LECTURE IV.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS OF KANTIANISM.

In last lecture I completed the survey of Kant's theory of knowledge and of the metaphysic dependent on it. In the course of the exposition those points only were brought into prominence which seemed to have special interest as bearing on the present position of philosophical questions. Before proceeding to note somewhat more particularly one or two of those problems, solution of which, as it appears to me, can be looked for in no other way than by carrying forward the critical method, I may briefly recapitulate the main results of that method so far as they have become apparent in the course of our survey. In so doing, it will be advantageous to reverse the order of statement, and to proceed from that view of Reason and its problem which was in truth the regulating idea in the Kantian philosophy.

The highest conception of speculative thought is the unity of Reason, the complete comprehension
of the manifold details of experience as elements in the supreme synthesis of self-consciousness. No finite nature can hope adequately to attain such unity, but the outlines of it are shadowed in finite knowledge or scientific cognition, and it is realised with at least subjective distinctness through the ethical ideas which alone have an import over and above the finitude of merely relative cognition. Reason, to use Kant's expression, is in its very nature architectonic, i.e. it endeavours to comprehend the organic plan of experience, the ultimate synthesis of existence and thought. It therefore works throughout under the idea of a systematic whole of thought, and its problem is the justification of this idea. Knowledge (scientific cognition properly so called), strictly limited to the content of sense-intuition, i.e. to finite, relative objects, is throughout penetrated by Reason, and manifests its incomplete and partial character when compared with the ideal which Reason sets before it. Under the forms of knowledge we cannot grasp the Unconditioned, i.e. no justification of the metaphysical idea is to be obtained through the notions of empirical cognition; and the recognised inadequacy of these forms to the solution of the highest problem enables us to define their legitimate province and to fix their significance for
thought. The context of experience which is given in and through the relative notions of understanding, is on a lower scale the type of the supreme unity of Reason, and its threefold synthesis of Ego, general thoughts or categories and particulars of sense corresponds after its kind with the supreme synthesis contemplated in the intuitive understanding, or God, the centre of the teleological system of things. We through the ethical idea (Freedom) know ourselves as members of this system, and recognise in the world of cognition but the mode or manifestation in finite intelligence of the world of Reason. Not that we are to think of the universe as being in itself double, to form a quasi-Platonic conception of a world of ideas corresponding to the world of sense. The phenomenal world is for Kant only the manner in which finite intelligence can be in connection with the infinite intelligible system. It is true he never succeeds in freeing his theory from a certain dualism inherent in it from the outset, and appearing as the irreducible element in the successive syntheses through which he strives to give expression to his final conception of the unity of Reason. The worlds of intelligence and sense seem still to be connected mechanically, and the result to be what Fichte called a "collective whole." This dualism,
as might easily be shown, is nothing but the last residuum of the individualist mode of viewing mind, which Kant was the first to subject to critical examination, but which still retained its influence over him. To it we must ascribe the appearance of subjective idealism which clings to the critical theory of perception, and which is peculiarly prominent in the analysis of sensibility. To it, also, we must trace the method of solving the various antinomies which appeared when scientific notions were employed metaphysically, for only on such a view could reference of the antinomy to the subject be regarded as a satisfactory solution.

The theory of cognition, on which this ultimate conception rests, and from which it is developed, may be regarded either as an analysis of experience or as the exposition of the idea of self-consciousness. It is, therefore, independent of either empirical (descriptive) psychology or empirical (natural) science. For in both of these the facts from which inferences may be drawn are parts of experience, cognised facts, elements known and known by self. In themselves, consequently, they can throw no light upon the conditions under which any experience of a fact is possible for the conscious self, under which any fact can be cognised. To
give as final result of philosophical analysis the proposition that experience consists of states of consciousness is to give no explanation whatever, for it merely refers the facts for explanation to the facts themselves. A state of consciousness, even if we allow for the moment that some intelligible meaning can be attached to such an expression, is not \textit{per se} an element of experience. It becomes so, or is for us a fact only in so far as it is cognised by the self or Ego, and it can be cognised only under the conditions of self-consciousness as such. So far from being an ultimate ground of explanation, states of consciousness are objects of cognition, and therefore merely parts of that completed whole which stands in need of explanation. Empirical psychology, therefore, which takes states of consciousness as known, and investigates their nature and connections, tracing out the laws of their combination, and considering their relations to the organised material of body and brain, is not even in sight of the problem which belongs to the theory of knowledge, and from which metaphysic starts. The question which that theory endeavours to answer, How is experience of any fact, even of a mental state, possible? is not to be identified with our analysis of the nature and relations of the fact when known as a portion of experience.
The distinction between the two problems, which is that between philosophy and science, and the absolute necessity of considering the first of them, are after all the most valuable lessons which the critical philosophy has given to subsequent thinking.¹

Empirical science, it was further apparent, had its limits fixed through critical analysis of those notions by means of which a coherent experience becomes possible. Within the sphere of the categories of finite thought, i.e., within the domain of matter and force, space and time, empirical science was possible and supreme. No proposition expressing the relations of facts discovered by experience could possibly throw light upon those conditions without which experience itself was impossible. No proposition as to the notions through which experience is possible can throw light upon the empirical connections of those facts, or can have more than regulative influence on empirical science.

