CHAPTER XXI

FA L L OF THE MUGHAL EMPIRE

SECTION I

SUCCESSORS OF AURANGZEB

WAR OF SUCCESSION

The death of Aurangzeb was followed by a war of succession among his sons. The eldest, Prince Muazzam (Shah Alam), was in Kabul; the second, Prince Azam, and the third, Prince Kam Bakhsh, were in the Deccan. Shah Alam, who had made secret preparations for the inevitable contest, marched quickly to Agra; his second son Azim-us-Shan, Governor of Bengal on recall to the Deccan, had already marched with his Bengal treasure to Agra and taken possession of the city, though he had failed to take the fort. On the approach of Shah Alam the commandant of the Agra fort capitulated and Shah Alam thus got the accumulated treasures in the vaults at Agra. The decisive battle of this fratricidal contest was fought near Jajau, to the south of Agra, on 18th June, 1707. Azam had with him a very big army of 45,000 foot and 65,000 horse. He was supported by Asad Khan and his son Zulfiqar Khan, who had played a prominent part during the last years of Aurangzeb. The loss on each side was about 10,000, but Azam’s army was completely destroyed. He himself lost his life as also his two sons. But the civil war was not over yet. Shah Alam, known as sovereign as Bahadur Shah, had to march to the South to defeat Kam Bakhsh at Hyderabad on 13th January, 1709. Kam Bakhsh died of his wounds.

BAHADUR SHAH (1707-1712)

Fortunately for Bahadur Shah, events in the Deccan had taken a favourable turn. Before proceeding to the North to fight for the throne, Azam had released Shahu, son of Sambhuji, from Mughal captivity. This was done on the
astute advice of Zulfiqar Khan. A civil war began in Maharashtra between the partisans of Shahu and those of Tara Bai. The Maratha menace for some time ceased to trouble Delhi.

But in the Punjab the Sikhs under the leadership of Banda were successfully carrying on a war of revenge against the Mughals. Though Bahadur Shah succeeded in taking the Sikh fort of Lohgarh, Banda escaped to the hills and the struggle continued. Ajit Singh of Marwar submitted, rebelled again and then submitted for the second time. The ruler of Marwar as also Sawai Jai Singh of Jaipur were taken into Mughal service.

Bahadur Shah died in February, 1712. He was an extremely weak man, far too old and easy-going to act with sustained energy. He was so undecided that he could not select his Wazir as between Munim Khan, his old minister, and Asad Khan, who joined him after Jahan with the prestige of service under Aurangzeb. He divided authority between the two which made for competition in administration.

JAHANDAR SHAH (1712-1713)

The inevitable civil war between the four sons of Bahadur Shah began immediately after his death. Azim-us-Shan, his second son, was the ablest of the brothers. But Jahandar Shah, the eldest, was supported by Zulfiqar Khan, who secretly brought all the three princes together for joint action against Azim-us-Shan, who was then defeated and slain. The three brothers, Jahandar Shah, Rafi-us-Shan and Jahan Shah, then fell out among themselves. The two younger brothers were slain and Jahandar Shah, a worthless profligate, now became the undisputed master. It was really the triumph of Zulfiqar Khan, but the triumph was very short-lived. About eleven months later Azim-us-Shan's son, Farrukh Siyar, with the help of two Sayyid brothers, Hasan Ali (later known as Abdulla Khan) and Husain Ali, succeeded in defeating Jahandar Shah and Zulfiqar Khan outside the city of Agra. Jahandar Shah was murdered in prison and Zulfiqar Khan was strangled to death.
FARRUKH SIYAR (1713-1719) AND THE ASCENDANCY OF THE SAYYID BROTHERS

Farrukh Siyar ruled for only six years. In the Akham-i-Shamgiri there is an alleged will of Aurangzeb in which he thus warned his children about the treatment to be accorded to the Sayyids of Barha, the clan to which the two principal supporters of Farrukh Siyar belonged, "You should be extremely cautious in dealing with the Sayyids of Barha. Be not wanting in love for them at heart, but externally do not increase their rank, because a strong partner in the government soon wants to seize the Kingship for himself. If you let them take the reins ever so little, the result will be your own disgrace". The Sayyid brothers of Barha actually played the part of King-makers during the period 1713-1720. But this was only possible because Farrukh Siyar was 'feeble, false, cowardly and contemptible'. The exertions of the Sayyid brothers won Farrukh Siyar his Empire. Abdulla was appointed Wazir and Husain Ali Mun Bakhshi. Besides these two chief offices they secured the government of two subahs for themselves and one for an uncle, leaving to the Emperor's friends and the Turani chiefs the honours of offices. The sickle sovereign, however, began to plot for their overthrow. Quarrels recurred pretty often but were patched up. Husain Ali was sent against Ajit Singh of Marwar. He compelled Ajit Singh to make an abject submission, though the Emperor secretly instigated the Rathor Chief to resist. Farrukh Siyar had to send away to Bengal his leading adviser and favourite, Mir Jumla. Husain Ali was then given the government of the Deccan in supersession of Nasam-ul-Mulk. The Emperor continued his plots against the Sayyid brothers. Husain Ali at last decided to start with his army for the North; he granted the Marathas the chauthi and videshmukhi of the six subahs of the Deccan and a Maratha army accompanied him in his Northern expedition. Farrukh Siyar's abject surrender was of no avail. The Sayyids took possession of the Imperial palace, deposed Farrukh Siyar and put him to death two months after deposition.

"There is a local tradition among the Sayyids of Barha that someone proposed to set aside the Imperial house altogether, the throne to be transferred to one of the two brothers. Probably
the difficulty was to decide which brother should reign. Rafi-ud-darajat, a son of the third son of Bahadur Shah, was set up as Emperor. Suffering from consumption, he began to sink very fast and had to be deposed soon after, his brother Rafi-ud-daula, another sickly youth, being put in his place. He died in September, 1719, and Raushan-Akhtar, son of Jahan Shah, fourth son of Bahadur Shah, was put on the throne with the title of Muhammad Shah.

FALL OF THE SAYYID BROTHERS

The Sayyid brothers had made too many enemies and the court party leagued with Nizam-ul-Mulk who about this time established himself in the government of the Deccan in opposition to the Sayyid brothers. Husain Ali began his march to the Deccan with the Emperor but was assassinated, the Emperor conniving at the murder. The day before his assassination he is said to have boasted about making Emperor of anyone on whom he chose to cast his shoe.

When Abdulla Khan heard about the murder he set up another puppet Emperor, Ibrahim, but the Imperial army turned northward and at Bilochpur, a village on the Jumna about five miles north of Hassanpur, Abdulla was completely defeated. He was poisoned in his prison two years afterwards. Muhammad Shah ordered that the Sayyids should be referred to after their death, the one as Namakharam, the other at Haramnamak. During the period of Sayyid ascendancy the Sikh movement led by Banda was cruelly suppressed.

MUHAMMAD SHAH (1719-1748)

Muhammad Shah was not the man to restore the prestige of Imperial authority and to revive the glory of Imperial arms. He was weak, devoted to pleasure, perhaps conscious of the hopelessness of the situation. With a demoralised army, a disintegrating administration and nobility whose ‘profession was envy’, Muhammad Shah followed the policy of drift, and during his long reign the dissolution of the Mughal Empire
as practically complete. The process of dismemberment was
begun by Nizam-ul-Mulk, who successively became Viceroy of
Mughal Deccan (1713-14, 1720-22) and Wazir of the
Empire (1722-1724) and finally exercised practically independent
authority in the Deccan (1724-1748). He is the founder of the
State of Hyderabad. Nadir Shah, before his departure from
Delhi with his spoils, warned Muhammad Shah particularly
against Nizam-ul-Mulk whom he had found to be the most
cunning, self-seeking, crafty and unscrupulous among the
courtiers at Delhi. But if the Nizam as the ablest of the self-
seeking courtiers achieved the greatest success in his career of
independence, others less able also achieved success as founders
of independent Viceroyalties—Saadat Khan in Oudh, Alivardi
Khan in Bengal, and the Rohilla Afghans in the region now
known as Rohilkhand. The Marathas succeeded in seizing
Malwa, Bundelkhand, Gujarat, Berar, and shortly afterwards,
Orissa. Nadir Shah’s invasion in 1739 left the Mughal Empire
bleeding and prostrate. Ahmad Shah Abdali completed the
work begun by him.

THE PUPPET EMPERORS

Muhammad Shah was succeeded by Ahmad Shah (1748-54),
Alamgir II (1754-59) and Shah Alam II (1759-1806). The Delhi
Empire gradually shrank to the northern half of the Gangetic
Doab with some territory on the west of the Jumna. The Jats
in the south and the Sikhs in the west encroached upon what
remained in the hands of the puppet monarchs—unworthy
descendants of Akbar, Jahangir, Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb.
Even in this region the government was not in the hands of
the nominal Mughal Emperor and between 1784-1803 it was
included within the Maratha sphere of influence. When, in
1803, Lord Lake, the British commander-in-chief, entered Delhi
and the Maratha power in the Imperial capital collapsed, there
was an end of the phantom of Imperial authority. The name
of the dynasty was struck out from the pages of time in 1857,
when the rebel sepoys sought to find a legitimate leader in
Bahadur Shah II, the last of the Mughals.
SECTION II

PERSIAN AND AFGHAN INVASIONS

The Safavi Empire of Persia and the Mughal Empire of India bordered on each other. The Safavis and the Timurids regarded each other as rivals, but in no instance did the Safavi dynasty embark on a policy of conquest. Bernier says, "If the Persians were in a condition of undertaking anything against Hindustan, why was it that in the last troubles and civil wars which continued so long in Hindustan the Persians sat still and looked on when Dara, Shah Jahan, Sultan Shuja and perhaps the Government of Kabul desired their assistance and they might, with no very great army, nor great expenses have seized on the fairest part of India beginning from the Kingdom of Kabul unto the river Indus and beyond it and so
made themselves umpires of all things." They might have also taken advantage of Aurangzeb's long absence in the south. Persia was not a menace to Mughal India, though it was an asylum for Indian rebels and as a neighbour was regarded naturally as a rival.

INVASION OF NADIR SHAH (1738-39)

The decline of the Safavi Empire began earlier than that of the Mughal Empire. Early in the eighteenth century dissolution came, the Safavi Empire broke to pieces, and Afghan rule in Persia began in 1722. Nizam-ul-Mulk advised Muhammad Shah to march to the assistance of the Safavids. The advice was, of course, rejected. But if the Mughal Emperor refused to march to the assistance of the ruler of Persia, another deliverer appeared in the person of Nadir Quli, son of Imam Quli, a poor Turkoman. After expelling the Afghans he deposed the Safavid ruler Tahmasp and became Recent in 1732 and King in 1736. Early in 1737 he laid siege to the Afghan fort of Qandahar and many Afghans fled to the Mughal province of Kabul in the north. Nadir Shah sent an ambassador to the Delhi Court to protest against this. The Delhi Court detained the ambassador and sent no reply for about a year. The triumphant Turkoman was not to be so easily got rid of. He decided to invade India. The defences of Afghanistan and the Punjab had been neglected by the declining Mughals. Nadir Shah had no difficulty in conquering Afghanistan. He then defeated the Indian forces guarding the Khyber pass. Although primarily a cavalry leader, he could also use his infantry to great effect. He entered Peshawar in November, 1738, and resumed his advance in December. Zahariya Khan, Governor of the Punjab, submitted after some resistance. Nadir Shah then marched from Lahore to Karnal (20 miles north of Panipat), where he met the Imperial army in February, 1739.

"The proceedings of the Imperial court during Nadir's invasion form a tale of disgraceful inefficiency amounting to imbecility." As Ghulam Hussain, the semi-contemporary historian, says, "The roads and passes being neglected, every one passed and repassed, unobserved; no intelligence was for-
warded to court of what was happening; and neither Emperor nor Minister ever asked why no intelligence of that kind ever reached their ears". No serious attempt was made to resist the invader till his arrival within striking distance of the Imperial capital.

After the fall of the Punjab the Emperor’s advisers, among whom must be included Nizam-ul-Mulk, decided to entrench at Karnal. The Persian army numbered 55,000, the total Indian force about 75,000. But the number of Indian non-combatants was excessive. Nadir did not make any frontal attack but secured Panipat, thus seizing the Mughal line of communications with Delhi. The Mughal army was thus compelled to come out. The battle of Karnal was, however, precipitated by Saadat Khan’s insistence on going out to the rescue of his camp followers. The battle lasted three hours, 8,000 Indians being slain. Negotiations for peace began and after some discussion it was agreed that the Persian army would go away on payment of a war indemnity of 50 lakhs. This arrangement was upset by personal jealousy. Khan Dauran, the Mah Bakshi of the Emperor, died of his wounds in the Mughal camp. The Nizam induced Muhammad Shah to confer the office on his eldest son. Saadat Khan, a captive in Nadir’s camp, was beside himself with jealousy and anger when he heard it. He assured Nadir Shah that if he went to Delhi he would get 20 crores in cash and jewels. The Nizam and the Emperor in their next visit to Nadir Shah were made captives, and the invader marched to Delhi with Muhammad Shah in his train.

A rumour spread in Delhi during Nadir Shah’s stay there that he had been assassinated and in a riot some of his troops were slain. In revenge he perpetrated a general massacre in which 20,000 were put to the sword. He spent two months at Delhi, issued coins in his name and the public prayer was read in his name as sovereign. He took with him booty which has been estimated as high as 70 crores, including all the crown jewels, the celebrated diamond Koh-i-nur and the Peacock Throne of Shah Jahan. At the time of his departure he placed the crown of Hindustan on the head of Muhammad Shah, succeeded to the conqueror the trans-Indus territory of the Mughal Empire. Thus was Afghanistan lost to the Mughals. The
Mughal Governor of Lahore was also to send him 20 lakhs a year as the surplus revenue of 4 districts east of the Indus which he had conquered from local chiefs. This invasion left the Mughal Empire 'bleeding and prostrate'; its weakness was revealed and its prestige was destroyed.

INVASIONS OF AHMAD SHAH ABDALI

Nadir Shah was assassinated in 1747. Afghanistan was made an independent State by Ahmad Shah Abdali. He had come to India in the train of Nadir Shah and he had seen with his own eyes how weak the Mughal Empire was. He naturally followed in the footsteps of Nadir Shah. "With the Khabar pass and the Peshawar district in foreign hands, the Punjab became a starting point for fresh expeditions against Delhi". He invaded India for the first time in 1748 and seized Lahore; but at Manipur near Sirhind he was defeated by a Mughal army nominally led by Prince Ahmad Shah. He invaded India for the second time in 1750. At Delhi the Iranis and the Turanis were quarrelling, and with no help forthcoming from the court, the Mughal Governor of Lahore, Mir Mannu, bought him off by agreeing to pay him the surplus revenue of the four districts east of the Indus that Muhammad Shah had agreed to pay to Nadir Shah in 1739.

The third Abdali invasion was undertaken in 1752. Mir Mannu was defeated near Lahore and submitted. Abdali conquered Kashmir and the Mughal Emperor, Ahmad Shah, ceded to him the entire country as far east as Sirhind. Abdali left Mir Mannu as his Governor in Lahore. The Mughal Wazir, Safdar Jang, a rival of Mir Mannu, did not come to his help; he was making preparations for war in Oudh and Allahabad while the Mughal Emperor made this territorial cession to Abdali.

The fourth Abdali invasion took place in 1756-57. Mir Mannu was dead and the disorganised condition of the Punjab caused by his sudden death brought the invader again to India. He entered Lahore and marched straight upon Delhi. The Rohilla Chief, Najib-ud-daula, went over to him. The Wazir, Imaudd-ul-Mulk, surrendered without fight. Abdali looted on an enormous scale. All men, rich and poor, aristocrats and com-

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moners, big merchants and small cultivators, were indiscriminately plundered. Abdali sacked Mathura and plundered Brindaban, but an outbreak of cholera in his camp compelled him to retreat. The booty which he took with him has been valued as high as 12 crores. The helpless Mughal Emperor, Alamgir II, was forced to cede formally the Punjab, Kashmir and Sind. Abdali left his eldest son, Timur Shah, at Lahore as his viceroy for the government of these ceded tracts. But the Marathas under Raghunath Rao came to the Punjab and expelled Timur Shah within a year. This made a war to the finish between the Marathas and Ahmad Shah Abdali inevitable. Abdali came, as was not unexpected, in 1759, and undertook a campaign that culminated in the decisive third battle of Panipat. Ahmad Shah did not profit much by this victory. His troops clamoured for their pay which was in arrears and insisted on being led back. He withdrew in March, 1761.

