as manifested (reflectively) in the conduct of one's self, or (socially) towards others. Happiness in, its true purity
and perfection is only to be found in virtue; a proposition
which he perpetually upheld, and from the misunder-
standing of which (as we shall hereafter see) two opposite
schools soon arose under the very eye of Socrates. For
morality in general, Socrates lays three solid foundations,
—religion, practical knowledge, and virtuous habits; and
with equal force insists upon the three. But in the con-
ception of the Supreme Governor, and of morality as his
law, he sought the consummation of his views and of his
hopes. And those who (as perhaps you know) have en-
deavoured to distort the example of Socrates into a support
for their views of the natural powers of man, and the inde-
pendence of practical morals upon supernatural aid, ought
surely to remember that his scheme of morals was itself
constantly referred to religious considerations and divine
help; and that his great mind, deeply versed as it was in
the practical knowledge of human nature, saw and owned
the necessity of assistances beyond human, craved them,
sighed after them, and, as we have already seen, seems to
have at length imagined them present from the very force
of desire. To a reformation thus extending through the
entire field of practical knowledge, Socrates saw the ob-
stacles, and he was prepared to meet them. The humble
son of the sculptor had received his mission, he discharged
it, and he was willing to be its victim. In each of the
accusers of Socrates, as the Apology of Plato expressly
tells us, a specific party was represented,—the poets, the
politicians, and the orators. They consummated their
work of vengeance, but they immortalized Socrates. He
must necessarily have soon died; but his enemies alone
could have procured us the day of the Phaedo!

We must now surrender, for a time, Socrates and his
age. He left, as we have before observed, nothing behind

would lend in practice to the highest form of benevolence, the endeavour to
电梯 and purify the minds of others. Hence the spirit of moral proselytism
so apparent both in Socrates and the best of his followers; a spirit, by the
way, of which we discover no traces in the Sophists. His analysis of Virtue
was undoubtedly defective, as Aristotle has pointed out (Magna Moral. l. 1, 5),
for it takes no account of passion (φθορα), nor of moral sentiment (φθορα). This
analysis is however most interesting to the student of ancient philosophy, as it
was the first step towards a systematic morality, the previous theory of the
Pythagoreans being justly stigmatized as irrelevant to the subject (όκ όλεκνά).

22 [See Xen. Mem. III. 9, 14, where happiness (ευ πράσσειν) is identified
with virtuous action (ευ τοιεί), Ed.]

23 ['"Sophists"' in author's MS. The passage of the Apology runs thus: το πόσον καὶ Μελητὸς μοι ἐπὶ ἄκτατο καὶ Ἀντωνι καὶ Λόκω, μελητὸς μοι ὑπὲρ τῶν
ποιητῶν σχηματισμοῦ, Ἀντωνίος δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν δημοσίων καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, Λόκως δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν θεάτων. p. 23 E. Ed.]
him that could deserve the name of a school, could take his place, or represent the murdered sage in the circles of Athens. But, vast as nature, all minds could find their systems in him! and accordingly, from his teaching, with new and regulated energies, we find Philosophy once more starting into her innumerable and diverging courses. To classify, to inspect, to analyse them, will probably be occupation sufficient for our next series of meetings here. The minor schools of the Cynosarges, Cyrene, or Elis, will detain us but briefly; in the vast and proportioned edifices of the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophies we shall find subjects to which a more protracted attention must be devoted, but which it must be the fault of your Professor if he fail to make deserving of that attention. You will accept my thanks for your attendance; our assemblies have not indeed been large, but I would hope that they have not been altogether without mutual profit and instruction.
SECOND SERIES.

LECTURE I.

SOCRATES AND THE MINOR SOCRATICS. SCHOOL OF MEGARA.

GENTLEMEN,

It was one of the last observations which I took occasion to offer to you, in commenting on the fortunes of Grecian speculation;—that in the comprehensive mind of that eminent man with whom our inquiries then ceased were contained the latent germs of innumerable subsequent growths. It was not merely the inventive sagacity of Socrates which placed him in this prominent historic position; though that sagacity was equally vast in its compass and penetrating in its power. It was even more than this, the freedom, candour, popularity, and variety of his intellectual pursuits; his unrivalled skill in the tactics of conversation, which provoked and managed inquiry; his almost patriarchal amicability of manners, which encouraged and guided it. The soil should indeed be worthless in which the dexterous husbandry of Socrates could deposit no seed that promised future development. We speak of the school of Socrates, but in the technical sense of the term he had no school. The Academy, the Lyceum, the Stoa, the Cynosarges, were the chosen localities of special sects; Athens itself (and in it as type or miniature—Greece—the world)—was the scene of the instruction, as of the studies, of Socrates. He might truly say with La Bruyère: "Je rends au public ce qu'il m'a prêté: j'ai emprunté de lui la matière de mes ouvrages: il est juste que l'ayant achevé, &c. je lui en fasse la restitution." His predilection for Athens was, it is true, exclusive. In one of the most eloquent passages of the Crito1 he represents the Republic as addressing himself: "None of the solemnities of Greece has ever induced you to quit Athens; except on one occasion, to attend the Isthmian games at Corinth; war alone could attract you from it: you have

1 [p. 52 n. Ed.]

16—2
not been a traveller, as others; you have never felt a
curiosity to see foreign nations and to study their laws;
you were contented with us and our government." But
in every region of that manifold Athenian world he was
at home. He found the human heart there, and found it
under every modification of social influence; and to all he
addressed a lesson suitable to all. "I respect and love
you, Athenians!" he exclaims, in the Apology recorded
by Plato; "but I will obey the voice of the deity rather
than yours; and, while I live and am able to do it, I
will never abandon the office of philosophy, the office of
giving you warning and advice, the office of addressing in
such fashion as this every man I meet: 'Oh, my friend!
how can you, a citizen of Athens (the city most famous of
the earth for civilization and resources), not blush to think
only of amassing riches and gaining honours, without once
occupying yourself with truth and wisdom—the soul and
its perfection?" And if any of you pretend that he is so
engaged, I will not take his word for it, I will not leave
him—I will question, examine, convict him." In such a
spirit as this, we can well credit his declaration that he
believed "a man's greatest happiness consisted in rational
discourse of virtue all the days of his life."

Accordingly, within the limits of Attica the influence
of this voluntary philosophic missionary was pervading
and powerful. His pupils were as various as the occasions
of his teaching. Derived indifferently from every quarter
of Athenian society, they carried into all their respective
departments of life a tincture of the character of the
master; his extraordinary powers and prompt willingness
to display them attracting round him, as hearers more or
less constant, not merely all that was excellent in the
youthful mind of Athens, but many also (as the founder
of the Cynic school) already advanced in age and matured in
experience. His very skill as a dialectician dazzled those
who could not pass from the form of knowledge to its
reality, and who considered as the highest of intellectual
attainments that quick and glittering play of weapons
which the great philosopher only valued as enabling him
to disarm the honest adversary without wounding him, or
to strike the blow home and sure upon captious and un-
principled arrogance.

Accordingly, among the constant or occasional auditors
of Socrates were seen many whose views had little apparent
connexion with philosophical contemplation. The future
leaders of armies, the aspirants after public distinction, the
rivals of the popular assembly, were observed in earnest
conference with this indefatigable teacher; whose versatility of mind was evinced in his prompt adaptation of his topics to the temper and circumstances of each, and in the employment of a style proverbially attractive. "De Gracis," says Cicero in exemplifying the various models of discourse (Off. I. 30), "dulcem et facetum, festivique sermonis atque in omni oratione simulatorem, quem eloquus Graci nominaverunt, Socratem accepimus." This qualification was indeed transmitted to the subsequent inheritors of his philosophy. It is the precept of Cicero in another passage of the same work, "Sit igitur hic sermo, in quo Socratis maxime excellunt, lenis minimeque pertinax; insit in eo lepos." (Ib. 37.) The simplicity of Xenophon, the richness and variety of Plato, form our principal examples of this rare excellence; in the time of Cicero it is probable that many others existed, as there is scarcely a disciple of Socrates to whom the composition of numerous treatises in the form of dialogue is not ascribed.

Of such auditors of Socrates as Alcibiades and Critias it is of course unnecessary here to speak; nor are the philosophical labours of Lysias, or even of Isocrates, of a character sufficiently marked to detain the student of the history of theoretical philosophy. The intellectual characteristics (as far as a brief sketch can effectually arrest them) of those disciples who themselves became masters, are here our only subject. A natural division offers itself. Some of these pupils of Socrates adhered, without much deviation, to the general principles of their Teacher; others, receiving their impulse from him and from the times, originated schools distinct from each other as from their common source, and strongly marked with decisive individuality.

I. Not possessed of his force of reason or weight of character, the former class yet saw that in the moral elevation of their fellow-citizens lay the great aim of conscientious inquiry; and they seem to have endeavoured, as far as they could, to fulfil this high function. As professed followers of Socrates, they strenuously exhibited his principles. With him they held that God exists, and through his works reveals himself; as an author in his volume:—that He is the providential cause and governor of the world, and (above all portions of his creation) the special guardian of man; that He is, moreover, the legislator of rational beings, having given them laws whose evident universality forbids the supposition of a partial or accidental origin; and that these laws are accompanied with sanctions of reward or punishment to which the fact of conscience bears perpetual attestation. To this rational
scheme of theology thus bound up with morals, they probably added the same series of incidental confirmations which are so constantly found in the records of the Socratic discussions, the evidence of authentic presages, and the palpable agency of the subordinate ministers of divine vengeance in the terrors of thunder and lightning; topics which Socrates was wont to advance, though it is now not easy to determine how far he purposely adapted himself in such statements to a popular and not injurious prejudice. The divinity of the human soul (whether in reality of essence or analogy of properties), and its immortality in a future state, were the natural, and one of them the necessary, supplement to this lofty theology. Like Socrates too, they spoke of "knowledge" in a peculiar and elevated sense of that term (doubtless, similar to the inspired use of "Wisdom"), as being the great object and chief blessing of man; and of vice principally under the character of a gross ignorance and stupidity. Such were the leading ideas of the philosophy of these writers, enforced with much simplicity of style, and purity of language; yet perhaps with no great depth of personal investigation or force of original thought. They came to their illustrious Teacher from all ranks of society. Æschines had to declare to Socrates that "having nothing else to give him, he gave him himself;" and Simo's reports of his teaching were designated σκυτικόν from the trade of the reporter... To Xenophon (distinguished in so many departments of action) the reputation of Socrates, and the world, are indebted for an invaluable series of notes of his master's discourses, and a sketch of his final defence corroborating that of Plato, though inferior in force and spirit; and the accomplished disciple of Socrates is discovered in the elevated morality of the Cyropædia. Two dialogues of very uncertain genuineness are attributed to Simo, the only remaining fragments of three and thirty. Of Crito, who was the author of seventeen, no relic is extant. The Πίναξ, or Picture, of Cebes, is of all the writings ascribed to this body of philosophers perhaps the most popularly known. Of even this performance, however, which has been since translated into nearly every modern language, the genuineness is questioned; and the Stoical cast of the sentiments, along with references involving apparent anachronisms, has induced many critics to attribute it to a philosopher of Cyzicus who taught in the reign of Marcus Aurelius. Wolf, whose critical scepticism has been evinced in so many other instances, is the principal champion of this opinion;

[Not two 'dialogues,' but two fabricated epistles are attributed to this philosophic cobbler. See Fabricius, Bibl. II. p. 719, ed. Harles. Ed.]
but the arguments, though advanced with great ingenuity, are not, as I think, sufficient to counterbalance the almost universal testimony of antiquity. We can scarcely believe, for example, that Laertius, who was nearly a contemporary of the Cyzicene Cebes, could be mistaken in ascribing the Tabula to the disciple of Socrates if it were really the work of the later hand. But criticism has almost unequivocally refused to admit the claim of three dialogues (usually printed in the editions of Plato) entitled, "of Virtue," "Eryxias," and "Axiochus," and formerly attributed to the Socratic Æschines, as the only relics of a voluminous writer of dialogues, orations, and epistles. Of Glauco nine, of Simmias the Theban, twenty-three, dialogues are said to have perished. The relics of the Socratic philosophy, as held by its most authentic interpreters, are thus reduced to a scanty and uncertain number; nor can the high probability which we possess as to the true doctrines of the sage and his intellectual offspring, in the pages of Xenophon, Cebes, and the simpler dialogues of Plato, coupled with the traditions of antiquity, altogether console us for this loss. The fate of these writings and of their authors, in the general chances of fame, impresses upon us how rapidly the lessons of a merely practical morality, however useful, disappear before the commanding and attractive presence of vast and proportional systems. A scheme of moral teaching, whose excellence lies in its equilibrium, requires extraordinary talents to rescue it from the reputation of sameness and insipidity; and the simplicity of truth, which in Socrates was dignity and power, might easily sink, in the hands of his less gifted pupils, into frigidity and languor. Uniformity without prominence fatigues the attention; truth itself in morals, being but the image of a familiar reality, can scarcely carry the charm of novelty; and our own experience will sufficiently remind us that in religion and philosophy it is seldom strongly popular when not in some point urged to

4 [It is impossible to believe that the Æschines which we possess was the work of a contemporary of Socrates and Plato. Besides the "Stoical cast of the sentiments," arguments against its genuineness may be drawn from the diction, which bears the marks cadentis Gracitatis, both in the use of late words, and of soleretic and Latinizing constructions. The question is apparently set at rest by a reference we find in Chap. 33 to a passage in the Laws, the latest work of Plato, which was probably not published until after the death of Cebes. Of bad Greek the formula, c. 26: Νη Δία ὁλότος is a glaring instance. In c. 15, κριτερίων occurs in the sense of criticus, as in the pseudo-Platonic Axiochus, 366 E. Ψαφιχος would have been used by a contemporary of Socrates. Πέρεπτερρακ(=Πέρεπτρακ) in the same sentence is also conclusive. With Wolf's arguments I am not acquainted: but the counter authority of Laertius is of little weight. Ed.]
ON THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

II. But there was little probability that the Grecian mind should long remain in this state of equipoise: or that reverence for the memory and eminence of any man should produce a unanimity which even the acknowledged supremacy of a common revelation has not been found to ensure. The variety of intellectual endowments, the difference of moral susceptibility and even of physical temperament, and the desire of special celebrity, would of themselves be sufficient to destroy it. And almost under the eye of Socrates himself, schools were already forming in which the symmetrical unity of his picture of the soul and its duties was broken into fragments, and in which each leader of a sect had taught himself and his disciples to be contented with one exclusive compartment of a vast inheritance of truth.

As might have been expected from the predominantly ethical cast of the speculations of Socrates, these teachers were chiefly distinguished by the opposition of their views as to the rule of life and conduct. But they were not so without exception; nor will a view yet more accurate, of the doctrine of Socrates, lead us to anticipate that they should be so. I have before noticed the peculiar constancy with which Socrates identified Wisdom and Virtue; a proposition which lies at the foundation of his, and of the Platonic amplification of his philosophy. Now Wisdom, thus considered, necessarily includes two elements,—correct knowledge of the right, and the habit of constant action according to that knowledge. But whether it was that Socrates regarded the latter component as too obvious to be formally insisted on; or that, by a still deeper study of the subject, he considered that the unclouded apprehension of moral rectitude was itself in a great degree unattainable except in and by a course of practical goodness, and thence inclusively supposed it; or, again, conceived that if the Supreme Good were perpetually presented to the soul, it would infallibly incline it;—it is certain that he seems to insist on the intellectual element with peculiar force, with a force which indeed to many readers of his discussions seems altogether overstrained. Ἔφη δὲ καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν ἀληθὴν πάσαν ἀρετὴν σοφίαν εἶναι. Had Socrates intended by this formula merely to establish the rule or criterion by which actions were to be determined, and to constitute a conformity to the decision of pure reason as this criterion, he would have said no more than has been ordinarily said since his time; but his meaning seems to have gone beyond this. Unquestionably Aristotle understood him as having represented the

state of knowledge as itself the state of virtue:—“ἐπτημᾶς γὰρ ἡ φήτ’ εἶναι πάσας τὰς ὀρθὰς, ὥστε ἤμα συμβαινεῖν εἰδέναι τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ εἶναι δίκαιον.” (Eth. Eud. I. 5.) Without at present entering on this question, I remark that such a theory (in whatever precise form originally held) must necessarily involve much logical discussion, though always in subservience to moral speculation. If it be held that the full exercise of perfect rationality is the great aim of a rational being, and the constant contemplation of the Supreme Good his surest path to excellence, or itself total excellence,—the investigation of those powers by which that contemplation may be effected, will inevitably demand the attention of the ethical theorist. Logical disquisition will force itself upon him in the work of exposition or inquiry. The records of Plato and Xenophon evince how largely Socrates was engaged in discussions as to the nature of Science and Truth; and it is very remarkable, that among the lost writings of his immediate disciples we find many tracts enumerated upon detached portions of the same general subject. Notwithstanding, then, the ethical direction of the Socratic teaching, and the subservience of all its labours to the moral elevation of man,—you will not be altogether surprised to find that the school most exclusively dialectical in all antiquity is counted among the various results of the general Socratic movement.

(1) The school of Megara, however, (for it is to this society and succession of philosophers I am now directing your attention) cannot be correctly understood by those who are content to find in the opinions of its founder (Euclides) a mere development of the views of Socrates. If I mistake not, in a former series of Lectures, I took occasion (though in a brief transient reference) to represent this school as the legitimate inheritor of the profound philosophy of Elea; and endeavoured to evince the justness of this account of its origination by the manifest congeniality of its doctrine and phraseology. Cicero has unquestionably stated the true position of the case, by uniting in one character the two elements,—the Eleatic tradition and the Socratic discipleship:—“non multum (dissentiunt) a Platone Megarici, quorum fuit nobilis disciplina, cujus (ut scriptum video) princeps Xenophanes, quem modo nominavi: deinde eum seculi, Parmenides et Zeno. Itaque ab his Eleatici philosophi nominabantur. Post Euclidas Socratis discipulus, Megareus; a quo idem Megarici dicti.” (Acad. Quaest. II. 42.) We saw (when treating it in its chronological place) the tendency of the Parmenidean philosophy, in inferior hands, to eventuate in
merely logical disputation; to pass from the substance to the form of reason. We know that in Zeno of Elea—though we have rejected the low and unfounded estimate of that able disputer—this anticipation was, from the pressure of opposition, too nearly realized; insomuch that this active champion of Eleaticism has been commonly regarded as the inventor of the art of methodical disputation: and the reader of the mystic and oracular fragments of Parmenides, in which the deepest questionings of self-searching Reason are, or seem to be, met, laments to find the philosophy of that man at whose extraordinary depth Socrates represents himself in early youth astonished and charmed (in Theaetet. 183), losing its coherence, and ravelling into a mass of tangled and unprofitable difficulties.

Euclides, who was either born, as some held, in a Sicilian city, or connected with that country, would naturally receive his earliest impressions from the philosophy of Southern Italy; and a disposition eminently ardent (perhaps even choleric) would not be likely to intenerate the stern and disputative character which it had now unhappily assumed. For though an affecting anecdote is related by Plutarch testifying on one occasion the patience and fraternal affection of Euclides, we can scarcely attribute the placidity of a philosophic love of truth to one who had recourse to the courts of justice to gratify that desire for oral conflict which the logical schools could only sometimes meet. With the elements of the philosophy of Parmenides treasured in a mind restless and acute, Euclides (whether directly from Sicily or Megara) came to Athens as the true centre of intellectual activity, and soon became an assiduous hearer of the great instructor of the Grecian mind. Plato's Theaetetus presents to us Euclides as preserving in manuscript a long discussion of his master's on the nature of human knowledge. Residing at Megara, we are told, that to evade an Athenian decree which forbade any intercourse with that city, Euclides was accustomed to assume a female dress, and brave the death, which was the certain consequence of detection, in order to gain the benefit of nightly conversation with Socrates. In the Phaedo we find him noted as one of the group that gathered round the bed, and hung upon the last accents, of the Martyr of Virtue; and Euclides is memorable in the history of philo-

---

8 [Gela, according to Diog. Laertius, who however does not seem to believe the tradition. Ed.]
9 [De fraterno Amore, p. 489. Ed.]
7 [I can find no authority for this statement, except the Index to Laertius. The passage to which the index refers (Lib. II. 5, § 30) has an entirely different meaning. Ed.]
8 [This romantic story is found in A. Gellius, V. A. vi. 10. Ed.]
sophers no less than of philosophy, as having made his house at Megara the hospitable asylum for his brother disciples⁹, terrified and dispersed by the fate of their common master.

It is not probable that this union continued much longer than circumstances necessitated. Euclides established, or continued, his own school independently of extraneous aid, and with sophistry fought the sophists. The cynic Diogenes, who witnessed the tumultuous contests of the pupils of Euclides, and perhaps had suffered from their pertinacious acuteness, took vengeance in a pun, and pronounced that their angry meeting deserved not the title of σχολή but of χολή¹⁰: and Socrates himself, who had witnessed and lamented the perverted sagacity of the Megaric philosopher, declared to his face that he "knew how to debate with sophists, but not with men".¹¹

Of the substance of these disputations, and the nature of the opinions which were popular in the school of Megara, our records are detached and scanty. A few memorial of Laertius, and a single phrase of Cicero, nearly complete our narrow stores. The waves of time, silently closing over what once were vast and proportioned systems, have left in too many cases but lonely and insulated summits above them; and it is but an imperfect consolation, that the scattered and barren peaks that thus rise above the waste of waters may at least be regarded as having been the most prominent points of the entire territory; and may even in some measure assist us to conjecture the shape and extent of regions for ever lost to our eyes. The task is indeed difficult and precarious, but to many minds this character will only excite and animate to effort. At all events, with whatever chance of success, it is our duty (unless we would degrade the history of speculation to the dry register of unconnected aphorisms it has been too often made) to endeavour to penetrate to the harmony which, whether apparent in error or real in truth, will be found to have pervaded every body of opinions permanent among men; though it is true, if I may alter my former comparison, that our relics of many of these philosophies are like the faint snatches of distant music, which the hearer involuntarily combines into a regular strain, scarcely aware how much of the completed

⁹ [So Hermodorus in Diog. Laert. ii. 108. Ed.]
¹⁰ [Ibid. vi. 24. Ed.]
¹¹ [Ib. ii. 30. Compare the bitter lines of Timon the Sillographer. Ib. § 107: "I reck not of such babblers as Phædo, or the wrangling Euclides, who has infected all Megara with a frenzy for debate." Ed.]
result is received from without or created from within. And whether we succeed or not, in presenting a perfect copy of the perished original, the exercise at least is valuable, which accustoms us to pass in our historical researches from facts to reasons, and to recognize in every authentic relic, however isolated or obscure, the element of a theory which once explained and corroborated it. We thus employ upon different materials an art analogous to that of the illustrious naturalist of France; we attempt to reconstruct from these organic remains (the precious fossils of history) the entire framework of systems now no more!