"In the explanation of given phenomena, no other things and no other grounds of explanation can be employed than those which stand in connection with the given phenomena according to the known laws of experience." Accordingly it may be said that, as one result of the Kantian analysis of knowledge, no scientific proposition as such is a
theorem of philosophy, no philosophic theorem is a proposition of empirical science. It is impossible for pure thought in any manner to anticipate experience; no advance in any physical inquiry is to be gained through pure philosophy. Rational science (Natur-wissenschaft as distinct from Naturlehre) is, indeed, possible; for in the necessary conditions of experience we have at least certain ultimate elements of all known facts; and thus, in the physical sciences, strictly so-called, advance is to be expected through experiment, aided and systematised by mathematics. The final goal of such science is undoubtedly the complete exposition of all collocations of matter in space as dependent on space relations, and therefore as capable of mathematical expression. It must be added, therefore, that only in a qualified sense can it be held that philosophy has to criticise the notions of science. It subjects them to criticism only in so far as they depend upon the ultimate conditions of knowledge as such. With any empirical conception of science philosophy has not to do.

In the sphere, then, of the relative categories, substance, cause, and reciprocity, and of the forms of intuition, space and time, within which the corresponding objects can be presented, science is supreme; beyond that sphere its categories have
no validity. Cognition as such must be limited to intuition. Beyond the domain of possible intuition, there is left for us but the certainty of Reason, as conscious of its own free determination, with the necessary conditions of that consciousness. Thus the completed synthesis contemplated by Reason cannot speculatively be demonstrated, but is brought before us with practical certainty when we become aware of our own position as members of an intelligible system, as raised by Reason above the limited categories of sense intuition.

I know nothing that would be more instructive than a careful comparison of the theory thus briefly sketched with that form of idealism which, descending from Berkeley, has played so large a part in English thought. In some respects the ultimate metaphysical conceptions of the two theories are in agreement; both regard the visible order of things as but the mode in which the finite intelligence is conditioned or limited, and both suffer from the individualism which would make it appear that this visible order is but a projection of the individual's mind. But the Berkeleyan idealism can never free itself from this defect, save by the violent assumption of objective principles, the warrant for which it neither investigates nor can give. The critical idealism, on the other hand, at
least points the way to an objective view of things, for its analysis of knowledge enables us to see that the particular fluctuating element, let us call it the given impression, which was the ultimate fact to Berkeley, is never known as such, but only when determined by thought and as related to the objective system or order of things. On such a comparison, however, and on the results that might follow from it, my time does not permit me to enter, nor is it my intention to offer any detailed criticism on the Kantian theory itself. At various points throughout the exposition I have endeavoured to indicate that Kant's own teaching enables us to see how advance beyond his position is at least possible, and that the true significance of many distinctions first drawn by him can only be had by restatement and reconsideration of them. There is one point, however, on which, before proceeding further, it is necessary to direct special attention—that is the conception Kant appears to hold of what constitutes reality in knowledge. No one has shown with more thoroughness that the momentary and individual impressions of sense are to the cognitive subject himself unreal, unrecognizable, and that they only become real for us in so far as qualified by thought and referred to the context of experience. Such reference is only through
understanding, and understanding is throughout determined by Reason. Yet Kant singles out this essentially fluctuating and transitory element as the only reality, and in consequence is led apparently to reject as at least speculatively unreal the pure principles of Reason. Two remarks may be made on this matter. In the first place Kant's view of what constitutes perception as distinguished from sensation is very far from clear, and the psychological obscurities or ambiguities in his doctrine lead to statements which at times appear violently to contradict the transcendental or metaphysical analysis which is the very essence of his critique. The reality of one element in the completed intuition, the sensation itself, is not to be identified with, or explained by, the real occurrence of the impression on the senses or organised matter in connection with which it arises. That is a purely mechanical process, and can only become for us intelligible when we abstract from the context of experience, and consider the sensation as something mechanically resulting from natural forces, the external vibrations, affection of nerves, and so on. In so doing, however, we are dealing with the sensation as it does not exist for us, and as it is not an element in our perception at all. Further, the sensuous factor in
intuition is not to be identified with the sensation as known, still less with perception itself. Perception does, undoubtedly, contain the element of sensation, but the sensation as such never appears in the perceptive act. Perception is part of cognition, and may be explained as reference of the fact that sensation has taken place to the objective order of events on which its occurrence depends. Sensation, cognised as such, is one among other objects of knowledge, and can exist for us only in the context of experience which makes up knowledge. It is probable that Kant, in dealing with this question of the reality ascribed to perceived facts, was misled by the connotation attaching to the term, "affections of mind," which, with him, plays a part not unlike that of "states of consciousness" in more modern psychology. Affections of mind, like affections of body, are only parts of known material, and have for intelligence reality only in and through the context of experience constituted by thought. It is quite impossible for Kant to maintain both that unity of consciousness, and therefore thought, which goes beyond the individual fact, is indispensable for perception, and also that the only real factor in perception is that which, *per se*, is not for intelligence at all. It is quite impossible to main-
tain the absolute severance of thought and sense, when their unity is recognised as not mechanical but organic. Were it admitted that the impression is the only reality, then Hume's idea of a stream of isolated perceptions, an idea which for an intelligence is contradictory, would be the result of Kant's analysis.