Abdali's idea now was to rule over the Punjab, Sirhind, Kashmir and Sind, with Delhi, Agra, Mathura and other places reserved for plunder. But the rise of the Sikh power very soon made untenable his dominion over the Punjab proper. He came to India in 1762, 1764, 1765 and 1767. With all his military genius and the tradition of victory that attached to his name he failed to crush the Sikhs; the cunning Sikh strategy, his preoccupations elsewhere, the disadvantage of fighting with a nation in arms and the terrible vitality of the Sikh Khalsa (or commonwealth) foiled him and the sovereignty of the Sikhs became established in the greater portion of the Punjab. Keen puts it very aptly, "A few incursions, each less successful than its predecessor; the famous Khalsa was to settle down, like a wall of concrete, a dam against the encroachments of the northern flood".

The motives of Ahmad Shah in undertaking his Indian expeditions have been thus analysed by Elphinstone. In the first place, he expected thereby to consolidate his power at home. Though his was a national Monarchy, he was himself after all, an upstart. He hoped by means of his foreign war to increase his reputation and thereby to win the loyalty of the Afghans. Not only would the Indian campaigns provide him with the expenses of maintaining his army but they would also enable him to heap favours and rewards on the Afghan chiefs.
The actual results of Abdali's Indian invasions in Afghanistan are not ascertainable, but, in the Punjab at least, he was indirectly responsible for the ultimate success of the Sikhs and his career in India is very intimately a part of the Sikh struggle for independence.

SECTION III

THE MARATHA EMPIRE

LAST YEARS OF AURANGZEB

The Maratha war of independence against Aurangzeb affected the Maratha State no less than the Mughal Empire. During this confused period, Rajaram had to revive the system of jagirs and saranjams for the hazardous service which he expected the Maratha chiefs to perform. The Marathas reduced spoliation to a system and the State servants had to support themselves by plundering on all sides. This created a very dangerous tradition. "When the Mughals denuded Maharashtra of all their effective, the Marathas, who had been long without a State to govern, a Government to control their activities, now found themselves even without an enemy to fight with. The floating mass of lawless elements, now off their anchor, drifted to all sides without a point or purpose. Crowning these conclusions broke out a civil war". The following problems remained as the legacy of the Maratha war of independence—to establish a well-regulated internal administration, to reclaim the people to civil life, to destroy the germs of civil war, and to lay the foundations of a stable State.

SHAHU (1708-49)

After Aurangzeb's death his Azam released Shahu (son of Shambhuji) in expectation that his return to Maharashtra would cause a division among the Marathas who were then united under the leadership of Tara Bai. This calculation proved to be quite correct. Tara Bai refused to give up her son's claims. She asserted that Shahu was an impostor, and compelled her courtiers to swear fidelity to her son against other
claimants. Thus a civil war began in Maharashtra. Shahaji entered Satara and was crowned in January, 1708. Tara Bai fell back upon Panhala, 12 miles from Kolhapur which was made the capital of the rival Kingdom. Her son died in 1712. Tara Bai was removed from the administration of Kolhapur and her place was taken by her co-wife Rajas Bai, who administered the Kolhapur Kingdom on behalf of her son Shamshuddin. But Shahu’s hold on the Maratha State at Satara was very precarious in view of the prevalence of open anarchy. A very remarkable man now appeared who became the saviour of the Maratha State.

**Genealogical Table of the Bhonsla Chhatrapatis**

| Jija Bai — Shahji — Tuka Bai |
| Vyankoji or Hikoji |
| (Tanjore) |

| Sai Bai — Shivaji I (1627 or 1650-1680) — Soyra Bai |
| Samhnuji I (1680-89) |
| Tara Bai — Rajaram (1689-1700) — Rajas Bai |
| Shivaji III |
| Sambhuji II |
| Ram Raja (1749-1777) |
| Shahu II (adopted) (1777-1810) |
| Pratap Singh (1810-39) |
| Shahji (1839-48) |

[Ram Raja was adopted by Shahu I. After the Third Anglo-Maratha War Lord Hastings placed Pratap Singh on the throne of Satara. When Shahji died without leaving any heir Satara was annexed to the Company’s dominions by Lord Dalhousie. The descendants of Samhnuji II ruled at Kolhapur till the merger of the State in Bombay Presidency.]

**Peshwa Balaji Viswanath (1713-20)**

Balaji Viswanath was a Chitpavan Brahmin of the Konkani. His early life is obscure. He rose to prominence in the service of Dhanaji Jadav and it is said that he was one of those who induced Dhanaji to desert Tara Bai and join Shahu. Dhanaji died in 1710. His son Chandrasen Jadav, however, deserted to
Kolahapur and afterwards joined Nizam-ul-Mulk. In 1712 Balaji was appointed as a Senakarta or agent in charge of the army. He brought order and efficiency in the administration of Shahu’s kingdom. He was appointed Peshwa on November 16, 1713. The robber barons were one after another crushed, but Balaji had to conciliate Kanhoji Angria, who had allied himself with Kolhapur and was advancing up the Bhoghat. In February, 1714, a treaty was signed at Lonavala which guaranteed to Angria 10 forts and 16 fortified places of less strength and also recognised him as the Sarkhel (admiral) of the Maratha fleet. He transferred his allegiance to Satara and the Satara Government agreed to help him against his enemies—the Sidis, the Portuguese and the English.

After the confusion, weakness and total anarchy of the period 1689-1712, it was necessary to initiate a new policy. In the spirit of the treaty of Lonavala Balaji created what came to be known as the celebrated Maratha confederacy. As the price of Maratha support he secured from Sayyid Husain Ali the grant of chauth and sardeshmukhi of the six subahs of the Mughal Deccan (1718). Balaji accompanied Husain Ali to Delhi and saw with his own eyes the anarchy and confusion there. The grant of chauth and sardeshmukhi was confirmed by Muhammad Shah later, and on the basis of this grant the Maratha confederacy was brought into existence as an organisation for collecting chauth and sardeshmukhi. The Peshwa, the Pratinidhi, the Senapati, the Sena Sahib Subah and other Maratha chiefs had spheres of influence from which they collected these dues. The sardeshmukhi was to be paid entirely to the King; 25 per cent. of the chauth was also to be given to him. Six per cent. (Sahota) and three per cent. (Nadgunda) of what remained of the chauth could be assigned by the King to whomsoever he pleased. The remainder (66 per cent.) of the chauth (Mokasa) fell to the share of the chiefs. This complicated system of collection held the confederacy together, and served as an instrument of Maratha imperialism. None had a compact property that might render him altogether independent. The Marathas demanded chauth and sardeshmukhi on the basis of the standard assessment of the days of Todar Mal or Malik Ambar, which these regions harassed by war could not pay. Arrears were thus always due and a standing cause of war was
thus always there. The Maratha State refused to take a lump sum or a solid territorial possession and deliberately preferred assignments on proprietors. The crowd of Maratha agents served as watchdogs of Maratha interest in different parts of the Deccan.

PESHWA BAJI RAO I (1720-40)

Balaji Viswanath died in 1720 and was succeeded in the Peshwaship by his son Baji Rao. He pursued the policy of northward expansion in opposition to the policy of Pratapdatta Sripat Rao, who preferred the plan of consolidating Maratha hold on the Deccan. Shahu was carried away by the Peshwa's eloquence and his argument which was summed up in the following words: "Let us strike at the trunk of the withering tree and the branches will fall off themselves." The Maratha flag was to fly from the Krishna to the Indus.

Repeated expeditions were led into Malwa and Gujarat. Malhar Holkar, Udaji Puar, Ranoji Sindhi and other lieutenant-of Baji Rao gained experience in these expeditions. As Grant Duff puts it, "Baji Rao comprehended the nature of predatory power and perceived its growth in turbulence and anarchy for which the system of distributing the revenue was the first remedy; he foresaw that confusion abroad would tend to order at home and that as commander of distant expeditions he should acquire the direction of a larger force than any other chief of the empire. The revenues of the Deccan would improve by withdrawing the hordes of horse which unprofitably consumed them." The victories which the Peshwa gained enabled him to acquire complete ascendancy over the Chhatrapati.

In 1726 the Peshwa went to the south and a contribution was levied from Seringapatam, but he was always in favour of northward expansion. Nizam-ul-Mulk blocked his way; with characteristic artifice he allied with Shambhuji II of Kolhapur and displaced the Maratha collectors of chauth and sardesh-mukhi. This meant war. In 1728 Baji Rao by means of skirmishing succeeded in drawing him into a situation at Palkhed (20 miles west of Daulatabad) in which the Marathas completely surrounded Nizam-ul-Mulk's army in a waterless waste. Nizam-ul-Mulk had to give up the cause of Shambhuji and afford
arity for the future collection of chauth and sardeshmukhi by Maratha agents.

But Nizam-ul-Mulk's diplomacy was at work, fomenting the enmity of the Maratha Senapati, Trimbak Rao Dabhade. There was open war between the Peshwa and the Senapati, but the former succeeded in defeating and killing the latter at Dabhoi in 1731. Baji Rao's brother, Chimnaji Appa, defeated and killed Girdhar Bahadur, the Mughal Governor of Malwa, at Amjhera (near Dhar) the same year. Muhammad Khan Bangash, who succeeded Girdhar Bahadur, could not stem the tide of Maratha advance and his successor, Raja Sawai Jai Singh of Jaipur, came to an agreement with the Peshwa. Emperor Muhammad Shah recognised Baji Rao as the Deputy Governor of Malwa. The chauth and sardeshmukhi of Gujarat were also ceded to the Marathas, the Dabhade family assisted by the Gaikwads dominating in that region. After the battle of Dabhoi the Gaikwads eclipsed the Dabhades in importance.

Baji Rao also led several expeditions into the Ganges-Jumna Doab and the Delhi region. All Mughal attempts to stop him failed completely. He even plundered the suburbs of Delhi. Muhammad Shah at last appealed to Nizam-ul-Mulk to come to Delhi to help him to defeat the Marathas. In 1738 the Mughal army led by Nizam-ul-Mulk and the Marathas under Baji Rao met near Bhopal. Nizam-ul-Mulk was hemmed in on all sides, the Marathas cutting off his supplies. They also prevented reinforcements reaching him and he was compelled to sign a convention granting Baji Rao the whole of Malwa as also complete sovereignty over the territory between the Narbada and the Chambal. Raja Chhatra Sal of Bundelkhand, who died in 1733, had by a will already left to Baji Rao one-third of Bundelkhand; his sons in possession of the rest of Bundelkhand became allies of Baji Rao.

The Peshwa was now in a position to strike with greater vigour at 'the trunk of the withering tree', but Nadir Shah now invaded India and the Delhi Government collapsed under his blow. Baji Rao appears to have thought that Nadir Shah would establish himself as Emperor of Delhi; he proposed to enter into an alliance with Nasir Jang, son of Nizam-ul-Mulk, who was then in charge of Hyderabad during his father's absence at Delhi. Baji Rao said, 'Hindus and Mussalmans, the whole
power of the Deccan, must assemble and I shall spread up. Marathas from the Narbada to the Chambal". He asked his brother Chimnaji, then besieging Bassein (under the Portuguese), to desist. Chimnaji, however, pushed the siege with great vigour and brought it to a triumphant conclusion in May, 1739. He thus removed the Portuguese menace from the Konkan. It was the most vigorous siege prosecuted by the Marathas. The Maratha chiefs hurried with all speed after the fall of Bassein to meet the Persian invader, but news now arrived that Nadir Shah had retreated, after restoring the degraded Muhammad Shah. Baji Rao himself died in April, 1740.

Baji Rao was not only a great soldier but also a great general. He has been rightly described as 'a heaven-born cavalry leader'. In his movements we find a unique combination of speed with surprise. He had all the qualities required in a great leader—character, persistence, energy, courage, political sagacity. He established Maratha supremacy in the Deccan and laid the foundations of their political hegemony in Northern India. But he made no attempt to check the dangerous feudal tendency which was destined to ruin the Maratha cause under his successors.

PESHWAI BALAJI BAJI RAO (1740-61)

Baji Rao's eldest son, Balaji Baji Rao, succeeded him in Peshwaship. Chhatrapati Shahu was always a factor to reckon with, but he died in December, 1749. Tara Bai declared that there was a posthumous son of Shivaji II, Ram Raja by name, brought up in concealment by a wandering bard after he had been smuggled out of Panhala at birth. In accordance with Shahu's will this young man was brought to Satara and solemnly crowned. Tara Bai had hoped to control the State in his name. But finding this to be impossible she declared him to be an impostor. Ram Raja was brought from Satara to Poona, where he drew up an agreement known as the "Sangola Agreement" by which all the chief offices in the State were given to the agents of the Peshwa (1750). Henceforth the capital of the Maratha Empire was Poona and not Satara. The Chhatrapati no longer counted in the Maratha State; he was a roi d'Asie.

Balaji followed in the footsteps of his illustrious father in his policy of northward expansion, but the South too received
his attention. Expeditions were sent to the Carnatic and tribute was realised from districts south of the Krishna. Quite early in his career as Peshwa Balaji bought off the opposition of Raghuji Bhonsle, the Maratha chief of Berar, an inveterate opponent of the Peshwa family, by giving him a free hand in Bengal; the Berar chief's annual incursions into Bengal compelled Alivardi to surrender to him the province of Orissa and to agree to pay him annually 12 lakhs of rupees as the chauth of Bengal. Balaji had his tussles with the Nizam, Salabat Jang, who was guided by that brilliant Frenchman, Bussy. Bussy's trained infantry outmanoeuvred the Marathas on more than one occasion in 1751. The Peshwa could not make an effort to alienate the State of Hyderabad so long as that resourceful Frenchman was there. But he was recalled by Lally, the French Governor of Pondichery, in 1758. Then Balaji made a supreme effort to crush the Nizam's State. The fort of Ahmadnagar was surrendered to the Peshwa. Ibrahim Khan Gardi, a soldier of fortune who commanded the Nizam's artillery and who was trained in the school of Bussy, was persuaded to join the Peshwa's service. Sadashiv Rao Bhaue, the Peshwa's cousin, won a spectacular victory over the Nizam at Udgir in 1760 and compelled him to agree to surrender a large territory. It was the apogee of Maratha greatness in the Deccan. The State of Hyderabad would have been crippled for ever, but momentous events happened in the North that were destined soon to nullify the effects of this victory.

NORTH INDIAN EXPEDITIONS

The Peshwa's brother, Raghunath Rao, led two expeditions to the North. The first expedition was in 1754-56. He realized tribute from Jaipur, Kota, Bundi and other States in Rajputana; he also helped Imad-ul-Mulk, the Mughal Wazir, to depose the Mughal Emperor Ahmad Shah and to put Alamgir II on the throne. Imad-ul-Mulk became entirely dependent on the Marathas. Lands in the Gangetic Doab were alienated to the Marathas. Raghunath Rao's second North Indian expedition was led in 1757-58. Ahmad Shah Abdali had invaded India for the fourth time in 1756-57, entered Delhi and compelled the Mughal Emperor to cede to him the Punjab and Multan. After Abdali's departure came Raghunath Rao. Imad-ul-Mulk again
joined the Marathas. Not content with entering Delhi, Raghu-
nath Rao also advanced to the Chenab and then withdrew,
leaving Adina Beg Khan as the Maratha viceroy of the Punjab.
This expedition was a "hollow show and financially barreled.

This map represents the approximate extent of the Maratha
Empire at the conclusion of Raghunath Rao's
Punjab expedition."

It led to a deficit of 88 lakhs, and this provocative advance to
the north-west and the expulsion of Abdali's viceroy made war
l'outrance with him inevitable. However, after this specta-
cular exploit Raghunath Rao was recalled to the South, Batta-
jji Sindhia being left in charge of Maratha affairs in the North.
The Marathas were fighting with the Nizam in the South, and Shah Abdali had already succeeded in sweeping away Maratha opposition in the Punjab. He defeated and killed Murtaza Sindhia at Barari Ghat (10 miles north of Delhi) in January, 1760, entered Delhi and defeated Malhar Rao Holkar. He then waited at Aligarh for the impending decisive fight.

