this common character, that it all professes to be expositions of ancient revelation. In this Brahmin and Buddhist alike coincide; for even the Buddhist himself, whose daring incredulity laughs at the Vedas, names with reverence a certain Buddha or series of Buddhas, from whom his doctrine declares itself traditionally descended*. This, then, being the common character of all, the sects of Indian philosophy are best divided not upon mutual differences of doctrine, but upon relative distance from the common centre of the old and standard revelation, the awful Vedas themselves. Thus considered, the true parallel for Indian philosophy will at once occur to you,—the scholastic systems of modern Europe. Making due allowances for differences of circumstances, it is in Scotus and Albertus and Occam that we find the Western echoes of Gotama and Kanada, and the rest of the Hindu logical theologians.

If we examine in this light the vast collection of writings, whether original, or expository of originals, or expository of expositions, which compose the Hindu philosophical literature, we shall find eight principal forms of doctrine. Two rigorously orthodox: the Mimamsa, 1st, the Purva Mimamsa, by Djaimiti; and, 2nd, the Vedanta, by Vyasa. Of these we have spoken. Two of a much more independent character, yet received with respect: the Nyaya (by Gotama), a philosophical arrangement of all the possible subjects of thought; the Vaiseshika (Kanada), a system partly logical, and partly physical, embracing the atomic hypothesis. Still more heterodox are the two famous Sankhyas, the Sankhya Capila, and the Sankhya Patanjali, the distinctive titles being from the reputed founders. And totally heretical are the tenets of the sects of Jaina and of Buddha. In making this distinction I adopt the learned labours of Colebrooke; the scholar to whom, perhaps above all others of this age, Oriental literature is indebted. I particularly recommend to you the disquisitions from his pen in the Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society. Until the original texts themselves be presented to us in an European form, these memoirs are probably the most authentic reports extant of the tenets of the Indian schools. You may add to these the labours of M. Abel Remusat in the Journal des Savans, and the writings of Sir W. Jones. The Bhagavadgita (one remarkable Indian monument) exists in an English trans-

* In the orthodox systems this reverential notice of their founders is unbounded. Capila (the founder of the Sankhya) was no less than a son of Brahma; or, according to other Puranas, an incarnation of Vishnu; and the author of the Kriyac (the principal monument of the sect) professed to have received his doctrine by traditional succession from Capila himself.
lation by Wilkins. It was also translated by Wm. Schlegel in 1823. The Oupnekhat is also translated by Anquetil-Duperron.

To explain minutely the peculiar views of these sects would be a task requiring volumes; and to the preservation of which no human memory would be competent. Those who are familiar with the powers of minute distinction displayed in the writings of Aristotle and of his commentators, can alone form any conception of the subtlety of logical discrimination which is evinced by these speculators. It presents indeed a fearful contrast, to observe the exquisite refinement to which speculation appears to have been carried in the philosophy of India, and the grossness of the contemporary idolatry paralleled in scarcely any nation of the earth, as well as the degraded condition of the mass of the people, destitute of active energy, and for the most part without a shadow of moral principle to animate the dull routine of a burdensome and scrupulous superstition.

It will be, for our present purposes, more instructive to take a general view of that side of the human mind which appears mainly to be revealed in the Indian speculation; illustrating the subject by references to the systems themselves.

In all the forms of Indian philosophy, whether orthodox or heterodox, one common object is equally professed as the present aim of human wisdom, the liberation of the soul from the evils attending the mortal state. And in all, this object is attempted by means not dissimilar, that is to say, by one modification or other of that intense abstraction, which, separating the soul from the bonds of flesh, is supposed capable of liberating it in this life from the unworthy restrictions of earthly existence, and of introducing it in the next to the full enjoyment of undisturbed repose, or even to the glories of a total absorption into the Divine Essence itself. In the unity of this object we may recognize perhaps the lingering traditions of original revelation, still upholding, in the midst of sensuality and degradation, some convictions of the primal dignity of the human nature and destiny: but still more strongly may we detect the secret but continual influences of a climate, which, indisposing the organization for active exertion, naturally cherished those theories which represent the true felicity of man to consist in inward contemplation and complete quiescence. For some universal principle can alone account for the unbroken similarity which (in spite of the ingenious disquisitions of some Orientalists,
who would find in their favourite field of inquiries varieties as numerous as those of European philosophers) does, in the great and leading features, characterize the entire series of these systems.

To arrive then at eternal beatitude, and at the pro- missory foretaste of that fuller consummation which the Yogi in even this life may attain, is the final scope of all Indian speculation, of some, as of the Sāṅkhya Patanjali, expressly and from the outset; of others, as the Sāṅkhya Capila and the systems Vaiseshika and Nyāya, more remotely and indirectly. But as the attainment of this superhuman condition is supposed to be principally dependent on what the Sāṅkhya Capila calls “a clear knowledge of discriminate truth,” the discipline for the blessing is made to include a vast series of preliminary doctrines with regard to the material and immaterial worlds, and a complete apparatus of dialectical distinctions. Generally speaking, I find in the Hindū Institutes two paths specified as leading to the state of perfectibility—religious ceremonial observances, especially sacrifice; and the exercise of absorbed contemplation. The former is ranked highly; the "aswamedha" or immolation of a horse under certain circumstances (to which you may remember the reference in Southey’s Kehama) is considered to entitle immediately, and ex opere operato, to exalted privileges; but even the Vedānta Sūtras themselves do not class these performances with the contemplative knowledge of the Divine Soul of all things. The Sāṅkhya Capila states the matter still more boldly. Sacrifice, the best of all temporal means, says the divine son of Brahma, is insufficient for the great object of absolute exemption from all mortal evils; were it merely because it supposes the slaughter of animals, and thus violates a higher precept interdicting the shedding of blood; but still more, because in point of fact, Indra and the other subordinate deities who have gained the celestial state by these sacrificial works, are deceived in expecting immortality: a thousand Indras have passed away, and a thousand more shall pass. To arrive at the possession of the prerogatives of the wise, wisdom itself must be sought and possessed. How then shall it be attained?

To solve this master-problem, the Indian systems usually commence with copious logical discussions; which, whatever be their origin, and however peculiar their dress, unquestionably leave the Hindū pupil little to learn from Zeno or Aristotle. The Nyāya (of Gōtama) is a system of pure dialectic; and coupled with that of Kanáda, includes a complete scheme of categories (Substance, Quality, Action, Community, Particularity, Aggregation); a minute cata-
logue of all the possible subjects of thought; and a sufficient account of the syllogistic form of reasoning, which (by returning back on the question) is made to consist of five members instead of three; which is substantially the same with our Western syllogism. The Sánkhya of Capila declares that (exclusive of Intuition, which belongs to higher natures) there are three species of knowledge, Perception, Inference, and Affirmation or Tradition (which is meant to include the informations of Sacred Writ, and of those gifted beings who retain the recollections of former worlds); and it professes to shew that the other sources contended for are in truth reducible to these. The Nyáya considers that we cannot place knowledge under less than four topics; which it calls Perception, Inference, Analogy, and Revelation. From these fountains (whichever enunciation be adopted), the Sánkhya, which seems the most elaborate of all the Eastern schools, proceeds to deduce the certainty of twenty-five principles, out of which, the universe is composed; and endeavours to establish from these elementary propositions those views of the total distinction of soul from any material essence, (on the due appreciation of which that high contemplation can alone be founded,) which is to end in raising the soul above the bonds and infirmities of space and time. We shall return to these Sánkhya "Principles," in the course of the very brief collective sketch of the chief dogmas of the Indian schools, which it is now the time to present. We have seen the common object; we have seen the common path proposed for its attainment, the knowledge of soul and body; let us now inquire as to the Indian views of that knowledge itself.

We begin with the Supreme Being. The Uttara Mímánsá, "which is to theology what the Púrva Mímánsá is to works and their merit," which is the great depository of the Vedantine beliefs, and whose chief extant memorial is the Brahma Sútra, attributed to Vyása (an avatar of

1 [One Hindú syllogism is made up, apparently, of an enthymeme and a regular syllogism: one of which is superfluous. As in the specimen given by Elphinstone, Vol. i. p. 236, note.]

1. The hill is fiery;
2. For it smokes.
3. What smokes is fiery (as a hearth);
4. Accordingly the hill is smoking;
5. Therefore it is fiery.

Professor Cowell, however, informs me that this five-membered syllogism is rhetorical rather than logical, and called "inference for the sake of another."
FIRST SERIES.

Vishnu himself, the reputed author also of the Mahábhárata, the great Hindú epic,—this, the high orthodox school of philosophy, declares from the Vedas themselves—of God—that he is the Supreme Eternal One, the Emanatory Cause (i. e. at once the efficient and material cause) of the universe. From him all proceeds; into him all is to be ultimately resolved; as a spider extends and retracts his thread, or (to use another common Hindú comparison) as the tortoise protrudes and then gathers back his lower limbs. It would not be easy to parallel the sublimity of the descriptions which the Vedas themselves contain of this All-creating Essence; the whole riches of a most opulent language are exhausted upon the infinity of his perfections; and the very title of Godhead (Bhargas) is constructed of three monosyllabic verbs which signify to shine, to delight, and to move. In both the Brahmin and the Buddhist systems a trinity of natures is discoverable; though upon the precise attributes of each divine personage there seem to be many varieties of opinion. In the ordinary expositions of the Vedantine theology they are declared to be Creator, Conservator, and Destroyer: among the atheistical followers of Capila a sort of natural trinity is professed under the title of Goodness, Foulness, and Darkness: and among the Buddhists of Nepal (according to Mr Hodgson's interesting account) the same notion reappears under the names of Buddha, Dharma, and Sanga—Intelligence, Matter, and Multitude. Such is the Deity of the Vedas. The Deity of the Sánkhya of Patanjali seems to be of much the same character. But the Sánkhya of Capila (to which I have just referred) denies the existence of a God altogether in any other sense than that of an intelligence issuing out of primitive nature, and to be resolved hereafter into it. These sages urge that we can derive no proof of a supreme Creator distinct from insensible nature, either from sense, reasoning, or revelation. All things are evolved out of an intelligence which was itself but a secondary formation. Were God detached from nature, he could have no inducement for creation; were he fettered to nature, he could have no ability for such a work. I need not remind you how completely these sophisms anticipate the more modern atheism of Europe. Of course, you may suppose the Capilists are obliged to exert some ingenuity in endeavouring to reconcile their views with the solemn Theism of the Vedas. They argue that the passages in these sacred records really refer either to a liberated soul, or to some of the mythological deities; or by some other such evasion endeavour to escape the fate which drove the followers of Buddha out of the Indian peninsula. I suspect, from
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scattered intimations, that while the Capilists attack the foundations of religion, the Buddhists originally were guilty of the darker crime of attacking the authority of the priesthood; a difference which will sufficiently explain the difference of their fortunes. It is certain, that, even to the present day, a genuine Buddhist, from the heights of his ascetic sanctity, is apt to despise the inferior aids of sacerdotal ministration; and is in fact more highly reverenced by the people; upon the same principle which gave to the mendicant saints of the Roman orders an influence so far above that of the secular clergy.

The Védánta philosophy does not enlarge upon nature as distinct from its great Author. But this deficiency is fully supplied by the copious dissertations of the Sánkhya and Vaiseshika physics. I before stated that the Sánkhya of Capila constitutes twenty-five principles of the universe. At the head of the list stands the venerated name of Nature or Prakriti—eternal matter undivided, without parts, not produced, but productive. The next title on this solemn bead-roll of the universal system is Intelligence (Buddhi or Mahat), first production of nature and prolific of all subsequent existence; and for the accommodation of religious associates, it would seem that this very Intelligence divides into a triune Deity: thus conciliating (though awkwardly) the theistic and atheistic hypotheses. Third on the catalogue comes the Personal Conviction (Atman), a singular element in a system of nature; but which seems to me to be internally connected with the theory of Illusion (Māyā), which this school probably countenanced; and which may seem to base physical existence itself on the transitory belief of it. The Capilist next enumerates five pure elements which themselves produce the grosser and perceptible elements of the external world. The organs of sense and motion are then named, and that Manas, or Mind, which seems to discharge the same functions as the communis sensus of the old psychologists, with additional functions of activity. “The external sense perceives, the internal examines, consciousness makes the self-application, and intellect resolves.” Finally is introduced that eternal essence which, though it may transmigrate through innumerable bodics, is made by wisdom capable of final liberation and perpetual repose—the Purusha, or Soul. The treatise itself (the Kārikā) sums up the whole: “Nature, root of all, is no production; seven principles including the Great Intellect are productions and productive; sixteen are productions unproductive; soul is neither production nor productive.”

In the Vaiseshika a physical system more precise and
Intelligible is enounced. According to Kanáda (the author of this system), there have been from all eternity simple, in composite, ultimate atoms: and from the aggregation of these, according to definite numerical proportions, the world has had existence. The Buddhist school seems to contend that these primitive atoms are indefinitely aggregated; and adds to the theory, that objects themselves exist only when perceived, not reasoning on any Berkeleian grounds, but holding that at each instant there is a momentary union of atoms which are instantaneously scattered as the perception ceases. It is a remarkable peculiarity in many of the Indian systems, that they incline to supposing the excellent to have been gradually formed out of evil:—“from darkness,” says the Káriká, “came foulness; and from this was formed goodness;” and we have seen that the same treatise supposes nature to have generated the Supreme Intelligence.

But the great object to which (as I have before remarked) all these systems equally tend, is the ultimate realization of that union with the Supreme Nature in which it is conceived that eternal beatitude is to consist. Creation is understood by the Káriká as the union of soul and body; and the soul, invested with a subtle semi-material frame (linga), is by all these theorists regarded as passing through perpetual and successive transitions from body to body; a frame which the Káriká likens to the attenuated flame which hovers over the wick of a lamp. According to the Vedántins this life is itself a place of retribution; and all future transmigrations are also of the nature of recompense. By the aid of this supposition, protracted into an antecedent eternity, the expositors of the Veda boldly essay to grapple with the question of the existence of evil as consistent with the infinite excellence of the Author and substantial cause of all; and I may, in passing, observe that there is scarcely a controversy in modern theology relative to free-will, grace, the merit of works, or the value of faith, to which you may not find copious allusions in the text of the Vedas, or the Sútras of its commentators. So similar under all systems, whether true or false, must be the main elements of the relations of man to God. The glory of true religion is not to have named these relations (which are obvious and inevitable), but to have illumined their nature and fixed them upon an infallible foundation.

A circumstance which aids this resemblance is the representation which the Indian philosophy gives of the estate of man; which it perpetually paints in the gloomiest

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6 This opinion is not peculiar to them, but common to all Hindús, springing necessarily from their theory of pre-existence and transmigration. C.]
colours. "The gods are happy, animals are dull, but man is the miserable slave of futility and darkness." The Káriká enumerates no less than sixty-two obstructions, besides the whole tribe of organic disabilities, which prevent the perfectibility of the human soul. For example, Error mistakes irrational nature, &c. for the Soul, and imagines "the Deliverance" to be absorption into these. Illusion imagines transcendent power to be deliverance, which is only a step to it. Nay, even Content itself is but a negative state, and far removed from the true eminence of the soul. It is folly to consider that this condition will come by luck, or without study, or by the mere act of nature, or by the decree of destiny. These convictions may ease the soul, but they cannot advance it! And from all these lowly postures of thought the wise man will still struggle forth, and exclaim, in the sublime language of the Veda itself, "May that soul of mine, which is a ray of perfect wisdom, pure intelligence, and pure existence,—which is the inextinguishable light fixed within created bodies, and without which no good act is performed,—be united by divine meditation with the spirit supremely blest, supremely intelligent!" Or again, "May that soul of mine which, distributed in other bodies, guides mankind as a skilful charioteer guides his rapid horses,—that soul which is fixed in my breast exempt from old age,—be united," &c. as before. For the possession of this supernatural elevation the cultivators of practical wisdom incessantly labour. Prolonged attitudes, endurance of suffering, unbroken meditations upon the divine nature, accompanied and animated by the frequent solemn repetition of the mystical name, "Om," are the means by which the Yogi, for perhaps 3000 years, has sought the attainment of an ecstatic participation of God; and, half-deceiver, half-deceived, affects to have already soared beyond earthly limitations and achieved hyperphysical power. Towards the complete consummation of this final liberation, the Vedas proclaim (and with slight differences the philosophic schools consent to the statement) that there are three degrees, two preliminary, the possession of transcendent power in this life (that is, of magical endowments), and the passage after death into the courts of Brahma, which are only precursory to that last and glorious reunion with the First Cause himself, which terminates all the changes of life in an identification with the very principle of eternity and of repose.

But it is time to release your attention. The effects of such views of God and man may easily be conjectured. Upon the mild sages of the Ganges they probably produce little result beyond the occasional suggestion of elevated
ideas, perhaps more than counterbalanced by the assoc-
iations of a minute and profitless superstition. But upon

The enormous mass of the nation these baseless dreams
can only result in the perpetuation of ignorance, and the
encouragement of imposture: to both of which they mani-
festly and directly tend—to the former, by being unfitted
for the vulgar mind, to the latter, by countenancing pre-
tences to supernatural power. How can we leave the
subject—which must often have recalled your Christian
associations—without a secret gratitude for that belief
which, while it displays in every page of its records more
than the casual sublimities of the Hindū Wisdom, is not,
like it, degraded by deception, and enfeebled by extra-
vagance; but presents to its members the Indian doctrines
of divine communion in such a form as not to dazzle but
to enlighten; which, while it encourages man, instructs
him also in humility; and never fixes the thoughts upon
the ineffable attributes of God in such a sense as to with-
draw them from the duties and the charities of daily life?

On next Thursday we shall commence our considera-
tion of the Grecian Philosophy.
LECTURE IV.

ON THE ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF PHILOSOPHY IN GREECE.

GENTLEMEN,

From the mysterious forms of the Indian mythological philosophy, from the vast sacerdotal institutions that have produced and protected it, from that petrifaction of living society in one immutable attitude which contrasts so wonderfully with the changing world of ordinary history,—we pass to-day to a very different scene. We pass to that country, four centuries of whose existence possess a share in the thoughts of every educated man, as extensive, it may truly be affirmed, as all the remaining mass of ancient profane history! We come to that country to which the filial devotion of every cultivator of his own intelligence turns as to the mother-country of the mind; to which every man instinctively points when he would illustrate the indefeasible claims and inherent destinies of human nature. A speck of the globe—a few cities on either side of a narrow sea dotted with isles scarcely discoverable upon the chart of a continent—has been the outward and visible scene for the successive apparition of the whole universe of mind. On that little theatre of mental action, and in the rapid development of a couple of busy ages, performers have played their part, who, even after the vast European movement of our later centuries, still preserve, if not their exclusive authority unquestioned, at least their intellectual eminence unshaken. There poetry still finds in many departments her most exquisite examples, there (and perhaps there alone) sculpture finds her ideal cease to be a dream, there painting, doubtless, may lament that her more perishable materials should have defrauded her of her triumphs, and music, that her achievements must be received upon the faith of history; there Philosophy has at least directed her course to every point of the compass of thought, and touched at all its points of access; and there, finally, language, on whose ministrant services reason and imagination are alike so dependent, arrived, even in its infancy, at a perfection which made its
proud and conscious possessors to class all who spoke not
their own melodious tongue by one indiscriminate appella-
tion characteristic of their vocal inferiority. But great as
are these services to civilization, they are not the only ones
for which Europe is indebted to that glorious people.
Placed as the outpost of that continent which was one day
to take the lead in the civilization of mankind, the Greeks
fought for the cause of human enlightenment as well as
personally advanced it. I well remember in early boy-
hood being laughingly asked my opinion of the relative
importance of Marathon and Waterloo; and to me, to
whom every thing later than Greece and Rome was at that
time a cypher in historical calculation, but one answer
was possible. I doubt if I should now remodel my verdict.
What was the day of Marathon as an element in the
history of man? Was it the brilliant struggle of some
mountain-tribe against the wild ravages of some ancient
'Zenghis or Timour? Gentlemen, it was the cause of the
world which was perilled that day. The destinies of ages
hung tremblingly upon every blow of these gallant men
of Attica. When, as the old historian tells us, the soldier,
covered with the dust of that immortal field, rushed into
the Athenian assembly with his \textit{Xalpere! nikômen?} and fell
dead as he gasped the words, he spoke a message to which
the civilization of ages was to be the echo or the answer!
Had the despot of Western Asia been as successful as his
Turkish copyist 2000 years later, had he gained his footing
in Greece at that hour, and flooded with his slaves the soil
in which were deposited the seeds of the world's advance-
ment, the civilization of Europe had been adjourned for
centuries. Homer and the early lightnings of the Lyric
Muse would have been perhaps irrecoverably lost; no age
of Pericles would have placed Athens where she is in your
hearts; her borrowed light would never have taught
Romans to think and feel as well as act; and the spirit
would not have existed which, evoked from its sepulchre
in codex and palimpsest, was in the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries once more incarnated in modern form, and be-
came the vivifying principle of the literature of Italy,
France, Germany and England.

The historians of Greece have given us few specific
accounts of its first intellectual impulses. Those who were
the best qualified for such researches continually lament
the poverty of materials, the contradiction and uncertainty

\footnote{So given by Lucian, the only authority for the story, so far as I know. Luc. \textit{pro lapso inter salutandum}, \textit{§ 3}, \textit{vol. III. p. 289}. Ed. Bipont. The soldier's or rather courier's name was Philippides, the \textit{\etaυροδρόμος} mentioned as the hero of another legend by \textit{Herodotus}, \textit{vI. 105}. Ed.]
of traditions. The political and civil story of Greece seems, by transient and shadowy glimpses, to stretch to a thousand years before its intellectual birth. Far in the depths of antiquity we catch the venerated names of the patriarchs of the land—of Ægialeus, and Inachus, and Deucalion, and Ogyges. So remote is the chronological position held by these mythical lords of the Pelasgic and Hellenic tribes, that the very gods begin their dynasty at a later epoch: it is not thirteen centuries before our æra that Saturn is said to have been expelled from Crete by the vengeance of that Jupiter whom a singular and capricious fame subsequently exalted to the loftiest position ever held by deceased mortal. Phœacia, Phrygia, and Egypt supplied colonists who mingled with the Hellenic race, and who, it is probable, rapidly lost their national characteristics in their incorporation with another people, and under the powerful influence of new local relations and excitements. As Greece is said to have done at a later period, so doubtless even now "capta feros victores cepit:" for few traces of distinctive foreign character are observable in the subsequent history of the united nation. A rude and stormy chivalry arose among tribes separated by the hills and rivers of the most varied country in the world; leaders were at their head whom (magnified through the mists of time) after ages converted into demi-gods; and perhaps the present condition of the Albanian mountaineers is not very unlike that of the Epirots, and even the more southern clans of Greece, in the earlier heroic ages. But Greece had already some elements prophetic of civilization. She was singularly free from the contracting institutions of the East, and by some early essays of maritime communication she had learned to import thought as well as wealth. A religion diversified and practical in its forms already gave occupation to the fancy; the names of Orpheus, Linus, Musæus, belong alike to the religion and the poetry of antiquity. The Argonautic expedition (whatever its duration and extent), the great national movement against Troy, must have increased the stores of thought, though attended, it would seem, with much domestic calamity; and the latter attests the progress of the Grecian states to the great principle of national unity, one of the most fertile sources of civilization. * Still the progress itself was slow; the age of Pericles was far distant; and I confess, when I contemplate the subsequent rapidity of Grecian development, I do not see my way through the three or

* [Compare with this statement the third chapter of Bishop Thirlwall's History, where the question of the colonization of Greece by foreign settlers is fully and impartially discussed. Ed.]
four centuries of littleness which (accepting the ordinary chronologies) succeeded the war of Troy. The Heracleidan invasion of the Peloponnesus created, doubtless, a temporary unsettlement; yet the children of Hercules were themselves a vigorous race, and not more unlikely, perhaps, than any other Grecian tribe, to further the national reputation. But Homer—or the Homerids—had by this time worked the miracle of the Iliad; and this was the proof and the pledge of what the Grecian mind had yet in store for the world.

