LECTURE III.

METAPHYSICAL IDEA OF THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY.

At the close of last lecture we had entered upon the consideration of Kant’s theory of Reason, the portion of his work which has most significance when we endeavour to comprehend the complete metaphysical conception of which the parts are being surveyed in detail. The ultimate aim of Reason had been determined as the systematic unity of cognition, in and through which the knowledge yielded by understanding might appear, not as a mere contingent aggregate, but as a connected organic whole.¹ Empirical knowledge is not, per se, in need of such systematisation; that is to say, science may and does proceed in its course without regarding the metaphysical problems inevitably raised when we endeavour to comprehend the sum total of experience itself. Nor does science itself ever of necessity lead to such problems as make up the substance of metaphysical inquiry. Incompleteness of scientific
explanation is not to be regarded as identical with the apparent insolubility of certain questions regarding the nature of experience and our relations to it. Only reflection upon the notions employed in scientific cognition can lead us to see their limited character and can enable us to determine, at least in outline, what would be required by a metaphysical explanation properly so called.²

It had also become apparent that in seeking for explanation of experience itself, in seeking the unconditioned, we of necessity employed these conceptions through which unity was possible in experience. But in such a case it is evident from the outset that Reason is doomed to failure. It is not possible that notions which serve to explain the perception of one conditioned thing among others, which enable us to pass from one part of the world of empirical cognition to another, can be valid as means for cognising the unconditioned, the totality of experience. "The notions of reality, of substance, of causality, of necessary existence itself, have no significance for determining any object, beyond their service in rendering the empirical cognition of a thing possible. They may thus be used to explain the possibility of things in the world of sense, but cannot be employed to explain the possibility of the universe itself, since
the ground of explanation for that must lie beyond the world, and consequently can be no object of a possible experience." We explain by referring one part of experience to another; all our scientific notions are strictly relative; how then shall we explain the sum total of cognised things?

Kant, as we further saw, was not content to rest the insufficiency of metaphysic constructed by scientific notions on this general ground, but submitted to detailed examination the use of the three special notions of empirical knowledge in the determination of metaphysical principles. One of them, substance, has appeared entirely inadequate to determine the unconditioned in consciousness. Cause, as we shall presently see, is equally incompetent when applied to the idea of the unconditioned as the absolute totality of the conditions on which any phenomenon or event depends.

When in presence of a conditioned object, Reason has but one prescript or rule; it demands the absolute completeness of the series of conditions on which the phenomenon depends. Now, the only notions with which it can proceed to determine the unconditioned totality of a series are the categories of the Understanding, which are strictly finite in content—i.e. serve merely to determine relations between parts of experience. Through
them knowledge of objects and consequently unity of empirical cognition is possible, but they cannot be employed to explain the whole of experience, which is manifestly not one among many objects to be known. Reason thus finds itself in a peculiar difficulty. The synthesis of conditions, or the conception by which we endeavour to give completed explanation of the conditioned, if really adequate to the unity demanded by Reason, must be too great for understanding, i.e., must involve elements transcending and contradictory of the notions valid for empirical explanation; on the other hand, if the synthesis be adequate to the Understanding, i.e., if the notions be employed with the limitations essential to them, it must be too small for Reason, must fall short of the unity required. This inner want of consistency in the categories of the conditioned manifests itself, in those cases where a series of conditioned and conditions is possible, as Antinomy or Antithetic. Over against the positive assertion of any synthesis an apparently well-grounded contradictory can be placed. Thus, e.g., if we demand the absolute sum of conditions on which the temporal and spatial element of any phenomenon depends, we find apparently equal grounds for asserting that the world began and did not begin, that it is limited in ex-
tent and unlimited. So, if we demand the absolute series of conditions on which the content of intuition, as filling space and time depends, we shall find it equally possible to say that simple substances exist and that they do not exist; in other words, absolute continuity and absolute discreteness seem equally reasonable. *Quantity* and *Quality*, then, when employed to furnish conceptions explanatory of experience as a whole, result in sheer contradiction. So also, if we demand the absolute series of conditions on which the occurrence of an event depends, we find that universal causation according to natural law, and spontaneity or independence of natural law, are equally possible and appear equally well grounded. Finally, the existence of a phenomenon as such seems to demand for explanation both that all events are contingent, and that at least some thing in, or in connection with, the phenomenal world is necessary; in other words, we seem driven to admit that the phenomenal world has and has not a necessary ground.\(^4\)

Now it is impossible, says Kant, to dismiss the problems suggested by such Antinomy with a vague reference to our ignorance.\(^5\) The conditioned, of which explanation is desired, is given in empirical cognition, and we are not in search of an absolutely unconditioned, *i.e.*, of some ground
which, *ex hypothesi*, *could* not be given in experience and of which we must perforce remain in ignorance, but of an absolute series of conditions as given in experience. Yet, from the evident contradiction which results from all efforts to comprehend such a series, it would seem impossible to attain our object. The ground of this impossibility, and with it the origin and significance of Antinomy in general, must be disclosed by Reason itself. For it is impossible that Reason should be in essence dialectical, or should propose to itself problems it cannot solve.  