**THIRD BATTLE OF PANIPAT (1761)**

The victor of Udgir was, therefore, sent to the North to fight it out with Abdali. The plan of Sadashiv Rao Bhau was to build a bridge of boats near Fattaha, attack Abdali in the upper Doab and raid the territory of Shuja-ud-daula of Oudh. But rains began too early that year, boats could not be secured, and Bhau changed his plan. He decided to attack Delhi which he succeeded in taking from its Afghan garrison in August, 1760, but the problem of food supply could not be solved thereby. He next reached Panipat in October, 1760. Abdali in the meantime won over Shuja-ud-daula, marched as quickly as he could, crossed the Jumna at Baghipat and came near the Marathas. Bhau entrenched at Panipat in November, 1760. Skirmishes and minor battles took place for sometime between the Marathas and the Afghans, who had entrenched about eight miles away. The Maratha army was by December, 1760, pent up, their food supply exhausted, their horses and camel dying and dying.

The starving Marathas decided to fight a desperate battle and on the 14th January, 1761, marched out. The forces actually engaged have been thus estimated: Afghans 60,000; Marathas 45,000 excluding irregular troops and camp followers. The battle raged from dawn to about 3 P.M. No victory was perhaps more complete and no defeat more conclusive. Very few Marathas escaped, and among the few were Nana Fadnavis and Mahadji Sindhia, destined to play a prominent part in Maratha affairs in later years. "An entire generation of leaders was cut off", including Viswas Rao, the eldest son of the Peshwa, who was the nominal commander, as also Bhau himself. "It was a nation-wide disaster like Flodden Field; there was not a home in Maharashtra that had not to mourn the loss of a member, and several houses their very heads". The news
of this terrible disaster hastened the Peshwa's death, which took place in June, 1761.

The third battle of Panipat must be regarded as one of the most decisive events in Indian history. On that fatal field Maratha Imperialism received its greatest blow and the Peshwa's prestige was rudely shaken. The Marathas lost their hold on Malwa, Rajputana and the Doab; in the Deccan the fruits of the victory of Udgir were lost and the Nizam boldly assumed the offensive. But recovery was not long delayed, under Peshwa Madhav Rao I the Marathas defeated the Nizam, recovered their hold on Northern India, and brought Emperor Shah Alam II under their protection. By then, however, the Indian world was very much changed. The British had brought Bengal and Bihar under their control and established their suzerainty over Oudh. Panipat made it impossible for the Marathas to resist the growth of British power in the Gangetic valley. In the South the temporary eclipse of Maratha power enabled Haidar Ali to consolidate his power in Mysore. Within the Maratha confederacy a great change came after 1772. Sindhia, Holkar, Bhonsle and Gaikwad became virtually independent of the Peshwa's control. Maratha Imperialism in Northern India henceforth meant the domination of Sindhia and Holkar, not the supremacy of the Peshwa.

GENEALOGICAL TABLE OF THE PESHWAS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Father</th>
<th>Son</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Balaji Viswanath</td>
<td></td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Baji Rao I</td>
<td>Chinnaji Appa</td>
<td>Sadashiv Rao Bhosle</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Balaji Baji Rao</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Madhav Rao I</td>
<td>Narayan Rao</td>
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<td>Narayan Rao</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Raghunath Rao</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Madhav Rao II</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Baji Rao II</td>
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Viswas Rao (killed, 1761)  
(1740-61)  
(1773-74)  
(1796-1818)  
(1761-72)  
(1772-73)  
(1774-96)
SECTION IV

SIKHS, JATS AND RAJPUTS

SIKHS IN THE 17TH CENTURY

A brief account of the Sikhs till the cruel death of Guru Arjan (1606) has been given in previous chapters. Under his son and successor Hargobind (1606-45) a transition to militarism became a feature of Sikh history. Hargobind was warlike; he kept a stable of 800 horses and 300 mounted followers. "He grasped a sword and marched with his devoted followers among the troops of the empire or boldly led them to oppose or overcome provincial governors or personal enemies. During the ministry of Hargobind the Sikhs increased greatly in numbers and the fiscal policy of Arjan and the armed system of his son formed them into a kind of separate state within the empire".

Hargobind passed over his sons and nominated his grandson Har Rai (1645-61) as successor. He was of a peaceable disposition, but for joining Dara Shukoh in the War of Succession he had to send his eldest son Ram Rai as a hostage to the Mughal court. His second son, Har Krishan (1661-64), succeeded him. Summoned to Delhi, he died there of smallpox, nominating Tegh Bahadur, second son of Hargobind, as the ninth Guru.

Quite early in his career Tegh Bahadur was summoned to Delhi for his activities that were not liked by the established Government; but he was protected by Ram Singh, son of Mirza Raja Jai Singh of Amber, and in his company the Guru went to Patna and thence to Assam. After his return to the Punjab he was seized and taken to the capital, where he was ignominiously put to death by an Imperial order in 1675.

It has been said that he was put to death because of the life of violence he led. Sikh tradition, however, asserts that he lived the harmless life of the wandering devotee. This incident, however, powerfully helped the transformation of the Sikhs into a martial people. Before starting for Delhi in answer to Imperial summons he girded upon his young son Gobind the sword of Hargobind, thus hailing him as his successor in the event of his execution.
GURU GOBIND SINGH (1675-1708)

The last apostle of the Sikhs awakened his followers to a new life. He established the Khalsa or the theocracy of the Singhis. The philosophical basis of the religion remained unchanged, but the outward forms and ceremonies were transformed. His followers were to be henceforth called Singhis or lions. The rite of initiation was to be called pahul. The watchword should be, "Hail Guru". They should honour the memory of Guru Nanak and his successors. They were to have long hair, dagger, comb, bangle, breeches. They should devote their energies to steel alone, ever wage war and slay enemies. By means of a new name, new dress, new equipment and new ceremonies "he called in the human energy of the Sikhs from all other sides and made it flow in a particular direction only. By this means the Sikh nation was poured into the mould of a special purpose". A religious teacher, a military leader and a rebel, it is not easy to place his actions in due order. He fought with the hill Rajas of the Punjab and also with the forces of the Mughal Empire; his sons were put to death by the Mughal Faujdar of Sirhind. He sided with Bahadur Shah in the war of succession, proceeding with him to South India, where he was murdered by an Afghan in 1708. He declared that the Guru would henceforth be found in the Khalsa. So the personal Guruship was abolished.

THE SIKH GURUS

1. Nanak (born 1469, died 1538)
2. Angad (period of Guruship: 1538-52)
3. Amar Das (1552-74)

| Daughter |
| Bibi Bhani |
- 4. Ram Das (1574-81)

5. Arjan (1581-1606)
6. Hargobind (1606-45)

7. Har Rai (1645-61)
8. Har Krishan (1661-64)

9. Tegh Bahadur (1664-75)
10. Gobind Singh (1675-1708)
WAR OF INDEPENDENCE IN THE 18TH CENTURY

Banda succeeded Guru Gobind Singh as the temporal leader of the Sikhs. He took Sirhind and slew its Faujdar who was responsible for the murder of Guru Gobind Singh's sons. He occupied a portion of the country at the foot of the hills, but was driven out of his stronghold at Lohgarh by Bahadur Shah and Munim Khan. He reappeared in Sirhind in the days of Farrukh Siyar; compelled to take shelter in the fort of Gurdaspur, he was reduced by starvation to submit. He was put to death at Delhi with his followers in 1716. An active persecution was kept up against the Sikhs by the Governors of the Punjab. But the invasions of Nadir Shah and Ahmad Shah Abdali created conditions favourable to the Sikhs, who never lost the impress of Guru Gobind Singh even in the days of their greatest adversity.

After 1752 the Mughal power ceased to count so far as the Punjab was concerned and the Sikhs had to fight with Ahmad Shah Abdali. After Abdali's great victory over the Marathas at Panipat (1761) it was expected that he would be able to strengthen his hold over the Punjab. But the hovering and harassing tactics of the Sikh marauding bands and the elusive nature of the enemy whom he could not crush wore out the great warrior. He gained a victory over them in 1762 near Ludhiana in which he killed about 12,000 Sikhs, but victory was ineffective. By 1767 he practically confessed that he was beaten and left the Sikhs to themselves.

The success of the Sikhs in the long contest against Abdali was due to several causes. In the first place, the Sikh method of warfare was admirably well suited to the circumstances. Having no chance of success in pitched battles they cut off his supplies and tried to ruin him without fighting. Ahmad Shah could not reach them in their mountain retreats. Secondly, he could not spare a sufficient number of troops in the Punjab to prevent the Sikhs from recovering their possessions and power. Thirdly, there were frequent rebellions in Afghanistan that often diverted his attention from India. Finally, an individual, however gifted, however great, is always at a disadvantage in fighting with a nation in arms, fired by a consciousness of its own destiny. Ahmad Shah is said to have remarked that it
would be necessary for the complete reduction of Sikh power to wait until their religious fervour had evaporated. During the war of independence the Sikhs presented an almost united front, and for the successful termination of this struggle credit should be given to the entire nation, not to any individual. After the virtual extinction of Abdali's power the disciples of Guru Gobind Singh parcellled out the greater portion of the Punjab among themselves and formed twelve Misl or associations of warriors led by powerful chiefs, thus developing what has been described as "theocratic confederate feudalism".

RISE AND FALL OF THE JATS

A branch of the Jat people was settled in the country south of the Jumna between Agra and Delhi. They occupied a position on the flank of the road between the two capitals and of the routes leading from these through Ajmer towards the Deccan. In the reign of Aurangzeb this robust race began to create great trouble. The rebellion of Gokla Jat was suppressed in 1669, that of Raja Ram Jat in 1688. The Jats under Bhajja became troublesome again in 1705-1707. Bhajja's son Churaman was taken into Imperial service in 1707. He fell into disfavour in the reign of Muhammad Shah and consolidated his position by constructing a stronghold at a place called Thun. It was deemed necessary to make an attempt to suppress him. Sawai Jai Singh of Amber was sent against him in 1716. He invested Thun, but the courtiers of Delhi persuaded the Emperor to agree to terms favourable to the Jat chief. The Jat leader remained a formidable power too near the Imperial capitals. Troubles were created by the sons of Churaman who took refuge in the fort of Thun. Churaman's nephew, Badan Singh, joined the Imperialists who succeeded in taking Thun in 1721. Badan Singh now became the Jat chief.

After Badan Singh's death (1756) his adopted son and successor, Suraj Mal, made the Jats a very formidable power in Hindustan. Badan Singh and Suraj Mal raised or repaired four almost impregnable fortresses in their dominions—Dig, Kumbher, Bharatpur, Ver. Suraj Mal also disciplined a body of cavalry after a method of his own. The Marathas as well as Ahmad Shah Abdali invaded his country on more than one
The Jats and the Rajputs

He would on such occasions retire to his fortresses and bid defiance to the invaders. At the time of the Afghan invasion of 1757, the Jats offered the most stubborn resistance at Chaumula when the Afghans tried to plunder Mathura. The Jats failed to stem the tide of invasion, but theirs was perhaps the most stubborn resistance on record.

When Ahmad Shah Abdali withdrew after the Panipat campaign the Jat Raja was perhaps the strongest potentate in North India 'with absolutely unimpaired forces and an overflowing treasury.' He captured Agra fort in June, 1761. Unfortunately for the Jat Kingdom, Suraj Mal was killed in 1763 in a petty skirmish with Najib-ud-daula who was at that time dictator of Delhi. His son, Jawahir Singh, succeeded him. He had a stormy career. He was assassinated in 1768. The Jat power now began to decline. It was torn by family dissensions and factional opposition. The Imperial army of Shah Alam II led by Mirza Najaf Khan recovered Agra in 1773 and Dig in 1776. The declining Jat power continued to exist with its centre in the impregnable fort of Bharatpur.

The Rajputs in the 18th Century

Rana Raj Singh of Mewar died in 1680. His State, unrivalled in its pre-eminence in the eyes of Hindu India, fell into the back-ground due to the weakness of his successors and their isolation from the Mughal court. Amber had played a very important part in Mughal history under Bhagwan Das, Man Singh and Mirza Raja Jai Singh. Jodhpur was perhaps equally important in the Mughal period and the Rathor soldiery formed a very important element in the Mughal army. The thirty years' war in Marwar after Jaswant Singh's death eclipsed that State for some time. In the days of Muhammad Shah two prominent chiefs of Rajputana, Sawai Jai Singh of Jaipur and Abhai Singh of Marwar, were pre-eminent in the Mughal court. Jai Singh died in 1743, Abhai Singh in 1749.

With the dissolution of the Mughal Empire Rajputana lost that peace which the suzerainty of the Mughals had imposed and maintained for about two centuries. "Rajputana became a zoological garden with the barriers of cages thrown down and the keepers removed". There were three storm centres—Bundi,
Jaipur and Marwar—where rivals contended with each other for succession. The Marathas led incursions into these territories, siding with one of the claimants against the other. Holkar and Sindhia regarded Rajputana with its internal distractions as a land to be plundered. Even when the civil wars ended Maratha visitations continued. This is the history of Rajputana until the establishment of British suzerainty—a story of war, domestic and foreign, with disorder and economic ruin as inevitable consequences. The Rajputs in the eighteenth century seemed to be a played out race.

SECTION V

INDEPENDENT VICEROYALTIES (OUDH, BENGAL, HYDERABAD)

CAUSES OF THE RISE OF INDEPENDENT VICEROYALTIES

The Great Mughals were effective rulers. They had a system of checks and balances in their provincial administration that made it impossible for the Subahdars to assert their independence. But under the weak Later Mughals (to be more precise from the days of Muhammad Shah) the pernicious practice of uniting several rich provinces under the government of one viceroy, as also the lack of supervision, made it easier for the Provincial Satraps to become practically independent. The Nizam, who controlled the resources of all the Mughal Subah of the Deccan, established the state of Hyderabad. Bengal, Bihar and Orissa formed an independent viceroyalty. The hereditary principle came to be acknowledged in Provincial Governments. These viceroys were at a considerable distance from the seat of the Central Government. But even viceroys nearer Delhi, like the Nawabs of Oudh, became practically independent.

THE NAWABS OF OUDH

Saadat Khan was a Persian immigrant from Nishapur. Appointed Faujdar of Hindaun and Byana in 1720, he showed great ability in the court intrigues in which alone a successful career could be made in those days. He was for some time pu
OUDH AND BENGAL

In charge of Agra and was appointed also to the government of Oudh. He was given the title of Burhan-ul-Mulk. After his failure against the Jats, he was removed from the government of Agra but continued to enjoy a semi-independent position in Oudh. In the battle of Karnal (1739) he was taken prisoner by Nadir Shah whom he induced to imprison the Mughal Emperor and to go to Delhi, but at the Imperial capital he was threatened with personal chastisement for his failure to raise the promised tax on him. He committed suicide to escape dishonour.

He was succeeded in Oudh by his nephew and son-in-law Mansur Khan, better known by his title of Safdar Jang. He rose to be the Wazir of Emperor Ahmad Shah. After his death in 1754 his son, Shuja-ud-daula, succeeded in the independent government of Oudh. He also enjoyed the rank of Wazir of the Mughal Emperor, the roi saincant Shah Alam II. After the battle of Buxar (1764) he gradually became a vassal of the East India Company.

THE NAWARS OF BENGAL

Bengal, Bihar and Orissa became practically an independent vicereignalty under Murshid Quli Khan, the celebrated Dhwon of Aurangzeb. Towards the close of Aurangzeb's reign Murshid Quli Khan was the Dewan of Bengal and Azim-us-Shan was the Subahdar, and during the long absence of Azim-us-Shan from his provinces he was also placed in charge of the military administration of Bengal and Orissa. When Farrukh Siyar ascended the throne he was appointed Deputy Governor of Bengal with an absentee Governor, and was made Subahdar of Orissa in his own name. Murshid Quli was formally appointed Subahdar of Bengal in 1717 and continued at the post till his death in 1727.

Murshid Quli Khan gave contracts for the collection of land revenue in Bengal (the Ijara system). Many old zamindars remained, but they were under the thumbs of the new Ijaradars. In the second or third generation these Ijaradars came to be called Zamindars. Murshid Quli employed none but Bengali Hindus for the collection of revenues. He thus created a new landed aristocracy in Bengal. The land revenue system taken over by the British was in the main his creation.
Murshid Quli Khan’s son-in-law, Shuja-ud-din Muhammad Khan, succeeded him in the government of Bengal and Orissa. Bihar was added to the viceroyalty of Bengal during his administration. He died in 1739 and was succeeded as a matter of course by his son Sarfaraz Khan in these Provincial Governments. Sarfaraz was defeated and killed in the battle of Gima, in April, 1740, by Alivardi Khan, a favourite of his late father, who had appointed him Deputy Governor of Bihar. In May, 1740, Alivardi was recognised by the Mughal Emperor as the Viceroy of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa.