The founder of the school of Megara presents himself as the compound result of three different elements. He came, as we have seen, from the study of the speculations of Parmenides, and he underwent a long and assiduous discipline in the hands of Socrates. Besides which, we cannot suppose him unaffected by the influence of that strange society of rhetorical philosophers everywhere present and active, the Sophists. In these commingled agencies we shall find a rational solution for the problem of his philosophy.

We formerly saw that the school of Elea, of which Parmenides was assuredly the most accomplished representative, delighted in separating the world of sense from the world of reason; and, feeling that the tendency of reason is towards generality, uniformity, unity,—in gradually reducing all the forms, ideas, or perceptions of reason to the sovereign category of "Unity." They could not believe that the ideas of the Reason can be elaborated from the phenomena of simple sensation, as blood is elaborated from aliment; and on the other hand, they could not believe that these ideas of the Reason are themselves without any corresponding archetypes in the system of being. Accordingly, they pronounced that there is a rational or intelligible world, the correspondent to human reason, and appreciable by it alone. Arriving at this point, they began to reflect upon this world of Reason, to measure the divisions and map down the features of this mystic country. In this important work, however, they seem to have discovered the precipitation of beginners; for before long we find them boldly enthroned upon the topmost peak of intellectual abstraction, the solitary idea of unity and existence. The sameness of the archetypal world, its independence of the limitations and variations of time and space, filled and overwhelmed their minds; and, in order to realize this conception of it with more directness and emphasis, they reduced all its categories to the bare notion of singleness and Being; and contrasted with this one
existence ever identical with itself, every subordinate nature liable to change. Now you know that on the perception of Change depends the acquisition of all our notions of time, space, and number; consequently in the Parmenidean philosophy the whole sensible world (of which these notions are as it were the framework) was condemned to a secondary, phenomenal, and transitory being. Moreover, the whole series of apparitions which compose the sensible world—its sights, sounds, contacts, pleasures, pains—have no necessary existence; but though they be all supposed to cease (as they plainly may be), though every sense be closed, and every notion that waits on sense be annihilated, the unchangeable indestructible Idea of Existence remains, one and identical. These multiplied phenomena, then, are but the outward and contingent manifestations of this interior reality; to them belongs that δόξα, or knowledge of opinion, which is based upon the believed constancy of their sequences, and which affords sufficient assurance for the temporary and physical sciences. Such is the single and all-sustaining principle of the philosophy of Parmenides. But into the bosom of this everlasting essence, thus one and unchangeable, the convictions of man irresistibly force him to introduce the ideas of Truth and Goodness; that they also may share in the same sublime unity, and be with it enshrined above the mutable elements of the sensible universe. How far Parmenides himself adopted this view it is not easy to determine, from our very defective materials; if we may trust the highly-finished representation of Plato, the supreme “Idea” of the Eleatic philosopher was αὑτὸ τὸ καλὸν, ὁ ἐστὶν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν; but however this may be, we may well believe that Euclides as the pupil of Socrates, and with him inclining to the deification of justice and truth, could scarcely fail to invest his supreme and ultimate Principle with moral attributes. Prepared, then, by these

29 It is not however certain that Euclides assigned any distinctly ethical meaning to the term Good. His system seems rather to have been a recession from the Socratic and moral to the old ontological view of things. Socrates had said “Virtue is Knowledge” (φήσανεν, καταθήκας, σωφρονεί), but by these predicates he declared himself to mean, practical insight into the nature and consequences of actions. So far as it is knowledge, virtue is one—one per se or formally considered—for knowledge is formally one. But the objects of knowledge are manifold; hence a corresponding multiplicity of virtues. Valour, for instance, is the knowledge of things really to be dreaded; Justice the knowledge of things which may lawfully be done; and Virtue in general the knowledge of the means to true happiness.

The Socratic formula, whatever its defects, is at least practical. But the doctrine of Euclides would seem to have made speculation the end or summum bonum. For there is little doubt that when Plato in the Philebus intimates his dissent from those who maintain that Intelligence or Knowledge (νοῦς, ἐνθυπαθία) is the highest good, his arguments are directed mainly against the
notices of the influences affecting the Megaric philosopher, you will not hear with surprise his definition of the sovereign good, which, as reported by Cicero, has perplexed so many of the commentators of that writer. "Id bonum solum esse (Megarici) dicebant, quod esset unum, et simile, et idem semper." (Acad. Qu. II. 42.) Nor will you be astonished that a thinker trained to regard the whole universe as the development of a divine unity, should have boldly declared that evil had no real existence; and that that which we mistake for positive evil is merely the preservation in various degrees of the supreme good: τὰ δὲ ἀντικειμένα τῶ ἀγαθῶ ἀνήρ, μὴ εἶναι φάσκων, is one of the few records of his habitual teaching preserved to us by Lactarius. But as the upholder of the metaphysical system of unity and identity is accustomed to explain the multiplicity of the sensible world as a manifold manifestation of the eternal sameness, an exhibition of itself under various aspects or characters; so the transformation of this supreme principle into a moral entity will produce a parallel representation of the diversities of virtue as varied forms of the sovereign good. We are not, therefore, disappointed to find our memorialist, in the passage immediately preceding the last, declare to us, that Euclides ἔν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀπεφαίνετο πολλοίς ὁμόμοιοι καλομένου ὡτὲ μὲν γὰρ φρονίσειν, ὡτὲ δὲ θεῶν, καὶ ἄλλων τοὺς καὶ τὰ λαοῦτα.13

There are two peculiarities in the reasonings of Euclides which seem to have perplexed the historians of philosophy even more than those which I have already enumerated.

Megaries. It may be remarked, that the Philocheus is not the only dialogue of Plato in which the Megarian dogmas are criticized; though, as they had so much in common with the Eleatic philosophy of Parmenides, they are frequently mixed up with the latter in a manner which renders it extremely difficult to distinguish one from the other. One passage, (Sophista, p. 246) is referred by Schleiermacher to the Megaries. If he is right, we gather from it that Euclides, like Plato, asserted the reality of Ideas (νοητὰ ἄττα καὶ ἀδομίματο εἶναί τὸν ἀληθινὸν ωτόλως εἶναι), being herein distinguished from his Eleatic masters. Perhaps it is to this Cicero alludes, Acad. Qu. II. 42, where he says, "Hi quoque (Megarici) multa, Plato " Euclides however differed from Plato, in so far as he denied to the sensible world that μεθέχει or participation in the ideas which Plato insists on as the ground of its reality. With Euclides therefore metaphysics was the only recognized science: Physics and Ethics, the sciences of Nature and Man, were alike impossible. In fact Plato shows (Ibid. 248) that the Megarian Ontology was a system of pure Nihilism: or as he says with grave satire: "The absolute Being has then neither life nor intelligence: but stands ever unaffected by change, a thing august and holy, incapable of knowing or thinking." A passage, it may be remarked, not favourable to those specialist's who claim Plato as a Pantheist. Ed.

[This obscure passage is supposed by Brandis (Handb. II. p. 114) to refer to the Megarian doctrine of Ideas alluded to in the foregoing note. It seems, according to this author, to imply that Euclides had departed from the high Eleatic doctrine of an absolute Unity, and that he admitted "eine relative Mehrheit des Seyenden." We hear nothing of εἰς in the reports of the opinions of Euclides' successors, until we find Stilpo, a hundred years after, engaged in disproving their existence. Ed.]

13
We are told that he rejected all analogical reasoning\textsuperscript{14}, and that he was accustomed to attack not premisses but consequences\textsuperscript{15}. The argument by which he is represented as vindicating the former of these opinions, appears at first sight so unsatisfactory as to increase the difficulty. "The objects were either like or unlike; if unlike, the analogy was obviously illusive; if like, it were better examine the objects themselves." When we remember that the argument from analogy is intended not to supersede positive examination, where it is possible, but to supply its place where it is not, nothing certainly can be more ineffective than to object to this form of reasoning that absence of an impossible perfection which leaves so valuable a probability behind it, in circumstances that forbid any higher order of conviction. The poverty of our materials renders any explanation of this difficulty precarious. The tendency of a purely metaphysical philosophy is to despise all empirical conclusions; and as probable arguments, in all their innumerable degrees, from bare possibility to fullest moral certainty, form the foundations of belief in the world of sense, the pupil of Parmenides may have learned, and taught others, to slight them. The love of direct consecutive demonstration which urged him to pursue his antagonists through the long labyrinth of their own conclusions, in preference to questioning the original validity of their assumptions, may have been connected with the same general philosophic habits: and no doubt, the superior brilliancy of the triumph when the contradiction was, after a chase of successive conclusions, at length palpably reached, had its share in popularizing this species of attack in the "eristic" school. I am strongly inclined, however, to suspect, that the argument against the use of comparisons (διὰ παραβολῆς λόγοι, Diog. Laert.) was originally nothing more than one of that multitude of quibbles for which the school of Megara is famous through antiquity. Suppose the assailant to ask the employer of the comparison, "are the objects like or unlike?" and to proceed, "if unlike, your comparison is void; if like, since you know them to be like, you must know both the objects, and your comparison is superfluous; for what you know you can personally examine, περὶ αὐτὰ δεῖν μᾶλλον ἀναστρέφεσθαι, ἢ οἷς ἦμοι ἕστι." This, I allow, is very contemptible sophistry; but the student of the fashionable philosophy of Megara will scarcely, on that

\textsuperscript{14} [Diog. L. p. 107. Ed.]

\textsuperscript{15} [τὰς ἐσωσθεὶσας ἑπτὰσα ποιεῖ καὶ λῆμματα ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ ἑπιφορᾶ. Πο. If, as Deycks supposes, these terms were invented by Euclides, to him will belong the honour of having discovered the form of the syllogism, λῆμματα being equivalent to the 

προτάσεις, ἑπιφορᾶ to the συμπέρασμα of Aristotle. Ed.]
account, deem it improbable. The very next champion of the school is immortal for conceits in whose company the inventor of such a quibble need scarcely blush.

I speak of Eubulides, the supposed author of seven sophisms whose singular celebrity through antiquity is known to every scholar, and really forms a most discreditable element in the estimation of ancient literature. My object being altogether to accustom you to trace the physiology of the history of speculation, employing facts as little more than the symbols of principles, and such facts only as are in themselves indicative of principles latent but real, you may suppose I do not purpose to dwell upon these miserable trifles. When indeed I remember that Philetas of old caught a consumption in the intense study of the *φευδώμενος*, and that Chrysippus (the glory of the Stoa) wrote six weighty volumes on the same puzzle, it is only prudence to withdraw from you the fatal attractions of the subject. Athenaeus has preserved to us the epitaph of the unhappy martyr, in which the sophism itself is pathetically personified as the murderer:

Σεισσώ, Φιλητᾶς εύλογον ὁ φευδῶμενος με
Μορία, καὶ πολλὰς φροντίδος ἔσχερας!

These logical difficulties are known by titles intimating not the form of the sophism, but its accidental subject. Thus we have, besides the Liar just mentioned, the Vailed, the Horned, the Electra, the Bald, the Sorites, the Hidden. A late ingenious writer, in a dissertation on the subject, has endeavoured to elevate these fallacies into the symbols or examples of profound metaphysical difficulties. The

---

18 [Eubulides appears to have been the person especially aimed at by Aristotle in his anti-Megaric polemics. Ed.]

31 [Deiph. IX. p. 401 E. The sophism is given by Cicero, Acad. Q. II. 29: Si te mentiri dicas, idque verum dicis, mentituris, an verum dicis? In Arist. Soph. Elech. xxv. 3, it is called "the argument proving that the same man at the same instant lies and speaks truth." Ed.]

18 [Lucian, Var. Antiq. p. 32, gives the following example of the *εὐκεκακλημένος*, called also the *διάλαθινον*, or "Hidden": "A. Do you know your own father? B. Of course I do. A. Do you know this person who stands vailed beside me? B. No! A. He is your father; it follows that you don't know your own father." Compare Plut. Theact. p. 165 B: λέγει δὴ τῷ διαλάθινῳ ἔρμηνῃ...οὐκ ἔσται τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἰσίνα τοῦ νοῦ τὸ οὐκ᾽ εἶπεν. Ed.]

31 [κατανίκησε. "What you have not lost you have. But you have not lost horns, therefore you have horns." Diog. L. vii. 187. Ed.]

28 [The Electra is like the Vailed. Orestes stands vailed by Electra; she knows Orestes, but knows not that the vailed man is he; hence she "να αὐτὴν ἠνώθη τα καὶ οὐκ ἠνώθη." Luc. 18. Ed.]

31 [The *φαλακρὸς* was probably a kind of reversed Sorites. As, for instance, Does the loss of one hair constitute baldness? No. Of two? No. When then does baldness begin? at the nth, or at the (n+1)th place? If not at the (n+1)th, why at the (n+1)th? unless the absence of one hair constitutes baldness, which was denied! Ed.]

"Vailed," or ἐγκεκαλυμένος, would mark the difference between sensible and rational knowledge; the "Liar" would evince that he who denied the possibility of truth convicted himself, by avowedly speaking falschood at the moment he made the assertion; and so of the rest. It is remarkable too, that one of these examples is employed by Plato himself for the same illustration; and indeed I am not afraid to confess my belief that the expository style of even that great master, admirable as it often is, was unduly influenced by the dialectical fashions of his day. This supposed purpose does not seem to have been suspected by antiquity; it is not, however, impossible that it may sometimes have exalted these sophisms from barren perplexities into instruments of instruction; and I will not deprive their memory of the benefit of the possibility. The whole rich inheritance passed into the hands of the Stoics, who did not suffer it to remain unproductive. "Tell me the doctrines," said Chrysippus, "and let me alone for proofs!" proofs which he adduced in such multitude, and managed with such skill, that it was said (as of the language of Plato, so of the logic of this Stoc), that if the gods themselves were to use dialectics, they would adopt the dialectics of Chrysippus.

As far, then, as we have now reached, it is not difficult to discover in the early stage of the Megaric school the mingled influences which I have already noted, the metaphysics of Parmenides, the ethics of Socrates, and the dialectical habits of the sophists. The influence of the metaphysics of unity and identity seems still more apparent and direct in the opinions of Diodorus and Stilpo, the only remaining names of importance in this body of philosophers. To penetrate, to illumine, and to harmonize their opinions by the faint light afforded in the pages of our ancient reporters, is a task in which, though I will use all possible brevity, I can scarcely ask you to accompany me this day.

[Possibly the author alludes to Theætetus, 165 B, where however the epithet ἐνδικτήρων ironically indicates the contempt with which Plato invariably speaks of this and similar tricks of controversy. The dialogue called Euthydemos was evidently written for the purpose of laughing them out of fashion. It is probable that in the numerous passages in which the ἐπιστρωτ or ἀντι-λογικοι are censured, he has in view the practice either of the Megarics or Cynics, or both. As an instance may be quoted Meno, p. 80 B. In the context of the passage in Theætetus, Plato shows psychologically the sense in which the logical paradox may be true. Hegel in his History of Philosophy, i. p. 138, is copious on the subject of this and the sister sophisms. Ed.]
LECTURE II.

SCHOOL OF MEGARA CONTINUED.

GENTLEMEN,

At the close of our last meeting we had traced the gradual progress of the philosophy of Megara into the sophistical subtleties of Eubulides: and among the mazes of their perplexing labyrinth I was forced, through fear of overtaxing your attention, to leave it. Some notice of these elaborate intricacies was necessary, not from their intrinsic value, but from their accidental celebrity in the literature of antiquity; but as my object is to pursue the history of Reason itself, rather than to undertake to track its multitude of collateral connexions and casual results in contemporary literature, I escape from the subject as speedily as possible; I abandon form for substance; I return with eagerness from the outward and ever-changing vesture, to the soul and spirit of philosophy.

It seems to me that in the speculations of Diodorus we may have an opportunity of making this transition. For though this reasoner comes before us with a full share of the disputatious characteristics of the school, I do not despair of finding something more solidly instructive in his history, though it seems to have been abandoned as hopelessly barren by the majority of our critics. Diodorus, who is styled by Cicero (De Fat., 6), “valens dialecticus,” and by Sextus is termed διαλεκτικότατος, was originally of a city in Caria, was favoured with the intimacy of Ptolemy Soter, and is said to have terminated a life of intellectual conflict by dying of grief and shame at being unable to solve the questions of Stilpo in presence of that monarch, who ridiculed his hesitation in a pun upon his name of Cronus.

As far as I can collect the tenets of Diodorus Cronus from the scattered notices of antiquity, he seems to have been eminent for the three following philosophic characteristics. He argued perpetually against the reality of motion; —he held a peculiar view of the nature of συνήμμενα, or connected propositions, affirming (if I rightly understand two obscure and intricate statements of Sextus Empiricus,
SECOND SERIES.

Pyrr. Hypot. II. 11, and Adv. Math. VIII.) that the antecedent and consequent in a just hypothetic ought to be connected by reciprocal necessity;—and he was the inventor, or employer, of a species of argument known in the ancient logic by the title of the "argumentum dominans," and specially used it for the purpose (as Arrian shows) of proving that nothing is possible which neither is, nor will be, true. (Epictet. II. 19.) I am now to attempt to illustrate the mental relationship of these tenets to each other and to a common origin,—seemingly as they do at the first sight, connected by so slender a thread:—and I do so, not merely as a specimen of the spirit of reciprocal illumination of every element by every other, in which I would have you study the detached records of ancient speculation; but still more, as including a valuable lesson regarding the tendency of a great philosophical system. Nor is the interest of the subject diminished by the circumstance that that system has been in our own day revived, unchanged in substance, but adorned with a novel splendour of detail and array of consequences, which have made it the most popular, and assuredly the most dangerous, metaphysical theory of the universe, in modern Germany.

We must (to understand Diodorus not as Diodorus, but as the element of a natural development of principles) return to the school of Elea. We found in that school—whose metaphysics were inherited by the Megaric succession—the principle openly stated that the sensible world is purely phenomenal, accidental, apparent; in contradistinction from that substantial world of Reason which alone deserves the title of real existence. Considered, then, by the intelligence, the world of existence becomes of course subordinated to the laws and forms of intelligence; it is a world of which we have the interpretation in our own reason, there alone, and there perfectly. Now of these laws of intelligence, as it is their undoubted character, that they regard the Necessary, the Unconditional, the Absolute—so is it certain that this absolute thing, thus contemplated by intellectual intuition, being the common foundation and essential reality of all things, and of all things equally, cannot but be one and ever identical with itself. To the eye of reason, then, there is no plurality, no change; one Being not merely supports, but is, the universe; and all that reveals itself in the lower world of sense is but the external manifestation of this Absolute Unity. Of anything which that mutable world includes it cannot be said that it is— it becomes; for its property is incessant change; and of that which incessantly changes, as on the one hand, there can be no assured science, so on the other, there cannot even

17—2
be any true and proper reality predicated. Vain it is to affirm, with the shortsighted naturalists of the Ionic school, that it is sufficient for us to trust the regulated sequences of nature; if these sequences be casual, not even the shadow of science can regard them; if they be arbitrary but believed to be invariable, this, again, is not science, but faith; if they be necessary and unalterable, then are they, what we affirm them, the mere manifestations in the world of sense, of the necessary attributes of a necessary and eternal thing;—they are then, as it were, the Absolute contemplated by the eyes of sense; and all the scientific reality of such laws is only the reality of the absolute Being that exhibits itself in them. The universe, then, is one, to the total exclusion of superior, inferior, or equal:—ἐν ταῖς πάντα.

My present object (as I cannot, to avoid misconstruction, too often remind you) being not to estimate the value of theories, but to trace their historical development, I do not now pause to criticise the Eleatic principle of Unity. For the sake of clearness, I simply and rapidly note the forms the same general principle has assumed in different ages; in order that you may be enabled advantageously to generalize the instruction afforded by analysing the relics of Diodorus. You will observe then, that all rational explications of the universe (as contrasted with pure sensuality) admit that there exists a being absolute, self-sustained, and infinite; the point of difference concerns the relation between this Absolute Being and the Universe. On the one side, the Theist (I speak now not as a theologian but simply as a reasoner) holds that the Absolute Being and the Universe are two distinct beings, and both real, though not with the same form or quality of reality; and that the connexion between the two existences is strictly that of Cause and Effect. This general doctrine is divided between two classes, one of which maintains the energy of the Absolute Being in the universe to be literally necessary; and the other to be the voluntary result of free activity under the guidance of yet higher attributes, and compelled only by the glorious necessity of ever doing that which is morally best... On the other hand, the Unitarian of metaphysics contends that the Absolute Being and the Universe are not two but one Being; and he holds either 1, that the Universe itself, such as we see and feel it, is the absolute, uncaused Infinite; or 2, that matter is infinite, and the infinite Universe the modifications of matter alone; or 3, that a primal force is the Infinite, and the universe that force in infinite action; or 4, that matter and force are themselves (as well as thought) the manifested attributes of the Absolute Being; or 5, (the system of Spinoza), that
thought and extension are the original attributes of that absolute nature of which the universe is the manifestation; or finally, the theory of Schelling and his followers, which (upon metaphysico-logical grounds) pronounces the identity of subject and object in that Absolute Unity of which nothing can be determined (for determination itself supposes limitation), but which the reason directly contemplates by an exclusive privilege, and than which in truth it can directly contemplate nothing else*. It would be indeed extraordinary if the last form of the theory of pure Unity coincided with the first, and the circle of speculation returned into itself; yet it does appear to me that in their grounds and reasons the school of Elea and the modern votaries of the Absolute Identity probably resemble more completely than any other two systems in the series.

