NOTES


2. Page 5. These four problems include the triple division emanating from the Platonic school (according to Sextus Empiricus: *Adv. mathematicos*, VII, 16 by Xenokratos) into logic, physics (i.e. cosmology), and ethics, with the addition of the psychological problem, which has in modern times pressed forward to an independent point of departure.


7. Page 21. For the point of view of modern positivism regarding this problem in contrast to the point of view taken by Comte and Stuart Mill, interest attaches
Notes


10. Page 24. Münsterberg, *l.c.* p. 282: "If we force the system of science upon the real life, claiming that our life is really a psychophysical phenomenon, we are under the illusion of psychologism. If, on the other hand, we force the views of the real life, the personal categories, upon the scientific psychophysical phenomena, we are under the illusion of mysticism. The results on both are the same. We lose the truth of life and the truth of science."

11. Page 27. Descartes (*Synopsis meditationum*) teaches that all substances are unchangeable; only body taken in general is substantial, not, e.g. the human body. Every soul, on the contrary, is pure substance, does not change, however much its single accidents (thoughts, feelings, and will-manifestations) may change. In his work *Cogitata metaphysica* (II, c. 11) Spinoza says (from the Cartesian point of view, which he essentially adopts in this work): *Si ad totam Naturam materiae attendamus, illi nihil novi accedit; at respectu rerum particularium aliquo modo potest dici, illi alicui novi accedere. Quod an etiam locum habet in rebus spiritualibus, non videtur: nam illa [se spiritualia] ab invicem ita dependere non apparat [souls are not so
dependent on one another as bodies]. Later, Spinoza reached another conception.

12. Page 27. Availing himself of an exposition of the ‘active reason’ of Aristotle, Averroes taught (see on this point Renan’s *Averroès et l’Averroïsme*. Paris, 1852), that while the individual souls arise and pass away, the intellectus universalis remains, the world-thought, which operates in the thought of single souls. In the middle ages this doctrine was revived, among others, by Siger von Brabant in his *Quaestiones de anima intellectiva*, recently edited by Mandonnet. (Mandonnet: *Siger de Brabant et l’Averroïsme latin au 13e siècle*. Fribourg, 1899.) The whole doctrine of the conservation of mind goes back to Neoplatonism (see Plotinus, *Ennead*, V, 9, 6). On Spinoza’s doctrine of the infinite intellect and the idea of God, see *History of Modern Philosophy*, I, p. 312 ff.; on Hegel, *ibid.* II, p. 174.

13. Page 29. Maxwell, *Scientific Papers*, Cambridge, 1890. Vol. II, p. 759. A little above the extract cited, Maxwell remarks that, while men to-day have generally given up the idea that the soul can be located anatomically somewhere in the brain, the idea has held sway longer, that if we could follow back the material processes far enough, we could arrive at a material process which was worked by the soul. Against this possibility the citation is directed. Cf. Spinoza, *Ethics*, III, 2, Schol. — Maxwell’s conception of the law of inertia in his *Matter and Motion*, § 41, leads to a similar result as his conception of the law of energy. Cf. my *Psychology*, II, 8.


15. Page 32. Münsterberg, *Psychology and Life*, p. 127: “Mental facts, as they are not quantitative, cannot enter into any causal equation.”


18. Page 37. Münsterberg, *Psychology and Life*, p. 162: "The reality of the will and feeling and judgment do not belong to the describable world."—P. 208: "The subjective attitude is never object; it is never perceived."


21. Page 51. See the interesting discussion of Le parallélisme psychophysique et la Métaphysique positive, in the Bulletin de la société française de Philosophie, Juin, 1901. Bergson remarked during this discussion and elsewhere (p. 51): "Étant donné un état psychologique, la partie jouable de cet état, celle qui se traduirait par une attitude du corps ou par des actions du corps, est représentée dans le cerveau: le reste en est indépendant et n'a pas d'équivalent cérébral. De sorte qu'à un même état cérébral donné peuvent correspondre bien des états psychologiques différents, mais non pas des états quelconques. Ce sont des états psychologiques qui ont tous en commun le même schéma moteur."

22. Page 54. I have introduced an example of this in my *Psychology*, 3d German edition, p. 80, note.

chologie, I, p. 168 (cf. also his article in the Zeitschrift für Psychologie, XI, p. 201), and Ehrenfels, Werttheorie, I, pp. 245–249, argue from the imperceptibility of the will, that the will is no particular psychical element. Cf. my criticism of the last work, in the Göttinger gel. Anzeigen, 1900, p. 742 f.