In the second place, if reality in ultimate significance is not given in and by the individual impression, then we must reconsider Kant's view of Reason and its functions. For it must be asked whether the impossibility of having sense-intuition of the absolute is sufficient ground for the doctrine that knowledge of the supreme synthesis is speculatively but problematic. There is, doubtless, and will always remain, the marked distinction between thought related to or concerned with one particular portion of the sphere of intuition, or with the relation between the empirical elements of cognition, and thought related to the whole sphere of intuition as such, or to Nature. If, indeed, knowledge be arbitrarily defined as the combination of thought with a particular finite element of experience, then the problems of Reason must naturally be held to be beyond knowledge. But on Kant's own showing, if we are inevitably compelled to admit that the finitude of the categories of under-
standing points to the unity of Reason which transcends them, that the empirical matter of cognition and its forms are but the modes in which the supreme synthesis is realised in finite intelligence, then the doctrine of absolute ignorance as to this synthesis can no longer be regarded as tenable, at least when so expressed. For what kind of knowledge is it supposed that we are to have of the unconditioned, of the object of Reason? To Kant, apparently, a knowledge of it, apart from the manifestation which is an essential factor in it. If we consider fairly the Kantian doctrine of the Thing-in-itself, it is evident that this pure abstraction is what he contemplated, an abstraction which is philosophically the counterpart of the theological idea peculiar to Deism; and to Deism, we must admit, the Kantian principles directly lead. It is supposed that a knowledge of God must mean the comprehension of something entirely removed from experience, something to be qualified by none but negative predicates, the θεὸς ἄγνωστος, or Deus absconditus, which has played so remarkable a part in the history of human thought. If there is one notion which philosophy should have taught us utterly to reject, it is that of an absolute and unconditioned, which is absolute and unconditioned only through perfect vacuity, through
containing nothing but negations. The most valuable lesson to be learned from Berkeley in some degree, from Hegel throughout, is the worthlessness and danger of abstractions, and the supreme abstraction is the unknown and unknowable God. Kant, it is true, partially freed himself from this obscure notion, and throughout the development of his philosophy one can trace the successive steps by which he endeavoured to render more and more concrete the ideal of the supreme intelligence, but even in the final form of his metaphysic, from his peculiar conception of the isolated sensuous impression as that which immediately brought us into contact with reality, and therefore of thought as merely secondary and in itself devoid of content, the old opposition appears between speculative knowledge and practical conviction. The full development of what is involved in Kant’s original question, How is experience at all possible? would lead to a different conception of the relation between the elements which appear subjectively as Reason and Understanding, objectively as the supersensible and Nature. Only through such development can we adequately estimate the value of the Agnosticism which at present has taken the place of philosophical and theological speculation. It is an error to suppose that metaphysic
desires to pass beyond experience, or to grasp anything whatever that is utterly dissevered from experience. Its object does not lie beyond the things we know. Metaphysic only desires to think experience, and its one rule is to avoid taking a part as explanation of the whole. Its ideal is the organic unity which Kant has so clearly sketched. If we choose to express it theologically, we may say that the only method of knowing God is through His manifestation, through the system of experience with which we are in connection through thought. We cannot know any being otherwise than by its manifestation. Its manifestation is its very being for us, and it is a mere effort of abstraction to distinguish between them and to imagine a knowledge of such being as it is not, and cannot be known.

A full discussion of Kant's relation to this particular problem, which is, indeed, but one of the modes in which the ultimate question of all metaphysical inquiry may be stated, would lead to more detailed criticism of his system than is here desirable. But it seemed specially important to point out how the apparently logical question which Kant sets in the foreground of the Critique of Pure Reason is directly and intimately connected with it, and that no approximation towards
its solution is to be attained otherwise than by carrying forward the fundamental ideas of the Kantian philosophy. Quite possibly rigorous analysis of the conditions of experience, i.e., of the notions by which experience is for us intelligible, may demonstrate to us that for finite intelligence complete comprehension of the ultimate synthesis is not to be obtained. But in that case we should have discovered the significance for us of those notions, and should have gained a deeper and truer idea of our relations to ultimate intelligence, and no philosophy can ever give us more.

I do not think it can be said that the relation of Kant to modern methods of speculation on this and allied problems has been fully recognised. To a large extent these methods have remained unaffected by the critical question, and bring forward their solutions with happy unconsciousness of the truth that the question requires to be answered before any real progress in philosophical conception can be achieved. In order to notice briefly one or two of the points with respect to which, as it seems to me, a return to the Kantian attitude is imperative, I shall comment upon the application of Kantianism to modern questions, which is given in Lange's *History of Materialism*. The principles of that work are professedly transformations of
Kantian doctrines, translations of them into the language of modern science. Here, then, if anywhere, we may expect to find the importance of Kant’s general position recognised, and the special significance of his several doctrines illustrated by their application to modern difficulties. For Lange himself was a man of infinite quickness and capacity and of unwearied industry, well trained not only in philosophy but in general science, and imbued with what is vaguely spoken of as the “modern” spirit. His work, undoubtedly, did much to accelerate the current which had already set towards Kant, and has exercised a very powerful influence, not so much, perhaps, on purely philosophic thought, as on the speculations which occupy the border-ground between philosophy and natural science. Metaphysically inclined physicists, indeed, have derived, and still derive, much of their sustenance from Lange’s work. Recognising the merits of the History of Materialism, I am yet unable to agree with the enthusiastic estimate of Lange’s disciple, Dr. Vaihinger, who “does not hesitate to call the History of Materialism the most significant philosophic fact of the present time.”

As a history, the work appears to me to have many faults. It reads later ideas and modes of conception into earlier theories, frequently violates the
rule of historic proportion, and in several matters of detail is both defective and inaccurate. Its value must be held to lie altogether in its general spirit, and in its criticism of materialism. The criticism is based on principles avowedly Kantian, but modified in harmony with modern and scientific theory, and the general spirit of the work is not inaptnly indicated by the term "Neo-Kantianism" which has been applied to the movement started by it. As I shall have to point out, the Kantian principles employed appear to me to be emptied of all that gives them peculiar value, and the results of the criticism, so far as doctrine is concerned, seem no more satisfactory than violent amalgamations of physics and philosophy generally proved to be. I confess to a feeling of profound distrust of any philosophic doctrine which is presented as the result due to the "methods of modern science."