The period from which we may date the real impulse of intellect and imagination in Greece, I would place about that time, not very distinctly marked perhaps in chronology, when the old kingly institutions sank almost everywhere before the democratic principle, and Greece assumed the form of an aggregate of small republics connected by a national feeling, reverence for ancestry, unity of religion and oracles, and the universal Amphictyonic Council.

Setting aside minuter discussions and regarding the aspect of the whole, the history of Grecian development is, with all its uncertainties and obscurities, a type almost perfect of the ideal representation of such a history. Every stage of progress which reason deduces as probable, investigation will find correspondingly realized; and as in this geology of time we penetrate into the depths of Grecian history, we seem to turn up every successive stratum and deposit, down from the rich luxuriant soil of cultivated reason and fancy to the rude and primitive mass of merely sensible impressions,—exactly as in an individual mind the imagination was the first instrument of advancement from sensible wants and necessities; and you know to what effect this faculty was cultivated, from the age of Homer (or rather of Homer's antecessors, of those to whom he himself traces his poetical lineage) to the age of Archilochus and Terpander. Now, allowing for other contemporary influences, it is scarcely too much to say that Grecian history grew out of the Grecian epics, and Grecian philosophy out of its lyric and sententious poetry. Herodotus is a Homer without his hexameters, his divine agents, and his similes: the whole texture of his style is interwoven with Homeric phrases, not purposely introduced, but manifestly forming an element in the very substance of the composition. If a chiefmain displays extraordinary valour against Persian or Lydian foes, it is still, as in the old Trojan days, ἐμέμυρτο

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8 [The old kingly institutions sank before the aristocratic, not before the democratic principle. See Thirlw. Ib. c. 10. Ed.]

4 [See Odys. L. 154, 325. Ed.]
ON THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

Lect. IV.

ἀλέχη: the untaught fury of the people still χειμάρρω ποτά-
μοι ὕδατος: the rain still descends, as it did in the verse of
Homer, ἐξαπλήθης and λαβροτάτω ὑδατ. Even those critics
whose organs were practised in such discernment detect in
the prose of the chronicler of elder Greece the faint music of
secret numbers, like the dim undertone of streams in a
forest; “ipsa διάλεκτος,” says Quintilian, “latentes etiam
numeros complexit tur.” Though it be prose it is still the
Musa pedestrís. And doubtless the preceding forms of this
transition had still less completely escaped from their
brilliant vesture of imagination: poetry, I doubt not, would
be found with her wings almost unclipt in the historical
writings, had they been preserved, of Hecataeus, Phere-
cydes, Cadmus of Miletus.

But Philosophy—the habit of hypothesis to harmonize
the world, or of inquiry to penetrate its realities, or of
rational conceptions to define its origin—did this also issue
out of an education of the imaginative faculty? What can
more truly evince it than the fact, that all the primitive
suppositions and results of Grecian philosophy were them-
selves expressed in metrical forms? Thales, was a poet,
Pythagoras dictated verses, Xenophanes, the originator of
the profound Eleatic school, and Parmenides, his still more
abstruse successor, delivered their whole system of doc-
tines in a poem. Empedocles expressed his theory of the
world in hexameters of great spirit and fire. Anaximänder
was specially remarked as having been the first to depart
from this practice among the Ionics, as Zeno of Elea
among the Italian sages. And even the earliest prose
compositions of these writers (when not employed in direct
argument or dialogue) seems to have been moulded into
the mystical and oracular forms of a measured delivery,
bearing much the same relation to poetry that the reci-

[Herod. III. 81. Ed.]

[This description, exaggerated as regards even Herodotus, is inapplicable
to his predecessors, whose style was concise and destitute of poetical ornament,
though the matter of their narratives was sufficiently fabulous. See the criticism
of Dionysius of Halicarnassus (De Thucyd. Judicium, p. 128, 36) compared
with that of the rhetor Hermogenes (De genere dicendi, II. 12), who in com-
paring Hecataeus with Herodotus, expressly says that “he was ἐπὶ ἄνω ἐκεῖ
γίνεται ὑπερβολή. Unfortunately the surviving fragments, which are mere
abridgment, do not enable us to verify these judgments. Ed.]

[The poem ascribed to Thales is acknowledged even by Diogenes Laer-
tius to be spurious (Vit. Thalei. c. 23). He questions the authenticity of all
the writings which passed under the name of this philosopher. From the
manner in which Aristotle records his opinions, it is evident that he knew of
no genuine work of Thales. See Brandis, Gesch. d. Phil., p. 111, and his
article Thales in the Dictionary of Biography. What “verses” of Pytha-
goras are alluded to is not clear. The “Golden Verses” were assuredly not
his. See Brucker, l. p. 1077. In regard of certain Orphic Verses attributed
by Ion Chius to Pythagoras, see Lobeck’s Aglaophamus, l. p. 330. Bentl.
Epist. ad Mill. p. 331, ed. Dyce. Ed.]
tative does to the aria in music. And the poetical spirit which animates the style of even Plato at a much later era, proves to what a period the influence of imaginative forms pervaded the regions of the higher philosophy. In fact, consider the nature and distribution of that wondrous and multiform art to which the imagination gives birth. You will divide it into two master-forms, of which the others are inferior and subordinate varieties. Poetry either details the succession of events, or it expresses individual affections. It is either narrative, continuous, external, historical, *epic*; or it is occasional, detached, internal, *lyric*—supplying vent to the pressure of emotion—whether of admiration, of hate, of sorrow, of joy, of terror, of exultation—and so forth. The early lyrist of Greece were contemporaries and fellow-citizens of its first philosophers. Still; there is a chasm between Xenophanes pronouncing his metrical dogmas on the unity of things, and Simonides or Stesichorus. Let us try if we cannot bridge this abyss. Among those who delivered, either at national and religious festivals or in their more private wanderings, their poetical aliment to the imaginative Greeks, some, doubtless (as indeed the existing fragments sufficiently establish) appropriated, as their more peculiar province, the great themes of man's circumstances and destinies, and of that vast and complicated system of which he was a part. Religious ceremonies, and the demand for corresponding hymns, would supply constant development to this sublimeter and more abstract tendency of thought. The reduction of the elder cosmogonies into forms satisfactory to the imagination, would force the poet into metaphysical and physical contemplation, even though his own mental conclusions, once more invested and disguised in the dress of sense and of mythology, might never appear as philosophy in his verses. The great and universal work of legislation—the labours of the Zaleucuses, the Charondases, the Solons—would demand the voice of poetry, sometimes to express the law, sometimes to aid its efficiency by celebrating its excellence*; and such a task can scarcely be fittingly executed without many a profound meditation on the nature of man and of government—on ethical and political philosophy. If you reflect on these circumstances, I think you will not refuse to admit a passage, not only conceivable but almost inevitable, from the youth of the mind to its manhood, from imagination to reason. Nor will you be surprised to find reason herself emerging deeply marked with the traces of her origin, and poetry for a considerable

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* Solon wrote a long Poem on the Athenian commonwealth. (Pausan. Philo, &c.)
period testifying the undue prolongation of her influence in swarms of hypotheses, which are, as it were, the poetry of speculation. But, circumscribed as my time is, we cannot dismiss this subject without glancing at the powerful auxiliaries which fortified the path of the Grecian intellect to speculation.

First and chiepest of all, we are to remember that Greece was a free country, and a country of boundless publicity in all its civil procedures. This advantage—not too common even now—was in the early Grecian æra, as far as we can learn, a blessing solitary in the world. I need not remind you of that India through which you have lately accompanied me, or of those vast Asiatic edifices of empire, of which little more than the king, and the king's murderer and successor, are known in history. Conceive then the influence of this spirit of publicity upon the development of the reason. Every man ran the course of his day, every man delivered his opinion and struggled for it, as a champion at the games; he had all Greece to witness him. The Grecian love of glory in all its forms—physical and intellectual—was so impassioned, and their sympathy with mental energy however manifested, so cordial, that for a long period it supported philosophy even against their superstition; and if a few of the leading teachers were ever and anon banished from Greece, or from the world, how many hundreds of these speculators were suffered to live and die in peace! Now of this emulation and this glory publicity was the parent. Cyrus, as Herodotus tells us, laughed at the Spartans for meeting together to practise on each other in the public squares; "the Persians," as he says, "being unprovided with any place of public resort." Does not the historian's simple remark speak volumes?

To one element of the Grecian liberty of speculation I have before alluded. We must not forget that Greece was unencumbered with an exclusive sacerdotal caste, that is, with an hereditary corporation of priests; for the difference is wide between a priestly order and a priestly caste. Among the Greeks many of the functions of the priesthood were discharged by the heads of families; and though the priest and his office were always regarded with profound respect, yet we have few instances of even an attempt at spiritual tyranny. The priest was venerated on account of the religion, not the religion on account of the priest. Of the mysteries themselves the great body of the educated citizens were participators, and the sacerdotal exhibitors of these performances seem rather to have been regarded as the mechanists, managers, and "showmen" of the rites,
than as, either in themselves or their office, forming an essential element of the solemnity. Like all historical representations, this is of course to be taken with occasional allowances and exceptions. The priest from interest, the statesman from policy, the people from habit, and the religious affection, which must have some food, and "abhor a vacuum" in its established objects—all parties would conspire to resist a direct assault on the majesty of Olympus (as all so often testified in the "Sacred Wars" of Greece); but in the convenient disguise of metaphysical abstractions the philosopher could usually escape detection, the priests themselves perhaps (in the community of the mysteries) were not unwilling to countenance speculation as long as the popular belief was not endangered, and, as a last resource, philosophy could fly to her own mysteries, her "esoteric doctrine," and there take shelter from the vengeance of the gods.

To those who perceive how in the progress of the human mind all things are connected with all, it will not be chimerical to add, as an antecedent and motive to the essay at philosophical system in Greece, the study of art itself, and the boundless admiration of its performances, which was ever so strong a characteristic of the Grecian people. The study of art has two tendencies corresponding to its two elements. A work of art is the realization in the sensible world of ideas and relations that belong to the world of thought. To a vain and sensual people, or to that class among a people, the works of art will delight the sense and pass no farther than the eye and ear. But it is not so with the higher few who either produce such works, or are critics worthy to appreciate them. To such the visible or the audible is mainly valued as it is the type and symbol of those conceptions of order and of harmony at which the outward work points, if it does not realize them. The sensible object, even the connected associations so manifold and so magical, are to such thinkers only the vestibule and the antechamber that lead the mind to repose in those loftier principles of symmetry which, as they are anterior to the art and to the artist, are by a natural extension held anterior to that great achievement of the greatest of artists—the universe itself, and to form, in truth, its plan, its basis, and its framework. Pythagoras, and his school of music and geometry, will occur to you to illustrate how real was this influence, and to what an extent it could operate to modify the views, and even the language, of its votaries in every department of philosophy.

These local and internal causes unquestionably pre-
disposed to philosophy, but to the actual impulse which
first set the reason upon inquiry, it is probable that foreign
influences strongly contributed. The latest writer upon
this subject (Dr Ritter, of the University of Kiel) maintains
at great length the self-organisation of Grecian philosophy;
a doctrine to which, assuredly, the great body of ancient
testimony is adverse. I know how remotely traditional a
large portion of this evidence is; but, even waiving the
authority of the Eastern and Alexandrian cities, how much
will remain to influence any reasonable belief upon a sub-
ject in itself (in spite of all the learned Professor's reason-
ings) affording scarcely any grounds for conjecture on
either side! Habits of commercial intercourse had been
established long before the period to which we now refer;
and we have direct attestations to an intimate political
connexion between Ionia and Egypt at the very time when
the earliest Greek philosophers attempted to systematize
nature and man. More than the impulse to inquiry, and
perhaps a few elementary suggestions, I think it is indeed
probable Greece never inherited from Egypt or Phænicia.
The Grecian intellect soon outstripped the boasted "wis-
dom of the Egyptians." Indeed we know that Thales
surprised his Egyptian directors with a geometry more
perfect than their own. The story of the measurement of
the Pyramids proves (if authentic*) two points. It proves'
that geometry must have been but very imperfectly cul-
vated in Egypt, if a conception so obvious and elementary
could be received as a valuable accession to the stores of
the science; and it proves with what rapidity the earliest
seeds of suggested knowledge (for all attest that geometry
came from Egypt) germinated in the mind of Thales.
Shall we deny the compatibility of the same facts, of
foreign and feeble origination,—of Grecian and rapid
development,—to the wider "Science of Principles" itself?

On this subject, however, of the foreign or exclusively
internal origination of Greek philosophy, I need not, I
suppose, tell you that much has been speculated and much

* We owe it to Laertius, and Pliny, and Plutarch—no earlier authority that
I know of.

* [The Greeks were singularly anxious to give to others the glory of one of
the most solid, if not the most brilliant of their intellectual achievements, the
invention of Geometry. Though they profess to have received Geometry from
Egypt, it is remarkable that each step in the progress of the science is ascribed
to a Greek, not to an Egyptian. The most probable opinion is, that though
the Egyptians had carried the art of mensuration to a perfection which aston-
ished their Greek visitors, the Science or Theory of Geometry was the exclusive
product of the Grecian mind, meditating, it may be, on the empirical precepts
of the priestly agriculturists. The well-known passage in the sixth book of
Plato's Lysis (p. 819) may thus be reconciled with that in the fifth (p. 747, c.),
in which he disparages the vaunted Egyptian "wisdom," representing it to be
mere "cunning" (μαχουρίας διρεκοφα), Ed.]
written. My object, I confess, as a Lecturer, is rather to
give you, in their spirit and general connexion, my own
results (such as they are), and occasional suggestions and
directions for those who have time and inclination for
further inquiry, than to enter into an actual statement of
the evidence itself upon this, or any other question of pure
erudition. This course—perhaps the more arduous and
responsible of the two—I adopt for two reasons:—first, my
present labours are principally intended not so much for
directly historical purposes, as with the simpler view of
exhibiting to you the extent, variety, and attractions, of the
subject itself: and besides this, I act upon my own ex-
perience of the almost total inutility of that kind of oral
instruction which consists of lengthened enumeration, and
is mainly addressed to the memory. What is merely ad-
dressed to the memory, if forgotten, is lost itself—and
time lost; what is addressed mainly to the reason, though
forgotten (which is far less likely) leaves improved fac-
culties behind it. For in points not too directly affect-
ing temporal and eternal happiness, it is scarcely too
much to say, that it is better to seek truth without find-
ing it, than to find it without seeking it.

The common, and the natural division of the history
of Greek philosophy makes it consist of three great
periods,—the first embracing its varied movement, from its
dawn in the speculations of Thales and Pythagoras, to the
great epoch of the teaching of Socrates; the second, the
successions of the schools which grew out of the Socratic
reformation, and which may be considered as having run
through their entire development (to have given out all
that was in them) by the time of the fifth academy, about
half a century before our era; and the third, the attempts
at revival, overwhelmed by the irresistible infusion of
foreign elements, and carried on under various names, and
with various fortunes, until the death-warrant of Grecian
philosophy was signed in Justinian’s decree for closing
the schools of Athens in the year 529. This triple division
includes a period not very far below 1200 years,—a period
of prodigious mental activity; a period, for many reasons,
immortal in the recollections of man, and which no multi-
tude, violence, or extent of future revolutions in his history,
is ever likely to obliterate, or even obscure. The visible
scenery of classical philosophy may assist your remem-
brance of its distinctions; countries serving the purpose
of the mnemonic chambers of which old rhetoricians speak,
in our recollection of a continuous and diversified history,
as well as in this case exercising many and obvious in-
fluences on the complexion of the history itself. The first
act of the drama of Grecian speculation was performed upon the varied theatre of the Grecian colonies—Asiatic, insular, and Italian—of even Thrace itself—verging at length (in Anaxagoras) to Athens: the second, the most brilliant and effective of all, belongs almost exclusively to that famous city; in the third, Philosophy opens her career in Alexandria, extends in a new form to Rome—to the Syrian cities—and at length returns, weak and faltering, as a pilgrim to his birth-place, to expire among the ruins of the old glories at Athens.

Let us now (without indulging in excessive or fanciful generalisations, and yet without confining ourselves to the mere letter of the ancient records) endeavour to combine in rational connexion the successive results, and the actual progress, of the Grecian intellect in the first of these periods. We have facts—often only detached and unconnected facts—delivered to the memory in the history of philosophy as to the senses in the history of nature: let us essay to interpret these facts into the higher language of law and principle. In some cases the separations and combinations are so obvious as to have occurred even to the least philosophic of the old recorders; in others, much light has been introduced into the darkness by later analysts:—wherever I shall have seen reason to coincide with them I will freely adopt their conclusions; wherever I disagree, advance such as I think more likely to represent the reality;—in both cases without often troubling you, for the present, with the fact, or the reasons, of assent or dissent.

I will only observe, in attempting thus to extract the subtle spirit from the miscellaneous fruits and products of thought in these primitive schools, that, if in one respect their antiquity brings us difficulty, in another it simplifies the labour. The main difficulty it brings is the rarity, the vагueness, and the very doubtful genuineness of our materials; the alleviation is to be found in a mental peculiarity which belongs to all early efforts of thought. That peculiarity is its fearless straightforwardness. Not discussing remote conclusions, it is not afraid of them, and does not provide against them. It sees no finger-posts erected by old experience to warn the wanderer among the abstruser bye-paths of speculation to beware of adjacent precipices. Accordingly, wherever thought would carry, the first disciples of thought would go. Their solution might be false or partial, but they worked out their problem as far as their intellectual calculus would enable. Now (accidental circumstances apart) the more natural the operations of reason the more symmetrical. Where a crystallization is
undisturbed we soon detect its process and its law. Thus it is that we can calculate—transferring the principle to moral natures—the conduct in any given crisis of an honest man with more certainty than that of a rogue; rectitude is one and invariable, obliquity manifold and mutable; and if we can but be certified that a character tells itself out with sincerity, we may make its former the counterpart and prophecy of its future actions.

This fearless prosecution of dogmas, as well as another peculiarity of a similar nature (the power of a leading principle to modify every division of the speculations of the same mind), is a characteristic of all the schools of philosophy in Greece, and eminently of those now before us,—precisely because they were to so great a degree self-originated and unpossessed of antecedent experience. And from this property, as I have said, their laws of progress and connexion are the more easily calculable. They took views originally limited indeed (hence their mutual oppositions and exclusions), but they seldom limited the consequences of them; and if one generation of a school did not reach the last term of the hereditary philosophy, that term was sure to be evolved among the conclusions of some successor. Thus, the Ionic tendency is traceable in an almost unbroken line of descent from Thales, through Leucippus and Democritus, to Epicurus: the Pythagorean, from Pythagoras, through Timæus, &c., to Plato: the Academic, from the more Socratic elements of Plato’s mind, through Xenocrates, &c., to Arcesilaus: the Stoic, from Zeno to Chrysippus:—and so of others, in more or less degrees.

Once more, let me recall you to the first stage of this vast Grecian development. I need scarcely tell you that I do not purpose to discuss or enumerate the special conjectures as to particular physical facts—the nature and constitution of the sun, moon, and stars, &c.—which are scattered among the relics of the early sages. Of these things they could form no judgment worth the regards of an age like ours. They were without our artificial senses,—our telescopes, our microscopes, our magnetic needles;—and before we indulge in triumph over the childishness of some of their conjectures, let us remember how much of modern physics is primarily due to these inventions, and how much of these inventions is due to accident. Besides, there is, I confess, to me something irreverent towards these venerable men in eagerly exhibiting what Providence has allowed us now to call their weaknesses; we forget the courage and depth of their abstract views of nature and man, in smiling over Anaximander’s hypothesis of eclipses.
as produced by the stoppage of apertures in the sun and moon, or Xenophanes’s notion of the stars as condensations of the clouds. At the same time, happier views, where they occur, and seem to have been at all legitimately arrived at, would deserve, of course, to be recorded with honour.

The division of “subject” and “object” is obvious. If not in all languages, it is assumptively in all minds. Metaphysicians may fix and define it; but they only shape and polish the precious mineral of reason which, in its rude and primitive state, is buried deep in every intellectual soil. Now science may occupy itself with either of these provinces. The reason may forget itself for the universe, or forget the universe for itself. It may inquire into the facts and the relations of the outward order, and may even dare to pronounce certain principles regarding them to be true by an a priori necessity;—or it may (remembering that all these principles are but the prescripts of its own nature imposed upon that which is not itself) drop back upon its own essence, and, neglecting for a time all practical applications, examine, first, the principles of its own constitution; and, secondly, the legitimacy of their transference to the world around it. Similarly in morals;—the mind, with its boundless faculties of conception and combination, may declare, may illustrate, may systematize, the rule of right; may exhibit its various applications in all the variety of human conjunctures; may pronounce the high probabilities of its future corroborations in a world which is to contain the solution of this; may even imagine ideal constitutions of society in which the rule would be maintained without fear of infringement: or, it may once more fall back upon itself, and question its own reason and consciousness as to the true nature, the certain existence, the authority of such a rule. Now, of the first period of Greek philosophy, it may be remarked that it was, with scarcely an exception, the philosophy of the object, not of the subject—of the universe, not of man. It was the rebound of baffled reason from the impenetrable bulwarks of the universe that at length drove it back upon itself; and perhaps deeper into itself in proportion to the strength of the shock. The mightiest of all problems was the very first it essayed in the very inexperience of its childhood; as infants (ignorant of the signs of distance, and the limits of their powers) are said, when presented to such objects, to stretch vaguely towards the sun or the stars! We shall soon see how reason was finally forced to return upon itself through the inevitable paths of dialectical disputation and the scepticism of the first “sophists.”
Of this great body of investigators of the universe, all antiquity has coincided in constituting two classes; which, from their first and chief localities, have been termed the "Ionic," and the "Italic." But their distinction was of a deeper character than can be presented by geographical position; a distinction reaching to the very foundation of their entire habits of speculation. We have already assigned to the ante-Socratic sages the study of the impersonal or objective in general; we must now divide this also, and classify them by the double aspect in which it can be beheld. In doing so I only comment and develop the views of Aristotle himself, in the able but rapid résumé which he inserts in the first book of the Metaphysics. The world consists of facts and relations of facts, of things and the laws of things, of matter and the harmony of matter, of (to borrow an analogy often too seductive) a body and a soul. The combination makes the universe. We should now smile at any teacher who claimed exclusive honours for purely physical or purely mathematical science: we know that the physiology of the world demands them both, the one to surprise with all the boundless variety of compositions and decompositions which experiment detects, or produces, in the material substratum of the world; the other, from a few of these elementary physical laws (perceived, or conceived, to operate uniformly) to pronounce all the effects of their combinations, to express in a line the harmony of ages, to be the true gamut or "notation" of the ideal music of the spheres. It is the oriental story of the lame mendicant who was sharp-sighted, and his strong-limbed neighbour who was blind; separated, each was powerless to stir—united, they advanced with ease and rapidity. But it is the calmer age of philosophy that allows these serene reconciliations; its youth is ardent and exclusive. Thales and Pythagoras, who possessed all, and more than, the knowledge of their times, both saw this double aspect of nature; Thales was a mathematician, Pythagoras was, doubtless, a naturalist; but the temper and taste of each was more powerfully attracted by opposite views; however in the course of nature they might both acknowledge these potent principles to be alike engaged in the complexity of the effect, when they came to characterizing the entire product, the contrasted points from which they contemplated the majestic scenery of the universe obviously affected their decision. In the Ionic school the direction impressed by Thales is much more observable in the progress of the school than in the teaching of the master; in the Italic, from the very commencement, the personal influence of Pythagoras infused into
the entire succession the strong peculiarities of his own intellectual and moral character. Moreover, you are to remember, that, properly speaking, Thales himself had no school or special sect; he was (so to speak) a "gentleman of private fortune" at Miletus, who travelled to gratify a curiosity for universal information, and to feed the energies of a working and creative intellect; his "disciples" were friends, united by taste and character: Pythagoras, on the contrary, was essentially a sectarian leader; for many years the oracle and high-priest of one of the most exclusive societies of antiquity; the legislator of mystic purifications, ablutions, initiations; in his personal nature regarded as little less than a god (or an actual God, if we believe Iamblichus, whose Pythagorean gospel, however, I advise you to study in a most sceptical spirit), and of influence sufficient to make the most trying sacrifices the price willingly paid for admission to his συστήμα.