I need scarcely inform you to which of the foregoing many varieties of hypothesis I would myself incline, as furnishing the true theory of the existence of the universe. The causal energy of God as exerted in the formation and support of a world dependent on, but separate from Him, is not more congenial to religion than it is acceptable to philosophy; but, as a lesson of toleration is never superfluous, I may, before leaving this part of the subject, seasonably remind you that the maintenance of even the latest of these forms of the theory that identifies the Absolute Being with the world of sensible manifestation, is not felt by many of its upholders to be inconsistent with a practical acceptance of the Christian faith. Whether the world be the attribute of which God is the substance, or the effect of which God is the cause, they regard as a transcendental question upon which Revelation was not meant to enlighten us; and though assuredly no small exercise of ingenuity would be necessary to reconcile this principle with the express declarations of the Scripture record, or to prove that Scripture did not, popularly indeed, but \textit{positively}, decide the transcendental question itself; or again, to evince that the Deity of the Bible is only a manifestation of the Absolute Nature in a shape cognizable by the Understanding;—yet, while we firmly resist error in every shape, we ought to rejoice in being able to extend indulgence to those maintainers of it whose happy inconsistency allows them to join, with wayward speculative opinions in the regions of abstract thought, a reverential reception of the whole law of life, and a coincidence in all the requisitions of practical morality.

I return to consider the subject in more direct connexion with the Megaric development of it, and specially in relation to the tenets of Diodorus. The supposition of the simple unity of the great All is inseparably bound up with the supposition of its eternity; for whatever is itself absolute, or an aspect of the absolute, has no relation to the limitations of time or space; of such there can (in the ordinary acceptation of the word) be no “creation.” Now, this eternity is the eternity not merely of the whole, but of every the minutest element of the infinite mass: and this again inevitably implies the equal necessity of the whole and of each such element, whether considered as evolved to our senses in time or in space, or in that resultant of them both which we term “motion.” Accordingly, in point of fact, the system is scarcely ever found unaccompanied by the strictest assertion of the doctrine of necessity; and this doctrine, by him actively maintained, will, I apprehend, be found the common chain that links the scattered fragments of the wisdom of Diodorus.

In the first place let us hear Arrian, who in the 19th chapter of the 2nd book of his precious discourses of Epictetus, presents us with the following account of one article in the lectures of Diodorus. “The argument called the dominative⁠—about which disputants interrogated each other, seems to have arisen from hence. Of the following propositions, any two imply a contradiction to the third. They are these. That every thing past is necessarily true; that an impossibility cannot depend on a possibility; that something is a possibility which neither is nor will be true. Diodorus, perceiving the contradiction, employed the first two to prove, that nothing is possible which neither is nor will be true.” The force of this reasoning evidently depends upon the assumption that in the scheme of the universe every element is so dependent upon every other, and (more directly) the future so dependent upon the past, that the assumed necessity of the past inferred the necessity of all that was to come, or, in his own words, inferred that whatever was not to come was an absolute impossibility. As this argument (though Brucker and others dispatch it

---

1 ὅς καὶ τῶν λόγων. The propositions in question are perhaps clearer in the original. They are: 1. Πᾶν παρεχθαυτός ἀληθὲς ἀναγκαῖος ὢν. Every truth (i.e. fact or event) of the past is necessary (could not have been otherwise). 2. Δύνατον μὴ ἀπολαμβάνει. 3. Δύνατον ὢς ὁ ὑπὸ τούτον ἀληθὲς ὢς ὢς ἂν. (Things which never did and never will happen are nevertheless possible.) Though Diodorus has the credit of this argument, it is of older date than he. See Arist. Meteor. VIII. 3: Ψαφίδ...οῖ καὶ Μεγαρικῶς ὑπὸ ἀνεφαργημένου δύνασθαι, ὡς ἂν μὴ ἐνεργῆς οὐ δύνασθαι, ὡς τὸν μὴ ἀκολουθοῦντα γίνεσθαι ἀλλὰ τὸν ἀκολουθοῦντα ὑπὸ ἀκολουθοῦντα ἀκολουθοῦντα ἀλλὰ τὸν ἀκολουθοῦντα γίνεσθαι κ.τ.κ. The paradox seems framed in order to overthrow the Aristotelian distinction of δύναμις and ἀληθεία. Ed.]
as an elaborate trifle) is evidently connected with the profoundest of metaphysical inquiries, I make no apology for continuing the passage in Arrian. Cleanthes and his followers, he tells us, assumed as premisses the second and third propositions of the series. "They held, that something is possible which neither is nor will be true; and that an impossibility cannot depend on a possibility; and they consequently denied that everything past is necessarily true." The universal connexion of the possible only with the possible, and the impossible with the impossible, was here again assumed; but the conclusion was against the necessity of the past. Chrysippus, the most eminent of the successors of Cleanthes, however, preferred to reject the logical principle which the others had assumed, and boldly asserted that an impossibility and a possibility might be interdependent. It will probably strike you as singular, that in this controversy the doctrine of immutable fate should have been apparently deserted by the champions of the Stoical institute; and this, as well as the general turn of phrase, leads me to suspect, that, in perfect conformity to the spirit of the times, and especially of the Megaric school, the disputants were more zealously engaged with the logical* dependence of conceptions than the physical dependence of events. Cicero confirms the report of the views of Diodorus in his treatise De Fato, c. 9: adding the illustration, "nec magis commutari ex veris in falsa ea posse quae futura sunt quam ea quae facta sunt; sed in factis immutabilitatem apparere, in futuris quibusdam, quia non apparent, ne necesse quidem videri." Unquestionably, in all these statements there is the same confusion as to the precise sense of "necessity," "possibility," &c. (whether considered as a quality in things themselves, or as a state of our knowledge regarding them), which has since darkened so many attempted expositions of the subject; and in the last passage it would seem as if the "necessity of the past" meant the impossibility that a thing which once has happened should be known not to have happened (for in what other sense can past facts evidence their own "necessity?" or be considered to be altered from "true to false?"). But even this confusion between the physical connexion of events (independently of our cognizance) and the certainty or uncertainty of our knowledge of them, or even between either of these and the logical connexion of antecedent and consequent in propositions, is itself (especially the latter) very characteristic of the union of Eleatic metaphysics and dialectics in the school of Megara. When once the uni-

*[Obscura questio est, quam vel duo vel philosophi appellant: totaque est logica; quam rationem disserendi voco. Cic. de Fato init. Ed.*]
verse was to be contemplated as an object not sensible but rational; to be explained out of the forms of abstract reason, and not by the inductions or analogies of observation, the tendency was irresistible to regard all its connexions not as physical, but as metaphysically necessary, connexions; that is, as connexions of the same kind as that between the premisses and conclusions of a logical demonstration. And hence, from Xenophanes to Stilpo, the difficulty which perpetually recurs, of determining whether the few and detached fragments we meet are truly portions of a philosophy which was content to balance logical principles, or which aimed at establishing a priori principles of the actual universe. Nor is it likely that the authors themselves were always clearly aware of the distinction.

If you have accompanied me in what I fear has been a toilsome course, you will have little difficulty in now detecting the true bearing of the Megaric philosopher's theory of the reciprocal connexion of a true hypothetic proposition. The combination—or confusion—of logical connexion with actual reality is here still more manifestly apparent. You are of course aware that the only truth required in a conditional proposition is the truth of the connexion of antecedent and consequent; nor would this truth be endangered though each element of the conditional assertion were really false. The embarrassment of the earlier logicians, however, on this very simple matter was altogether inconceivable, and betrays an apparent indistinctness of conception which renders the student doubtful whether it can be possible that he has rightly understood their representations of variance upon a subject so manifestly admitting of none. I will not now afflic your ears with a detail of these un instructive quarrels: the theory of Diodorus and his auditors alone concerns us. Diodorus is understood to have held that no hypothetic was valid (and probably likewise no simple proposition) in which the propositions, or terms, were not reciprocally predicable or mutually inferential. The relation of this logical tenet to that system of universal necessity in which every event was

8 [Sext. Empir. adv. Log. viii. 113. Philo, Diodorus' opponent, had said: "There is but one case in which a hypothetic is untrue, viz. when the assumption is true, but the inference false, e.g. If it is day, it is night. A hypothetic is true, 1. When both assumption and inference are true, as, If it is day, it is light. 2. When both are false, as, If the earth flies, the earth has wings. 3. When the assumption is false, but the inference true, as, If the earth flies, the earth exists." Diodorus denied all these propositions, maintaining that the only true hypothetic was that in which a true inference is necessarily and always combined with a true assumption. (Onôp µητα ἐμβλήηης µητα ἐμβλήηης ἀρχηγον αὐτής, ὁποῖος λήγειν τι ἡ ψευδος.) Nothing is said by Sextus of "simple propositions," to which the controversy is evidently inapplicable. Etc.]
dependent on every other, and nothing conceivably possible which was not also real, is too obvious to require comment. [I may note, in passing, that the doctrine that the possible and real are coextensive, has been developed in two opposite directions. A French theorist of the last century held a doctrine which involved the proposition that there was nothing conceivable which was not realized in some part of the universe*. The difference, then, between the doctrine of Diderot and that of Diodorus would be, that the one swelled the real to the possible, the other contracted the possible to the real; both equally ending in making them coincide.]

The last proposition which I informed you was held by this Megaric philosopher was that in which the opponents of the reality of the sensible universe in every age of Grecian philosophy agreed, and which formed the great practical example and public triumph of their doctrine,—the denial of the reality of motion. In the latter part of my last series of lectures I believe I endeavoured to show you that this famous proposition was far from being the mere dialectical puzzle it is so commonly represented. The "Solvitur ambulando" of a modern logician (an obviously unsatisfactory evasion) was tried upon Diodorus himself in a more disagreeable form. We are told by Sextus Empiricus⁴ that he had gone with a dislocated shoulder to the famous surgeon Herophilus; and that the latter delayed the operation for a considerable period, assuring the unhappy logician that he had been so abundantly convinced by his last lecture, of the total impossibility of motion, that though his eyes seemed to assure him the bone had left its place, he refused any longer to trust those deceiving senses:—nor was it without considerable entreaty and earnest recantation that the physician consented to forget that the bone could not have moved "either in the place where it was, or the place where it was not." The proposition "that motion is impossible" is only a popular instance and practical example of the wider proposition, that succession is rationally inconceivable; and the principles on which the proof was based are equally applicable to every case of change. The true object in them all seems to have been to demonstrate, that, tried by pure reason, change is contradictory; and consequently, that in that intellectual world of which pure reason is the organ, the only real and eternal world, change, and all its phenomena of plurality and succession, can have no being. The steps by which the rational contradiction alleged to be

---

* Diderot—with Mr Stewart's comments in Prel. Disc. Notes.

⁴ [Pyrrh. Hyp. ii. 245. Ed.]
involved in the phenomena of motion was reached, were various; but the object was the same in all. It is evident, that to accuse this tenet of violating the evidence of our senses, was so far from being an answer to its supporters, that their triumph, and the intended value of it, were actually founded on that very fact...One of the forms of Diodorus's view of the subject led him to assert that though actual motion was contradictory, accomplished motion might be real; κινεῖται οὐδὲ ἐν, κεκίνηται δὲ (Sext. Emp. adv. Math. x. 85):—or, in his own accurate language, the παρατατικὸν ἔξωμα was false, but the συντελεστικὸν true. This manifestly turned upon the argument, that at any given moment the body being in a definite place was actually not in motion; though in a subsequent moment it might be asserted that it must have been. Whatever be the rapidity of the motion, argued the subtle Megaric, at each separate instant the body must occupy a single place, which gives the very notion of rest, which again is the formal contrary of motion; the same may be said of every successive instant; these instants make up all time; in what time then does the body "move?" Yet, on the other hand, we are irresistibly led to believe that the body has been in constant motion: it moves not, yet it will have moved. The suggested conclusion was, that the phenomenon of change presents a contradiction which cannot stand the test of reason; the world of sense (which is essentially a world of incessant change) is therefore an illusory presentation on which no science can rest; numerical plurality (involving succession) is itself a mere accommodation to the inferior nature; and no safe footing is to be had for philosophic thought, until the mind, penetrating through the vail of sense into the sanctuary of reason, there detects, beneath this multiplicity of appearances, the hidden unity of things—infinite, eternal, and alone! We may now take leave of the fragments of Diodorus, whose views, you will perceive, I have endeavoured to arrange and harmonize, so as to supply, not merely information as to definite facts, but an authentic illustration of the natural workings of a fundamental idea in speculation. You can now understand that the Megaric philosophy is nothing more than a development, in a dialectical form, of the metaphysical principle of Unity; it is the logic of the Eleatic metaphysics. The illustration will be completed by a notice of Stilpo, ordinarily reckoned as the last name of celebrity belonging to this school. The founder of the Stoics is said to have inherited and propagated the reflections of Stilpo; and his son and pupil Dryso is numbered among the masters of Pyrrho the Sceptic. The fact
is internally probable; as the moral theory of Stilpo is equally discernible in both. In arriving at Stilpo, then, we may consider ourselves as having reached that stage of the Megaric development when its original principles worked themselves out; thenceforth combined with new elements, and limited in their influence by more prevailing ingredients.

The logical dexterity of Stilpo was the charm and terror of his age. He was himself a native of Megara, where by an honour similar to that posthumously accorded to Pindar, his house was reverently spared in the sanguinary siege of the city by Demetrius. Celebrated as he was in his own and succeeding generations ("philosophus acutus et probatus" is the testimony of Cicero), our extant memorials of his opinions are not more numerous than those of Diodorus. But they seem to me, scattered as they are and broken off from the common trunk which supported and united them, to bear very perceptible proofs, in the fruit which they bore, of the germ from which they grew. The family-likeness of the Eleatic and Megaric parentage is stamped upon the remotest and most isolated of its progeny.

Of Stilpo, then, little more is reported than that he attacked the "Ideas" (tà ɛδη) now become, in two different theories of them, the badge of the Platonic and Peripatetic philosophy; that he denied the possibility of logical predication, and that in his ethical speculations (to which he earnestly devoted himself) he held that the sovereign good consisted in absolute impassibility, or "apathy."... With these notices the ordinary chroniclers of philosophy are contented; but the study would be of little practical utility if some principle were not attainable which might illustrate them by itself, and by each other. These tenets (especially the dialectical principles) are usually regarded as plausible exercises of ingenuity in "cristic" opposition to the popular philosophy of the day; but even difficulties themselves are seldom chosen without a motive; and the very absurdity alleged against one of them would seem to indicate some profounder purpose in its ardent vindicator. The doctrine to which I allude is thus reported by Plutarch; and considered as an insulated opinion, does cer-

---

6 *Crit. Colot. c. 22, confirmed by Simplicius ad Arist. Phys. fol. 26. From Plato's *Sophist* (p. 251 c) it appears that Stilpo was not the inventor of this sophism. It was used by the Cynic Antisthenes, also a bitter opponent of ɛδη, to whom the words τῶν γεγονότων τῆς δυνάμεως point the allusion in the text of Plato. A German editor of Aristotle sees in this quibble an anticipation of the Kantian distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions. But this is to do it too much honour. See Deycks, *de Meg. Doct.* p. 85. Ed.]
tainly appear eminently absurd. Stilpo denied "that one thing could be predicated of another," by this mode of argument: "if running be predicated of a horse, the subject is not the same with the predicate; and so likewise when good is predicated of a man: for if a man and good were the same, how could 'good' be predicated of food and physic, which are confessedly things so different?" The humblest novice in logical science at once rejects this reasoning as a sophism; and we can scarcely doubt that a disputant so eminent as Stilpo saw the force of the obvious objection quite as clearly as we do. It is plain, then, that he must have proceeded upon some principle deeper than a logical one; upon some previous theory with regard to human knowledge of which this argument was but an example. To what then does this assertion amount, when viewed not in the example but the principle? To the assertion that no proposition is truly affirmable in which the subject and predicate are not absolutely equivalent. Now I have repeatedly represented the Megaric school as the dialectical form of the Eleatic. The Eleatic reasoners maintained the absolute identity of all which in this world appears individually different, the identity of all in the unity of a common nature: and they regarded it as the triumph of reason that it could detect this sublime sameness beneath the shifting scenery of sense. The business of reason was, then, the perception of identity; and all was ultimately resolvable into this category. What, then, was more natural than the declaration of our bold logicians of Megara, that in the strictness of truth, no proposition was tenable but that which expressed the relation of identity; that no term was predicable of another except in the affirmation of absolute sameness? And, as a necessary consequence, that every form of assertion which refused to identify the subject and attribute belonged not to the sphere of pure reason, but to that inferior world of the senses with which a just dialectic had no concern whatever.

In the strict prosecution of his fundamental metaphysics, then, Stilpo might be plausibly led to the apparently startling proposition which denied the legitimacy of predicates more extensive than their subject. It is obvious that this train of thought, pertinaciously pursued, would result in the denial of all abstract notions; for these abstract notions are the very predicates to which Stilpo refuses his logical passport, as well as being the very attributes that difference substances from each other. You will expect, therefore, to find the champion of the philosophy of unity obstinately opposed to every theory of the reality of universals, whether "in things" or "beyond
things"—Aristotelic or Platonic,—and here, accordingly, history places him. The guardian of the old Eleatic inheritance faithfully fulfilled his charge; and eagerly offered battle to every defender of every modification of the universal idea. The promptitude, the tenacity, and the publicity of the contests of these eristic gladiators of Greece at once remind us of the similar engagements in the scholastic ages; but I suspect that the discussions of the ancient logicians would be found more really interesting and more substantially valuable, because less strictly limited in their theological philosophy, and thence more at liberty to start and follow every variety of metaphysical hypothesis. This, however in its causes a misfortune for these inquirers themselves, may, with great probability, have made their engagements richer in variety and interest. It is a real cause of gratitude, that on many subjects of the higher metaphysics we are, for all practical purposes, released from dependence on the caprices of speculation; but we need not on this account resign all interest in their history: it is well to have that ground surveyed to our hand which we are unwilling ourselves to tread.

We must now briefly interpret Stilpo in his character of an ethical philosopher, a department in which he seems to have attracted much of the notice of antiquity, and largely to have influenced the subsequent fortunes of philosophy. I have before observed that internal evidence, as well as historical tradition, establishes the influence of this master in the rule of life advocated by Zeno and the Stoics, by Pyrrho and the Sceptics. The anecdote of the attachment of Zeno is well known; who, when Crates the Cynic in a fit of jealousy would have dragged this illustrious pupil from the lecture-room of Stilpo, exclaimed aloud, “You may remove my body, but Stilpo detains my soul!” And the Stoics themselves approved as a brother him who could reply to the conqueror of his native city, inquiring (in Seneca’s version of the story), “Numquid perdidisset?” “Omnia bona mea mecum sunt!” a sentiment by which, as Seneca, in his usual style of epigram, observes, “ipsam hostis sui victoriam victi.”

The sovereign good of Stilpo was expressed in one word, ὁμαδεσία, a term which Seneca translates “animus impatient,” not without apologies for the employment of a term which in his days, as well as in our own, seems to have obtained a signification the exact reverse of this philosophic use of it. (Ep. ix.) He distinguishes between this rigorous tenet and the more reasonable doctrine of the Stoics; “Noster sapiens vincit quidem incommodum omne,
This Ethical theory harmonizes with the Eleatic metaphysics.

We have seen the Eleatic principle of Absolute Unity in its metaphysical and dialectical aspects; we must now spare a moment to contemplate it in its moral attitude, in which it will be found not less influential in itself or instructive in its manifestations.

The principle professes to merge all individuality in absolute sameness. We may expect, at first sight, to find this doctrine not less active in the world of life than in that of inanimate nature or abstract conception. If, then, the reasoner who habitually dwells upon the oneness of the universe, come to apply his views to the properties of separate minds; and if his philosophic loyalty can stand the test of carrying out his principle in the very citadel of individuality, the personal consciousness; he must, to establish his point (which, if not absolute, is nothing), undertake to break down the barriers which nature seems to have erected between man and man. Now, if we adhere to the world of consciousness, this enterprise is impossible. No effort of ingenuity can invalidate the conviction with which each individual pronounces himself to be himself alone, and not another. But, by this time, you can readily conjecture that the Megaric was not to be embarrassed by a difficulty of this nature. He could demur to the evidence itself of consciousness; not indeed by denying that the witness makes the affirmation, but by refusing to allow the witness's competency. He could declare that the internal sense was as worthless as the external in the search of eternal truth; and that if the laws and principles of morals are to be based upon a scientific foundation, they must be fixed, not on the yielding sands of consciousness (itself, as Heraclitus had so often shown, never for two instants the same), but upon the impregnable rock of Reason. The philosopher will, therefore, morally as metaphysically, labour to forget himself in the universe. He will obliterate the illusive conviction of individuality by making himself, as far as possible, a petty element in a general plan; and regard life, as well as nature, as the necessary servant of unalterable fate. But if thus it be wisdom to show no will but the will of the universe, it must be wisdom to efface every principle which can urge the will; and this without exception; for while by perfect
neutrality the man leaves himself to the disposal of the governing whole, by the exertion of any affection or desire, no matter how popularly virtuous, he advances himself beyond the level of his place in the machine, and presumesto establish a separate interest in the world. It thus appears (if I am not mistaken in this attempt to penetrate his views) that Stilpo might, by a resolute adherence to his metaphysical principle, have arrived at that ēnāthēia which has so much perplexed the historians of ancient philosophy: nor can we be surprised to find, that, when from these cloudy heights of speculation the philosopher descended into common life, and transferred the theories of the pure reason into the sphere of sense, he would be likely to display what Pliny calls "rigorem quendam, torturatatemque naturae duram et inflexiblem." From this result it would seem that Stilpo himself was preserved, either by felicity of natural constitution, or by realizing that absolute indifferentism which is the directest practical form of his theory; or perhaps by that still more common solution of such difficulties to theorists of every class, a convenient oblivion of his whole array of irresistible truths when they threatened the smallest interference with his actual comfort.

In our day, under the modifying influence of Christianitv, and from other coincident causes, the moral and religious aspect (for it professes a religious aspect) of the system of Absolute Unity is very different. By the German apostles of the system advantage has been taken of these tendencies to the Infinite which seem to reveal themselves in every human breast, to cast round this imposing theory of the universe a garb of poetry and enthusiasm, which a severe critic has too justly designated "the mysticism of Atheism." That by a special intellectual appreciation that Absolute Essence which is no other than God can itself be contemplated, would seem calculated to elevate the soul to the loftiest apprehensions of itself and of nature, were it not that the Object thus discovered is left without attribute, almost without positive being; and a chilling silence observed as to the certainty or authority of all beneath this ultimate abstraction. Every aspiration after the infinite which can animate the heart of man is easily enlisted on behalf of a system which occupies ground so lofty, which does not ascend to the infinite, but supposes it attained, and thence at leisure surveys the universe: science, religion, and art—the true, the good, the beautiful—seem to swell to new amplitude, and rise to new dignity, when harmonized together as the necessary developments of that Absolute, which is one with the reason
and the reason with it; and it is not even difficult to con-
ceive, that the more mysterious doctrines of revelation may
be ingloriously made to appear the subordinate conse-
quences of the vast conception. But with all this, the
problem (which is no other than to reconcile the finite and
the infinite, simply—to explain the mystery of creation)
remains too certainly unsolved; and the votary of the
absolute, cheated out of his God, receives nothing in return
but a vast and impracticable abstraction.

