtain in the reception and diffusion of philosophical opinions.

Now as we have defined for the enunciation of facts the two classes—doctrines and their circumstantial accompaniments—so shall we consider each distinctly in reference to the discovery of the inductive laws that (under the ordination of Providence) are found to regulate their successive history and mutual influences.

First,—as to doctrines themselves.

The first effort of classification is here directed to the reduction of the variety of systems under the smallest attainable number of leading principles. This generalization has been attempted with great boldness and brilliancy by many of the later writers upon this branch of history. An able representation of their views, with many ingenious additions, may be found in the clever work of M. Cousin. It is, after all, little more than an amplification of a single passage in the History of Tennemann, itself the result of preceding and protracted dissensions among the German literati. It is impossible, however, not to observe in these systematic statements, a tendency to the substitution of a priori deduction for experimental induction, precisely similar to that which marked the infancy of the physical science of the material world. In this study, moreover, the rapidity of the theorist is peculiarly suspicious; because facts can be disguised with peculiar facility, and thence both the historian and his pupil deceived into fancying an account complete where much is supposed, or much omitted.* These cautions are not, however, to be considered as detracting from the reality or dignity of the study itself; one which, indeed, in some degree forces itself upon the most ordinary readers of philosophical systems. Of empirical, of rational, of sceptical, of syncretistic, of mystical

* A striking instance of this tendency is exhibited in the writings of the celebrated Professor Hegel, of Berlin, who seems to have ventured the conception and execution of an a priori history of human knowledge.
schools, all men will speak who read to reflect; it is of
only the more importance that they should speak of them
with perception of their constituent tenets, and correctness
of application to particular instances.

The second effort at the establishment of historical
laws is directed to the development of doctrines in the
hands of successive teachers. Of this principle the most
general form unquestionably is, that doctrines increase in
intensity and exclusiveness in proportion as they are trans-
mitted through a longer series of defenders engaged from
conviction or from situation to support them. When the
original principles have been altogether exhausted of their
consequences, this progression of course ceases; but until
then (unless externally affected) it continues, the remotest
consequences, which are usually the last deduced, being always
the most daring and exclusive. For examples, you
may recall, the Socratic hesitancy heightened into the
Academic scepticism; Platonism compared with Neo-
platonism; Locke and Condillac; Descartes and Fichte.

The third class of these laws of the history of Philo-
sophy I would refer to the mutual action and reaction of
different systems. The effects—which are well worthy of
the deepest inquiry—will be found to be of opposite kinds;
that is, to result in either limitation or exaggeration, ac-
cording to circumstances. A very striking instance of the
latter efficacy may be found in the Cynic and Cyrenaic,
and their successors, the Stoic and Epicurean institutes.
Of the former the instances, though less definitely observ-
able, are, perhaps, still more constant and more numerous;
especially in those whose minds are not prepossessed by
professional interest or the enthusiasm of a party.

To these intimations of some of the guiding principles
of the scientific history of doctrines considered in them-
selves, I shall add two or three further remarks to exercise
your powers of reflection. One shall be, that in almost all
instances of philosophical development, the whole world—
its origin and principles and construction and object—has
been the first subject of human consideration. The reasons
are, among others, these: The more constant interest felt
in these external objects, on account of their being the
great and earliest sources of pleasure and pain. The vast
variety of outward objects which stimulates curiosity
(minds being nearly the same in all men). Their differ-
ences and resemblances are far more easily detected. They
appear far more easily modifiable by human effort; and
thus the study seems to promise more valuable results.
They admit of far greater varieties of explanation and
hypothesis. The passage from the outward to the inward
worlds is usually accomplished by one of three paths: 1st, Religious belief; for this in a manner externalizing the mind itself (in the conception of a supreme mind or minds) transforms even the outward tendency into a mental one. 2nd, Logical disputation or scepticism, which forces the examination of the principles of reason. This agent is remarkable in the transition to the Socratic age in Greece. 3rd, The discussion, even though it be only the practical discussion, of general morals. This influence is remarkable in the transition from the Socratic teaching to that which succeeded it.

Another remark for your consideration is this, illustrative of the last: that the external world is scarcely ever at first considered in detail but in the mass, as one vast phenomenon. It is usually explained, in this stage of reason, by a mingled solution composed out of a few facts of ordinary experience and vague analogies of man's own organized frame.