Gentlemen, the philosophers of both these divisions were not believers in a God, in any sense which a Christian reasoner would assign to that great proposition. The innumerable attempts to attach the glory of such a conception to the names of Thales, Pythagoras, and the rest, have always appeared to me completely unsuccessful.

Before entering upon a sketch of the connexion of their systems, it may be well to speak of this point, as unfounded notions respecting ancient theology (arising, I suspect, from inexperience in the original documents, few as they are) have ever been a source of hesitation, obscurity, and misconception in the popular expositions of the earliest Grecian theories of nature. In the Ionian school (until the publication of the opinions of Anaxagoras, who, as I believe, was himself very far from a clear and comprehensive mastery of the conception) there assuredly appears nothing worthy of the name of Theism: in the system of Pythagoras (whose religious tendency is often celebrated) Deity is indeed named, and many expressions employed which, seen through a modern medium, might appear fraught with singular sublimity; but a closer inspection of the system, not as it was remodelled in the pompous pages of Porphyry and Iamblichus, but as it came from the venerable founder himself, discovers a deity with scarcely a character of distinct or personal subsistence, a mystical unit in a universal harmony, a pervading fire of which our own souls are parcels. The moral attributes which he attached to deity seem to me (most creditable as they are

10 [A partial exception must be made in favour of Xenophanes, as I shall endeavour to shew in a subsequent note. Ed.]
to their illustrious designer) to belong, in his own conceptions, less to God than to the gods; or, if viewed in any higher light, to be so inextricably confused with that mystical arithmetic, of which he considered the universe a sensible representation, as to become, by their place in the system, rather harmonic laws than moral essences. So completely was this the case that, before he could thus sublimate Justice, he was obliged to call it a square-number, &c.\textsuperscript{11} If, however, a deity were personally and distinctly avowed as separate from his creation, such notions as these would not be wholly inapplicable, symbolically regarded; indeed they are, as it were, the mathematical dress of the modern ethical school of Clarke. But you may observe, as a general scholium upon this subject, that ancient philosophy, even in its subsequent and highest flights, on this side of mysticism, dreaded to transfer to pure Deity the attribution of human excellences, except in a form, as in Plato, abstract, unpractical, and irrelevant to individuals; while, on the other hand, ancient religion overlaid its deity with human weaknesses, low, contracted, and debasing;—two parallel experiments on a vast scale, performed in the two great provinces of human nature, to testify the profound want in the complex system of the reason and affections of man, of some yet unuttered representation, which, by uniting the objects of both, could give to mankind all that was best in humanity without compromising Deity, and all that is awful in the divine, without sacrificing the tenderness, intimacy, and sympathy of the human nature! But to return to the primitive schools, and their conceptions of the prime agent of the physical world.

One of the most difficult tasks, but one of the most necessary, for the inquirer into the true spirit of a remote philosophy, is, a total abstraction of all local and modern ideas. Unless you can close your eyes for a moment to the blaze of evidence with which Christianity, and the writings consequent on Christianity, have surrounded the belief of a Supreme Agent separate from the world he has called into existence; unless you can conceive your affections disengaged from the hold with which the Christian Revelation has fastened this truth around the heart; nay, unless you can even remove the fainter light of the Platonic and Ciceronian theology, you cannot apprehend the true position and difficulties in which the first rational explorers of the universe were placed. We may think that, by a strong effort of imagination, we can adequately conceive

\textsuperscript{11} See the \textit{Magna Moralia} attributed to Aristotle, p. 1182 A, Bk. I, cap. I.
this state of human reason in its first awful interview with nature; but we are still like those who, after looking at the sun, pass suddenly into darkness: for a time there remains upon the eye the involuntary image of the brightness we have left. The conception of the free production of a universe by an Infinite Essence altogether above and beyond it is not elementary in human reason; it is not the step of the child, but the stride of the man. The religion of antiquity was so far from aiding the progress to this conviction that it perpetually counteracted it; polytheism, far from bringing light into the obscurity, filled it with phantoms, and taught men to be contented with them! It presented a catalogue of divinities whose tombs were scattered through Greece: even the sepulchre of the Father of Gods and Men, which was the special boast of Crete, and the heaven, which these immortalised benefactors gladdened with their presence, was only, as it were, the "upper-story" of this world. To all beyond religion could only give the name of "Fate;" and philosophy too often was content to follow in its footsteps*. In fact (and the remark is worth your notice), Homer was to antiquity not at all unlike what (on very different grounds of authority) the Bible is to us; and you will find through almost all of ancient philosophy the same anxiety to confirm a philosophical dogma by the high traditional evidence of Homer that among us a daring speculatist often evinces to confirm his notions by their supposed consonance with the Scriptures. Homer was the public document of polytheism; the popular repository of the national beliefs. Entangled among these fancies, the efforts of the reason were constantly hampered and misled; its theological tendency was downward to be popular; and, when struggling out of these fantastic illusions, it strove at length to meet the immensity of nature, untaught, and unassisted, it grew bewildered with the vastness,—made one wild, though sublime effort,—conceived an ἄρχη, or principle, which might be to nature what the life or soul is to the body—an inherent, inseparable, energy—and fell exhausted, still outside the threshold of truth!

We are not to call these early labourers of reason "Atheists," for all, or almost all, admitted a governing principle in some sense; they were Pantheists, in that higher form of Pantheism, which, though it associates the

* The trace of this wretched labour to accommodate speculation and superstition, to match each prodigy in Olympus with a hypothesis in philosophy (or, as degrading a task, to justify the latter by the former), is observable through most of the history of Grecian reason; and perhaps was never wholly got rid of, though its results were pretty much what Lord Bacon stigmatizes in another case—"fantastica philosophia et heretica religio."
universe necessarily and irrevocably with its principle, yet
does not wholly confound them, and even allows to the
moving spirit a certain superiority over the mass it per-
vades. Much has been said of the sublimity of the instan-
taneous obedience to divine command expressed in the
third verse of the book of Genesis; but for a far profounder
sublimity of conception you will refer to the first:—and
every investigation of the feeble and wavering theology
of primitive reason will deepen your reverence for that old
and venerable record, which, in the midst of so much un-
certainty as even the wisest acknowledged when they
approached the relation of nature and its cause, calmly
prefaced its story of the world with the declaration, with-
out exception, reservation, or indecision, that “In the be-
ginning God created the heaven and the earth.” Nor was
this “the wisdom of the Egyptians:” Thales and Pythago-
ras surely did not leave that country less rich in its ancient
learning than the Jewish cosmogonist; yet both found the
world to be living, ἐμφυὴν, and its God to be the ψύχω-
σις, or animating principle of the universe. How conve-
nient are the preferences of sceptical criticism! It can fall
in raptures of admiration before the νοὺς διακοσμῶν—the
ordering Intelligence—of Anaxagoras, though obscurely
and timidly put forth; it turns coldly from that page which,
ages before him, without an effort, scaled the full height
of the conception, and presented to us the result in all its
glory, unweakened by limitation, unalloyed by error, and
unclouded by doubt!

That this representation of the elder philosophies is the
true one, I might argue from the unanimous tradition of
antiquity,—that to the Anaxagoras, whom I have just
mentioned, belonged the distinction of first placing Pure
Intelligence at the helm of the universe. “When,” says
Aristotle (in the 1st Metaph., c. iii.—far our most valuable
document for the philosophy of those times as respects
these questions)—“When a man said that there was in
nature, as in animals, an intelligence which is the cause of
the arrangement and of the order of the universe, this man
appeared alone to have preserved his reason in the midst
of the follies of his predecessors (ὁν υἱῶν ἑφανη παρ’ εἰκη
λέγοντας τοὺς πρότερον). Now we know that Anaxagoras
of Clazomenæ first openly maintained these views, though
Hermotimus of Clazomenæ has the credit of having antici-
pated him.” Such attestations as these (with the well-
known fact that this Philosophy obtained a characteristic
title from his system) surely outweigh the multitude of
refinements by which some critics have endeavoured to
antedate these views. You will also hereafter perceive how
even Anaxagoras himself supplies the harmonising intelligence with preexisting materials.

But these representations will become more probable, because more consistent, in the rapid review which I shall attempt of the real spirit and connexion of these systems. By seizing (if we may dare to say we have indeed seized) that spirit and connexion, we shall see with the eyes and hear with the ears which in Ionia contemplated the features, and in Italy caught the harmonies of nature, much more than 2000 years ago. We shall behold our infant reason in its cradle; and (with all its comparative deficiencies) I think I shall induce you to agree that that infancy was yet the infancy of a Hercules! To this subject, then, we will devote our next meeting.
LECTURE V.

ON THE EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY. IONIC AND ATOMIC SCHOOLS.

GENTLEMEN,

It becomes my duty to endeavour to present to you some account of the first efforts of philosophical inquiry in Greece. In order to excuse any deficiencies you may observe in the sketch I shall present, I must be permitted, for my own defence, as well as your instruction, to refer to some of the obstacles that have at all times impeded the progress of investigators in this field. The extent of these difficulties they only can estimate who sincerely search for truth; those who lightly adopt the easy solutions of theorists on secondary information will, of course, not appreciate the labours of penetrating to sources they have never desired to reach; but they who honestly desire to understand, not the speculations of the modern systematisers of history, but the reality of ancient wisdom, will be at least as anxious to fix the certainty of facts, as to follow the succession of deductions.

Among these difficulties in the ascertainment of facts is to be mentioned, in the first place, the lateness of the traditions on which we depend for the principal part of our knowledge of primitive Grecian thought. On Plato and Aristotle we are chiefly dependent for this service; and their distance is such as to oblige even them to contemplate their objects through the dim and distorting medium of two, or more than two, centuries. The accounts transmitted by Aristotle are, in his usual dry and definite style, clearly enough separated from the mass of his own reasonings; but those of Plato are so inextricably entangled in his speculations, that it is almost as difficult to recover the original philosophies from his dialogues as it would be to subtract a particular tint of colour from a painted landscape of a thousand blended hues. His sages are introduced, not with the precision of a report, but as the heroes of a drama; and we as little look for the cold reality of truth in his philosophical representations as we look for the accuracy of history in an historical romance. Plato seems,
indeed, destined to spread the influence of his personal character almost as far backward into history as he did forward into the course and fortunes of human thought. The speculations of primitive antiquity are resuscitated in his pages, but the resurrection is in another and a glorified body.

At a later period a new source of perversion arose. The early assailants of Christianity in the schools of Alexandria, anxious to match the miracles of Christianity with rival wonders, exalted the first teachers of Grecian wisdom into the apostles of a supernatural revelation. Endeavouring to elevate them to divinity, they loaded them with all the characteristics and the opprobrium of imposture. The fame of Pythagoras has especially suffered by this injudicious advocacy; and the philosopher of Samos, installed as a god, is decorated with the insignia of a juggler and a hypocrite. On the other hand, the Christian teachers, not yet instructed by experience as to the true nature of their argument, were often tempted to retaliate by representations scarcely more justifiable, and to deny to the early sages even a glimpse of those truths in moral science whose exclusive light they conceived that the religion of Christ had claimed as its own.

The circumstance which gave facility to all these misrepresentations was the transmission of doctrines by oral delivery. Passing from teacher to teacher, each added or subtracted according to the tendencies of each; and the ultimate condition of a tenet was the representative, not of the mind of the original framer, but of the complex, and often contradictory, succession of minds through which it had passed. To this was added the uncertainty arising from the very form of these doctrines, which, expressed in the highest strain of figurative language, often admitted of a diversity of interpretations with nearly equal facility, and assumed to each commentator a complexion reflected from his own habits of thought. Had, however, these reasoners commenced their views from elementary grounds by a regulated process, even this rich and ornamental dress could scarcely have perplexed beholders as to the true direction and rate of their progress. But no such methodical march is discoverable in the first essays of inquiry; all is there detached, conjectural, aphoristic, unsettled. The way to discover is seldom learned but by discovery itself; and methods are the last things perfected in philosophy.

There is a further cause of confusion which I think necessary to be mentioned, because it assumes the prerogatives of superior accuracy. It is the habit of reducing
all the eminent names of the early philosophers under fixed
successions,—making each the inheritor and continuator
of the doctrines of a single determinate predecessor. I am
inclined to think that this enrolment of philosophers in
files is altogether the creation of an age far later than their
own; an age in which such successions were established,
and in which, consequently, habit had made it difficult to
conceive philosophers otherwise propagated and preserved.
Pherecydes is made the common teacher of Thales and
Pythagoras; yet we know that he was (as well as Anaxi-
mander, who is made the pupil of Thales) their mere con-
temporary. And it cannot be questioned, the radical
differences of systematic views of teachers supposed to be
successive and dependent, is such as to deprive these hy-
pothetical successions of much claim to probability1.

We saw, at our last meeting, that the universal cha-
ter of the first age of Grecian speculation was its out-
wardness,—its tendency to theorise the visible universe in
preference to the consciousness or its phenomena. The
first impulses of the mind are, as we observed, almost
invariably external; it becomes mingled, and even iden-
tified, with its objects; and the manner in which colour
assumes extension, figure and place, is a type of that
wider and more perpetual instinct which leads the soul to
diffuse itself upon, and to lose itself in, the material un-
iverse. A sufficient indication of this fact in the present
case, is to be found in the very titles of the treatises whose
fragments, or whose traditions, remain from that age:—
they are, almost without exception, discourses τεταυεων
(De rerum natura). The question in debate (for it is well
at once to fix this) regarded nothing less than the origin,
initiating and subsequent revolutions of things:—and the effort,
doubtless, of these sages was to supply to the speculative
mind something answering to the vague affirmations of the
popular creed. Hence they perpetually kept these super-
stitions in view, and made it a constant object to har-
monise their physics with the public theology,—to make
their cosmogonies an explanation of the theogonies of the
poetical faith.

The question was, then, What was to be fixed as the
"ἀρχή" of the surrounding universe? This is a word,
which, as then understood, can scarcely be correctly ren-

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1 The remark of a late eminent scholar (Nīke) on this point is true, and
well expressed: "Solent fere grammatici hominibus inclytis magistros querere
quam maxime inclytos, et sine magistro vix ullam patiuntur; adeo ut nonnum-
quam claris scriptoribus affinerint ejusmodi preceptores, quorum aut ob
sestas distantiam aut alien quanvis ob causam discipuli illi esse omnino non
potuere." Ed.]
ON THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

It was not the _cause_ of the world, nor yet the final element, but rather that thing which should be assumed to give a rational explanation of the rest. The word "Principle" is, perhaps, nearest to its significance, because almost equally indefinite. The _αρχή_ was the last term to which the inquirer's analysis brought him,—whether it resulted as water, or fire, or harmony, or unity, or mind. The word is reported to have been first employed by Anaximander, who made the Unbounded his _αρχή_; and to Plato is ascribed the useful labour of distinguishing between it and the kindred term _σταυρέω_, with which it was often confounded. The word slowly limited itself; but, in the earlier stages of its use (more especially in its application to the first principle of the air and fire philosophies), its uncertainty has for ever left the true scope of its employers in a great measure undecided. We can, however, plainly enough detect the gradual progress of these schools, in all their divisions, towards the conception of the Infinite and Absolute Being—a process wonderfully instructive. The elemental _αρχή_ rising gradually from its grossly material nature into the finer forms of matter, escaping at length even these subtler bonds, and becoming no longer a fire, or an air, but, as it would seem, a _spiritual_ flame and diffusive presence, until at length the element, in even its most attenuated state, seems to have been conceived as little more than the type or symbol of the Supreme Principle.

We agreed, at the last Lecture, to follow as our safest guide the division established by Aristotle, with which internal principle of division the geographical discrimination of the Ionic and Italic schools nearly corresponds. In selecting an _αρχή_ for the universe you must remember that these speculators were without a revelation, on the one hand, to fix their religious views,—without experimental investigation, on the other, to fix their scientific ones. What then remained? Suppositions more or less approximate to the truth, or reasonings independent altogether of experience; in other words, physical analogies or mathematical deductions. Here, then, lay the point of difference. Both parties sought general laws, but the one, by analogies of phenomena, the other, by the first principles of quantity itself; the one attempted to class the contingent, the other, to fix the necessary and eternal; the one evolved things in time, the other co-ordinated them through space. The one was the remote and shadowy image of our chemistry, the other, perhaps, of our mathematical mechanics.

We shall consider first the fortunes of the Ionic teachers, and of those connected with them in principles. "Let us,"

Gradual refinement of this conception.

Aristotle's distinction adopted.

Ionic and Italic, or Physical and Mathematical Schools.

The Ionic philosophers.
saying a letter attributed to one of themselves, “Let us begin all discourses with Thales.” To introduce any light into these obscure recesses we must, however, once more attempt the work of classification. The simplest principle of division will be that which places on one side those philosophers who accounted for the universe by the transformations of a single element, and who, for the most part, conceived the universe as a vital organisation; and, on the other, those who explained it by the combination of atoms, united either fortuitously, or by intelligent agency, or (as Empedocles) operated on by a twofold principle of attraction and repulsion, which, from the analogy of the affections, he styled “love” and “hatred.” Now it appears to me that Thales, the common parent of these very opposite theories of the world, actually involved in his own teaching the germs of both; that is, that he, in adopting both water and a moving principle as alternately his ὅραξες τῶν πάντων, did really include both the purely vital and the purely mechanical interpretations of the universe. But, as I would much rather furnish your minds with thoughts than with names, let us enlarge for a while upon this double aspect of the world as it presented itself to the physical section of the primitive philosophy.

Man explains the universe by himself. Whatever be the real value of the laws he imposes on the world, and in imposing seems to detect; whether these relations under which he co-ordinates nature are of the eternal essence of nature herself, independent of human perception, or are merely mental—the laws rather of his own constitution than of external existences,—and thus necessary by a merely subjective necessity: however you decide this question, on which so much thought has of late been exhausted, it will still be the truth, even if not the whole truth, that, in the first instance, man explains the universe by himself. He subjects the world to the empire of his own intellectual principles; he projects the shadow of his own reason on a world whose existence is yet felt to be distinct and independent of him. You know that a great portion of every logical investigation of human nature is occupied with defining and classifying these laws of reason (causality, substance, identity, diversity, &c.), under which, to receive the world at all, we are obliged to apprehend it. To accomplish this is a high achievement of advanced reason. And the difficulty is not at all so much to enumerate all

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[Anaximenes, in one of two epistles quoted by Diog. Laertius, ii. c. 4, and supposed to be addressed to Pythagoras. They are very paltry forgeries, the production evidently of the same hand to which we owe the epistles of Thales found also in Diogenes. Ed.]
these principles, as to enumerate none but the true ones; for though man has no right to make a priori application to the world of any principles but those supreme intuitions which possess the universality, necessity, and immediate evidence of pure reason, his early tendencies are constantly leading him to a wide and vague application of his whole nature to the world around him, to see himself in everything, to recognise his will, and even his sensations, in the inanimate universe. This blind analogy is almost the first hypothesis of childhood. The child translates the external world by himself. He perceives, for example, successions under the law of causality, but he adds to this causality his own consciousness of voluntary effort. He perceives objects under the law of extension, but he has little conception of an extension which should overpass his own power of traversing it. The child personifies the stone that hurts him; the childhood of superstition (whose genius is multiplicity) personifies the laws of nature as Gods; the childhood of philosophy (whose genius is unity) made the world itself a living, breathing, animal, "whose body nature was, and God the soul."

Gross as was this conception, it reacted in an error still more unfortunate. When our organised nature had been thus transferred to the universe, as even the faintest inspection of man displayed a superior and inferior principle—a mover and a moved—it was natural, and on the grounds of the application necessary, to constitute such in the external world. But as the feeble psychology of that age had not arrived at a clear and definite separation of the motive power from the animal system, there was no such definite separation made in the great external organisation. Accordingly, whatever seemed the most subtle or pliable, as well as universal element in the mass of the visible world, was marked as the seminal principle whose successive developments and transformations produced all the rest; and then, the living principle in this (confused with itself) was called by the same name. Then came the reaction I have intimated. When from the world these theorists once more descended into themselves, they came with all the machinery of their external system about them; and as it would have been preposterous to exalt the spirit of a man above that of the universe, the predominant element in the world became the presiding principle in the human microcosm,—and the soul was now fire, now air, now a mixture or quintessence of the elements. This tendency was, of course, strengthened by the belief, almost universal, that the soul was itself a detached portion of the divine nature, and that, after the completion of its allotted
changes, its destiny was absorption into that vague and
unfixed essence to which they were wont to give the title of God—a striking point of resemblance to those Indian
systems in whose examination we were lately engaged.

But, as there is a motion of organisation, so there is
a motion of mere local arrangement and elementary af-

finity. And the possibility of explaining the universe by
this apposition of primitive particles, was also contempl-
ated by these philosophers. Now this may be accomp-
lished on two suppositions; either by mutual affinity, or
by intelligent agency: and this was probably the true
distinction between the systems of Empedocles and Anax-
agoras. However this be, you can easily conceive that the
latter, by the very force of his doctrine of Intelligence,
might be led to reject the class of analogies I have men-
tioned, and to consider the universe as the aggregate of
particles of infinite smallness, combined and arranged by
the presiding agency of a supreme reason.

Having thus attempted to distribute these numerous
teachers under two general classes, we may now proceed
briefly to note their respective views. As to Thales, I
have said that an inspection of the few accounts preserved
of his doctrine led me to think that he, without perhaps
much precision, embraced a combination of both. I have
no intention of entering into minute statements of special
tenets, which you can obtain in any of the ordinary sources.
But we know that Thales considered Water the primary
element, out of whose transformations the material world
was formed, for reasons which you may find recorded in
Aristotle, and which certainly evince the great Milesian's
tendency to the organic theory of the world. Other rea-
sons, have, however, been conjectured, and, perhaps, tra-
ditionary doctrines mingled with the current of the specu-
lations of Thales. We know also that he added to this
original element a formative principle of motion (which,
indeed, Cicero* pronounces to have been his "god").
Here, then, we seem to perceive a syncretism of both the

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* ["Deum autem eam mentem quae ex aqau cuncta fingeret." Nat. D. 1.
10, 25. Here however the speaker is the Epicurean Velleius, who in this
Dialogue is purposely made to misrepresent the doctrines of the philosophers.
"Velleius sidenter sane, ut solent isti, nihil tam verens, quam ne dulciare
alia de re videretur," &c. Ib. c. viii. 18. Whether or not this particular
statement was believed by Cicero, it is now agreed that it came from the
Epicurean Phaedrus, his teacher and contemporary. From the same source
proceeded in all probability the apocryphal account of Thales' opinions in
Stobaeus, EcL 1. [50]. The hypothesis of a formative and a formed principle
is quite at variance with the testimony of Aristotle, and with the whole spirit
of the earliest Ionian Philosophy. It would have been, in effect, an anticipa-
tion of Anaxagoras. Ed.]
systems I have noted. But I would further invite your attention to the intimate reciprocal influence of the theology and psychology of that remote age;—an influence, indeed, which is still manifested in the too frequent connexion of atheistic and materialist views in our own times. Thales, as we are well assured, defined the soul as a principle 

\[ \text{αἰσχυντος} \]

Extending the principle, he attributed separate souls to all moving things—as to the loadstone; and held that “the world was full of gods;” portions, as Aristotle⁴ saw, of the universal soul. You will perceive that this perfectly harmonised with that theology which made the Deity the moving energy of the universe, i.e. the energy which operated those successive transmutations by which the primitive aqueous element was condensed into the harder, or attenuated into the subtler portions of the world. Thus the different fragments of his philosophy illumine each other, and reveal the lineaments of a proportioned system. Certain reports of the Thaetic teaching preserved in Clemens and Laertius are too late to be safe, and seem discordant with the character of these recognised principles of his philosophy.