The critical method of solution is one which throws much light on Kant's fundamental idea, and at the same time brings into prominence the least satisfactory aspect of his theory of knowledge. If the objects known were really things-in-themselves, *i.e.*, did they exist, so constituted as we know them, apart from and independent of the synthesis of possible experience, then seeing that they would be in themselves conditioned, the series of conditions must of necessity be given along with them. In such a case no escape from Antinomy would be possible; Reason would remain for ever in the state of self-opposition. But if the thing known be merely phenomenon, *i.e.*, exist as so constituted only in the synthesis of experience
in which it is given, then it is no longer necessary
that the series of conditions should also be given.
For these are themselves only other syntheses of
experience, and must be cognised by the same
notions which afford knowledge of the conditioned
under consideration. The prescript of Reason, in
such a case, would be merely that we must uncondi-
tionally seek for the series of conditions, and it
is quite possible that we may recognise the im-
possibility of ever bringing our search to an end;
The appearance of Antinomy would thus signify
that in the synthesis of experience, and through
the categories which constitute that synthesis, the
unity of Reason or completed explanation is not to
be attained. Such—all details as to the differences
between the several kinds of Antinomy and the
special features of each solution being omitted—is
the critical answer to the difficulties Reason en-
counters in the sphere of the cosmological ideas.
In words, indeed, Kant makes his solution depend
entirely on the distinction between phenomena
and noumena; but, such distinction being rightly
apprehended, it reduces itself to that above given
—viz. the finite relative character of the categories
of the conditioned, and their inadequacy as means
of explaining the conditioned itself. The result is
in so far negative, for Reason has no categories
with which to think the world of experience save those just discussed, and contradiction in things themselves is avoided only by depriving Reason of any power to obtain an answer to its difficulties. Positively, however, there is an advance, for there now begins to arise the fundamental question of Kant's metaphysic, a question which, stated subjectively, would be that of the relation between Reason and Understanding; objectively, that of the relation between the intelligible and phenomenal worlds. On this we have to direct particular attention in the subsequent evolution of Kant's ideas, and it will assist much to enter somewhat more fully upon the discussion under one of the Antinomies—that which concerns the opposition between natural causation and freedom. The method of treatment is of importance both generally and for the particular view of the ethical element in the critical philosophy. Kant rightly calls attention to the fact that all psychological or practical teaching with regard to freedom must remain valueless, unless it be shown that freedom as such is not incompatible with the mechanical law already recognised as an a priori condition of experience. The distinction drawn by him between Intelligible and Empirical character has been
much misunderstood, and requires careful statement. It is peculiar to the category of Cause as contrasted with Quantity or Quality, that in it the synthesis is of two perceptions, and consequently of two elements which may be heterogeneous, whereas in them the synthesis concerns parts of intuition, and consequently, elements which must be homogeneous. Although, then, the law of causality permits us to say that for every given event there is a series of events from which it must follow, it does not permit us to say what these events are. It merely demands that the cause for every phenomenal event shall be found in phenomena, but does not prescribe the kind of causality belonging to such phenomena. Now it is at least possible to conceive, or does not contradict the fundamental law of experience to suppose, that in phenomena their causality may be determined otherwise than by phenomenal antecedents, although the effects of such antecedents, being phenomena, must be regarded as empirically or naturally determined. In particular, it must be pointed out that the synthesis of intuitions which we call object must have a transcendental ground, which determines it as empirical representation, and so we may conceive in the case of any
phenomenon that, though the mode of its connection with others, the empirical character of its causality, is throughout determined by natural law, yet that the empirical character itself may be determined by a causality purely intelligible and following intelligible law; in short, may be determined by an intelligible character. Thus the phenomenal world would appear as the manifestation in the forms of experience, and therefore under natural law, of the noumenal world, which, being beyond time, is not determined by natural law, but may freely originate events, and is subject only to the law of pure understanding. Such a mode of causation is not, indeed, a possible object of experience, and consequently we can never hope to demonstrate its existence, but with equal certainty it must be held that we can never demonstrate its impossibility. If, then, from elsewhere, we have indications of something in human reason not limited to the forms of intuition, we cannot by dogmatic or scientific objections be debarred from investigating the nature and significance of such conceptions.

The substance of this difficult discussion may be stated in a form differing from that given by Kant. The world of experience must be for intelligence a system of things causally connected. No object
of scientific cognition can be regarded as free from the law of natural causation, for only through this law is nature possible. But the very fact that the conception of cause only enables us to think each separate event as part of a united system, points out the limit of that conception. We cannot subject the whole of experience to the law of natural causation, and are led inevitably towards the notion of something beyond the phenomena of sense. So far, indeed, as the separate events are considered, it is clear that, for cognition, it is only requisite that they should be regarded as forming parts in a systematic experience; but it is quite possible that the ground for their specific connections or positions in empirical cognition may depend upon something not itself phenomenal. If, then, we find that, connected with experience, there is something which, from its very nature, can never be merely an object of scientific cognition, and which—yet seems to affect in the way of causation facts belonging to experience, we are not to regard such a causality as contradicting experience. Scientific cognition has its definite and determinate sphere; whatever is merely object of knowledge falls within that sphere. But such cognition is only for an intelligence not itself merely one of the objects of knowledge;
and consequently, alongside of the causal connection of experience we must place the connection of reason as at least possible.

Kant has connected his discussion solely or mainly with the Noumenal Ego, or intelligible character in man; but the argument is perfectly general, and, taken in connection with what is said under the IV. Antinomy (on contingency and necessity) brings into comparative clearness the position of the noumenal world in the Kantian system. Things, as objects of scientific cognition, are contingent, dependent—not grounds of their own existence. As explanation of the being of each one, some other phenomenon is adduced. Within experience, then, which presents us with elements, connected, but each conditioned by the others, no object can be found which can serve as necessary ground for all others—no unconditioned. We are thus able to sever entirely the problems of reason and of scientific cognition. In the latter, explanation is to be sought entirely in the conditioned, and metaphysical completeness of explanation is impossible. In the former, completeness of explanation is sought; but as it cannot be obtained within experience and by the notions connecting experience, it must be found in the supersensible or noumenal world. The two spheres are entirely
distinct. Within the realm of science no part can be played by any notion which refers to the supersensible, and it is of no concern to science what views are held with regard to that higher world. Within the realm of reason no use can be made of the categories of science, nor can we ever hope to comprehend the noumenal world in the fashion of scientific cognition.

What relation, then, does Kant definitely think as obtaining between the intelligible and empirical worlds? So far as can be judged from the discussion in the cosmological antinomies, he appears to land himself in the doctrine that the noumenal world is somehow mechanically related to the phenomenal—a doctrine which is, philosophically, the counterpart of the theological idea of God as distinct from the known universe, and arbitrarily creative of it. Yet, though Kant never succeeds in freeing his theory from this appearance of merely mechanical or contingent connection between the ultimate elements, it is to be noted that the mere possibility of an intelligible ground, distinct from the phenomenal, which is indicated by the cosmological antinomy, is supplemented both by the ethical ideas and by the crowning synthesis of teleology; and that, even in this preliminary outline of his metaphysical conception,
he does not draw so sharp a line of separation between the noumenal and phenomenal as is frequently ascribed to him. He seems inclined to regard the phenomenal as the form in which the noumenal world appears—a form having inner connectedness as a system of experience, but in a twofold manner contingent—first, as to its being at all; second, as to the empirical or material connections in it.