Another observation is, that among the first problems proposed to himself by man, are the vastest; the origin, for instance, and subsistence of the world. The reason is, the total absence of scientific method, on the one hand, and of detached experimental knowledge on the other. From the combination of these remarks, you will rightly deduce that the first manifestation of Philosophy is usually in the form of a metaphysical physics. That it is largely tinctured with religious beliefs, is a fact arising from a distinct origin, circumstantial not essential.

A last remark upon this head relates to the form or dress of doctrines in their early appearance. This is almost universally more or less imaginative. General laws are impersonated, and a strong tendency evinced to place a demon or elemental god over each class of observed phenomena. The tendency of imagination is polytheistic, as of science monotheistic. Even in the human frame itself there is found among savage nations the belief of a multiplicity of souls*; the process leading to "polypychism" being exactly the same as that which multiplies the directors or animators of the universe. When philosophy advances, it emancipates itself from this servitude to a poetical superstition; but it is long before it attains the notion of a supreme principle other than a divine fire, or air, or light; witness the whole course of the first ages of Greek philosophy.

These observations (which I will trust to your own reflection to enlarge into others more refined and more valuable) must for the present suffice as regards the laws of

* Mentioned, I think, by Dégérand.
the rise and propagation of doctrines considered in themselves. I will finally offer a few remarks on the other division—the influence of collateral associations and events upon the character and fortunes of philosophical systems. Of these the most convenient division would set on one side the influences of personal disposition and habits of life, on the other those of surrounding circumstances in all their variety. That in the former class influence is really exerted upon the formation of individual opinions, I need not pause to establish. For instance, peculiarity of intellectual powers directs to a preference for those reasonings and conclusions in which those powers are called into action. Peculiarity of moral feelings colours the aspect of moral deductions, giving a disproportionate hue and prominence to those feelings as elements of ethical truth. Disposition and temperament are similarly and strongly influential in urging the mind to an exclusive admiration of that side of general truth in which such constitutional peculiarities are either justified in theory, or brought into practical operation. We pass to the operation of habits of life. These, whether practical, artistic, literary, political, or religious, exert influences of which the history of philosophy presents many prominent instances; but which have, perhaps, never yet been examined and analyzed with the precision they deserve. I can only offer a hint or two on the less prominent of these secret tendencies. The operation of literary habits (as apart from purely reflective ones) is towards the consideration of human nature principally as it is susceptible of literary representation; that is, of representation under the established forms of received phraseology. The operation of habits of artistic production is towards the statement of human nature in relations of perfect symmetry, and with a view to the attraction of admiration by novelty. The operation of religious habits favours the subordination of all the principles and powers of the mind to a supernatural sphere of influences past, present, and future. Hence the systems produced under these impulses when they arrive at philosophical completeness, and are urged to the last measure of their course, are usually founded on a basis really and fundamentally sceptical; that is, on the utter depreciation of the claims and prerogatives of human reason. Pascal and Huet are examples; the modern mystical school of France still more so. Of the other class of influences, not personal but external, the field is altogether too vast for our present survey. As in the preceding cases, I shall rather suggest than expound; leaving the subject to fructify in your own subsequent contemplations.
The principal sources of influence in this department are—peculiarities of political position, peculiarities of social connexion, peculiarities of climate and natural scenery. Of the first briefly. Despotic governments are favourable to speculations remote from active practical application; that is, in natural science to mathematical inquiry, in mental science to mystical theories, in moral views to individual discipline rather than social enterprise or regulation—to asceticism and quietism. Of all these you have a prominent example in the state of science in India, where a despotic exclusiveness forms the principle of the whole social fabric. Free governments are favourable to speculations political and practical, rather than to those of an abstract and internal character. The government of a complete democracy is inevitably accompanied (among a cultivated people) by philosophical theories eloquent and unsolid. Ancient Athens, and revolutionary France, will at once occur to you as corroborating a principle to which indeed I know scarcely an exception.

Of the influence of natural position and surrounding scenery upon the complexion of the favourite philosophical doctrine of a country, much has been ingeniously speculated. Whatever be the real amount of this efficacy, it probably belongs almost wholly to the earlier and more imperfect stages of rational development. It is perhaps unwarrantably fanciful to find in the vast features of Hindostan the type at once and motive of its theories, and in the broken and diversified landscapes of Greece the image of its prodigiously varied mental manifestations.