I have spoken of these modifications of the Unitary
system (the modern German and the ancient Grecian) in
connexion, because they seem to have both arisen under a
form very similar. They both seem to have been in their
original essentially logical systems; systems, that is, pur-
posing to show how the reason of man must necessarily
contemplate the world to contemplate it at all; and after-
wards to have assumed the form of direct physical dis-
covers. In this point of view, the system—erroneous
even as an abstract scheme—becomes puerile and fantastic.
Yet this metaphysical hypothesis of Schelling is actually
styled the "Philosophy of Nature;" and the student of the
patient school of Baconian induction would start to see
with what easy deliberation a teacher, perhaps the most
popular and distinguished philosophical master of the 19th
century, addresses himself to the task of constructing an a
priori universe. Of course, the universe thus discovered
coincides accurately with the universe of reality; and the
illustrious professor felicitates himself for demonstrating
that to exist which he has seen around him since his birth.

But even as a merely logical explication of the universe,
I cannot think the system of "Absolute Unity" satисfac-
tory. It is true that any multitude may be arbitrarily
regarded under the category of unity; the whole reality of
things, the effect and its Almighty Cause, may be contem-
plated as One: but the essential discrepancies of things
are not neutralized by this logical amalgamation, nor can
any sound mind accord to that fallacious unity which, in
spite of irreconcilable discordance, identifies subject and
object, cause and effect, finite and infinite! We may, if
we please, term the finite a "manifestation" of the infinite,
or an emanation, or an aspect: the true difficulty, the
transit from the infinite to the finite,—the revelation of the
Incomprehensible in a world determinate in time and space
—is not one degree alleviated though we invented ten thou-
sand titles for the process, and called upon every language
of the globe to supply its contribution to our terminology.
God and the universe exist: it is as impossible to identify
the terms as it is to efface either!
SECOND SERIES.

You will not be astonished to find that Stilpo (along with the rest of the succession) was not remarkable for any cordial sympathy with the popular polytheism. With all its faults, the system of the "Unity of All" was at least calculated to raise the conceptions above the deified profligates of Olympus; and Stilpo, for some irreverences about the Minerva of Phidias, was cited before the Areopagus, and banished from Athens. "Ask me—" he whispered to Crates, who made some unseasonable inquiries about the proper mode of honouring these marble deities—"ask me, thou foolish man, when we are alone, and I'll tell you!" Euclides himself was famous for a reply still more evasive. He had been asked by some intrusive inquirer, how the Gods existed, and what were their tastes:—"One thing is quite certain," replied the sage coldly—"they have a thorough dislike for curious questioners!"

We here abandon the Megaric school, but its principles, especially its moral principle, we shall recognize in forms more or less determinate, on future occasions. At our next meeting we shall find it, little changed, among the precepts of Antisthenes, the founder of the famous sect of the Cynics. On that occasion I will endeavour to throw some light on the Cynic and Cyrenaic institutes of human life,—a subject of vast practical interest; the more popular character of which may make some amends for the unavoidable abstruseness of the disquisitions of this day; disquisitions which the poverty of original materials (amounting altogether to six or seven fragmentary notices), the absence of assistance from preceding inquirers, and the remoteness from ordinary conceptions of the fundamental theory which I have endeavoured to make the key of the entire,—have combined to render equally laborious to the investigator and (I fear) exhausting to the attention of minds not habitually exercised in these arduous speculations.
LECTURE III.

ELIAC OR ERETRIAC, CYNIC AND CYRENAIC SCHOOLS.

GENTLEMEN,

Before proceeding to the subject announced for this day, I ought to take a brief and transient notice of the school known by the title of the Eliac, and afterwards (from its most distinguished master, who was a native of Eretria in Euboea) the Eretriac school. This sect, which, though in its founder Phædo originally Socratic, was in its second founder Menedemus impressed with the stamp of Megaric opinions, differs so slightly from the school so largely illustrated at our last meeting, as to require little separate notice. Of Phædo, whose name has been familiarized to every ear by the celebrated dialogue of Plato, we know as a philosopher very little. It is said that to Socrates, who ever professed to regard the symmetry of body as mysteriously connected with harmony of soul, and who had been attracted by the appearance of Phædo in the midst of misery and want, he was indebted for release from a state of disgraceful servitude; and it is probable that the pupil's grateful fidelity was contented with extending the doctrines and reputation of a master so beloved.

In Menedemus, however, who studied under Stilpo, the Megaric infusion becomes strongly perceptible. When I have informed you that Menedemus is related to have held that virtue is one and undiversified, all apparent differences being only differences of name; that the Supreme Good is itself one and unchangeable; and that if not the total suppression, yet at least the absolute government of desire, was the great element of human excellence, you will recognize these opinions as a reiteration of speculations already recorded and analyzed. One element in the opinions popular at Eretria is preserved by Cicero (Acad. Qu. ii. 42). He tells us that to these philosophers "omne bonum in mente positum, et mentis acie, qua verum cer-

1 [Plutarch de virtute moral. 2 p. 80a Wytenh. Menedemus μεν ὁ εἶ 'Eretrias ἀνήκει τῶν ἄρετῶν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὰς διαφορὰς, ὡς μᾶς οὖσα καὶ χρομβήση τολλοκτ ἔθνημας: τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ αὐθαρυσθη καὶ διαθέτει καὶ δικαιοσύνην ἱκεσθαι, καθὰντι βασιλείας καὶ εὐβριωτῶν. Ed.]
neretur *.” a doctrine which (if I can venture to interpret a brief and obscure sentence) would seem to make the perception of truth the highest good of man, or to identify in one truth and goodness, as different aspects of the same original essence. This would appear to betray a Platonic*, as well as Megaric, influence; or perhaps a remaining tinge from the old Socratic sources. With his master Stilpo, the Eretrian teacher rejected all but identical propositions; and instituted dialectic warfare against all composite and negative assertions⁴. Of his opinions not much more has been rescued from the wreck of time, if we except the important practical maxim (not uncelebrated in antiquity), that a philosopher ought to get married⁴.

When we were engaged in considering the philosophy of Socrates, we saw that that great teacher had placed, as a corner-stone of practical morality, the proposition that virtue and happiness were inseparably united. Two auditors heard the maxim, but they left their instructor with opposite conclusions. The one held that virtue was happiness, the other that happiness was virtue; and both urged their respective opinions to an extravagant length. These auditors were the founders of the Cynic and Cyrenaic schools. Perpetually opposed to each other by the ordinary historians of philosophy, these schools are made to represent two irreconcilable tendencies of human nature. It will be my endeavour to carry the principle of harmony into even this opposition; and to discover, in the origination of these contrasted institutes of human life, the workings of a common motive and the effort for a common object. The aspiration after independence is the principle that equally interprets both.

Antecedently to the exercise of reflection, Man, suspecting no disparity between himself and his circumstances, submits to his position in the world, and instinctively imitates surrounding example. Encompassed by slaves he never dreams that he was born for freedom. More familiar with his own position than with any other body of facts familiarity produces its usual effect; con-

---

* Compare Plat. Philtch.
* [The doctrine is Socratico-Megaric rather than Platonic. It is contested in the Philebus, probably as the opinion of Euclides. (οὐθὲναυτῶν(sc. ἄνθρωπός καὶ φυσικῶς) ἄτι τάγαθή, ἀλλ’ ἄλλα τι ταχίστω, ἐκεῖθεν μὲν ταῖς, ἀμείναι δὲ ἀμφοῖς, p. 29 b.) Diogenes Laertius informs us (ii. 17, 134) that "Menodemus thought scorn of Plato and his followers, and also of the Cyrenaics, Stilpo being the only teacher he really admired." Cicero (Acad. Fr. ii. 42) identifies the Eretriacs and Megarics, significantly adding, "Hos contemnimus et jam abjectos putamus." —— ED.]
⁴ [These paradoxes are stated at length in Simplicius Phys. 19 b fol. Compare Prantl, Gesch. d. Logik. B. I. Abschnitt II. —— ED.]
⁴ [Diog. Laert. d. ii. § 128. —— ED.]
stancy is confounded with absolute necessity; what is and
has been seems to explain itself by its existence; and the
wonder which he daily sees he forgets to be wonderful.
But with reflection, however raised, comes restlessness and
dissatisfaction. He is set at variance with the scene
around him. He finds himself in the midst of a world of
perpetual mutability; yet he aspires after fitness, certainty,
repose. If, then, he be (through the mysterious dispensations
of Providence) as yet untaught (except in the inefficacious
form of a purely speculative tenet) to seek that high
repose in resting upon what even the contemptuous Ta-
citus could find as an element of practical influence in the
Deity of the Jews alone—Summun illud et æternum, neque
mutabile neque interitum*—it is manifest that the first
office of self-questioning reflection must be, to attempt the
arrangement of this matter between the world and the un-
quiet Being placed amidst it. The problem is simply no
other than this—to conciliate the demands of the mind,
irresistibly forming to itself an ideal state of perfect fitness
and harmony, with the actual circumstances of man in a
world of apparent confusion. When the solution of a
future state in which this great reconciliation may be
effecte, is presented to the mind, the difficulty is of course
so alleviated as almost to vanish; and the corresponding
 intimations which Revelation contains with respect to the
positive uses of the present state in the furtherance of a
general scheme of progressive perfection, leave (in a
practical point of view) scarcely anything to be reasonably
desired on the question. But to speculators from whom
this harmonizing truth was hidden, or by whom it was
entertained only as a faint and shadowy possibility, re-
fection was restricted to the original elements of the
calculation, and the dispute between Man and his Cir-
cumstances remained without mediator or umpire. Con-

fined within the present world, man must prepare to meet
his stubborn foe; nor will his enemy allow him choice
either of ground or of weapons. The prize of the contest—
the ultimate point of all earthly wisdom—assumes ob-
vously this form, the achievement of such a conquest over
the uncertainty of fortune as may amount to a total inde-
pendence of all its possible caprices. And I need not
remark, that as far as the anticipation of futurity can
affect the happiness of the present, this still remains, as
much as ever, the true form of the aim of all genuine

* [Tac. Hist. v. c. 5. For mutabile, imitable is now read, and rightly.
Tacitus does not find an element of practical influence in this, beyond its
incompatibility with image-worship, and it is hard to say whether he regards
this as an advantage or the reverse. Ed.]
earthly prudence. The celestial element which Revelation has introduced into the estimate (powerfully influencing as it does, through the agency of faith, and hope, and fear, the state of present happiness) of course must enter into every rational computation of the sovereign good of even merely temporal life; but it does not alter the principles of the computation themselves. It has thrown a mighty counterpoise into the scales, and it has contributed to enlighten the Reason that holds them; but they are the same scales which the same Reason held two thousand years ago. Prudence is still prudence, and nothing else; the love of personal happiness still unaltered, however the materials of calculation may vary.

The problem, then, being the attainment of unalterable repose in the midst of change, our first analysis exhibits it—now as ever—as resolvable in two possible forms. The mind becomes independent of nature by a change effected in either the mind or nature: in the mind by suppressing all its desires, or in nature, by compelling it to gratify them. This is the most general form of the difference between the ascetic and licentious systems of human life; and between Antisthenes and Aristippus as their respective representatives. Proceeding from abstract supposition to the theory as modified by the actual relation and character of the two terms, we perceive of the ascetic system, that its course is simple and absolute; it presents vast difficulties indeed in practice, but no direct contradiction in its theory. But the case is different as regards the opposite institute; and on the nature of the difference depends the solution of the character of Aristippus. It is obvious that the proposal is hopeless to compel nature to satisfy all human desires; and we may presume that no intellect, however perverted by its extravagant wishes, could seriously advance this as a practicable code of happiness for man. Some modification, then, must be introduced; and in the adoption of this modification lies the peculiarity of Aristippus as a teacher of Hedonism. The enjoyment of pleasure is the business of man; the attainment of all conceivable pleasure is impossible; nor can humanity expect to summon, at its call, all the aggregated treasures of every time and every space, which yet alone could duly answer the conditions of such a problem. In this point, therefore, nature is manifestly too strong for man; yet our problem is to subdue nature to his desires. The proper solution will be found in neglecting this unattainable height in theory, without resigning any of its practical advantages. For though a single moment of time and a single portion of space are all which, by the very constitu-
tion of his being, is granted to man; and though into that moment of time and point of space cannot be compressed more than the eternal laws of things will permit;—yet, if such a temper of mind be generated as will snatch from each place and instant the utmost amount of pleasure that it yields, without counteracting the intensity of the emotion by reference to any other possible varieties of past or future position; the subjection of circumstances to the sovereignty of mind—the philosophic independence of change—will have been effected sufficiently to save the principle. This I consider to have probably been the ultimate form of the Aristippean reasoning. The maxim that the philosopher who commands all enjoyment is commanded by none; the "οὐκ ἐν τῷ τοῦτῳ ἔχω ἄλλο" of his own apophthegm ⁶; the "mihi res non me rebus subjungere" of Horace; are subordinate exhibitions, or easy results, of the foregoing train of speculation.

Having thus endeavoured to illustrate these systems by exhibiting them as contrasted solutions of a common problem, I will notice a few further analogies, before proceeding to a more detailed examination of each.

1. That they were both fostered by the teaching of Socrates, is an historical fact and an internal probability. In the discourses of Socrates a very slight examination shows us elements which the spirit of system might naturally be expected to detach from their subordination, and erect into ultimate principles of action. His earnest confidence in the eventual happiness of virtue might easily be misconstrued into a representation that virtue was only of value as it insured it; from which the transition was almost imperceptible into the assertion, that all which produced real happiness was therefore virtue. In this stage of the deduction we find ourselves with the more mature school of Epicurus; but the earlier preachers of the maxim aspired to higher attainments than their successors. Happiness, not virtue, being once made the object in the foreground, it was felt necessary to confer that stability upon happiness which the advocates of virtue had ever claimed for their first principle. Despising as unworthy of the science of morals, if indeed this ever occurred to them, the evasions and compensations which Epicurus subsequently employed to shelter his feeble fabric of human happiness, by helping the present from the hopes of the future and the recollections of the past;—the Cyrenaics found the certainty and stability of happiness in confining it to the immediate instant of its enjoyment. Thus, not to urge the deduction farther, in this form of their theory you can without diffi-
culty recognize the double distortion of Socratic principles; the attribution of happiness to virtue lost in the attribution of virtue to happiness, and the demand for the stability of the first principle of morals caricatured by the pretended certainty of all momentary pleasure for the moment of its possession.

Not less manifest is the Socratic influence in the Cynical school; as indeed Greece plainly recognized when it styled Diogenes of Sinope Σωκράτης μαυσώμενος*. When Socrates affirmed (as Xenophon reports him, Memor. 1. 6), τὸ μὲν μηδένος δεῖ θειον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ως ἐλαχίστων ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ θειον,—and when, in conformity with such a principle, he exhibited a constant though temperate hostility to the luxurious habits of his age, you can at once discern the side of his manifold intellect which attracted Antisthenes to his conversations, and the habit of life which that stern moralist parodied in the club and wallet of the mendicant.

2. The next point of analogy between these opposite systems is in their common disdain of all scientific inquiry, except in strict subservience to the explanation of their respective systems of moral life. I need not remind you that in this particular they are the types of the adopters of extreme views of human life, whether ascetic or licentious, in every age of the world†. But until it shall have been proved that the highest glory of man is not to know and commune with his Creator, and that that knowledge and communion is not facilitated by the knowledge of his works; the cause of science will have little reason to tremble at the arguments, however it may dread the influence of its opponents. It is a singular fact, however, that a vast number of philosophical works are ascribed to Antisthenes by Laertius, who gives us a catalogue of their titles, occupying some pages. It is not improbable that these performances were written previously to their author's adoption of his severer maxims‡. We know that he arrived at

* The Cynic founder himself professed that the life of strenuous virtue required a mental firmness which he styled "the Socratic force."
† The opposition of the advocate of mere enjoyment appeals too little to reason to deserve much notice; the antipathy of the votary of self-denial acquires some show of respectability from its motive. We know how common is that short-sighted jealousy which would dissociate the connexion between knowledge physical or abstract and the interests of a pure and high morality.
‡ This is certainly not true of all the dialogues of Antisthenes. (See Diog. Laert. vi. 92, §§ 4, 2. οἱ δὲ πᾶσαι ἄγαθοι συνήθεις διὰ τοῦ μεγάλου Προσλέκοντο, κ.τ.λ.) Antisthenes survived Socrates more than thirty years, and seems during that time to have waged a brisk war with Plato and the Academy. He is mentioned by Diodorus Siculus as still alive in the archership of Cephsidorus (b.c. 365). Aristotle came to Athens b.c. 367, and probably knew Antisthenes, for his notices of the Cynics and their master savour of strong personal dislike. ED.]
the school of Socrates already advanced in life; and doubtless had occupied his earlier days among the disputations of the sophists, of one of whom (Gorgias) he had been the recognized pupil.

3. Another characteristic in which the Cynic and Cyrenaic schools are united is very remarkable. From each of these sects proceeded successors who inherited their mutual hostility, under the well-known titles of the Stoic and Epicurean schools; but, contrary to the usual progress of philosophic opinions, the principles of the subsequent were less unqualified than those of the anterior teachers. In each case moderation was the result of enlarged experience. The same perpetual attenuation of the more startling peculiarities of the system is observable (as far as we can see) in the whole progress of the Stoical philosophy. In a brief attempt to sketch the principal laws that regulate the progress of opinions, on a former occasion, I believe I noted this double effect of the conflict of principles—the mutual exaggeration and the mutual diminution. It is not much for the honour of human candour, that the latter should be, as here, the more unusual result.

4. The only remaining coincidence which I think it now necessary to notice, between these opposing theories of life, is the important fact, that they both seem to have at length terminated in countenancing an absolute indifference to life itself. That this result should meet us among the maxims of Cynicism will probably not surprise you; that it should accost us—a grisly phantom—among the bowers of the Cyrenaic voluptuary, may perplex you, as it has perplexed the majority of the compilers of the history of philosophy. I trust, before the close of this lecture, to convince it to be the natural consequence of predisposing causes. I know no more instructive fact, indeed, than this—that both the special systems of moral philosophy most celebrated in antiquity seem, whether directly or indirectly, to have furnished their disciples with reasons for the justification of suicide. Is it not a tacit avowal of their universal failure in their universal object? The improvement of human life to its highest value, and the attainment of perfect happiness, were the common object of both; death, the gloomy refuge of despair, discovers itself among the maxims, or the suggestions, or the inferences, of both!

We have regarded these systems, Cynic and Cyrenaic, in their common origin, and detected those resemblances in the midst of opposition which a common origin and object.

8 [The ὄψυχθεων of Antisthenes must have been exaggerated. He was but 70 at his death, which occurred, as just stated, after B.C. 365. He was therefore not more than 35 when Socrates died. Ed.]
invariably produce. We must now proceed to contemplate them more distinctly. Virtue, even in her travesty, claims precedence over unblushing vice; and our first inquiry shall apply to the philosophy of the Cynics.

With the personal history of the masters of Philosophy farther than it is necessary to explain the complexion of their teaching, it has not been my practice to engage you. Of the champions of the Cynic life we know little more than the occasional references of contemptuous antiquity betray. Antisthenes was of humble origin; the father of Diogenes had been banished for forgery. To men who entered life under auspices so unpropitious, a levelling and rigorous philosophy would be naturally acceptable. The reader of almost any of the lighter fragments of ancient times will not require to be reminded of the peculiarities of Diogenes; but a more judicious curiosity will extend to the state of society in which such a character could obtain immediate and universal notoriety. Historical scepticism has long learned to doubt the story of his Tub; an elaborate dissertation has, indeed, been written to prove it the mere fable of subsequent inventors (Heumann De Dol. Habit. Diog. Diss.); but the man is more wondrous than his dwelling, and his moral far more extraordinary than his physical position. It was assuredly no ordinary race of mankind among whom such a teacher could obtain eminence; and it is still the triumph of virtue, that even in her worst exaggerations she can command reluctant awe. The title of "Cynic" was a subject of dispute among even ancient etymologists. Some derived it from the scene of the master's teaching, the Cynosarges—a gymnasium near the temple of that Hercules whom he loved to cite as the representative of moral heroism and physical endurance. Many degraded it to an insulting allusion; but I find Sextus Empiricus happily softens this comparison to a compliment: "The Cynics," he declares, "rejoiced in the title of an animal celebrated as just, tenacious, grateful, spirited, and a terror to plunderers." To the latest period of heathen philosophy the sect seems to have maintained its scattered existence; but when its best and loftiest principles had been incorporated in the Stoical philosophy—"a Cynicis tunica" distantia"—it naturally tended to extravagance in order to maintain its distinctness, and seems

9 [The accident of the locality probably suggested the characteristic name. Somewhat similar is the instance of the Dominicans, who were called, or called themselves, Dominici canes. ὅ ἄγων was a common substitute for ὅ κυνης in writing of any of the Cynics, early or late. Inattention to this usage led Dr Whewell into a droll misapprehension of the meaning of Athenaeus vii. 16, in his paraphrase of the Gorgias. (Platonic Dialogues, i. p. 221.) Ed.]

10 [Which the Stoics wore, but the Cynics dispensed with. Ed.]
LECT. III. to have become to the Pagan world of contemplation pretty much what the mendicant orders were to the Christianity of the fourteenth or fifteenth centuries. I ought to premise that our knowledge of the Cynic habits is mainly derived from later writers,—such as Laertius, Arrian, and Maximus Tyrius. Few as are the positive records they contain, the value of even such notices is necessarily lessened by the remoteness of the authority. You will then excuse me, if I seem to advance with a less assured tread in endeavouring the task of reducing these relics into system.

We saw that the aim of the Founder of Cynicism was the establishment of man’s total independence of nature; and that the means proposed consisted in the absolute suppression of the affections. The “Life according to Nature,” a phrase which in other systems assumed a higher and better import, seems in the Cynic to have signified little more than a life independent of all the appliances of art. In the perfect votary of naked Cynicism the amputation of affection should be unqualified. Even the domestic impulses, and the tics of patriotism, we seem to perceive noticed with brief and harsh frigidity in the relics of the discourse of Antisthenes. The moral liberty which the annihilation of the passions was to ensure was declared to be the supreme good; this was virtue, and virtue brought happiness—the only happiness the sage could value. Laertius expressly records the maxim, τέλος το κατ’ ὀρθὴν ζησί: and attributes to the Cynic legislator that principle which afterwards made so distinguished a figure in Stoicism, that all between perfect virtue and vice were indifferent (αδιάφορα). To such a degree did this enthusiasm for independence urge the Cynics, that, if we may believe many of their ancient assailants, it led, not merely to a superiority to ordinary business, but to a wilful exhibition of contempt for ordinary decency. It is in this view that Cicero speaks of the sect in a passage in his Offices—“Cynicorum natio tota ejicienda est. Est enim inimica verecundiae, sine qua nihil rectum esse potest, nihil honestum.” B. I. 41.