The discussion of the antinomy involved in the dynamical notions of causality and necessary existence, points the way towards the final idea which Reason employs as explanatory of the conditioned world of experience. The cosmological conception contained the series of conditions for a given phenomenon, and had unmistakably indicated that no completed series was attainable within the sphere of phenomena. Now, in the whole sphere of experience there is a certain unity, corresponding formally to the category of reciprocity, or disjunctive totality. Every real thing, every part of the system of cognised fact, is regarded as being real, or as having determined existence, in and through its relations to other real things. The individual element is only to be completely determined by reference to all possible real predicates. Empirical cognition may never suc-
ceed in exhausting the determinability of the individual; but through the conception of this sum total of reality, our known universe has for us a unity, and empirical research a definite aim. More particularly that which we call the real in any phenomenon, that which is empirically given, is determined in each case by reference to the sum total of reality. Now reason, endeavouring after the ground for the complete determinability of all objects whatsoever,—desirous, in short, of finding the complete unity to which they belong,—adopts this conception, empirically justifiable, of a disjunctive totality, converts it into the idea of an Ens Realissimum or collective sum of all possible predicates, regards this as the necessary ground of all existing things (none of which can be viewed as other than contingens), and finally personifies the idea as God. Though Kant does not point out the connection, it is well to note that the final goal of reason in this procedure is the ideal of an intuitive understanding, the ideal which, critically stated, is by Kant substituted for the idea here discussed.

The examination of the validity of this idea, i.e. of the possibility of employing the notion of reciprocity as explanatory of the system of reality itself, takes the following form. If the unity
thought under this idea be a true solution for the problem of reason, it must be that an object corresponding to the abstract idea of the *Ens Realsimum* exists. Reason, therefore, must establish a synthesis between this abstract thought and existence, and, in so doing, it may start either from existence or from the abstract thought itself. In the first case we have the cosmological and physico-theological proofs of the existence of God; in the second, the ontological.\(^{16}\) Kant has little difficulty in showing that the cosmological argument and the argument from design not only suffer from defects peculiar to themselves, but involve for their final inference, or ultimately turn upon, the ontological argument.\(^{17}\) With regard to the latter, it is as readily shown that a synthetic judgment affirming existence cannot rest on a conception only. Existence denotes the relation of an object to our conception, and therefore cannot be contained in the conception itself. *Being* is not a predicate which can be found in the subject of any judgment, and if we desire to add it synthetically, we must have some third term beyond the idea of the subject. Such third term, possible experience, is wanting in the case of the *Ens Realsimum*, which transcends experience.\(^{18}\) Speculatively, then, Reason has no ground for asserting
that an object corresponding to the transcendental ideal exists; while at the same time, as Kant cautiously points out, no speculative proof of its non-existence can be given. So far as this final problem of Reason is concerned, we have only the negative result which has throughout attended efforts to cognise the thing in itself; *noumenorum non datur scientia.*

As was briefly noted, the critique of theology seems to follow a method somewhat different from that employed in the discussion of the Antinomies; the result, however, is the same in substance. The finite category of Reciprocity or disjunctive totality, valuable as a notion of Understanding, and giving unity to our conception of nature, is inapplicable to the unconditioned, and has no inner consistency when extended beyond the sphere of finite, relative cognition. The sum total of things known has not its ground in itself, and when we endeavour to connect this world-whole with the supersensible, cogitated as its ground by means of the category of reciprocity, Understanding finds no third term by which to effect the synthesis. The supreme ground of things, the *Ens Realissimum,* remains a mere Idea, for which objective existence cannot be proved. It is but the projection or shadow of the unity desired by Reason, and it is clear that if
Reason has for material only the mutually determining substances of the phenomenal world, and for method the purely relative notions of Understanding, no more concrete unity can be attained. The *Ens Realissimum* is in truth the notion of God as the substance of substances, the purely Spinozistic conception of God as the indeterminate ground of all possible determinations, and is nothing but the category of reciprocity raised to ultimate abstraction. The Kantian substitute for this we shall presently discover.\(^ {20} \)

What, then, is the sum of Kant's view with regard to Reason and its function? Not certainly the vague Agnosticism which has often been assumed as its full equivalent. The mere abrupt assertion that knowledge is limited to intuitions of sense, and that with such intuitions it must remain content—a theorem in itself of much simplicity—cannot be accepted as having any significance apart from the system of which it is an integral portion. That cognition is only of elements of sense experience, and that the categories of understanding have validity and application only within the limits of possible experience, are propositions which must be thoroughly grounded, not assumed on the strength of experience itself, or as the result of some unsuccessful attempts to
represent the supersensible under forms other than those of sense. And the full grounds for these fundamental theorems cannot, so Kant thinks, be exhibited in any other manner than by reference to the special characteristic of Reason itself, the imperative demand for unity of conception. "The law of Reason, which requires us to seek for this unity, is a necessary law, as without it we should not possess the faculty of Reason, nor without Reason a consistent and self-accordant mode of employing the Understanding, nor, in the absence of this, any proper and sufficient criterion of empirical truth." In other words, the unity of Understanding, which alone renders experience possible, is subordinate to, or dependent on, the unity of Reason. The limit, and consequently the validity, of cognition can only be disclosed and accurately determined by reference to that which passes beyond the limit. The systematic connection which Reason demands, and which involves the idea of a completed whole of cognition, prescribes limits to the unity of Understanding, and points to the higher unity of which that is but a part. The finite modes of this subordinate unity are indeed inadequate to the requirements of the higher synthesis, and therefore we cannot determine the soul as substance, or complete the causal
series of the phenomenal world, or determine God as the supreme ground or Intelligence whose manifestations are the phenomenal. The modes in which the rational demand for Unity expresses itself cannot, then, be regarded as constitutive, i.e., they are not immanent in the objects known, but must be viewed as merely regulative, i.e., as pointing out or specifying the final goal of speculation, and thus furnishing an ideal or norm for research. As regards the whole system of cognition, such principles must be held to have objective worth, for though they do not determine objects as such, they require systematic unity in the operations of the understanding, or demand absolutely that understanding shall proceed in accordance with the requirements of such systematic unity.²²