With regard to the difficulties affecting the branch of inquiry we have been this day discussing, the principal are the scattered position of the facts to be combined; the peril of premature generalization, to which, as we have seen, special facilities are afforded; and the prejudices, which, because the systems of other ages are in many respects the systems of the present day, are apt to reflect the prepossessions of the present day upon the discussions of other ages.

The general uses of such inquiries it is (if I have made myself intelligible) scarcely necessary to recapitulate. Besides the general uses of all knowledge of the highest order, the constant practical applicability of every law investigated in the history of speculation, bestows on this a peculiar value. One detached result I cannot omit. It is that in explaining the general laws which regulate the formation and transmission of thought, these inquiries will be found (as I may hereafter attempt to shew) to furnish a very forcible contribution to the mass of the evidences
of the Christian faith; by demonstrating the total improbability of the generation of the Christian system of belief and practice, in consonance with these laws, and through a purely natural process. By this physiology of the history of opinion, it might, I say, be invincibly shewn, that Christianity (under its times and circumstances) was indeed a distinct and peculiar energy thrown into the system of human thought and human events; and not producible by any pre-existent function or organism contained in that system. But this altogether incidentally.

Finally, the history of Philosophy, the history of the Church, the history of Governments, what lesson do they all unite in teaching? Tolerance and candour. This is, above all others, the practical admonition which the story of opinions should have a tendency to impress. Astronomy, by fixing the laws of the heavenly bodies, destroyed one principal field of superstition; the history of Philosophy (cultivated as I have now ventured to represent it) would tend to achieve the same destruction of intolerance, and by means extremely similar. In this case, the effect is produced by the strong arm of science reducing to simple laws and connexions, no longer the revolutions of the skies, but the revolutions and interferences of error and of truth; and while such a labour would tend to lessen the undue power of casual associations by exposing their influence, it would tend also to create in the mind of the philosophical observer that calm and equitable appreciation of the genuine position of man in respect to truth, which is one of the happiest aids that science can lend to the soothing precepts of practical religion. Recognizing everywhere the unity of human nature in the variety of position, it sees or teaches to see, in each honest misconception the misfortune of a brother, not the crime of an enemy: and in harmonizing, if not contradictory opinions yet contradictory prejudices, by referring those opinions to the almost inevitable partiality of views, it finds even in the cold domain of speculation some of that happiness, and may perhaps anticipate some of that reward, which the Divine Author of the great Practical Philosophy of Man promised, when he declared, “Blessed are the peace-makers; for they shall be called the children of God.”

On our next day of meeting (Tuesday) we shall enter, I hope, upon some discussions of the Indian systems of philosophy; on which so much has lately been thought and written, that we can scarcely omit some notices of them,
LECTURE III.

ON THE PHILOSOPHIES OF INDIA.

GENTLEMEN,

I PROCEED to endeavour to interest you with some notices of the remains of the Indian Speculative and Practical Philosophies. It is a subject upon which, notwithstanding the labours of many illustrious inquirers, our information is still exceedingly ambiguous and defective. It is, likewise, a subject, which in some respects is so widely removed from our western habits and associations, as to require a rare power of identification with new positions and circumstances in order to be thoroughly intelligible;—a sort of metempsychosis of which few are capable without repeated efforts, and long and laborious practice.

Towards the elucidation of the literature, both imaginative and philosophical, of India, much has of late, indeed, been contributed; and Britain has fairly occupied that preeminence in the investigation which her superior acquaintance with the country, the extent of her resources and the authority of her functionaries, made to be her duty towards the general cause of erudition. The society of Bengal, as well as those of Bombay, Madras, and other British stations in the East, have enjoyed the advantage of investigating the subject in the midst of Indian scenery and associations; while the Royal Asiatic Society has brought to the common store the benefits of retirement from the pressing demands of civil or military offices, and the facility of consulting the parallel or contemporary collections of other literatures preserved in the great libraries of England, and of making those comparisons of the intellectual development of different countries which reflect so strong a mutual illumination upon all. On this head, the connexion of the Indian with the Egyptian and early Grecian systems will be considered the topic most remarkable and attractive. The tradition so universal among at least the later Grecian

1 [In revising this chapter I have had the valuable assistance of Professor Cowell, whose notes are marked C. Ed. 1872.]
writers, of the travels of Pythagoras in the East, as well as some very striking resemblances between the Hindū systems and the cosmogonies of the Italic school as recorded by Ocellus and Timaeus, if they do not constitute a proof, at least warrant an investigation; and unquestionably it is from the Indian sources (many of which are still unexplored) that the light which may yet clear this interesting question can alone be reasonably anticipated.