The first point for consideration is, naturally, the conception formed by Lange of the aim and purport of philosophy in general and of the Kantian criticism in particular. A definite response to such a query might easily be collected from various quarters in the History, but the following brief summary by Dr. Vaihinger will certainly not be regarded as unfair. "According to Lange,
philosophy has first a negative, and second, a positive problem. The former is handled in Logic and Theory of Knowledge, the latter in speculative Metaphysics. The negative part is related to the positive as destructive criticism to dogma. As negative criticism, Philosophy has to show that it is itself, as a science, impossible; the critical theory of knowledge destroys all the claim of speculation to attainment of truth. . . . In its positive aspect, philosophy must certainly be speculative, but with perfect consciousness that its speculation is mere poetic fancy, not truth. We must speculatively fashion for ourselves a harmonious picture of the world, but must remain conscious that this is merely a subjective ideal, with no claim to represent reality." From this one can see very fairly what is Lange's idea of the result of Kant's *Critique*. That result is for him demonstrated positivism. Only the mechanical, the sphere of sense intuition, has reality; within that sphere cognition is possible and the terms true and false may with significance be employed. Whatever lies beyond sense intuition lies beyond knowledge, and with respect to it the terms true and false must be devoid of signification and therefore inapplicable. Ideals we may form, which represent for us this dim and shadowy region, for there is in us, accord-
ing to Lange, an organic impulse towards unity (this is his equivalent for *Reason*), and such ideals may have ethical worth, may be for the good of our souls; but it is the one lesson of philosophy to the individual that such ideals have no reality corresponding to them; subjective fancies they are and must remain.  

That such a doctrine has a superficial resemblance to the final propositions of the *Critique* may be granted; that it leaves out of consideration the unity of cognition which Kant so strenuously insisted upon, and consequently detaches certain theorems from the context within which alone they had in Criticism their full import, is, I think, beyond question. Only from an erroneous conception of the real significance, or rather, one would say, of the essential elements of Kant’s theory of knowledge, could such deductions be drawn, and, as I shall immediately point out, the interpretation of that theory by Lange is entirely erroneous. A detached portion or aspect of the completed theory is taken by him as being the whole, and what he thinks to be the result of Kant’s critique of knowledge is not, in truth, Kantian at all, but is the old Protagorean maxim of Relativity, of which it is no exaggeration to say that the *Critique* is the reasoned refutation. For this Relativism, par-
particularly in its modern form, in which it is regarded as the solitary stronghold against materialism, is nothing but a re-statement of the theory of Hume, that the sum of cognised existence is the stream of conscious states, impressions, or ideas, without subject in whom they are united, or object to which they may be referred. The close analysis to which Kant subjected this doctrine, and the mode in which his fundamental theorem as to the limits of knowledge is connected with his exposition of thought as necessarily involved in intuition, seem to be entirely overlooked. Lange's doctrine of knowledge, therefore, presents itself to me not as the translation of Kant into the terms of modern scientific thought, but as the reproduction of Hume in terms of modern physiological psychology.

Before noting the new foundation which Lange proposes to give this view, it may be permitted to remark that the title applied to it, relativism, is altogether misleading and out of place. If absolutely the sum and substance of cognition consist in states of consciousness (it being granted for the moment that some intelligible conception of such a theorem could be formed), then clearly there is nothing to which such cognition can be in relation, there is nothing more to be known. The petty
difficulties as to variation of sensations in health or disease, generally employed to illustrate the limited and subjective nature of our cognition cannot be held as in point, for they simply indicate differences between certain classes of things known. Further, nothing in consciousness itself can be conceived as "pointing to something beyond," an ambiguous expression, which Lange, strangely enough, employs. For it must be remembered that when conscious states are regarded as so many separate facts, each with its definite nature (for all the world like so many beads on a string), there is no possibility of relation among them. A conscious state, conceived by itself, as Kant is never wearied of pointing out, is a thing in itself, and by no ingenuity can we conjure out of it relations to other things. It is incredible the difficulty and absurdity which beset us when we endeavour to regard phenomena or states of consciousness as so many objects, atoms. It may be added that no such abnormal state as an "indefinable consciousness" can be allowed to have any pertinency as explanation of the fact that we somehow distinguish the series of subjective, individual, or personal phenomena from that which is objective. The doctrine of Relativity, as usually held by empiricists, has significance only under the
pre-supposition of an objective system of things acting in definite ways upon a sensitive organism, and having as effect the various states of consciousness which make up the substance of cognition or conscious experience. For, in such a case, we may readily proceed to doubt the objective validity of the assumption with which we started, and may demonstrate "by the slightest philosophy" that if only effects are known, causes must remain unknown. It would be unjust to credit any thinker with such a crude philosophical conception, save on the clearest evidence; but I think it will become quite apparent that this and nothing further is the first principle of Lange's theory of knowledge.

As has been pointed out above, Lange substitutes for Reason in the Kantian system an impulse towards unity which is somehow imbedded in our organisation. From what will later appear as regards this organisation it may be at least doubted how we come to discern in it any such impulse towards philosophical unity, for we must suppose that the organisation referred to is the ultimate basis of what in perception is presented to us—in which case it is the absolutely unknown. This, however, may be permitted to pass without further comment. In a quite similar manner Lange substitutes for Kant's deep-going idea of self-
consciousness as the one condition of knowledge, the necessary dependence of objects known on the nature and conditions of our organisation—an organisation which it is remarked, may with philosophical correctness be called indifferently psychical or physical. "Whenever it has been shown that the quality of our sense-perceptions is completely conditioned by the peculiarity of our organs, then we can no longer dismiss as 'incontrovertible but absurd' the view that the whole orderly connection in which we arrange sense-perceptions, in a word, our whole experience, is conditioned by a psychical organisation, which compels us to experience as we do experience, to think as we do think, while to another organisation the same objects might appear quite differently,—and that the thing-in-itself cannot be an object of knowledge to any finite being."