Now the first remark which occurs in reference to a system based on the aspiration after total independence through suppression of desire, is this; that, in attempting the annihilation of all other vices, it inevitably tends to aggravate to portentous magnitude the vice of pride. In fact, the system amounts to little else than a sacrifice of all the rest of human nature on the altar of this single passion. It is like that stoppage of the natural transpiration in the animal frame, which only increases and exacerbates the other discharges. The truth is, that in such a system,
SECOND SERIES. 283  

whatever may be its pomp of profession, virtue is only nominally the cardinal idea; it is not cultivated for its own sake, but as the minister to another and more prevailing motive; and the Cynic (in this respect too closely copied by the Stoic of after times) thought much less of pleasing the Deity than of being his equal.

The next observation upon this system regards the Cynic conception of virtue itself. Virtue being mainly regarded as the means of liberation from the tyranny of those desires which are themselves the dependent slaves of circumstance, was considered to consist wholly in the subjugation of desire. As this rigorous rule extended to all the varieties of affection, it demanded (especially in those whose nature was not indurated by age and disappointment) a series of continued sacrifices; and accordingly by the Cynic no virtue seemed to be recognized of which the essence was not stern self-sacrifice. But this is an error, though even to this day a common error. Self-sacrifice, though a valuable test of the force of the virtuous principle, is not itself a necessary accompaniment of virtuous acts. Virtue consists in conformity to a rule. This conformity, partly through original frailty, partly through the aggravation of evil habit, can, in many cases, only by man be attained with more or less of self-denial: and in such cases the desert of virtue is unquestionably increased in proportion to the self-denial undergone in order to effect the conformity. But so far is sacrifice from being of the necessary essence of virtue, that the perfection of virtue consists in that state which habit has made it a sacrifice to abandon,—a state therefore in which, if self-subjection were of the essence of virtue, vice should obtain its honours; while on the other hand, years of self-sacrifice are endured by the slaves of ambition and avarice to realize their distant and prospective objects;—cases which plainly show that endurance of pain for a purpose beyond it is only incidentally connected with virtue. It proves the strength of the virtuous principle by trial; it heightens it by exercise; but it does not constitute it.

This error in the Cynical theory led to consequences similar to those which it has produced in all ages where it has been a prevalent practical principle. The endurance of suffering, valuable only as a means, was insensibly exalted into an end. Pain, which in itself has no moral character whatever, was identified with virtue; and physical misery made the necessary condition of moral happiness. By this perversion the virtues themselves were transformed into their opposites. Resignation, which, when founded on a high and holy principle, is nearly the loveliest form of
LECT. III.

human virtue, was hardened and embittered into frigid arrogance; and the fortitude that could despise the pomp of kings was itself the abject courtier of public notoriety.

Into the fundamental error involved in the whole principle of the absolute suppression of the affections, as themselves contradictory to reason, I prefer to postpone entering, until we shall have an opportunity of canvassing the theory in its mature form, in the philosophy of Stoicism.

These Cynic parodists of virtue do not appear to have ever attained much real influence over the public mind. Their celebrity, like that of the earlier Christian ascetics, was chiefly confined to the more unlettered classes, who, unaccustomed to disentangle the complexity of the human heart, assumed that man can have but one motive for voluntary austerity, and that the highest of all. The very extravagance of their tenets attracted those who were not habituated to minute distinction; who want time, or inclination, or opportunity, or natural faculty, to close with subtle truth; and with whom therefore a teacher, to be popular, must forget his precision of outline and delicacy of shading, assuming a style that bears much the same relation to the accurate form of philosophical inquiry as scene-painting bears to miniature. Such disciples have no memory for limitations or exceptions. The Cynics accordingly abounded in those unqualified maxims in which much truth keeps much error afloat. Ὁ σοφὸς ἀναμάρτητος, "the sage is sinless!" Μανεῖν μᾶλλον ἡ ἡσθείν, "I had rather taste insanity itself than pleasure!" Τὰν μᾶθη-μάτων ἀναγκαίωτον, τὰ κακὰ ἀποραθεῖν; a truth certainly, but indicative of the coldly negative character of the Cynic teaching. "He that will be my pupil," said Antisthenes, in the same spirit, "must bring a new book, a new pen, and a new tablet." The enemies of cultivation, they became in each successive age more and more the objects of literary ridicule; nor need I remind you of the Mordax Cynicus of Horace, or of the unsparing satire—the Menip-uses and Cyniscuses—of Lucian.

I have not detained you with any consideration of the logical views of the early Cynics. They were either sub-

---

11 [So Aristotle seems to say, *Metaph. viii. 3, 7*, where he speaks of Antisthenes and his admirers as uneducated, ἀνωτάτως. This however is said in reference to their logical tenets. Ed.]

12 [The logic of the Cynics was of the Eristic kind, like that of the Megarians, which it resembled in its general physiognomy, though the results to which it led were in some respects different. Antisthenes seems to have denied the truth of all propositions that were not identical, Arist. *Met. iv. 29*, and therefore the possibility of definitions, *ib. vii. 3*. These sophisms he may have learnt from Gorgias, his first master. His abhorrence of the Platonic ideas seems to have betrayed him into a rude form of materialism.
servient to the declared hostility of the sect against all its contemporaries (such as Antisthenes's attacks on the ideas of Plato), or the perpetuation of the tenets of earlier schools, or doctrines intended as objections to the value or validity of all speculative science whatever. One principle, attributed by Cicero to Antisthenes, it is but justice to record as some counterpoise to the severity of my past criticisms. In it we seem to discover the sentiments of Socrates professed with the courage of the Cynic; if, indeed, the opinion (which appeared in one of his written treatises) was not rather due to the elder philosophy of unity. "Antisthenes, in eo libro qui physicus inscribitur, populares deos multos, naturalem unum esse dicens, tollit vim et naturam deorum." (De Nat. D. I. 13, 32.)

We must now change the scene, and instead of the harsh and unwelcome dictates of the Cynic school attempt to unravel the softer logic of Cyrene. With that city, one of the most beautiful of antiquity, this school is connected throughout its entire development. Whether we class its teachers as one continued succession, or rather (with some historians) arrange them in two nearly synchronizing successions, of whom Aristippus the elder, his sister or daughter Arête, the younger Aristippus the son of Arête, and Theodorus Atheus, form the first,—Antipater, Hege-

He denied the existence of qualities, saying, "A man I can see, but I never saw the thing you call humanity." "True! your body has eyes, but your mind has none," was the retort. (Schol. Aristot. Brandis, pp. 60, 68; Tzetz. Chil. vii. 606.) Many covert allusions to Antisthenes exist in the Platonic Dialogues, and have been pointed out by Schleiermacher and others, especially Winckelmann (Antisthenis Fragmenta, p. 35, note). To the list he gives ought possibly to be added Sophista, p. 246, a passage alluded to in a note on the last Lecture. In the War of the Giants there described the "gods" represent the Megarians, the ηλης φιλοι. Their earthborn opponents have puzzled commentators, who speak, some of Democritus, others of Aristippus and the Cyrenaics. The foregoing anecdote and the materialism it implies, incline me to suppose that Antisthenes may be meant. The fierceness attributed to the anti-idealists agrees best with the Cynic character; and the strong terms in which their materialism is described accord ill with the more refined theories of Democritus and Aristippus. Δρός καὶ πέτρα (trees and rocks) are but indifferent synonyms for the "atoms and void" of the one, or for the θεωρητὴς τοῦ πᾶσαν (the unknown somewhat, or quasi-somewhat, which produces sensation) of the other.

This speculative materialism found its counterpart in the ethical theory of Antisthenes, and if we may believe Xenophon, in his ethical practice also. See the speech of Antisthenes in the Convivium, iv. 38, from which we may derive the maxim, that vice is culpable in the inverse proportion to its grossness. An extravagant personal vanity was characteristic both of Antisthenes and of the obscene Diogenes: and it is impossible not to sympathize in the scorn with which the more high-minded Socrates looked upon these odious caricaturists of their master. The germs of Cynicism may indeed be detected in the teaching of Socrates as reported by Xenophon, but these theoretical errors were neutralized by his nobler nature. This topic is well handled by Zeller in his History of Greek Philosophy, § ii, p. 57; § ii, p. 117. Ed.]
sias, and Anniceris, the second; they seem to have all gathered round the luxurious capital of Cyrenaica. I have before endeavoured to show you how even this system sprung from the effort for a content beyond what nature ordinarily allows; how the motionless rigour of the Cynic, the active volatility of the Cyrenaic, are but two responses to the same question; I must now endeavour with brevity, but if possible with accuracy, to lead you through the path by which Aristippus appears to have gained his solution, avoiding those aspects of the system which I have already illustrated, and which I may trust to your recollection for still preserving.

Every kind of speculation, I remarked already, was by both these sects employed as the mere instrument for establishing their respective ethical conclusions. That system of the human mind was, therefore, adopted by Aristippus, which would lead with the greatest directness to his practical philosophy. Though I have little doubt that this was the process by which the younger Aristippus (for to him the theoretic form of Cyrenaism is attributed) modelled his philosophic views, it will, I believe, be most perspicuous to reverse his course of inquiry, and explain the theory in the synthetic form, deducting the ethical from the elementary physical principles. The author of the system, as we now have it, appears to have set out with the restriction of all human faculties to simple sensibility,—the power of receiving sensations; on which, as those of no two human individuals might be the same, no certainty of knowledge could possibly, he argued, be built. These phenomena of sensibility ("interna permotiones," Cicero calls them, Acad. Qu. II. 46) being the sole materials of knowledge, and thus the sole criteria of truth, all ethical rules must depend on the qualities of sensations. Now the qualities common to all sensations are pleasure and pain; pleasure and pain are, therefore, the only elements of moral calculation. Pleasure being the sole subjective good, all attribution of good, as anything separate from pleasure, can only

18 [Aristippus the elder, though the fact of his authorship is disputed (Diog. L. II. 8, 84), was undoubtedly the inventor of the Cyrenaic system. He must even have developed it in a logical and systematic form. The consistent theory of pleasure combated in the Philebus of Plato was certainly his; and there can be little doubt that the curious and very subtle psychological speculations criticized in the first half of the Theaetetus were his also; however difficult it may be to distinguish them from the doctrines of Protagoras, from which, according to some accounts, they appear to have differed rather in phrase than in substance. I strongly suspect, however, that Sextus Empiricus, who gives the details of what he represents as Protagorean doctrine, drew largely from the Theaetetus. This, however, is one of the numerous questions respecting the "Sophists" which we have no means of answering; but which ought to be answered before we can have the right to dogmatize on the merits or demerits of the teachers to whom that name has adhered. Ed.]
regard those objects which are the means of pleasure, and which, by a natural licence of language, receive the title of that which they confer. Virtue, then, and every exercise of the affections (as friendship or patriotism) must fall under the sway of the universal formula; they are all to be sought or cultivated only with a view to the advantage of the possessor. And, as a certainty is essential to happiness, the sage will (according to the analysis I before produced) ensure his certainty in the immediacy of enjoyment, carefully rejecting all intrusive suggestions of past or future. Pleasure they constantly affirmed is μονόχρονος; and upheld that we reason inaccurately when we enlarge upon any universal notion of felicity, which in truth is only applicable to actual, individual, and instantaneous sensation. The Epicurean insisted upon pleasures of tranquility,—the Cyrenaic despised this cold negation; the Epicurean pleaded for mental enjoyment as the great element of happiness, the impatient philosophy of Cyrene disgraced itself by an almost unequivocal preference for the claims of the body; the Epicurean would draw all the tender recollections of the past, all the bright anticipations of happiness to come into his treasury of existing felicity,—the Cyrenaic disdained a maxim which if it occasionally heightened pleasure might as often neutralize it by pain. But every sorrow that darkened the horizon of memory or expectation was as nothing to the practised Cyrenaic, who had trained his soul into the unparticipated idolatry of the present moment. This, perhaps, throws some light upon a sentiment which Cicero seems scarcely to have understood. He represents Aristippus (Fusc. Quest. iii. 13) as holding that no griefs were to be regarded but "insperati dolores." According to the representation which I have ventured to give of the Cyrenaic theory of pleasure and pain, these were precisely the only griefs which the genuine Hedonist would allow to exist. But when to the advocates of this system the obvious objection was proposed, that this account gave no solution of a very remarkable phenomenon which can scarcely be overlooked in any ethical estimate—the eternal sameness and independence of the rule of virtue; that rule acknowledged in all climes, under superficial, but with little or no substantial, varieties; that rule of which Antisthenes had so truly proclaimed, that "it governs the sage far more powerfully than the laws of his country can do;"—the answer of the Cyrenaic was that

14 [Cicero's words are, "Cyrenaici non omni male aegritudinem efficent, sed insperato et nec opinato male." Compare Lib. iii. 22, and 31. Ed.]
which has since been so often reiterated by those who clothe his principles in a less undisguised form—that the sameness of convenience produced a sameness in the means of ensuring it, and therefore an identity in the assumption of "virtue." And if any more pertinacious antagonist objected, that by some mysterious contrariety to their own interest, men are found who wilfully maintain that even the highest certainty of physical pleasure and absolute impunity from avenging laws cannot justify a man in betraying his friend or assassinating his parent, the Cyrenaic escaped under vague references to the power of antiquity and prescription, and the veneration for all which is consecrated by custom and consent.

Of this degrading but seductive philosophy, Aristippus himself was the example as well as the teacher. Possessed, it would seem, of that constitutional gift of animal spirits which is so often mistaken for higher attainments in the art of philosophical or religious content, he resolutely pursued his maxim of extorting pleasure from every situation, and in every country gathering the fading flowers of enjoyment. We find him in Sicily the accomplished visitant of the court of Dionysius, at Corinth the acknowledged favourite of youth and beauty; but in every fragment of his discourse preserved from antiquity, we cannot fail to observe in the prosecution of his own art of pleasure, that total absence of refinement which proved that he was still ignorant of its most attractive forms. This is important to mention, because it was the direct result of the shape in which Aristippus adopted the general philosophy of Eudæemonism. To materialize pleasure, and to rob it of its associations in the past and future, was perhaps to be expected from the first advocate of the system; assuredly it proved that system to have not yet arrived at its most dangerous maturity.

The minuter varieties which the principles of Aristippus underwent in the course of their transmission from teacher to teacher, I am not now about to record. But there are one or two manifestations of their agency too instructive to be overlooked. And with a notice of these I shall close the subject.

1. The system of the school of Cyrene was a materialist system of psychology; and where a belief in Revelation has not interposed its extrinsic influence, it is undeniable that the materialist system has a strong tendency to speculative Atheism. I do not assert that it admits of no legitimate escape from this conclusion; I speak simply of the generation of a tendency to adopt it. To this result it seems to me that all philosophic history,
more particularly the history of the French philosophy of the last century, bears irresistible testimony. To the Theist the manifest existence and necessity of a designing Supreme Intelligence becomes a powerful argument for the possible, or probable, or certain, existence of a separate immaterial human mind; for he reflects, if matter cannot generate God to organize it into all its exquisite forms of design, why should it be deemed adequate to originate that thing from which alone we learn in the perception of design to conclude a God? While on the other hand, as the materialist's only notion of intelligence in man (and thence his only notion of intelligence at all) is as a function of matter—one of the innumerable forms of material results—it is impossible that he can find any reason from analogy for admitting, or at all conceiving, intelligence distinct from matter. Consequently, as design inevitably infers intelligence, he escapes into a confused Spinozism, in which the primary matter of the universe is itself endowed with thought. The very notion of "design" in the materialist's view can signify no more than mental matter conceiving suitabilities; and accordingly beyond mental matter the argument from design is never likely to bring him. How these tendencies are increased by a system which destroys the distinctions of virtue and vice, and thus silences the promise which the conscience makes of a Supreme Judge, it is unnecessary to insist. The result in its completeness is presented in Theodorus of Cyrene, whose daring denial of a deity is perpetuated in the title "Atheos, which posterity has affixed to his name.

2. To the development of Cyrenaism finally to be noticed I have already promised to direct your attention.

That there is in even the wildest visions of earthly enjoyment a something mournfully brief and unsatisfactory is a remark with which you are all of course familiar, and the truth of which, doubtless, you can all in many degrees attest. The remark itself is nearly as old as human experience, though under the empire of Christianity alone (for reasons not difficult to be apprehended) it has been brought out with a prominence commensurate to its importance. The same Divine Conriver, who has bestowed upon man

* If (from independent reasoning) we know that the First Cause cannot have been material, can we believe that which pronounces the necessity of a First Cause is itself a material product? If the conceiver of Order was separate from tangible matter, is the perceiver of Order the creature of matter? [Compare Shelley's Adonais:]

"Nought we know dies; shall that alone which knows,
Be as a sword, consumed before the sheath
With sightless lightning?" Ed.]

B.
ON THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

LECT.

III.

desires and affections with a view to their rational gratification in the maintenance of his temporal scheme, has yet taken care, by affixing to them all this melancholy character of felt insufficiency, to stamp them all as being, in their present exercise, the temporary machinery of a merely introductory stage of existence. To a mind habitually thoughtful, then, it may be expected that the very experience of pleasure will more or less constantly present this supplementary conviction; and, indeed, those who are conversant with one large class of the works of imagination at this day most popular in our literature, will not fail to have observed that their secret but pervading charm consists in the use of this sublime discontent as a means of interest and effect. These dangerous but fascinating productions attract, precisely because they administer to two opposite but coincident feelings—the love of pleasure and the conviction of its nothingness; and they are dangerous, because they accustom the mind to be contented with this imperfect development of the purpose of the emotion; to think that to deplore the deficiencies of earth is really to desire heaven; or that vaguely to long for that mysterious world to come, as the complement of earthly enjoyment, is truly to elevate the affections to "things above!

Pleasure, then, tends to betray its own poverty, unless when the natural growth of satiety is prevented by variety or occupation. The possible consequences are twofold. The melancholy conviction must either cast the restless though wearied spirit upon the supposition of a future state, where its disquietude shall find peace (which is the legitimate lesson of the disappointed affections); or in default of the admission of this great reconciling fact—whether from mere despair of its possibility, or more deliberate disbelief—must darken into gloomy disgust with life, and impatience of its wretched remnant. The school of Cyrene fails not to furnish its example. In Hegesias, who from his doctrine was surnamed πεισθάνατος, the philosophy of pleasure became a philosophy of suicide. Pleasures, according to this teacher; were the accidents of rarity or frequency; the pleasures of all classes were levelled to a degrading equality; they were indifferent, worthless, overbalanced by misfortune; and the sage, wearied with the unprofitable chase, would gladly seek the easy refuge of eternal rest. Suicide, like things of less moment, has in various ages of the world spread by the

16 [This was written in or before 1840. In the margin stand the names of Byron, and the late Lord Lytton, to whose more recent productions the description in the text is quite inapplicable. Ed.]
agion of fashion; and so powerful was the melancholy rhetoric of this advocate of the grave, that an Egyptian king was obliged to prohibit the publication of his discourses. In that country of mysteries the gloomy orator might have found his own type; the shrouded skeleton of the Egyptian banquet might symbolize the sepulchral visions of Hegesias vailed—yet only lightly vailed—amidst the festive philosophy of Aristippus and his disciples.

18 [So Cicero Tusc. Qu. 1. 34, 83, who adds, ib. 84: "Ejus autem...liber est Ἀτοκαρτηρῶν, in quo a vita quidam decadens revocatur ab amicis: quibus respondens, vitae humanae causa erat incommoda." Ed.]
LECTURE IV.

PLATONIC PHILOSOPHY. NO. I.

GENTLEMEN,

We have traced the chief lineaments of those minor philosophies which engaged the Grecian world during the latter life and immediately after the death of Socrates. In reviewing them, marked as they are by strong characteristic differences, we have been, as it were, modulating through a diversity of keys in the human soul; but all these are only the prelude to the more solemn and profound harmony to follow. It is not without emotion that I arrive at that stage of our progress which brings me to the philosophy of Plato: a philosophy which, whether regarded in itself, or with reference to its influences upon the history of reflective man, rises before us in all the dignity of the mightiest and most permanent monument ever erected by unassisted human thought exercised upon the human destinies. It is true, that in the opinion of the multitude, this majestic structure can now be considered as little more than the ruin of ancient glory; the interest that still belongs to it is, in their mind, the interest that attends the decay of everything which bears the impress of former greatness, and that makes all for ever venerable which once was venerated. Even in this view the speculations of Plato would amply recompense the inquiry of every mind which has learned to find its Present in the Past; and which, seeing little in the world around it to engage or gratify, would gladly compose its favourite scenery of thought from the ideal excellences of a world that cannot return. But the claims of the Platonic philosophy far overpass this inferior ground. Its powerful influences in every age sufficiently demonstrate this. They prove that, whatever opinion we may justly form regarding the details of its reasoning, and however we may be disposed to criticize their legitimacy, there is, in the body of the system itself, a something which finds its echo in the heart, and its reflection in the reason, of universal man: and they suggest that even its errors, if they exist, are, from their peculiar complexion and character, likely to be better worth investigation than the truths of narrower the-
SECOND SERIES. 293

We may refuse assent to the express decisions of Master, we may often lament his wavering indecision in his conclusions in which nothing seems concluded,—we may regret also that Imagination should flush with her rich and changeful hues those very regions which it is the declared purpose of the philosopher to present in the ethereal transparency of pure Reason; and, lost in the bewildering labyrinth of beauty, we may sometimes sigh for the cold exactness of Plato's great pupil and rival;—but in defiance of all our exceptions, objections, and perplexities, there is a spell in the page, and no man, worthy to read Plato, can read him, and not own himself in the presence of a mighty Interpreter of the human Soul.

