NOTES TO LECTURE I.

[References to Kant's *Works* are to the edition of Rosenkranz and Schubert; to the *Kritik* alone, in Hartenstein's reprint, 1868; to the *Kritik der prak. Vern.*, in the 1791 edition.]

1 The works which mark this renewal of interest in the Kantian system are extremely numerous. It is possible, perhaps, to date the revived study of criticism in its special reference to modern problems from the years 1865-6, though in this connection Zeller's essay (*Ueber Bedeutung und Aufgabe der Erkenntniss-theorie*, 1862; republished, with additions, in *Vorträge und Abhandlungen*, 2te Sammlung, 1877) should not be forgotten. In 1865 Liebmann, an earnest student of the critical philosophy, published his *Kant und die Epigonen*, the burden of which is the necessity of return to Kant and examination of the problem of knowledge from his point of view. In 1866 appeared the first edition of Lange's *Geschichte des Materialismus*, a work which had at least the merit of having brought into close relation Kantianism and modern physical science, and which may be regarded as the completed statement of the so-called Neo-Kantian views. Of the numerous works which followed in quick succession after the movement was fairly started, the following are the most important:—Cohen, *Kant's Theorie der Erfahrung*, 1871, and *Kant's Begründung der Ethik*, 1877 (remarkable for exactness of exposition, though at times interpreting
Kant in greater accordance with psychology than is desirable or appropriate); Arnoldt, _Kant's transcendentale Idealität d. Raumes u. d. Zeit_, 1870 (with particular reference to the dispute between Kuno Fischer and Trendelenburg, but containing much valuable matter on Kant's theory of Intuition); Stadler, _Kant's Teleologie_, 1874, and _Grundsätze der reinen Erkenntniss-theorie in der K'schen Philosophie_, 1876; Hölder, _Darstellung d. K'schen Erkenntniss-theorie_, 1874 (one of the clearest and best monographs on the subject); Laas, _Die Analogien der Erfahrung_, 1876 (a critical review of Kant's teaching on Substance, Cause, and Reciprocity, from the standpoint of modified empiricism); Riehl, _Der Philosophische Kriticismus_, I., 1876 (a very fresh study of Kant's method in relation to Hume and his immediate predecessors, inclining to regard Criticism as the foundation of Positivism); Montgomery, _K'sche Erkenntniss-theorie_, 1871 (interesting from the point of view taken, that of extreme empiricism; for a priori intuition Montgomery substitutes the muscular sense); Thiele, _Kant's Intellectuelle Anschauung_, 1876 (traces very carefully the several stages of Kant's opinion with regard to intellectual intuition, and points out the importance of the notion for adequate comprehension of Kant's position).

On points of detail treatises and pamphlets are too numerous to be mentioned; Bergmann, Asmus, Leclair, Ueberhorst, Jacobson, Grapengiesser, Meyer, Witte, Wangenheim, Dorner, Zange, Krause, have handled the relations of Kant to philosophy in general, the psychological element in the critique, the connection between Kant and Fries, the doctrine of the categories, the theory of space, etc.; in short, a whole literature, critical and controversial, has grown up around the _Kritik_, which bids fair to be buried under its commentaries.
The new movement has not been confined to Germany. In French there have appeared recently at least two accurate accounts of the Kantian system: Desdouits, *Philosophie de Kant, d’apres les trois Critiques*, 1876; and Nolen, *La Critique de Kant et la Metaphysique de Leibnitz*, 1875. The earlier work of Vacherot (*Metaphysique et Science*, 1858, 2d ed. 1863) is still the most thorough and appreciative. In England real study of German thought dates from the appearance of Dr. Hutchison Stirling’s *Secret of Hegel*, 1865. Some assistance was given by Professor Malafay’s translation of Kuno Fischer’s *Commentary* (1866); and, not to mention writings more or less informed by the Kantian principles, we have had recently from Professor Caird (*Phil. of Kant*, 1877) a most thorough and penetrating review of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

In many works, not officially devoted to Kant, discussions of his philosophy form the principal element. Among such may be mentioned Göring (*C*, *System der Kritischen Philosophie*, 1874-5; Spir, *Denken und Wirklichkeit* (2d ed.) 1877; Caspari, *Grundprobleme der Erkenntnis-theorie*, 1876; Liebmann, *Zur Analyse der Wirklichkeit*, 1877.

* Particularly valuable in this respect is the work of Cohen above referred to (*Kant’s Theorie der Erfahrung*), though in it the influence of ideas dependent on the Herbartian psychology is at times too apparent. The historical evolution of Kant’s own opinions has been most carefully studied, and must be looked upon as an indispensable preliminary to complete understanding of the *Kritiken*. In addition to K. Fischer’s review of the pre-critical works (*Gesch. d. neu. Phil. III.*), the following are particularly valuable:—Michelis, *Kant vor und nach 1770*;

3 Ultimately the problems raised by science and philosophy must coincide, for both science and philosophy are expressions of the same tendency towards unity of cognition. Both are efforts to render intelligible the details of experience which appear at first sight heterogeneous and irrational. Both, consequently, bring to the consideration of experience the one assumption of its final intelligibility. Only through careful analysis of what is involved in this assumption, and requisite in order that it may be realised or cease to be a merely general prescript, can it be discovered how the methods of the special sciences and of science as a whole, are related to and differ from the method of philosophy proper. It has been the misfortune of recent thought to neglect the close connection between the two, to oppose them to one another, and consequently to strive after the reduction of one to the other. To solve the ultimate problem of speculation by the method of science, strictly regarded, is as hopeless as the attempt to advance experimental or physical science by the speculative method. Possibly we may discover in Cartesianism, where the unity of philosophy and science is a fundamental idea, the germs of the later opposition between them, for in Cartesianism the purely speculative method and the modern doctrine of external mechanism appear side by side, and give rise to widely divergent streams of thought.
It would not be impossible to show that the development of Berkeley’s thought leads him from the crude position of individualistic idealism, first assumed in the Commonplace Book and Principles, to a view of the nature of the sense world, or world of phenomena, in fundamental harmony with that of Kant. For although Berkeley never quite frees himself from the influence of the subjective idea (see for a peculiarly gross example of the lengths to which this may be carried, Princ. § 94, “Did men but consider that the sun, moon, and stars, and every other object of the senses, are only so many sensations in their minds, which have no other existence but barely being perceived, doubtless they would never fall down and worship their own ideas”), yet his doctrine of sense-symbolism, his contrast of physical and efficient causality, and the hints given in Siris towards a comprehension of the infinite mind and its archetypes, carry him far from his first position. The occurrence of a sense-idea must be distinguished from the sense-idea itself, and the occurrences of phenomena make up the matter of sense-symbolism or order of nature. Such order of nature is not self-explaining, and must be referred to the action of the divine cause. It is, in fact, the mode in which the divine thought manifests itself to finite intelligence, and the divine ideas or archetypes are the originals of the special connections or forms which the finite intelligence receives. This is not far removed from the final position of Kant, but in it, even more than in Kant, we feel the impossibility of explaining the relation of infinite and finite by the limited category of cause. In his whole view of physical causation and of the (to finite minds) arbitrary action of the Deity, Berkeley has not advanced beyond the Cartesian position, specially as in Malebranche. And the supreme difficulty of Carte-
sianism, the connection between Extension and Thought, reappears in Berkeley in the opposition between the active finite Ego and the passive or necessitated world of sense-phenomena. Berkeley nowhere manages to clear up his notion of Power or Force, and his *Siris* particularly seems to confuse Intelligence, as ultimate ground of the phenomenal world, with intelligence as a force effecting special physical changes. On other points in Berkeley’s doctrine, e.g., on the origin of externality, or the permanence of the Ego, the limits of a note forbid me to enter.

5 The criterion of “distinctness,” or power of separating ideas, is used throughout by Hume in his proof of ultimate unconnectedness among the facts of experience. It is this principle which supplies the foundation for his criticism of our knowledge of real existence, and though in appearance he allows certainty to knowledge of abstract quantitative relations, it is doubtful whether he did not in the end return to his earlier doctrine that mathematics rest on sense experience. Ultimately, then, there is only the stream of isolated perceptions, conjoined but not connected. —*Works* (ed. 1854) I. 116, 181.

6 It might almost be said that scientific thought has returned to the position so boldly sketched by Descartes at the beginning of the 17th century, and the analogies between the difficulties now raised through the procedure of science and the perplexities of the Cartesian physics and psychology, lend additional force to this opinion. The Cartesian doctrines (1) of mathematico-mechanics as the universal science of nature, (2) of the uniformity of matter, (3) of the constant quantity of motion in the physical universe, (4) of life as a special form of mechanism, are essentially the ideas of modern physical science.

For the expression categories, as applied to physical science, see Hegel, Encyclopädie, II., (1), 19.

"The proximate causes which we assume for the phenomena of nature may be either unchangeable or changeable; if the latter, then the same fundamental principle compels us to seek other causes for this change, and to proceed in our search until at last we reach ultimate causes, operating according to unchangeable laws, and consequently at all times, under the same circumstances, producing the same effects. The ultimate aim of the theoretical sciences of nature is thus to find the ultimate unchangeable causes of natural processes.

"We do not require here to decide whether in reality all processes must be referred to such causes, i.e. whether nature must be completely intelligible, or whether there are some changes not subject to the law of necessary causal nexus, but falling within the sphere of spontaneity or freedom; it is perfectly clear, however, that science, whose aim is to understand nature, must start from the assumption of its intelligibility, must draw its inferences and proceed in its investigations in accordance with this assumption, until, perchance, incontrovertible facts compel a recognition of the limits of the principle.