"It is an immediate consequence" (i.e. of the Kantian theory) "that objects of experience are only objects for us,—in a word, that objectivity is not absolute objectivity, but only objectivity for men and any similarly organised beings, while behind the world of phenomena the absolute essence of things—the thing-in-itself—remains in impenetrable obscurity." ¹¹

Although Lange professedly bases this fundamental doctrine on Kant, he really supports it by,
or deduces it from what is vaguely described as the physiology of the senses, and it was surely unnecessary to invoke the great name of Kant for such a theorem. Nay, it is more than unnecessary, it is positively erroneous. To imagine that Kant’s doctrine of the transcendental ideality of space and time is to be entirely identified with the simple proposition that sense phenomena vary according to the organs of sense is to misunderstand its true significance and to overlook Kant’s very express declarations. The subjectivity of the so-called secondary qualities is not in kind the same as the subjectivity of the pure intuitions. The facts made known to us in respect to these qualities by the psychology of sensation are interesting and valuable as empirical results, but they lie entirely within the sphere of phenomena, and do not furnish the ground for distinguishing phenomena as such from things in themselves. The relation between special inner states and the action of external vibration and nerve mechanism is a fact of experience, presupposing the cognition of phenomena as such, and can throw no light whatsoever on the fundamental conditions of sense perception itself. We ought not to confound the questions as to the possibility of cognising phenomena of sense, and
as to special empirical relations between these phenomena.\textsuperscript{12}

- I may remark further, with respect to Lange's fundamental doctrine, that the impossibility of cognising the \textit{thing-in-itself} may have very various meanings for different thinkers. In Kant, as we have already seen, it is simply the expression for the distinction between the unity attainable through the finite and relative categories of understanding and the unity which is held before us by Reason. We saw, also, how the nature of this thing-in-itself was gradually determined, until it at length appeared as pointing to the supreme synthesis of intelligence and objects manifested in the forms of phenomena to finite cognition. Now this is not in any sense Lange's view. To him the thing-in-itself is presented as the unknown cause of the special modifications of consciousness, and remains unknown simply through being the cause. Such a theory has no meaning, unless combined with the peculiar assumption which, as already indicated, may be detected as lying at the foundation of modern relativism. To base the limitation of cognition on the facts of sense perception as disclosed by physiological psychology, does not then seem to me a very fruitful method, and I cannot agree with Dr. Vaihinger, who thinks that Lange's
special superiority over Kant lies in the fact that he brings to bear on the problems of the *Kritik* the results of modern physiology and psychology, and is thus enabled to construct an almost irrefragable theory of cognition.”

On the whole, then, Lange’s first principle is nothing but the usual formula of subjective idealism. All that is known is the series of conscious states, or, to use the ambiguous term which plays as distracting a rôle in German philosophical literature as *idea* in English, we know only *Vorstellungen*. Now Lange apparently thinks that so soon as we have reached the conviction that all our knowledge is of *Vorstellungen*, we at once become aware that experience is necessarily relative, “phenomenal of the unknown,” and in this way there would seem to be gained a kind of foundation for the doctrine of the thing-in-itself. The consequence, however, is quite illogical, and is not in any way to be regarded as a mere repetition of the expression common in Kant, that *phenomena* imply *noumena*. It has a show of validity solely from the ambiguity attaching to the term *Vorstellungen*, and from the resulting laxity with which the first principle of the doctrine of knowledge is interpreted. We are inclined to think that “mere ideas,” mere products of the laws of my sensibility
and understanding, must have a cause; but if our
knowledge be really limited to, or rather made up
of these ideas, we cannot qualify them as "mere represen-
tations," or refer to any cause not con-
tained among them. Lange is here involved in an
inextricable confusion between his relativist inter-
pretation of the thing-in-itself and the significance
which Cohen's work had shown him really belonged
to that notion in Kant. He endeavours in vain to
reconcile the principle that the thing-in-itself is
only a limiting notion with the view of the thing
as operating on the organisation. 14

The series of Vorstellungen, then, is the sum of
experience, and therefore of existence for us. One
need not now ask if knowledge is hereby explained;
if there is not a radical distinction between con-
sciousness of a series of Vorstellungen and the series
conceived as existing per se, without a unity to
which they are referred; or, finally, if knowledge
does not involve relations among the several ele-
ments in the series of Vorstellungen, which must
be impossible were there not some connecting link,
some unity in which they may be compared. All
these problems, the very questions which in effect
Kant puts to Hume, are entirely overlooked in
this translation of Kant into the language of
modern science. Merely noting their omission,
however, I proceed to consider somewhat more carefully the further explication of Lange’s fundamental theorem. Evidently in that a most significant part is played by the organisation. Now, what is this organisation? If it is something known, then, as the principle of relativism is all-inclusive, it too must consist of Vorstellungen, and this is at least the first form of Lange’s explanation. “We remark,” he says, “that the same mechanism which produces all our sensations also produces our representations of Matter. Matter as a whole may be, nay, must be, a product of our organisation, just as well as colour, or any modification of colour. Whence it may be understood that it is almost the same thing whether we speak of a psychical or of a physical organisation—for that physical organisation is merely a Vorstellung of mine and cannot be in its essence distinct from what I call psychical.” It would appear to follow from this, which is at least a logical deduction from the principle of relativity, that the organisation as known is a complex of representations (Vorstellungen), and consequently that the organisation which really produces Vorstellungen is not the organisation as known to us. Contradictory as such a proposition may appear to be to his first assertion, such is Lange’s view. He sums up his doctrine of know-
ledge in the following brief statements:—"1st, The world of the senses is a product of our organisation. 2d, Our visible corporeal organs, like all other parts of the world of phenomena, are only pictures of an unknown object. 3d, The transcendent ground of our organisation remains quite as unknown to us as the things which operate upon it. We have only before us the product of the two."16 Here comes forward without any disguise the crude assumption upon which the doctrine of Relativism is based, and it is scarcely necessary to criticise it further. With particular reference to Lange, however, it may be pointed out that the dependence of the world of sense on organisation is proved by facts which imply that the organisation in question is that known to us. We nowhere come in contact with the unknown organisation which appears when the theorem of relativity is made universal, and, in fact, to make it as first stated, universal, is the most effective mode of exhibiting its one-sided and partial character. The same peculiar saltus is found in most of those theories which find ultimate explanation in reference to the Unknown and Unknowable.17