It is not wonderful, then, that Plato (like one of his ideal Ideal Forms) has since manifested himself in our world in every variety of external shape. Every view of human nature which exalts its condition and its destinies, allies itself by a natural sympathy with the philosophy of Plato; and even by those who reject his reasonings in their original form, these wonderful conclusions are accepted, as presenting in a poetical or mythic shape the highest results of subsequent speculations. Platonism is immortal, because its principles are immortal in the human intellect and heart. After captivating the serene reason of Cicero, after receiving the strong tincture of Oriental infusions yet maintaining itself unaltered in the schools of Alexandria, after supplying language to the mystic interpretations of Origen, and the aspiring affections of Augustine, it disappears to rise unimpaired in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries; it possesses half the South of Europe, it encourages the speculations of Descartes, it fills and animates the whole capacious mind of Leibnitz, it affects the tone of theological exposition in every Christian country, and peculiarly in one remarkable school of divines in England; and, outriding the storm of the ultra-sensualism

\[\text{footnote: The so-called Cambridge Platonists, H. More, Cudworth, John Smith, Whichcote, &c. See an interesting notice of these divines in Burnet's History of his own Times, i. p. 187. It is remarkable that some of the warmest promoters of the new mathematico-physical philosophy in Cambridge are numbered among these Platonists or their disciples; Wilkins, for instance, and Barrow, whose theology however is cast in a different mould from that of the divines above enumerated. It was to these that the name of Latitudinarians was first applied by 'men of narrower thoughts and fiercer tempers.' Burnet, &c. The impiety of Hobbes's opinions, which had 'spread much,' led 'this set of men at Cambridge to assert and examine the principles of religion and morality on clear grounds, and in a philosophical method.' "They were all very zealous against Popery." "And now that the main principle of religion was struck at by Hobbes and his followers, the papists acted upon this a very strange part. They went in so far even into the argument for atheism, as to publish many books, in which they affirmed that there was no certain proof of the Christian religion, unless we took it from the authority.} \]
of France, it finally reappears in the *Critique of Pure* 

son of Kant, which reminds us even more of the ideal 

traction of the Platonic, than of the minuteness of the 

Aristotelian, dialectic. How Platonism has since then 
fared, it is needless to tell you. Its influence is at this 
moment on the increase. It has of late engaged the 
exegetical labours of the Continent far more than any other 
classical or critical subject: and elaborate translations of 
the entire works of Plato have been among the tributes of 
his admirers in France and Germany. High as are the 
quickness of his rival; minute and comprehensive 
as were his labours; clear as is his 
ience of didactic exposition; accurate as is his reasoning and its expression; and 
aided as he has been, and is, for these reasons, by the direct 
patronage of our great Universities,—the influence of Aristotle is again waning before the 
triumphant star of his master;—if, indeed, since the expiration of the scholastic 
ages, he could ever have been regarded as mingling in the 
general current of human thought with the depth and force 
of Plato.

[t.] One cause for this influence is, doubtless, to be 

found in the attractive and affectionate tone,—in the high and 
consoling doctrine,—with which, from the depth of antiquity, Plato still addresses every elevated spirit. Wearied 
with the daily nothingness of a life which mocks with the 
ilusion of happiness, that retreats as we approach it, it is 
wonderfully soothing to speak across the chasm of ages 
with one who could thus distinctly perceive, in the nature 
of his own reason, the promise of an eternal heritage above 
and beyond the visionary scene of earthly life; and though 
to us from external testimony surer argument of this 
mighty truth is given than any which the investigation of the 
soul, and of its correlative ideal world, can confer, 
assuredly in no well-taught mind is its fellow-feeling with 
the nobler efforts and aspirations of reason on that account 
diminished. On the contrary, I am persuaded that the 
very tendency of faith, when it becomes an abiding princi-

cle, is to internalize more and more our proofs and con-

of the Church as infallible." In the present state of opinion in England, 
no apology seems necessary for inviting attention to this curious statement of Burnet. Interest in this school has been lately revived by the able essays 
of Principal Tulloch, which first appeared in the *Contemporary Review*, and 
have since been embodied in an elaborate history of the men and their opinions. Unfortunately, with perhaps the single exception of Whitchcot's pithy Aphorisms, the writings of the Cambridge Platonists properly so called do not come 
under the vulgar description of "readable books." Henry More's poem is in 
parts excellent—but the general ruggedness of his numbers, and diction is but 
scantily interrupted by stanzas altogether satisfactory in point of rhythm and ex-
pression. See an article in the *Retrospective Review*, Vol. v. p. 223, containing 
extracts, some of which are justly characterized as "truly Spenserian." Ed.]
victions of a future world, to loosen their dependency on
the evidence of witnesses, and thus to bring them, if not
into coincidence, at least into sympathy, with the very
class of proofs on which the Platonist loved to dwell.

[2.] In glancing at this link of connexion, I have,
indeed, fallen upon that which constitutes perhaps the most
powerful cause of the prolonged influences of the writings
of Plato,—the harmony of many of their sentiments with
some parts of our divine religion. Limited as are our ideas
and our expressions, it would be strange indeed if all the
nobler views of the destinies of human nature did not in
some measure correspond; "deep calleth to deep" in the
human soul; and all that understand it must in some
degree understand each other. A Revelation, though it
descend from the Supreme Wisdom Himself, must be com-
pressed into a size adequate to the human faculties, to be a
Revelation to them; and must, therefore, in many cases,
traverse ground already trod, and in all cases employ
phrases already employed. We are not therefore to wonder,
—and I trust no short-sighted jealousy will pervert the
honesty of our judgment,—when we recognize in the high-
wrought speculations of Plato, among much that is fantastic,
and much that is false, glimpses of a world not unlike that
which Christianity has disclosed; and when we hear the
Holy Spirit that breathed in the Evangelists utter, to indi-
cate supernal truth, words and phrases not unfamiliar to the
student of Plato. This may perhaps be the fitting time to
pause for a moment upon an objection which has been
answered in just as narrow a spirit as it has been alleged:—
nor the less fitly now, that in many minds it has hardened
into a resolute prejudice against the whole subject of Pla-
tonism, and may, therefore, be properly resisted at the
outset. You will, however, consider it a digression, (though
a necessary or expedient one,) and be ready, after a brief
delay, to return to our main topic.

Infidel writers, who discern in the theology of the New
Testament, and even in the discourses of its Divine Founder,
expressions, and perhaps forms of thought, of a Platonic
cast, have eagerly seized this characteristic as a pretext for
humanizing its entire system and origin; and one,* more

*It is scarcely necessary to observe that the writer alluded to is the
celebrated author of the *Decline and Fall*, whose 21st chapter is well charac-
terized in the text. Guizot's notions of Plato were confused enough: those
of M. Guizot, his commentator, though much more precise, are scarcely more
true. One point indeed the illustrious Frenchman has clearly stated; he has
shown that there is no *Logos* in Plato; but he is as clearly mistaken in
supposing that St John was indebted for the term or its equivalent only to
Hebrew sources. Nothing is more striking than the coincidence of phrase
between the Evangelist and Philo; and Mr Milman properly calls attention
eminent, has, with unmatched powers of sarcastic insinuation, represented the whole as a mere copy of the fashionable Platonism of the day. Various answers have been given, rebutting this charge by a reference to the historical facts of the case; answers completely satisfactory to every candid mind, as respects the total improbability of the connexion alleged. But when minuter discussion approaches the doctrines or phrases themselves, a jealous dread is evinced, of allowing, in the remotest degree, the analogy contended for. Now, as concerns the doctrines in question, especially that cardinal doctrine which is placed in the front of the controversy, it would be premature to speak; because any fair discussion of the subject would involve a lengthened consideration of the supposed Platonic models. It may be enough for the present to say, that the resemblance is, at most, nothing more than that faint similitude which may naturally be anticipated between the independent conceptions of a very gifted reason, and the general outlines of truth in even its most mysterious regions. Of the "Persons" (to use a very imperfect phrase) of the blessed Trinity we know little more than a distinction of offices; and such,—or something approaching to such,—a distinction of offices in the Supreme Essence is not, perhaps, wholly beyond the antecedent conjecture, however beyond the demonstrative certainty, of contemplative reason. And every such speculation, if it cannot much corrobore, cannot at all enfeeble, the truth.

But with regard to the phrases, especially with regard to one which holds a high place in the vocabulary of Christian Faith, there can be little doubt, but surely as little difficulty. Those who idly dream that he compromises Christianity, who willingly concedes the fact of the use of an old and recognized term to express a truth till then unknown, are little aware how far their principle will carry them. For example, the learned labours of Wetstein, Schoettgen, and others, seem to have shown us many of our Lord's expressions, and even parables, among the relics of Rabbinical literature. Granting the critical question of priority decided, need the Christian advocate fear to assume a wider ground? is there anything unworthy of a divine Instructor in such

to the "long residence of St John at Ephesus, the centre of the mingling opinions of the East and West," in proof that he was acquainted with the Alexandrine literature. Mr Milman's conclusion nearly agrees with the views set forth by Prof. Butler in the text: "The simple truth may be, that St John took the familiar term, and, as it were, infused it into the peculiar and Christian sense in which it is used in his writings" (D. and E. Chap. xxii. note, p. 314, ed. Miln.). Those interested in the subject would do well to compare Dumer's Christologie, especially the Introduction to that valuable and now well-known work. Ed.]
adoptions? or rather are they not themselves a mark of superiority to that ambition of even the best human hearts, the ambition of exclusive originality? Surely we may conceive that out of thousands of possible forms of expression, an instructor liberated from earthly weaknesses would select precisely that which was most suitable, because most congenial, to his auditory; and this, though he possessed a complete acquaintance with every other form in which the same commissioned message of wisdom could have been fashioned. There seems to be no law of divine interference more certain than that God always uses the machinery prepared to His hand, as far as it can be consistently employed. I need not point to baptism, circumcision, and many other rites, as instances of this. It must be remembered that the natural world itself is His property no less than the supernatural; and that there is no right product of human thought of which He is not Himself the producer by the instrumentality of created minds. It seems to me most manifest, that the anxiety to claim absolute novelty for every the minutest element and circumstance of our belief, is only one of the many forms of our habitual degradation of God to our own standard. Were we charged with the publication of a system of belief, and allowed unbounded liberty in devising it, doubtless we should delight in startling the unbelieving world with unexpected terms and propositions; and we ascribe this petty pride to that Majestic Governor whose impartial care is over all His works, and whose purpose, when He came among us, was, not to triumph in the mistakes of His noblest creatures, but, without respect of persons, ages, or countries, to bring in an everlasting righteousness.

Now the use of the expression mainly alleged in this discussion is a prominent example of the very principle of adoption of which we have spoken. That the term Λόγος was already in use, and already employed in a sense not dissimilar to that in which it is consecrated by inspiration, is unquestionable. It is found in the writings of the Jewish Platonist Philo; it is found in a sense far less definite indeed in the writings of Plato himself; its Hebrew form was familiar to the Jewish theologians. The object of the great Evangelist was, manifestly, not to invent a term, but (what was much better) to declare that there was a Being who really possessed the same or similar attributes with those which his hearers had, from various sources, learned to ascribe to their Λόγος and their Memra* Jah; and with

* Memra is a Chaldaic term, signifying the Word. In many of those passages in the Pentateuch where the ineffable Name Jehovah occurs, the
this view he makes (as it were) their Logos the Hero of his narration, incorporating in his own account, by the very adoption of the term, every fragment of truth which the world already possessed; and rather enlarging, fixing, and clearing the received notion, than introducing one radically new. You will perceive how natural, or rather, how necessary, is such a process, when you remember that this is exactly what every teacher must do, who speaks of "God" to a Heathen; he adopts the term, but he refines and exalts its meaning. Nor indeed is the procedure different in any use whatever of language in sacred senses and for sacred purposes. It has been justly remarked, by (I think) Isaac Casaubon, that the principle of all these adaptations is expressed in the sentence of St Paul, "Ov ἀγαπηντες ευπρεπετε, τοῦτον ἐγὼ καταγγέλαω ὑμῖν." And in its most general aspect,—that He who has given us faculties for reflection and conjecture should now and then condescend to accept our poor products as materials for His own purposes of enlightenment, is only another instance of the same condescension, which, to the exaltation of His own glory, and of ours in His, accepts our temples, our praises, and our prayers.

Such are the principles on which I would recommend you to regard this controverted question; principles which I have here introduced with a view to their accompanying you in the course of studies which must perpetually bring you to points where Christian analogies will arise. You will everywhere see how freely our Revelation has adopted its language from every quarter, to what higher purposes and more assured hopes it has consecrated it; and in this very freedom in the use of its subordinate materials, you will (if I have succeeded in impressing my own view) recognize the calm superiority of independent truth.

But, with respect to the prolonged popularity of the Platonic philosophy, as dependent on its connexion with the Christian faith,—the subject on which we were engaged,—you will readily apprehend that the foundation of this connexion lies deeper than any coincidence of occasional phraseology. As I have already intimated, the true bond of union was to be found in a certain similarity of sentiment upon the ultimate destinies of human nature, and upon the character of the Supreme Being*. On these

Chaldaic paraphrases have substituted the term Memra, thus ascribing Divinity to the Word. Vide Calmet, Dict. in voc. T. W.

* [In the Tübinger Zeitschrift for 1837 will be found an interesting essay by Baur, entitled "Das Christliche des Platonismus, oder Socrates und Christus." Ackermann had previously published a treatise on the same subject: Das Christliche in Platon &c. Ed.]
subjects, which necessarily occupy so much of the Christian’s thoughts, the Platonic treatises supplied expressions, views, and arguments, adapted without difficulty to Christian purposes. And however inferior to the warm-hearted ethics of Christianity, in all that concerns the reciprocal duties of men, and too absorbingly contemplative in its whole tone, it is easy to conceive how this very character might possess attractions for those who had rather think and feel than resolve and act.

But while the reputation of Platonism has thus been upheld by its partial sympathy with the genius of revealed truth, I need scarcely remind you that this alliance has not always been favourable to its encouragement*. With many of the stricter fathers of the Church Plato was sternly pronounced to be the “Condimentarius haæreticorum.” A later authority furnishes the warning, not, perhaps, always unreasonable, to the weaker order of minds, “Platonem tum precique cavendum esse, cum piis dogmatibus magis similis esse videtur.” And Clement VIII. was earnestly dissuaded by the famous Cardinal Bellarmine from sanctioning by his pontifical patronage this too seductive counterfeit of Christian piety. But, while noticing the more general grounds of its perpetuation, I must not now suffer myself to be drawn into any detailed account of the history of Platonism; one of the most interesting, indeed, but also one of the most complicated, subjects in literary history. We may find an occasion to trace it hereafter.

Of a thinker, who has thus deeply impressed his image upon the subsequent fortunes of the human mind, every reader acknowledges a natural curiosity to learn the personal story; to penetrate to the springs of that mighty river which has since spread so widely through every region of thought. The minute history of the life and mind of Plato executed by his own inimitable pen, would be the richest biographical treasure in all uninspired literature. But the fountain of his wisdom (apart from the suggestions and excitements of the Socratic teaching) is nearly as secret as those sources of the Nile which he is said to have spent so many mysterious years in reaching. He himself soon became the god of a mythology more fantastic than that

* One or two terrible characteristics of the original Platonic writings, which those at all conversant with them will too readily recall, could scarcely fail to mingle a darker colouring of dread (not to say abhorrence) in the admiration that accompanied a Christian’s perusal; and the very resemblance of the higher elements of Platonism to Christian sentiments offered unhappy facilities to the endless caprices of heresy.

4 [“Doleo bona fide Platonem omnium haæreticorum condimentarium factum.” Tertull. de Anima, c. 43. Ed.]
which he had lavished such treasures of fancy in beautifying.

His first essays were poetical, epic, lyric, dithyrambic; and we may conjecture, from the character of his writings, how deeply he enjoyed the wild and imaginative legends of his national history. At the age of twenty he became the hearer of Socrates; and charmed with the vista, which the converse of that teacher opened to his ardent and far-reaching intellect, abandoned the outward profession of poetry, too often, perhaps, only to embody it in the form of philosophical enthusiasm. We have scarcely a trace to guide the conjecture—How did Socrates receive this mighty pupil? Anxiously looking for facts, we are presented by Apuleius with a vision of a swan that predicted to Socrates the first arrival of Plato. The strong common sense of the old master could scarcely have approved the more daring flights of the pupil; yet his penetration cannot but have detected the germ, and admired the expansion, of extraordinary faculties. The few indications of their connexion are honourable to Plato. Illness prevented his presence on the day which he has immortalized in the *Phaedo*; but he had endeavoured in vain to raise his voice among the mob of judges that condemned his venerable instructor, and his purse was then at the service of Socrates, who, however, declined to accept it. At the fall of the leader, Plato, with the rest of the scattered army of Philosophy, fled to Megara. Shortly after, he commenced those travels, of which so much has been said, and so little can be believed. At Cyrene he studied mathematics under Theodorus, whom he has introduced in more than one of his dialogues. If the duplication of the cube be justly ascribed to Plato, these lessons were not without fruit. In search of still deeper

---

* [The particulars of this "mythology" are detailed by Diogenes Laertius, in his *Life of Plato*. See also Apuleius *de Doctr. Plat. init*. Ed.]

* [This rests on the words in the *Phaedo*, ἱλαστέον θεῷ, οἷς, ἔνθις. The clause may however have been inserted by way of insinuated apology for the unsocratic ideas attributed in that dialogue to Socrates—one of those artifices which Plato frequently employs—an οἷς ἐξαίτω θάνατος. Ed.]

* [Plutarch, *de Socr. Genio*, p. 579 c. 7, ed. Wytenbach. The Delians had been promised by an oracle that they should "have rest from their troubles when they had doubled the size of the (cubical) altar" in their island. In their ignorance of geometry the poor islanders "doubled each of the sides, whereby they made a cube eightfold instead of twice the size of the original one. In their distress they called Plato to their aid," who, after administering a characteristic rebuke, referred them to his friend Eudoxus. According to the same Plutarch, *vit. Marcell. c. 14*, Archytas the Pythagorean was the subject of Plato's censure. Stories like this prove little more than that Plato was held in high esteem as a geometer. According to Montucla, who quotes Proclus or Euclid, Hippocrates of Chios had before Plato pointed out the true solution of the Delian puzzle. *Histoire des Mathématiques*, t. p. 173. Ed.]
wisdom he continued his course to Egypt, where some of his biographers secrete him for thirteen years, penetrating with the zeal of a kindred mind the mysterious learning of the priesthood. Αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχονε, says Xenophon; but there are few traces of this preference in his works; and the doctrines supposed to have been derived from thence he might more easily have obtained from that source which Xenophon sarcastically classes with the former—the Πυθαγόρευς τερατώδης σοφία. No one understood better than Plato the influence of supposed antiquity over the imagination; and accordingly the μάθημα πολιων (Tim.) of Egypt meets us in the allegoric fictions of the Timeus and Phaedrus, &c.; but instead of that frequent and reverential allusion which a philosophic speculator can rarely help making to the source of his knowledge, Plato, in his more critical mood, seems to notice the wisdom of Egypt with cold and slighting reference. Whether true or false, the picturesque language of Valerius Maximus makes it worth citation: "Αἰγύπτιον peragravit, dum a sacerdotibus ejus gentis Geometricæ multiplices numeros, atque celestium observationum rationem, percipit. Quoque tempore a studiois juvenibus certatim Athenæ Platonem doctorem quærrentibus petebantur, ipse fluminis incalculables ripas, vastissimosque campos, effusam barbaricum et flexuosos fossarum ambitus, Αἰγυπτiorum semen disciplus lustrabat." (Val. Max. viii. 7.) With a spirit of enterprise not unlike that which some of our own explorers of the mysteries of the Chinese empire have evinced, the philosopher is said to have gained access to the country in the disguise of an oil-merchant. The Christian fathers delighted to trace him on his tour of inquiry among the He-

[Not Xenophon, but a late Sophist who assumes his mask. The document from which the Greek words in the text are taken is one of those "Socratic Epistles," the credit of which has been thoroughly demolished by Bentley. (Works, Vol. ii. p. 199, ed. Dyce.) The letter in question turns on the supposed feud between Xenophon and Plato; hence the disparaging remark upon Plato's sojourn in Egypt. But the feud itself has been shown by a great scholar to be but weakly attested, and the only passage in Xenophon's writings in which Plato's name occurs, indicates respect rather than dislike or contempt. (Boeckh, De simulata quam Plato cum Xenophonte exercitus fortior. Jeronini, 1811.) Ed.]

[As in the Laws, v. p. 747, and Republic, iv. p. 436. In another passage Plato lauds the Egyptians for their proficiency in arithmetic. He nowhere appeals to the Egyptian priests as to authorities in questions of theology: nor does Cicero, when he speaks of Plato's having received "numeros et celestia" from that quarter, intend by "celestia," divine things. These two seemingly superfluous remarks are suggested by Note ii to the celebrated 21st chapter of the Decline and Fall, where, after quoting the passage of Cicero referred to, Mr. Gibbon observes that "the Egyptians might still preserve the traditional creed of the patriarchs." The coincidence of the quotation and the comment compel us to believe that this usually vigilant author seriously held both the opinions alluded to. Ed.]
brew nation, and attributed to this period, as well as to his Egyptian investigations, those sublime views in which they regarded him as the transcriber or amplifier of revealed truth. Plato’s voyages to Sicily are better authenticated. His ineffectual efforts to reclaim Dionysius, and his attachment to Dion, are minutely related in the epistles appended to his works,—epistles, whose legitimacy, however (with perhaps the exception of one or two), the severity of modern criticism refuses to acknowledge. The general fact that Plato travelled to Southern Italy, and there studied the congenial philosophy of Pythagoras, cannot be fairly questioned. Hermogenes is said to have been his instructor in the philosophy of Parmenides, which he has delivered and enriched in the very abstruse dialogue that bears that name; Cratylus, from whom another remarkable treatise has its title, taught him the theories of Heraclitus, and Archytas of Tarentum those of Pythagoras, of which he is reported to have secured a more permanent memorial in the purchase of the books of Philolaus, by which, if we may believe Laertius, the Pythagorean system was for the first time divulged. Thus, rich with the spoils of all pre-

---

8 [Mr Grote is probably the only living scholar of eminence who adheres to the belief, which was not abandoned by Bentley, that all the so-called Platonic epistles were written by the persons whose names they bear. Mr Grote admits also as genuine all the dialogues enumerated in the Alexandrian Canon. Ast condemns all the Epistles indiscriminately; and the same is Nicks’s judgment (R. H. Vol. I. not. 27), though, it must be confessed, on erroneous grounds, so far as regards the 7th. Special essays on the subject have been published by J. A. Grimm, Berl. 1814, and by Herr Salomon, 1835. Add Wiegand, Epist. Plat. Specimen Criticum, Gissae, 1828. The general impression of the learned is perhaps faithfully represented in the following remarks of Brandis: “The Platonic epistles were too meanly esteemed by Ast. Though undoubtedly not genuine, they are in all probability the work of comparatively early authors, who may have been generally informed of the historical particulars referred to in them” (Hannover, II. p. 145). Bentley founds his belief in their authenticity mainly on the circumstance that they were acknowledged by the Alexandrine grammarians. This, were the letters intrinsically more worthy of Plato, would be a fair subsidiary argument: but too many of them savour of the “falsery” whom Bentley in other cases is so quick to detect. At the same time it by no means follows that because some are suspicious or worse, all should be condemned without exception. This rule has certainly not been adopted in judging of the Epistles for instance attributed to Isocrates—many or most of which have been accepted, while others, with or without good cause, have been rejected by critics. I still incline to the belief that the 7th and 8th Epistles, which properly form but one, were rightly excepted by the Dutch critic Cobet from the doom pronounced on the rest (Col. Variae Lett. p. 235). Ed.]