"We have seen above that the phenomena of nature must be referred to unchangeable ultimate causes; this demand may be expressed in other words, thus:—as ultimate causes we must find forces unchanging in time.
Portions of matter with such unchangeable forces (indestructible qualities) are called in science Elements. Now, if we regard the Universe as broken up into elements with constant qualities, the only possible changes in such a system are spatial (i.e., dependent on position), i.e., are motions; the external relations through which the operation of forces is modified, can only be spatial; and, finally, forces can only be forces producing movement, dependent, so far as their action is concerned, on relations of space alone." Helmholtz, *Erhaltung der Kraft*, pp. 2-4.

8 This is put strongly, perhaps too strongly, by Whewell. "Such principles as I have mentioned—that material substance cannot be produced or destroyed, that the cause is measured by the effect, that reaction is equal and opposite to action, are not the results of experience, nor can be. . . . If the axiom of substance were not true, and were not assumed, we could not have such a science as Chemistry, that is, we could have no knowledge at all respecting the changes of form of substances" (*Phil. of Discovery*, 349). On the other hand, Professor Huxley (*Hume*, p. 52) speaks with contempt of "pure metaphysicians," who "assert that scientific observation is impossible unless such truths are already known or implied; which, to those who are not 'pure metaphysicians,' seems very much as if one should say that the fall of a stone cannot be observed unless the law of gravitation is already in the mind of the observer." Professor Huxley, however, seems to overlook the distinction between the conditions of experience as such and the special laws of this or that portion of experience (see Kant, *Prolegomena*, § 17), and he would undoubtedly find it hard to show that observation of a fact from which any scientific inference could be
drawn is possible without involving the general principle on which all scientific observation is based. Probably he means by the observation of the “fall of a stone” the consciousness of a particular series of sensations; he would find it equally hard to show how I can be conscious of a series as such apart from the general condition which enables me to determine existence in time at all. Professor Huxley evidently thinks, however, that the human mind can be conscious of a single sensation, i.e. can determine its own existence as sentient, absolutely, or apart from the element of difference (see Hume, pp. 55, 68). This is to outgo Hume himself, and is, after all, mere words. The single sensation, say red, which Mr. Huxley is contemplating, is the sensation as known to him in actual connected experience. What qualities it may have, regarded apart from such experience, neither Mr. Huxley nor any other “geographer” of the human mind is likely to inform us.

By cause in its modern scientific acceptation, I refer specially to the doctrine of the conservation and transformation of energy, which has for the first time allowed us to state the scientific law of causation in an accurate form. Valuable as is this doctrine for practical purposes, much remains to be done in the way of clearing up the presuppositions on which it rests. It is probably incapable of statement apart from that conception of the physical universe, which we shall see is the real counterpart of the category of Reciprocity, the conception of a system of substances or ultimate subjects of motion, mutually determining, and through their reciprocal determinations forming one system. So far as I have been able to discover, all expressions for the laws of energy involve, more or less

10 The following sentences from Guelincx, who pushed the Cartesian opposition of Thought and Extension to its logical consequence, are extremely curious when considered in connection with much modern speculation on the same subject: “Igitur in mundo nil quicquam agimus, spectamus eum duntaxat, verum illud spectare rursus admirabile modo contingit, nam mundus non potest se ipsum ut spectetur, adhibere, nec speciem suam nobis ingerere, est in se ipso invisibilis. Quemadmodum non operamur in id, quod extra nos est, ita, quod extra est, non operatur in nos” (*Ethica*, p. 122). “Nec motus sequitur in membris meis voluntatem meam, sed voluntatem meam comitatur” (p. 124).

Since these lectures were given an extremely able examination of certain modern theories on this subject has been published.—*Modern Realism Examined*, by the late Prof. J. M. Herbert, 1879.

11 The first and most important of the scientific writers who called attention to Kant as having greatest significance for modern thought was Helmholtz. In various addresses, but more especially in his great work *Physiologische Optik*, 1867, he brought forward the Kantian philosophy as supplying a groundwork both for scientific cognition as a whole, and for the theory of perception in particular. It is to be said, however, that Helmholtz, like many other scientific writers, seems to owe his knowledge of Kant to Schopen-
hauer. His doctrine of Cause, e.g., is not Kantian, but distinctly belongs to the later writer.

Kantianism is very prominent in Wundt (see Die physikalischen Axiome, 1866; Physiologische Psychologie, 1874; and particularly his inaugural addresses of 1874 and 1876). Zöllner (Über die Natur der Kometen, 1872) deserves mention for the enthusiastic manner in which he has called attention to Kant's merits in physical science. He, too, like Helmholtz, seems to have drawn more from Schopenhauer's Kantianism than from Kant himself.


13 Zeller, ut sup. Cf. pp. 470, 488. See also Helmholtz, Pop. Sc. Lec. (E. Trans.), p. 6. "On this hypothesis it seemed competent for the human mind, even without the guidance of external experience, to think over again the thoughts of the Creator, and to re-discover them by its own inner activity."

14 It is not to be denied that Hegel, and, to an even greater extent, Schelling, erred in their mode of dealing with natural science; but the supposition that metaphysic, say as conceived by Hegel or Fichte, who may be selected as specimens of "pure metaphysicians," attempts to construct a priori the body of physical knowledge, rests only on gross misapprehension, and is rejected in so many words by these authors themselves. (See Hegel, Encyclopädie, § 145; and very specially Fichte, Werke, II. 333, V. 340.

15 Cf. Helmholtz, Pop. Sc. Lect. p. 5. "Kant's philosophy rested on exactly the same grounds as the physical sciences, as is evident from his own scientific works." For an adverse view with regard to the relation between Kantian-
ism and scientific method, see Hegel, Encyk., § 60 (WW., VI. pp. 121-2).

16 Helmholtz, Ueber das Sehen des Menschen, 1855; p. 6.

17 Kant, WW., I. 563. Cf. Prolegomena, §§ 4, 5, 40, 42.

18 The third part of the Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels (WW., VI. 205, sqq.) contains some remarkable utterances on Man. The other works referred to are chiefly Ueber den Gebrauch teleologischer Principien in der Philosophie (VI. 355-391); Muthmaasslicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte (VII. (1), 363-385); Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte (VII. (1), 315-337).

19 Cf. Schultze, Kant und Darwin, 1875; Dieterich, Kant und Newton, 1876; Kant und Rousseau, 1878; Lasswitz, Atomistik und Kriticismus, 1878.

20 These oppositions, which form the substance or matter of modern reflection, may be thus summarised:— Thought and Being, Mind and Nature, Soul and Body, Freedom and Divine or Natural Law, Natural Inclination and Moral Reason, Mechanism and Teleology. All of them appear in Descartes; they are, indeed, but the specific modes in which the Cartesian reform expresses itself.

21 We may say that exaggeration of this distinction is the cardinal error of Cartesianism. The subject is there purely negative or critical thought, empty self-assertion as opposed to the fulness and concreteness of the world as known. The Idea of God in Descartes, the Vision of all things in God with Malebranche, and the Infinite Sub-
stance of Spinoza, are but violent efforts to overcome the irreconcilable opposition with which these thinkers started.


24 Works (ed. 1854), IV. 173.

25 Huxley, Selected Essays, p. 139.

26 See Lange, Gesch. d. Materialismus, II. 3-4.

27 The pressure of this difficulty, caused by assuming as known to thought a distinction absolutely insoluble by thought, is seen with greatest clearness in Malebranche and G. W. Leibniz. The real existence of things is for Malebranche a quite unnecessary addition to the "Intelligible Extension" which we perceive in God. (See Entretiens sur la Metaphysique, V. and VI.)

28 Specially interesting at the present time is that view of metaphysical or psychical Monism which, in various forms, is presented by Noire, Wundt, Taine, Lewes, S. H. Hodgson, and others.

29 Gesch. des Material. II. 4-5.

30 As is done, among others, by Zeller. See Gesch. d. deutsch. Phil. 426 ; Vorträge u. Abhandl. 2te. Samm. 491.

31 With what is here said may be compared the very thoughtful treatment of Phenomenalism, by J. Grote (Exploratio Philosophica). The same view lies at the bottom of Ferrier's vigorous polemic against psychology (Institutes, passim).

31 It might easily be shown that the irreconcilable opposition between Thought and Things into which Descartes was led, resulted from the fact that his first transcendental
conception of thought was allowed to fall back into the psychological conception of the concrete individual mind.

32 Prolegomena, § 13, Anm. I.

33 The similarity of Kant's thought and language to that of Hume on the same point is very remarkable. Kant (Werke I. 158), "Wie aber etwas aus etwas anderm, aber nicht nach der Regel der Identität, fließe, das ist etwas, welches Ich mir gerne möchte deutlich machen lassen." Hume (Works, IV. 39), "We always presume, when we see like sensible qualities that they have like secret powers, and expect that effects similar to those which we have experienced will follow from them. . . . Now, this is a process of the mind or thought, of which I would willingly know the foundation."

34 Werke, XI. i. pp. 25-6.

35 The extent of Kant's acquaintance with Hume's works is a disputed point, not apparently to be settled with absolute precision. That he knew the Treatise of Human Nature seems to me extremely improbable. There is no external evidence in favour of the supposition, and internal evidence is altogether against it. Kant could not have persisted in regarding Hume's sceptical criticism as limited to causality had he read the Treatise; nor, in that case, would he have failed to notice Hume's empirical theory of mathematical truths. Throughout, indeed, he assumes that Hume grants to mathematics a priori, though analytical, truth; a more thorough study of the Essays might have cast some doubt upon this. As to the time at which Kant first came in contact with Hume, that must probably be thrown as far back as the 1755 translation into German of the Essays. From the Notice of his. Lectures, 1765-6
(WW, I. 297), it is evident that Kant was in the habit of using Hume's *Moral Essays* in his ethical prelections, and, if the report of Borowski is to be credited (*Leben Kant's*, p. 170), he must, as early as 1756, have been engaged in the study and criticism of Hume's theory of knowledge. I cannot trace any distinct evidence of Hume's influence before the period already mentioned as that of the formulation of the critical question—1769-72; up to that date Kant's development seems quite intelligible when regarded as his progress from the principles of the Leibnitz-Wolff metaphysics. See on this matter, *pro* and *con*, Paulsen *Entwicklungs-geschichte*, pp. 47, sqq.; and B. Erdmann, Ed. of *Prolegomena; Einleitung*, p. 81, sqq.