24. Page 57. See fuller treatment of this point in my Psychology, II; IV, 7 e; V, B, 5; VII, A, 1; B, 4–5.

25. Page 59. Ostwald attempts in his Naturphilosophie (Leipzig, 1902) to show that the concept of energy is the fundamental concept of natural science, and since manifestations of consciousness are also (after Kant) to be conceived as activities, energy also becomes the fundamental psychological concept. On the relation of the two kinds of energy to one another he does not express himself clearly. In one place the processes of consciousness themselves are called ‘energetic’ (p. 394), at another he says that consciousness is conditioned by the energy of the nervous system (p. 396), and again mental energy is defined as ‘conscious or unconscious nerve energy’ (p. 398).


28. Page 65. See ibid. chap. VI.

29. Page 69. Hobbes, Logic, chap. 3, §§ 8–9; Physics, chap. 25, § 1. (Nevertheless Hobbes teaches in another place that it is analysis of the given data that leads us to principles: Analytica est ars ratiocinandi a supposito ad principia, id est ad propositiones primas vel ex primis demonstrandam. De rationibus motuum et magnitudinum, chap. 20, § 6.) — Fichte, Grundlage d.


34. Page 84. The expression 'static concept of truth' was used — with a somewhat different motive — by Louis Weber in the philosophical congress at Paris in 1900.


37. Page 91. H. Hertz, Über die Beziehungen zwischen Licht und Elektrizität, 1889, p. 29. — Boltzmann's Address before the meeting of German scientists, 1900 (translated in The Monist, Jan.'1901: The recent development of method in theoretical physics), and his paper in the Übersichten der Wiener Akademie, chap. V, 8 (translated in The Monist, Oct. 1901: On the necessity of atomic theories in physics). — Cf. on this whole question also C. Christiansen, Den elektromagnetiske Lysteori (Det danske Vid. Selskis Oversigter, 1889), and the same author in Fysisk Tidsskrift, I, pp. 4–5.

33, 302-305 (where he shows for what he is indebted to Faraday and Lord Kelvin), 326, 777 f.

39. Page 93. Cf. Über Wiederkennen (Vierteljahrs-
schr. f. wiss. Phil. XIV).

40. Page 93. On this point we cannot grant the case to Ostwald when he tries to trace back everything in Nature to ‘energy.’ Mass as well as space, weight, and chemical properties are to be derived from the concept of energy. It is quite correct that all these concepts presuppose the concept of energy; but is it the only fundamental concept in natural philosophy? Then one ought also to be able to derive ‘geometrical’ properties from dynamic; but Ostwald does not attempt this. In his volume on Die Überwindung des wissenschaftlichen Materialismus (1895) he defines matter as “a spatially (sic) ordered group of different energies” (p. 28). This spatial order, which is here recognized as of special moment, he seems to me to push a little to one side in his Naturphilosophie (1902), in which the ‘energetic world idea’ is developed. The chief doctrine on which he builds his system is, however, as follows: “Every process without exception can be exactly and exhaustively expounded and described, by declaring which energies experience temporal and spatial (sic) changes” (p. 152). That the concept of energy and of time cannot be separated from one another is self-evident, because energy means the capacity to overcome opposition, and all overcoming lays claim to time. The connection of the concept of energy with spatial changes is not so self-evident. This connection is derived by Ostwald simply because he has taken the concept of energy from spatial phenomena by investigations as to the changes in definite parts of space. Only the fact that he leaves this geometrical element heedlessly in his
concept of energy makes it possible for him to believe that this concept is to be accepted at face value as the same for psychical phenomena as for physical, so that the problem of ‘souls and bodies’ would be solved by setting up the concept of energy. See above, note 25.

41. Page 96. Hume, Treatise on Human Nature, I, 3, 6: “Your appeal to past experience decides nothing in the present case, and at the utmost can only prove, that that very object, which produc'd any other, was at that very instant endow'd with such a power.”

42. Page 97. Critique of Pure Reason, p. 181: “By this basal doctrine [the doctrine of causality and the related principle of the conservation of ‘substance’ and of the reciprocal action of everything that exists] we shall be justified in putting together phenomena only according to the analogy of the logical and general unity of concepts.” — P. 180: “An analogy of experience will thus only be a rule, according to which unity of experience shall come out of perceptions, and as the principle of events (phenomena) be valid not constitutively but merely regulatively.”


