APPENDIX I.

KANT'S REFUTATION OF IDEALISM.

The "Refutation of Idealism" seems to have presented unusual difficulties to critics of Kant's theory. In a recent communication to Mind (July 1879, pp. 408-410), Mr. Henry Sidgwick analyses the argument, and insists that in it Kant, perhaps unconsciously, imagined himself to prove the existence of Noumena, or, rather, identified the real thing in space with the unknown ground of the phenomenal world. When such a view can be held as following from certain expressions in the "Refutation," it becomes of importance to print out exactly what it was Kant imagined himself to be discussing. Quite possibly misunderstanding of the "Refutation" results from some misconception as to the question at issue.

I do not myself at all comprehend why Mr. Sidgwick should use the expression "objects in space outside our bodies," for no such distinction appears in the "Refutation," and it must be evident to any one who considers the Kantian formulas, "inner and outer experience," that externality to our bodies has no pertinence. But without discussing this, I would point out that the "Refutation" can only be understood when its place in the Kritik is taken into
account. In the second edition it appears in connection with the postulates of empirical thought, and is introduced as supplementing the distinction which is there drawn between possible and real. According to Kant, the element of reality in experience is necessarily that furnished in empirical intuition by perception, or in its purest form, sensation. Although the complete object or thing is not perceived until the sensation is qualified by the categories (Kr., p. 195-6), yet in order that there should be real cognition at all, there must of necessity be an element of sensation, a given impression, something not produced by the subject, not developed by the laws of his imagination. But, it occurred to Kant, to assert this in respect to real external existences is to presuppose that there is external perception, that is to say, is to suppose that inner and outer experience, cognition of the existence of external phenomena and of my own existence, stand on the same level. Now, Cartesian or problematic idealism had always insisted that none other than determinations of my own existence are immediately known. (Notice that the question is not of Vorstellungen, which give no cognition, but of determination of existence.) According to that theory, therefore, external perception, determination of the existence of real things in space, would be simply a phase of inner experience plus an inference to externality. So far as determination of external objects is concerned, imagination not perception, would be the essential factor. Now Kant is emphatic in pointing out that here, and here only, lies his problem. He desires to prove that determination of my own empirical existence is impossible apart from a given real fact of external perception, an empirical intuition of outer sense, i.e. sensations determined through the cate-
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...category of substance, and cognised as really existing. He is not in any way dealing with the thing-in-itself, but with the existence of external phenomena, and is only desirous to make perfectly clear that for this a given real impression or real external perception is imperatively required. When, therefore, in the Proof he uses the expression Vorstellung eines Dinges ausser mir in contradistinction to Ding ausser mir, he is aiming solely at the difference between imagination and perception. (The distinction between thing and representation or notion of a thing, is not uncommon in Kant, and never, so far as I am aware, has any reference to the question of Noumena, but always to the relation of actual and possible in experience.) The note to the first remark in the Proof should have prevented any confusion on this head.

It is well known, moreover, that the refutation of Idealism is substantially contained in the Critique of the Paralogisms as it appeared in the first edition of the Kritik, and the mode in which it is there introduced can leave not the slightest doubt as to its true significance. The context is by far the best commentary on the Proof as in the amended form. It is true that to any one who does not sufficiently appreciate the Kantian doctrine of the thing-in-itself, expressions such as reality of external things, bodies made known to us in perception, representation of reality, may appear ambiguous. In the treatment of the Paralogisms as in the first edition, the most satisfactory explanations are given of all these, together with the most explicit statement that the thing-in-itself is not in any way involved in the problem. From Kant's classification of idealistic theories there given, and his discussion of Cartesianism, it is sufficiently plain how simple is the theorem he is
desirous of proving. That a given, not self-produced, element of sensation is involved in external perception, and that this is the real factor in perception; such is the substance of his theory, whatever may be thought of its truth or consistency.
APPENDIX II.

Kritik der Urtheilskraft, § 76.