37 The logical principles of the Leibnitzian theory of knowledge are of interest sufficient to repay detailed examination. The only systematic treatment of them (*Kvet's* *Leibnitz's Logik*, 1857) is neither sufficiently full nor thoroughly sound. The fundamental principles follow at once from the conception of knowledge as but the self-evolution of the consciousness of the individual subject or monad. It follows from this (1) that there is no absolute distinction between empirical and *a priori* truths; (2) that the first principles of all truths are contained in the consciousness of the *Monas Monadum*; (3) that all knowledge forms a completely connected and harmonious system; (4.) that the process of discovering truth is *Analysis*, by which we clear our confused ideas and refer them to first truths; (5.*) that ultimate truths are identical propositions; empirical truths are those which, from the point of view of the finite mind, cannot be reduced to identities save through an infinite process.—(See *Opera Philosophica*, pp.
208 ; 80, 620, 717 ; 719-720 ; 177, 707, 83, 99.) Thus
the system of knowledge consists of data, and consequences
from them and contained in them. Scientia generalis, or
logic in its highest sense, a logic of which the Aristotelian
is but a branch, has to investigate fully the methods by
which we may pass from data to consequences, or from
consequences to data. It falls thus into two parts (I dis-
miss as unimportant the distinction between Art of Judg-
ing and Art of Discovery) : I. Synthetic or Combinatorial,
II. Analytic. In the first, we can have demonstration ;
in the second, as the regressus is infinite, only probability.
Synthetic logic has therefore to determine the laws of the
possible combinations of given data ; analytic logic,
the degrees of probability with which we can infer the
data from which given effects followed. The method of
synthetic logic is mathematical, or rather, mathematical
reasoning is but a special modification of the general laws
of combination of data. The ratiocinative calculus requires
for its completeness (a) reduction of all notions to simple
data, (b) exposition of the general rule and special modifi-
cations for combining, (c) a new algorithm or character-
istic notation. The first requisite leads Leibnitz to the
doctrine of ultra-quantification ; the second to the state-
ment of the general principle of substitution of equivalents ;
the third is only partially worked out. Details, so far as
given, are to be found in the logical tracts (Opera Phil.,
pp. 81-104). The logic of Probability is only indicated
as a desideratum. A historical account of the develop-
ment of these thoughts, as in Tschirnhausen, Hansch,
Plouquet, Ridiger, and others of the Wolffian school,
would be a valuable addition to our histories of logical
doctrines. (See for a severe criticism of the arithmetical
method in Logic, Hegel, Logik, III. 142-3.)
38 See, among other passages, the admirable sentence (WW, I. 568).


40 Only in this way can I comprehend Kant’s expressions in the Prolegomena with regard to these judgments. It is quite impossible to suppose that the arbitrary or empirically influenced subsumption of two perceptions (the shining of the sun and the warmth of the stone) under the category is the process by which the categories enter into knowledge. Kant appears to me to be, in this instance, as in the corresponding illustrations under the discussion of the second Analogy, endeavouring to explain, by reference to empirical connections, the nature of objectivity as such. The view taken in the lecture is confirmed by the curious remark that judgments of perception, in which the predicate is my feeling, cannot be raised into judgments of experience (Proleg. § 19 n). The real error in the matter is the description of these as judgments, without a more explicit statement of the place they occupy in the growth of knowledge. The view of judgment in the Kritik (Analytik, § 19) is quite sufficient to destroy the idea that the so-called judgments of perception are anything more than subsequent empirical acts, possible only in reference to objectivity already recognised.

41 Cf. in addition to the official passages in the Kritik, Prolegomena, and Logik, Werke, I. pp. 470, 565-6; XI. 1, pp. 97-8.


43 Werke, I. p. 565.
NOTES.


45 Kritik d. r. V., Analytik, §§ 18, 19.

46 Kritik d. r. V. pp. 577-8 n.

47 On the deeper significance of this synthesis, see Fichte, Werke, I. 113-14, and Hegel, Werke, I. 21 sqq.


49 See on the point referred to, Kritik d. r. V. 579 n. Arnoldt (Kant's Transcendentale Idealität, pp. 50-51) has some good remarks on Kant's use of the term intuition.


51 See Werke, I. 445-46, 469, 502, 508 ; V. 322, 427 ; Kritik d. r. V., 132 n, 307 n, 567-68. On the matter necessary for perception of space, see specially Kritik, 228, and Werke, V. 427.

52 Kritik, 579 n ; and generally, Kritik, pp. 115-122, 579-584.
NOTES TO LECTURE II.

1 *Kritik*, 579 n. "Perhaps no psychologist has yet remarked that Imagination is a necessary element in Perception itself. For this faculty has been restricted to mere reproduction, and, in addition, it has been believed that the senses not only convey impressions but also unite them and produce images of objects, for which, however, without doubt, there is something more required than receptivity for impressions, i.e. a function of their synthesis." This remark is historically inaccurate, but is all-important for Kant's own theory. Cf. *Werke*, I. 502, 508.

2 It is of interest to compare with Kant's view the most elaborate psychological treatments of Perception; those of Berkeley and Mill. The function of Imagination in sense-perception is recognised, though not with sufficient clearness, by the former, and the relation between the presented and represented elements in perception is the crucial difficulty in his theory, and in the similar view of Mr. Mill. It will be found to differ from Kant in two points mainly—(1.) The transcendental rule of Imagination, that which Kant calls *Affinity*, is left without recognition; (2.) The represented elements bear only the character of parts in the construction of an intuition, whereas Kant points distinctly to the representation of sense facts determined in time. The occurrence of sensations, which is suggested, and the permanent laws of their
occurrence, are inconceivable apart from the objective order of events determined in time. The “possibility of sensation” is truly equivalent to the possibility of experiencing a sensation. This objective reference, or reference to the order of experience, is left unexplained by Mill, and is thrown by Berkeley into the divine mind, which guarantees subjective associations.

3 Not, be it observed, “forms of synthetic unity of Time itself.” The difference is of importance in view of recent discussions. Kant holds that time, like space, is only known through experience in it; consequently the schemata are not modes of time, but modes of synthetic unity of the possible manifold in time.


5 The psychological side of the Deduction is given in greatest detail in the first edition of the Kritik (see. pp. 567-585). The essence, however, is to be found in the second edition, § 24, and specially § 26 (pp. 126-9, 131-4). An accurate summary is given by Hölder (op. cit. 35-58), who rightly places in the foreground the function of imagination.


7 In addition to the general discussion in the second edition of the Kritik (specially §§ 17, 19, 21), the relative
remarks in the first edition should be kept in view (see particularly \textit{Kr.}, p. 572-3, and the important note, p. 577-8.


One of the clearest expositions of \textit{Schematism} to be found in Kant is given in his letter to Tiestrunk, \textit{Werke}, XI. 1, 184-7. That the mediating element between notion and intuition, or rather between the Ego and the particular of sense, is the function of synthesis, which, on the one hand, is conditioned by the pure generality necessary to consciousness as such, and on the other hand, by the special nature of intuition, is more firmly expressed here than in the relative section of the \textit{Kritik}, pp. 140-6. It is certainly true that, for the production of the \textit{schemata}, the pure forms of perception are requisite, but it must be noted that the schemata are not modes \textit{of} these pure perceptions but modes of synthetic unity in them. The most general contents of time, not time itself, are the basis of the schemata. This point is much misconceived in ordinary histories of philosophy, \textit{e.g.}, Zeller, \textit{Gesch. d. deuts. Phil.}, 431; Schwegler, \textit{Handbook (E. T.)}, 222.


I refer specially to the discussion under the 2d Analogy (\textit{Kritik}, pp. 173-187). The brief notices, K. 133, 207, 213, 430-1, 483 n, 508, 521, are much more satisfactory and to the point. Cf. \textit{Kr. d. prak. V.} 92-94.

Cf. \textit{Kritik}, 211, 213.

14 Kritik, 191-2. Cf. Prolegomena, WW. III. 87-8. The necessary unity of experience points to a higher view than that which Kant is here contemplating, though it appears at a later stage, when the transition is made to the theory of Reason, or Metaphysic. The idea indicated by Kant is the groundwork for a doctrine of cause, which has been well expressed by Sophie Germain: "Our intellectual tendency to seek the causes of every object that attracts our attention appears to me to indicate that we do not perceive the object in its entirety. It presents itself to us with a character of incompleteness; we ask what is the unity to which it belongs. We see it as a part; we desire to know the whole to which this part belongs" (Œuvres Philosophiques, p. 133.) It is not, however, sufficient to say that the object presents a fractional character; its incompleteness can only appear on reflective comparison of experience with the rational idea of unity.


16 See Prolegomena, WW. III. p. 72.

17 See for this misunderstanding of Kant, Schopenhauer Vierfache Wurzel... § 23.

18 Kritik, 176, 133. Cf. with Prolegomena, § 30, the passage in Kritik, 508.


20 Those who, like Schopenhauer, think that Kant is deducing his proof of Causality from special kinds of sequence, fail to give due prominence to that which is above all things insisted on by Kant, viz. empirical contingency. Kant, so far as the empirical character of events is concerned, would
express himself very much as Hume did. Cf. what is said of *Analogy* in general, *Kritik*, 167-8.