The new Subahdar found his provinces exposed to the incursion of the marauding Marathas from Nagpur. The Bengali incursions into Bengal began in 1742 and continued until 1751. In this incessant warfare Alivardi Khan was worn out and a large part of his territory ravaged. In 1751 he signed a peace with Raghují Bhonsle of Nagpur on the following terms: Orissa was practically ceded to Raghují, and from Bengal a tribute of 12 lakhs a year was to be paid as chauth. The river Suvarnarekha was fixed as the boundary of Bengal. Alivardi died in April, 1756, and was succeeded by his grandson, Siraj-ud-daula, whose career is a part of the history of the rise of the British power in Bengal.

THE NIZAMS OF HYDERABAD

The founder of the Hyderabad State, Mir Qamar-ud-din Chin Qilich Khan, better known as Nizam-ul-Mulk, was the grandson of an immigrant from Bukhara. He entered Mughal service in the early part of Aurangzeb’s reign. Bahadur Shah made him Governor of Oudh. He became Governor of the Deccan for the first time in 1713, but he was soon replaced by Sayyid Hussain Ali. After the fall of the Sayyids he again made himself master of the Deccan. In 1722 Muhammad Shah made him Wazir of the Empire; but he was so disgusted with the frivolities of the court that he left for the Deccan in 1723. Suspicious about his loyalty, Muhammad Shah induced the Deputy Viceroy of the Deccan, Mubariz Khan, to resist him but Mubariz was slain by the Nizam in the battle of Shakarkhid (in Berar) in 1724. Unable to undermine his position, the Emperor confirmed him in his office and granted him the title of Asaf Jah. In his tussles with Baji Rao the Nizam was in-
vastly worsted, but the campaign of Palkhed or the defeat near Bhopal tank did not affect his position as the Viceroy of the six Mughal Subahs in the Deccan. He was in the North during the years 1736-40, making a vain attempt to save the Mughal Empire, first from the Marathas and then from Nadir Shah. The defeats suffered by him at Bhopal and Karnal proved that he was incapable of playing the part of saviour of a declining Mughal Empire. He returned to the Deccan in 1741, and suppressed the rebellion of his second son Nasir Jang who had acted as his deputy during his absence. In 1743 Nizam-ul-Mulk established his authority at Arcot and at Trichinopoly. He installed his nominee Anwar-ud-din as the Nawab of Arcot. He died in 1748. He has been described as the most outstanding personality in the declining days of the Mughal Empire, more skilful in diplomacy than in war. He has left his impress on Indian history as the successful founder of the State of Hyderabad.

He left six sons to fight for the heritage. The second son, Nasir Jang, succeeded him at Hyderabad, the eldest Ghazi-ud-din trying to play an important part in the Imperial court at Delhi. But Muzaffar Jang, a favourite grandson of Nizam-ul-Mulk, who was at that time governor of Bijapur and Adoni, set himself up as a rival of Nasir Jang. His cause was taken up by the French. Nasir Jang marched to meet him but was assassinated. Muzaffar Jang was raised to the viceroyalty, but he too was assassinated soon after. A French escort was led by the brilliant French leader Bussy and he declared Salabat Jang, one of Nasir Jang's brothers, as the successor of Muzaffar Jang. Bussy dominated the affairs at Hyderabad from 1751 until his recall by the French Governor Lally in 1758. Salabat Jang was without any ability. After the recall of Bussy he invested his brother Nizam Ali with full power. Peshwa Balaji Baji Rao followed his father's policy of hostility towards Hyderabad. A large Maratha army led by Sadashiv Rao Bhau succeeded in completely defeating the Nizam in the battle of Tungir (3rd February, 1760). He ceded to the Marathas territory yielding 60 lakhs of rupees, the forts of Asirgarh and Daulatabad as also the cities of Bijapur and Burhanpur; he was allowed to retain the rest of his territory on condition of paying chauth to the Marathas. This might have been the beginning of the
end of Asaf Jahi dynasty, but the Maratha disaster at Panipat had its repercussions in the South. It was followed by the death of Peshwa Balaji Baji Rao and this temporary paralysis of the Maratha power enabled Nizam Ali to regain much of what was lost. Panipat undid the work of Udgir. Nizam Ali, after his success, threw Salabat Jang into prison, where he died two years afterwards. With Nizam Ali’s accession in 1762, the Asaf Jahi dynasty was once again secure, and undisputed succession gave it as much stability as it was possible to attain in those days. Nizam Ali was defeated by the Marathas in the battle of Kharda in 1795. He ruled for forty years and died as a vassal of the East India Company.

SECTION VI

CAUSES OF THE FALL OF THE MUGHAL EMPIRE

MILITARY INEFFICIENCY

Irvine writes in his work, The Army of the Indian Mughals, “Military inefficiency was the principal if not the sole cause of the Mughal Empire’s final collapse. All other defects and weaknesses were as nothing in comparison with this. Its revenue and judicial system was on the whole suited to the habits of the people; they looked for nothing different and so far as those matters were concerned, the empire might have endured for ages. But it had lost all military energy at the centre. The rude hand of no Persian or Afghan conqueror, no Nadir, no Ahmad Shah Abdali, the genius of no European adventurer, a Dupleix or a Clive, was needed to precipitate it to the abyss. The Empire of the Mughals was already doomed before any of these had appeared on the scene”.

The constitution of the army was thoroughly unsound. A trooper rode his own horse and if it was killed, he was ruined. He very often fled not because he was a coward but to save his horse which was his whole invested capital. As the army was organized he was the soldier of his immediate commander and was not taught to look beyond him. Even in the days of Shah Jahan, in connection with the three sieges of Qandahar we find the Mughals outclassed in the weapons of warfare and
methods of fighting. The admirable personal qualities of the Great Mughals alone enabled them to make an effective use of an instrument otherwise inefficient. About the Later Mughals, I ma no writes, "Excepting want of personal courage every other fault in the list of military vices may be attributed to the degenerate Mughals—indiscipline, want of cohesion, luxurious habits, inactivity, bad commissariat and cumbersome equipment".

DECLINE IN THE CHARACTER OF THE NOBILITY

The composite army of Afghans and Turks, Rajputs and Hindustanis, that followed the banner of the Delhi sovereign could only be efficiently led by leaders of tact and patience, gifted with personal bravery and administrative ability, but, as Sir J. N. Sarkar puts it, "To the thoughtful student of Mughal history nothing is more striking than the decline of the peerage". Bloody battles of succession, armed contests between rival nobles for Provincial Governorships, alienation of the Hindus, weak sovereigns unable to select right men, gross favouritism, dirtiest jobbing account for this startling decline in the character of the nobility. In such uncertain conditions adventurers from Bukhara and Khora-san could no longer seek a career in India. The classic example is that of Muhammad Yar Khan who became weary of Nadir Shah’s stern discipline, deserted him and remained in India, but he became soon disgusted with the state of things here and went back to Persia. Nadir Shah said, "You feared the violence of my temper; how is it that you have returned to me?" The reply was "To be slain by a man like you is preferable to spending life among a pack of cowards”.

There was no patriotism in an army composed of Persian, Central Asian and Afghan soldiers of fortune. There was some loyalty to the sovereign’s person, and in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the sovereigns were strong personalities. But an imbecile and intriguing Farrukh Siyar or a timid and wavering Muhammad Shah could not inspire personal devotion and prevent factious intrigues. Swayed by their favourites and guided by such Wasirs as the aged voluptuary Qamar-ud-din Khan or the incapable and selfish Imad-ul-Mulk, the Mughal Emperors could not prevent inefficiency and factious intrigues
ruining the Empire. The Irani, Turani and Hindustani parties quarrelled with each other. Saadat Khan, an Irani, would betray his master for promoting a Turani; Safdar Jang, an Irani, would not come to the aid of the hard-pressed Governor of the Punjab because he was a Turani rival. Reverence and devotion to the head of the State, which Akbar and his successors had inspired, no longer kept the nobles within proper limits.

INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL ENEMIES

Repeated Maratha incursions into the Doab, Maratha conquest of Gujarat, Malwa and Bundelkhand, and the Bargi incursions into Bengal showed that the Mughal Government was unable to meet its own domestic enemies. The reign of anarchy had already begun when Nadir Shah invaded India. The invasions of Nadir Shah and Ahmad Shah merely completed the progress of dissolution which had already advanced very far. The independent Provincial Governors, the triumphant Marathas, the irrepressible Sikhs and the determined Jats were fast undoing the work of Akbar and Shah Jahan when the foreign invaders came in and completed the process.

FOR FURTHER STUDY

Irvine, Later Mughals, 2 Vols.
Sir J. N. Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, Vols. I-II
I. Banerjee, Evolution of the Khalsa, Vol. II.
V. G. Dighe, Baji Rao.
Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, Vol. II.
CHAPTER XXII

THE COMING OF THE EUROPEANS

SECTION I

THE PORTUGUESE IN INDIA

VASCO DA GAMA

On the 17th May, 1498, Vasco da Gama and his sailors reached the shores of India, landing at Calicut. The discovery of a direct sea route to India was a great event. The project had been planned by Dom João, following the traditional policy of Prince Henry the Navigator. The discovery of the Cape of Good Hope by Bartholomew Diaz made the realization of the project possible, and Vasco da Gama carried out a matured plan based on authentic information gathered during half a century of exploration. The historical results that followed have made popular imagination rank him with Columbus. In 1502 the Pope gave the King of Portugal permission to style himself “Lord of the Navigation, conquest and commerce of Ethiopia, Arabia, Persia and India”.

Vasco da Gama’s voyage of reconnaissance gave the Portuguese an idea of the articles to be found in the Malabar market and the wares that could be sold there. He was a crude sailor, and inspite of his stay for three months in a Hindu State he remained ignorant of the existence of the Hindu religion. He returned to Portugal in August, 1499.

After him came Cabral. He reached Calicut in September, 1500, established a factory there, but very soon quarrelled with the Zamorin. The Portuguese factory was levelled to the ground. Cabral secured valuable cargoes from Cochin and Cannanore. The Raja of Cochin, an enemy of the Zamorin of Calicut, became a friend of the Portuguese. “The object of the Portuguese was now not only to hinder as far as possible trade between India and the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, but also to divert to Portugal all the trade of the East with Europe”.

Vasco da Gama came for the second time in 1502. He had now a large fleet at his command. An inhuman, greedy sailor, he perpetrated horrible deeds of cruelty, sinking pilgrim vessels without mercy, and by a policy of frightfulness trying to scare the Arab merchants away from trade with India. He erected a factory at Cochin and returned to Lisbon, leaving a small fleet to patrol the coast. The Zamorin of Calicut invaded the territory of Cochin, but Affonso de Albuquerque now arrived with a small Portuguese squadron and drove him out of Cochin. Duarte Pacheco was left with a hundred men to defend Cochin against the Zamorin. With about 8,000 Cochin troops he held his own for about four months against overwhelming odds, the army of the Zamorin numbering about 60,000. A peace was then arranged.

The Portuguese now abandoned the policy of sending annual expeditions and in 1505 decided to appoint a viceroy who would remain at his post for three years. Francisco d’Almeida was the first viceroy. He was to build fortresses at Anjadiva (a group of small islets near the Malabar coast), Cannanore and Cochin. Anjadiva proved useless, but the Raja of Cochin became a Portuguese puppet. A Portuguese garrison at Cannanore held its own. The Zamorin’s fleet was destroyed. Almeida also gained a great victory off Diu over a fleet sent by the Sultan of Egypt to drive away the Portuguese intruders from the Indian Ocean.

ALBUQUERQUE

Affonso de Albuquerque succeeded Almeida with the rank of Governor in 1509. Next year he occupied Goa. Yusuf Adil Shah of Bijapur recaptured it, but Albuquerque recovered it not long after. He strengthened it, increased its commercial importance and made it the head-quarters of the Portuguese in the East. He did everything in his power to encourage the Portuguese to take Indian wives in order to secure a permanent population. He captured Malacca in 1511, relieved Goa again in 1512, but failed in his attack on Aden. He succeeded in establishing Portuguese suzerainty over Ormuz. He died in December, 1515, having established a Portuguese Empire with its system of naval bases from Ormuz to Malacca, from which
they commanded all seaborne trade and held to ransom the vessels of all other nations. Almeida relied on the Portuguese fleet with bases at Cochin and other places patrolling the coast and commanding communications. Albuquerque's system was different. He would occupy certain important points and rule there, colonise select districts through mixed marriages, build fortresses at important strategic places and, wherever possible, induce petty local chiefs to recognise the supremacy of Portugal, if necessary by a yearly subsidy in gold.

EXPANSION OF PORTUGUESE POWER

The Portuguese Governors who succeeded Albuquerque followed his trail. They secured Bassein in 1534 and Diu in 1537, erected a fort at Colombo in 1518 and by the middle of the sixteenth century established their hold over the island of Ceylon. Under the Portuguese Governor of India with his head-quarters at Goa five Governors ruled respectively over Mozambique, Ormuz, Maskat, Ceylon and Malacca. But the Portuguese never attempted to penetrate inland into the interior of India; Portuguese India is not a historical fact. They never ruled over any area of India that was outside the range of their ships' guns.

Portugal 'held the gorgeous East in fee' for the whole of the sixteenth century. In the seventeenth century, however, her Indian settlements fell one after another into the hands of the Dutch; the English later took the place of the Hollanders. The Marathas captured Salsette and Bassein in 1739. The Portuguese retained only Goa, Daman and Diu.

CAUSES OF THE DECLINE OF THE PORTUGUESE POWER

The ultimate decline of the Portuguese power in the East was due to several causes. The Portuguese system of mixed marriages produced a degenerate race that did not possess the military qualities necessary for the maintenance of an empire. It has been said that the East resented the intrusion of the West by absorbing and degrading the earlier Western intruders. The Portuguese administrative system was also 'surprisingly ineffective', worse than that of the Zamorin or Adil Shah. The officials had no sense of loyalty, even the soldiers had the right
of private trade, corruption was rampant. The Portuguese system was undermined by abuses and corruption.

The religious intolerance of the Portuguese was another important cause of their decline. The Franciscan missionaries arrived in Goa in 1517. Hindu temples were destroyed there. An Inquisition was established in Goa in 1560. An atrociouls religious persecution began. The ecclesiastical supremacy established in Goa was alone sufficient to ruin the Portuguese Empire in the East. The horrible cruelty of the Portuguese in their dealings with the Muhammadans, their torturing and burning of relapsed converts, make one wonder why the Portuguese power did not collapse before it did.

After the decline of Vijayanagar Goa lost its importance as a trade centre. The Dutch and the British arrived to contest Portuguese monopoly. In 1580 Portugal joined her fortunes with Spain. Her ships and her men were engaged in Europe fighting the battles of Spain. Defeated first by the Dutch and then by the English, Portuguese domination of the Eastern seas collapsed, their inferior naval power hastening the process.

RESULTS OF PORTUGUESE RULE

The most important political consequence of Portuguese rule in the western coast was that it checked the tendency towards unification in Malabar. The Zamorin of Calicut would have succeeded in his attempt to create a single state but for the Portuguese, who conciliated the local princes and with their sea power and with the support of the petty local chiefs frustrated the attempts of the Zamorin. The Dutch, who succeeded the Portuguese in their political influence in this region, fostered the political disunion of Malabar, which thus fell later an easy prey to Haidar Ali.

Bernier describes the Portuguese in Bengal in the seventeenth century as "Christians only in name; the lives led by them were most destestable, massacring or poisoning one another without compunction or remorse". The horror and loathing associated with the "Feringhees" make it almost absurd to suggest that the Portuguese have any place in the cultural history of India, but the Jesuit missionaries sent to Akbar's court,—Aquaviva and Monserrate, who were sent in 1579, and Xavier and Pinheiro.
who were invited in 1594—were virtuous, learned, active priests and they have made some contribution to Indian culture. They were disappointed to find that the Mughal Emperor and his courtiers were in no mood for conversion, but the Commentaries of Monserrate and the letters of Xavier are rich mines of information for the historian of the Mughal period.

It has been said that the Portuguese successfully frustrated all attacks made on them by the Turks. "Although we have no documentary evidence for believing that the Turks ever entertained the idea of establishing a naval and still less a military base in India, it is quite conceivable that if one of their fleets had succeeded in driving the Portuguese out of their fortresses on the Indian coast the establishment of the Christian powers in India might have been infinitely postponed".