Anaximander, who is ordinarily placed next to the founder of the Ionic philosophy, I omit. It has, I think, been very clearly shewn by later⁵ inquirers that his position in the consecutive history of thought is altogether different. The whole character of his views seems unlike those of a pupil of Thales: and we know that Aristotle, in his rapid but precise sketches, is never found to include Anaximander.

⁴ [Pseudo-Plut. De Placitis Phil. IV. c. 2. Aristotle’s statement is more guarded: “If we can rely on the notices we have of Thales, he too would seem to have conceived the soul as a moving principle; for he is reported to have said that the loadstone possessed a soul, because it could move iron.” De Anima, i. 5, 17. This passage throws doubt on the 

\[ \text{αἰσχυντος} \]

of the author of the 

\[ \text{Placita} \]

who probably had it from an inferior source. If the fragments of Philolaus are genuine, as Böckh believed them to be, the word 

\[ \text{αἰσχυντος} \]

was probably coined by him. Philolaus, ed. Mullach, frag. 21. But the Aristotelian words and notions contained in this fragment seem incompatible with genuineness; and a question arises whether 

\[ \text{αἰσχυντος} \]

may not rather have been borrowed from Plato, Phaedr. 245, c, as it was by the pseudo-Ceulius, and by Hermes sp. Stilbæum. The same question applies to 

\[ \text{βαμνουργφς} \]

in the same fragment, which may in like manner have been borrowed from the Timæus. Ed.]

⁵ [De Anima, i. 5, 10: “Οθεν λεγατο καὶ Θαλῆς τὴν πλῆρη θεῶν εισα. Ed.]
We rise, then, from the principle of water to that of Air. This element seems happily to unite corporeal and spiritual qualities; and though Anaximenes betrays no indications of direct Theism, we may recognise in his very Pantheism the effort to reconcile, in some intermediate substance, the opposite qualities of the mental and material natures. As before, the soul reflects the ultimate principle of the world; the last element of the world is air, and the soul is air.

In Diogenes Apolloniatus we have the commentator and refiner of Anaximenes. The “air” of Diogenes possesses intellectual qualities, precisely as the “fire” of Heraclitus, to whom we shall presently arrive. The deity of Diogenes is a divine air pervading the universe, itself a huge vitalized organism. The breath of man is his soul, or the vehicle of his soul.

But we have not scaled the ladder of the elementary universe. In the views of Heraclitus (to whom, following the thread of thought, rather than of locality, I now pass,) Fire was the substance of the universe; God, and the soul of man, a subtle and diviner flame. Heraclitus is said to have been instructed both by Hipparus and Xenophanes, but on vague and unsatisfactory authority: from his Ephesian origin, and the complexion of his doctrine, Creuzer conjectures Oriental associations. In Heraclitus, then, the universe was reducible to an eternal Fire, whose motions in never-ceasing change (ποιήσεως) were regulated by the co-eternal ordinances of supreme fate; fire, which seems in the sun and stars to be enthroned in the loftiest chambers of the universe; fire, whose boundless energy is manifested openly in destruction, and secretly, but universally, in the great work of renovation and life, and whose agency in the “caloric” of the modern chemistry is scarcely more confined than the physics of Heraclitus made it. Such an element as this seemed, if any, to claim supremacy over the other materials of the physical world. The tenets of Heraclitus, however, extended into all the recesses of the moral as well as the physical system. Believing all the subject of incessant change, his doctrines tinged his life and

7 [Diogenes Laertius is very brief in his account of this philosopher, whom however he calls ἰδων ἄληχυς. He quotes Antisthenes for the assertion that Diogenes was the pupil of Anaximenes, which the character of his theory renders probable. A detailed account of his speculations is to be found in Simplicius on the Physics of Aristotle, fol. 32, quoted by Ritter and Pfreider, § 27. He was contemporary with Anaxagoras (Diog. L. 79. 9), and probably survived him. A dissertation by Schleiermacher on “Diogenes of Apollonia” is preserved in the Transactions of the Berlin Academy, 1811, and was republished in his Philosophical Works, Vol. ii. p. 140. The fragments have been edited, together with those of Anaxagoras, by Schorn, Bonn, 1846. Ed.]

conversation with a melancholy which became proverbial through antiquity. But why is it that Heraclitus is found so eminently obscure? 'O σκέτωνος was his title even among his contemporaries. It strikes me that the solution is to be found in the peculiarity of his position. Of all the physical theorists of his time who looked upon the world as a vital organism, Heraclitus, perhaps, arrived nearest at the purely spiritual* conception of its author. Such a state—the transition-state from one to another, and distinct view of the principles of the world,—is marked with restlessness, disquietude, uncertainty, and obscurity. Nor will you be surprised to find in such a teacher the germs of much which became subsequently developed in complete system: this is a character which always belongs to these denizens of the border-land of discovery. From Heraclitus’s theory of perpetual fluxion Plato derived the necessity of seeking a stable basis for the universal system in his world of ideas, as Aristotle expressly tells us: and this lofty mysticism of his language unquestionably had a pervading influence over that great philosopher’s mind.10

9 [Such seems to have been Justin Martyr’s opinion, Apol. i. c. 46: “Those who have lived in communion with Reason (Logos) are Christians, though they may have been reputed Atheists; as among the Greeks, Socrates and Heraclitus, and their like.” Compare the citation from Eusebius, &c. in Beilby’s Remarks on Free-thinking, p. 408, Dyce. The Heraclitian “Fire” is endowed with spiritual attributes. Aristotle calls it ὕπατος, and says it is ἀναμφιστάτης (De Anima, i. 2, 16). It is in effect the common ground of the phenomena both of mind and matter; it is not only the animating but also the intelligent and regulative principle of the universe (πύρ ἀπέξων ὁρόνων...κατά θεοί χώρως κεραυνόν), the Ξύψος Λόγος, or universal Word or Reason, which behoves all men to follow, though the multitude live as if it were not, walking by the light of private judgment (ἴδια ἀφίσιον). If this theory seem to materialize mind, it may with equal fairness be said to spiritualize matter; and the phrases quoted above, from undoubted sources, appear to justify the assertion in the text; which may be compared with that of a very recent German writer: “Das bewegte Ein’s der Herchen, das Werdende, ist so immateriel als das ruhende Ein’s der Eleasen, das Seyn.” Zeller, Phil. d. Grisch. i. p. 57.

Among modern aids to our knowledge of Heraclitus may be mentioned Schleiermacher’s dissertation, published first in Wolf and Böttger’s Museum, 1808, and republished in the Second Vol. of his Philosophical Works. It bears the title, “Heraclitus the obscure, of Ephesus, exhibited by the aid of his Fragments and the testimonies of the Ancients.” A valuable supplement to this treatise is the Heraclita of Bernays, Bonn, 1848, to which add his two papers in the Rhenish Museum (Heraclitische Studien, R. M. Vol. vii. p. 90, and a dissertation on the New Fragments contained in the Pseustos Origenes’ Conflation of Heresies. 1b. Vol. ix. p. 241); and also his Epistola Critica to Mr Bunsen, which appeared in the fourth vol. of Bunsen’s Ephesus, and is reprinted in the third vol. of the same author’s Analestas Ante-Nicena, together with annotations on the recovered Fragments. Lassalle’s elaborate work, entitled Die Philosophie Heraclitus des dunklen (Berlin, 1845), should not be left unnoticed. It is an ambitious attempt to explain all the difficulties of Heraclitus by the reflected light of Hegel’s philosophy. Ed.]

10 [Heraclitus was perhaps the greatest speculative genius among the forerunners of Plato, who began his philosophical life as a student of this philosopher, and who dedicated his mature powers to the task of reconciling the Ephesian doctrine of Unrest and Development (τὸ δύο, τὸ γεγομένον) with the Eleatic principle of Permanence (τὸ διο, τὸ ἐστὶ). The States also built up
We have now seen three of the ordinary elements elevated into the successive honours of supremacy. Pherociades (the supposed master of Thales) had, long before the age of Heraclitus, declared Earth to be the original matter; and nothing now remained but the work of composition. The great compounder of all the past systems of nature was Empedocles; and this I consider the chief character of his doctrine. Empedocles declared that there were four elements equally concerned in the constitution of the world, and that forces which he, in a kind of philosophical mythology, termed "Love and Hate," animated these primary substances into the harmony of motion. In the fragments

their elaborate physical system with Heraclitean materials; and, to descend to modern times, some of Hegel's most daring paradoxes are conceived by their author to have been anticipated by Heraclitus. (Heg. Ges. d. Phil. 1. p. 334; Wis.achseits d. Logik, B. 1. § 1, c. Anm. 1.)

Heraclitus is further known by his Aphorisms, which are among the most brilliant of those

"Jewels five words long
That on the stretch'd fore-finger of all Time
Sparkle for ever."

Among the most famous of these are the following: πᾶλα μαχαίρα πᾶτρον:

"War is Father of all things." (All things are evolved by the strife of antagonistic forces.) "No man can taste twice in the same stream." (Material substances are perpetually losing their identity.) "The wisest of men is an ape to the gods." (Hence Pope, "And shew a Newton as men shew an ape").

"Αρκούσαντες φαντάζεται κρήτων," explained by Laenelle as the "weltdurchwehende θύρα des Gottes," compared with its "sinnliche Darstellung," or possibly referring to the superiority of vital and organic to merely mechanical arrangements, as indeed Plutarch seems to understand it—ἐν τῇ τὰς διαφόρας καὶ τὰς ἐπιθέσεις τοῦ μονομάθους θεός ἐκρυψα καὶ κατέδωκε. "Summa ars celeare artem" may be the popular interpretation of this gnome. "Time is a child at his sports" (ever constructing, ever levelling). "Life is the death of gods, death their life" (a dictum reproduced in various forms by the Pythagoreans, Plato, Euripides, &c., as the well-known exclamation: τίς δ' οἶδαν εἰ τὸ χρόνον μένουσα καθάρει τῇ κατατάσσεις τῇ ἐμφάσει). "Men are mortal gods, gods are immortal men." "Πᾶσα διάσωστος διάλογον," "A man's character is his destiny." "Πολυμοναῖος νόον οὐ διδάκεις," "The greatest clerks are not the wisest men." Ἀφήνετε, σοφοτάτη. Hence Bacon, de Augm. 1. Op. p. 22, ed. 1776, 4to: "Cum autem conclusiones inde deducuntur, que oblique relabimus applicat, vel infirmos metus gignunt, vel immundiora capiuntur, tum deum se devocet cruciatum ille et perturbatio mentis quae de loquimur: tunc enim scientia non est amplius lumen siccum (ut voluit Heraclitus ille obscurius, Lumen siccum, optima anima) sed fit lumine madidum, atque humoribus affectum maceratum." But this Heraclitean philosophy takes many shapes: (1) Galen (Quod anim. mort.). Ἀφήνετε, σοφοτάτη. (2) Eusel. Ἐπ. κ. α., ταύτης ἐπικρίνει σοφοτάτη καὶ ἀριστή. (3) Plutarch de Orac. Def. p. 332 αὐτή γὰρ ἐπαύρην µὴν ψυχή καὶ ἂριστος. Ἡ πλούσιος ἄρσαται καὶ ἀριστήσεται. ฉะนั้น, ἧς ἄρσεν ἁθρόην φίλας διαπαντέθην τοῦ σώματος. (4) Clemens Alex. Pedag. 1. 2 Ἀφήνετε δὲ τις γὰρ ψυχή καὶ σοφοτάτη καὶ ἀριστή. (5) In Stoic. Flor. v. 160 we have simply αὐτής ψυχής σοφοτάτης καὶ ἀριστής. A comparison of these passages tempt to the conjecture which will probably be thought a rash one, that αὐτή and αὐτή may have been interchanged, and that ἄρω της is only a gloss on the less usual αὐτή. In that case αὐτής ἅρωτας would be what Heraclitus really wrote. Zeller suggests a different way of accounting for αὐτής. Phil. d. Gr. t. p. 480 note l. Ep.]

[The best collection of these Fragments is that of M. Karsten, Amsterdam, 1838, whose numbers are adopted in the passages quoted in these]
of Empedocles I seem to recognise the traces of a most miscellaneous philosophic education, in which Ionic and Pythagorean influences are almost equally observable. He speaks of monads
[The doctrine of monads, that is to say ultimate corpuscles or atoms, is attributed to Empedocles by Plutarch (De Fide, orb. Lus. p. 926, quoted by Karsten). But neither the word nor the notion occurs in his Fragments; and Aristotle seems to deny that Empedocles was an atomist (De Gen. et Corr. i. 8, de Caelo, iii. 4). False still is the statement of the Pseudo-Origen, who in the Philosophumena speaks of a "divine Monad," or "intelligible Fire," as one of the tenets of Empedocles, confounding, as would seem, Pythagorean with Heraclitic or Stoic notions, and making Empedocles responsible for the compound. This author, whom we may venture to call Hippolytus, is to be trusted only when he quotes. By the Monad of Empedocles he probably means what our philosopher styled "the Sphere or Globe," σφαῖρας, by which he figured the original uncreated universe (compound, μῦτα, is Aristotle's synonym for it), which contains in its bosom the four elements, as yet unseparated, together with two coequal and co-ordinate developing forces, Love and Hate; by the latter of which the elements are separated, being then by Love re-united and combined into the forms of organized nature. The word σφαῖρας, a coinage of his own, was suggested by the εὐκάλεος σφαῖρας ἄκος of Parmenides; though Empedocles understands by it a physical rather than a metaphysical unity. The motive to this philosophical figure is obvious. Empedocles strove, here as in other parts of his system, to combine, if not to reconcile, the Dynamical and Mechanical theories of Nature, which divided the speculators of the Ionian school. His σφαῖρας is a syncretism of the primeval chaos, the ἦν τό πᾶν χρῆμα, of Anaxagoras, and the vital forces which, under the names of air, water, or fire, operate, according to Anaximenes, Thales, or Heraclitus, all the varying phenomena of the universe. His νέκται and φαύνης (Love and Hate, Discord and Unity) are evidently suggested by the Eternal Strife, the πάλαιμος ταῖρη τέως of Heraclitus; perhaps are intended as an improvement upon it. They, and the elements upon which they act, make up the Totality or σφαῖρας, to which Empedocles gives the name of God; herein differing essentially from Anaxagoras, whose Supreme Intelligence is conceived as extraneous to the undigested mass which he "comes to organize" (ἐγεῖρεν ἐν ἐμβόληι). In modern language, Anaxagoras is a Theist, Empedocles a Pantheist. But the process of creation is the same in both philosophies: consisting not in change of one substance into another, which Empedocles repudiates as decidedly as Anaxagoras, but in the due mixture and juxtaposition of elements in themselves immutable. Empedocles is praised by Aristotle for fixing the number of these elements, which Anaxagoras leaves undetermined: a judgment which might surprise us, did we forget that Aristotle adopted all four into his own scheme of Physics. The "Globe" of Empedocles is a favourite plaything of the later Platonists, who scruple not to identify it with their own κόσμος νοητός, or "region of intelligible forms." From these later Platonists, through whatever channel, there can be no doubt that Bacon borrowed his "Globus intellectualis." Compare Proclus in Tim., 166, 1, διττον τοις τᾶς σφαῖρας ἢν ἄλογον τῶν ἐν αὐτῶν τῶν δὲ νοητῶν, κ.τ.λ. (a mistake, however, as regards Empedocles), and Simplicius in Phys. Arist. 72 ἢ νοητόν ἀλογόν τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ δηδακων, καὶ ἐκείνου τοῦτον παράδειγμα ἀρχέτερων τιθέμενος κ.τ.λ. These passages, taken together, afford a solution of the hitherto (by editors) unexplained riddle in the Advancement of Learning: It is the perfect Law of Enquiry of truth, that nothing be in the Globe of Matter, which should not likewise be in the Globe of Crystal or Form. Works, iii. p. 456, Spedding. Ed.]
quintessence\textsuperscript{18} of the elements. The process of communion between man and the world around him is effected, according to Empedocles, by the action of the same element upon the same; according to which tenet he distributes the elements among the senses respectively\textsuperscript{14}; but the Pythagorean pupil is still manifested in the resolute denial\textsuperscript{15} of all knowledge that deserves the name to the feeble grasp of sense, and the restriction of true apprehensions to the eternal verities of reason. The philosopher of Agrigentum

\textsuperscript{18} [The reader must not infer from these expressions that Empedocles is responsible for the word 'quintessence,' or that he uses any corresponding Greek term. \textit{Quinta essentia} (ρέματα οὐσία) is of Aristotelian extraction. It denoted the fifth element, out of which the heavenly bodies were supposed by that philosopher to be formed. \textit{De Mundo}, c. 11. 6: στρογγύλων οὖσαν ἐσφραγίζω τῶν τετράυν, ἀκοίματος τε καὶ θείων. Empedocles admits no such fifth element. Ed.]

\textsuperscript{14} [A very curious philosopher of Empedocles deserves notice here. He held the doctrine—eagerly espoused by some of the most considerable physical speculators of antiquity—that from all bodies minute particles are perpetually thrown off, which find their way into other bodies by corresponding minute passages (φόριον, "pores"). This theory of Emancipations (ἀφαίητα) he employs to explain the action and reaction of substances upon each other, and in particular the phenomena of sensation and perception. In pursuance of the hypothesis, Empedocles was led to the invention of the plausible principle, which was adopted without inquiry by nearly every ancient school, \textit{similia similibus percipiantur}, "like is only perceived by like" (v. 321). Earthy particles, he tells us, are known by their impact on the earthy elements in the human frame, "water is felt by contact with the water, fire by attraction to the fire within," &c. This naive but ingenious fiction was embraced by Democritus, and after him by the Epicureans; with this difference, that they hypothesize a vacuum through which the emanative particles pass, which Empedocles explicitly denies. (v. 63. See his elegant simile of the Clypeus, v. 282.)

Plato, whoлага at the hypothesis of emanations as an explanation of the phenomena of the senses (Men, p. 761), adopts the general principle (\textit{similia similibus}) in his theory of the Intellect, and of its relation to the cognate Ideas, the intelligible incorporeal objects of an incorporeal intelligent subject. (See \textit{Repul.}, p. 508.) Similarly in the \textit{Timæus}, p. 55, he represents the soul as compounded of two principles, the principle of identity or permanence (ἡ ταὐτότης), and the principle of change or diversity (ἡ διάφορα), corresponding respectively with the intelligible and the sensible universe, γνῶσις καὶ γ ν τὰ ὁμοιὰ τὰ διόιον, (Arist. \textit{De Anima}, i. 2, § 7, where see Trendelenburg’s learned and accurate note). The same principle seems to lie at the root of Bacon’s twofold division of the soul into the "spiraculum" and the "anima sensibilis;" "quorum alterum orium habuerit a Deo, alterum e matricibus elementorum." (\textit{De Augm.}, iv. c. 3.) Many other curious philosophical hypotheses are traced to this source by Sir W. Hamilton in his \textit{Discourses on Philosophy}, p. 60. Ed.]

\textsuperscript{15} [Cicero places Empedocles in the same category with Socrates, Democritus, and Anaxagoras, "omnes puræ veteres; qui nihil cognosceri, nihil perci, nihil scire posse dixerunt; angustos sensus, imbécillos animos, brevia curricula vitae, et (ut Democritus) in profundo veritatem esse demersi; opinionibus et institutis omnia teneri; nihil veritati relinquii; deinceps omnia tenebris circumfusa." \textit{Acad. Post.} i. c. 12. There are passages in the Fragments of Empedocles which undoubtedly point to the distinction between reason and sense, on which so much stress was laid by Parmenides and the Eleatics; for instance in the lines:

γαλῶν πίστιν ἔρυκε νῦει ἡδὶ ἡ δῆλον ἑκαστον. v. 53,

and τὴν αὐ νῦε δέρκε μνὴ ἐμαυσιν ἑτο τεθνώτ. v. 108.
is, therefore, usually\(^{18}\) classed as an appendix to the Italic school; I have, however, thought it well to place him with the Ionics in his philosophy of the elements, as an arrangement more conducive to an harmonious view of the progressive development of the entire subject.

When the universe had been thus humanized, and the very affections of the human nature attributed to its attractive and repulsive forces, it is evident that philosophy had but one step further to make in order to reach the completion of the analogy. The world was not merely to be endowed with organisation, and with active principles of desire, but still more, with the regulating energy of an Intellect. That by some such progressive course as this Anaxagoras was led to his conception of the Supreme Intelligence, I cannot but think highly probable. But along with the principle of Intelligence Anaxagoras had coupled a system which totally discriminates him from the teachers

But, as Karsten and others have properly observed, these passages are not to be interpreted too rigorously. If Empedocles had denied \(\text{in toto} \) the credibility of the senses, it would be difficult to account for the estimation in which he was held by Lucretius: difficult also to reconcile such unbelief with the materialism implied in his theory of the universe. This Sextus Empiricus seems to have remarked, for he says: Empedocles represents that "all the senses are trustworthy, if under the control of reason" (\(\text{τὸν λόγον αὐτῶν ἐκτιμάτων} \)). \textit{Adv. Math. VII. 124.} Empedocles was in fact not more a rationalist than Democritus and Anaxagoras, in whose company he is placed by Cicero. Complaints of the imbecility of the human faculties, compared with the obscurity and vastness of Nature, are common to all the ancient philosophers. The \(\text{φόντος} \) of the Agrigentine was, in his own case, a vivid and highly inventive fancy: not as in Parmenides, an unequalled power of speculative abstraction. Empedocles is even classed by Aristotle with the philosophers who identified intellect and sense. \textit{Metaph. III. 5. Ed.}\n
\(^{18}\) [As by Brucker, whose account of the philosophy of Empedocles is however not to be relied upon, being derived, in great part, from bad secondary sources. On the question, to what sect or succession Empedocles may most properly be referred, Karsten has the following sound remarks: "Multum autem disceptatum est, in qua philosophorum secta Empedocli sit posita: plurimi cum Pythagoreis, alii Ioniis, alii Eleaticis ammumerandum opiniat sunt. Ex eis vero quia disputavimus, apparece arbitrari, illius rationem cum omnibus his seictis connexam, nullius earum proprium fuisse. Cum Eleaticis in eo consentit, quod unum illud immutum perfectumque, ab illis \(\text{τὰ δύο} \) assignaturum, in mundi principia transfinit; cum Ioniis in hoc præsentim, quod res naturae perpetuum fluere, et huc illuc agitari cessit; cum Pythagoreis pluraque, quæ ad res divinas, ad animos et religiones pertinent, habet communis; quibus Orphica quaedam placita et instituta aliter. Sic et diversis elementis confìata est Empedoclis ratio, nullius tamen ingenii signum et effigie impressa." \textit{De Emped. pp. 5, 7.} The same author thus characterizes his theology: "Physica Empedoclis doctrina cum theologica arcissime cohæret; est, ut ita dicam, nature \(\text{ἀρτομοεις} \), summo jure Panteismus appellandus. Tali autem sentiend\(\text{i} \) ratio tam temporibus quibus vixerit Empedocles, quam ingenio ipsius et moribus consentanea erat. Quippe evanuerat dii, obsoleteverant fabulæ, emortua erat religio, a priscis Graeciae vetibus consecrata; ita factum ut eruditores aut divinum numen plane tollerent, aut, si essent acrore religionis sensu, hi converterent se ad nature vires, in easque transferent divinos honores et munera, fabulose antiquitatis Diis negata, quorum \(\text{nisi nomina et umbrae retinebant.} \) Ed.\]
whom we have as yet contemplated. The architecture of the universe was with him executed on a different plan, and framed out of different materials. But, to understand this, we must retrace a few steps, and recur to that Anaximander whom we before rejected from the ordinary classification.