In an elaborate article on the *Philosophy of Causality* (*Princeton Review*, Jan. 1879, pp. 178-210), Dr. Hutchison Stirling has re-stated with great fulness and force the objections previously taken by him (*Fort. Review*, July 1872) to Kant's proof of the 2d Analogy. To enter on all the points raised in this article would demand longer space than can here be given, and would be unnecessary after the discussion of schematism already given in the text. Two special arguments, however, go so directly to the heart of the matter that it is incumbent on all Kantian students to consider their position with regard to them. Dr. Stirling contends *first*, "that any time-multiple correspondent to the multiple of Judgment, the relation of antecedent and consequent, is not to be found;" and *second*, "that, even on Kant's own terms, the multiple of special sense already possesses necessity; nay, that on Kant's own terms that multiple already *must* possess necessity" (*Pr. Rev.*, 202. Cf. on the second point, *Fort. Rev.*, *ut cit.*, p. 424).

With regard to the first point, I find it difficult to reconcile Dr. Stirling's general account of the time-multiple or schema (*Pr. Rev.* 203) with Kant himself. Dr. Stirling, e.g., regards permanence of time as being the schema for the category substance, whereas, so far as I can judge, Kant's teaching is to the effect that the said schema is the permanent *in* time. The difference is one of considerable importance, for to me Kant's reasoning seems unintelligible unless we suppose that he is considering the conditions under which time-determination is possible. His words are quite emphatic. Time itself is not a perception, and any determination in its regard must be given by the
thought relations of possible content of time. With regard either to time or its content, however, Dr. Stirling can find no multiple of imagination corresponding to antecedence and consequence (pp. 204-5). In time itself there is merely succession, no rule; and if we consider that the contents of time are successive *realia*, real facts of sense-intuition, we see at once that no one of them can be conceived as giving rise necessarily to the other. Each *is*, but *is* only as a fact, as a degree of sensation, without causal reference. Both arguments would be admitted by Kant, but neither refers directly to the problem of causation. Dr. Stirling does not allow sufficient weight to Kant’s distinction between *à priori* determination of the elements necessary to an intuition, and *à priori* determination of the conditions of existence. With absolute mathematical certainty we can say that every element of real experience must have degree, i.e., consciousness must be filled to a certain extent. From the conception of this filling-in nothing follows; but if I ask, How can real intuitions, so determined, be matters of experience at all? a new element appears. To be cognised as existing, they must be related in time, for time is the universal form of all consciousness. The conditions of existence will consequently be the conditions of synthesis in time. The third element in the *Anallogies* which Dr. Stirling seems to overlook, is this possibility of experience. A fact of experience to be known at all must be known not only as a *quale* or *reale* of sense, but as determined in time. There is no question as to the category of quantity acting *now*, and the category of causality *then*. We can certainly sever our consideration of quantitative relations from reality, but to do so is, in Kant’s own words, “to amuse ourselves
with cobwebs of the brain” (Kr. 152). In experience all parts are real quantities determined as to their existence (Daseyn) in time. The time-multiple in question, then, is not to be sought for in the realia themselves, nor in time itself, but in that which renders possible experience of change in the realia, and this, as has been pointed out in the text, is the schema of determined or necessary sequence. The prior, further, is not any definite a which is already in experience, but simply the representation of realia, which being given, the perceived change is determined as to its being in time. I differ from Dr. Stirling as to the presence of both cause and effect in Kant’s examples of causal nexus (See Pr. Rev., pp. 198-9). Dr. Stirling’s second argument is that the sense-multiple, by which I understand him to mean a definite a and b in experience, must be subjectively felt as irreversible, necessary, before it can be subsumed under the category of causality. “It is not,” he says, “every multiple of special sense that possesses, so to speak, the cue of causality” (p. 205. Cf. Fortnightly Rev. ut cit., p. 424). On this I can only add to what has been, from other motives, advanced in the text, the following two remarks. First, the multiple which is in the case in question, is not a definite a and b, and the irreversibility applies not to certain sequences, which, on other grounds, we may call cause and effect, but to the sequence of perceived parts in real experience. The multiple, in all cases of causality, is change plus the representation of preceding real contents of sense. Secondly, to suppose that only some multiples of special sense afford matter for the causal judgment is to do violence to Kant’s own words. All events in time are subject to that judgment. There is no conjuring of
causal nexus out of contingent sequence, no reading of necessity into this or that special connection of phenomena. The particular preceding a, which being given, b follows, is the problem of scientific research. That Kant should be understood to say that we a priori know that this and that special modification of sense are related as cause and effect, is to me altogether incomprehensible.

Dr. Stirling's remarks on the subjective character of Kant's mechanism of perception seem to be justified, not on the special grounds he has advanced, but on the ground of the individualist phraseology which Kant is incessantly employing. Nowhere is this so clear as in the Transcendental Ästhetic, but in fairness to Kant, it should be remembered that his proof is more general than the expression he has given it. Space and Time are not merely subjective spectra by means of which the individual intelligence conjures order into subjective rhapsody of sense facts, but conditions under which matter, the external as such, is possible for any intelligence. This is the real burden of his argument, despite the unfortunately psychological aspect which in Kant it confessedly wears. So with Causality, which is not to be regarded as a subjective addition to matter already given, but as the condition under which sequence or change is possible for intelligence as such.

21 Kritik, 207; 228 (Cf. W. V. 403-6); 173.

22 The Cartesian idealism, therefore, though Kant's argument is, on another side, valid against the individualism of Berkeley. Erdmann (Grundriss d. Ges.*d. Phil. 3d ed. II. 322) remarks that Fichte had pointed out that the idealism criticised was not that of Berkeley.
See specially the IV. Paralogism as in 1st edition; *Kritik*, pp. 597-619. The Refutation of Idealism given there (pp. 605-6) is amplified in 2d edition (pp. 197-200, and *Vorrede*, pp. 29-30 n), but not essentially altered. The impossibility of cognising *a priori* the content of perception seems to Kant sufficient proof of its reality (*WW*. V. 321). Cf. I. 509, and *Kritik*, 164-5, 602.

Kant perfectly recognises this with respect to the pure unity of consciousness; see *Kritik*, p. 617.


See the remarkable passage, *Werke*, V. 405-6.

See *Werke*, I. 522, 550, 606; *Kritik*, 205 sgg., 605; *Werke*, V. 310.

See Critique of IV. Paralogism, as in 1st edition.

It would be interesting to point out how this mode of viewing the inductive methods enables us to secure for them their due place in a system of logic. The usual sharp distinction between deduction and induction leads to grave error and confusion of thought. What is usually called induction is not in kind distinct from reasoning in general, but is only the collection and examination of facts under the guidance of general principle. Berkeley must be credited with a sound conception of the nature and significance of inductive method (see Fraser, *Life and Works of Berkeley*, p. 407 n), though his recognition of the ideal forms is not sufficiently explicit.

*Prolegomena*, § 57 (*WW*. III. 127-8). "Reason finds for itself no satisfaction in all the notions and laws of understanding which are sufficient for its service in ex-
perience, i.e. in the world of the senses; for ever-recurring problems deprive it of all hope of a completed solution. The transcendental Ideas, which have as their aim this very completeness, are such problems of Reason. Now it (i.e. Reason) sees clearly that in the world of the senses this completeness cannot be given; just as little can it be given in all these notions which merely serve for comprehension of that world—Space, Time, and all that has been brought forward under the name of pure notions of the Understanding. The world of sense is nothing but a chain of phenomena (Erscheinungen) connected according to general laws; it has, therefore, no subsistence by itself; it is distinctly not the thing-in-itself, and therefore has of necessity reference to that which contains the ground of the phenomenal, to essences, which cannot be known merely as phenomena, but as things-in-themselves. Through knowledge of these only can Reason hope to find satisfaction for its desire of completeness in the progress from the conditioned to its conditions."


32 Werke, I. 429 n.

33 Jacobi, Werke, II. 304. Cf. Harms, Phil. seit Kant, 186.

34 On Things-in-themselves as ground of phenomena, see Werke, I. 427, 429-30, 436; IV. 216; XI. 1, 187. The most important passages used in the text are Kritik, pp. 220-2, 240-1.

On the applicability of the categories to Things-in-themselves, see Werke, IV. 392-3; Kritik d. prak. Vern., 245-6.
Riehl (Philos. Kriticismus, I. 439, sqq.) has the curious idea of a distinction between Noumenon and Thing-in-itself. See against this Werke, I. 427, and cf. Kritik, 218 n.

On dialectic as negative proof, see Werke, I. 527-8.

On Reason as the origin of the conception of Limit, see Grundleg d. Met. d. Sitten (ed. 1791), 107-8. The use of Verstandeswelt, throughout the ethical works, to denote the intelligible system is somewhat confusing.

The principle that consciousness of a limit is only through reference to that which is above the limit plays a most important part in Kant. See Werke, IV. 292, and specially 296. Cf. also Proleg, § 59 (WW. III. 136-8).

See specially Kritik d. Urtheils Kr., § 76. Thiele's work, Kant's Intellectuelle Anschauung contains much valuable matter on this difficult point.

See on Spinoza's view of the Ego as determined through the category of Mode, Fichte, Werke, I. 100. Cf. I. 155.
NOTES TO LECTURE III.

1 See *Kritik*, p. 437. "If we survey the whole extent of our knowledge through Understanding, we discover that what Reason specifically directs in its regard and strives to bring about, is systematisation of knowledge—i.e. the connection of the whole according to one principle. This rational unity always presupposes an Idea—that, namely, of the form of a totality of cognition, which precedes the determined cognition of the parts, and contains the conditions which determine a priori the place of each part and its relations to all the others." Cf. pp. 337, 548-9, and *Proleg.* § 56.