Such frequent reference is made in the third lecture to § 76 (77 in Hartenstein's edition) of the Kritik der Urtheilskraft, that I have thought it well to give here a translation of it. The doctrines contained in it may be found more briefly expressed in various parts of the work, and the section itself appears to me a good specimen of Kant's over-elaboration. It contains, however, the official discussion of a very important element in the critical theory of knowledge, and the substance of Kant's teaching on the difficult notion of End in Nature.

In the preceding sections Kant had expounded the Antinomy of the teleological judgment, and had solved it by drawing the distinction between dogmatic assertion with regard to the generation of organic products and the critical principle of judgment upon the same. In § 75, which is called a Note, he then proceeds to explain more fully the distinction between objective and subjective principles, determining and reflective judgment, and traces the origin of these distinctions to the peculiar character of our understanding. He shows in the first place that the important difference between actual and possible results from the fact that our cognition contains
two heterogeneous elements, intuition and thought, and notes that in the supreme notion of speculative thought, that of the absolutely necessary ground of experience, we can attain only possibility so far as cognition is concerned. Were there not this separation between thought and intuition, were our understanding intuitive, then to be and to be thought would be synonyms. He shows further that, in the practical sphere, the notion of Obligation is also connected with the peculiarity of our nature. Here we have absolutely given the necessary universal, the law of Practical Reason, but the particular of volition is in its regard undetermined or contingent, and from this contingency arises the notion of Obligation. He proceeds lastly to apply these considerations to the matter involved in teleological judgment, thus:—

"In the same way, as regards the case we are now considering, it may be admitted that we should discover no distinction between the mechanism of nature and its technic, i.e. its teleological connection, if our Understanding were not so constituted that it must proceed from universal to particular, and consequently that the faculty of Judgment can in reference to the particular cognize no adaptation to Ends (Zweckmäßigkeit), and so pronounce no determining judgments in that regard, unless it possess a universal law under which it can subsume the particular. But since the particular, as such, has a certain contingency with respect to the universal, while Reason nevertheless requires unity in the combination of particular laws of Nature, and therefore conformity to law (which conformity, in the case of the contingent, is called adaptation to End), and since deduction of particular laws from the universal, so far as that which is contingent in them is concerned, is
impossible _a priori_ through determination of the notion of the object, it follows that the notion of the adaptation of Nature in its products to Ends is one necessary for the human faculty of Judgment in reference to Nature, but not serving to determine the objects themselves; it is, consequently, a subjective principle of Reason for the faculty of Judgment, and, so far as _regulative_ (not _constitutive_), is as necessarily valid for our human faculty of Judgment as if it were an objective principle."

He then proceeds in § 76:—

"In the Note certain peculiarities of our faculty of cognition (even of the higher faculty) have been brought forward, which we are easily misled into attaching as objective predicates to things themselves. They concern, however, _Ideas_, for which no adequate object can be given in experience, and which, therefore, could serve only as _regulative_ principles in following out experience. The same, it is true, holds good in the case of the notion of Natural-End (_End in Nature, Natur-zweck_), so far as the ground of the possibility of such a predicate is concerned, for that can only be found in the Idea; but the corresponding consequent (the product itself) is actually given in nature, and the notion of a mode of causation in the latter (as if it operated according to Ends) appears to make the Idea of a Natural-End a _constitutive_ principle. In this respect the Idea (of Natural-End) differs from all other Ideas.

"What constitutes the difference in question, however, consists in this: that the idea contemplated is not a principle of Reason for Understanding, but for the faculty of Judgment, and is therefore simply the application of Understanding in general to possible objects of experience,—in those cases, too, in which the Judgment cannot be
determining, but must be merely reflective. The object, therefore, may certainly be given in experience, but cannot at all be judged as determined according to the Idea, still less as completely adequate thereto; our judgment on it can be merely reflective.

"There is therefore involved a peculiarity of our (human) understanding in relation to the faculty of Judgment, in the reflection of the said faculty on things in Nature. But if so, then at the root of the matter there must lie the Idea of a possible understanding other than human (just as in the Critique of Pure Reason we found it necessary to contemplate another possible intuition if we were to maintain that ours was a particular species, a species, that is, for which objects are valid only as phenomena), in order that we may say; from the special quality of our Understanding certain natural products, so far as their possibility is concerned, must be treated by us as generated through purpose and as Ends, although we do not thereby insist that there actually exists a particular cause determined to operate by the idea of End, and consequently do not deny that another (higher) Understanding than the human may find even in the mechanism of Nature (i.e. in a causal nexus for which an Understanding is not exclusively assumed as cause), the ground of the possibility of such products of Nature.