I suppose it unnecessary to inform you, that if we are to believe the records themselves of Indian wisdom, or the affirmations of their modern expositors, the antiquity of their speculations reaches to a period transcending the boldest suppositions of European chronology. The professed revelations on which the great part of the fabric of their philosophy is built, claim a far higher antiquity than even the epochs of their astronomical science; and the principal monument of the latter (the Sūrya Siddhānta) is revered by the Brahmins as having been issued from heaven precisely 2,164,930 years since. Well aware of the mysterious and indefinite veneration with which extreme antiquity surrounds its objects, and the ready answer which the character of a celestial revelation whose date is placed where no investigation can follow, supplies to the objections of heresy, the Indian teachers proclaim that the basis of their philosophical convictions is a revelation co-eternal with nature herself; that no time has existed when the Vedas have not been; that the universe itself cannot claim a remoter origin than these declarations of the will and the character of its Author. In illustration of this belief the sages of the Mīmāṃsā (or orthodox) school are wont to affirm that the language in which these records are embodied is no human or arbitrary dialect; that the association of words and thoughts is (at least in this instance, though the assertion, indeed, seems to be general) no con-

[If the "resemblances" were even more striking than Mr Butler supposes them to be, they would prove nothing as to the obligations of the early Greek philosophers to India. For the treatises of both Ocellus and Timaeus are now admitted to be forgeries, possibly of the Macedonian, certainly of no earlier period. Ed.]

As I have touched on the subject I may, however, be permitted to add, that it is not impossible that the reports of the early Grecian systems may have been coloured by the subsequent intercourse with India, in the age of Alexander, by the expedition of Megasthenes, and, still more, during the existence of the Bactrian power, from the 255th to the 126th year before our era;—to which, indeed, we may add the close connexion between the great commercial city of Alexandria and the merchants of India during the entire reign of the Ptolemies, and under the Roman Empire. Knowing, as we do, the changes which the Alexandrian teachers introduced into the Pythagorean philosophy, it can certainly not be thought improbable that some of these changes may have originated in Indian associations. The writings of Clemens contain an account of Buddhism;—a proof that the philosophy of India had attracted notice in the literary circles of Alexandria. But on this topic I cannot now enlarge.
ventional connexion; but, that sound (which by one curious
tenet of some of these schools is held to be eternal) was from
the beginning of all things irrevocably connected with the
truth it was to express. The entire constitution of the In-
dian community, its immutable castes, and the very arts or
offices they cultivate and discharge (which are for the most
part assumed or alluded to in these writings), are thus
stamped with the impress of an unfathomable antiquity;
and the astonishing inviolability which has confessedly
characterized them in all periods of their history is easily
explained by the affirmation, that, formed from, they are
formed for, eternity.

Those bold attributions have met with the usual fortune
of such claims among inquirers, who, being free from the
national prejudices which gave them force, have had leisure
for scepticism. The preposterous demands of the Bhattach-
of Hindostan have produced a reaction of total disbelief,
which, if not as absurd in reason, is perhaps as ungrounded
in fact. Descending, then, from that platform of eternal
and supra-mundane existence on which alone the sages of
Agra and Benares will consent to take their stand, and
directing our course by the scattered glimpses of historical
light, and the indications afforded by the internal state
of the books and of the country, let us briefly notice
some of the simpler probabilities of the question of In-
dian antiquity.

The first and the most imposing of those fortresses
in which the advocates of the primitive glories of India
entrench themselves, is the argument founded upon their
astronomical remains. This point has been-laboured with
the sagacity of an accomplished astronomer, and the elo-
quence of an accomplished writer, by the illustrious French
historian of the science, Bailly. The tables of Tirvalore,
whose epoch dates 3102 years before our era, are those on
which he principally relies. It will be obvious to you all,
that if by theory or observation the true laws of the
motions of the heavenly bodies are once discovered, the
possession of their configuration at any one epoch will
involve the assignment of that configuration at any other.
That these (or any other) tables, therefore, commence
from any given epoch, is no unequivocal proof that the
observation they profess to record really belongs to that
epoch; the same principles which allow the astronomer to
prophecy the future, will enable him to picture the past.
The determination, whether the observation be genuine
or fictitious, will, as regards a state of the science less

8 [On this subject compare Elphinstone's History of India, B. III. c. 1.
Ed.]
improved than our own, generally turn upon the actual accuracy of the representation of the heavens at the supposed period. Now tried by this searching test, the Indian tables unquestionably cannot stand scrutiny. A pretended conjunction assigned to the epoch in question (the commencement of the Kali-yuga, or present age of the world), is demonstrated to be a mere approximation, such as the present attainments of the Indian astronomers would have enabled them to reach, but which any direct observation must infallibly have transcended. The great name of Laplace gives as much weight to this inference as any human authority can be conceived to do.