2 Cf. *Proleg.* § 40 (WW, III. p. 94.) On the difference between scientific incomprehensibilities and metaphysical problems, see *Proleg.* § 56 (*WW.* III. pp. 121-2), § 57 (*WW.* III. pp. 126-7); *Kritik*, p. 337.


4 One of the clearest and briefest expositions of these antinomies, their origin, and solution, is to be found in Kant’s Essay, *Fortschritte der Metaphysik seit Leibnitz und Wolff* (Werke, I. 524-9). The whole Essay is of great importance, as giving Kant’s mature views on many points
of interest in the Kritik. On the origin of Antinomy, see Fichte, Werke, I. 245; Hegel, Phil. Abhandl. 33-35.

5 Kritik, p. 339.

6 Kritik, 450-1; cf. p. 418.

7 Kritik, pp. 371-2.

8 See Werke, I. 530; cf. Kritik, p. 372.

9 See Kritik, p. 373. ("If phenomena are things-in-themselves, Freedom cannot be saved. In such a case Nature is the complete and adequate cause of every event, and the condition of any event is always contained in the mere series of phenomena which, with its results, is necessitated according to natural law. But, on the other hand, if phenomena are not taken to be more than they really are—i.e., are not taken to be things-in-themselves, but mere Vorstellungen, connected according to empirical laws, then they must themselves have grounds which are not phenomena.") Cf. also Kritik, p. 390. From the latter passage, with which may be compared note 30 (Lecture II.), it is clear that Kant’s argument turns upon the limited, conditioned character attaching to the portions of experience. It is unfortunate that he also introduces the mode of reasoning suitable to psychological idealism.

On the impossibility of Freedom, if the categories of understanding applied throughout to man and his actions, there is a remarkable passage in the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, pp. 180-3, in which occurs the expression, "conscious automata," familiar in recent discussions.

10 Kant has quite sufficiently explained what has so frequently been regarded as a glaring inconsistency in his theory, the use of the notion ‘cause,’ in reference to the
supersensible or noumenal world. See _Kritik der Urtheilskraft_, p. 37 (Werke, IV.), and pp. 392-4 (ibid.) Cf. also _Kritik der prak. Vern._ pp. 94-6, 245-6; _Prologomena_, §§ 57, 58.

11 On the notion of contingency more will afterwards be said. A very comprehensive discussion of the question is contained in Stadler, _Kant’s Teleologie_, pp. 60-67. See also Cohen, _Kant’s Theorie der Erfahrung_, pp. 233-4.

12 The discussion under the third Antinomy is in principle the same as that which appears in the Critique of Judgment. It is the first stage of the fuller determination to be given to the supersensible world. See Hegel, _Logik_, III. 207-210.

13 As to first, see _Kritik_, p. 491; as to second, see _Kr. d. Urth._ pp. 24-5 (Werke, IV.)

14 The category of Reciprocity which is here discussed is that of greatest importance and is, moreover, the notion by which transition may most readily be made to metaphysic. It has been already pointed out (note 9 to Lecture I.) that the chief modern generalisation of physical science rests upon this category; and it may here be added that upon the same idea depend entirely many of the most important discussions in recent philosophical literature—e.g. that concerning the possibility of plurality of causes, the questions involved in so-called ‘Automatism,’ and generally the deterministic view which underlies much of the historical method. For scientific expression of the notion, reference may be made to Du Bois-Reymond (Grenzen des Naturerkennens, pp. 5-7), who follows Laplace. It is to be observed that, in his very able
statement of the limits to application of the notion, we have simply a supposed insuperable difficulty placed alongside of a principle which is regarded as unconditionally true. No effort is made to test the notion itself, to discover why and how we come to apply it, and consequently how its limits are to be explained. No exposition, however, of the nature and results of the category has ever surpassed, or even equalled, that given by Fichte, in the first book of his Bestimmung des Menschen. A few sentences may be quoted from that work, to show how fully the import and consequences of the principle had been grasped by him:—"In every moment of her duration Nature is one connected whole; in every moment each part must be what it is, because all the others are what they are. You could not remove a single grain of sand from its place without thereby, though probably imperceptibly to you, altering something throughout all parts of the immeasurable whole. But every moment of this duration is determined by all past moments, and will determine all future moments. You cannot conceive even the position of a grain of sand other than it is in the present, without being compelled to conceive the whole indefinite past as having been other than it has been, and the whole indefinite future other than it will be" (Werke, II. 178). "That my states of existence have been accompanied by consciousness, and that some of them—thoughts, resolutions, and the like—appear to be nothing but modes of mere consciousness, need cause me no perplexity in my reasoning. . . . Thought exists, and exists absolutely, just as the formative power of nature exerts and exists absolutely." "A thought arises in me simply, and just as simply the corresponding real form, and the movement
which corresponds to both. I am not what I am, because I so think or so will; nor do I so think or so will because I am; but I am and think, both absolutely; but both harmonise from some higher ground.” “I am what I am because in this conjuncture of the great whole of Nature only such, and no other, was possible; and a spirit who could look through the secrets of nature would, from knowing one single man, be able distinctly to declare what men had formerly existed and what men would exist at any future moment; in one individual he would cognise all real individuals. My connection, then, with the whole of Nature is that which determines what I have been, am, and shall be, and the same spirit would be able, from any possible moment of my existence, to discover infallibly what I had been and what I was to become.”—(Ibid. 179-80, 181, 182-3). From these principles Fichte, with the utmost clearness and consistency, deduces the consequences as regards soul and body, nature and will, which have been made familiar to us in recent discussions on Automatism. It is worth while noting that rigid adherence to the thought of reciprocity is destructive to that of causality. For under this notion, taken in its full abstraction, change in the universe becomes inconceivable. We cannot with any consistency think the states of the universe as cause and effect, even without taking into account that, in endeavouring to do so, we must inevitably defeat our own aim.

As was said, this idea of reciprocity is perhaps that by which the scientific or popular consciousness most easily becomes metaphysical. But in pure metaphysic the notion occupies a remarkable historic position. In Spinoza, and, to a certain extent, in the Cartesian demand for a completed whole of cognition, reciprocity is the one key to explana-
tion (see e.g. Spinoza, Eth. II. Prop. 43, 44; and for an admirable exposition of his theory of knowledge, Camerer, Die Lehre Spinozas, pp. 67-112). In the Beweise für das Daseyn Gottes (specially pp. 505-6, 510-17, Werke, XII.), Hegel comments upon this Spinozistic notion.

The poetic expression of the same thought is familiar to us in Tennyson's little poem, "Flower in the crannied wall."

15 See Kritik, pp. 452-3. "Finally, in reference to theology, we must treat all that which may never be given save in the connection of possible experience as if this composed an absolute unity, though throughout dependent and always conditioned within the world of sense, but at the same time as if the complex of all phenomena (the world of sense itself) had a single supreme and all-sufficient ground beyond its sphere, i.e. to say a self-existent, original, and creative understanding, in reference to which we must regulate all empirical employment of our reason when pushed to its utmost limits, as if objects themselves originated from such a prototype of all Reason." In other words, our notion of reciprocity, when carefully tested, manifests its inadequacy, and must be supplemented by the idea of a ground of things external to the system itself. Such ground is the supposed intuitive understanding.

16 See Werke, I. 543-4.

17 The force of Kant's criticism of the arguments for the existence of God has been as much under-estimated, on the one hand, as exaggerated on the other. The really important element is the closeness of scrutiny to which the notions of understanding as media of proof are subjected. Kant is quite successful in showing that by the notion of cause, or of necessary existence, we cannot pass beyond experience itself. This result of his criticism
seems to me to have been somewhat misapprehended in
the most able recent work on the subject, Professor Flint's
*Theism* (1877). Professor Flint repudiates the idea of an
infinite regress as the necessary result of applying the
notion of cause, holds that the merely abstract employ-
ment of the principle of causality, as in Kant, is childish,
but, curiously enough, hesitates when he comes to deal
with the inference of a first uncaused cause (see p. 121),
and is willing to allow that this does not result from the
principle of causality alone. Surely this is quite Kantian,
and surely Kant is warranted in asserting that the notion
of cause only enables us to "spell experience" to connect
events which form parts of our experience, and con-
sequently, that by this notion, in its scientific form, we
cannot pass beyond experience. He is quite aware of
what Professor Flint (pp. 118-9) calls the "concrete" use
of the principle of causality; it appears in him as the
principle of teleological judgment, and he is surely correct
in saying that the notion here employed differs widely
both in import and validity from that of cause.

I quite agree with what Professor Flint says (p. 284)
as to the narrowness inseparable from Kant's doctrine of
knowledge, but that narrowness is not to be overcome by
simply levelling all distinctions between the notions of
understanding and the ideas of reason. Nor do I think
Professor Flint quite justified in his strictures on Kant's
critique of the ontological argument (pp. 282-3). To
annul the subject of a judgment, says Professor Flint,
implies the idea of the subject, and from the idea follows,
in the case of a triangle, the equality of its angles to two
right angles, in the case of God, his necessary existence.
Certainly, would be the reply, but this omits the one
point in dispute. You may draw what conclusion you can from the idea of a triangle; the question is whether the idea is of such a nature that its object can be given in experience. If so, then, without doubt, all that can be deduced from the idea must be accepted as objectively valid. The validity, be it observed, does not depend on the strength or accuracy of the deduction, but on the possibility of realising in experience the object corresponding to the idea. Whatever, therefore, be the narrowness of Kant's conception of experience, the same argument cannot be applied to an idea which may be schematised in experience and an idea to which no object can be found. It may be permitted to quote here Kant's own remark, "A notion is always possible, if it is not self-contradictory. This is the logical criterion of possibility, distinguishing the object of the notion from the nihil negativum. But the notion may none the less be quite empty, unless the objective reality of the synthesis whereby it is generated has been specially demonstrated; and such demonstration rests always on principles of possible experience, not on the fundamental proposition of analysis (the law of contradiction)." *Kritik*, p. 408 n.