Now in the idea of a systematic whole of cognition are involved not only the general laws which express the conditions of experience as such and are a priori, but specifications of them, or empirical laws which cannot be known a priori. To say, then, that our cognition must proceed according to the idea of systematic unity is equivalent to saying that Nature, not in its formal aspect as the complex of general laws of all possible experience, but in its material aspect as the complex of empirical rules of actual fact, must be accommodated or
adapted to the faculty of cognition—that Nature, in short, must be viewed as throughout intelligible. Undoubtedly this principle cannot be scientifically proved. Although we can say that no experience is possible save under those general forms which express the very substance of Understanding, yet real empirical experience might be utterly chaotic; it might be quite impossible to discover real classes, empirical or special laws of fact. The empirical, as such, is thoroughly contingent; nay, even the certainty of general law may be viewed as contingent, for our categories only yield synthetic principles in relation to something quite contingent, viz. possible experience. The principle, then, under which we subsume real experience is not constitutive but regulative, a mere maxim of reason, and subjective. The adaptability of Nature to our faculty of cognition is, therefore, not a principle which determines objects; and judgment, which mediates between universal and particular, is not here, as in the case of the synthetic propositions of understanding, determining, but merely reflective. The empirical particular is given, but the universal is not necessarily given in and with it; we supply the universal.

The notion of reflective judgment Kant, as we shall presently see, works out at length in the
Critique of Judgment; meanwhile, there must be indicated, as of extreme importance for understanding the Kantian theory of knowledge, certain detailed explanations of the general principle of Intelligibility put forward in the Critique of Pure Reason. All ultimate explanation, we already found, is in essence of a threefold form; the type is invariably that which has presented itself in the analysis of Perception. The manifold or particular is united into one consciousness through the general or universal. Here we are dealing specially with the unity of empirical laws, a unity which is not indeed involved in the very notion of experience and understanding, but without which understanding and experience, as known to us, would not exist. The conditions of this unity are three in number. First, that there should be a certain identity in nature, a certain possibility of regarding various phenomena as species of higher genera. This, when raised to its highest form, or made ultimate, is the Principle of Homogeneity, the expression of the rational search for unity amid diversity, and the basis of the old logical rule *Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem. Second, that there should be difference or particularity in nature, a possibility of surveying completely and distinguishing the species that come
under genera. This, in its abstraction, is the Principle of Diversity or Variety, expressing the necessity for manifold or difference in cognition, and is the basis of the rule *Entium varietates non temere sunt minuculae.* Third, that there should be connectedness or relatedness among the phenomena of nature, a possibility of regarding all, whether genera or species, as forming parts in one systematic whole, and therefore of passing without discontinuity from one empirical conception to another. This, in abstraction, is the Principle of Affinity or Continuity, the union of the first two principles, the expression of the ultimate relatedness of things, and the foundation of the rule *Datur continuum formarum.*

These principles are the formal or abstract expression for what Reason can retain of the three Ideas. The Ideas, when first discussed, appeared to carry with them reference to objects, in this respect resembling the categories. But no object within experience can be found adequate to them, and the apparent demand that there shall be an object is in truth delusive. So far as theoretical cognition is concerned, then, the Ideas simply express the rational requirement of systematic unity, and are therefore not notions of objects, but problems towards the solution of which we approxi-
mate. It is true they have another aspect, i.e.,
their value for cognition is not their only value,
but theoretically they are to be regarded as regu-
larive merely. Through this view of their nature
we obtain the true substitutes for Rational Psy-
chology, Cosmology, and Theology. We cannot
determine the soul by the category of substance,
but we proceed, and must proceed, in our search for
systematic unity, as if psychical phenomena could
all be determined as modifications of one simple
permanent essence (Principle of Homogeneity).
With regard to Nature in its corporeal or mechani-
cal aspect, we proceed as if the series of conditions
on which any event depends were really infinite
(Principle of Diversity). With regard to God, we
proceed as if all the objects in the universe had
connection, in so far as they are due to or ordered
by a supreme, all-comprehending intelligence
(Principle of Continuity).90

Now it is remarkable that in this last principle
Kant has again approached the idea of an Intui-
tive Understanding; indeed, it is plain that in
order to understand much of his later, more ma-
tured metaphysic, we must bear in mind that the
transcendental Idea of God, the principle of In-
telligibility, the teleological view of nature, and
the Intuitive Understanding, are in essence identi-
cal. As Kant in this connection remarks, "The highest formal unity, which rests solely on notions of Reason, is the teleological unity of things, and the speculative interest of Reason renders it necessary to view all order in the world as if it originated from the purpose of a supreme Reason. Such a principle opens up a quite new prospect for our Reason in its application to the field of experience, that, viz. of connecting the things of the world according to teleological laws, and so attaining their highest systematic unity." The notion of End, as the supreme metaphysical category, makes its appearance here somewhat abruptly, and it will be necessary to point out how it comes forward in this place before considering how the faint outline of a final conception sketched in the extract just given receives filling in from Kant. The principle we have just been discussing at some length, that of the Intelligibility of Nature, is merely the assertion that Nature is adapted to our faculty of cognition, i.e., is to be treated as if it resulted from an intelligence similar to ours. But to view Nature as the product of an Intelligence is to view it as the end realised by that Intelligence; the principle of Intelligibility is therefore the principle of teleological judgment. In itself, Kant is careful to say, this principle is merely regulative, but
it contains of necessity reference to a hypothetical supreme understanding, and, when fully determined, leads to the final conception of the universe as an organic whole, in which the parts and their connection are dependent on the idea of the whole. How such a unity as is thus contemplated should be even possible, we have no means of cognising. It is a transcendental ideal, a mere prescript of Reason. The Ideal, however, is not left quite so indeterminate by Kant, and in following the development of his views on this, the outcome of his Critique, we may take as a clue the kind of conception which, with his doctrine of theoretical cognition, must be formed of the Intuitive Understanding. The elements in the ultimate synthesis are clearly the pure Ego, the world of experience or phenomena, and the supersensible substratum of the phenomenal world. To cognize the relations of these three we must employ the categories of understanding, and, as the question is of a certain systematic unity, the category appropriate is evidently the category of Reciprocity. The phenomenal world shall, somehow, appear as the result of the mutual relations of noumenal ego and noumenal non-ego. Although such a conception is not theoretically demonstrable, yet we shall find that what Kant substitutes for it retains traces of
the category, Reciprocity, beyond which he never proceeded. The category cannot be used otherwise than analogically, still it is employed, even though at times Kant would appear to have regarded the system as organically rather than mechanically united.