But this is a mere negative conclusion. A very happy suggestion was advanced in some papers in the sixth and eighth volumes of the Astronomical Researches, towards resolving the interesting question of the actual date of the Indian Tables. Mr Bentley observed that the most likely time when the actual observation was made, would be that at which the errors of the tables would be less than at any other; and that if that time could be computed, we should manifestly detect the epoch from which all other fictitious or predicted notes arose, the error accumulating with the distance. By laborious calculations on this principle he determined the Brahma Gupta tables to the year of our æra 536, and that Sûrya Siddhânta, of whose millions of years I have lately spoken, to about the year 1000. Of the connexion of the Greek and Indian astronomers much has been speculated without any decisive result. There are marks of resemblance, and also marks of difference: one of the latter is worth noticing as an instance of the decisiveness of those historical confirmations which are derived from the immutable truths of mathematical science and the constitution of the physical world. In one of the elementary astronomical calculations the sine of ascensional difference is not employed, but the arc of ascensional difference itself; a difference which could be safely neglected only in a tropical climate; and the neglect of which proves that the rule was formed for the latitude in which it is now found. On the other hand are not merely resemblances, but, as it is said, direct references by name to the astronomical skill of the Greeks (or “Yavans”) in some of the elder fragments of Indian learning. The diurnal rotation of the earth was held, and exploded, by both. For the further elucidation of the point, we must, I apprehend, await further discoveries in the field of Indian literature itself. Unquestionably the mathematical knowledge of Hindostan is at present possessed less as a productive treasure than as a traditional
deposit; and seems to partake of the character of the
country itself, where all is stationary, and the present venerate
the past too highly to venture to outshine it.

In the enormous buildings and excavations—such as
the fortress of Dowlatabad, the cave-temples of Ellora—
which are to be met in every part of India, other writers
find evidences of a vast, united, and highly cultivated
people: while again, the exceeding minuteness of laws
(to which remote antiquity cannot be denied) would seem
to infer a high degree of civilization in all its departments
among the people whose daily life and intercourse these
laws were meant to regulate. That institution of castes
which is found in all the most ancient records of India
presupposes antecedent advancement; and we know that
Alexander found beyond the Indus the monarchs of vast,
and, it would appear, civilized empires. Of the imaginative
literature of India (the Mahabharata, Sacontala, &c.) the
antiquity is undeniable; and for the principal feats of their
skill in the mechanical arts (celebrated in the earliest ages)
they themselves know no origin later than the instruction
of the gods. I do not speak of the legends of the con-
quests of Sesostris, as attesting the early existence of Indian
empire; because such accounts, even if unquestioned in
authenticity, throw little or no light upon the question
which immediately concerns us,—the antiquity of Indian
civilisation as a presumption in favour of the antiquity
of its philosophy. We are not however to forget the Sansc
script language itself, a language of richness, variety, and
strength; and of whose claims to be considered the elder:
sister of the European dialects, it is, after the labours of
Bopp and other philologists, almost impossible to doubt.