Anaximander (who is said to have been the first of the sages who committed his views to writing) is represented, in the very detached and doubtful reports preserved of his doctrine, to have declared that the principle of the world was a certain ἀνίφος, the basis of innumerable changes, of worlds perpetually rising and falling, and of gods, who, if distinct from these worlds in substance, are at least equally liable to the fate of incessant mutability. You may find his theology in Cicero (De Nat. Deor. Lib. 1). The word ἀνίφος, on which our opinion of his views must rest, has usually been rendered infinitude; but when we find Aristotle calling it a μίγμα of elements, we may be inclined to suspect that Anaximander meant a state of being without limitations or divisions, in other words, a or Χως, state of chaotic combination: a conjecture in which I find myself confirmed by a late learned writer on this branch of learning. So far was Anaximander from sympathising with the theory of universal vitality, that he endeavours (as has been well shewn) to solve the phenomena of organisation itself by mechanical theories. Here we observe, then, a decided warfare of principles: the pupil of Thales symbolises ill with his reputed teacher, and not at all with his reputed successor. You will find this point well reasoned out by Ritter in his account of the Ionic philosophy; and, as I think, at least as convincingly established as a question can be on which our information is so defective.

In Anaxagoras the theory of a mechanical, not vital union of particles, arrived, in its legitimate course, at a far higher perfection. To the philosopher of Clazomenae matter, ever numerically the same, underwent combination and separation from the energy and dictates of a supreme

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17 [This view of Ritter's (Gesch. d. Phil. iii. c. 7), peculiar, if I mistake not, to himself, has not found favour with more recent historians of philosophy, as Brandis and Zeller, who agree in classing Anaximander with his predecessor Thales and his successor Anaximenes, and deny the atomistic tendency attributed to his doctrines by Ritter. (See Brandis, Handb. i. p. 133; Zeller, Phil. der Griechen, i. p. 156.) The classification of the anti-Socratic philosophers proposed by Zeller, is in its principle different from that of Ritter, and seems to me on the whole more natural and more in accordance with Greek, as distinguished from modern ideas. Ed.]

18 [The Fragments of Anaxagoras have been edited by Schaubach (Leipzic, 1827), who has added a copious Latin commentary. Also, more critically, by Schorn (Innsbruck, 1829). They are all taken from Simplicius, who quotes them in his invaluable commentary on the Physics of Aristotle. Ed.]
mind. No point of space is unoccupied by particles which, nevertheless, are infinitely small; but the entire is pervaded by the influence of a guiding reason which unites elements in their fitting position, affinity, and proportion. The same Reason which can explore the world must have been exerted to arrange it; and man can see in the work the image of the intelligence of the Artist. This noble conception of the universal frame was, in the philosophy of Anaxagoras, carried into many minuter details; and in the inferior part of his structure he, of course, committed the errors which all must commit who venture upon interpreting nature without duly compelling her to answer the question of reason, and to reveal herself. The harmony, however, which the doctrine of an arranging Intellect bestowed upon the theory of the universe, soon attracted notice, and multiplied converts; and though Anaxagoras suffered from the jealousy of those who dreaded that Deity would supplant the deities, the manifest and happy influence which he exerted upon the subsequent direction of the Grecian philosophy is the sure test of the substantial efficacy of his teaching, and the proudest monument to his memory. At the same time, in our admiration, we must preserve measure and proportion. It was Socrates who made of the Nous a genuine Providence; and who thence fixed on its true basis the study of, and the argument from, final causes. "We know," says he, in one golden sentence of the Memorabilia, "our soul by its operation; and so we know the Deity by his works."

The physical views of the mechanical philosophy were

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18 [Anaxagoras, unlike the early pantheistic speculators, rigidly separates his Supreme Intelligence from the material universe. His Nous is a principle infinite, independent (ἀναφοράτες), omnipresent (ἐν πάσῃ παντὸς μορίᾳ ἐνῶ), the subllest and purest of things (κατὰ τῶν πάνω χρηστῶν καὶ καθαρότατων), and incapable of conjunction with anything besides (μεμιμαί αὐτῷ χρηστὸς). The Nous is also omniscient (πάνα ἔρων), and uniform (τὰς διάνοιας ἑνώς). Simplicius, in Arist. Phys. 1. 1. 33. The extract from which this account is taken is quoted at length by Ritter and Preller, § 64. But for the accident of its preservation by Simplicius we should have been unable to form an adequate idea either of the purity of Anaxagoras’s Theism, or of the justice of Aristotle’s remark, that, compared with his predecessors, the philosopher of Clazomenae was like a sober man among raving drunkards. (Met. 1. 3. 16.) Aristotle, however, as well as Plato (Phaed. p. 96), complain of the timorous application of this principle by its author. ED.]

31 [B. IV. c. 3. 14. Ed.]
continued in a very different spirit by the Atomists, to whom Leucippus is attributed as founder. The excessive and chimerical extravagance of these theorists was mainly produced by the rival extravagance of the Eleatic school. The local history of this succession of philosophers is very obscure and uncertain; it seems to have had some connexion of hostility with the Eleatics, and to have probably arisen in Elea: we know, however, that its champion, Democritus, was a native of Abdera in Thrace. Its true scope cannot be perfectly comprehended without the contrast of the Eleatic institutes: we may, however, in the

goras, under that of Intelligence. As Dr Whewell observes (Hist. of Ind. Sc. i. p. 64), the atomic doctrine "points to the corpuscular theories of modern times," while that of Anaxagoras "may be considered as a dim glimpse of the idea of chemical analysis." The following lines of Lucretius contain a luminous account of the homoeomoria:

Principio, rerum quem dicit homoeomerian,
Ossa, videlicet, e paussilis atque minutis
Ossibus hic et de paussilis atque minutis
Viscibus visus, gigani sanguinemque creari
Sanguinis inter se multis coeuntibus gattis
Ex aurique putat micis consistere posse
Aurum, et de terris terram confecerit parsis,
Ignibus ex ignis, omnium omnibus esse,
Cetera consimili fingit ratione putaque.
Nec tamen esse ulli idem ex parte in rebus inane
Conceit, neque corporibus inane esse secundis.

Linguatular hic quedam latitandi copia temnis,
Id quod Anaxagoras sibi surnit, ut omnis omnis
Res putat immixtis rebus latitare, sed illud
Apparere umum, caues sint plurima mixta
Et magis in promptu primumque in fronte locata.

Lib. 1. vv. 834 seqq., 875 seqq. En.]

32 [The Fragments of Democritus have been collected and carefully edited by Mullach, in his Quaestiones Democritae (Berlin, 1843), and in his Fragmenta Philosophorum, vol. 1. Paris 1860. They are exceedingly well worth reading, and bear for the most part an analogy of genuineness. It does not appear certain that Leucippus left any written record of his opinions. (See Mullach, Q. D. p. 374, not. 3.) Diogenes Laertius makes, on the authority of Aristotle, a peripatetic, the curious statement that Plato made a collection of the books of Democritus, and would have burnt them, but for the representations of two Pythagorean friends, who pointed out the futility of the proceeding—παρὰ πολλοῖς γὰρ ἔσονται ἢ βιβλία ἤσον. This, adds Diog., perhaps after Aristotle, will account for the fact that Plato, who refers to all the other philosophers, nowhere mentions Democritus. But Peripatetic notices of Plato are always open to suspicion, and this story may have been invented to explain the fact. Covert allusions to Democritus have been detected, or rather perhaps imagined, in the Sophistes of Plato and other dialogues, by Schleiermacher, and others. En.]

32 [The Atomic and Eleatic doctrines may seem, at first sight, to have nothing in common. We learn however from Simplicius (in Phys. 1. fol. 7), that Leucippus studied philosophy under Parmenides (for whom Zeno is falsely subtituted by the author of the Philosophumena), and a passage in Aristotle (De Gen. et Corr. 1. 8) explains the relation between the two systems. Accordingly, much of the phraseology and some of the postulates of the Eleatics were adopted by Leucippus and Democritus, who however gave a physical, material meaning to the metaphysical notions of the former school. Thus their vacuum is styled μὴ ἐν (Non Est), their atoms ὠρα (cauta): and
consecution of doctrine, briefly notice these sages as our closing sketch, and as presenting the fullest development of the Ionian mechanists.

In the philosophy of Leucippus all traces of a Supreme Intelligence disappeared. The universe—a dark, unshaped mass—consisted of two principles (if they can so be termed), reality and inanity. Through a boundless void (here differing both from Anaxagoras and the Eleatics) atoms, infinite in number, and diversified in figure, eternally wandered,—their wanderings governed by that dark negation of guiding law to which the title "Necessity" was ascribed. To contemplate the scenery of the universe exists the soul, which (according to the principle so often noted) is itself a subtle combination of atoms.

Time, Space, and Motion (it was thus Democritus took up the strain) are all eternal. As truth can only contemplate that which really exists, and as atoms and void alone are worthy the name of real existences, they are the only genuine subjects of real knowledge, and all else is but the shadowy diversity of internal impressions which can claim no real archetype. Thus was commenced that species of scepticism which has since, under various forms, been so constantly reiterated. To Democritus, in the pursuit of this his system, belong many anticipations of truths which modern psychology regards as its exclusive discoveries. He asserted, with great perspicuity and decision, that secondary qualities are but the modifications of human

they boldly assert, in defiance of Parmenides, "quod non-Ens est" (ἐστι τὸ πάντα, Προς. 1: 8; οὐτὸν μᾶλλον τὸ ἐν τῷ μη ἐστὶν ὀλοκλ.) Again, the Eleatics denied the possibility of motion, on the ground that motion implies that very contradiction. But Democritus, by his hypothesis of a νυκτήματος, was enabled to assert the possibility of motion also. In denying motion, Parmenides denied the possibility of change, or "-generation and dissolution." But motion secured, generation and its opposite can be explained; for they are but motions of atoms to or from each other. The propositions, "atoms are homogeneous," and, "they possess magnitude," are proved by Democritus on grounds as purely a priori as those on which the Eleatics built their theory. The first follows from the assumption that like can only act on like; the second, from the postulate, that no number of infinitely small parts can constitute a magnitude. These instances are sufficient to shew that the early Atomic theories contained a dogmatic as well as a sceptical, an a priori as well as an empirical element. See the following note. Ed.]
sensibility, and that by touch alone can man discover the external world. But not this alone is the result of touch; the gods themselves are known only by material contact, and no new conception can reach the soul (which itself is a compound of round and moving atoms) except through the direct proximity of emitted images. Thus, by a total materialism, was laid the basis of that philosophy of which Epicurus soon became the completer; and which, ornamented and enlarged by the progress of science, has been transmitted, without much substantial change, to so many of the medical psychologists of the present day.

testimonies which represent Democritus as identifying knowledge and sensation, and even as asserting that all sensible appearances are true. Compare Arist. Metaph. iii. 4, 10. Mullach, p. 415, supposes that this last was one of those early opinions which Democritus, according to Plutarch, afterwards abandoned. This, however, is improbable, and seems to be contradicted by Theophrastus, who says that in one of his treatises Democritus sets out by pompously announcing his intention of proving the truth of the senses, which in the sequel of the same treatise he entirely subverts. Ed.

35 [Aristot. De Anima, i. 2. E —]

36 [The Ethical doctrines of Democritus are not mentioned in the text; but they are certainly not without importance in the history of this branch of Philosophy. The elegance and purity of Democritus' style are justly praised by ancient critics, as the remaining fragments testify. Ed.]
LECTURE VI.

ON THE PYTHAGOREANS AND ELEATICS.

GENTLEMEN,

At our last meeting we rapidly traversed the field of philosophical contemplation presented in the labours of the Ionic school, and in those of some other speculators whom congeniality of views, rather than proximity of place, or any immediate historical connexion, associates with them. I endeavoured, with a success, I am afraid, very inferior to my design, to supply to your minds some of those leading ideas in which ordinary histories are apt to be so deficient, but without which the barren chronology of systems and their teachers is nearly as profitless as any other acquisition of mere memory, and not at all, as we are too prone to think, rescued from inutility by either the dignity of the subject, or the rarity of the possession. It is the difference between an anatomical enumeration and a physiological discussion. Facts and dates are as indispensable as a map of the nerves, or of the blood-vessels; but in the physiology of history alone can the student look for the organization, the action, the play, and life, of the whole.

Having been unable to comprise the entire ante-Socratic movement in my last Lecture, we must again prepare to penetrate into this patriarchal age of Greek philosophy, where all is so intermingled, and so incomplete, but where all is likewise promissory of a mighty future. It is like that pre-Adamite world, where dwelt, as some Oriental fictions held, the gigantic shadows of men as yet unborn: the outlines of systems to come were dimly traced in enormous proportions, and the mind, yet in the phantom-peopled twilight of an imaginative superstition, wandered, almost unconsciously, through the path it was afterwards to travel in a fuller light, and with a march more assured.

We saw, that in the absence of a true experimental philosophy of nature, two paths, and, as far as we can see, two paths alone, lay open to the speculator on the mysteries
of the external world:—the one, that of analogies more or less correct; the other, that of pure a priori deduction; the one looking on nature, but looking on her with a careless and shortsighted glance; the other withdrawing the eye almost wholly from the sensible world, and, with introverted glance, contemplating the ideal forms of the mind, in order subsequently to apply, by an arbitrary and vigorous imposition, these mental conceptions to the material structure. The former of these courses, in some degree adopted by all these sages, was ardently, and almost exclusively, embraced by the Ionic and their kindred schools; the latter was the peculiar province of the theorists of the Italic sects. We have already traced the fortunes of the former. A few words will give the moral.

Had the Ionic and Atomic schools, instead of vaguely conjecturing the successive transformations of the world at large, condescended to the task of minute observation and particular experiment, the physical sciences might have been anticipated by many centuries. But the exceeding subtlety of the elementary principles of the material world, or the diversity of nature's disguises, was, as yet, little suspected; experiment was, therefore, slightly, or not at all employed to extort her secrets; while, on the other hand, the real magnitude of the visible creation was so utterly unimagined, that the naturalists of this primitive age could speak of the earth and heavens as of a single mass or system—vast, indeed, but raised upon a common base, and placed, in all its parts equally, within the easy reach of fair conjecture. Thus, hypothesis followed hypothesis, guess supplanted guess, according as any unobserved fact, or ingenious analogy, gave it currency; until, at length, opposing authorities enfeebled each other; the oracles of physical science became less regarded as more and more numerous and contradictory, and the inquisition of nature, darkened into a hopeless mystery, almost universally made way for moral researches. Such was the fate of the system of physical conjecture; such the moral it furnishes. We must now reverse the picture, and briefly sketch the efforts of the contemporary system of physical demonstration, with its transition into the metaphysical system of the universe... I shall only observe, that you are not to take any of these terms as characterizing completely,—they are intended to characterize eminently—the views (Ionic and Atomic, Pythagorean, Eleatic) to which they are applied. At no time were the leaders of these schools exclusive contemplators of a single aspect of the external world; they were all, in some degree, metaphysical; all, in some degree, mathematical; all, in a high degree, conjecturers as to the
process of the physical changes around them. But, to rest upon the prominent features of their habitual speculations, the Ionics were a physical sect, the Pythagoreans a mathematical sect, the Eleatics a metaphysical sect: their attempts to satisfy themselves as to the objects of their thoughts and experience usually lay in the field of these different sciences; it was there they sought the solution of the universe, and there they endeavoured to persuade the world they had found it.

Pythagoras, from whom the Italic schools date their origin, whether instructed by foreign teachers, or directed by his own meditations, (for into the voluminous discussions, which have left this matter very much as they found it, I do not now mean to enter,) or, as is more probable, governed by both,—had long devoted his intellectual adoration to the lofty idea of Order. This idea—which seems the perfection, or necessary to the perfection, of all to which it can be applied,—at first, it was not learned to venerate in the happy adaptation of civil as well as civil government; to which the efforts of the commanding minds of Greece were

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1 [The reader of this Lecture should bear in mind and allow for the permitted difficulty of ascertaining how much of Pythagorean doctrine derived from Pythagoras himself, and how much was excogitated by his pretended followers. Aristotle only once mentions Pythagoras (Meta. Magna Moral, init.): ob ilia epopoeia is elsewhere his form of citation. Among the genuine "Pythagoreans," Philolaus, a contemporary of Socrates, was the most distinguished. His reputed fragments, preserved in Stobaeus and elsewhere, have been edited by Boccchi in his celebrated monograph Philolaus des Pythagorers Lehren, Berlin, 1819. But the notices in Aristotle (Meta. i. 5, 7; xii. 4, 8; Phys. i. 6; Magn. Mor. i. 1, and elsewhere,) are by far the most authentic sources of information concerning this remarkable school, and enable us to test the genuineness of other documents. The first Pythagorean writer is said to have been Philolaus, Diog. L. vii. 15. The treatises attributed to Ocellus Lucanus and Timaeus Locrus are undoubtedly spurious. The former is filled with Eleatic rather than Pythagorean matter; the latter has the air of an abstract of its Platonic namesake, containing moreover terms used in a sense unknown in the time of Socrates (as ὁλοκλήρως, &c.). Ahrens condemns them on grounds of dialect (de Diale. Dor. p. 23), including in the same sentence all the supposed Pythagorean fragments, except those of Philolaus. The same is said to be the conclusion of Gruppe, in his treatise über die Fragmente des Archytas, &c. Berlin, 1840. But even those of Philolaus are doubtful. His Dorisms, though not so manifestly spurious as those of Timeus Locrus, &c., are alloyed with admixtures of the lingus vulgaris, and the presence, still more suspicious, of Aristotelian phrase and manner. This subject is ably handled by Mr Bywater in the Cambridge Journal of Philology, i. p. 12. It is certain that a great crop of forged epistles and treatises sprang up in the century preceding our era; watered as it was by the pious zeal of the philosophic Jews, king of Mauritania, who paid highly for additions to his library, especially in its Pythagorean department. Accordingly, the art of literary forgery appears to have attained a degree of perfection in his time which it never afterwards recovered. Those who would know more of this curious subject may consult Ritter and Preller, p. 61 (where the necessary references are given), Mullach's Preface to his edition of Xenophanes, &c. (which contains the work of the false Ocellus); also Ritter's Geschicht d. Philosophie, Vol. i. p. 337; ed., and Bywater, ubi supra. Ed.]
so constantly directed, and in which this harmony of reciprocal relations is so prominently manifested, as itself the very essence of that condition of mankind. From this political order the transience was natural to the internal republic of the reason and the passions of the individual;—and Pythagoras could not but feel that, however affection more prompt and decisive may be necessary to urge to action so to fortify in endurance, yet to the calm observer it was the very essence of virtue, or one of its leading characteristics, that it involved the perfect proportion of all the active principles of the soul. With Pythagoras, whose system was, in its ultimate intention, a purely practical system, this was the most impressive consideration of all: but a mind so accomplished, and so thoughtful, was unlikely to rest in any single or restricted application of a great principle. When, accordingly, from the sphere of action, Sage of Samos passed into that of speculation, the same harmonious order seemed even more conspicuously to reveal itself as the underlying genius of that serene and silent world, which, from his youth, dwelt with delight upon the eternal relations of space and number, in which the perfect proportion seems to find its first and the sole determinate, and without the latter of which no part all proportion is absolutely inconceivable: and to the genius whose inventive energies were daily adding new and surprising contributions to the store of discovered relations, it began to appear as if the whole secret of the universe was hidden in these mysterious correspondences. The extension—unwarrantable, indeed, but in an age of inexperienced in the wiles of hypothetical illusion—scarcely be wondered at—may have, on the known principles of Pythagoras, proceeded thus. The mind of man perceives the relations of an eternal order in the proportions of space and number; that mind, doubtless, a portion of the soul which animates the universe—for on what other supposition shall we account for its internal principle of activity?—the very quality that essentially characterizes the Prime Mover, and can scarcely be attri-

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8 [This, though attributed by Laertius, viii. 33, to Pythagoras, is rather a Platonic than a Pythagorean platitude. The notions of the Pythagoreans seem to have been cruder and more fanciful. They defined Justice to be a square number (δίπλωμα λεκτος τῶν, Magn. Mar. i. 1), identifying all the virtues with numerical relations, and thus (as the author of that treatise observes) intruding alien notions into the region of Ethical science (τὰς ἀρετὰς εἰς τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς διενεχόμενος ἐν δημοκρατίας ἡν ὅτι τῶν ἀρετῶν τῇ θεολογίᾳ έκφυερεν). The dogma that the soul is a Harmony, so ingenioulsly refuted in Plato's Phaedo, was probably Pythagorean. See Ritter and Preller, § 102, a. Ed.]
buted to any inferior nature;—and on what other supposition are we to explain the identity which subsists between the proportions or principles authenticated by the reason, and the proportions or principles that are perceived to exist in the spaces and multiplicities around us, and independent of us? Can this sameness be other than the sameness of the external and internal portions of a common nature? And as that universal soul reflects the symmetry of the universe it vivifies, so do these fragments which are deposited in human clay; even as the same mirror, which presents a vast and single image, if broken into innumerable pieces, will return as many images as there are fragments. The proportions of the world inhere in its divine soul, being themselves its very essence, or, at least, its attributes: what, therefore, the mind of man feels, the mind of the universe cannot but confirm and countersign;—and the universe itself answer and acknowledge. Man, then, can boldly assert the necessary harmonies of the world; he possesses within him a revelation which declares that the world in its real structure must be the image and copy of that divine proportion which he internally adores. Again, the world is assuredly perfect, as being the sensible type of the Divinity, the outward and multiple development of the Eternal Unity; it must, then, when thoroughly known, answer to all which we can conceive of perfect; that is, it must be regulated by a legislation, of whose code we have the highest principles (whatever may be the details) in those first and elementary properties of numbers which stand nearest to unity. The world is, then, through all its departments, moral and material, a living arithmetic in its development, a realized geometry in its repose: it is a κόσμος (for the word is Pythagorean), the expression of harmony, the manifestation to sense of everlasting order: and he approaches nearest to the eternal fountain of beauty, who, by dwelling with greatest constancy upon proportions and fitnesses, escapes the region of apparent irregularity to reside in that of perpetual symmetry. Hence you at once perceive why it was that to geometry Pythagoras first introduced his disciple; in this science he found the representation, and the very language of his philosophy of proportion: and you also see how it happened that the entire school invested mathematical truths with a moral character, and in return clothed morals in the dress of mathematics. This, indeed, forms one source of the difficulty which critics still find in the attempt to penetrate the precise meaning of the expres-

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sions of the school of Crotona: they pass with such subtlety from the practical to the theoretic—from the arithmetic of virtue to the virtue of arithmetic—that we can pronounce with as little definiteness as, perhaps, they themselves possessed, to which department any particular proposition is intended mainly to relate. It is the same difficulty which, in all cases, is found in separating the type and the anti-type in two counterpart languages.