This may be put in another fashion. The systematic unity demanded by Reason leads to the conception of the universe as determined by a supreme intelligence. Now the only mode of determination of objects with which we are theoretically acquainted is the mechanical or necessary. As the supposed intelligence is removed from the conditions of experience, its activity must be free, and the effects produced must be viewed as spontaneously originating. (Thus, it may be remarked in passing, the oppositions of Freedom and Necessity, Mechanism and Teleology, are for Kant identical.) If, then, our conception of an intuitive understanding is to be further specified, it must be by means of any indications we have of a causality not subject to mechanism but free or self-determining. From the notion to be formed of such Freedom we shall arrive at the full significance of the teleological judgment, or judgment founded on the relation between the noumenal and phenomenal.
It has already appeared that Reason, speculatively, can at all events advance no dogmatic disproof of free causality. If, then, there be given in consciousness any fact inexplicable save through the supposition of Freedom, we are not debarred from accepting Freedom as a fact, even though its possibility be theoretically incognizable. Now a fact which necessitates the assumption of Freedom as its *sine qua non* must be of such a nature that its content is not limited by the conditions of intuition, Space and Time. There is only one fact, the notion of which is given as so unlimited, namely, the moral law. The conception of Duty, as that which should be, evidently refers to no fact given as existing. In itself this conception is purely formal, and it is characteristic of all actions truly moral that they contain reference to the form of law only, that they are performed from respect for Duty. As pure form alone is it possible that the notion of Duty should express a rule of action for a rational being as such, for a being in whom Reason is practical or can prescribe ends for action.

If the particular volitions by which we realise our ends always conformed to the pure law of duty, or were always prompted by maxims or motives which we could at the same time desire to
see universally followed, then the subjective will of the individual would coincide with pure Practical Reason or objective will. But in man subjective considerations intervene; he is not merely pure intelligence, which can think a universal law of action, and can recognise that a law of duty, whether possible or not, would be realised as universal law, but a natural phenomenon, swayed by empirical motives or impulses. Thus the conformity of subjective volition to objective reason appears as in fact contingent, as something which ought to be, but is not. The relation of subjective to objective will, so regarded, is obligation. It is evident, further, that as the moral law is pure form, it can be prescribed by nothing but Reason itself, for any admixture of foreign empirical elements would destroy the absolute purity of the conception, Duty. Finally, it may be pointed out that the kind of obligation contained in the law of Duty is unconditional; the imperatives of Duty are categorical, given and capable of being given only to Reason and by Reason. Thus, by mere process of analysis, it becomes apparent that Duty or Moral Law, Autonomy of Practical Reason, and the categorical Imperative, are various modes of expressing one and the same fact. 37

So far we have but pure analysis of the given
fact, Duty. But the moral law as a categorical imperative demands to be realised, and, as we have seen, such realisation in the phenomenal world is to be regarded as contingent. How, then, is it possible that there should be this connection between Reason as practical and the phenomenal world? How should pure regard for Duty be for intelligence a command which must be realised in the phenomenal world? In other words, How has the moral law the force of obligation?

It is quite true that we must ascribe to every rational being Freedom in a practical sense, as independence of material or empirical conditions, for no rational being can think his actions as due to external force, and consequently must act under the idea of freedom, or be for practical purposes free. Such freedom, however, is in its notion merely negative—goes no farther than the Critique of Pure Reason carried us; but it points the way towards the positive notion we are in search of. For freedom is a kind of causality, and therefore, though not dependent on physical antecedents, is not to be conceived as lawless. The one law of a free will is autonomy; in every action the will is a law to itself; a free will and a will subject to moral law are thus one and the same. Freedom
is consequently the necessary correlate of the consciousness of moral law.

The problem, however, is not yet solved. We have not yet seen how it is possible for such autonomy of will, such freedom, to carry with it obligation. In the noumenal world, in the world of pure reason (Verstandeswelt, as Kant calls it), man must regard himself as free, not merely in a negative sense, as being above empirical conditions, but positively, as being subject only to the law of his own reason. In the phenomenal world, on the other hand, he must regard the effects of his volition as throughout determined by natural causation. If he were only a member of the intelligible world, then all his actions would conform to pure autonomy of will or moral law; if only a member of the phenomenal world (world of sense), then all his actions would conform wholly to the natural law of the desires and inclinations, i.e., of happiness. But the world of understanding to which he belongs is the very foundation of the phenomenal world and its laws; consequently the law of this intelligible world must be regarded as binding upon him. Only when I regard myself as belonging, on the one side, to the world of understanding, and on the other, to the world of sense, does the principle of practical reason become for
me a categorical imperative, and the realisation of its precepts an obligation. 39

Freedom, then, the one speculative idea the certainty of which is directly given, is for Kant the very essence of Reason. 40 Only as determining itself has Reason any positive content. Though theoretically undemonstrable—for under the forms of understanding we cannot even comprehend its possibility—Freedom is in a practical regard the one absolutely sure notion of Reason. With his usual caution Kant does not directly identify Freedom with the consciousness of an unconditional moral law, but throws out the identification as a hint. "Freedom and an unconditioned practical law therefore point mutually to one another. I do not here ask whether they are in fact distinct, and whether an unconditioned law is not rather the mere self-consciousness of a pure practical Reason, which is one with the positive notion of Freedom; but I only ask whence the knowledge of an unconditioned practical law rises, whether from Freedom or from the practical law." 41

This secondary question he answers in favour of the moral law. So far as consciousness of Freedom is concerned, there is immediately given only the mere negative notion which had been treated in the Critique of Pure Reason; the positive notion,
consciousness of self as active or practical in an intelligible or rational system, is gained through and in the consciousness of the moral law.  

The two notions which thus form the foundation of Kant's ethics are Freedom and autonomy of will, or the idea of pure will as universally legislative. Only in the practical sphere, i.e. only in the relation of reason to will do we come immediately into connection with the noumenal, for only here are we presented with objects which cannot be regarded as merely objects in experience. No other notion than that of causality supplies us directly with a means of connecting the phenomenal and intelligible systems.