On comparing, then, Lange's first principle of the theory of cognition with the question placed before himself by Kant, and the answer given by
him to it, I cannot but come to the conclusion that the essential element in the critical method has not been duly apprehended, and that no amount of psychological or physiological detail will advance the solution of purely metaphysical problems until their relations to the Kantian criticism has been more accurately determined. These details concern matters within, and subordinate to the distinction which is drawn in knowledge properly so called between self-knowing and objects known, and it is with the full analysis of the nature and significance of the distinction itself that philosophy is primarily concerned. To bring forward as an equivalent for self-consciousness with its conditions, the series of sensations with their organic accompaniments, is really to ignore the work of the critical philosophy, and to return to the earlier stand-point of pure phenomenalism. As to the mode in which Lange, carrying out his new conception of the fundamental fact in cognition, translates the doctrines of the Æsthetic, Analytic, and Dialectic, a briefer notice will be sufficient. He objects, naturally, to Kant’s method of discovering the a priori element in knowledge,—a method which, according to him, “can be none other than the method of induction”— but he approves of Kant for having “raised sensibility to an equal
rank with understanding as a source of knowledge"—a statement so ambiguous that, despite its appearance, it may be correct.\textsuperscript{18} He thinks that motion and permanence should be added to space and time as forms of intuition, and, as might be anticipated, is dissatisfied with Kant's discovery of the categories through the table of logical judgment.\textsuperscript{19} I shall not offer any comment on these criticisms, though some of them might well give rise to discussion. \textit{A-priority} Lange is willing to admit, though only in a sense suited to modern science. There are certain organic conditions, structural dispositions of our organisation, which give rise to the necessary relations in the representations produced through them. Thus "\textit{even if space and time are not ready-made forms which receive a content only through our intercourse with things, they may yet be forms which by means of organic conditions necessarily arise out of the mechanism of sensation}. . . . \textit{The fact is evident that the psycho-physical disposition through which we are compelled to perceive things in space and time is in every case given before experience, and in so far as the very first sensation of an external thing must be accompanied by a representation of space, be it ever so obscure, space is a mode of intuition given \textit{a priori}}."\textsuperscript{20} Quite the same line of
reasoning applies to the categories; they, too, are but expressions of certain structural arrangements in our organism. "To put it accurately, it is not notions themselves that are given prior to experience, but only certain (organic) dispositions through which the effects of the external world are combined and ordered according to the rule prescribed by these notions." . . . "Perhaps," he adds, "the foundation of the notion of cause may be discovered in the mechanism of reflex movement or sympathetic irritation; then we should have translated Kant's pure reason into physiology, and thereby rendered it more evident." 21 Apart from any criticism on this "physiological deduction" of Kant which might be suggested by doubt as to what organisation Lange is really referring to, it may be permitted to remark that a mechanical disposition or arrangement of parts, whether in the sympathetic nervous system or any other portion of the organism, is merely one of many "representations" (Vorstellungen) in the form of space. Now space cannot be regarded as being in itself the ground for the supposed connection of parts through which a new mental product, such as the notion of cause, might be evolved, for space is merely the ground of the possibility of external or mechanical arrangement. Even if we could, as
the result of observation and experiment, point to some special mechanical arrangement of parts of our organism as invariably associated with the notion of cause, we must still admit that the ultimate ground of the notion is not in the mechanism itself. Lange would probably refer in this case to the unknown cause of the mechanism,—which is merely to leave the problem where it stood. Reference of all difficulties to the unknown seems, indeed, the last resort of empiricism in philosophy. It may be added that the detection of a special organic arrangement, as the corresponding element to any particular mental connection, is a matter concerning positive science only, and throws no light on the metaphysical or philosophical problem which lies in the background.  

With his newly expressed theory of knowledge Lange then proceeds to consider those questions which may be said, on the whole, to resemble those dealt with under the transcendental dialectic. The relation between the psychical and the physical, the idea of end in relation to mechanism, and the nature of the ideals, moral, religious, and social, which the human mind seems irresistibly constrained to form, are successively submitted to examination.

With respect to the first of these, Lange's theory
appears to resemble what has been called Monism, though under that title many widely differing doctrines have been grouped. He rightly points out that, if we draw a distinction between physical and psychical, we cannot regard the peculiar fact in question, the subjective state of consciousness, as a product in rerum natura over and above the physical process in brain and nerves, without thereby violating the physical axiom of the conservation of force. 23 One would be inclined, indeed, to push the same line of reasoning farther, and to maintain that we have not and cannot have any sound conception of causal connection apart from the relations of extended substances in space. Matter in motion seems the one objective fact to which we can properly apply the category of cause. The notion of cause proves itself quite inadequate when we endeavour to determine by its means such a relation as that involved in conscious action, as when we say, we are the cause of our actions, or even an idea is the cause of an act. The relation of ground or determination, in short, is not to be identified with the causal. And in the highest reference, when we attempt to think by means of the causal nexus the mode in which supreme intelligence might stand to the world of phenomena, the contradictions which at once manifest them-
selves suffice to show that such a form is entirely inadequate and unsuitable to the matter brought under it. It is not possible for us to think God as the cause of the universe, unless we deprive that notion of all its significance when we apply it to determine the relations of material phenomena.