I should weary myself and you if I attempted to recount one half of the conjectures which have been advanced towards giving that "harmony" to the assertions of Pythagoras which they were intended to illustrate. The endeavour is usually fruitless or unsatisfactory when built upon a few detached phrases which may have almost any signification or none: I think it more profitable to offer a few remarks upon the aspect of things which must have presented itself to the mind of Pythagoras, steadying my course by occasional reference to the preserved traditions of his teaching, but scarcely venturing to reduce to the consummate precision of a modern theory a series of views which, in the mind of the master himself, were rather a habit of thought than a regular system of nature.

Though Pythagoras found in geometry the fitting initiative for abstract speculation, it is remarkable that (notwithstanding his acknowledged proficiency in that science which he largely enriched) he himself preferred to constitute the science of numbers as the true representative of the laws of the universe. The reason appears to be this: that though geometry speaks indeed of eternal truths, yet, when the notion of symmetry or proportion is introduced, it is absolutely necessary to introduce, and often necessary to insist in preference upon, the properties of Number. Hence, though the universe displayed the geometry of its Constructor or Animator, yet Nature was eminently defined as the μίμησις τῶν ἀριθμῶν. Moreover, in order to represent in a mathematical form the successive developments by which the vast totality was evolved, it is obvious that the production of numbers offered the most immediate example, and the most expressive language. But, besides attaching himself to abstract relations in all the departments of nature, he found in number the most suitable type of these harmonies, because it alone is universally applicable; for, under the law of multiplicity, the world in all its parts is inevitably conceived. But, again, number presented itself in preference from its being a higher reach of abstraction, and thence, apparently, more

completely mental, and thence, finally, more applicable to the ultimate laws of the universe, and to the identification of these with the mind itself of man. Geometry presupposes space; but number presupposes but the conception of any existence whatsoever more than single. Once more, the relations detected in number reveal themselves under a character more mystical (a reason hinted by Aristotle in his account of Pythagoras), as more remote from merely sensible experiences, than those of the science of space; and thence the imagination would be naturally led to attribute to these relations, and to others, yet undiscovered, powers and properties much more completely transcending the sphere of daily evidence.

The key to all the Pythagorean dogmas, then, seems to be the general formula of unity in multiplicity:—unity either evolving itself into multiplicity, or unity discovered as pervading multiplicity (which latter is answerable to what we term harmony or proportion). The principle of all things (the same principle which, in this philosophy, as in others, was customarily called Deity) is the primitive unit from which all proceeds in the according relations of the universal scheme. This primitive nature* seems sometimes spoken of as having nothing in common with the arithmetic of the world, and sometimes as being the ultimate substance of it all—a discrepancy which has given rise to much discussion, but which, perhaps, is most easily reconciled by observing a peculiarity in the notion of "1," which makes it easily applicable to either view. For it is evident that the unit may be considered at the same time as no number itself, and yet as the element of all. Thus, 1, considered by itself, is assuredly no number in the same sense in which 2 is;—a fact evident from the admission that "1," multiplied by itself, produces no increase, and, in fact, has no proper significance; 1 + 1 (or 2) being the first abstract number—the first conception of addition. And if it be asked how the repetition of that which is no number can produce number, the answer is, that it is the repetition itself which constitutes the number; that in 1 + 1, it is not the 1 on either side of the sign which includes the essence of the number, but the sign—the plus—itself. By reflecting on this, it does not seem difficult to conceive how the Pythagoreans, with a very apt and forcible application of this arithmetical language, could perceive in the Eternal Unit that heads the numbers of the universe, at once a nature infinitely removed from all the harmonious multiplicity that surrounds him, and, at the same time, the necessary pre-requisite for its production and existence.

* [See Arist. Metaph. xii. c. 6, p. 1080a b. Bkk. Ed.]
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But though this All-creative Unit sees in the universe only the redoubled product of itself, it is not, in the fulness of its nature, contented with a mere plurality, however completely dependent on its own everlasting essence as foundation. And this gives rise to the second aspect under which I said that the school of proportion contemplated the world:—one which I conceive to be altogether separable from the former. When, uttering itself abroad, the Eternal "One" became many, it willed not—the very nature of the generation forbid—that a total divorce should for ever exist between the created and the Creator. And yet, if they be sundered with a discrepancy of nature so total as exists between plurality and unity, it seems internally impossible that they can ever be connected. But this is not so. Into the sensible world of multitude the all-pervading Unity has infused his own ineffable nature; he has impressed his image upon that world which is to represent him in the sphere of sense and man. What, then, is that which is at once single and multiple, identical and diversified,—which we perceive as the combination of a thousand elements, yet as the expression of a single spirit,—which is a chaos to the sense, a κόσμος to the reason? What is it but harmony—proportion—the one governing the many, the many lost in the one? The world is, therefore, a harmony in innumerable degrees, from the most complicated to the most simple; it is now a Triad, combining the Monad and the Duid, and partaking of both; now a Tetrad, the form of perfection; now a Decad, which, in combining the four former, involves in its mystic nature all the possible accordances of the universe.

I do not wish you to consider that for every one of the foregoing propositions I have any decisive text; I have endeavoured, combining fragments of tradition, to present a general sketch of the line of march by which the Pythagoreans appear to me to have moved; and if it differs from the accounts of others on the one hand, you are at perfect liberty to differ from it on the other. There are certain special interpretations of the Pythagorean numbers, to which, as I conceive them altogether conjectural, I think it unnecessary to direct your attention:—such as those which pronounce the Monad to be God, the Duid matter, the Triad the complex world. I think it likely that such applications may in detail have been made by Pythagoras: once on the highway of a priori theory he could scarcely

have remained in the region of pure abstraction; and we
know, from his astronomical speculations, that he did not.
For our own instruction, however, I think it more profitable
to attempt harmonizing the general principles, which are
always curious, and often true, than to follow them into
applications, of which the record is uncertain and the bene-
fit inconsiderable.

When, once more descending from these lofty calcula-
tions, Pythagoras sought to apply them to his practical
philosophy, he looked for a medium of connexion. He
found it (where few would have expected) in the theory and
practice of Music. This study possesses the advantage of
being at once a subject of profound mathematical calcula-
tion, and an art productive of the most powerful results on
the affections. It linked the mathematical and the moral:
and it linked them the more closely that in every case of
mental impression the pleasurable result was found myster-
iously to correspond with fixed arithmetical proportions.
It may easily be imagined how this connexion (which, even
in the present advanced state of physical science has at-
tracted so much unavailing curiosity) impressed and charmed
the mind of a philosopher in the search for mystic relations
between the soul of man and the sensible world. In his
mind a single principle was essentially diffusive, and rea-
ppeared in every sphere of thought. Accordingly, having
once discovered (for the discovery itself is attributed to
him) that the changes of sound were indissolubly connected
with changes of length and tension, he reversed the pro-
position, and asserted that sound—that which is essen-
tially "harmony"—perpetually waited on proportion; and that,
as the heavens themselves were ordered in consonance with
number, they must move amid their own eternal harmony,
—a harmony to which the soul of man, from familiarity,
through all its series of past transmigrations, (for this was
the solution of the difficulty,) had become deaf and irre-
sponsive. Indeed this was but one instance (though, per-
haps, the most prominent one) of the tendency which the
Pythagoreans had, as, on the one hand, to finding propor-
tions in the world of sense, so, on the other, to finding the
world of sense in their proportions. As sound was made
to accompany the harmonious march of the heavens, so
light and fire were exalted to the throne of the elemental
world; and, as that throne, in consistence with the laws of
geometrical precedence, must be the centre of a perfect,
and therefore circular, motion, the great depository of light

* [Pythagoras ad harmoniam canere mundum existimat. Cicero, de Nat.
D. iii. 11, 27. Ed.]
and heat—the sun—must occupy the centre of the universe, and the planets, in circular orbits, at musical intervals, describe their measured revolutions around him: while (so determined was Pythagoras to construct the world upon his preconceptions of numerical fitness) a tenth body, to us invisible,—the Antichthon—exists to consummate the mysterious Decad, which Pythagoras’s astronomical knowledge did not allow him otherwise to complete.

The Pythagorean views of the soul of man were deeply modified by their physical, and, still more, by their moral tenets. The soul was a moving number; that is, as we may suppose, a self-moving monad, the copy (as we have seen) of that infinite monad which unfolds from its own incomprehensible essence all the relations of the universe. In its physical constitution it was termed fire, exactly as the Deity was also frequently described. It was intellectual and passionate, νοῦς and θυμός,—the former portion sempiterna, as being, indeed, but a ray of the Eternal Fire; and Pythagoras encouraged every form of divination and magic by that connexion which seems almost invariable.

9 [Something to this effect is found in Pseudo-Origen, Conf. Hares. vi. 28: θεν ο Πυθαγόρειος λόγος των μέγας γεωμετρίας και αριθμητικής ήλιον...ἔστησε τον οίκον τοῦ Μήπου...ἐν δια τῷ κόσμῳ κατάστασιν τοῖς σώμασι πνεύμα, καὶ φέρειν ὁ Πλάτων. This is probably a pseudo-Pythagoreanism, the genuine doctrine being that the “fire in the centre” is quite distinct from the sun; οἱ τοῦ μέγους πύρ είναι φασιν, Arist. de Caelo, ii. 13. Φιλόλαος πύρ εν μέγω περι τῷ κέστρον, Stob. Ecl. i. p. 488. This fire they symbolically called the “Watch-tower of Zeus” (Δίων φυλακῇ, πυρὸς, οἶκος), and the “Hearth-altar of the universe” (ἑστία τοῦ παντός). (Hence probably is to be explained Plat. Phaidr. p. 247: Μένει γὰρ Ἑστία ἐν "θεῷ οἴχα μόνῃ." Ten bodies revolve round this fiery centre: the Heaven, or firmament of fixed stars, the (five) planets, the Sun and Moon, the Earth, and her counterpart the Antichthon. (Stob. ibid. quoting Philolaus, on which fragments, however, consult by means Bywater, ibi supra, p. 37.) Ed.

10 [Aristotle’s criticism of this Pythagorean fancy is worth translating; “Further,” he says, “they construct a second Earth, (opposite to this of ours,) which they call the Antichthon. Thus, instead of seeking out reasons and causes which shall agree with the phenomena, they prefer to force the phenomena into accordance with certain reasonings and notions of their own.” Ed.]

11 [Αἰσθάνεται ψυχήν κυνώμα, Pseudo-Plutarch, de Placitis Phil. iv. 2; τὸ αὐτὸ κύριον, Arist. de Anima, i. 2, 7. Ed.]

12 [So Pseudo-Origen, Conf. Hares. vi. 28: πῦρ γὰρ ἐστιν ἡλιος, ψυχ. Aristotle, de Anima, i. 2, 6, relates that “certain of the Pythagoreans maintained that the motes floating in the air were soul: while others conceived that it was soul which caused their motion. The reason is, that these motes appear to move perpetually, even when the air is perfectly still.” This and other passages imply considerable diversity of views among even the genuine Pythagoreans. Ed.]

13 [The triple division of the soul into νοῦς, θυμός and φαινόν, (Diog. L. viii. 1, § 30), of which the last only is peculiar to man, is more fanciful and therefore probably more authentic than the two-fold distinction in the text, attributed by the Pseudo-Plutarch (Plac. Phil. iv. 4) to Pythagoras and Plato. See also Cicero, Tusc. Quest. iv. 5. If Plato borrowed largely from the Pythagoreans, later writers have given much that is Plato’s to Pythagoras, and this distinction among the rest. This appears clearly from Arist. Mag. Mor. i. 1, 7. Ed.]
(we have seen it universal in India) between these superstitions and the doctrine of the identity of the soul and its Deity. But in morals the legislator of Crotona found his appropriate sphere. In his usual numerical notation moral good was essentially unity, evil essentially plurality or division. In the fixed truth of mathematical essences he found the exemplar of social and personal virtue; truth was, therefore, a peculiarly Pythagorean virtue, and justice the glory of man. From these elements the Pythagorean neophytes naturally were led to the life of Cenobites; their community was secret, silent, and guarded with all the forms of a solemn initiation; and, to manifest the purity of their disinterested association, he who determined to abandon the connexion was suffered to depart, and presented with double his original contribution; but over his seat was erected a sepulchre, and his fall was honoured with all the melancholy ceremonies of a funeral rite.

On such a system as this much might be said, if time allowed us to say it. You have, of course, perceived its radical defect as an explanation of the universe; a defect which it holds in common with every physical demonstration of particular facts by the mere exercise of abstraction. It substituted reason for evidence, and imagined that the soul would find within itself the copy of all outside it. Now, as far as the universe is subject to mathematical laws, this process is unquestionably correct; and in the system of Pythagoras, as in every other hypothetical solution, some truth gave currency to much error. But in order to interpret the universe by calculation, we must first discover what the laws are whose operation, under all their conceived varieties, we are to determine by our calculus. If certain spaces, times, velocties, be given, we may fix all their diversities by the properties of number and space; but no reach of mathematical conception can determine the original elements themselves. In the system of Pythagoras, then, as in all that have ever influenced the world long, the misapplication of a great principle formed and perpetuated his error.

14 [Pseudo-Plutarch, Plac. Phil. i. 7, partially confirmed by Theophrastus, Met. 9, quoted by Ritter and Preller, § 111. ED.]
15 [These particulars are taken from Iamblichus, V. P. xvii. al., and are to be received with caution. Very early writers, however, testify to the existence of an ascetic rule of life in the Pythagorean societies, as Herod. ii. 61, who identifies the Pythagorean with the Orphic discipline. The Pythagorean Life (τρεχον διόλου) is referred to by Plato, Rep. x. p. 600. The Orphic, ibid. ii. p. 364; and Legg. vii. 782, C. See Grote, H. G. iv. c. 37. According to Aristotle, as quoted by Plutarch (ap. Gallium, i, 11) the Pythagoreans did not abstain from animal food, but only from specified parts of animals, μυς καὶ καψίς καὶ θάλασσα καὶ τοιούτων ἄλλων, χρησιμοὶ δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις. Fragn. Aristotelis, ed. Bkq. T. v. frag. 189, also frag. 190 ibid. ED.]
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In the later Pythagoreans the system appears to have undergone considerable change. Timeus (whose fragment, whether authentic or not, contains some of the noblest passages of human composition) smiles at the metemyphosis, and deliberately declares it, and similar theories, to have been falsehoods justifiable upon grounds of public expediency.  

Nearly at the same αera with Pythagoras a travelling sage arrived in Italy from Ionia. He brought with him his Ionian tendencies, and in Italy amalgamated them with Pythagorean views. This distinguished person was Xenophanes of Colophon, the founder of the celebrated school of Elea—a school whose interesting character, as well as deep obscurity, makes me regret that I can afford to it upon this occasion so few moments. For this, as well as other deficiencies, I must throw myself upon the possibilities of the future; as I should, indeed, regret to think that circumstances should prevent me supplying you on some future occasion with details less unworthy of subjects so deeply interesting to every one who feels that, in studying the reason of others, he pursues one main path to the knowledge of his own.

As the Ionics had studied external varieties, so the Pythagoreans had studied mental harmonies, until they saw nothing else in the universe; and as the Pythagoreans externalized mental harmonies, so the Eleatics (under four eminent leaders, Xenophanes, Parmenides, Zeno, and Melissus,) externalized the conclusions of the pure reason compared with the Ionics and Pythagoreans.

Its passage through Ontology to Dialectic.

36 [See Tim. Locr. 104, D. This passage is itself an indication of the spuriousness of the treatise referred to, which is surely overpraised by Prof. Butler in the text. See above, note (1). The theory of convenient falsehoods” would not unnaturally commend itself to “Timeus Locrus.” Would that he were not indebted for it to Plato! in whom it is unhappily to be found, though in a less “developed” form. (Rep. V. p. 489.)

I may remark in passing, that an anonymous biographer of Plato represents the philosopher as having purchased the treatise of Timeus Locrus from the Pythagoreans. This statement however confounds Timeus with Philolaus. Ed.]

37 [The best recent works on the Eleatic philosophy are, Karsten’s Fragments of Xenophanes and Parmenides, Amsterdam, 1830-35; Mullich’s edition of Aristote de Melisso, Xenophone, &c., Berlin, 1835; Stallbaume’s larger edition of the Parmenides, Leipzig, 1839; and Brandis’s articles, Xenophanes, Parmenides, Zeno, Melissus, in the Dictionary of Biography. Brandis had paved the way to a more complete knowledge of this very Greek school of speculation in his Commentationes Eleaticae, published at Altona in 1873, and had been followed by M. Victor Cousin, in the essays on Xenophanes and Zeno, republished in the Nouveaux Fragments Philosophiques. Mullich’s text of Xenophanes and Parmenides appears to me to be an improvement on Karsten’s, who, again, had much surpassed preceding editors. The statements in the text agree with Ritter’s, whom Professor Butler evidently consulted. Ed.]
itself\textsuperscript{18}, and thus may be said to have formally created the metaphysical system of the universe. It is to be observed, that, as the Eleatic philosophers advanced, they appear to have become more and more purely dialectical, until in Zeno the system became almost wholly a logical system; so that they seem to have travelled through ontology into logic—a singular and important fact.

To those who investigate by the mere exercise of reflection the relations of the external world, one main distinction will perpetually present itself. Some of these relations are both single and multiple (as those of arithmetic and geometry); others are in their very essence single (a substance, absoluteness, identity). The former constituted the Pythagorean field of contemplation; the latter, the Eleatic: the one assumed the world, and would harmonize its variety; the other assumed reason, and denied the possibility of real variety. Hence the great maxim of the Eleatic sect, τά πάντα ἐν\textsuperscript{19}. The very tendency of the Pythagorean school was obviously to depreciate the sensible, a principle which pervades all their fragments; and the next step in the march of system was to negative the reality of the sensible altogether, and to declare that reality belongs only to essences—that all essences are \textit{One}. Xenophanes was the Spinoza to whom Pythagoras was the Descartes. Not content with any form of the Dualistic system of the universe, and almost as little with the Emanative, he boldly declared that in the system of things there is truly no plurality; all that so appears being merely presented under a peculiar æsthetic or sensible law\textsuperscript{20}. God (for thus does philosophy adopt this name to

\textsuperscript{18} [Parmenides professed this, as in the remarkable \textit{dictum}, τά αὐτά νοεῖν τα καλά έναι. (Idem est Cognitare atque Essere.) Frag. ν. 40. So ν. 93:

τοιούτῃ ἐντα τοιούτῳ τα καλά ἐντα ἐντα νόμῳ,

οὐ γὰρ ἄνευ τοῦ κοσμοῦ, ἐν δὲ νεφαρσομένῳ διὸν,

εὑρήσει τα νοεῖν.]

\textsuperscript{19} [Thought, and that for which Thought exists, are one: for thou wilt not find Thought apart from Being, wherein Thought is affirmed. ] The reader will be reminded of the Cartesian "Cogito, ergo sum," of which Parmenides seems to assert the converse. To have become conscious of the antithesis implies a considerable reach of speculative ability, justifying the \textit{θεωρητοὺς βίους} attributed to this philosopher by Plato. Ed.]  

\textsuperscript{20} [Plat. \textit{Sophist}, p. 242: το έδ χαδο ἑνω Ελεατικόν θεὸν ἀνεί Χενοφάνους τα καλά έν τοιούτῳ ἐντανώς, ὡς έν τοιούτω τοιούτῳ καλομένῳ, οἵτω διάφησιν τοιούτω μοίνου. The words έδ χαδο have puzzled interpreters. Brandt supposes them to refer to the Pythagoreans, who however were hardly so early as Xenophanes. It is Plato’s habit to trace the early systems to a mythical or poetical origin: as in \textit{Theat.} p. 154, where he affects to father the Heraclitean doctrines on Homer, or "yet more ancient authors." Comp. \textit{Phileb.} p. 30. The greater number of such passages are, in my opinion, mere banter. See however Karsten, \textit{de Xenophanis Philosophia}, p. 93, note (4). Ed.]

\textsuperscript{20} [It seems to me probable that in asserting the Unity of God, Xenophanes did not find himself compelled to deny the existence of a Plurality. If we may]
consecrate its conclusions) is the one sole Being of the universe; and all which manifests itself within the sphere of sense is merely the illusive representation of a phenomenal world, which to experience seems diversified, but trust the unfavourable and, as some think, unfair critique on Xenophanes in the treatise De Melisse, Xenophane et Gorgia, written by Aristotle, or, as Mullah with great probability suggests, by an epitomator of a lost treatise of Aristotle, the Deity of Xenophanes was carefully distinguished from the outward universe (ῥα τολάδα) on the one hand, and from the Non Ens on the other. (See c. 3, 1, 10, ed. Mullah.) It was Parmenides who, in order to complete the reasonings of his master, first perceived or imagined the necessity of identifying Plurality with the Non Ens: in other words, of denying reality to the outward, phenomenal world. If this view is correct, there seems no ground for qualifying the theology of Xenophanes with the epithet "pantheistic." For though the term pantheism be sufficiently vague to include theories approximating, on the one hand, to Atheistic materialism, on the other scarcely distinguishable from the purest Theism; it can hardly be made to comprehend a doctrine which assigns to the Divinity moral as well as intellectual supremacy, which acknowledges an outward universe distinct from Him, and which represents Him as causing the changes in that universe by the acts of an intelligent volition. All these characteristics, it appears to me, are found to meet in the simple but sublime description of God with which the father of the Eleatic school commenced his philosophic poem: "There is one God, among gods and men the greatest: unlike to mortals in outward shape, unlike in mind and thought." * He has no parts, no organs as they have (comp. Arist. l. l. 677, 31) being "all sight, all ear, all intelligence" (οὐλος ὁρανί οὐλος δε νοει, οὐλος δε τ' ἀνώει); "wholly exempt from toil, he sways all things by thought and will" (τοιον ενπο ματα σεβαστει) "exempt too from motion, he abides ever in one place (ἐν τοιοί) for it befits Him to wander hither and thither in space." The epithet κρασιστος, which does not occur in the remaining fragments, we learn from the author of the treatise, was applied to the Deity by Xenophanes, and in the sense of "exceedent as well as all-powerful" (τοιον δυνατοσι καὶ μανησιοσ λέγων). This lofty, however imperfect, Monotheism is placed by its author in glaring contrast with the anthropomorphic fancies of the popular religion, which he lashes with a force of sarcasm entitling him to a high place among ethical-satirical poets. We are further informed by the author of the treatise, that the god of Xenophanes was described as "uncrueled," or more properly "uncrucified" (ἀγνοροσ). This attribute, necessary in order to distinguish the Deity from the world (ῥα κομωματα), was supported by arguments which, though rejected by Xenophanes only in relation to the divine nature (τοιον λέγον τοιοι τοιοι) do virtually prove more than it seems to have designed to prove; striking, in effect, at the root of all phenomenal reality. This inference, which escaped the ψυχοι (Metaph. l. 5) of Xenophanes, did not elude the acuteness of his pupil and successor, who, accordingly, scruples not to denude the God of Xenophanes, styled henceforth the One, of all attributes but bare existence, and to deny even that to the phenomenal universe, or the Many. We cannot wonder that the great logical coherence—we may add, the paradoxical character—of the system of Parmenides drew upon it the eyes of antiquity; and diverted them from the speculations of the simpler but more devout Xenophanes. Nor is it unnatural to suppose that the utterances of the master would be construed in accordance with the principles of his scholar; the vague by the more definite, the simpler by the more finished and elaborate theory. Accordingly we find that Xenophanes has obtained credit for much that is the exclusive property of Parmenides and Zeno: in particular, for identifying God with the universe, and for denying "plurality."