A very fine statement and review of the arguments for the existence of God is given by Daub (*Vorlesungen*, II. 541-513). Romang's treatment (*Natürliche Religionslehre*, 194-226) is also very instructive. Hegel, throughout the *Logik*, and in the special lectures on the subject, submits the proofs and Kant's view of them to thorough criticism (see particularly *Werke*, XII. 436-62).

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19 Kant's cautious statement on this point has also met
with less than justice from his critics. It has been made a continual reproach to him that in the Critique of Practical Reason, he has, on the ground of the moral law, reintroduced the idea of God as indicating a reality, while his theory of knowledge compels him to say that such reality cannot be known. Such teaching may doubtless be misconceived. Thus, to take but one instance, Professor Flint, in a special note (Theism, pp. 397-9), says, "His reply" (i.e. to the objection that possibly the practical is as weak as the speculative foundation) "amounted merely to re-affirming that we are under the necessity of associating the idea of a Supreme Being with the moral law, and then qualifying the statement by the admission that we can know, however, nothing about that Being; that as soon as we try to know anything about him we make a speculative, not a practical, use of reason, and fall back into the realm of sophistry and illusion from which the Critical Philosophy was designed to deliver us." Now this is hardly Kant’s argument, and the criticism does not really affect Kant’s position. What Kant says is, in substance, that the moral law is the very essence of Reason, that the existence of a Supreme, Intelligent Will, i.e. of God, is necessarily bound up with this law, and that, consequently, the existence of God is given with as much certainty as Reason itself. But we can determine neither the moral law nor the nature and attributes of God by the forms of scientific cognition, which are in their regard entirely inadequate. The confused observations (Kritik d. Urtheilskraft, p. 353), where the reading of the second edition must be taken, in no way militate against this view. Professor Flint’s remark "that the ideas of freedom and responsibility might be as delusive when supposed to assure us of reality as those of
causation and design," I do not exactly understand. The idea of cause has nothing delusive in it; nor can it, without some stretch of language, be said to assure us in any case of reality. After all, does Kant's view differ fundamentally from the ordinary theistic teaching that God is incomprehensible, and therefore not adequately cognised through merely relative notions? (See Theism, pp. 297-8). When the arguments founded on cause, design, etc., are tested, we generally find the frank admission that per se they are not entirely adequate, and surely the ground of this inadequacy is where Kant has placed it.

20 The discussion here in particular, and generally in the Dialektik, is most important as regards the full significance of the categories of themselves. The value of the critique of the Ideas in this respect is briefly hinted at by Hegel Logik, I. p. 51.

21 Kritik, p. 440, cf. Prolegomena, § 44 (Werke, III. 100) "Yet there must be harmony between that which belongs to the nature of Reason and to that of the Understanding, and the former must contribute to the perfection of the latter, and cannot possibly confuse it." A more cautious statement is given at the close of § 60 in the same work (WW., III. 141).

22 See generally the appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic (Kritik, 435-50). In a complete exposition it would be requisite and interesting to point out the special nature of this regulative employment of the Ideas, to distinguish the several functions of judgment as determining, reflective, and practical, and to note the corresponding places assigned to schema, symbol, and type. On the latter point see Werke, I. 591, 513; IV. 231, and Kritik d. prak. Ver. p. 122. Clearly the analogon of a schema referred
to in the *Kritik d. rein. Ver.* p. 448, is what Kant later
designated symbol.

590 sqq.

24 *Werke*, IV. 22, 24-5.

25 *Kritik*, p. 491.

26 "Judgment in general is the faculty of thinking the
particular as contained under the universal. If the uni-
versal (the Rule, Principle, Law) is given, then the judgment
which subsumes the particular thereunder, is determining.
But if only the particular is given, for which the universal
is to be found, then judgment is merely reflective" (*Werke*,
IV. 17), cf. WW., I. 589.

evident, and in a later note special passages will be
adduced in proof, that what Kant is here dealing with in
the *Critique of Pure Reason* is the substance of the critique
of teleological judgment. The hypothetical use of Reason
(*Kr*, 438) is the reflective judgment of the later *Kritik d.
Urtheilskrift*.

28 *Kritik*, 442. On this is grounded the worth of
these principles for cognition, i.e. their transcendental
character.

29 For a most interesting exposition of these laws, see
pp. 653-70 of Professor Caird's *Phil. of Kant*. On the
whole subject there is a very valuable chapter in Cohen's
Kant's *Begründung der Ethik*, pp. 73-99.

30 The Ideas, then, do not indicate objects. Theoret-
ically they point only to the definite directions in which
rational completeness of experience is demanded. But
from the fact that Reason has no other than finite and relative categories whereby to think this completeness, and that such categories always indicate connection between objects, we represent to ourselves the supreme unities of experience as supersensible things. "Pure Reason does not in its Ideas point to particular objects, which lie beyond the field of experience, but only requires completeness of the use of the understanding in the system of experience. But this completeness can be a completeness of principles only, not of intuitions and of objects. In order, however, to represent the Ideas to itself determinately, Reason conceives them as the cognition of an object—a cognition as regards those rules completely determined, though the object is only an Idea—in order to bring cognition through understanding as near as possible to the completeness indicated by that Idea" (Proleg. § 44, p. 100). "We must therefore conceive an immaterial being, an intelligible world, and a supreme Being (mere Noumena), since in these only, as things-in-themselves, reason finds that completeness and satisfaction which it can never hope for in the derivation of phenomena from their homogeneous grounds, and since these really refer to something different from themselves (consequently quite heterogeneous), for phenomena always presuppose a thing-in-itself, and therefore indicate it, whether we may know more of it or not" (Ibid. § 57, p. 129).

These remarks are important, for even if we hesitate with regard to the Kantian restriction of cognition through finite notions to possible sense-intuition, we must accept the doctrine that the content of these categories is of such a nature that by their means the unconditioned cannot possibly be determined. The homo-
geneity to which Kant refers precludes us from employing the categories of substance or cause to determine the nature and existence of the soul or the Supreme Being. The notion of cause, it may be specially remarked, must be altered in significance when we infer by its means the existence of a Supreme Being. That this is so, seems to me sufficiently indicated by the fact that those who employ the notion in the Theistic argument are compelled to deny the existence of causes in the world of sense. The well-known doctrine, that so-called secondary causes are not in truth causes at all, a doctrine familiar in Malebranche and Berkeley, is merely the recognition of this fundamental difficulty. (See Professor Flint’s *Theism*, p. 126, “In fact, as we have already seen, a secondary cause is not strictly a cause.”)

31 *Kritik*, p. 461. On the same point the passage, pp. 464-5, should be consulted.

32 See *Kritik der Urtheilskraft*, pp. 18-19 (*Werke*, IV.); and *Werke*, I. 589-90.


34 “Reciprocity, indeed, is the name that not inaptly describes the peculiar view with which Kant followed up the suggestions of Hume. Kant, for example, referred all to the reciprocity of Noumena. What constituted Knowledge was Phenomena derived from the reciprocal action of the Noumenon without and the Noumenon within.” Stirling, *Secret of Hegel*, I. 297. Cf. *Ibid.* p. 303.


36 As already remarked (sup. note 30), it is of importance in Kant’s view that the Ideas do not indicate objects.
For it follows therefrom, in addition to what has been already pointed out, that the supersensible cannot be cognised as in immediate relation to the things of experience. We cannot cognise, e.g., God as the cause of the universe. Were this possible, then God would be simply one out of many objects of experience—an evident contradiction. But though we cannot so determine the nature of the supersensible, we may yet think the relation between it and the world of experience by means of finite categories, provided we keep in mind that such cognition is only analogical. "Since we can never cognise these intelligible existences (Verstandeswesen) as they may be in themselves, but yet require to assume them in relation to the world of sense, we are at least able to think this connection by means of the notions which express their relation to the world of sense. For were we to think an intelligible existence only by the notions of understanding, we should not thereby think anything really determinate; were we to think it through properties which are borrowed from the world of sense, it is then no longer an intelligible existence; it would be thought as a phenomenon, and belong to the world of sense. . . . If we limit our judgment merely to the relation which the world may have to a Being, the very notion of which lies beyond all the knowledge we can attain within the world, then we stop at this boundary (i.e. that between experience and the supersensible). For then we do not attribute to the Supreme Being any of the properties in themselves, by which we represent objects of experience, and hence avoid dogmatic anthropomorphism; but we attribute them to his relation to the world, and allow ourselves a symbolical anthropomorphism, which really concerns only words,

It may be added here that the outlines of the ethical metaphysic, which is the culmination of Kant’s theory of knowledge, are sketched with quite sufficient fulness and clearness in the Critique of Pure Reason; see Doctrine of Method, section II., Canon of Pure Reason.

37 Kant adds in the Grundlegung “Humanity as End in itself,” but this notion is really equivalent to that of the universal legislation of will. For it is not humanity as a concrete or aggregate that is end, but the realisation universally of rational freedom. See on this point Cohen, K.’s Beyr. d. Ethik, pp. 195-6.


30 For this double position of humanity, see Grundleg. d. Met. d. Sitten., pp. 110-2. It is the origin of the special contingency which leads, through the idea of end, to the ethical postulates. See Kritik d. Urtheilskr. § 75 (Werke, IV. p. 294).

40 References for this are scarcely requisite. The following is perhaps the strongest expression of Kant’s doctrine:—“It is very remarkable, however, that among Facts there is to be found one Idea of Reason (which in itself cannot have an adequate exposition in Intuition, and consequently cannot be theoretically proved to be possible). This is the Idea of Freedom, the reality of which, as a special mode of causality, may be shown through the practical laws of pure Reason, and, in con-
formity thefeto, in real actions, consequently in experience. This then is the only one of all the Ideas of pure Reason, the object of which is a Fact, and must be included among *scibia.*” Kritik d. Urth. § 90, Werke, IV. p. 375.