SECTION II

OTHER EUROPEAN MERCHANTS IN INDIA

THE DUTCH IN INDIA

The Dutch attempt to attack Portuguese monopoly of trade with the East began in 1595. "The pent-up enterprise of the Dutch commercial class burst forth as if a dyke had been cut". The United East India Company of the Netherlands was formed in 1602. They turned their attention to the Spice Islands. Moluccas was first seized from the Portuguese. Malacca was taken in 1641. Thus the Dutch seized the trade with the Far East. Between 1638 and 1658 Ceylon passed into their hands. Holland sent out an admiral named Coen, one of the most distinguished men to take charge of Dutch affairs in the East. He founded the town of Batavia and succeeded in ousting the British from the East Indies, thus compelling them to concentrate their attention on India. Pepper and spices, the produce of Sumatra, Java and the Moluccas, were in great demand, and trade in these articles was the most lucrative. Early in their career in the East the Dutch made a mistake: they chose the East Indies instead of India. The East Indies have been very well described as 'a seductive bypath leading astray from world
dominion’. The Dutch found very soon that it was inconvenient to pay in money for pepper and spices and noticed that cotton goods from Gujarat and the Coromandel coast were very much in demand in the Malay Archipelago. They decided to seize this trade from the Arab and Indian merchants and pay for pepper and spices by imported cotton goods. Secure in the Malay Archipelago, the Dutch succeeded in ousting the Portuguese from Malabar, seized Quilon, Cranganore and Cochin, and succeeded to Portuguese influence in this region. Under Van Goens, who broke the Portuguese power in the whole of southern India, Negapatam became the head-quarters of the Dutch in India.

"While the naval power of the Dutch was the despair of their rivals, they themselves were often inclined to envy the English, who were able to carry on their trade without incurring the vast expense for the upkeep of a navy and of fortresses and garrisons which burdened the budget of the Dutch Company." The expenses of the Dutch Company increased throughout the eighteenth century. The English began to copy from ‘the wise Dutch’ their policy of the strong arm. At first they failed. But about the middle of the eighteenth century, we find the Dutch navy neglected and the British and French power growing. After Clive’s successes in Bengal the Dutch attempted to retrieve their position. In 1759 they failed at Biderra; their fleet sailing up the Hughli was destroyed. In 1781 the Dutch again provoked British hostility and lost Negapatam and Trincomali in Ceylon. They later regained Trincomali through the efforts of their allies the French. When the war ended Negapatam was permanently lost. The Dutch could never be serious rivals of the English in India.

THE FRENCH IN INDIA (1664-1740)

The French arrived very late on the scene. The English as also the Danes had established trade settlements in India before the arrival of the French. _La Compagnie des Indes_ was formed in 1664. The French trading classes, however, lacked enterprise, and even Colbert’s energy and enthusiasm could not ensure success to this new French venture. Pondichery was founded in 1673 and was developed through the energy, ability
end courage of Francois Martin until it became the capital of the French settlements in India. But it was not until 1697 that the activity of the French Company in India became manifest. Their Surat factory also shook off its torpor. Their factories at Madrapatam, Calicut, Mahe, Karikal and Chandernagore did some brisk business, but nothing remarkable happened until the outbreak of the War of Austrian Succession in 1740.

THE DANES AND OTHER EUROPEANS IN INDIA

The Danish East India Company was founded in 1616. They established a factory at Tranquebar in 1620 and another at Serampore in 1755. The Danes, however, played no prominent part in Indian affairs and their factories were sold to the British in 1845.

The Emperor of Austria granted a charter in 1723 to an association of merchants in Flanders. This was known as the Ostend Company. It was suppressed in 1731. A Swedish East India Company was chartered in 1731. Another Austrian East India Company was sought to be chartered in 1755. All these projects after some vicissitudes collapsed.

THE ENGLISH EAST INDIA COMPANY (1600-1740)

In 1600 Queen Elizabeth granted to a body of English merchants under the title “The Governor and Company of Merchants of London trading into the Indies’ monopoly of English commerce for a term of 15 years from the Cape of Good Hope to the Straits of Magellan. This Company is generally known as the East India Company. The first and second voyages were made to the Spice Islands under James Lancaster, the subscribers dividing up the profits of each undertaking among themselves. A ship of the third separate voyage came to Surat where it did some trade. William Hawkins, captain of this vessel, who could speak Turkish, saw Jahangir with a letter from James I. He was graciously received and allowed to reside at the Mughal court for sometime (1601-11); but Portuguese influence at the court was strong enough to prevent any grant to the English of the right to trade in Mughal ports. In 1612 two ships under the command of Thomas Best succeeded in defeating a Portuguese fleet off Surat. This increased the
prestige of the English. An Imperial farman was granted in 1613, and a permanent British factory was established at Surat. In 1615 the English gained another naval victory over the Portuguese off Surat. The British could as yet bring very small trade, but the Portuguese had a very well-established commerce.

The position of the British merchants was, therefore, still precarious when Sir Thomas Roe arrived as accredited ambassador of James I to the Mughal court. He was in the Mughal court for three years. He could not get concessions for trade in Bengal and Sind, but he got privileges for trade in Gujarat. English factories were established at Agra, Ahmadabad and Broach, all under the authority of the chief at Surat, who was styled President. The British captured Ormuz in 1622, thus very considerably weakening Portuguese power in the Eastern seas. Factories were established at Masulipatam in 1616 and at Armagon (north of Pulicat) in 1626. The English and the Dutch were welcomed by Mughal officials as a counterpoise to the Portuguese. There could not, however, be any co-operation between the two Protestant powers, and after the famous "Massacre of Amboyna" in February, 1623, in which ten Englishmen were put to death after an irregular trial on a charge of conspiracy to seize the fortress, whatever co-operation existed was at an end. On the other hand, truce was concluded between the English and the Portuguese in 1635, and the Anglo-Portuguese treaty of 1642 definitely established accord between the erstwhile enemies.

A direct consequence of this Anglo-Portuguese friendship was the establishment of an English settlement at Madras near the Portuguese fort of St. Thome. The land was rented from the Raja of Chandragiri. The new settlement was named Fort St. George. It superseded Masulipatam as the head-quarters of the East India Company on the Coromandel coast. Factories were also started at Hariharpur in the Mahanadi delta as also at Hughli, Patna and Cossimazar to secure Bengal silk, sugar and saltpetre. An appalling famine occurred in 1630-31 which affected Gujarat, Ahmadnagar, Bijapur and Golconda. Thousands died of starvation or committed suicide, some even taking to cannibalism. This calamity had a lasting consequence. Depopulated Gujarat had now no calico to export from Surat; the weavers were 'dead or fled'. The calico trade, therefore,
shifted from Gujarat to Madras. Moreover, indigo, an export of Surat, was driven out of the European market by the competition of the West Indies. Thus European commercial activity shifted from the west to the east of India.

The East India Company had its own internal difficulties. A rival body known as Courten's Association was started in England in 1637. It got the support of King Charles I and developed into a rival venture. It established factories at Rajapur, Bhatkal and Karwar but began to languish and soon ceased to trouble the old Company. The East India Company's charter had been renewed in 1609, its privileges being indefinitely extended subject to revocation after three years' notice. But the monopoly, once broken by Courten's Association, could not be easily re-established. A rival association, the Assada Company, proposed to establish colonies at Assada in Madagascar, and on some part of the coast of India. The venture, however, failed. An exclusive charter was granted to the existing Company by Cromwell in 1657. It lost its validity with the Restoration. But King Charles II granted a fresh charter. A Scottish Company was sought to be floated in 1695, but it failed. In 1698 the Company's position was seriously threatened when a new Company under the style "The English Company Trading to the East Indies" was granted the exclusive right of Indian trade, allowing the old existing Company to continue its operations until the expiry of three years' notice as required by the charter. Various complications arose. The old Company and the new Company hampered each other. The two were, therefore, united in 1702 under the name "The United Company of Merchants of England Trading to the East Indies". The shares were equalised and by the award of Godolphin in 1708 the union was consummated.

In spite of these troubles there was commercial prosperity in the East. But the Company's servants in all their grades—writers, factors, junior merchants and senior merchants—were paid ridiculously low wages, with the privilege of private trade. They became serious rivals of the Company's trade, and it was impossible to suppress this because they could, if necessary, carry on under the name of Indian merchants. The Company, therefore, gave up port to port trade and confined itself to the direct trade between England and India. The factories in upper
India were abandoned and the activities of the Company were concentrated at Surat, Madras and Hughli.

Bombay was acquired in 1661 as part of the dowry of Catherine of Braganza, the Portuguese Infanta who became queen of Charles II. The King made it over to the East India Company. Gerald Aungier, President of Surat and Governor of Bombay (1669-77), organised the settlement. It became the headquarters of the English in Western India in place of Surat in 1687. About 1686 Sir Joshua Child, at the head of the East India Company Directorate in England, decided to follow the policy of the strong arm, in imitation of the Dutch, instead of trying strenuously to placate the local officials for the continuance of trade privileges. But his attempt “to establish such a policy of civil and military power and create and secure such a large revenue to maintain both as may be the foundation of a large, well-grounded, sure English dominion in India for all time to come” failed disastrously. A fruitless attempt was made to seize Chittagong. On the western side also local shipping was seized. In retaliation Mughal forces besieged Bombay. The English had to fly from Hughli. Peace was concluded with the Mughal authorities in 1690. It was a humiliating submission, one of its conditions being the dismissal of Sir John Child, Governor of Bombay, who had seized some richly laden Mughal vessels. Sir John Child died before the conclusion of the negotiations.

After their failure in Bengal the English had withdrawn to Madras. Job Charnock, their leader, was asked by the Mughal Subahdar to return to Bengal. He came back in 1690 and founded Calcutta on an unpromising site. The old privileges were restored by an Imperial farman. Kipling’s description of the event is not inappropriate:

“Once two hundred years ago the trader came meek and tame
Where his timid foot just halted there he stayed,
Till mere trade
Grew to Empire—”

In 1714 an embassy was sent to Delhi under John Surman to obtain a comprehensive grant of trade privileges in all the three provinces; protracted negotiations led to the grant of three Imperial farmans in 1717 that formed the basis of the Company’s trade. The right to trade in Bengal free of duties
return for the payment of 3,000 rupees per annum was recognised. Freedom from duties was also recognised throughout the Mughal Deccan in return for the rent paid for Madras. A lump sum of 10,000 rupees was to be paid for customs and duties at Surat. The Mughal Empire was, however, dissolving, and soon the United Company had to face new problems and shape new policies.

SECTION III

ANGLO-FRENCH RIVALRY IN THE DECCAN

FIRST CARNATIC WAR (1746-48)

The War of the Austrian Succession, which broke out in Europe in 1740, extended to Ind.a in 1746. In that war England and France fought on opposite sides. At that time the French Governor of Pondichery was Joseph Francis Dupleix, who had already displayed much organising ability. The Governor of the French island of Mauritius (or Isle de France) was Mahe de Bourdonnais, a man of unlimited resources and of buoyant energy. He had made Mauritius with its harbour (Port Louis) a solid point d’appui in the Indian Ocean. As the English and the French were now at war in India, La Bourdonnais with his ships came to the Coromandel coast. The English ships were led by an unenterprising sailor Peyton who withdrew to Ceylon after an indecisive act’ on; he reappeared after some time only to sail away in alarm to Hughli. La Bourdonnais appeared with his ships and some troops from Pondichery before Madras, which made a pusillanimous surrender (1746). He was willing to restore the place in return for a ransom. This Dupleix refused and retained the place until 1749. The fleet of La Bourdonnais was crippled by a storm in October, 1746, and he withdrew.

Nawab Anwar-ud-din of Arcot, appointed to the government of the Carnatic by Nizam-ul-Mulk in 1743, could not be an unconcerned spectator of these events happening in his own territory. He resented the seizure of Madras without his permission and sent an army under his eldest son. The French in Madras made a sally and compelled the Arcot army to retire
to St. Thome. A tiny force under Paradis marching up with reinforcements succeeded in scattering the Arcot army as it barred its way at St. Thome. This ridiculously easy French victory is rightly regarded as one of the decisive events in the history of India. Orme, a contemporary historian, writes, "It was now more than a century since any of the European nations had gained a decisive advantage in war against the officers of the Great Mughal. The experience of former unsuccessful enterprises and the scantiness of military abilities which prevailed in all the colonies from a long disuse of arms had persuaded them that the Moors were a brave and formidable enemy, when the French at once broke through the charm of that timorous opinion by defeating a whole army with a single battalion." Cavalry fighting according to established Indian practice was useless against well directed field artillery, and against infantry that could keep their ranks and reserve the fire. European predominance at sea was never disputed; European superiority on land now began. It is relevant to note that French troops at St. Thome were not entirely European but included companies of sepoys, i.e., Indian infantry trained by Europeans.

Dupleix failed to capture Fort St. David but repelled a naval attack made by the English on Pondichery (1748). When the news of the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748) reached India, Madras was restored to the English (1749). As they now acquired it by treaty they no longer paid the quit rent of 1200 pagodas a year which they had formerly paid to the Nawab of the Carnatic. The first Carnatic War between the English and the French, apparently unimportant, 'set the stage for the great projects which Dupleix began to develop.'

SECOND CARNATIC-WAR (1749-54)

The Governor of Madras as also the Governor of Pondichery had now troops that they could not send home until the beginning of the sailing season. They tried to place them at the service of some Indian power in order to save the expense. Floyer, Governor of Madras, took up the cause of a claimant to the throne of Tanjore and secured Devi Kottai with the surrounding country. The plans of Dupleix were, however, more far-reaching, leading ultimately to an unofficial war.
between the English and French Companies’ representatives in India, without the sanction of the authorities in Europe.

Nizam-ul-Mulk died in 1748. His eldest son was at Delhi, trying to play a prominent part in Imperial politics. The second son, Nasir Jang, succeeded at Hyderabad. But his claim was disputed by his nephew Muzaffar Jang. A claimant for the Nawabi of Arcot also appeared in the person of Chanda Sahib, son-in-law of the late Nawab Dost Ali of the Carnatic, who had been killed by the Marathas in 1740. Chanda Sahib had been taken to Poona as a captive but was released after seven years. He wanted to recover the possessions of the family and acted in concert with Muzaffar Jang. Dupleix decided to support Muzaffar Jang for the Subahdari of the Deccan and Chanda Sahib for the Nawabi of Arcot.

The French and their allies defeated and slew Anwar-ud-din in the battle of Ambur near Vellore (1749), and took his eldest son Mahphuz Khan prisoner, his second son Muhammad Ali flying for refuge to Trichinopoly. He made preparations there to resist Chanda Sahib and his allies. The British began to help him as they deemed it necessary to oppose further extension of French influence. Nasir Jang arrived to settle matters in the Carnatic and also to put an end to the pretensions of his nephew. He was joined by some English troops; the opposition of Muzaffar Jang collapsed and he surrendered to his uncle. As Nasir Jang dallied and tarried at Arcot, Dupleix made his preparations. Bussy captured Gungi. Nasir Jang then marched out from Arcot to meet the French. He was assassinated on the field of battle on December 16, 1750, in the battle of Velimadupet, as he was coming out to meet his enemies, by the Pathan Nawab of Cuddapah, a traitor in league with Dupleix. The plunder of Nasir Jang’s camp yielded so much spoil to the French “that every one from the councillor to the writer, from the captain to the private, had his share and officers who only joined the service later looked back with regret to the happy days when a mere ensign received 60,000 rupees. Never had so much gold been seen at Pondichery. It was comparable to the solid gains of Plassey.” Muzaffar Jang was proclaimed as Subahdar in the place of his dead uncle. He marched north accompanied by Bussy and a French escort, but he was murdered on the way in February,
1751, and Salabat Jang, third son of Nizam-ul-Mulk, was raised to the throne. Bussy remained at Hyderabad with his French contingent of 900 Europeans and 4,000 sepoys. A born diplomat, conciliatory yet resolute, he remained in power at Hyderabad until recalled by Lally in 1758. For the payment of his troops he was granted four sarkars—the coastal districts of Mustafanagar, Ellore, Rajahmundry and Chicacole. Thus Dupleix's policy was very successful in the Deccan because of the skill and wisdom of Bussy.