"The problem, then, is that of the relation of our Understanding to the faculty of judgment, i.e. we must try to discover here a certain contingency in the special quality of our understanding in order to note this as its peculiarity, distinguishing it from other possible Understandings.

"As might be expected, the contingency in question is
found in the particular which the faculty of Judgment is to bring under the universal, given in the Notions of Understanding, for the particular is not determined by the universal of our (human) understanding, and it is contingent in how many ways things differing, though agreeing in a common attribute, may be presented in perception. Our understanding is a faculty of Notions, i.e. is a discursive understanding, for which it evidently must be contingent, of what kind, and how varied, may be the particular that is presented in Nature, and that can be reduced under its notions. But since, for real cognition, intuition is also required, and since a faculty of perfect spontaneity of intuition would be a faculty of real cognition distinct from and entirely independent of sensibility—consequently, would be Understanding in the most general sense—we may therefore conceive of an intuitive Understanding [negatively, i.e. merely as not discursive], which does not proceed (by notions) from universal to particular and so to individual, and for which there does not exist that contingency in the adaptation of particular laws of nature to understanding which renders it so hard for our understanding to reduce the multiplicity of nature to unity of cognition—a reduction which can only be effected by our understanding through the quite contingent harmony between natural attributes and our faculty of notions, but which is not required by an intuitive understanding.

"Our understanding, then, has the peculiarity in reference to the faculty of Judgment that, in cognition through it, the particular is not determined by the universal, and therefore cannot be deduced from the latter alone. Nevertheless, this particular in the multiplicity of Nature must be adapted to the universal (through Notions and Laws)
in order that it may be subsumed thereunder an adaptation which, under such circumstances, must be quite contingent, and, for the faculty of Judgment, without determinate principle.

"In order, then, that we may at least think the possibility of such an adaptation of things in nature to our faculty of Judgment (an adaptation which we represent as contingent and therefore as possible only because it is an End), we must at the same time conceive of another understanding, in reference to which, and, moreover, apart from any End attributed to it, we may represent as necessary that harmony of natural laws with our faculty of judgment, which for our understanding can be thought only through the medium of Ends.

"Now our understanding is so constituted, that in cognition (e.g. of the cause of a product) it must proceed from an analytical universal (i.e. from notions) to the particular (the given empirical intuition), whence, therefore, it determines nothing as regards the multiplicity of the latter, but must expect this determination for the faculty of Judgment from subsumption of the empirical intuition (if the object is a natural product) under the notion. On the other hand, we may conceive of an understanding which, not being like ours, discursive, but intuitive, proceeds from a synthetical universal (the intuition of a whole as such) to the particular, i.e., from whole to parts. In such an understanding, then, and in its representation of the whole, there is not necessarily involved the contingency in the connection of parts rendering possible a definite form of the whole; which is required by our understanding, seeing that it must proceed from the parts as grounds, thought generally, to
the various possible forms that may be subsumed under them, as consequents. From the peculiarity of our understanding, on the other hand, a real Whole in nature can be regarded only as the effect of the combined motive forces of the parts. If, therefore, we would represent to ourselves not the possibility of the whole as dependent on the parts, which is the mode appropriate to our discursive understanding, but, after the standard supplied by the intuitive (archetypal) understanding, the possibility of the parts (in regard to both their specific nature and their interconnection) as dependent on the whole, this, from the very same peculiarity of our understanding, cannot come about because the whole contains the ground of the possibility of the connection of the parts (which would be a contradiction for discursive cognition), but only because the idea of a whole contains the ground of the possibility of its form, and of the connection of the parts involved in this form. But since, in such a case, the whole would be an effect (a product), the idea of which is regarded as the cause of its possibility, and since the product of a cause which is determined to act simply by the idea of its effect is called an End, it therefore follows that it is merely a consequence of the peculiar nature of our understanding when we represent to ourselves certain natural products as possible only through another kind of causality than that of the natural laws of matter, as possible only through the causality of Ends and Final Causes, and that this principle does not concern the possibility of the generation of such things (even treated as phenomena) in this particular mode, but only the judgment upon them possible for our understanding. From this we can at the same time understand why in natural science we are far from satisfied with
an explanation of natural products through Final Causes, because there we require that natural production shall be judged in conformity merely with our faculty for judging it, i.e. reflective judgment, and not in conformity with things themselves, with a view to the determining faculty of judgment. Nor is it at all necessary, in taking this view, to prove that such an intellectus archetypus is possible, but only that, as in contrast to our understanding, discursive and requiring individual representations, and in contrast to the contingency of such a peculiar quality, we are led to that idea, viz., of an archetypal intellect, an idea which is not contradictory.