It is not my purpose to enter on any of the details of the Kantian ethics, for they are not essential elements in his final metaphysical conception, but attention may be directed here to the peculiar formalism which characterises the system, and which is the counterpart of the formalism inherent in the theory of knowledge. Pure practical Reason, as universally legislative, and the possible maxims of individual volition, seem so absolutely heterogeneous that no conjunction can be effected. That one of the elements in what we call ethical action is the formal or purely moral seems undoubted, but equally certain is it that the formal aspect remains
for Kant the entire content of what is ethical. In
details the perplexity thence arising manifests
itself, first, in the extreme difficulty of finding a
means of transition from the simply universal
principle to the system of concrete ethical rela-
tions; second, in the necessity for postulating an
endless ethical progress; and finally, in the ex-
treme rigorism or purism which would have as
present motive in all ethical action the constrain-
ing force of reverence for supreme moral law.\textsuperscript{44}

Just as in theoretical cognition the medium of
reconciling so far as possible the pure generality of
the conditions of experience with the contingency
in the special laws of nature was sought in the
notion of end, or in the adaptation of nature to our
faculty of cognition, so here, in the practical sphere,
the same notion comes forward with even greater
value attached to it. For in the practical sphere
the notion of end has complete validity, whereas
for theoretical cognition it can be employed only
by analogy. Practical Reason has an object, not
empirically given, but following from its very
nature and prescribed by itself. The realisation
of its own law, both in the special sphere of the
individual, where opposition is experienced from
the particular empirical maxims of will, and also
in general, or in its unconditional totality, is the
pure object of practical Reason, the end at which it is aimed. Otherwise expressed, this end is for Kant the *summum bonum* or highest good, the complete and unconditioned totality of the object of pure practical reason, the perfect harmony of universal and particular will.⁴⁵

The notion of the *summum bonum* contains in itself two elements, virtue or state of worthiness to be happy (which is the supreme good, *bonum supremum*), and happiness, which must be added to virtue if the good is to be perfect or highest. Now these two factors are not identical, nor is their combination in one notion given analytically. From the one the other does not analytically follow. Since, then, it is *a priori* necessary that the *summum bonum* should be realised, the possibility of synthesis between these two factors must somehow be cognisable *a priori*. The one, consequently, must be the *ground* of the other, and there must be some common third term, some basis, which shall enable us to cognise *a priori* the necessity of such relation between them. When, however, we try so to think the connection between the two elements, we find that finite categories are being applied to infinite objects, and that antinomy naturally results. It is impossible that the desire for happiness can be the origin of the maxims of
virtue, for this desire is not in itself moral. It is impossible to regard virtue as the cause of happiness, for happiness depends upon temporal conditions not included under the determination of will itself. The moral law, then, which is an integral portion of the final end contemplated, would seem to be merely fantastic, the work of imagination. The present antinomy, however, like those of pure speculative Reason, yields at once to critical consideration. The first impossibility holds good absolutely, the second only under a particular condition. If we regard virtue, i.e., practical reason, freewill, as causative in the world of sense, and at the same time regard the said world as the only field for realisation of moral maxims, then, beyond all doubt, it cannot be asserted that happiness must necessarily be associated with virtue. For nature, as mere object of a priori cognition, as mere possible experience, is not necessarily adapted to the requirements of reason, even in its practical employment. But we have seen that there must be contemplated existence other than that of the sensible world; it is, therefore, possible that in this supersensible system the third term may be found by which virtue and happiness are connected. The exacter specification of this third term is the most notable portion of Kant's practical Kritik, and
through it we may effect the transition to the final aspect of his theory.

The realisation of the *sumnum bonum* is the absolutely necessary object of a will determinable by moral law, and therefore, since that law is given as a fact, the conditions of such realisation must be possible. Now, the *sumnum bonum* contained two factors:—1. Accordance of disposition with the moral law, *i.e.* perfect holiness; 2. Happiness proportionate to virtue, and dependent on it. As regards the first, it is evident that the harmony between empirical and rational can be attained only through an infinite progress, an infinite series of stages in the development of ethical strength and purity. Such infinite progress, which is truly the object of our will when morally determined, is possible only on the supposition of the soul's immortality. As regards the second, the more interesting on general grounds, it is evident that Happiness in proportion to morality cannot be thought as dependent on the will of any being so far as only part of the sense-world. The condition, then, which renders possible the ultimate harmony of the world of experience with the demand of practical reason, must be looked for in the supersensible ground of that world. This ground, since it contains the
principle of connection between virtue and happiness, must be regarded as possessed of both intelligence and will, that is to say, is God. The existence of God, then, is the condition necessary for the harmony of moral or practical reason.  

Thus in the domain of practical reason we obtain the only solutions possible to us of the difficulties into which we were thrown by applying the finite categories of Substance, Cause, and Reciprocity or Disjunctive Totality, to the Ego, the World, and the unity of both. For (i.) instead of the permanence of a soul-substance, of which we could have no intuition, and hence no grounded cognition, we have now the practical and rational certainty of permanence in the ethical progress of the moral agent; (ii.) instead of the merely negative conception of a noumenal causality, and of its possible exercise in the world of sense, we have now the practical certainty of moral or rational freedom; (iii.) instead of the mere ideal of a being on whom depends the existence of all contingent things, we have now the practical certainty of a supreme moral ruler. Thus immortality of the soul, positive freedom of will, and Reason as the ultimate ground, are speculative Ideas practically warranted, though theoretically neither demonstrable nor comprehensible.
Such Ideas, though objects only of practical belief, and not of knowledge, are by no means to be regarded as taken up arbitrarily. They are necessary assumptions in the domain of Reason itself, and could be rejected on no other ground than that they contradict the results of the speculative employment of the same faculty, a ground already shown to be untenable. Nor is it to be imagined, either that Practical Reason is called in to fill up the gaps left by the critique of the speculative ideas, or that in regard to these ideas there is any radical difference between pure practical and pure speculative Reason. In both Kritiken it is Reason simply that is under investigation, and the difference concerns only special faculties to which it stands in relation. For, with reference to the faculty of cognition, Reason must appear to demand that objects corresponding to its conceptions shall be exhibited, and such exhibition is impossible. But with reference to mere self-determination, Reason only demands that objects corresponding to its conceptions shall be known to exist, even though no further determinations of the nature and mode of their existence can be attained. Even to call them “objects” is to some extent inaccurate, for God, the Immortality of the
soul, and Freedom of will, are not "objects," nor can they be cognised as such. 49

Thus Reason, as self-determining, supplies us with notions of Freedom, Reason as determined with notions of Nature, the categories of Understanding. Union between these two has been found in the notion of End, in the idea of Nature as adapted to Reason in its practical aspect. The notion of End is, therefore, the final element in the Kantian metaphysic, and although Kant had occasionally handled it in the Critiques of Pure and Practical Reason, it lay in the nature of things that he should devote special consideration to it.