Leaving, however, the general consideration of cause, we have now to see how Lange explains the peculiar relation of physical and psychical. They are, he thinks, two aspects of the same fact. That which in its objective aspect appears as motion in the brain and nerve substance, is subjectively a state of consciousness. The total series of facts, psychical and physical, which appears to us twofold, is in reality but one. Nor is there any means of connecting the two series. Physical facts, as known to us, cannot possibly account for psychical processes. When we treat of them psychologically, we deal solely with the inner aspect; when we treat of them physically or scientifically, we deal solely with the outer aspect. A true materialism is thus at the same time a consistent idealism. Neither objective aspect nor subjective aspect is the reality itself: “ultimately,” as Mr. Herbert Spencer puts it, “it is one and the same reality that is manifested to us subjectively and objectively.”

Monism, even so crudely expressed, is a theory
which might be held by thinkers whose fundamental principles differed widely. In regard to the mode in which it is stated by Lange, two points seem to call for attention. In the first place, we must notice that subjective and objective, the aspects of reality, are in themselves a series of states, *phenomena*, isolated from one another, but known. To the thinking individual they are manifested as two, though in essence one. (I may say that it is not quite clear what is to be understood by their essential unity, whether they are one in the sense of being double faces of one thing which has no existence apart from these aspects, or one as modes in which a really existing entity manifests itself. But the same argument applies to either.) They are, therefore, cognised, known in consciousness and under the forms of consciousness. To say that the way in which the one essence appears as twofold transcends natural explanation is to say nothing. We are here dealing with a fact which is necessarily beyond natural or scientific explanation in its restricted significance. Incompetency of natural explanation appears only because we are attempting to think of the cognitive subject as one object connected with others after the fashion in which these are connected with one another. The problem, therefore,
\textbf{remains entirely where it was.} There is physical, there is psychical, and both are known to the thinking subject.\textsuperscript{25}

In the second place, with his Monism Lange unites what may with justice be described as subjective idealism. "Not only the external world, but also the organs with which we apprehend it, must be treated as mere pictures of the truly real."\textsuperscript{26} It would follow, therefore, that differences in phenomena are only differences of \textit{Vorstellungen}, and that a difference in kind cannot be explained by reference to anything within the sphere of \textit{Vorstellungen} themselves. The particular difference in question, moreover, must lie exactly where Kant placed it; the one set of facts is material of external intuition, the other is the material of internal intuition. If with this conception of the difference we attempt to construe Monism consistently, we shall find insuperable difficulty. Either there is no objective aspect at all, which would really be the most logical conclusion from subjective idealism, or else the objective aspect for one individual is simply the idea of what would be a subjective state for some other individual. Consider, for example, the group of sensations, etc., which we call perception of an external form, say a circle. According to the Monist view there is, alongside of these
sensations, a series of processes which make up the objective aspect. But for the individual this objective aspect is non-existent. When, to take entirely the position of the subjective idealist, we think of this objective series, we do so by representing it as an object to be perceived—that is to say, as a series of sensations in our own mind, or in the mind of an observer. It has no more of objective in it than the circular form. If we are true to the position of subjective idealism, we must give up this attempt to mix together the transcendental consideration of the object known with the purely psychological or scientific discussion of the relation between organism and sensuous states. The two questions lie in totally diverse spheres, and only confusion results from attempting to combine their treatment in one doctrine.27

So far as I can judge, this particular problem remains very much where it was left by Kant. The results of his examination, the solid bases for any further discussion, were mainly two; that the categories of external relation could not be applied to inner states, and that the external, as known to us, could not be taken to be the cause of the internal, as known to us. The distinction of external and internal thus appears as one lying within the ultimate distinction in cognition, and consequently
any form of Monism which appears as solution must be one in which the notions employed are not those of mechanical or external relation. In other words, no scientific answer—taking scientific in the Kantian sense—is to be expected. We cannot say that inner and outer are one as substance, which is the Spinozistic view and that of modern physiological psychology; nor that inner and outer are two as substances, which is the Cartesian idea and that of popular thought; but we may say that the two are united in knowledge, that what we call the physical is not there for us in its full reality until grasped and apprehended in consciousness. The totality of things is that in which the physical exists in and for consciousness. In such a metaphysical conception there is not involved any contradiction between thought and mechanical law. The supremacy of mechanism has its due place and its full right. The external is but the mode in and through which the internal is manifested, and no manifestation in the external requires to violate mechanical law.

A similar line of thought, bearing on the relation between reason and the mechanism of understanding, should be applied to the obscure notion of end or design. The categories of substance, cause, and reciprocity, which are supreme over
external phenomena, concern only the relations among themselves of given parts. They consequently assume or imply a given mechanism within which they are applicable, and consequently furnish no explanation either of the mechanism itself or of anything beyond its changes. Given a particular relation of parts or forces, and, under due assumptions, we can determine the consequences of a new antecedent; but neither the original relations of the parts nor the nature of the change itself can be mechanically determined. It would, therefore, follow that no argument from the mere existence of a mechanism in nature can in any manner affect the doctrine of design, unless it be thought that design is itself an external relation, which would contradict our mechanical idea. At the same time it must be emphatically expressed that the peculiar relation between organ and function is one to be discovered by observation and not anticipated by any a priori reasoning. We are too apt to read our partial interpretations into nature, and to construe by the scanty knowledge of nature which we actually possess. Moreover, it must also be held that the Kantian limitation of end to metaphysics is thoroughly justified. No scientific insight is gained through the notion of design or purpose, nor do we scientifically explain by its means. The notion is
purely metaphysical, and rests ultimately upon the thought relation between reason and the world of things presented to understanding in the form of mechanism. Explanations limited to the scientific are modal, i.e. state the modes or ways in which the phenomenal appears, and are consequently never exhaustive. We have still to think the relation of the individual to the whole system of facts, the universe, within which he has his existence, and it is here that the notion of end has its place. Interesting, then, as are the discoveries and discussions relating to the nature and modification of organisms, they affect only the erroneous and limited conceptions of teleology which are still too prevalent. So soon as we take the rational view, we must see that not in this or that inner detail of animal or vegetable economy is design to be traced, but that the true import of the idea is that of intelligibility of the universe—an intelligibility by no means exhausted in mechanical relations.  