44 On the first of these, see generally Hegel, Rechtsphilosophie, § 135; and for more elaborate treatment the very clear essay in Mr. Bradley’s Ethical Studies, pp. 128-145, and the remarks of M. P. Janet, La Morale, Liv. I. c. 2; on the second, see Fichte, Sittenlehre (WW., IV.), pp. 131, 150, 209; on the third, see Schiller’s well-known essay, Ueber Anmuth und Würde (specially pp. 353-8, Werke, XI., Cotta, 1847), and generally Garve’s prolix essay (Ethik des Aristoteles, I. 318-95.) With the remarks of Schiller, however, there should be compared Kant’s well-grounded reply, Religion innerhalb, etc. (WW., X. p. 23 n).

45 See Krit. d. prak. Ver. 100-16, 192-5.

46 Ibid. 219-26. See also Krit. d. Urtheilskr. §§ 86-88.


On the nature of these Postulates and the necessity

48 It is grave injustice to Kant to represent him as resting the belief in the Immortality of the Soul and the existence of God on the merely prudential ground that they are useful for moral purposes. Mr. Huxley, who goes even further, seems to me altogether to reverse Kant’s position, and to regard him as retaining these beliefs in order to give foundation for morality. He writes (*Hume*, p. 181): “Kant adds, as you cannot disprove the immortality of the soul, and as the belief therein is very useful for moral purposes, you may assume it. To which, had Hume lived half a century later, he would probably have replied, that, if morality has no better foundation than an assumption, it is not likely to bear much strain; and if it has a better foundation, the assumption rather weakens than strengthens it.” It seems probable that Mr. Huxley is misled by his own term *morality*, which may either mean *moral law* or *moral disposition*, i.e. the strength of purpose conformable to moral law in the individual. It is to the latter that Kant refers in the passage quoted by Mr. Huxley, whereas Hume’s hypothetical answer seems to refer to the former. It juts upon one to have Kant even apparently credited with the doctrine that ethical theory is founded on the religious or theological postulates.

Mr. Huxley is equally unjust to Kant in his remarks upon the doctrine of noumenal liberty (*Hume*, 196). It is an old objection that is there advanced (see e.g. Garve, *Ethik d. Aristot. I.* 218, and Lange, *Gez. d. Mat. II.* p. 60), and one of such simplicity that Kant may be credited
with not having overlooked it. It has no force for any one who does not accept the doctrine that the mechanical or phenomenal is self-explaining.


50 There are many literary difficulties connected with the *Kritik der Urtheilskraft*, on some of which a remark may be permitted.

(1) As to its contents. How does it happen that the consideration of Æsthetics and of Teleology are united? So far as the expressions of Kant’s own opinion are concerned, we should say that the Critique of Taste forms one distinct work, with principles of its own, and not in any way effecting the junction between Speculative and Practical Reason which Kant desired. (That the Critique of Taste is the peculiar subject of the third *Kritik*, see *Werke*, I. 611, 614-5; IV. 21; XI. i. p. 87. That the reflective judgment, and therefore the notion of “formal adaptation,” belongs to the Kritik of Pure Reason (see *Werke*, I. 611; IV. 240). It appears, then, that Kant was led to unite æsthetics and teleology for two reasons; first, in both, judgment was the faculty (see *Werke*, I. 608-610); and second, there appeared to be some natural relation between. Judgment and Feeling (see *Werke*, I. 587-8: “Now the faculty of cognition according to notions has its a priori principles in pure understanding (i.e. in its notions of Nature); the faculty of will in pure Reason (i.e. in its notion of Freedom), and there yet remains of the faculties of mind in general a mediating faculty or receptivity, to wit, Feeling of Pleasure and Pain; while, also, of the higher
powers of cognition there remains a mediatby one, the faculty of Judgment. What is more natural than to suspect that the one may contain a priori principles for the other?"

(2) The classification of kinds of "Adaptation" (Zweek-mässigkeit — conformity to End) is rather confusing. Kant distinguishes first — Formal Adaptation, i.e. the general principle that the empirical particular must harmonise with the employment of understanding; second, Subjective or Aesthetic Adaptation, where the ground of judgment is a feeling; third, Objective Adaptation, where objects, or parts of objects, are in relation to one another as means and ends. Under the third, again, he distinguishes a Formal Teleology from a Material or Real. In the first, the teleological arrangement is not one in which actual causal relation is involved, e.g. the variety of properties in a geometrical figure; in the second, the objects or parts are causally related. Of this second, the material objective adaptation, Kant finally distinguishes external from internal. The greatest difficulty is caused by the want of perfectly definite statements with respect to the relation of these several kinds, specially as to the relation between Formal Adaptation, and Material Objective Internal Adaptation. See note 54 to this Lecture.


52 Ibid. p. 38.

53 The general nature of the reflective judgment is quite sufficiently indicated in the passages where it is formally defined: Werke, I. 591-4; IV. 17. Its necessity arises from the fact, which is invariably present to Kant's
mind, though it is not always brought into sufficient prominence, that in all thought, all cognition, a universal is imperative. We must have some principle, some general rule, if we are in any way to think the particular. In the transcendental judgment, or determining judgment, universal and particular are given together,—the nature of the particular is determined; for it must be so qualified, in order to be matter of cognition at all. In the reflective judgment the particular, not simply or in the abstract, but of varied kind, is given in sense-perception, and its variety of kind must, in order to be cognised, be brought under some unity. This unity, supplied by judgment itself, is the idea of adaptation of the particular to the faculty of cognition. Now, if we examine what Kant points out as the critically justified substitute for the third transcendental idea, the principle for the regulative use of the Idea, we shall find that it is identical with the specification of Nature, which is the principle of reflective judgment (cf. Kritik, pp. 437-9, with Werke, I. 17-18). The three special laws into which Kant, in the Critique of Pure Reason, expands the general principle of the formal adaptation of Nature, are called expressly “Maxims of the Faculty of Judgment” in the later work (Werke, IV. p. 20). The principle of the hypothetical use of reason, and of the reflective judgment, are described in precisely the same terms as subjective, merely logical, but at the same time transcendental.

It is to be noted, however, not only that judgment generally, but that the reflective judgment in particular, covers more than what is included under the hypothetical use of reason in the Critique of Pure Reason.

It is evident that no new principle is involved in
the teleological judgment on organisms; but it is not at
once clear from Kant's method of statement how formal
and objective teleology are related to one another. That
the difference consists only in the empirical conditions of
organisms is, I think, sufficiently brought out in the fol-
lowing passages: Werke, I. 594-5, 609, 613; IV. 260,
285; VI. 386-7. Of these I shall quote only one, which
appears the most definite (W II: I. 609): "In the same way
it must be granted that the teleological judgment is based
on an *a priori* principle, and is otherwise impossible, even
although we discover the Natural End expressed in such
judgments only through experience, and, apart from expe-
rience, could not cognize the very possibility of such things.
In other words, the teleological judgment, even though it
connects with the idea of the object a definite notion of
an End, which it assigns as ground of the possibility of
certain natural products (which is not the case in the
esthetic judgment), is nevertheless only reflective like the
other." Empirically we discover certain collocations of
mechanism, not, so far as we can judge, explicable by
mechanical laws. Our judgment upon these is a special
application of the general principle of reflection. See on
the generality given to the judgment on particular forms,
I. 613.

55 That purely scientific considerations never lead to any
justification of external teleology, see Werke, IV. 250.
For the relative justification of such teleology, when
development of a being under moral law is recognised as
supreme end, see Werke, IV. 344, 399.

56 That we are empirically ignorant of how organisms
should be mechanically possible, see Krit. d. Urtheils.
(Werke, IV.), 261, 275-6, 277, 285, 290, 300-301; that only organisms display inner conformity to End, see ibid. pp. 259, 263, 268.

* * * * *


Kant undoubtedly asserts the absolute impossibility of any finite intelligence comprehending the mechanical generation of Organisms. See Werke, IV. 290, 301, 308. Passages to the same effect, from the earlier works, are collected in Schultze, Kant u. Darwin; but they are unimportant. The ground for Kant's statement, viz., that cognition or reason demands necessity, and that, in order to see the necessity of empirical detail we require insight into the supersensible, should not be overlooked. Organisms appear to Kant special examples of empirical contingency. See Werke, IV. 240, 252, 288.

68 See specially Krit. d. Urtheilskr. § 77 (Werke, IV. 305-9) and § 81 (Ibid. p. 325-6).

69 References for what is here said are given in note 54, above.

61 See Kritik d. Urtheilsk. §§ 75, 76. Cf. Appendix II.

62 The curious manner in which Kant, by anticipation, contemplates the explanation of varieties in organisms by mechanical and physiological causes is commented on by Haeckel (Nat. Hist. of Creation, Lect. V.), by Schultze, (Kant u. Darwin), and by Stadler (Kant's Teleologie). The most important passages are decidedly those in the Critique of Judgments §§ 79 and 81 (Werke, IV. 312-5, 322-5). So much at least seems clear, that Kant would maintain (1) the impossibility of mechanically, or by inorganic causes,
explaining life; and (2) the necessity of certain original differences of forms, certain *Keime*, upon which circumstances may operate. Both assertions, however, are founded on experience only. (See for (1) *Werke*, IV. 313 n.; for (2), *Werke*, VI. 321-2).

63 *Werke*, VI. 382-3.

64 *Werke*, IV. 344.

65 *Kritik d. r. Ver.* p. 538.
NOTES TO LECTURE IV.