We have already called attention to this notion as the mediating element through which the various oppositions in the Kantian system were so far reconciled. For these oppositions, of Understanding and Reason, Phenomena and Noumena, Necessity and Freedom, Mechanism and Teleology, are at bottom the same, and they find the same solution. In the Critique of Pure Reason, the principle of the adaptation of Nature to our faculty of cognition appeared as the means of reconciling Understanding and Reason. In the Critique of Practical Reason the adaptation of Nature to the requirements of practical reason
appeared as the means of reconciling Freedom and Necessity. In both, then, constant reference had been made to the supersensible basis of things; and in the Critique of Judgment, undoubtedly the hardest of Kant's writings, this reference is made explicit and final.\textsuperscript{50}

The ultimate opposition with which we are presented in the Critiques of Pure and Practical Reason, is that between the categories of Understanding and the notions of Freedom, between the world of sense and the world of intelligence. But though there is an impassable gulf between these two, rendering impossible any transition from one to the other by the theoretic use of Understanding, as if they were distinct worlds exercising no mutual influence, yet it has also appeared that the supersensible, the world of freedom, is to exercise influence on the sensible, the world of nature. For the notion of freedom is to realise in the world of sense the end posited by its own laws, and it must therefore be possible so to think Nature that its conformity to law should permit at least the possibility of Ends according to Freedom being realised in it. There must, therefore, be some means of uniting in thought the supersensible which is the ground of Nature, and the supersensible which is practically contained
in the notion of Freedom. Some common notion must be found, which, though not theoretically or practically cognisable, yet renders possible the transition from the one realm to the other. Understanding and Reason, the categories of finite thought and the Ideas, the world of natural necessity and the intelligible system of freedom, must be thought as united, as harmonising with one another, through the particular constitution (determination) of the supersensible, which is their common basis. We have already seen that Judgment is the faculty which mediates between the particular and universal; accordingly here, where particular and universal are carried to their ultimate abstraction, Judgment, par excellence, is the mediating faculty, and its principle, that of the adaptation of nature to our faculty of cognition, is in the first instance the third term we are in quest of. “Understanding, through the possibility of its a priori laws for Nature, proves that this can be known to us only as phenomenon, and therefore, at the same time, points to a supersensible substrate for it, but leaves this wholly undetermined. Judgment, through its a priori principle for the consideration of Nature in reference to its possible particular laws, gives to the supersensible substrate (in us as well as without us)
determinability through intellectual function. Reason, finally, through its practical a priori law, gives determination. Thus Judgment renders possible the transition from the domain of Nature to that of Freedom."⁵² Judgment is, in this case, only reflective, i.e. while the particular is given in experience, the universal is supplied by us, and evidently the principle of such judgment is that of End, Design, or Adaptation. The particular of Nature, which is not determined by the universal of the categories, is judged as being fashioned or ordered by an Understanding, since in no other way is it possible for us to think that particular laws should harmonise so as to form a consistent, orderly, intelligible experience.⁵³ Of this adaptation or design Kant signalises two species—first, subjective, where the empirical condition for the exercise of the faculty of judgment is furnished by the feeling of pleasure or pain; second, objective or logical, where the possibility of the given natural form is thought as necessarily depending on the notion realised in it. The first is the matter for aesthetic judgment, the second for teleological judgment. The latter only is here considered, and even that, but to such extent as is requisite to disentangle the main idea inherent in Kant’s exposition of it.⁵⁴ The following, then,
are the main points in the doctrine of teleology. External adaptation, where one thing is supposed to exist solely as a means towards another, is to be carefully distinguished from inner adaptation, in which the parts of a whole are so related as to be mutually cause and effect, means and end, and in which the parts are only for and through the whole. Any judgment of external adaptation (such, e.g., as the adaptability of sand on the sea-shore for the growth of pines, etc.) is relative, and always lies open to the further question as to the necessity for the existence of that which in the given instance is regarded as end. Only the organised products of Nature exhibit inner conformity to purpose, or display a mode of causality not, so far as we can judge, explicable through mechanical law. For an organised product has a mode of growth entirely distinct from the mechanical addition of like parts; its members are mutually dependent; and its product is something similar to itself. As distinguished from an artistic product, where the result also embodies the idea of the whole and the parts also exist only for the whole,—where, therefore, the parts are united from without,—an organised product must form a unity through the mutual determination of the parts, and the parts must be
mutually cause and effect of their specific form.\textsuperscript{57} It is not indeed possible to prove that such bodies as organisms cannot be produced by the operation of mechanical laws, but there can be no doubt, Kant thinks, that we are unable to perceive how they could be so produced.\textsuperscript{58} At the same time, causality according to ends, the mode of causation here described, is not an object of experience, it is not a category of understanding; it is not even a notion of Freedom. We must rigidly confine its application to the faculty of Judgment, and hence we can see that the apparent dialectic between the principles of mechanism and teleology is removed so soon as we critically state the limitations of both. For these principles do not assert absolutely. Mechanism is true for objects as matter of experience in general, \textit{i.e.} as phenomena; teleology is only the mode in which we think unity in particular experience for behoof of the faculty of judgment. We neither assert that things must be generated mechanically, nor that there must be a production according to end or final cause. In the supersensible these opposites may be the same. To our intelligence they differ, and have different spheres, but a higher understanding might see the ultimate identity of the two.\textsuperscript{59}