With these various topics of consideration affording
undeniable presumptions in favour of the antiquity of
Indian literature in general, the subject of the date of
Indian philosophy in particular is as yet encumbered with
insurmountable difficulties. The peculiar formation of the
text-books themselves is such as to have admitted of interpola
tion with such facility, as to nullify almost all conclusions
from the antiquity of one to that of another portion of
the same collection. The works which are
transmitted under the highest characters of age, consist
almost wholly of sutras, or detached aphorisms, with, often,
little discernible connexion: and the productions of greatest
extent are crowded with episodes which some oriental
scholars conceive to be unquestionably assignable to dif-
f erent ages. Under such circumstances it would be wholly
impossible, within the limits of a lecture, to enter into any
complete discussion of the respective antiquity of the
various relics of the Indian philosophy. I shall therefore substitute the conclusions of those eminent Orientalists who have devoted their almost exclusive attention to the subject—as far as even they have ventured to pronounce. The Vedas, which, as I have said, are the common basis of almost all Indian speculation, are assigned by Colebrooke to 1400, by Sir W. Jones to 1600, years before Christ. The entire collection of the Vedas has not been achieved by any Western scholar. These famous writings are composed of prayers, of doctrines, and of precepts,miscellaneously collected; and are accompanied by certain summaries or abridgments, called Upanishads. The great centre of Indian legislation—the Laws of Manu—are ascribed by Sir W. Jones to about 800 years before our æra: by Schlegel they are regarded as of much higher antiquity. The Puránas, or Theogonies, are eighteen in number. They are deeply tinged with the speculative beliefs of India; and abound with fables conceived in that fantastical spirit which has always characterized Eastern invention. Their date is quite uncertain; but probability would ascribe them to an epoch later than the former.

To the Vedas belongs a practical commentary, all whose precepts are considered of authority equal to that of the Sacred Writ itself. This is the Púrva (i. e. Prior) Mímånsá. It treats altogether of the nature, occasions, limitations, extensions, of religious observances; that is, of the varieties of dharma or duty—a word which, very characteristically, signifies in one gender “moral merit,” and in the other, “an act of ceremonial devotion” (a fact to which a parallel may be found by those intimate with the lower class of Irish in their use of the word duty). This collection, which is voluminous, consists of between two and three thousand sutras, and nearly one thousand sections under the title of Adhicaranas. These works—the Vedas, Puránas, and the Mímånsá—form the chief monuments of the theology and moral literature of the Brahmins; and, within the circle of these productions, they would probably be willing that the national mind should for ever move.

4 [The text of the four Vedas has now been printed by European scholars, viz. the Rig, the Yajur (in its two recensions) the Sàma, and the Atharva. C.]
5 [These, it is now known, are not “summaries or abridgments,” but rather mystical treatises which teach a pantheistic philosophy as the esoteric doctrine of the Vedas. C.]
6 [The Puránas are believed to be all later than the Christian era, most of them by several centuries. C.]
7 [In its discussions of the circumstances of religious duties it enters into many minute casuistical distinctions, and hence has a character quite as much logical as moral. Indeed, almost every investigator of the Mímånsá seems to have been struck with its close resemblance to the elaborate disquisitions of the casuists of the Roman Church.]
Of course you do not require to be reminded of the peculiar conformation of society in Hindostan, in its relation to the boundless authority of the priesthood. Upon this subject, as it meets us perpetually in studying the various fortunes of speculation in the nations of antiquity, a remark must be hazarded. An established priesthood (omitting a few occasional advantages in their concentration for purposes of research), vested with peculiar privileges as public instructors, must be injurious to the free growth of knowledge in every case but one—the case in which they are the guardians and expositors of a true revelation. This necessitates their existence, and justifies it; but, this one case apart, I know no instance in which it can be fairly affirmed that the exclusive privileges of a sacerdotal class did not operate injuriously upon those nations—Egyptian, Indian, or any other—in which they existed. Subsisting by imposture, they were obliged to cherish public ignorance to prevent its detection; and their very wisdom was converted into a crime by the fact of its concealment. I have made this distinction, with regard to the priesthood of a true and false revelation, because, simple as it is, it has constantly been overlooked by two classes of writers who are equally in error; and because it is necessary to guard against the unlimited extent of conclusions to which a candid survey of the history of ancient philosophy must (within its own sphere) inevitably lead.

But even the vigilant guardians of Hindû theology come before us themselves in the light of philosophic investigators. To what precise origin the Vedânta philosophy is to be attributed, on what occasion the interpretation of the Vedas was thus reduced to system, or what impulse first urged the students of the sacred text to theorise its contents in a methodical exposition scarcely less revered than the original itself, it seems now almost hopeless to inquire. But the fact is certain, that by the side of the eternal Vedas, the incarnations of Deity, resides tranquilly a vast and elaborate system of Man, Nature, and God; a system out of which all the other forms of Indian speculation seem more or less directly to have arisen; and which, if not itself independent, was at least the occasion of independence to others. For the references in the Brahma-Sûtra (the chief monument of Vedântism) to the rival systems of Câpiâ, Kanâda &c., bear every appearance of having been later interpolations;—redoubts added to meet successive heresies, like the articles of our Athanasian Symbol.

The entire mass, then, of speculation in India bears