On the final doctrine in Lange's Neo-Kantianism I may be very brief, for the problems to which it is put forward as an answer were considered, so far as space permitted, in the early part of this lecture. Lange's view is one of the many modifications of Agnosticism. The ideas of God, the soul, and immortality, are but poetic fictions, with no claim to
represent reality, products of mechanism, but valuable as tending to elevate our thoughts above the details of knowledge and daily life. Psychologically they are mere cobwebs of the brain, but have two characteristics which distinguish them from mere phantasmata. They are not peculiar to this or that individual, but spring from the common nature of humanity; and, secondly, they have ethical value, indeed, they are based on the ethical idea of *worth* or importance for the elevation of life. 20

Apart from the facts that the idea of ethical worth is one strangely out of harmony with Lange's first principles, and that much is ascribed to the common basis of human nature to which it does not seem competent, I cannot see in this more than a mangled reproduction of the ideas of the Kantian metaphysics, together with the dogmatic assertion, from which Kant wisely refrained, that beyond natural mechanism there is no reality. It does not seem necessary to enter on any detailed criticism of a view which seems quite irreconcilable with the subjective idealism of the theory of knowledge on which it rests.

I selected Lange as representing one phase of modern thought, because from his dependence on Kantianism there come forward more definitely in him than in any other writer known to me those
problems previously noted as of special interest in our times. The relation of the individual to the universe, the nature of this known universe, the particular relation between physical and psychical, with such ethical and social consequences as may follow therefrom, are all treated by Lange in a fashion which seems to me fairly to represent a considerable and important current of modern speculations.

On all such problems the only true method of procedure appears to me that indicated by the critical philosophy. I am far from maintaining that in Kant satisfaction for all speculative difficulties is to be found, for his system has manifested inner want of consistency and evident incompleteness. We cannot at once accept reason as supreme and self-determining, and maintain that reality, as such, as given only in sense-intuition; we cannot at once hold that reason is in itself concrete and that it is purely abstract. But the method indicated in the critical philosophy, by which the final problems of metaphysic, What ought I to do? What can I expect? are made to turn upon the question, What can I know? seems to me the only sound and fruitful basis for speculation. To some extent it must be granted that previous thinkers, such as Locke and Berkeley, had drawn attention
to an analysis of knowledge as the essential portion of philosophy, but in none of them was the problem of knowledge raised to its ultimate abstraction, or made perfectly general, and as a consequence, their work was of service only for psychology. To them analysis of knowledge meant analysis of the contents of the individual consciousness. On the other hand, the *Kritik* raised the fundamental question as to the possibility of knowledge, even of the knowledge of self which is usually taken for granted as certain. It can hardly be too strongly impressed on the student of philosophy that the ordinary method of starting in constructive metaphysic with the Cartesian certainty of one’s own existence is misleading and likely to entail the gravest error. No consciousness of self is possible, save in relation to a system of facts, of whatever nature, differing from the unity of the self cognising them. It is from Kant’s recognition of this essential duality in knowledge, this organic unity between the cognitive subject and the system of cognised fact, that the importance of his analysis of knowledge arises. It thereby becomes with him the propædeutic to metaphysical speculation. The minute analysis of self-consciousness, as was formerly said, may seem to lead to a merely logical formalism, a kind
of empty framework of notions into which concrete material of knowledge falls; but this is to take but a partial view of the matter. Full knowledge of a single fact is possible only through universal knowledge; knowledge of self contains implicitly the whole system of thoughts through which the relations of the individual to the universe may be known, and by means of which answers, such as are possible, may be given to those problems which concern his nature and destiny. Implicitly these thoughts are contained there, but it is far from necessary that they should be realised in the consciousness of the individual. The complete and methodical analysis of the conditions of experience is nothing but the explicit statement of these thoughts, and towards such explicit statement the first essays were made in the Kantian philosophy.

As it seems to me, then, Kant's declaration to the metaphysicians of his own time, that they were solemnly interdicted from their functions until they should have considered the question, How are synthetic a priori judgments possible? may be repeated now in its most general form. Until philosophy has taken up de novo the problem as to the possibility of experience at all, it must remain not only infinitely removed from the solu-
tion of metaphysical problems, but absolutely incapable of stating these problems in the form under which they must be contemplated. No danger is so great in metaphysis as an ill-framed question; and without patient, minute analysis of thought we cannot really test the significance or import of metaphysical difficulties.

I do not think it, then, an unfair conclusion to be drawn from the consideration of the present state of philosophy, that the return to Kant has really been due to the pressing need for some objective, well-grounded theory of knowledge. Without such theory, metaphysical speculation must remain an airy fabric without solidity or foundation, within which we may live, if we so choose, but which can lay no claim to real existence or worth for thought. As the impulse towards metaphysical construction can never cease so long as reason continues, it is surely of importance that the way should be cleared by a thorough-going analysis of reason itself. Such analysis, or at least the first sketch of it, was given by Kant, and from his time the questions of philosophy have assumed a new form. If we, too, are to connect our knowledge into coherency and system, and to understand, so far as it may be given to us, the significance of the universe in which we find our-
selves, we must resume the problem as it came from the hands of Kant. No earlier method is now of service; no method that is unaffected by criticism can adequately attempt the problems of modern thought. To understand itself, and to push forward to new solutions, it is imperative that our philosophy should return to Kant.