Up to this point Kant has been merely engaged
in emphasising an empirical fact, the extreme diversity between mechanism and that peculiar collocation of forces, themselves mechanical, which is presented to us in organised bodies. For it is to be observed that in his view, the notion of an end in Nature (*Natur-zweck*), that is to say, of a causality in nature distinct from the mechanical, is neither a category of understanding nor an idea of freedom. So far, then, what he says on Teleology is not an integral part of his general philosophical conception, and has for us only an indirect interest. But although this notion of end in Nature is empirically conditioned, and the object in connection with which it arises is given only in experience, so that we could not, *a priori*, pronounce such an object possible, yet there must be some general principle through which the particular mode of thinking denoted by the notion becomes at least possible. This general principle is the rule for the faculty of Judgment, which has been already stated, the principle of the intelligibility of Nature.\(^60\) Now this principle, as we already saw, is definitely and necessarily connected with the important doctrine of empirical contingency, and Kant, in considering the teleological judgment, is naturally led to express, in the most precise form, the origin and significance of this doctrine.\(^61\) The notion
of the contingency of the particular arises, according to him, from the fact that in our cognition Understanding and Sense are distinct, that with us the special forms of the particular of sense are not determined by the general rules of understanding, while these general rules themselves receive concreteness only through sense, and therefore in modes, so far as they are concerned, contingent. Our understanding is discursive and must proceed always from general to particular; but if the particular be contingent, then the general form under which its varied collocations are thought by us to be necessary or intelligible, is not a principle for understanding, but only for judgment. In other words, the particular so far as Judgment (i.e. Reflective Judgment) is concerned, consists in the varied collocations and forms of the general laws of nature, and the principle by which we think to ourselves unity or intelligibility in this particular is not one which in itself determines the particular; it is merely supplied by Reason on account of the peculiarity or limited nature of our Understanding. The analysis, however, is not yet complete. The principle of reflective judgment, according to which the parts of experience are thought to be so determined as to form a unity for understanding, is the general principle of teleological
connection. For our understanding cannot, from its discursive nature, think the whole as determining the parts otherwise than through the mediating notion of End; i.e. where the parts seem to exist only through and for the whole, the reason is for our understanding to be found in the notion of a causality according to end. The notion of adaptation in general is, therefore, dependent on the peculiarity of our understanding, and marks its limit. But, as we have repeatedly seen, the determination of one thing as peculiar in quality, the definition of a limit, is only possible through reference to something not so qualified,—to that which passes beyond the limit. If, then, we determine our understanding as limited so far as the particular of nature is concerned, the notion by which in reflective judgment we overcome this limit, is implicitly the notion of another understanding which is not similarly limited, and for which contingency of the particular would not exist. In such an understanding the particular would be determined in and by the universal. The whole of experience would be for it an organic whole; the universal would be no longer, as in our understanding, analytic, receiving concreteness from an accidental particular; but synthetic, or a representation of the whole in and through which the parts are
definitely given. Of such an understanding we can form no adequate conception, but the notion of it lies at the root of the reflective judgment, and is the necessary correlate of our understanding.

[The special application of this notion to our judgment upon the nature and generation of organisms follows directly. An organised body is one in which the parts, as regards form and combination, depend upon the whole. But for our understanding, mechanical generation of a whole through combination of the parts is the only intelligible mode. We have therefore, in the contingency of the parts of an organism as regards the whole, the particular elements which compel us to conceive it as possible only through a causality according to ends—i.e. as the realisation of the idea of the whole. It is certainly not implied that such causality is actually the mode in which organisms are generated; for we cannot assert that the supersensible basis of that mechanism which we discover in nature may not contain in itself the ground for organic products. We only say that, owing to the peculiarity of our understanding, its limit as regards the particular, we must judge of organisms in conformity to the notion of end. For scientific explanation, then, teleology affords no aid, and must not be called in, save as an auxi-
liary principle in directing research. The mechanical and the teleological modes of thinking nature may quite well co-exist. Both are necessary, from the peculiar nature of our understanding, and both, though the second more directly, refer to the supersensible substrate which we may conceive as the necessary correlate of the intuitive understanding.\[62\]

Thus the contingency of the particular in experience, and especially the contingency of organised natural forms, when compared with the general laws of mechanical causation, points the way towards the final reconciliation of understanding and reason, of necessity and freedom, and enables us to see why in science no other than mechanical explanations can ever be resorted to; while, at the same time, it is recognised that the mechanical is inadequate to final solution, both of nature itself and of the special forms we call organisms.\[63\]

The teleological principle, however, is theoretically only for reflective judgment, and therefore enables us to conclude with no certainty as regards end itself. But not only does the notion of end, in natural forms as inner adaptation, lead us to regard nature as a system regulated according to the same idea—i.e. lead us again to introduce the conception of external adaptation, and so to con-
template the possibility of a final end in nature; but the end presented to us by practical reason is itself a final end, and by its means we are enabled to grasp, with subjective or practical certainty, the notion of a complete teleology in nature. As natural phenomenon, man cannot regard himself as final end; nay, in Nature merely as such, whether external or internal, nothing leading to such an idea is to be discovered. But as practical reason, as a moral being, man can regard himself as the final end, not merely of nature as it is, but of the created system. For practical reason places before him an end of absolute worth, the realisation of the highest good, the moral development of a nature under moral laws. Through this we obtain a principle by which we may, with at least subjective certainty, determine the nature of that supreme understanding to which the hypothetical employment of reason had led us. Through the practical, the merely problematic result of speculation receives for us concreteness or definiteness. For we are, from practical grounds, compelled, with at least practical necessity, to ascribe a certain end or aim to this supreme understanding. The moral law in us, or practical reason, prescribes the realisation of the highest good; but the elements of the highest good, as we have already seen, require to be united
by some being beyond nature. We, as beings subject to moral law, must therefore think the supreme cause as a moral cause—i.e. as so determining the course of things that scope shall be permitted for the realisation of the final end of reason. The ultimate conception, then, of the Kantian metaphysic, is that of ethical teleology. "The systematic unity of ends in this world of intelligences, which, although as mere Nature it is to be called only the world of sense, can yet as a system of Freedom be called an intelligible, i.e. moral world (regnum gratiae), leads inevitably to the teleological unity of all things which constitute this great whole according to universal natural laws—just as the unity of the former is according to universal and necessary moral laws—and unites the practical with the speculative reason. The world must be represented as having originated from an Idea, if it is to harmonise with that use of reason without which we should hold ourselves unworthy of reason—viz. the moral use, which rests entirely on the idea of the supreme good. Hence all natural research tends towards the form of a system of ends, and in its highest development would be a physico-theology. But this, since it arises from the moral order as a unity grounded in the very essence of freedom and not accidentally
instituted by external commands, establishes the teleology of nature on grounds which, *a priori*, must be inseparably connected with the inner possibility of things. The teleology of nature is thus made to rest on a transcendental theology, which takes the ideal of supremo ontological perfection as a principle of systematic unity, a principle which connects all things according to universal and necessary natural laws, since they all have their origin in the absolute necessity of a single primal being."

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