1 Something has already been indicated as to Kant's view of Psychology. The two following passages are very instructive: Kritik, pp. 557-8 ("What place remains, then, for empirical Psychology, which has always claimed to be part of Metaphysic, and from which, in our time, such important philosophical results have been expected, after the hope of achieving something satisfactory by the a priori method had been given up? I answer: It must be placed by the side of empirical physics, i.e. physics proper, as belonging to applied philosophy, for which pure philosophy contains the a priori principles. With the latter, then, applied philosophy is connected, but is not to be identified with it. Empirical Psychology must therefore be entirely banished from Metaphysic, and, indeed, is excluded by the very idea of that science"); and in the letter to Sömmering Ueber das Organ der Seele (IVW. VII. 1, p. 119 n): "By Mind (Gemüt) there is only to be understood the faculty of combining given representations, and so producing unity of empirical apperception (= animus), not the substance (anima) as in nature altogether distinct from matter, to which we do not attend. Whence we may draw the conclusion that in dealing with the thinking subject we do not touch upon the province of metaphysic, unless we have to consider pure consciousness and its a
priori unity in the combination of given representations, i.e. Understanding; but that, while we remain within the sphere of physiology, we have only to consider the faculty of imagination, for the intuitions of which (even when the object intended is absent, i.e. empirical representations), corresponding impressions on the brain (the proper habitus of reproduction), belonging to a whole of inner intuition of self, may readily be allowed.” Cf. Ibid. pp. 121-2, for Kant’s opinion with respect to the metaphysical importance of physiological psychology.


3 "A stage of natural science may indeed be contemplated in which the whole world process would be represented by a single mathematical formula, by one immense system of simultaneous differential equations, in which would be given the position, direction of motion, and velocity of every atom in the universe at every instant of time."—Du Bois-Reymond, Grenzen des Natur-Erkennens, p. 5.

4 A good example of this merely mechanical or metaphorical fashion of regarding sensation, and of the curious conclusion to which it may lead, is furnished by Mr. Huxley’s emendation of Hume. The only certainty for Mr. Huxley is "the momentary consciousness we call a present thought or feeling," and a momentary consciousness can exist in a mind which is absolutely devoid of everything save that one impression. "When a red light flashes across the field of vision there arises in the mind an ‘impression of sensation’ which we call red. It appears to me that this sensation, red, is a something which may
exist altogether independently of any other impression or idea, as an individual existence."—(Hume, pp. 55, 68.) Naturally for Mr. Huxley, the relations under which individual existences are thought must likewise result mechanically; they, too, are impressions, or "a kind of impressions of impressions."—(Hume, p. 69.) Oddly enough, there seems to be no sufficient cause for these impressions of impressions. Each impression mirrors, or is the result of, a single impact, but when "two impressions of equal figures are present, there arises in the mind a tertium quid, which is the perception of equality." (p. 71).

Naturally, Mr. Huxley will not allow any distinction between an effect and the consciousness of an effect; "there is only a verbal difference between having a sensation and knowing one has it. . . But the pure metaphysicians make great capital out of the ambiguity."—(Hume, p. 73.)

It is very interesting to find that while Mr. Huxley traces the errors of metaphysicians to the distinction, foolishly regarded by them as significant, between sensation and consciousness of sensation, Mr. Herbert Spencer discovers that the source of metaphysical confusions has been the "confounding two quite distinct things—having a sensation, and being conscious of having a sensation."—(Psychology, II. § 405.) Nay, Mr. Spencer thinks that apart from clear distinction between subject and object, it is not possible for any intelligence to be conscious of a sensation as such.—(Ibid. p. 373.)

Vaithinger, Hartmann, Dühring, und Lange, 1876, p. 217. This is a very interesting work, specially as showing the full significance of the principles only thrown out in unsystematic fashion by Lange. Frequent reference will be made to it, as giving a trustworthy summary of
Lange’s views. For another summary, see M. Nolen’s articles, Rev. Philos., 1877, October and December.

6 In this opinion of the merits of Lange’s work I am happy to agree with Professor A. Lasson and Professor Flint, see Phil. Monatshefte, 1877, p. 225, and Antiheist Theory, 1879, p. 459.


8 This organic impulse is called by Vaihinger “aesthetic, ideal, architectonic, and synthetic.” See op. cit. p. 18. “Speculation ist ein Erzeugniss des aesthetischen, idealen, architectonischen, synthetischen Triebes.”

9 See Mr. Spencer’s First Principles, pp. 89, 161.

10 This is fully recognised, in an indirect fashion, by Mr. Spencer. See, among other passages, Psychology, II. pp. 493-4, and generally Psychology, Pt. ii. ch. 3.

11 Ges. d. Mat. II. p. 5, and p. 3.

12 See Kritik der reinen Vern. p. 63, especially the note containing passage from 1st edition.

13 See Vaihinger, op. cit. p. 23.

14 See Ges. d. Mat. II. pp. 49-50.


16 Ges. d. Mat. II. p. 423.

17 Perhaps this is specially noticeable in Mr. Herbert Spencer. Apart from the particular obscurity attaching to what Mr. Spencer designates as the “object,” we find constant reference to an environment which gives rise to the
various modifications of consciousness. Such environment is only a conceivable ground of explanation if it be itself differentiated or variously constituted; and, in fact, all explanations of particular states of consciousness, by reference to objective causes, implicitly assume that these causes are constituted in themselves as we know them. Yet, when Mr. Spencer has to deal with the ultimate ground for the whole series of states, subjective and objective, we find him constant in the assertion that this must be regarded as unknown and unknowable. It is sufficiently clear that the unknown and unknowable is not the cause to which reference is made when tracing the correlations involved, according to Mr. Spencer, in psychological analysis. We cannot, at the same time, hold that it is impossible to qualify a known state as a mode of consciousness without reference to a something not itself such a mode, and also hold that known modifications of the organism and external real phenomena are the correlates of states of consciousness.

It may be added that many of Mr. Spencer's utterances when dealing with the problem of Idealism have a significance hardly reconcilable with the general principles of his philosophy. His transfigured Realism, in particular, is a remarkable metaphysical doctrine.

18 Ges. d. Mat. II. pp. 29 and 32.

19 Ges. d. Mat. II. p. 33.

20 Ges. d. Mat. II. p. 36.

21 Ges. d. Mat. II pp. 44-5.

22 See the passage quoted from Kant in note 1 to this Lecture.

23 Ges. d. Mat. II. 374.

It is to be observed that in forms of psychological Monism represented by Lange, subjective states of consciousness are viewed as effects, while the objective states, their causes, are at the same time viewed as modes of consciousness. This is only possible because of a confusion between the objective processes and our knowledge of them. They are really treated as something over and above the subjective states, but so soon as the question is raised, What constitutes the difference? it is declared that no difference exists. In the following passages, which I select from Mr. Huxley as from one who is always clear and precise, this ambiguity is very distinct:—

"The 'collection of perceptions' which constitutes the mind is really a system of effects, the causes of which are to be sought in antecedent changes of the matter of the brain, just as the 'collection of motions,' which we call flying, is a system of effects, the causes of which are to be sought in the modes of motion of the matter of the muscles of the wings."—Hume, 78.

"Therefore, if we analyse the proposition that all mental phenomena are the effects or products of material phenomena, all that it means amounts to this: that whenever those states of consciousness which we call sensation, or emotion, or thought, come into existence, complete investigation will show good reason for the belief that they are preceded by those other phenomena of consciousness to which we give the names of matter and motion. All material changes appear, in the long run, to be modes of motion; but our knowledge of motion is nothing but that of a change in the place and order of our sensations, just
as our knowledge of matter is restricted to those feelings of which we assume it to be the cause."—80-81.

"For anything that can be proved to the contrary, there may be a real something which is the cause of all our impressions; that sensations, though not likenesses, are symbols of that something; and that the part of that something, which we call the nervous system, is an apparatus for supplying us with a sort of algebra of fact based on those symbols. A brain may be the machinery by which the material universe becomes conscious of itself. But it is important to notice that even if this conception of the universe, and if the relation of consciousness to its other components should be true, we should, nevertheless, be still bound by the limits of thought, be still unable to refute the arguments of pure idealism. The more completely the materialistic position is admitted, the easier is it to show that the idealistic position is unassailable, if the idealist confines himself within the limits of positive knowledge."—81-2.

Now, since it can hardly be imagined that any of these writers regard states of consciousness as other than the subjective modes of the individual, it would follow that every physical process is at the same time a change in the subjective modes of some individual consciousness. Surely this is the very insanity of Idealism. Mr. Huxley escapes by speaking of our knowledge of motion as if it were distinct from motion, but it is doubtful if he could retain such distinction. The question is simply, Are the objective processes which we, by scientific observation, discover to be the concomitants of subjective states, at the same time causes of these states, and themselves states? Only one writer, so far as I am aware, has freed himself
from the difficulty, by maintaining that conscious states are not states of the individual, that they are neither objective nor subjective. This is Mr. Shadworth Hodgson's doctrine, as expounded in his able work, "Philosophy of Reflection." It would be unbecoming to offer any brief comment on a work which deserves elaborate treatment, but I must remark that only the peculiarity of Mr. Hodgson's terminology disguises the substantial agreement in his mode of thought with philosophers from whom in words he appears to dissent.

25 See a very valuable section on Monism in Lotze's Medicinische Psychologie, pp. 45-55.

26 Ges. d. Mat. II. 427.

27 Although I do not agree with Mr. S. H. Hodgson in his method of stating the distinction between the Nature and the History of a fact, his remarks are very important. See Phil. of Reflection, I. 226-7.

28 On the caution with which the notion of End must be applied, see Lotze's Allgemeine Physiologie, pp. 48-57. A very good statement, of Kantian tendency, is given in Mr. Herbert's Modern Realism Examined, pp. 385-8.