10 [The obligation to Cratylus is witnessed by Aristotle, Metaph. i. 6, that to Hermogenes only by Laertius. Plato was the pupil of Cratylus before he heard Socrates. How much of the lore of Pythagoras could be acquired in Greece Proper it is hard to say: but it seems unreasonable to doubt that Plato returned from his Italian sojourn a more accomplished Pythagorean than he went. The purchase of Philolaus’s book (not “books”) is regarded as a fact by Boeckh, whose Philolaus contains a searching critique of the ancient accounts. The question of the book, it should be observed, is distinct from
rious philosophies, this great genius returned at length to Athens, to devote his remaining life to the establishment of that comprehensive system which was to combine, to conciliate, and to supersede them all. The gardens of Academus have left the proof of their celebrity in the structure of language, which has derived from them a term now common to all places of public instruction. It will be readily believed that Plato soon became the most frequented of the Athenian teachers of wisdom; and not only the distinguished men of a most distinguished time, but the literary ladies of Athens, crowded the gymnasium of the philosophic analyst of beauty and of love. One of the strongest proofs of his popularity is to be found in an accusation which the libellous pen of Athenæus has recorded. That amusing but abusive writer presents us with a fearful list of the future tyrants who heard the lessons of Plato. Plutarch \textit{(adv. Colot. i.)} meets us with a list of the champions of freedom formed in the same school. A combination of the catalogues shews us among the pupils of Plato all the aspiring minds of their day. The point here established Plato himself well understood. "The soul of the young philosopher," declares his hero in the sixth book of the \textit{Republic}\textsuperscript{18}, "is warped from philosophy by the very qualities we have admired in him. Every plant, every animal, which finds where it is placed neither suitable nourishment, nor season, nor climate, corrupts in proportion to the very vigour of its nature...Think you that great crimes and consummate wickedness arise from an ordinary soul, and not from one of the highest natural force, whose lofty endowments have been depraved by circumstances of education; or do you imagine that a feeble spirit can ever do either much good or much evil?" To obviate such unhappy results, Plato did all which the lessons of a moralist could do; but he himself acknowledged how ineffective were his labours, and that God alone, (as the Heathen impressively declared,) could save the young men of his age from ruin. "When seated,"—if I may again venture to offer a feeble copy of the magnificent original,—"in the public assemblies, the courts, the theatres, or wherever the multitude gather,

that of the genuineness of the surviving Philolaic fragments, most of which, perhaps all, are open to grave doubt. A graphic passage in the \textit{Thetæus} \textsuperscript{28} (p. sro clides of Thrace; Aristonymus the lawgiver of the Arcadians, with Phormio and Menexenus, Eudoxus and Aristotle, who performed the same office at Elis and Pyrrha, Cnidus and Stagira. Chabrias and Phocion are also mentioned among Plato's pupils. For the counter-list see Athen. xii. p. 508. Ed.)
they blame or approve words or actions, equally tumultuous and extravagant in their censure and their approval, while the echoes of every wall reverberate the cries of both—all what effect can such scenes produce on the heart of a young man? What principles of education can escape shipwreck in this storm of contending judgments, and not run adrift with the current? Must not the young man judge with this multitude, of honour and shame? Will he not love what they love, and become what they are?... backed as they are by the power of degradation, fine, and death! No—there is not, there never was, there never will be, a moral education possible that can counteract the education of which these are the dispensers; human education, that is: I except, with the proverb, that which is divine. And truly, any soul that in such governments escapes the common wreck can only escape by the special favour of heaven.” (Rep. vi. 6; 7.) When we read these melancholy and indignant allusions to the political and social condition of his country, as forming the invincible obstacle to the moral advancement of its members, we may perceive how deeply Plato felt the responsibility and the importance of the office of a public instructor. They shew us also how little he is to be blamed for inevitable inefficiency. His Alcibiades is the ideal representative of the young Athenian political adventurer of his day. His Socrates is the representative of that philosophy which would have recalled these brilliant wanderers to the principles of a high, inflexible, morality, and which exhausted every allurement of fancy to win them to truth. But of Plato, in this character of a philosophic reformer of his degenerate countrymen, it would now be premature to speak; we shall have abundant opportunity to consider the subject in the sequel.

At the mature age of 81, in the 2nd year of the 108th Olympiad, Plato died; leaving the inheritance of his school to teachers who appear to have but feebly sustained its celebrity, and who, though their successive names and order are recorded, seem to have left but little impression upon the philosophy of antiquity. In the hands of a subsequent succession, who had little in common with Plato but the gardens in which he taught, his tenets were disguised, corrupted, and enfeebled into a system of almost unmodified scepticism. Had the opinions of Plato been consigned to traditional preservation, the most positive and doctrinal of philosophers would probably have descended to us as a dreaming doubter, floating the air-blown bubbles of fancy upon every breeze for the amusement of watching the beauty of their tints and the rapidity of their dissolution.
SECOND SERIES.

Fortunately, we have sureer evidence of his views. Plato has the singular fortune of coming down unimpaired to posterity. The collections of his writings err by excess not defect; several performances are ascribed to him which custom alone now preserves among his works; but, as far as we can discover from the remotest catalogues and allusions, no one vessel has foundered, of the large squadron which Plato committed to the stream of ages.

These famous writings are, as you know, couched in the form of dialogue, the favourite shape for the philosophical literature of the Socratic age. Laertius ascribes the first adoption of it to Zeno, the Eleatic logician; but it is probable that the dialogues of this stubborn arguer consisted rather in the rapid interchange of logical difficulties, than in the graceful play of intellect and fancy which makes the Platonic conversations still unrivalled in their line of art. To Alexamenus of Teos (an island or city of Ionia) the honour is likewise ascribed of originating this agreeable form of disquisition. But all its cultivators are forgotten in the merit of Plato. The dignified plainness of Xenophon is without his variety and skill, the solidity of Arrian is without his copiousness. In Cicero, (besides the inmeasurable inferiority of the language in which he wrote,) we miss his case and divine simplicity. Our own Berkeley presents a very pleasing copy of some features of the dialogues of Plato; and Shaftesbury recalls him often, though the evident imitation perhaps too often disturbs the effect. The opinion of antiquity seems unanimous upon the literary merits of Plato. The greatest of ancient orators was probably his hearer ("Audivisse Platonem Demosthenes dicitur," Cic. Brut. c. 31); and an age which could understand the excellences of a yet living language, has hesitatingly placed the founder of the Academy in the foremost ranks of the artists of Grecian style. A single passage of Lucian, which some of you will probably not have forgotten, briefly enumerates the excellences which the subtle apprehension of Greek criticism recognized in Plato. Ἐνθα, ὁ Πλάτων, ἂ τε μεγαλούχων διανομή, καὶ ἡ καλλιφωνία δευτεροις Ἀττικη, καὶ τὸ κεχαρισμένον, καὶ πειθοῦς μεστὸν, ἂ τε σύνεσις, καὶ τὸ ἀκρόβατο καὶ τὸ ἐπαγωγὸν ἐν καὶ τῶν ἀποδειξε ἀναταῦσθαι, σιδήρα πρόοστιν. It would be endless to cite the attestations of Cicero:—"Quis uerior in dicendo Platone!...non intelligendi solum, sed etiam dicendi, gravissimus auctor et

[Diogenes Laertius, II. 47, attributes the invention to Zeno. It was Aristotle, according to Athenaeus, p. 505, who made Alexamenus the first writer of dialogue. Ed.]

[Plut. c. 12. Ed.]
magister...longe omnium quicunque scripserunt aut locuti sunt exstittit et suavitate et gravitate princeps...divinus auctor, varius, multiplex, copiosus...quidam deus philosophorum". Such are a few of the phrases in which Cicero is accustomed to speak of his philosophical master. A judge not less accomplished than Cicero describes his more elevated style: "Multum supra prosum orationem, et quam pedestrem Graeci vacant, surgit; ut mihi non hominis ingenio, sed quodam Delphico videatur oraculo instinctus." (Quint. Inst. Orat. x. c. i.) Such was the critical estimate of the writings of Plato when Greek was still a living tongue, and those more delicate differences were palpable which have now perhaps for ever disappeared to our less instructed organs. Ancient critics declared his style to be the medium between prose and verse. Accordingly, in the midst of his severest discussions, Plato minglest the strange fictions of his national mythology and the venerable traditions of foreign lands; and endeavours to supply authority for his less assured decisions in the records of an inmeasurable antiquity. Nor, however a colder judgment may disapprove of this combination, is it without an inexpressible charm to imaginative students of the past. "To speak," he declares in the Timaeus, "concerning the other gods, and trace their generation, is beyond my power. In this case we must trust to the accounts of the elder sages, who, being themselves the children of the gods, must have known the story of their parents. Wrong would it be not to believe the children of the gods, even though they could produce no arguments of scientific value. They speak of that to which they are naturally allied; and therefore, duly obedient to law and right, we should bow to their tradi-

---

18 [Tim. p. 40 D. In this passage the practised student of Plato will not fail to detect a savour of irony, which has evaporated in Prof. Butler's not very exact translation. Mr Sewell (Plato, p. 87) would probably have avoided the same error, and with it the necessity of inserting in his translation words which have no counterpart in the original, had he been aware that this ironical purpose was acknowledged by Eusebius. (See Prep. Euseb. xi. p. 640.) The Greek however tells its own tale: τέρα τῶν ὁλιγῶν ᾠδικῶν ἔτη καὶ γένων μᾶλλον ἡ καθ' ἴματα. πιστεύεις δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων ἐπιστημῶν μὴ θεών οὖν, ἢ ἐφ' ἐκείνους ἐπιστήμην αὐτόν, προγίνεται εἰδὼν ἐλέησαν ἄδειον οὐκ θεών παθὴν ἐπιστήμην, καθ' ἔσορος ἐκείνων καὶ διαγωγὰς ἐπιστημῶν λέγομεν, ἀλλ' ὡς οἰκίαν φάσιν παραγιγγέλλω, ἐγγίζομεν τῷ χείμα τιμίωτοι. Οὗτοι οὖν καὶ ἐκείνοις ἄρα αὐτοῖς περὶ τῶν νομῶν τῶν θεῶν ἔγγυτοι καὶ λεγέων γῆς καὶ ὅρμος ῥώμης ἐκ τιμίωτοι ἔκ τιμίωτοι ῥώμης. Theodore, a weaker man than Eusebius, takes the passage seriously. (Græc. aff. Car. i. p. 12, ed. Oxon.) The remarks which follow in Prof. Butler's text are not, however, deprived of their importance by the selection of an infelicitous example. The loftier the "aspirations" of Plato, the less was it to be expected that they would find satisfaction in the theogonies of Orpheus and Hesiod. Ed.]
tion.” That harsh and contemptuous criticism, to which it is not given to appreciate Plato, may discern in such declarations the proper food for a feeble ridicule; they who see in the illustrious Greek an invaluable study for historians of the human soul, will recognize those aspirations after a light supernatural and divine, which Plato inherited from his master, and which both acknowledged at every turn in the progress of thought! “Oh, Solon,” cries the Egyptian priest in the same work, “you Greeks are ever children; there is not an old man in Greece!... You are all young in soul, you have no tradition venerable through ancient report, no doctrine hoary with years!” In this spirit, when he would recur to remote antiquity, he often professes to derive his knowledge from distant sources. Thus, it is an Armenian who delivers the remarkable portrait of the future state of recompense, in the tenth book of the Republic,—the same representation which is further illustrated in the close of the Gorgias. We can never rightly estimate the labours of Plato unless we regard his writings as themselves works of art, no less than transcripts of doctrine. His versatility in the dramatic representation of character has made some of his dialogues far more resemble what we should style “genteel comedy” than a philosophical exposition. Thus the entire Euthydemus is nothing less than a dramatic satire, of boundless humour and variety, upon the follies of the sophistic professors; and assuredly lies much nearer to Aristophanes than to Aristotle. The Protagoras, in like manner, while it treats an important philosophical question—the possibility of communicating virtue by didactic discourses,—includes a dexterous exposure of the same class of pretenders. The Hippias Major discusses and rejects the vulgar and narrow definitions of Beauty; but in doing so, makes the mercenary trader in wisdom, from whom it derives its title, eminently ridiculous. The Ion speaks of poetry, but incidentally exposes another class of self-sufficient professors, the rhapsodists, or reciters of verse. Indeed the student of Plato will find how few of the absurdities which the Molières or the Congreves of modern times have exhibited on the stage can claim originality in extravagance; while he will find what authors professedly dramatic have scarcely ever presented, the entire exhibition of human folly made subservient to the establishment of a high-toned

[This statement requires qualification. I agree with Mr Grote and Dr Whewell in thinking that on the whole Protagoras has the better in the argument between him and Socrates; and the exposure of the other sophists present on the occasion is distinctly "Aristophanic," and therefore so exquisitely amusing. Ed.]
and presiding morality. It is remarkable, too, how in his loftiest flights, this great author never forgets the reality—
even the lowest reality—of human nature. In the Symposium, Socrates has scarcely concluded his magnificent picture of the love of the eternal Beauty, when Alcibiades enters the apartment; the tone suddenly alters, and we are presented with the wild ribaldry of profigacy and drunkenness. The speech of Callicles, the shrewd man of the world, in the Gorgias, might have been spoken without the alteration of a syllable in a Parisian drawing-room of yesterday. Is this new to our ears?—“My dear Socrates, you talk of law. Now, the laws, in my judgment, are just the work of the weakest and most numerous of human minds; in framing them, they never thought but of their own interests; they never approve or censure except in reference to this. Hence it is, that the cant arises, that tyranny is improper and unjust, and to struggle for eminence, guilt. Unable to rise themselves, of course they would wish to preach liberty and equality. But nature proclaims the law of the stronger...We surround our children from their infancy with preposterous prejudices about liberty and justice. The man of sense tramples on such imposture, and shows what Nature's justice is...I confess, Socrates, philosophy is a highly amusing study—in moderation, and for boys. But protracted too long, it is the ruin of its votaries. Your philosopher is a complete novice in the life comme il faut...I like very well to see a child babble and stammer; there is even a grace about it, when it becomes his age. But to see a man continue the prattle of the child is absurd. Just so with your philosophy” (p. 484, fol.)...Or is not the maxim he interposes worthy the school of La Rochefoucauld?—“The philosopher cunningly avoids the life in which he knows he could not succeed; and praises such habits as suit his temper, insinuating, under these generalities, applause of himself.”

Perhaps, however, it is in parody of the graver pretence of his day, that the exquisite dexterity of the pen of Plato most appears. The bustling Hippias, hot from Elis, charged with an embassy, and boasting his encyclopedical knowledge, equally conspicuous in shoemaking and in syllogism; the long-winded and pompous Protagoras; the declamatory Gorgias; all are transplanted into his page with unerring accuracy; and all successively contrasted with that one inimitable old man, who, ever the same, is never wearying; whose shrewd simplicity laughs in their face, while protesting the most unqualified humility, and who meekly conceding everything is gradually gaining all. Perhaps there is not in literature a more perfect specimen
of this assumption of style, than is presented in the course
of a dialogue (the *Theætetus*) to which I shall have soon to
introduce you at greater length. Socrates assails by irre-
sistible proofs the famous dogma of Protagoras, that truth
varies with the variety of opinion; and lamenting that
Protagoras himself was no longer alive to champion his
own tenet, undertakes in his stead to exhibit it to the best
advantage. The speech in which this is effected is not
only an imitation of sophistry, but, of the precise sophistry
of Protagoras, and not this merely, but (as we can plainly
detect) a formal copy of the inmost peculiarities of his
style. So much does Plato delight in individualizing his
characters, indeed, that we have sometimes to regret the
restriction under which the proprieties of the speaker seem
to lay the spirit of the reasoning itself. I have always felt
this, for instance, in perusing a very remarkable dialogue
(the *Euthyphron*), in which a great question—the independ-
ence of the principles of morality upon the mere will of
a Supreme Governor—is perpetually approached, yet never
fully met. Euthyphron is a heathen priest, and argues as
one; and Socrates, though triumphantly exposing the
discordance of Polytheism with the unity of religious mo-
rality, scarcely penetrates to the question in its ultimate
form. He declares, indeed, with great precision, that an
act is not holy because the gods love it, but that the gods
love it because it is holy; but the fundamental question of
the eternal coincidence of these two terms in the divine
nature, could not be effectively stated to the minister of
polytheism. It is, therefore, glanced at, and dismissed.
Of the point itself, however, his whole philosophy suffi-
ciently proclaims his opinion. We shall soon see, how,
abstracting from those acts which we approve, the quality
which we approve in them, and which we designate "just"
or "good," he made the Divine Mind the eternal depository
of a goodness and a justice, of which these were the copies
or participants, and thus identified the will and the recti-
tude of God.
LECTURE V.

PLATONIC PHILOSOPHY. NO. II.

GENTLEMEN,

My last lecture closed with some remarks on that style of Plato which has been the object of so unbounded an admiration to the critics of antiquity. A few further observations may not be superfluous before we proceed to contemplate the body that is clothed in this attractive dress.

I remarked to you that the dialogues of Plato are to be regarded as specimens of art, no less than as philosophical treatises. But it may be questioned whether their excellence in the former view has not tended to impair their value in the latter. The characteristic excellences of the philosophic style are perspicuity, precision, and method; the single-minded inquisitor of truth grows impatient at interruptions, and is not to be reconciled to deviations from the high road of reasoning by any occasional prospect, however novel or extensive. The flowery bye-paths of Plato’s digressive style are, therefore, pronounced tedious and tantalizing by the dogged pursuers of a conclusion; and their indignation is not much alleviated by finding (what is not at all unusual in this writer) that at the close of a dialogue, "magna et præclara minantis," they are as far as ever from a settled declaration of opinion. This freedom from all the ordinary restraints of argumentative style was, indeed, not the least of the recommendations of the dialogic form of disquisition to its author. “Shall we return to our subject?” asks Socrates in the Theætætus. “Not at all, Socrates,” is the reply. “You have justly said that we are not the slaves of our discussion, but our discussion of us... We are not like the poets, subject to judge or spectator, to preside over our conversations, to reprimand our deviations, and to issue directions which we must obey” (p. 173 b). But perplexing as these capricious changes are to the baffled student, perhaps the more rigorously methodical arguments are sometimes not less so. Plato is then metamorphosed from the enthusiastic visionary, whose soul seems at every
turn of the discourse impatient for the pure empyrean of contemplation, into the most microscopic analyst of words and propositions. No hasty enthymeme, no unpermitted assumption, will then escape. We seem to see the conclusion within an inch of our eyes, but we are compelled to approach it by infinitesimal gradations. The adversary's arguments must die, as Molière's physician dispatched his patients, selon les règles. On other occasions there is the same minuteness, but the purpose intended is long imperceptible; and when the final inference does arrive, we cannot avoid the suspicion that it has been strangely shuffled into the cards by some logical sleight-of-hand, invisible to us from the rapidity of the artist's motions. For my own part, with unbounded admiration for this great writer, I have often, in reading some of his more paradoxical discussions, sympathized with the candid perplexity of Adeimantus in the sixth book of the Republic. "My dear Socrates, it is quite impossible to oppose a word to all these reasonings of yours; but observe the manner in which those are affected who listen to your arguments on this subject. They think that, entirely from their own inexperience in the art of asking and answering, they are by degrees brought on from question to question, until these minute deviations accumulated at the end, betray a direct contradiction to their original proposition. And just as at draughts the beginner is at length blocked up by the skilful player, so as not to know how to escape, so we novices are blocked up in this logical game of yours, without truth being at all the more concerned in the matter" (p. 487 B). The difficulty of these cases is augmented by our frequent uncertainty whether the author is really in earnest; whether he is amusing himself in parodying the affected precision of the Sophists, or whether, from long familiarity with their style of debate, he has unwittingly fallen into their wire-drawn prolixity. These, however, if they be blemishes, are but occasional blemishes; and I ought in justice to add that the thorough idolators of Plato, with the gifted perspicacity of devotees, invariably discover all the rarest treasures of wisdom in those very passages which I have

1 [An advocate of "the Sophists" would find much to complain of in this sentence. Certainly none of the fraternity with whom we are acquainted equalled or approached the dialectical ἄδοξος of Socrates. Apologies for this seeming desultoriness and prolixity are not unfrequent in the dialogues. The passage recently referred to in the Theaetetus—one of the most desultory—has evidently this intention; but in the Parmenides prolix discussion is no longer apologized for, but urged upon the youthful inquirer as a sacred duty: καθή μέν οὖν καὶ θεία ἡ ἁρμα ἡ ἁρμας ἐγι τοις λόγοις· ἔλευσον ἐκ σαιτῶν καὶ ἀφικέραν μᾶλλον διά της δοκιμίας ἀριθμοῦ ἐτῶς καὶ καλομέτρη αὐτὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἄδοξος, ἐν ἑτο ποι ἐν. (p. 135 C.) Ed.]
dared to pronounce prolix and fatiguing. How ready are
we to reflect praise on ourselves in praising our author, and
to extol that as food only for the gods which we rejoice
to think few but ourselves have been able to digest!