To support this view fully would exceed the limits of a note, already perhaps too long. I shall therefore only add, that the opinion is founded on a comparison of the remaining fragments of Xenophanes with the testimony of Aristotle (which I have been careful to discriminate from his criticisms), and that I cannot find it inconsistent either with the language of Plato, that the
which reason cannot possibly admit to be other than one unchanged and unchangeable nature. In truth, the very notion of change involves contradiction; for whether the second member of the alteration be like, or unlike the first, it may be irresistibly shown that there is no adequate cause for a true and genuine change. The "God" of Xenophanes becomes (as has well been noted) in Parmenides purely metaphysical "existence." This philosopher (whose system was expressed in spirited and effective verse) brought the doctrines of the school into a shape more precise and comprehensive, by clearly distinguishing the double worlds of sense and of reason,—views which in Plato were heightened and completed; and with which you may compare the farther extension of the principle in the philosophy of the once-celebrated Campanella, who establishes five separate worlds—(situational, material, mathematical, mental, and archetypal). By this time the Eleatic philosophers had learned almost wholly to discard every conclusion derivable from experience. Melissus completed the system by denying space itself, with all its appendages; and Zeno of Elea was its apostle and warrior through the cities of

Eleatic Unitarianism "originated with Xenophanes, nay, earlier still" (Soph. p. 243), or with the statements (again distinguished from the inferences) of Aristotle in the well-known and important passage in the fifth chapter of the first book of his *Metaphysics*. That it is necessary to draw this distinction between what Aristotle records, and what he infers from the writings or sayings of the earlier thinkers, will be conceded, I apprehend, by most persons conversant with these subjects; and if it were doubted, might be proved ex abundante from instances in the little treatise already so often referred to; as, particularly, from that singular instance of bad faith, the pretense that because Xenophanes uses the term "spherelike," the God, of whom it is the (evidently metaphorical) epithet, must needs have been "corporal"—an inference, by the way, at variance with Aristotle's own express testimony in the passage quoted from the *Metaphysics*; and, if true, fatal to those who would identify the theory of Parmenides (who uses the selfsame epithet evidently in a nonmaterial sense) with that of his predecessor. I have said nothing in this place, of the account of Xenophanes given by Simplicius, because I believe it, as well as the passage in Cicero's *Academics*, II. 37, 118, to have been taken, meditatively or immediately, from the Aristotelian treatise. *Ed.*

21 [This distinction of "worlds" is Platonic, not Eleatic. For the Eleatic formula ἐν τῷ πάντω forbids any such dualism: as the counter-formula of the Platonists (ἐν τῷ πολλῷ) implies it. The "world of sense" was to Parmenides and Zeno the *Non Ens*, a mere blank negation; in Plato it is a real world, because ὅσα μετέχω, and therefore cognizable by reason, whose office it is to find the One in the Many (Law in Phenomena). It is true that in the latter half of his poem Parmenides indulged in some exceedingly vague cosmical speculations; but he takes especial (one would have thought unnecessary) pains to warn his hearers that these are mere flights of fancy, without any ground in truth and reason. Some physical notions are also attributed to Zeno by Diogenes Laertius, who possibly confounds him with Melissus. For a concise but luminous exposition of Eleatic doctrine see Zeller's *Philosophie d. Griechen*, I. p. 366, and ed. *Ed.*]

Greece. The paradoxes of Zeno are well known: their scope and purpose is not so generally apprehended. It has of late been very clearly developed by the German critics. The advocates of a sensible world, and those of a purely rational world, had at length come to public discussion,—in Athens especially, which was now rapidly becoming the “eye of Greece,” after having been so long its protecting arm. The zealous republican Zeno (who is said to have been himself a martyr to a high spirit of liberty), carrying his independent spirit into logical encounter, undertook to prove, that, for every paradox imputed to the rationalists, a score could be objected to the theory of a real sensible world. Hence his arguments against motion (whose reality, as that of all change, was strenuously denied by the whole Eclectic school); and, still more, his arguments to prove the impossibility of a sensible unity. As the Pluralists held that unity was absurd, he determined to show that Pluralism was absurd; and, for this purpose, the Palamedes of Elea (as Plato terms him 22) was incidentally led to deeper and more systematic views of the nature and distributions of dialectical science. It is from his “Art of Logic”11, composed with this view, and publicly taught by the author, that to Zeno of Elea has been ascribed the high honour of its invention. Into this subject I have not now time to enter; but I have sufficiently accomplished my purpose if I have exhibited to you that the bold logician of Elea was no vender of idle subtleties (as we are in the habit of terming him), but, on the contrary, the active and consistent defender of a vast and profound system of the universe in relation to man—a system since revived in many forms, and on whose true merits and conciliation with other truths, the philosophical

22 [In the Phaedrus, p. 261. Palamedes was a great inventive genius, the “sophist” of the heroic ages. Another locus classicus concerning Zeno exists in Plato's Parmenides, p. 138, where his philosophical relation to his master is set forth. Cousin infers from the less respectful tone adopted in the Phaedrus, that Plato was ill acquainted with Zeno's works when he composed the latter dialogue (Frag. Phil. p. 170). But the sophisms of which Zeno was the parent quite justify the epithet in the Phaedrus (τὸν Ἐλεατέων Παλαμήδα). En.]

24 [Zeno was the first, or one of the first, who wrote philosophical dialogues (Diog. L. iii. 47), which bore, perhaps, a rude resemblance to the purely dialectical portions of the Platonic dialogues. Diogenes further styles him “the inventor of dialectic.” This he may have been, if we understand by dialectic the method of question and answer. But no work of Zeno's is mentioned under the title, “Art of Logic,” as Professor Butler says, if I understand him rightly, in the text. Such a work must have comprised a theory of reasoning, a matter beyond the reach of any pre-Socratic school. The best, if not the only, single treatise on this philosopher is M. Cousin's Zénon d'Elle, already referred to in note (17). It has however too much the character of an éloge. The life of Zeno in the Dictionary of Biography is from the pen of the late Prof. Brandis. En.]
ON THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

world is, I fear, as discordant in this day as it was in the
days of Xenophanes or Zeno.

We have now briefly sketched the progress of this
remarkable school; that is, we have at least seen that
their object was to demonstrate the absolute unity of the
universe, and to establish that all variety was, in truth,
only the apparent diversity under which it is given to
the perishable senses to contemplate it. Among their merits
it must not be forgotten that they inspired notions more
abstract and exalted regarding the Supreme Author of all;
and it is remarkable that the Eleatics were led to employ
the a priori arguments for the existence and attributes of
God (very similar to those of Clarke and others) at the
very time that Anaxagoras was bringing to light the
teleologic one. And so it has ever since been. The Su-
preme Author of reason levies his tribute justly from every
part of our nature, and in all its principles obliges us
equally to recognize his own image and superscription.
It is, perhaps, happy for us that we are not wholly de-
dependent upon such proofs, but, even among our higher
privileges, it is surely interesting and useful to observe
what man has done when unpossessed of them, and a happy
task to return thanks to Providence that, while leaving
us in light, he never left the world altogether in darkness.

The speculations of the Eleatic school were resumed
and continued subsequently to the age of Socrates in the
school of Megara (as it was termed—from the city in which
it was established—the birth-place also of its principal
founder, Euclides). The dialectical tendencies of the Ele-
atics were here carried to their utmost development; and
new subjects for the subtleties of distinction and definition
afforded in those ethical discussions, which the teaching of
Socrates had now made popular. This Eristic school, how-
ever,—for such was the title which its disputatious
habits obtained for it—was still, through all its departments,
manifestly tinged by a strong Parmenidean infusion; and
the principle of Unity was the directive light by which it
endeavoured to guide its course through every successive
region of research. The universe was still one eternal
nature; evil was not permitted to exist, as breaking the
mighty singleness of the uniform whole; and as good alone
was real and invariable, so all that was invariable and real
was of the nature of good, ἐν τὸ ἄγαθον. And as the deduc-
tions of the pure reason, pursuing a single immutable
course, tend to the One and the Unchangeable, the Me-
egarics were led to contemn the value, and even deny the
cogency, of all analogical habits of conclusion; while, in
the field of practical morality, that which was the same-
ness of unity to the reason became the quiescence of apathy to the conduct or affections; and Stilpo, the chief teacher of practical philosophy among the Megaric succession, declared that the prime felicity of wisdom consisted in total impassibility...But I am anticipating the period which belongs to a future Lecture in my desire to present to you, as much as possible, the complete development of each leading idea.

To the revolution effected by the teaching and authority of Socrates, with its immediate antecedents and consequences, we will pass at our next meeting.
LECTURE VII.

GENTLEMEN,

HAVING followed with a hurried, but, I trust, not altogether an unfaithful, step, the principal lines on which the Grecian philosophic reason travelled during its first period, we are at length obliged to pause where it pauses. As long as truth is sincerely held in view, the very errors of infant philosophy command respect for their motive, and insinuate admonition in their consequences; they are so many experiences in the youth of science, on which its advanced age has already grown wise, and may, perhaps, still afford to grow wiser; if they betray the weakness, they are also invested with the attractive simplicity of childhood; but as soon as the attainment of truth is degraded into a secondary or incidental end, and the importance of the prize is forgotten in the dexterity of the contest, philosophy not merely cannot be said to have forfeited our respect, but even cannot truly be considered to exist. To such a crisis as this we have now arrived. I am bound to notice its causes: they demand, and will reward, your attention. The materials for the history of this transition-period are not scanty, but they are scattered; they are to be sought in every department of the civil and political, as well as literary, history of the time; for the entire character of the Athenian mind, in the age of Pericles, is revealed in the career and the influence of the Sophists.

What is sophistry? It is the *mimicry of wisdom*—the *form and attire*, without the substance and body, of well-ordered reason. If then you would seek the causes which

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1 [So Aristotle, *Soph. Elench. c. 2*, who adds, "the sophist is one who *trades* in this unreal wisdom." Compare Cicero, *Acad. ii. 23*: "Sophistes... qui ostentationis aut questus causa philosophantur." The mercenary or self-seeking character, and the absence of scientific method and scientific earnestness, are features which enter into all the portraits of the "sophist," as drawn by the philosophers. See the passages collected in the *Cambridge Journal of Philology*, No. II. "On the Sophists." A significant definition is also that of Philostratus, and the more remarkable as proceeding from an admirer: "The ancient Sophistic may be regarded as a philosophizing Rhetoric." Of the Sophists known to us, some, as Gorgias, have more of the rhetorical, while Protagoras and others shew more of the philosophic element. The vulgar applied the term indiscriminately to all men of science or letters except the poets:
fostered the growth of this evil, you must seek what motives those were which impelled the teachers of philosophy to prefer the form of wisdom to its reality, or to the search for its reality, and their auditors to countenance or flatter the deceit.

Now, to begin with a principle of the highest generality, its causes. It is, I am persuaded, not fanciful to observe, that in the Grecian intellect there was in all the regions of thought a tendency to dwell upon the form in preference to the internal reality of objects. This is, in fact, the genius of art expressed in its ultimate formula. In religion, the Greek delighted in the temple and the procession more than in the god; in poetry, his joys, his sorrows, his meditations, were moulded in a form essentially picturesque,—such as the eye could contemplate; in the ideal beauty of statuary, his taste inclined to precision of outline even more than to depth of expression; in history (notwithstanding Thucydides, the recency of whose subject necessitated accuracy), he inclined to the perfection of style more than the perfection of veracity; in national policy, wealth and power themselves were scarcely valued in comparison to that floating phantom of "glory" which is their shadow! But it is superfluous to follow the application minutely. It is well known that in other departments of intellectual exertion, subsequent ages have robbed Greece of her supremacy; that in the arts of form—in the perfection of external beauty—she has never been surpassed. To investigate the causes of this remarkable phenomenon is not within my present sphere,—I have but to state and apply it. In such a disposition, then, of the national mind, with so peculiar, predominant, and pervading a genius, it seems fair to conclude, that there must have existed a perpetual tendency to transmute science itself into an art of design, a tendency whose constant and powerful activity could only be resisted by efforts of extraordinary firmness on the part of its cultivators. Now the sophists were the artists of philosophy. They made of the simple and natural process of philosophical discussion a series of practical manœuvres; and taught men to construct by rule and compass disquisitions upon the good and the true, as they had been taught to build a temple, or chisel a statue, or design a picture.

*generally, however, as a term of reproach. The entire question is too intricate to be satisfactorily dealt with in a note: but the testimonies accumulated by the author of the article referred to, will at least revive the memory of that distinction between "Sophist" and "Philosopher," which the most brilliant of modern historians is thought by many to have succeeded in obliterating. Ed.*
We saw, in a former Lecture, how important were those advantages which Greece had contributed to the development of thought in the perfect publicity of her institutions; we must not now close our eyes to the same fact as a source of its errors and extravagances. As publicity had fostered philosophy, so publicity aided to destroy it; as it had cleared the path and encouraged the race of speculation, so it now beguiled speculation into the oblique and tortuous by-ways of verbal subtlety and dialectical display. The anticipation of general sympathy which at first had fortified (as a powerful and legitimate corroborative) the young energies of Grecian thought, at length usurped the whole mind, and became its only adequate motive for exertion; and men who mainly sought to please the public taste could rise no higher than the public taste permitted. Now, as we just observed, the cordial sympathies of the Athenian public (for it is in Athens that philosophy has now established her seat) never penetrated with undiminished intensity from the form to the substance of reason; and the professors of wisdom who would attract such a people should possess the skill of rhetoricians and the promptitude of oral logic, quite as much as the depth, perseverance, and sincerity, of genuine science. They should be able to confute rather than to convince, and at least as deeply skilled in seeming as in being wise. Nay, upon the principle before laid down, it is scarcely extravagant to say that the Athenian listener preferred (not merely the semblance without the reality, to the reality without the semblance of reason—but even preferred) the semblance without, to the semblance with the reality of truth. The brilliant falsehood, which defied, or seemed to defy, logical detection, was the very triumph of form and colour over weight and solidity; it was eminently the creation of art and of the mind, it was to reason what the work of Apelles or Zeuxis might be to nature—the very perfection of imitation.

The transition into this unfortunate stage of the Greek philosophy was accelerated by a fact to which it requires some abstraction from present circumstances to assign its adequate amount of influence,—I allude to the want of an engine of diffusion corresponding to our art of printing. The absence of such a mode of publication, forcing the teachers of science almost altogether upon oral delivery in their solicitude for fame, inevitably perverted them into orators. He who sought public distinction (the perpetual passion of an Athenian) looked for it principally in the number and rank of his immediate disciples and auditors;
and his style and topics of discussion were necessarily regulated by his anxiety to augment them.

But besides these distracting influences, so fatal to the serene sincerity of philosophical inquiry, we shall discover another in the new position in which philosophy at this time finds her ministers in Greece. Wisdom was now sold for money—a circumstance almost equally injurious to the buyers, to the sellers, and to the commodity in exchange. The inferior ranks of the Athenian youth might be contented with inferior masters; but the young men who held the great offices of the state in prospect, sought from the most accomplished minds in Greece the knowledge of nature, of man, of his passions, and, above all, of the means of swaying them. Eloquence was the engine of ambition; to eloquence, then, and to truth only so far as it is subservient to eloquence, the pupil, and therefore the master, solicitously and almost exclusively applied himself. To the morality of the rhetorician right and wrong are only indirectly important; right and wrong became, therefore, of inferior moment; the object to the “artificer of persuasion” was not self-conviction, but social influence, and, consequently, the object of a philosophy governed by such motives, must be the discovery of those weaknesses, and those plausibilities on every side of every question, which may enable the student, at the shortest notice, to advocate or oppose any proposition whatever. The genius of professional sophistry, is, therefore, essentially sceptical; and, in point of fact, the leading names among the sophists of the Socratic age are enrolled likewise among the philosophers of scepticism.

This view presents the Athenian sophists under a darker aspect. But, unhappily, it is only too characteristic of the entire condition of Athenian society at the period in question. The Athenian mind had, for two centuries, been passing under a course of education in which the powers of taste—the perception of the beautiful—had been refined to a degree almost inconceivable to a people of less practised sensibility. It had, to the cultivated class—of which alone I now speak—become their religion, or the garment which alone made their religion of interest; and everything which could minister to this emotion was welcomed in proportion to its efficacy. Along with painters, and statuaries, and architects, and minstrels, came the sage with his portraits of the beauty of virtue, and the order of the world; and he had his place with the rest, and for the same reason. But as he had no claim to attention when his power of charming the imagination was past, he, too, had to give way when rival
magicians in speculation appeared who could artfully fascinate the soul with a still more pleasing terror, who could invest with a certain dark and stern beauty the fiends of disorder and dismay; could call the world a lovely chance, and human life a dream, and preach that it was the whole cannon of its duty, the whole perfection of its virtue, to recline, crowned with flowers, and hear the songs of Anacreon. Such a system has a double aspect; its gayer side will, assuredly, be popular,—its gloomier pictures perhaps even more so. I know not whether you will fully enter into the thought when I observe, that, in the excess of luxurious refinement, there appears to be, in the more sensitive order of minds, a singular tendency to melancholy: more especially to the melancholy of unbelief;—a feeling transient, it may be, but often recurring, which can thoroughly sympathize, from the midst of its satiety of enjoyment, with those gloomy teachers who deplore the nothingness of life, and which, forced to recall how visionary is all which once promised to be happiness, cannot bear to think that there is any happiness in promise which is not a vision also.

In such a state of society—alternately careless in luxury and ambitious in effort—it is not difficult to conceive what success might attend an active and eloquent disputant, who, as Protagoras of Abdera, equally suited all its tendencies, by declaring that there is no criterion whatever of truth, that "man is himself the measure of all," and that, consequently, the reality of things was as manifold as the variations of human feelings,—a principle which it seems he fearlessly applied to even the existence of the

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Protagoras, born B.C. 490, perhaps; died B.C. 420, probably.

His maxim, "Man the measure of all."

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[II would fain have expunged this passage, had it been possible to do so without deranging the context. It probably would not have survived its author's revisionary criticism. As a description of the Sophists and their disciples it is thoroughly inappropriate. The effeminate Epicureanism indicated by it was the vice, as the "songs of Anacreon" were the production of a later age. The strains of the true Anacreon are not those of a voluptuous trifler; nor were the lusts to which the Sophists were accused of pandering those of the senses. Ed.]

[See Plato's Theaetetus. It is difficult to determine how much of the acute argumentation and subtle mental analysis to be found in this dialogue existed in the work of Protagoras which it professes to review. But until this point is settled, it is impossible to measure aright the speculative powers of the greatest of the Sophists. The practical tendency of the dogma, that "the Individual" (for that and that only is the meaning of πάντα το ονόμα "is the measure of all things" is unmistakably immoral; but we are not entitled to assume that Protagoras consistently carried out his principle: indeed, the contrary seems to follow from the distinction he sets up in the Theaetetus, between the Good and the True, as regards their comparative cognizability. But though Protagoras may not be open to the charge of teaching immorality, it is shown by Socrates that his principle ought, in consistency, to have been extended to moral as well as metaphysical distinctions, and that it is virtually as subversive of the one as it professedly is of the other. Ed.]
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Lect. VII.

Gorgias
Born bef. 480 B.C.;
died about 380 B.C.

Diagoras
flr. about 424 B.C.

Prodicus,
date uncertain, but
died later than 399 B.C.

Prod. 399. Plat.
Apoll. 159A.

Passage of
the Protagoras
illustrative of
the estimation
in which the
Sophists
were held.

Gods, which, without honouring the problem with a definite
decision, he pronounced to be altogether doubtful; or who,
as Gorgias, though receiving (as we are told) 100 minae
for his lessons in rhetoric, taught a philosophy which upheld
the imposibility of transmitting real truth by words; or
who, as Hippias, boasted himself master of all the arts,
from the loftiest to the least; or, as Diagoras, professed
open Atheism; or, as Euthydemus, and others, declared
justice the creature of human policy, and man destitute of
every principle of obligation beyond instinct and compul
sion. Protagoras, indeed, was banished, and Prodicus
is said to have been put to death as a public corruptor
(a charge which certainly his beautiful apologue does
not corroborate); but the estimation in which these public
declamers were held is abundantly manifest from the
writings of Plato, especially the "Protagoras," in which a
most vivid and dramatic sketch is presented of the pompous
pretences of the genuine sophist of the Athenian porticoes.
For instance—to borrow a picture better than a hundred
dissertations—"Entering, we found Protagoras walking
up and down in the portico, and with him, walking on one
side, Callias, son of Hipponicus, Paralus, and Charmides;
on the other side, Xanthippus, son of Pericles, &c., and

4 [According to Eusebius, this doctrine was broached at the beginning of
Protagoras's "Treatise concerning the Gods," possibly a different work from
that Προτάγορας ὁ θεός, which, according to the same authority, Porphyry had
read. (Compare Euseb. Evang. Pref. pp. 468 and 790.) The latter is not
improbably the work reviewed in the Theaetetus, and from passages in that
dialogue it seems to have been called by its author Ἀθηναῖος, to which the
addition ἀθηναῖος may have been made subsequently. Concerning the
writings of Protagoras, see Frei's Questionis Protagoras, p. 178 seq. The
treatise "Concerning the Gods" may have been filled with speculations
resembling those of Crito, in his tragedy called Styrphus, of which a considerable
fragment is preserved. (See Wagner, Fragm. Trag. I. p. 102.) It may
be remarked in passing, that Mr Grote's attempt to justify Protagoras by the
example of Xenophanes (H. G. VIII. p. 469) leaves out of sight the important
fact, that while Xenophanes denied and ridiculed the gods of the popular Pan-
theon, he was a devout believer in one supreme Deity; a faith which can
hardly be attributed to Protagoras. Ed.]

5 [Diagoras is not usually classed with the "Sophists," nor is the state-
ment that he "openly professed Atheism" capable of proof. See Professor

6 [Perhaps Thrasymachus is intended. No such opinions are attributed, so
far as I know, to Euthydemus, of whom extremely little is known. Ed.]

7 [This incredible statement is found only in the Scholia on Plato (Rep. X.
600), and in Suidas. Prodicus was described as a corrupter of youth by Aris-
tophanes (Suid, in vit. Prod.). All that is known of this Sophist has been col-
clected by Professor Welcker in two interesting articles which first appeared
in the Rhenish Museum, 1833, and have been republished in his Kleine
Schriften, Vol. II. The reader may also consult the life of Prodicus in Smith's
Dictionary of Biography and Mythology, written by Prof. Brandis, who has
drawn largely from Welcker, correcting him, however, in some particulars.
Ed.]