But the division of forces proved fatal to the schemes of Dupleix. "Although in the Deccan he secured unrivalled glory and almost incredible territorial possessions, he was disabled from securing the Carnatic and thus afforded the English both time and opportunity of making that breach by which they were to overthrow the whole structure". A new Governor was now at Madras, a strong silent man of action. Saunders was appointed in September, 1750, and he decided to encourage Muhammad Ali at Trichinopoly to resist. From 1751 to 1754 the two Companies fought in the Carnatic and the English succeeded in gaining the upper hand. The French siege of Trichinopoly dragged on (1751). Muhammad Ali suggested an attack on Arcot, now the capital of Chanda Sahib. Saunders entrusted this task to Robert Clive of the Company's civil service, who had joined a small military force raised by the Government of Madras under Major Stringer Lawrence. Clive boldly seized Arcot (1751) and defended it against the forces of Chanda Sahib for 53 days. It was a glorious feat of arms and marks a turn in the tide. The French army before Trichinopoly, led by Jacques Law, had to surrender in June, 1752. Chanda Sahib surrendered to the general of Raja of Tanjore whose troops were fighting by the side of the British under Lawrence. Chanda Sahib was beheaded, Lawrence not choosing to interfere. Thus Muhammad Ali became the undisputed Nawab of the Carnatic.

Dupleix was, however, irrepressible. He won over the Mysoreans and Murar Rao, the Maratha chief of Gooty, who were fighting as allies of the English at Trichinopoly. The Raja of Tanjore returned to neutrality. But Clive cleared the Carnatic of all French posts except Pondichery and Gingi. The Pondichery-Mysore-Gooty coalition was about to break up in
1754 for lack of money though Dupleix never despaired of taking Trichinopoly and spent over £350,000 of his own money. But the French Company had already decided to conclude peace; Godehu, one of the Directors, landed at Pondichery in August, 1754. This meant the recall of Dupleix and the abandonment of his plans so far as the Carnatic was concerned. The unofficial war thus ended. The two Companies decided not to interfere in the quarrels of the Indian princes. Dupleix returned to France, where he lived until 1763.

POLICY OF DUPLEIX AND CAUSES OF HIS FAILURE

With his very clear vision Dupleix could see for himself that the Indian armies were helpless against European discipline, but this discipline could also be imparted to Indians in European service. In the disturbed state of things then prevalent in India he could easily establish French predominance by siding with one of the claimants with his European and Indian troops. He wanted to present before his masters the accomplished fact. The French Company had to import silver to India in return for her commodities. But if it acquired territory in India yielding a sufficient surplus to cover its investment, this annual drain of silver from France would stop. "The surplus revenue of its Indian possessions would be exported in the form of commodities". But he made the mistake of not taking the Company into his confidence and did not let his superiors know his plan in its entirety until it was too late.

One of his greatest defects was that he divided his forces. If Bussy with his troops had been brought from Hyderabad to Trichinopoly he could have perhaps taken that place and secured the Carnatic; but Dupleix was very anxious to maintain French influence in the Nizam's court. Developments in the Carnatic later led to the recall of Bussy and the collapse of French influence at Hyderabad. As Dodwell says, "It is unwise to pursue two objects at once and to attempt more than one has the means of accomplishing". A quick victory in the Carnatic was necessary for the success of Dupleix's plans.

Moreover, as the war dragged on money was found wanting. He somehow thought it impolitic to ask the French
Company to send money and always drew a rosy picture for his home authorities. Bussy could not supply him the money he required. The military plans of Dupleix crashed to a large extent because he had not the sinews of war.

With Bussy absent at Hyderabad the French soldiers in the Carnatic could not cope with the ability and spirit of Lawrence and the brilliance and daring of Clive. Saunders, grim and tenacious, grasping fully the implication of his policy, was ever ready with his counter-moves and supported Muhammad Ali with all the resources of the English Company. He was thus largely responsible for the failure of Dupleix.

Dupleix had no idea of the importance of naval power, which was the one essential factor in any scheme of European domination in India. But inspite of his failure Dupleix must be regarded as the pioneer of European conquest on Indian soil, it was the spirit of this Frenchman and his associate at Hyderabad that ruled in the camp of his rival who established British power in Bengal.

THIRD CARNATIC WAR (1756-63)

The Seven Years' War began in Europe in 1756. The French and English settlements in India were again involved in hostilities, but when the news was received in India the Madras and Pondichery authorities had not sufficient troops to begin effective fighting in the Carnatic. The British were busy in Bengal against Siraj-ud-daula, and Bussy, dismissed at Hyderabad on account of the intrigues of Shah Nawaz Khan, could not be reinstated until August, 1756. With his position thus rudely shaken, the latter was busy re-establishing French sway in the Northern Sarkars (1757) and could not operate against the British in Bengal or at Madras. Clive thus succeeded in taking Chandernagore (23rd March, 1757) and in crushing Siraj-ud-daula (23rd June, 1757) undisturbed by the French.

Count de Lally, the general selected by the French, arrived at Pondichery in April, 1758. He took Fort St. David and prepared to attack Madras. For making this supreme effort he thought it necessary to gather all the troops and recalled Bussy from Hyderabad. Pigot, the British Governor of Madras, assisted by Stringer Lawrence, put up a stubborn defence; a British fleet appeared and Lally had to raise the siege (1758).
The French detachment left by Bussy in the Northern Sarkars was defeated by Colonel Forde (1758) who was sent by Clive from Bengal. The victories gained by Forde at Kondur and Masulipatam undermined the position of the French, already weakened by their failure at Madras. The French fleet under D'Ache suffered a defeat off Pondichery and sailed away, leaving the British supreme on the Coromandel coast. Sir Eyre Coote, the British general, succeeded in defeating Lally in the battle of Wandiwash (22nd January, 1760). Pondichery was besieged and capitulated (16th January, 1761). Gingi and Mahe, the remaining French posts on the east and west coasts of India, fell soon after. Thus the work of Dupleix and Bussy was destroyed in 1760-61; the French power in India collapsed. The Peace of Paris (1763) restored the dismantled French possessions.

CAUSES OF FRENCH FAILURE

The principal cause of French failure was the superiority of the British at sea. The British were so strong at sea that they could pour supplies into the Carnatic from Bengal and also bring soldiers from Europe, while the French, unable to replenish their resources for want of command of the sea, became relatively weaker as the campaign progressed. Mauritius proved in this campaign to be too distant a base for effective naval operations on the Coromandel coast.

During the third Carnatic War the British had the resources of Bengal at their disposal, and Bengal was rich at that time. Supplies from Bengal enabled the Government of Madras to fight for about three years without being seriously handicapped for want of resources. Mir Jafar proved to be unable to meet British financial needs. He was deposed in 1760 in favour of Mir Qasim, so that the British might get what they wanted from Bengal. After the arrival of Lally French India did not receive more than two million francs for the expenses of this decisive war.

Haidar Ali, already established in power in Mysore, entered into a treaty with Lally to help him in his war with the British. But in August, 1760, Khande Rao, his Dewan, took up the cause of the faineant Mysore monarch and ousted Haidar who did not succeed in re-establishing his position in Mysore until after the fall of Pondichery. The army he sent to help Lally
he had to recall hastily. There was nothing to divert British attention from the single purpose of crushing the French.

The personal factor cannot be altogether overlooked. Lally, who was unpleasantly sharp-witted and cursed with an ungovernable temper, was the worst leader possible at this critical hour in the history of the fortunes of the French nation in the East. The quarrel between the Pondichery Council and the French leader paralysed operations, and in the place of united counsels and energetic action there were dissensions on land and inaction at sea. After the surrender of Lally, Dubois, his Intendant, was cut down by another Frenchman Defer because Dubois possessed papers proving official corruption. This old, almost blind, Intendant of the disgraced French general had drawn his sword in vain to save himself. This crossing of swords was 'a fit image and striking resume of the history of the last three years of the French in India'. British superiority lay in the quality of leadership as also in the professional superiority of men like Lawrence and Clive, Forde and Coote.

FOR FURTHER STUDY

Danvers, History of the Portuguese in India.
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CHAPTER XXIII
BRITISH ASCENDANCY IN BENGAL AND OUDH

SECTION I

PLASSEY

SIRAJ-UD-DAULA'S HOSTILITIES WITH THE BRITISH

Siraj-ud-daula, grandson and great-nephew of Alivardi Khan, succeeded him as Subahdar of Bengal in April, 1756. He was a young man of twenty-three. Two months after his accession he seized the English factory at Cossimbazar and then marched against Calcutta which he captured without any difficulty. Those who surrendered were crowded into a room which had been used as the military prison; the majority of the captives are said to have died of suffocation. This is known in history as the "Black Hole Tragedy".

The truth of the story of the 'Black Hole' has been doubted by many and it is very likely that the vainglorious Holwell, from whom we get details of the story, touched it up to make himself play a conspicuous part in it. We have also no reliable evidence to prove the exact number of persons who remained to surrender. The accepted version of the 'Black Hole' has its perplexities which can hardly be reconciled with its authenticity. As many as 146 Europeans could not have been left at Calcutta on that evening. The true number was probably only 60. All the former residents of Calcutta whose manner of death could not be ascertained during a week of very confused fighting and complete breakdown of British administration were later described as "perished in the Black Hole".

CAUSES OF SIRAJ-UD-DAULA'S ANTI-BRITISH POLICY

The anti-English attitude of Siraj-ud-daula was due to a fear of English aggression. The story of the murder of Nasir Jang and of the protectorate established by the French at
Hyderabad and by the English at Arcot was not unknown in Bengal. Ghulam Husain, author of *Siyyar-ul-Mutakkherin*, tells us that Alivardi was apprehensive that a court faction would perhaps utilise the services of Englishmen and his successor's fate would be that of Nasir Jang. Ghasiti Begam, the aunt of Siraj, and her adviser Rajballabh appreciated the power and prestige of the English Company and wanted its help to oust the young Nawab, who was, however, too quick for the conspirators. Shaukat Jang, a cousin of Siraj, revolted at Purnea. He was advised to make an alliance with the English against Siraj. The young Nawab thus felt from the beginning that he should reduce the power of the English in Bengal so that they might remain satisfied with trade 'on the footing they did in (Murshid Quli) Jafar Khan's time'. If Holwell is to be believed, Alivardi had also contemplated 'reducing their trade on the footing of the Armenians'.

**SIRAJ-UD-DAULA AND THE FRENCH**

An expedition was sent from Madras for the recovery of Calcutta under the command of Clive, who occupied Calcutta on 2nd January, 1757. Siraj once again marched with his army to meet Clive. A night attack made by Clive, though far from successful, disconcerted the Nawab; he concluded a treaty with the English confirming their privileges, restoring what he had plundered from Calcutta, and granting them the right to fortify the city and coin money. The Seven Years' War had already begun. Clive attacked and took Chandernagore from the French in March, 1757. Ahmad Shah Abdali had entered Delhi and was plundering Mathura and other places. There was for sometime a rumour that he intended advancing eastward. The Nawab dreaded an invasion by the Afghans and dared not alienate the British. Though he was pro-French he was not in a position to alienate the British at this stage and Clive took the fullest advantage of the situation; the Nawab was thus deprived of the support of his natural allies against the English. The English were, however, conscious that the Nawab still entertained hostile feelings against them. He was writing frequently to Bussy in the Deccan. He took the French fugitives from Chandernagore under his protection.
CONSPIRACY AGAINST SIRAJ-UD-DAULA

About this time Clive and the Calcutta Council became aware of a movement at Murshidabad for the subversion of the authority of Siraj. This young man, 'too ignorant and headstrong to use management with his dislikes,' had alienated the great bankers—the Seths, as also Mir Jafar, Roy Durlabh, Yar Latif Khan and other prominent personages at Murshidabad. The plan of the conspirators was to dethrone Siraj and to confer the Nawabi on Mir Jafar, a prominent general of Alivardi's time. Armed contests between rival nobles for Provincial Governorships were a feature of the history of India in the eighteenth century. This was the consequence of chaos inevitable on the decline of an empire. The army was full of Persian, Central Asian and Afghan soldiers of fortune, eager to place their swords at the service of the highest bidder. These soldiers looked to their immediate chiefs; they had no loyalty to the state. The conspiracy at Murshidabad was regarded by those Indians who took part in it as balancing one chieftain against another—'Siraj-ud-daula, the grandson of a usurper, against Mir Jafar, the most powerful noble of the province.'

BATTLE OF PLASSEY (1757)

The English felt that "it would be a great error in politics to remain idle and unconcerned spectators". Clive marched against the Nawab with an army of 3,000 (2,200 sepoys and topasses; 800 Europeans). The Nawab, surrounded by traitors, distrusted his army. Watts, the British Resident at Murshidabad, had already come to an understanding with Mir Jafar, Roy Durlabh and Yar Latif Khan who led the bulk of the Nawab's army and who promised inactivity in any engagement between the Nawab and the Company. On his way to Plassey, in the district of Nadia, not quite sure of the result of the intrigues of Watts, the victor-to-be hesitated but ultimately decided to march forward. Even at Plassey his journal shows that he decided to make a night attack, and nothing was done but replying to the cannonade of the Nawab's army. But as that army began to fall back to the camp, Kilpatrick, during Clive's temporary absence from the field, ordered an advance. The order once given could not be recalled. The Nawab felt that
he was betrayed and fled. He did not lose more than 500 men. The English army had 18 killed and 56 wounded. Their six-pounders fired 511 round shots. The English army was at the mercy of the hordes of cavalry under Mir Jafar, Roy Durlabh, and Yar Latif who commanded the right flank of the English advance. "But they were as inactive as were the Pathans, Nabobs with whom Dupleix had concerted the destruction of Nasir Jang".

This was the epoch-making battle of Plassey (23rd June, 1757). It cannot be considered as a great military achievement of Clive. As Malleson puts it, Clive must have been astonished at the numbers against whom he was about to hurl his tiny band. "What if they should be true to their master!" was a thought which must more than once have traversed his brain as he witnessed that long defiling. Intrigue had done its work and a distant cannonade led to complete collapse. The Nawab's army numbered nearly 50,000 men, but only about 12,000 forming the right wing and 12 pieces of cannon took part in this battle. All the rest of the army stood with folded arms and then promptly took to flight. The failure of Siraj was ignominious. He fled, was taken captive and then put to death by Miran, son of Mir Jafar. A few days later Clive placed Mir Jafar on the throne of Bengal.

SECTION II

MIR JAFAR AND MIR QASIM

MIR JAFAR (1757-60)

The era of puppet Nawabs now commences with the East India Company as King-maker. In theory the battle of Plassey only restored the English to the situation in which they were before the capture of Calcutta by Siraj-ud-daula. Mir Jafar granted to them in addition the Zamindari of the Twenty-four Parganas, but his unfortunate predecessor had also consented to it by the treaty of February, 1757. They were also indemnified for their losses. Two clauses of the treaty of 15th July, 1757, however, mark the establishment of British political
and military ascendency: "The enemies of the English are my enemies, whether they be Indians or Europeans"; "whenever I demand the English assistance, I will be at the charge of the maintenance of them". By these clauses Mir Jafar placed himself at the mercy of the Company.

Distracted by the attack of the Mughal Prince Ali Gauhar, later known as Shah Alam II, threatened by the Marathas, with a very troubled financial position, and with the pay of his army in arrear, this weak and irresolute Nawab became more and more dependent on British support. The affairs of Mir Jafar were in such plight because he started with a great financial handicap. He agreed to pay compensation to the extent of Rs. 1,77,00,000 to those who had suffered in the siege of Calcutta. The total amount of gifts and donations to the English army, navy and officials has been estimated at about £1,250,000, Clive's share amounting to £234,000. But these were only the gifts that were proved or acknowledged. Clive was, in addition, given in 1759 an assignment of the revenue of the Twenty-four Parganas which the Company had to pay to the Nawab for its Zamindari right. When we read about the intolerable financial position of Mir Jafar we are surprised at the statement of Clive made later in England, "Consider the situation in which the victory at Plassey had placed me. A great prince was dependent on my pleasure. An opulent city, more opulent and populous than London, lay at my mercy, its richest bankers bid against each other for my smiles. I walked through vaults thrown open to me alone, piled on either hand with gold and jewels. Mr. Chairman, at this moment I stand astounded at my own moderation."