44. Page 100. Rich. Avenarius, Kritik der reinen Erfahrung, II, pp. 332–339. — Ernst Mach, Zur Analyse der Empfindungen, p. 168: “The fact of the irreversibility of time reduces itself to the fact that the changes of value of physical magnitudes take place in a definite direction. Of the two analytical possibilities only one is real. We need not see in this a metaphysical problem.”

Cf. on these theories Heinrich Grünbaum, Zur Kritik

45. Page 102. Bosanquet also concedes this: “At any given moment we have no choice but to say, that the future is conditioned by the past, . . . effect by cause.” Logic, I, p. 272.

46. Page 104. La base psychologique du jugement, § 27.

47. Page 106. Jevons, Principles of Science, 2d ed., London, 1877, p. 43. (De Morgan had already pointed out, as Jevons remarks, that we customarily think and argue within a limited world or sphere of ideas, even though this is not expressly declared.)

48. Page 107. Francis Bradley has clearly discerned the opposition between time and ‘the Absolute,’ when he declares: “If time is not unreal, I admit that our Absolute is a delusion” (Appearance and Reality, p. 206). “The Absolute has no seasons” (ibid. p. 500). — The criticism of a speculative theory and the reaction against it consequently often utilizes the reality of time as a main argument. Cf. C. H. Weisse’s and S. Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel. (History of Modern Philosophy, II, pp. 267, 286–7.) In a brilliant volume, Tidsexistensens Apologi Et stycke relationsteorie (Upsala, 1888), Pontus Wilner has attempted to shatter the ‘Either—Or’ here exhibited. He tries to show that the highest completeness can only be reached by the successive unfolding of qualities which would mutually exclude one another if simultaneous. But the question of the limitation which inheres in the very succession is thus not raised!


50. Page 113. Cf. La base psychologique du jugeme-
ment, §§ 24 and 27, and, with reference to religious conclusions, my Religionsphilosophie, pp. 64-68.


52. Page 119. Cf. on this point my Religionsphilosophie, pp. 54-63.—In the epistemological section of the Religionsphilosophie I have already expounded my conception of the problem of Being and its treatment.

53. Page 124. Goethe, Farbenlehre, pp. 124, 175-177. Cf. Conversations with Eckermann, 18 Feb. 1829, 21 Dec. 1831.—Goethe applied this idea not only in the realm of the theory of colors, but also to magnetism and botany. See Sprüche in Prosa (On Natural Science) and Conversations with Eckermann, 27 Jan. 1830.—From his Nachträgen zur Farbenlehre it is evident that Hegel took up with avidity the idea of type-phenomenon as Goethe had expounded it.


55. Page 142. See History of Modern Philosophy, II, p. 180 f. It is characteristic of the English thinkers who have most recently dealt with some of Hegel’s fundamental ideas, to conceive that the argument here is much more of an analogy than a proof. Francis Bradley never considers the analogy as permissible; according to him, the highest reality cannot be called either soul or body, although the soul more than the body possesses that combination of extent and unity, that ‘self-consistency’ which is the mark of true reality (Appearance and Reality, pp. 307, 359).—In his article on Hegel's treatment of the categories of the idea (Mind, 1900,
p. 149 f.) McTaggart concedes that we only have a single example of the category ‘Geist,’ which according to Hegel possesses theological or cosmological significance. — If a distinction is made (as by A. E. Taylor in Mind, 1900, p. 245) between two idealistic schools, the one standing near Leibniz and Lotze, and the other holding by Hegel, then I must emphasize the fact that it is the first of these two schools that has most clearly discerned the real philosophical basis of metaphysical idealism. (Taylor himself even acknowledges that in both schools an analogy with the mind of man is fundamental when he says that both are agreed in “the main principle that it is in mind, and nowhere else, that we are face to face with the central reality of the universe,” ibid.)

56. Page 145. Compare on this type my Religionsphilosophie, pp. 47 f., 118 f., 277 f.

57. Page 155. In my Ethik (2d ed., p. 27 f.) I went no deeper into the relation of the notions of worth, of purpose, and of the norm. But see, on the other hand, La base psychologique du jugement, § 27 (cf. § 37), and my Religionsphilosophie, p. 10 f.


62. Page 176. In my Religionsphilosophie, for the sake of a more comprehensive illumination of the problem, I introduce beside the psychological-historical inquiry also an epistemological and an ethical inquiry. In this shorter exposition I dwell especially on the psychological-historical inquiry, pointing out only casually
and very briefly the epistemological and ethical points of view.

63. Page 182. Plato, Phaidros, S. 249 C. (πρὸς ὄλσπερ Ἡεῖς ὃν Ἡεῖς ἔστι). Literally rendered, "that, to live in which is the divinity of God."