8 [Recited by Socrates in Xen. Mem. II. 2. Ed.]
Antimærus of Mende, who bears the highest reputation of all the disciples of Protagoras, and is studying with a view to hereafter being a sophist himself. Others followed behind to catch what was said, seeming chiefly to be foreigners whom Protagoras brings about with him from every city through which he travels, charming them (ἐνλαύν) with his voice, as Orpheus of old, while they under the fascination follow the voice; some also of our countrymen were in the train. As I viewed the band (χορόν) I was delighted to observe with what caution they took care never to be in front of Protagoras, but whenever he turned, those who were behind, dividing on either side in a circle, fell back so as still to remain in the rear. 'Him past, I saw' (to speak in Homeric phrase) Hippias of Elis enthroned beneath the opposite portico; around whom, on benches, sat Eryximachus, son of Acumenus, Phædrus, and Andron, and others—alike Athenian and foreigners. They seemed to question Hippias concerning the sublimities of nature and the revolutions of the stars; while he, reposing upon his throne, resolved each successive difficulty. Presently I came upon Prodicus of Céos, who sat retired in a chamber, which Hipponicus had been wont to employ as his store-room; but, in order to receive the stream of gathering guests, Callias had removed the provision-stores, and resigned even that corner to their use. There Prodicus, who was not yet risen, lay cushioned among the bedclothes, and around him several—as Pausanias, Agathon, Adimantus, and others. But the subjects of their discussion I could not gather from without, though extremely anxious to hear Prodicus; for I hold him to be a man of wisdom more than human; but the perpetual reverberation of his voice—an extremely deep one—confused the words in their echoes."

And who is it, Gentlemen, that the graphic pen of Plato has here introduced to us as describing (with his own calm inimitable humour) his adventures in that Athenian mansion,—confounding the learned pride of Protagoras, and crushing his tissue of declamation in the iron grasp of close and manly reason? It is THAT MAN whom the simplest and most hurried narrative cannot approach without emotion,—that man, whom all ages have united to acknowledge as almost the ideal of humanity itself. When in the midst of these philosophic hirelings, when even in the midst of the honest conjecturers of the material world, the historian comes upon the form of Socrates—of the calm teacher and martyr of moral wisdom—though he be the dullest chronologist of facts and dates, he owns a thrill he cannot repress; and it is, perhaps, to the honour
of themselves, and of their subject, that of the philosophy of Socrates his biographers have left little definite analysis: every writer seems lost in the theme, and unconsciously to assume admiration for inquiry!

For the personal history, and the customary manners of Socrates, I need not inform you that you are to refer to Plato and to Xenophon, and to form your estimate from both. Plato was by his own contemporaries accused of "Pythagorizing" the Socratic doctrine; but the sagacious critic will, nevertheless, find unquestionable marks of genuineness in a great portion—though assuredly not in the entire—of the Platonic records. To the style and manner of the illustrious teacher they bear the manifest testimony which the representations of a consummate copyist of externals cannot fail to afford. My present object shall be to note the purposes, the influence, and more prominent articles of the actual philosophy, of this great master of practical reason.

We have seen in what condition Socrates found the philosophy of his country. The material world had been assailed by two great parties of explorers with almost equal ill-success. Many curious and valuable truths had indeed been incidentally discovered; but they lost their value in being confounded with the general chaos of conjecture; and no test existed by which they could be separated from the error that surrounded them. In the field of moral investigation the enterprizes of philosophy had been still more profitless. Ranked as little more than ancillary to rhetoric, the ethical philosophy of man was degraded into the theory of "the colours of good and evil" (to adopt a Baconian phrase), and the object of search was seldom the true, but the effective; while, among the disciples of the Italic school, it was usually absorbed in a dreamy and unpractical mysticism. Physical conjecture was, however, the philosophic passion of the time; and Socrates himself began his studies under the Ionic Archelaus in that field. In the Phaedo he alludes to his early interest in physical research, in order to illustrate his subsequent discontent with such pursuits; and in the Clouds of Aristophanes (exhibited twenty-three years before the death of Socrates) it is as a natural philosopher—the speculator in astronomy, the measurer of flea-leaps—that the moralist is introduced. Now this is highly important, as illustrating the true position of Socrates as a philosophical reformer. I have been accustomed to compare him with the oracle of the revolution of the

\[ p. 96 a. seqq. Ed. \]
seventeenth century; and, by mutual resemblances and contrasts, the results of Socrates and Bacon will illumine each other.

Let us then observe that the purposes of each were alike directed to utility, to the profitable as distinguished from the merely formal, and the practically inapplicable. This was equally the leading idea of the Athenian and the Englishman. Observe further, that neither left behind him any definite system upon specific articles of philosophy, that each rather shewed the way to think than the results of thought; and that, though to minds so energetic and creative, it was impossible not sometimes to conjecture and to theorize, yet even theories themselves were intended rather as examples of the general formula of inquiry than as individually self-supported, or as claiming attention upon their own grounds. This is obvious to all readers of the physical speculations of Bacon, who expressly declares it in the arrangement of his own writings: in the recorded conversations of Socrates it seems to me to be scarcely less exhibited. Thus every discourse exhibits the mode of inquiry and the sincerity of truth; yet scarcely a

[The Socratic Method deserves to be more precisely described. Aristotle informs us that in the sphere of general philosophy two discoveries are justly attributed to Socrates, the inductive mode of inquiry, and the practice of seeking general definitions, τῶν τε ἐπιστημών λόγων καὶ τὸ ἄρσεναν καθότως (Rhetor. xiii. 4). Of these the former was ancillary to the latter, as Bacon perceived, Nov. Org. i. 105. "At inductio, qua se inveniuntur et demonstrationes scientiarum et artium e contrario naturam separar quadam debet, per rejections et exclusiones debitas; ac deinde post negativa tot quod sufficit, super affirmativas concluere; quod non habente eactum est, nec tempus certe, nisi tantummodo a Platonis, qui ad extenuas definitiones et ideae, hac certa forma inductionis aliquidus usitavit." It might be rash to assume that the method of Socrates is faithfully represented in Plato; but the Socrates of Xenophon proceeds on the same plan, though the comparative want of precision in some of the Xenophontic conversations may lead us to suppose that Plato had improved upon his master. Against this supposition, however, may be set the testimony of Xenophon himself, iv. 5, 12: ἐπη δὲ καὶ το διάλεγοντων ἐκ τῶν συνώντων κοινη βουλήσεως, διάλεγοντας κατά γένη τα τρέχματα. Where, faulty as is the etymology, the dialectic process is described with great felicity. Elsewhere (iv. 61) we are told that Socrates was never weary of investigating τί ἐστιν τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, in other words, of seeking the right conception or definition. So Aristotle, Met. i. 3, ἐρημεῖ καὶ το ἔρημον. It is clear, therefore, that Socrates possessed, consciously to himself, an idea of scientific method, and that his repeated asseveration that he "knew nothing" was grounded on the comparison of his own attainments with that idea. See Plato, Apol. 21 d, and compare Schleiermacher "On the worth of Socrates as a philosopher" in the Philological Museum, ii. p. 599; Zeller, Philos. Grec. i. p. 50. Induction was the bridge by which Socrates led his hearers from the "common notion" to the right conception implied in a term, proceeding by the rejection and exclusion of that which was irrelevant or proper to the individual or the subordinate species, "per rejections et exclusiones debitas." See the dialogue with Euthydemos, Mem. iv. 4, where the steps in the argument are traced with a precision worthy of Plato. The two counter-processes of the dialectician, Induction and Division, are described with great elegance in the Phaedrus, 265 d. fol. Ed.]
single dialogue is found to terminate in *any direct conclusion*; a peculiarity which in fact has in all ages perplexed the expositors of Plato, but which surely could not have had place without a secret purpose. And from this peculiarity it likewise followed that each of these teachers left *no school* to wear their livery and minister to their fame; naturally, for the very object of each was to show all men how to *think for themselves*. Socrates, indeed, bequeathed his general principles of ethical philosophy to a few disciples who were content to copy and record him—as Xenophon, Æschines, Simo, Cebes, Simmias, Crito; but these lasted only for a generation, and left no living succession to champion their tenets. In these respects then we see the similarity of these two legislators of philosophy: let us now, with equal rapidity, characterize the difference. Bacon wearied of ineffective logical speculation, Socrates of ineffective physical, the former resigned in a great measure the internal world for the external, the latter, the external world for the internal. The physical theorists of the Ionia succession 11 were to Socrates precisely what the schoolmen and the imaginers of hypothetical worlds were to Bacon: and as the folly reigned in different regions, the path of the reformers lay in contrary directions, and Bacon conducted science into the world of matter, while Socrates had led her into the heart and actions of man.

To speak more specially of the features of this reformation. The merits of the indefatigable converser, who, among, the groves and public walks of Athens, fought his calm victorious way through all the hosts of sophistry in the latter half of the fifth century before Christ, were mainly these. In the first place, he recalled philosophy from eloquence and verbal subtlety by the exercise of the most singular combination of acuteness with practical good sense perhaps ever presented. As a reasoner he manifestly overmatched the sophists themselves, whom he purposely fought with their own arms, and whom, indeed, on some occasions in the dialogues of Plato he seems to copy (doubtless in order to overthrow) to a degree not altogether acceptable to a modern reader, who forgets the national predilection for these contests, which made it impossible to present truth attractively except in the form

11 [This clause stands thus in the author’s MS.: “The dreaming disciples of Pythagoras and Thales at length sunk into the puérility of sophistical disputants,” &c. This is not true of the disciples of Pythagoras, the greatest of whom were contemporary with Socrates; nor is it clear who are the “dreaming disciples of Thales” referred to. I have therefore ventured to substitute words of my own, justified by Phado, p. 96. Ed.]
of regular dialectical disputation. Again, by Socrates
the mind of Athens was, in a great measure, withdrawn from
studies, of which, without some fundamental reform, two
centuries had exemplified the hopelessness\textsuperscript{18}. Such a
reform of physical science the tastes and habits of So-
crates do not seem to have even led him to contemplate;
but even had he seen it with the prophetic eye of that
great man to whom I have already compared him, it is
doubtful whether he would not have resolutely preferred,
when he inspected the manners of his countrymen, as a
higher and holier office, the almost exclusive dissemina-
tion of the principles of moral truth, and of the way to
explore and establish them. Again, for the dogmatical
assertion of suppositions as unquestionable truths, So-
crates, with a reach of logical sagacity peculiarly his own,
taught the great principle of humble inquiry, the com-
 mencement with doubt\textsuperscript{19}.—a principle which subsequently
degenerated into a scepticism for which Socrates is not
to answer. He made doubt the first step—"scepticism"
makes it the entire process and result—of philosophy...But
among all the great maxims which the authority of So-
crates fixed and fortified in the world of speculation,
none should justly rank higher than the principle of in-
ternal meditation, as the true outset of legitimate inquiry.
I promised, as you may remember, that in the person of
Socrates would be found that transition from the external
to the internal which separates the first and second periods
of Greek philosophy. In this maxim, and its conse-
quences, we find the passage effected. For in the prin-
ciple, comprehensively considered, there is a double aspect
—intellectual and moral. Regarded morally, it declares
that the foundations of ethical science can only be laid in a
diligent investigation of the actual phenomena of the moral
constitution\textsuperscript{20}; and that if sophistical scepticism has ques-

\textsuperscript{18} [Aristotle says, "In the time of Socrates definition took the place of
inquiry into nature, which philosophers deserted in favour of moral and political
speculation; τὸ γὰρ τὰ περὶ φύσεως διηθεῖται, πρὸ δὲ τὴν μνήσιμον δράχη
καὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς ἀπόκλισιν αἱ φιλοσοφοῦσιν. De Part. Anim. i. 1, 44. Ed.]
\textsuperscript{19} [As Meil tells him: "I had heard, Socrates, that you are always doubting
and causing others to doubt; and now I find it by experience to be so;
for you have so bewitched me by your spells, that I am in a state of utter
doubt and confusion." Men. p. 86. For the moral aspect of the Socratic scepticism,
see the conclusion of the Theaetetus. Ed.]
\textsuperscript{20} But this at least was the interpretation Plato put upon the Socratic "know
thyself." But it can hardly be said that Socrates himself clearly perceived the
connection between Ethics and Psychology; at least there are no traces of such
knowledge in the Xenophontic reports, nor are his somewhat arbitrary and
superficial definitions of the virtues altogether compatible with it. See the
well-known passage in the Magna Moralia, 1. 1, where the superiority of the
Platonic to the Socratic Ethics is traced to Plato's clearer views of the constitu-
tion of man's nature. I have said elsewhere that the "self-knowledge of
tioned the existence of morality as distinct from physical enjoyment or suffering, a genuine philosophy must establish it in that region where alone it can be found,—the world of the human heart,—where, disentangled of all incidental accessories, it lives a pure and primitive formation...Regarded intellectually, it declares that in the principles of the mind of man must be sought the principles of inquiry and of advancement. And it is observable, that Socrates appears to have combined both these views into one formula when he professes to call virtue itself a "science," and yet (as he so often demonstrates) a science "that cannot be taught." Accordingly, in compliance with these masterconceptions of the position of man in regard to truth, the method of Socrates is (as he himself humorously styled it, in playful allusion to his maternal descent) essentially a "maieutic" or obstetric method: a constant effort (that is) to "deliver" minds of that secret truth which lay concealed in their own constitution; and hence, perhaps, from the practical method of his master, Plato in part derived his own theory of knowledge as "reminiscence.""

In the statement of his views and inquiries Socrates employed a peculiar vein of irony,"—partly, as I suppose, Socrates consisted in the rigorous examination of the notions of his own mind, rather than of its operations and faculties, and chiefly of those notions which relate to moral distinctions," and this I still think a substantially correct view of the matter. [Ed.]

18 ["Whether Virtue can be taught" was a question much agitated in the time of Socrates, who appears to give contradictory decisions on different occasions. Compare Plat. Meno, pp. 96, 98, with Protagoras, p. 361, in the latter of which passages he censures his own inconsistency in first denying that Virtue can be taught, and then maintaining that Virtue is Science; and the inconsistency of his opponent in affirming the first, while he rejected the second proposition. According to Xenophon, Mem. I. 2, 19, Socrates seems to have adopted the common-sense view that Virtue is partly matter of teaching, partly of practice (δισκύρη), and partly of natural disposition. But Xenophon appears unconscious of the logical difficulty of reconciling this with that identification of Virtue with Science or Wisdom which he elsewhere distinctly attributes to his master. The Cynics and Megarians who accepted this identification consistently asserted that Virtue is ἀδιάκριτον. [Ed.]

16 [Plat. Theol. p. 149. [Ed.]

17 [This doctrine is developed in the Meno, p. 81, and more fully in the Phado, p. 72. The conjecture that it was suggested by the teaching of Socrates is highly probable, but the doctrine itself is too speculative and fanciful to have found favour with Plato's master. [Ed.]

18 [Schleiermacher (Philosoph. Werke. III. 4, 9) ingeniously remarks, that "the irony of Socrates is nothing else than the co-existence in him of the idea of Knowledge, with the absence of positive acquisition; literally, the knowledge that he knew nothing." It is somewhat remarkable that the term εἰπόςvela never occurs in Xenophon. Of the thing, however, we have examples in the dialogues with Theodote, the hekera, Mem. III. 11, and in that with Euthydemeus, ib. iv. 2. The Latin equivalent to the word is dissimulatio, Cic. Acad. Qu. II. 5, 15. Its Greek antitheton is διακόπτα, vanity or self-glorification. Comp. Arist. Eth. N. IV. 13, 2. Whether Socrates really used this weapon so unspARINGLY as Plato represents is a curious question. Perhaps the fact may have lain somewhere between his representations and those of Xeno-
to evade the bigotry of the times, and partly, doubtless, to pique and irritate into self-inquisition those with whom he conversed. In many points, unquestionably, his own convictions were not settled; and by the use of this veil (which none ever interposed more dexterously) he at once gained, and gave, the benefits of discussion, and yet preserved his own doubts from inconvenient disclosure. This seems to me the true account of the famous Socratic irony...But in the course of these discussions, and of all the principal circumstances of his life, he professed to be guided by a warning voice—a δαιμων, or genius—seldom directing indeed to action, but constantly restricting from evil. Of this remarkable attribute, what shall we say? Much has indeed been written and speculated as to this singular accompaniment, which to many minds has invested with the dignity of supernatural inspiration the deeds and words of Socrates: especially when they remember that it was just about the period when the Hebrew prophets were ceasing, that this celestial light rose in another land. Without entering into the probabilities of such a supposition, I may state my own opinion;—that this restrictive voice was originally meant by Socrates himself as only the emphatic title of Conscience regarded (as his philosophy invariably taught) as the voice of God in the heart of man; but that, in all probability, as his destinies became more and more remarkable, and as he felt himself manifestly the selected instrument of moral benefit to a thoughtless and corrupt people, his own secret enthusiasm (by a process frequent among men of singular history) began at length to whisper to him that he walked under the special guidance of heaven. Harmless—let me rather say, noble and truthful—illusion! which represented as servant of truth him who surely did the work of truth, and taught to believe himself directed by heaven, him who assuredly did not walk with-

phon, who, however, would be deterred by the apologetic purpose of his principal work from giving great prominence to so unpopular a feature in his master's character. Possibly it was a quality for which he himself had no especial relish. Ed.

19 In using the terms "δαιμων, or genius," Prof. Butler appears to have fallen into an exploded error. Socrates always speaks of το δαιμων, or δαιμων το, "a divine or supernatural somewhat" ("divinum quiddam," as Cicero has it), the nature of which he does not attempt to define, and to which he never attributes distinct personality; speaking of it, now as a "sign," σημειον, Phaedr. p. 242 B, now as a φωνη, or "voice," Apol. S. p. 31 D. This voice or premonitory sign he undoubtedly referred to a divine original.” See Xen. Mem. iv. 3, 12, 13; but he nowhere indicates the particular deity from whom he believed it to emanate. According to Schleiermacher this δαιμων "denotes the province of such rapid moral judgments as cannot be referred to distinct grounds, which accordingly Socrates did not attribute to his proper self; for instance, presentiment of the issue of an undertaking; attraction and repulsion in reference to particular individuals.” Plutarch’s treatise is well
out a divine superintendence, who "did by nature the things contained in the law,"—who, an ordained minister of that natural code, "shewed" to others "the work of the law written in their hearts," and taught their "conscience to bear witness," and their "thoughts" to "accuse or excuse one another." (Rom. ii. 14, 15).

In the science of God, Socrates taught (as we know by unquestionable contemporary evidence, that of Xenophon) that the Supreme Being is the immaterial infinite Governor of all (Mem. i. 4, 17, 18), that the world bears the stamp of his intelligence, and attests it by an irrefragable evidence (Mem. i. 1, 19); and that he is the author and vindicator of all moral laws. It is undoubted that to these high and holy principles our illustrious philosopher added much subservience to occasional superstitions. Demons and divination clouded and perplexed the serene simplicity of his theology; and Socrates carried into morals and religion the spectres of old errors, exactly as Bacon (with his magic and witchcraft) polluted with them his physics. In each case alike we justly attribute the excellence to the man, the error to the time. For one maxim of practical religion Socrates has been severely, and I think unjustly, censured. He countenanced, as we are told, the adoption in each country of its customary deities. But to me, I confess, this counsel has always appeared rather to manifest the superiority than the inferiority of Socrates to the delusions of polytheism. He knew that such deities were on a level as to authority, that if worshipped at all they could have no claim beyond that local veneration which prescription had given them; and when unable, or perhaps (for he was not infallible) unwilling, to question their existence, he at least endeavoured that these subordinate agents should as little as possible intercept the view of the supreme Artist, that they should remain in their provincial governments, lest the attempt to extend

known. Its Latin title, De Genio Socratis, is simply a mistranslation of the Greek πέρι τοῦ Ἡρακλῆος δαμασκίου: and is not countenanced by any words of the author. He never speaks of a δαμασκίος, nor does Clemens Alexandrinus; who however in one passage conjectures that the δαμασκίος of Socrates may have been a familiar genius. Strum. v. p. 592. This conjecture becomes an assertion in Lactantius, Inst. D. 11. 14, who converts the daemonium into a daemon: "Et Socrates esse circa a sidum daemon loquebatur, qui puero sili adhesisset, cujus mutu et arbitrio sua vita receretur." Apuleius, it is true, had already led the way to this error in his treatise de Deo Socratis. It is adopted without scruple by Augustine and other Christian writers; and, as might have been expected, by Ficinus and the earlier moderns, as Stanley and Dacier, in whose writings the daemonium appears full fledged as an "attendant spirit" or "good angel." Brucker (II. C. P. ii. c. 2, § 9), with more affectation of criticism, falls however to point out the origin of the mistake. The classical passages bearing on this curious subject are collected and quoted at length by Kühlner in his preface to the Memorabilia, p. 18. Ed.]
the authority of any might lead to his universal recognition.

In Political Philosophy Socrates laid down the cardinal principle of Justice as the foundation of government, and the true hinge upon which the solution of social difficulties should be made to turn. The systematic resolution of all the theory of society into the elementary principles of natural law\(^{20}\) appears, so far as I can collect, to have almost wholly originated with the comprehensive mind of Socrates.

But in the sphere of personal morals, the science of life, the philosopher was eminently himself. The principles which he here established were of the most universal application, and constantly contemplated practice. But I confess I do not think it easy to condense into any systematic series of deductions the Socratic ethics; and, indeed, the fact which has always struck me as peculiarly admirable in his moral reasonings, is, their unfettered variety, and the exquisite calmness and perfect equilibrium with which he allies together all the diversity of motives. The word \textit{Sophia} includes in it all human excellence\(^{8}\), whether

\(^{20}\) [See the discussion between Hippias and Socrates recorded in Xen. \textit{Mem.} iv. c. 4, esp. § 19, fol. Other detached political precepts occur in the \textit{Memorabilia}; among the most striking of which are, (1) "Kings and rulers are neither those who hold the sceptre, nor those elected by the vulgar, or singled out by lot, nor those who owe their position to force or fraud; but those, and those only, who are acquainted with the science of Government," \textit{ib} c. 9, 10. Compare the definition of the \textit{Art regal} (βασιλεία), \textit{ib} c. 2, 11. (2) "There are five principal polities: monarchy, or the government according to the laws of willing subjects; tyranny, which is an illegal and arbitrary rule exercised against the will of the governed; aristocracy, plutocracy, and democracy" (the last being somewhat loosely defined, possibly by the fault of the narrator.) Other passages lead to the conclusion that Socrates drew the first lineaments of that Political Science which was afterwards fully developed by Plato and Aristotle. The conversation with Euthydemus (\textit{Mem.} iv. 2, 14—19) upon Justice and Injustice, which resembles the discussions in the first book of Plato’s \textit{Republic}, may be mentioned as an instance in point. \textit{Ed.}]

\(^{8}\) [The identification of Virtue with Wisdom or Science is the most characteristic feature of the Socratic Ethics. Of the four "cardinal virtues," Socrates seems to have acknowledged three: Justice, Temperance, and Fortitude or Valour. Wisdom he held to be the collective term, to which all these are subordinated. For he denied the possibility of a man’s acting counter to his judgment of that which is best, and therefore referred all vicious action to ignorance (Xen. \textit{Mem.} iii. 9, 4, 5). \textit{Sophia} or \textit{ευγνωσία} consisted, according to Socrates, in the foresight of the consequences of actions, not, as in Plato, in the apprehension of Ideas. Socrates was, consequently, a Utilitarian in Morals, maintaining that Good and Beautiful were relative terms, identical with Useful (χρήσιμος or καλός), \textit{ib} c. 8. He held, however, that of all the consequences of our actions, their effects upon our own spiritual nature are by far the most momentous, \textit{ib} i. 6, 9; iv. 3, 8, 6, ἄρα μὲν ὅσα τὰ τοῦ ἄνθρωπος ἔνων ὁμοίως τὰ ἐκ μελλερεώς γιγαντεύει, ἄρα τὰ τοῦ μελλέως ἀλήθειαν ὁτι ἐκ μελλέως γιγαντεύει. Hence his repeated exhortations to self-reflection, as the means towards self-knowledge. Though, as Mr Grote points out, Socrates nowhere formally recognizes benevolence as a duty, his principles