The revolution of 1757, and the manner in which it was brought about, undermined the foundations of the Nawab's government. But Clive, who was at the head of the Calcutta Council, succeeded in controlling it as also maintaining it so long as he remained here. In 1759 he helped Mir Jafar in expelling Ali Gauhar from Bihar which he had invaded. Mir Jafar, ill at ease under the British protectorate, was intriguing with the Dutch, who were also feeling very uncomfortable on account of the establishment of British ascendancy in Bengal. But the Dutch vessels were captured by the East India Company's ships and Colonel Forde coming from the
Northern Sarkars was sent by Clive against the Dutch land forces that were worsted at Biderra in November, 1759. Mir Jafar failed 'to substitute for a foreign master a foreign ally'. The Dutch paid the English East India Company ten lakhs as damages. Clive was at the head of the affairs of the East India Company in Bengal from December, 1756, to February, 1760, when he vacated the chair of the Governor of the Presidency of Fort William in Bengal and sailed for England.

Clive's successors, Holwell (February-July, 1760) and Vansittart (July, 1760-1764), were unable to maintain this arrangement. The Company as the dominant military power was controlling and maintaining the Nawab's government, but the Nawab, a usurper of British make, was failing to make the promised payments to the Company. Ali Gauhar was now the nominal Mughal Emperor because his father was murdered in November, 1759; he was still hovering in Bihar. But he was successfully driven out of Bihar and the Zamindars who afforded him help were chastised. Miran, Mir Jafar's son and chosen successor, was killed by lightning. This brought up the question of succession and Vansittart, following the policy suggested by Holwell, decided to depose Mir Jafar in 1760 in favour of his son-in-law Mir Qasim. The revolution was quietly accomplished, Mir Jafar withdrawing from Murshidabad to Calcutta.

MIR QASIM (1760-63)

A new treaty was concluded with Mir Qasim and he had to give presents 'which cast a sordid air over the whole business'. It was provided that 'the Europeans and Telingas of the English army shall be ready to assist the Nawab Mir Md. Kasim Khan Bahadur in the management of all affairs', and 'for all charges of the Company and of the said army and provisions for the field etc., the lands of Burdwan, Midnapur and Chittagong shall be assigned . . . . and the Company to stand to all losses and receive all the profits of these three countries'.

Mir Qasim was an efficient ruler. Within a short time he was able to pay a large sum to his English creditors and the Government at Calcutta was able to remit two and a half lakhs
to Madras which enabled the English to prosecute the siege of Pondichery successfully. Major Carnac succeeded in defeating the nominal Mughal Emperor Shah Alam II on the banks of the Son. Mir Qasim proclaimed him Emperor in Bengal after his departure from the province. He was for sometime apprehensive that the British would secure a grant of Bengal from the fugitive Emperor. He increased the vigour of his revenue system and so great was his skill in accounts that nobody could escape. He is said to have realised in two years almost double the old revenue of the country.

Mir Qasim was from the beginning the object of suspicion and hostility on the part of the majority of the members of the Calcutta Council, who were not guided by any sense of justice; having no sympathy with the Indian point of view, they cared only for their profits. The abuses of English private trade had advanced very far under Mir Jafar and precipitated an open war between the Calcutta Council and Mir Qasim. Under Imperial farmans the Company was exempted from the payment of transit duties on goods passing through Bengal. The Company's servants, who got ridiculously low wages, enjoyed the right of private inland trade with which the Company had no concern. They claimed that this exemption from transit duties extended to this trade as well, which claim was, of course, absurd. As Vansittart put it, "It could never be intended by the Mughal King that private foreign merchants should be upon a better footing than private native merchants". After Plassey Mir Jafar issued orders exempting from duties goods covered by a pass (Dustuck) issued by the head of an English factory. After Plassey the great power of the English intimidated people and the trade abuses grew. The privilege was so abused that Mir Qasim felt that he must try to settle the matter. Not only were these Dustucks used for the private goods of the Company's servants; these were even sold to Indian merchants. Warren Hastings remarked in 1762 that such a system "can bode no good to the Nabob's revenues, to the quiet of the country or the honour of our nation." A very reasonable plan was discussed by the Nawab with Vansittart and Warren Hastings, and an agreement was arrived at. But the Calcutta Council would not agree and turned the proposal down. Furious with this rebuff, Mir Qasim remitted all duties
on Indian and European traders alike. Matters came to a head at Patna where Ellis, chief of the English factory, tried to seize the city; he was defeated and war began (1763).

Dodwell says that "it was a war of circumstances rather than of intentions". After all that had happened after Plassey, it was absurd to expect an equipoise between the East India Company and the Nawab of Bengal and a conflict was inevitable. The outrageous proceedings of the Calcutta Board and of Ellis at Patna must not make us blind to the inevitability of the failure of the system of Vansittart. Mir Qasim had discharged the Company's debt, paid the arrears of his army, retrenched the expenses of his court, reduced the power of the Zamindars and established an effective government. He had withdrawn to Monghyr from Murshidabad and there raised an army on European model with the help of European adventurers like the Alsatian Reinhard, better known as Samru, and the Armenian Marker.

When war was precipitated by the assault of the city of Patna by Ellis, Major Adams took the field with an army of 1,000 Europeans and 400 sepoys against Mir Qasim's army of 15,000 to 20,000 men. But Mir Qasim had no genius for war and his soldiers, led by adventurers, guided only by their selfish instincts, were defeated in successive engagements near the banks of the Ajai river, at Katwa, at Gheria and at Udhuanala (1763). Adams advanced upon Monghyr and Mir Qasim fled to Patna. There he killed the English prisoners who had fallen into his hands. Adversity developed the cruel side of his nature and he murdered all his enemies who had the misfortune to fall into his hands.

He then fled to Oudh and induced Shuja-ud-daula, the Nawab of Oudh, who was the Wazir of the nominal Mughal Emperor, as also the Mughal Emperor Shah Alam II, to become his allies. The terms of co-operation were agreed upon. Carnac, who led the British army now, was supine. The confederates advanced up to Patna but failed to take the city and had to fall back. Major Hector Munro, who succeeded Carnac, restored discipline in British ranks and took the offensive. Shuja-ud-daula, who was now fighting for himself, was after a stubborn contest completely defeated at Buxar (22 October, 1764). He fled into the Rohilla country. Oudh was overrun,
Shah Alam joined the English camp, and Mir Qasim became a fugitive, to die in 1777 at Delhi in extreme poverty.

**MIR JAFAR RESTORED (1763-1765)**

Meanwhile Mir Jafar had been restored in July, 1763. He signed a new treaty in which he agreed to limit the number of troops he would maintain, to receive a permanent Resident at his Durbar and to levy only a duty of 2½ per cent. on English trade in salt. He promised to pay 30 lakhs for the expenses of the war, to make a donation of 25 lakhs to the British army and half of that to the British navy, and to pay compensation to private individuals for the losses they had suffered. In the words of Srafft, “the Nabob became no more than a banker for the Company’s servants, who could draw upon him as often and to as great an amount as they pleased.”

Mir Jafar died early in 1765 and his successor, Najm-uddaula, had to agree to appoint a minister who was to be nominated by the English and who could not be removed without English approval. He was to maintain only such troops as were necessary ‘for the dignity of his own person and the business of collections throughout the provinces’. The Nawab was thus deprived of any independent military support for his executive. He became a figurehead with the administration in the hands of the nominees of the English. The Calcutta Councillors again took large presents but they combined their traffic in Nawabship with the assumption of absolute military supremacy in Bengal. Affairs were otherwise in great disarray when Clive reached Calcutta in May, 1765, as the Governor of Bengal for the second time.

**SECTION III**

**DEWANI AND DOUBLE GOVERNMENT**

**PROBLEMS BEFORE CLIVE (1765-67)**

Clive had to face a political as also an administrative problem. He had to settle the exact nature of British relations with the Mughal Emperor, the Nawab Wazir of Oudh and the Nawab of Bengal. The administrative questions that required
solution were no less difficult—to restore discipline in the Company's service, civil and military, and to put an end to the abuses of the past.

**TREATY WITH THE NAWAB OF OUDH (1765)**

Vansittart had promised Oudh to the Mughal Emperor, Clive, however, thought it proper to come to terms with Shuja-ud-daula and restored him to his dominions. According to the terms of the treaty of Allahabad, Shuja-ud-daula was to pay fifty *lakhs* to the East India Company for the expenses of the late war, and to enter into a defensive alliance with the Company. The Mughal Emperor, Shah Alam II, was put in full possession of Kora and Allahabad as a royal demesne for the support of his dignity and expenses. The union between Shuja-ud-daula and the East India Company proved to be firm. Clive did not want to pursue a policy of conquest. He wrote, "If ideas of conquest were to be the rule of our conduct, I foresee that we should, by necessity, be led from acquisition to acquisition until we had the whole empire up in arms against us". He hoped that Oudh would be a dependent buffer State.

**GRANT OF DEWANI BY SHAH ALAM (1765)**

In Bengal the process of exhausting the Nawab's functions was continued. On August 12, 1765, Clive secured from the Mughal Emperor a *farman* granting the East India Company the *Dewani* of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, promising in return to remit regularly the sum of 26 *lakhs* of rupees as royal revenue. The Nawab of Bengal sank into a mere pensioner. He was to be paid the annual sum of 53 *lakhs* of rupees for the support of the *Nizamat*. Clive established a Double Government in theory, with the Company as the *Dewan*, and the Nawab as *Nazim*. But the Nawab, having lost all independent military or financial support for his executive, became a mere titled pensioner. Clive, however, did not take over the administration of the country. The general administration remained in the hands of the Deputy Nawabs—Reza Khan in Bengal, Shitab Rai in Bihar. According to Clive's arrangement the Company left to the Deputy Nawabs the functions of *Dewan* as well as *Nazim*—land revenue and customs collection, civil
justice, criminal justice and police. The Deputy Nawabs were to administer Bengal really in the interest of the Company while maintaining a fiction of the sovereignty of the Mughal Emperor and the formal authority of the Nawab. Clive had no sense of responsibility for the good government of Bengal. According to his system, the only addition to the duty of the Company's servants in Bengal was 'superintending the collection of the revenues and receiving the money from the Nabob's treasury to that of the Dewany or the Company'.

This 'masked system' which Clive set up, in which power was separated from responsibility, has been defended on political grounds. According to Mill, it was 'the favourite policy of Clive to whose mind a certain degree of crooked artifice seems to have presented itself pretty congenially in the light of profound and skilful politics'. But avowed dominion would have created difficulties at Paris and the Hague and would have perhaps aroused bitter opposition of the European commercial rivals. As Firminger says, 'So far as the Nabob's power and wealth was concerned, he was aware that the English had, so to speak, sucked the orange dry but he imagined that the skin and pulp left behind on the table would delude the other foreign guests in Bengal into the idea that the English had not as yet devoured everything worth eating'.

REGULATIONS RELATING TO THE COMPANY'S OFFICERS

During his second Governorship Clive insisted on the East India Company's servants executing covenants prohibiting the acceptance of presents except within certain narrow limits. This was in accordance with orders of the Court of Directors. Many people, however, thought that their signature to the covenant was a mere matter of form. In view of the prevalent attitude of the Court of Directors Clive could not suggest a generous increase of the salary of the East India Company's servants; but the orders of the Court of Directors prohibiting interference of their servants in the inland trade of the country were positive and he, therefore, tried to find a way out of this difficulty by setting up a society of trade under the control of the Council. Clive wanted to remunerate only the superior servants of the Company who were given shares in the society
of trade which enjoyed a monopoly of the inland trade in salt, betelnut and tobacco, ‘the three articles next to grain of greatest consumption in the empire’. Fifty-five persons were to share in the proceeds of the society, including the Governor. Clive sold his shares in 1767 to two of his colleagues for £32,000. The monstrous scheme was disallowed by the Court of Directors in 1768.

During his second Governorship, Clive’s attempt to cut down the field allowance of the Bengal officers led to a mutinous combination of the European officers of the Company. Clive met this opposition with characteristic boldness. Most of the officers had to submit and the ringleaders were treated with great severity.

ESTIMATE OF CLIVE

Clive left India in February, 1767. He has been described as the acquirer of an Indian Empire for Britain but, as Mervyn Davies puts it, just as the Mughal Empire was not the work of Babur but of Akbar, so the British Empire in India was the work not of Clive but of the men who followed him. “His gifts were too limited for the larger task. He had not the sympathy, nor the imagination, nor the knowledge, nor the understanding, nor the patience nor the endurance necessary for the setting up of a great new system”.

DOUBLE GOVERNMENT AT WORK (1767-72)

The system of government associated with the name of Clive continued under his successors, Verelst (1767-69) and Cartier (1769-72)—the Nawab a figurehead, administration in the hands of the Naib Subah, Reza Khan, a nominee of the Company, but the English Resident at the Darbar deciding every matter of importance. Power remained divorced from responsibility. Trade abuses continued and as Becher, one of the Company’s servants, wrote in 1769, “the fact is undoubted that this fine country which flourished under the most despotic and arbitrary government is verging towards ruin”. An attempt was made by Verelst to check highhandedness and venality by appointing English Supervisors for the Dewanlands, but it was found in the days of Cartier that they only
made confusion worse confounded, and as they were permitted to continue private trade they abused their position of authority. What was really lacking was a principle of government adequate to the substance. In the words of Firminger, "The Court of Directors imagined that all it behoved their servants to do was to lie beneath the tree and let the ripe fruit tumble into their open mouths".

Famine of 1770

It was not until 1772 that the Company decided to 'stand forth as the Dewan' and assume responsibility for the administration of the country, but this decision was perhaps directly due to the great famine of 1770 which made Bengal 'a silent and deserted province'. In this terrible famine the Government relief effort was 'to the extent of £9,000 among thirty millions of people of whom six in every sixteen were officially admitted to have perished'. The famine was caused by the failure of rains but the Supervisors were accused of creating 'corners' in their attempts to preserve sufficiency of grain in their respective districts. Notwithstanding this terrible famine with its 'dire scenes of horror', the net collections of the year 1771 exceeded even those of 1768. The system of government was brutal and inhuman, and even the Court of Directors felt that the only effective cure would be the assumption of direct responsibility.

FOR FURTHER STUDY

H. Dodwell, Duplex and Clive.
Hunter, Annals of Rural Bengal.
Firminger, Introduction to the Fifth Report.
CHAPTER XXIV

REVIVAL OF THE MARATHAS AND RISE OF MYSORE

SECTION I

PESHWA MADHAV RAO I

REVIVAL OF THE MARATHAS AFTER 1761

The third battle of Panipat seemed to mark the beginning of the end of Maratha Imperial power. But Maratha recovery was very rapid and Peshwa Madhav Rao I (1761-72), son and successor of Balaji Baji Rao, is entitled to the highest praise for this unexpected recovery of the Maratha Empire from the effects of the stunning blow at Panipat.

WAR WITH NIZAM ALI

Madhav Rao I was in his seventeenth year when he succeeded his father. His uncle Raghunath Rao, a veteran soldier who was very fond of power, became the regent. Nizam Ali, who had practically ousted Salabat Jang from power at Hyderabad, tried to take advantage of Maratha misfortune and marched with about 60,000 troops towards Poona. The Marathas closed their ranks. Nizam Ali was defeated in a decisive battle in January, 1762, but Raghunath Rao, who was perhaps anticipating a struggle for power with his nephew, granted him very favourable terms. Disputes now began between the uncle and the nephew. Raghunath Rao was supported by the Nizam. The Peshwa submitted to his uncle, but the unusually fine character of this youngman enabled him steadily to get the upperhand. In 1763 he helped his uncle to defeat the Nizam in the battle of Rakshashbhuwan on the Godavari river, but Raghunath Rao again granted very favourable terms to the ruler of Hyderabad.
WAR WITH HAIDAR ALI

The Peshwa turned his attention against Haidar Ali whose rising power had become a menace to the Maratha territory between the Krishna and the Tungabhadra and who had already encroached on the Maratha sphere of influence north of Mysore. Haidar Ali was completely defeated in 1764-65, but Raghunath Rao prevailed upon the Peshwa to grant him favourable terms. Another campaign in 1766-67 further checked the growing power of Haidar Ali. The Peshwa also brought about the final submission of Janoji Bhonsle of Berar, a Maratha confederate, who was in league with the enemies of the Maratha Empire like the Nizam and Haidar Ali. Raghunath Rao, eager for power and anxious to join these enemies of the Marathas, had to be placed under restraint.