Besides incidental difficulties of this kind, it seems also
certain, that this great Philosopher sometimes assumed a
veil of intentional obscurity. His language seems con-
tantly to point to a gift requisite in his reader which no
reading can give. "The father of the world is hard to
discover, and when discovered cannot be communicated."
Meditation, laborious and protracted, alone can reveal the
mysteries of intellectual truth. In the Phaedrus he speaks
earnestly against writing itself, and the spurious knowledge
it confers. "Every man must obtain the heavenly fire for
himself: and by uniting with the mind's celestial object,
kindle that divine and circumcising flame which alone can
truly illuminate the mind." "On these things," he reiterates,
"it is vain to write. Whoever attempts it will fail. Except
a few divinely gifted men, whom God has made capable of
finding these truths of themselves, he will only cause some
to despise him, and swell others with a miserable arrogance
as if they apprehended mysteries of which they are pro-
foundly ignorant." You will easily perceive how such a
conception as this, of the incommunicability of the supreme
truth, must have led to a despair of satisfactorily expressing
it; and how the deficiencies of language, and its depend-
ence on sense, must have beguiled him into those varieties
of mythic representation which form not the smallest of
the difficulties that meet the interpreter of Plato.

Nor can we doubt that the peculiar position of Plato
must have necessitated this voluntary assumption of a pro-
tecting veil of enigmatical language. I see, indeed, little
ground for the hypothesis which Warburton, to buttress his
theory, has advocated, of the division of the dialogue into
esoteric and exoteric; understanding the former term as
involving a secret and mysterious learning, and the latter
as including the inculcation of popular fallacies for politic
purposes. The very instances to which he appeals seem to
contradict his assertion; for assuredly the ἀποθέωσις—"the
unity of God and the detection of polytheism,"—are as
openly exhibited in the alleged exoteric, as in any of the

8 [Timæus, p. 38 c. Ed.]
4 [This and the preceding quotation are somewhat freely paraphrased from
the 7th Epistle, p. 341 d., fol. The entire passage is curious, and should be
compared with Ep. II. 314. Neither passage, it may be observed, lends any
support to the Warburtonian distinction of "exoteric and esoteric dialogues."
They rather prove that all Plato's writings are exoteric; his esoteric views
having been communicated only to the initiated. On the genuineness of the
Platonic Epistles, see note (g) to Lect. IV. of this series (p. 392). Ed.]
other dialogues; and the immortality of the soul (the doctrine on which Warburton would charge Plato with insincerity) appears in those very dialogues which are supposed to contain his real thoughts. (Republic, Phaedo, &c.) But with all this, it is manifest that (the fate of Socrates before his eyes) Plato must have felt the necessity of employing such language as, while it would be intelligible to the thoughtful, might yet admit of a popular interpretation for the jealous defenders of the popular system of belief and worship. And hence, while no mind to whom the discovery could be profitable can fail to read the main lineaments of the divine character—single, sempiternal, and supreme—in his page, the same page is filled with as multitudinous a throng of gods and demiurges as could be demanded by the most unlimited for a polytheistic theology.

One obstacle to the full intelligence of Plato can only be removed by persevering study. In the last series of Lectures delivered in this place, endeavoured to supply somewhat of a clearer and more methodized account of the earlier Greek philosophies than on a likely to find in the unconnected chaos of our con. text-books. Without penetrating to the spirit of these systems, the true position of the illustrious Founder of the Academy can never be understood. You are not to tear Plato forcibly from his native soil, to transplant him into the trim gardens of modern philosophy, and to judge of the size or proportions of this lord of the forest deprived of all his natural accompaniments, and condemned to droop in an unpropitious clime. The works of Plato are the result of all that had gone before them; they must be estimated as a result; they could have been produced at no other conceivable time. They are a narration, and a system supplanting rejected systems. They assume theories as well-known, of which he mere modern knows nothing; they enter into discussions of subjects which then reverberated through every school in Athens, but of which the critic must now bend a patient ear to catch the faintest echo. Such considerations as these will suggest to you the value of the criticisms of the sibyllary despisers of Plato. He could form but a defective estimate of the merits of Thomas Reid who had not before him the writings of Locke, of Hume, and of Berkeley: the poems of Parmenides, the Pythagorean books of Philolaus, the "dark sayings" of Heraclitus, should be our own before we could confidently pronounce on the merits of Plato. “Quamvis de diversis officinis hæc ei essent philosophiae membra suscepta;—naturalis ab Heracliteis, intellectualis a Pythagoreis, rationalis et moralis
ex ipso Socratis fonte, unum tamen ex omnibus, et quasi proprior partus corpus effecit." Those inimitable excel-
ees, indeed, which arose from the depths of the author's own mind, and which address man equally in every age, we can scarcely fail to perceive unless hopelessly unfitted for the higher offices of speculation and feeling;—but how many are the remarks that now drop dully upon our ears which in their own day were decisive and significant; how many an argument, which, after the labours of innumerable subsequent thinkers, may now seem ineffective or super-
fluous, was then, without the waste of a single needless word, the very answer the time demanded!

To put the reader, as far as practicable, exactly in the position which Plato occupied, is the task of criticism. In this field much has been done by the successive labours of a vast number of learned men; and more in our own age, perhaps, than in any preceding one. The inquiry into the origines Platonicae has been carried into the remotest quarters.

The singular sublimity, and often the antique cast, of his sentiments, his own love for the authority of tradition, and the legends of his mysterious wanderings in Egypt and the East, have united to engage many critics of the highest celebrity to endeavour to trace a wisdom so exalted to a divine source, and to see in Plato a commissioned "apostle of the Gentiles." This opinion of the derivation of the Platonic philosophy from the Hebrew Scriptures was among the Christian Fathers nearly universal. Justin, Clemens, Eusebius, Augustine, insist upon it; and evince, by their prompt adoptions of the phraseology and, wherever possible, of the theological views of Plato, how justifiable they considered it to enlist in the cause of divine truth the services of this eloquent commentator on primitive revelation. "What is Plato," says Numenius (cited by Clemens Al.) "but (Μωυσῆς Ἀττίκης) Moses in the dialect of Attica?" Eusebius cites an assertion of the Jewish Aristobulus, that a version of the Old Testament existed before that of the Seventy, and that Plato drew his wisdom from its perusal. This seems, however, too unsupported by any corroborative testimony to be admitted:—and it

---

8 [Apuleius de Dogm. Plat. I. 570. Ed.]

6 [Prop. Eran. xiii. p. 663 D. According to Gibbon, it was Josephus who persuaded the Christian Fathers that Plato derived a part of his knowledge from the Jews (D. and R. c. xlii. note 11). See Josephus c. Apion. ii. c. 15. However this may be, the belief was current among the Alexandrine Jews at a much earlier period. Ed.]

7 [Strom. I. l. § 22. Ed.]

8 [Aristobulus pretended that this earlier translation had been made "before Alexander's conquest of the Persians" (Euseb. Pr. Ec. p. 663 D). See Valesianus's Diatriba de Aristobulo, XVI. Ed.]
SECOND SERIES.

certainly would be extraordinary that no traces should be
perceptible in the writings of Plato, of his acquaintance
with the singular people from whom this hypothesis would
deduce his wisdom. Something has been made of the
curious legend in the third book of the Republic, which
Plato calls a Phænician Mode; but unfortunately no ad-
missible parallel can be discovered for it in the Scriptures,
—for that which Eusebius instances is utterly visionary.

A more circuitous route is proposed for the transmission of
this divine teaching. The Israelites had commercial con-
nexions with the Egyptians; the captivity of Jehoahaz,
and the residence of Jeremiah and Baruch in the country
of the Pharaohs, nearly synchronized with the travels of
Pythagoras. The disciples of Pythagoras communicated
his treasures to Plato, who himself might when in Egypt
have conversed with the grandchildren, or even the chil-
dren, of the exiles of Israel. This hypothesis, which is not
altogether destitute of reason, would perhaps be more
readily accepted, if its advocates had not done all that
could make it ridiculous, by the frequency of their violent
adaptations of Plato to his supposed model. If Eusebius
reads in the Laws of good and bad daemons, he protests
that Plato must have had the first chapter of Job before
him. If Plato commands the seller of a commodity not to
exaggerate the merit of the article, he was plagiarising
from the book of Proverbs. And Dacier pronounces that
he must have been more than man, if he sketched the
character of a legislator as laid down in his Laws, without
borrowing from the history of Moses. The Soul of the

9 [p. 414 c. A mythus more palpably Greek it is impossible to imagine.
Those who dream that these elegant fictions embody the "wisdom of the
East," would do well to consider a passage in the Phædrus, which seems
designed to refute any such hypothesis: "O Sókrates, μάθων σου
Δεσπότεις καὶ ὅποιον τὸν Ἰακώβην λόγου ποιεῖς, p. 275 E. "It is no
trouble to you, Socrates, to invent any story, whether it please you to lay
the scene in Egypt or in any other country." Ed.]

10 [Prop. Ev. xii. p. 613 A. The supposed parallel passage is in Ezekiel
xxii. 18. This is a rather extravagant instance of the mode in which the
Fathers (τοίς οπίσιν καὶ ταξινομεῖσι) were accustomed to deal with Plato. Ed.]

11 [Frequent use has been made by the Christian Fathers of two passages
in the Epistle, which it is worth while to transcribe. In the second Epistle
we read (p. 313 E): περὶ τῶν πάντων βασιλέω πάντων ἄστιον ἀστιον,
καὶ ἑαυτῷ ἐπεκτείνατο, καὶ ἑαυτῷ ἀπαντήσας πάντων τῶν καλῶν.
And in the sixth as follows: τῶν τῶν πάντων τῶν ἄνθρωπο
τῶν τῶν καλῶν καὶ τῶν καλῶν, τοῦ τοῦ ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἄνθρωπο
καὶ τῶν καλῶν καὶ τῶν καλῶν, τοῦ τοῦ ἀληθεύουν, καὶ τῶν
καὶ τῶν καλῶν, καὶ τῶν καλῶν, καὶ τῶν καλῶν, καὶ τῶν
καὶ τῶν καλῶν. These mystical passages have been supposed by some
to have been inserted by a Christian hand; in which case they must be under-
stood as referring to the Christian Trinity. But the text bears no marks of
such interpolation. The conjecture that the entire epistles in which the pas-
sages occur were the handiwork of a Platonizing Jew of Alexandria is more
reasonable; and it is borne out by the resemblance of the mystical phrases in
the letters to expressions of Philo relating to his Logos, &c. The difficulty
ON THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

World is the "Spirit that moved on the face of the waters;" and the soul that animates the heavens, was the misconception of a phrase in Isaiah. But when the remoteness of the resemblances to antecedent passages of Scripture, and the supposed similarity to subsequent revelation, at once increases the interest of the problem and renders this solution inapplicable;—many of these writers do not hesitate to advance another more direct and decisive. Plato himself comes before us in the mantle of immediate inspiration. Augustine, Origen (in controversy with Celsus), Jerome, Eusebius, Clement, do not hesitate to affirm that Christ himself revealed his own high prerogatives to the gifted Grecian. From this hypothesis, however, the facts of the case force them to make many abatements. In the mid current of this divine revelation are found errors fantastic and frivolous which it is impossible to ascribe to the celestial illuminator. Plato, then, was partially enlightened; and clouded the heavenly beam with the remaining grossnesses of the natural sense. When the question arrives at this state, its decision becomes more and more perplexed. The natural providence and the supernatural interferences of God are separated by a line we cannot always draw. If He be the author of the faculties that apprehend truth, he is the author of every apprehension of truth. How far, then, the Deity was energizing in the mind of Plato, risks becoming a question of words; while this supposed revelation surrounded with dangerous error, becomes almost useless to those who are not furnished with an additional revelation to fix the demarcation.

The age in which the Fathers of the Christian Church flourished was not an age of criticism in our sense of the arising from the later date of the Alexandrine's writings is removed by the supposition generally adopted, that his views and language were, to a considerable extent, inherited from earlier allegorising speculators of his own nation. (See Mangey's Preface to his ed. of Philo.) Eusebius truly says that no Greek before Plato would have dreamt of "speaking of the creative Father as the Lord;" and though we cannot accede to his hypothesis, that Plato borrowed the language in question from the Hebrews, we can find no difficulty in acknowledging the obligations of the pseud-Plato to that source. (See Euseb. Prep. Evang. xi. p. 534, n. e.) The following account of the Philonic triad may save the necessity of quotations, which might be multiplied indefinitely, from the Alexandrine himself: "Duabus superioribus Dei virtutibus Theo et Domino (Kupiaq) quae at éndwore al ἐκποίησις ἐνδώπεις audiant, si quis adnumeret copulam, qua utraque conjuncta tenetur, sive Verbum Divinum, sive Divum ipsum, existat sanctissima quaedam Trias." Dähne, Questions Philonico, p. 25, not. 98. An English writer of the last century, who exhibits great sobriety of judgment in dealing with other passages in Plato, which had turned the heads of more learned men, ventures on the bold supposition that those in the Epistles refer, not to any Jewish speculation, but simply to the distinction in the Philo-K, between τὸ αἰφρων τῷ πρόποσι καὶ τῷ διάφορον. (Cesar Morgan, Trinity of Plato, pp. 43—46, ed. Holden, 1853.) This opinion is however hardly tenable. Ed.]
SECOND SERIES.

These great men may have been employed upon weightier duties; they certainly were little employed upon this. It is proper, therefore, to suggest, as a circumstance of some importance in this controversy, that the writings in which the most startling resemblances occur—the Epinomis and the Epistles of Plato—are, by the more searching sagacity of modern criticism, refused to that author. Their precise history is, however, very uncertain. The eagerness of the Neoplatonics to match the divine features of Christianity with parallel doctrines, unquestionably led to interpolations, which their adversaries had not always the learning, or the caution, to expose; and the necessitics or conveniences of exposition would often lead a Christian preacher to accept with complacency forms of expression which enriched his own vocabulary; and, still oftener, to present to the enemy the impressive argument derived from exhibiting the name most reverenced by philosophic Paganism as a herald of the divine truth—as "not that light, but to bear witness of that light." In whatever way you decide the question of these resemblances of phraseology and sentiment, let me recommend to you all, in the meantime, the admirable language of one who leaves few to improve what he has once delivered. "Whatever," says S. Augustine, (De Doctr. Christian. ii. 40) "those called philosophers, and especially the Platonists, may have said true and conformable to our faith is not only not to be dreaded, but is to be claimed from them, as unlawful possessors, to our use. For as the Egyptians not only had idols and heavy burthens, which the people of Israel were to abhor and avoid, but also vessels and ornaments of gold and silver and apparel, which that people, at its departure from Egypt, privily assumed for a better use, not on its own authority, but at the command of God, the very Egyptians unwittingly furnishing the things which themselves used not well; so all the teaching of the Gentiles not only hath feigned and superstitious devices, and heavy burdens of an useless toil, which we severally, as, under the leading of Christ, we go forth out of the fellowship of the Gentiles, ought to abhor and avoid; but it also containeth liberal arts filled for the service of truth, and some most useful moral precepts: as also there are found among them some truths concerning the worship of the one God Himself, as it were their gold and silver which they did not themselves form, but drew from certain veins of Divine Providence running throughout, and which they perversely and wrongfully abuse to the service of daemons. These the Christian, when he severs himself from their wretched fellowship, ought to take from them for the right use of
preaching the Gospel... For what else (he continues) have many excellent members of our faith done? See we not how richly laden with gold and silver and apparel that most persuasive teacher and blessed martyr Cyprian departed out of Egypt? or Lactantius? or Victorinus, Optatus, Hilary,—not to speak of the living? and Greeks innumerable? And this Moses himself, that most faithful servant of God, first did, of whom it is written, that "he was learned in all the wisdom of the Egyptians."... "Let every good and true Christian," he says elsewhere, "understand, that truth, wherever he finds it, belongs to his Lord." (1b.) "By whomsoever truth is said, it is said through His teaching who is the truth." (Ep. 160).

The connexion of the Platonic philosophy with the inspired wisdom of the Hebrews, you will find maintained at great length, by Gale, Lamy, Dacier, and Huet, and resisted by Le Clerc, Menage, and L’Enfant.

The influence of the antecedent philosophies of his own country, upon the formation of the views of Plato, is far more palpable. The brief record of ancient criticism, authenticated by Plato’s greatest pupil, and evidenced in the writings themselves, is, that "he followed in Sensibles, Heraclitus—in Intellectuals, Pythagoras—in Morals and Politics, Socrates." To the second member of this division must be added a strong Electic infusion. And as we shall see that the Philosophy of Plato was eminently ethical,—all else being subservient to this,—we shall anticipate that the influence of Socrates would be everywhere discernible. Now, it is well worth considering how much of even the purely speculative tenets of Plato are directly connected with the characteristic peculiarities of his Master. For example, an unquestionable authority, Aristotle himself (Met. 1. 5), refers the theory of Ideas to the Socratic custom of definition. After noticing the impression which the gloomy doctrine of Heraclitus (of the incessant change of all that encompasses us in the world) had made on Plato, Aristotle proceeds:—"On the other hand, Socrates being occupied with morals, and no longer with a physical system, and having sought evermore in morals that which is universal and first, directed his attention to definitions. Plato, who followed and continued him, was led to think that definitions ought to belong to an order of beings apart, and have no relation to sensible objects; for how should a common definition apply to things sensible, the subjects of perpetual change? Now these beings apart he designated Ideas," &c. It is here evident that Plato sought to combine the universality of the Socratic definition with a stability beyond that of physical science; and
thus not only generalized with Socrates, but abstracted and realized his generalizations to meet the objections of the Heraclitian. Again, we recognize the habitual doctrine of Socrates, that the best good of man is in the perfect development of reason, in those tenets which abound in the Platonic dialogues, which identify vice with ignorance, and even pronounce that no man is voluntarily evil, οὐδεὶς ἔκων κακός. The physics, again, of Plato are little more than an explanation by final causes; and in the fanciful suppositions to which this leads, we can read an exaggerated result of the Socratic convictions of a Divine Providence as evidenced in the structure of the world. But the luxuriant fructification of the Socratic germ transplanted into this rich soil, is even more remarkably exhibited when we see to see doctrines gradually formed out of the very habits of the master’s conversation. Thus it can scarcely be doubted that the Platonic doctrine of Reminiscence was at least partly suggested by that extrication of preconceived truths which Socrates was wont to call his “dialectic art.” In the very course of the dialogue (the Μένος) in which the doctrine is most explicitly set forth, we have an example of the process by which the doctrine itself was probably suggested.

To the ethical principles of Socrates it is manifest that Plato added views for which he was much indebted to the lofty metaphysics of Pythagoras. The Phaedrus is said to have been the first of his dialogues, and in that wonderful

33 [In the celebrated conversation with the slave, in whose un instructed mind a succession of judicious leading questions operates a “reminiscence” of certain mathematical theorems. Μένος, p. 84. fol. Ed.]

34 [Against the tradition, that the Phaedrus was the first-born of Plato’s genius, several modern authorities have ventured to rebel. The arguments of C. F. Hermann (Gesch. d. Phil. Phil. p. 375) are especially entitled to attention; and we can only regret that the work in which they occur is written in a style which even a German must find difficult and repulsive. Among the internal reasons for fixing a later date for this dialogue, may be enumerated, 1. Its Pythagorism, implying that Plato when he wrote the Phaedrus had studied in Magna Graecia. (See Cicero, de Repub. I. 10, 16; de Fin. v. 29, 87.) 2. The multifarious learning displayed in it—a learning of which there are few traces in his youthful works. 3. The maturity of its ethical-psychological views—as in the tripartite division of the soul under the figure of the charioteer and two horses (Phaedr. 246), &c.—contrasted with the Socratic crudity of the Lysis, Protagoras, &c. 4. The clear exposition of the principles of philosophical method (Ib. p. 265), and the complete theory of “ideas” implied in the great mythus (p. 247). Lastly, the perfection of the Phaedrus as a work of literary art. On the other side, we have the testimony of early—apparently Peripatetic—authorities. See Diog. Laert. III. 38, a passage from which we may infer that the juvency of the Phaedrus was a fiction invented by way of apology for its supposed bad taste. Much stress has also been laid on the passage relating to Isocrates (Phaedr. 279), who, it is argued, would not have been painted in such flattering colours at a later period, when the shallowness of that plausible rhetorician could no longer have escaped the penetration of the philosopher. This argument has the more force, if we admit that the description of the δρόφος τοιούτου ἔνθα ἄλοιπος in Euthyd. 304 D is intended.
performance the youthful author is evidently fresh from
the study of the mystic moralist of Crotona. The essen-
tial activity, and thence the essential immortality, of the
soul, a doctrine held, as we know, by Alcman of Crotona,
and altogether Pythagoric; the metempsychosis; the ten
periods of the soul;—all these show that if Plato at this
period had not mastered the secrets of Pythagorism, he
had at least been conversant with its exoteric doctrine.
Nothing, indeed, can be more interesting to the student of
the mental history of Plato, than the whole examination of
this remarkable dialogue. It is to the other writings of
Plato what Plato himself is to the more measured style
that succeeded him. We find him in the Phaedrus still
encompassed with the poetry of his early days, and unable
*to contemplate truth except through the prism of imagina-
tion*. He is now *in love* with philosophy, and he delights
to lavish his richest treasures of decorative fancy upon the
object of his love. The necessity of an eternal world of
intellect to form the basis for science, he perceives as
clearly as ever; but perhaps never again does he picture
its scenery with colouring so bright and so varied; nor even
in the Symposium itself is the tendency of the soul to the
absolute and central beauty painted in words so glowing.
The very scenery of the whole is fraught with mystery,
and adapted with exquisite art to second the effect of the
main subject. The consecrated waters of Iliissus, the
Muses' temple, the haunts of ancient song—of Boreas,
and Orithyia, of the nymphs, and of mystic Pan,—such is
the locality where the hierophant of the ideal world un-
folds the story of the soul. Elements even more ancient
than the wisdom of Pythagoras are to be found scattered
through this composition; but all blended together with
such masterly skill as to present a perfect and harmonious
uniformity. Plato, who introduced many neologisms, is
reported to have been the first inventor of the word
"Poem", the Phaedrus alone would make it appropriate
that he should be.

for a portrait of Isocrates, as Schleiermacher was the first to suggest. The
question is discussed at some length in my Introduction to the Phaedrus. Ed.

14 [The inability is a mere assumption. The Phaedrus contains a perfectly
clear statement of the theory of dialectic. If the argument were good for any-
thing, it would prove that the Symposium and Timaeus are youthful works; which
it is certain they were not.

Notwithstanding the poetical colouring of the Phaedrus, the ideal theory
shines quite distinctly through the Erotic mythus, which, as well as that in
the Symposium, is a deliberately planned allegory, differing from many of
Plato's myths in this respect, that the sign and the thing signified are always
or nearly always distinguishable. The praise bestowed upon this mythus in
the text is not in the slightest degree exaggerated. Ed.]

15 [The word occurs several times in Herodotus. Plato may possibly have
been the first who used it in the restricted sense. Ed.]