"Now if we regard a material whole, so far as its form goes, as being the product of the parts, their forces and power of combining themselves with one another (other materials which serve to bring these parts near to one another being understood as included), then we represent to ourselves a mechanical process of generation. But in such a fashion we do not arrive at a notion of a whole as End, the inner possibility of which throughout presupposes the idea of a whole, and on which depend the nature and mode of action of the parts; and yet in this way we must regard an organised body. Still, as has just been shown, it does not therefore follow that the mechanical generation of such a body is impossible, for this would be equivalent to saying that it is impossible (contradictory) for any understanding to think such a unity in the connexion of the manifold, unless the Idea (of this unity) were also its generating cause, i.e. unless the production were intensional (purposive). Such a conclusion would certainly be warranted if we were justified in regarding material objects as things-in-themselves. For then the unity, which is
the ground of the possibility of natural formations, would be simply the unity of space, a unity, however, which is no real ground of generation but only its formal condition, although having some resemblance to the real ground we are in quest of, since in it no part can be determined save in relation to the whole (the idea of which whole is therefore the necessary condition of the possibility of the parts). But since it is at least possible to regard the material world as mere phenomenon, and to think as its substratum something as a thing-in-itself (something non-phenomenal), and, further, to supply for this a corresponding intellectual intui-
tuition (even though this is not our mode of intuition), there would then be a supersensible and real ground (though incognizable by us) of that Nature to which we ourselves belong; in which, therefore, we would treat according to mechanical laws whatever in it is necessary as object of the senses, while the harmony and unity of the particular laws and forms of this mechanism (which in regard to it must be judged by us contingent) we would also treat according to teleological laws as object of Reason (and so also with the whole of nature as a system); we would thus judge it (Nature) according to two kinds of principles, the mechanical mode of explanation not being excluded by the teleological, as though the two were contradictory.

"Hence, also, we may comprehend, what certainly might otherwise be easily suspected, but could hardly be asserted with confidence and proved, that the principle of mechanical deduction of natural products which are conformable to End may undoubtedly co-exist with the teleological, but in no way supersedes it. In other words, in the investigation of a thing which we must judge as a natural End (an organised body), we must certainly try all
known and yet to be discovered laws of mechanical generation, and may hope to make good progress therein, but must never hope to be relieved from the reference to a quite distinct ground of generation, that, namely, of Causality according to Ends, in order to explain the possibility of such a product; and it is simply impossible for any human understanding (nay, for any finite understanding of kind like ours, however superior in degree) to hope to comprehend the generation of even a blade of grass by merely mechanical causes. For, if the teleological connexion of causes and effects as rendering possible such an object is quite indispensable for the faculty of judgment, even to study such objects only by the guidance of experience; if, for external objects as phenomena a sufficient cause directed towards ends cannot be discovered, but if this, which yet lies in Nature, must still be sought only in the supersensible substrate of nature, from insight into which we are, however, completely shut out, then it is simply impossible for us to obtain for teleological connexions grounds of explanation taken from nature alone, and, from the peculiarity of the human faculty of cognition, it is necessary to seek the supreme ground of these connexions in an original understanding as the cause of the world.”