RESTORATION OF MARATHA POWER IN THE NORTH

The Peshwa next sent two expeditions: one to the North to recover the power and influence which the Marathas had in Malwa, Rajputana and the Doab before Panipat, and another to the South to crush Haidar Ali. The southern expedition (1769-72) was brilliantly successful. The Peshwa himself led it but as he fell ill and returned to Poona, Trimbak Rao was nominated as the leader of the expedition. He completely defeated Haidar Ali near Seringapatam; but the Peshwa was dying and this news emboldened Haidar. Though Trimbak Rao’s position was strong it was not possible under the circumstances to strive for the complete overthrow of Haidar; a treaty had to be concluded that left Haidar in possession of resources that still made him a formidable antagonist. In the North, the leaders of the Maratha expedition succeeded in re-occupying Malwa and Bundelkhand, in exacting tribute from the Rajput chiefs, in crushing the Jats and Rohillas, and also in occupying Delhi. They brought the fugitive Mughal Emperor Shah Alam II, a British pensioner at Allahabad, back to the Imperial capital (1772). The Peshwa’s premature death in November, 1772, was responsible for the return of the Maratha army to the South and this hasty return undid its work in the North. In the words of Grant Duff, “The plains of Panipat were not more fatal to the Maratha empire than the early end of this excellent prince”.
HAIDAR ALI

EARLY CAREER

While the Maratha power was again making itself felt in the North as also in the South, the small State of Mysore under Haidar Ali became a factor in the power politics of those days. Haidar was an adventurer of exceptional ability. He began his career as a Naik in the army of Nanjaraj, the commander-in-chief of the Mysore State, and very soon became his favourite. In the service of Nanjaraj he took part in the Anglo-French conflict at Trichinopoly and there he gained his experience of the art of war. He was appointed Faujdar of Dindigul in 1755. He took advantage of the bankruptcy of the Mysore State and the mutinous condition of the Mysore soldiery to oust Nanjaraj and to become the virtual ruler of Mysore, the nominal King being retained as a mere figurehead. His Dewan Khande Rao in his turn strove to oust him from power and sought Maratha help for this purpose. But the Panipat campaign diverted Maratha attention. Khande Rao was not effectively supported and Haidar succeeded in overwhelming him. In 1761 he became safely established in supreme authority in Mysore.

TERRITORIAL EXPANSION AND WAR WITH THE MARATHAS

Haidar now embarked upon a career of conquest and seized Sira, Bidnur (Nagar), Sunda and other places. But he had to reckon with the Marathas. Peshwa Madhav Rao was alive to this danger. The Maratha-Mysore wars of 1764-65, 1766-67, and 1769-72 diminished his power and prestige and might have ruined Haidar altogether but for the fatal illness and premature death of the Peshwa. Taking advantage of the chaos and confusion in Maratha affairs that followed the demise of Peshwa Madhav Rao, Haidar conquered Bellary, Gooty, Chitaldrug as also the Maratha territory between the Krishna and the Tungabhadra. He also secured Cuddapah. Towards the south he had already succeeded in bringing Coorg and Malabar under his sway. All Maratha attempts to check his advance to the Krishna in the years 1776-78 failed, though the
Marathas were allied with the Nizam in their effort to stem this tide of expansion. As a French writer puts it, "By steps rather slow but sustained, by a constant good fortune, he has formed a new power, comparable to a torrent that upsets and destroys all that it meets on the way".

RELATIONS WITH THE ENGLISH

With the English Haïdar's relations were not friendly. There was enmity between Muhammad Ali of Arcot and Haïdar Ali. Besides intense personal dislike, territorial disputes concerning certain districts also caused friction between these two Muslim rulers. The bungling diplomacy of the Government of Madras which controlled the Arcot Nawab precipitated a crisis. The Madras Government entered into an alliance with the Nizam in 1766 and agreed to help him with a British detachment. The Nizam advanced into the Mysore territory with his British auxiliaries at a time when Peshwa Madhav Rao I was also pressing Haïdar very hard. Haïdar prevailed upon the Peshwa to grant him peace; he also won the Nizam over and induced him to join him in his project of the invasion of the dominions of the Nawab of Arcot and the British. The unprovoked enmity of the British made him furious and he invaded the Carnatic along with the Nizam. Thus the First Anglo-Mysore War (1767-69) began.

Haïdar and the Nizam were defeated by Colonel Smith in the battles of Changama and Trinomali (1767). The Nizam withdrew and later concluded a separate peace with the Madras Government (1768). Haïdar was not to be so easily thwarted. He knew thoroughly well how to keep the effects of his defeats confined within narrow limits. He was to some extent successful against other British commandants though he was not able to defeat Colonel Smith. The war dragged on. At the head of his swift cavalry Haïdar made a sudden dash and approached Madras in March, 1769. The panic-stricken Madras Council was thus compelled to conclude a treaty providing for mutual restitution of conquests and a defensive alliance (April, 1769).

As a realist Haïdar felt that this defensive alliance must be the mainstay of his foreign policy. The Nizam was un-
dependable. The Peshwa was his principal enemy who had twice defeated him and seized valuable territory from him. British military power might be utilized in a defensive alliance against the Marathas. But when the Marathas again invaded his territory (1769-72) he requested the British in vain to come to his aid. The Madras Government was shifty, intractable and undependable. Even after 1772 he tried to bring about a closer rapprochement with Muhammad Ali and the Madras Government. But he grew disgusted with their shifts and subterfuges. He felt that he had to reckon with the prospect of their joining an offensive alliance against him in future. When the First Anglo-Maratha War (1775-82) began, the Marathas, with a better sense of the realities of the situation approached him and the active anti-Maratha phase of his career ended. War with the British being more or less inevitable after this, the main preoccupation of his life as that of his son later on was to crush the British. As Haidar told a British ambassador later, he decided to expunge the English name from the Carnatic.

SECTION III

FOREIGN POLICY OF HASTINGS

REVISION OF CLIVE'S FOREIGN POLICY BY WARREN HASTINGS

When the Marathas reappeared in Northern India in 1769, occupied Delhi in 1771 and induced the Mughal Emperor to come to Delhi and place himself under Maratha protection, Warren Hastings, Governor of Bengal (1772-74), naturally found that in the changed circumstances Clive's foreign policy required revision. The districts of Kora and Allahabad had been given to the Mughal Emperor. Now that he was in Maratha custody and the Maratha menace was real, Hastings decided to restore Kora and Allahabad to the Nawab of Oudh who was to pay 50 lakhs for this restoration. The payment of the tribute of 26 lakhs to Shah Alam was also discontinued. The other important British problem in foreign affairs concerned Rohilkhand.
BRITISH TREATY WITH OUDH (1773)

"The central pillar of Hastings's foreign policy was the alliance with Oudh". He tried to strengthen Oudh in every way. He concluded a treaty with the Nawab of Oudh at Benares in August, 1773. He sought to establish a definite agreement with Shuja-ud-daula in place of the loose manner in which British concerns with him were conducted. The Nawab raised the question of Rohilkhand, which was now exposed to Maratha invasion. The Rohilla Afghans formed a loose confederacy and ruled over a fertile country along the base of the Himalayas. Warren Hastings referred to the strategic importance of the Rohilla country in the following words, "It is to the province of Oudh, in respect to both its geographical and political relations, exactly what Scotland was to England before the reign of Queen Elizabeth. The reduction of this territory would have completed the defensive line of the Vizier’s dominions and of course left us less to defend, as he subsists on our strength entirely". This was the policy underlying what is called the Rohilla War.

THE ROHILLA WAR (1774)

The events leading up to the Rohilla War and the details of the war are not pleasant reading. In June, 1772, Hafiz Rahamat Khan, the Rohilla chief, agreed to pay Shuja-ud-daula 40 lakhs if he succeeded in compelling the Marathas to withdraw from the Rohilla country. The treaty was signed in the presence of Sir Robert Barker, the British commander-in-chief. The Marathas withdrew, came again in 1773, but again withdrew. They had soon to return to the Deccan on account of domestic complications following the death of Peshwa Madhav Rao I. Shuja-ud-daula demanded payment from the Rohillas but they declined to pay. When the treaty of Benares was concluded he wanted British help to punish the Rohillas and to conquer Rohilkhand. He promised to meet all the expenses of the campaign and to pay a sum of 40 lakhs. Hastings agreed. The Nawab, however, changed his mind. But in February, 1774, the vacillating Nawab asked for British aid in terms of the treaty of Benares. A British army under Colonel Champion marched to Rohilkhand and, with Oudh forces, defeated and
killed Hafiz Rahmat Khan at Mirankatra in April, 1774. The Rohillas were driven out and the country was incorporated within the dominions of Oudh.

The Nawab Wazir had at one stage desired to give up the Rohilla expedition to which Warren Hastings had readily agreed. Hastings wrote then, "I was glad to be freed from the Rohilla expedition because I was doubtful of the judgment which would have been passed upon it at home, where I see too much stress laid upon general maxims and too little attention given to the circumstances which require an exception to be made for them". Sir Alfred Lyall criticises the political immorality of the whole transaction. He writes, "A shifty line of policy is far more unsafe than a weaker frontier". The invasion was unprovoked and the operations of Oudh troops were uncontrolled. The Rohillas "were in reality suppressed for reasons not unlike those which led to the political destruction of Poland because they could not be trusted to hold an important position on the frontiers of more powerful states". Oudh had to be strengthened against the growing menace of the Maratha power; so the Rohillas were sacrificed. The financial part of the transaction was the most avowedly cynical aspect of it. Hastings himself observed, "The absence of the Marathas and the weak state of the Rohillas, promised an easy conquest of them, and I own that such was my idea of the Company's distress at home added to my knowledge of their wants abroad, that I should have been glad of any occasion to employ their forces, that saves so much of their pay and expenses."

WARREN HASTINGS AS GOVERNOR-GENERAL (1774-85)

By strengthening and giving armed support to Oudh, Warren Hastings succeeded in building up 'a firm breakwater against the incessant fluctuations of predatory warfare that distracted Northern India'; but as Governor-General (1774-85) he found the British power in India entangled by the Bombay Government in a war with the Marathas, and some years later the bungling diplomacy of the Madras Government was responsible for a war with Haidar Ali and the Nizam. Hastings found himself in the midst of a tremendous conflict against a combina-
tion of the most formidable powers in India—the Marathas, the Nizam, Haidar Ali—as also the European rival in India—France.

ORIGIN OF THE FIRST ANGLO-MARATHA WAR

After the death of Peshwa Madhav Rao I in 1772 his brother Narayan Rao succeeded, but he was murdered nine months later (1773) by some adherents of his uncle Raghunath and confusion began in Maratha history. Raghunath was recognised as the Peshwa, but the birth of a posthumous son to Narayan Rao led to the development of a concerted opposition.¹ The child was formally invested as the Peshwa and Raghunath Rao became an exile and pretender. The Bombay Government in their anxiety to secure possession of the adjoining island of Salsette entered into an agreement with him. They seized the island of Salsette by force and concluded with him a treaty known as the treaty of Surat on 7th March, 1775. Raghunath Rao agreed to cede in perpetuity the islands of Salsette and Bassein with a share of the revenues of the Broach and Surat districts. The English agreed to assist him with a force of 2,500 whose cost he would defray. Thus began a war between the Council of Regency at Poona and the Government of Bombay.

THE FIRST ANGLO-MARATHA WAR (1775-82)

Colonel Keatinge was sent with troops to Gujarat to act in concert with Raghunath Rao who was there. After some skirmishes a battle was fought with the Poona troops at Adas (Arras) on 18th May, 1775. Keatinge won, but at a heavy cost. In the meantime the Supreme Government at Calcutta expressed its disapproval of the treaty of Surat, declaring the war to be ‘impolitic, dangerous, unauthorised and unjust’. In spite of the protest of the Bombay Government Colonel Upton was sent from Calcutta to negotiate with the Poona Government. He concluded a treaty which is known as the treaty of Purandhar (March, 1776). The treaty of Surat was formally annulled. Raghunath Rao was to get a generous pension and to reside in Gujarat. Salsette was to be retained by the English

¹ See Genealogical Table, p. 444.
if the Governor-General so desired. The provisions of this treaty included the cession of Broach revenues and payment of 12 lakhs to defray the war expenses.

Raghunath Rao could not understand the nature of this interference and he decided on his part to refuse these terms. The Bombay Government afforded him asylum at Surat in violation of the treaty of Purandhar. In this unsettled state of affairs a despatch arrived from the Court of Directors in which they approved 'under every circumstance' of the treaty of Surat. This emboldened the Bombay Government to disregard the treaty of Purandhar and they invited Raghunath Rao to Bombay. Another despatch of the Court of Directors in 1778 further emboldened the Bombay Government to form a fresh alliance with Raghunath Rao on the basis of the treaty of Surat. Suspicions of French intrigue at Poona added to the existing complications. The Bombay Government decided that Raghunath Rao should be installed at Poona as Regent for the young Peshwa Madhav Rao Narayan and Nana Fadnavis, the leading Minister, and his Council of Regency should be ousted. They sent an expedition towards Poona in November, 1778. The army was composed of 3,000 men. It proceeded up the ghats but, confronted by a big Maratha army, fell back, and at Wadgaon found further retreat to be impossible. A convention disgraceful to British political and military prestige was signed at Wadgaon and the humiliated British army was allowed to retire (January, 1779). To avoid surrender Raghunath took refuge with the Maratha chief Mahadji Sindhia.

The Convention of Wadgaon was repudiated by Hastings. He had already sent a detachment under Leslie whom he had instructed to march by the land route to Bombay. Leslie embroiled himself with the chiefs in Bundelkhand. But he died in October, 1778, and was succeeded in command by Goddard who led his detachment to Surat in safety. This successful march across the breadth of the Indian continent increased the prestige of British arms. Raghunath Rao escaped from the custody of Mahadji Sindhia to the protection of Goddard. According to Grant Duff, this escape was Mahadji's contrivance. But Raghunath Rao could no longer be regarded as of any importance and for all practical purposes the English now became a principal in this contest.
A general confederacy was now formed against the English. It was composed of the Marathas, Haidar Ali and the Nizam. The insane desire of the Bombay Government to show what they could do on their own initiative was only surpassed by the diplomatic blunders perpetrated by the Madras Government. The Nizam was alienated by a treaty concluded in 1779 by the Madras Government with his brother Basalat Jang, whom they took under their protection on condition of his allowing them to rent the district of Guntur. Haidar had become anti-English because he could not persuade the Madras Government to enter into a defensive alliance which he might utilise against the Marathas. He became exasperated by the British capture of Mahé, a French possession in Malabar, by the Basalat Jang affair, by frequent boundary disputes, and as a consequence of constant friction in Malabar. The Wadgaon Convention helped the building of this hostile confederacy. The Poona Government recognised Haidar’s conquests as far as the Krishna. It was arranged that the Nizam would invade the Northern Sankars, Haidar would invade the Carnatic, Mudhoji Bhonsle of Berar would attack Bengal, and the Poona Government would continue the war on the Bombay side. Haidar could also count upon the possibility of French co-operation. France and England were at war since 1778. Mudhoji was, however, bought off by Hastings, who also succeeded in securing the neutrality of the Nizam by giving up Guntur in 1780.

Warren Hastings struck hard. Goddard, having concluded a treaty with Fateh Singh Gaikwad, carried Ahmadabad by assault in February, 1780. Hastings won over the Rana of Gohad, who might be expected to give sufficient trouble to Mahadji Sindhia. In order to support him he despatched Captain Popham from Bengal. Popham escalated the strong fort of Gwalior in August, 1780, assisted by spies supplied by the Rana of Gohad. It was followed by important consequences. Mahadji Sindhia had to hurry to the north. General Goddard captured Bassein in December, 1780, and defeated the Maratha army in the Konkan. But he made the mistake of advancing to the Bhore Ghat. He allowed himself to be entangled by Nana Fadnavis in negotiations which led to nothing, and in his effort to retire on Kalyan and Bombay to canton for the rains he suffered a reverse.
While these events were happening on the Bombay coast the plan of Warren Hastings to create a powerful diversion in the heart of Sindhia’s territory was further developed. Colonel Camac invaded Malwa and in February, 1781, reduced Sipri, advanced to Sironj and succeeded in surprising Sindhia’s camp and frightening him. Sindhia showed willingness to come to terms. He concluded a separate treaty with the British in October, 1781, and bound himself to stand neutral. The British army recrossed the Jumna.

TREATY OF SALBAI (1782)

Warren Hastings had earlier a plan of mediation through Mudhoji Bhonsle, but it was now considered better to negotiate with the Poona Darbar through Mahadji Sindhia. The treaty of Salbai was concluded on the 17th May, 1782, Sindhia being at the same time the plenipotentiary of the Peshwa and the mutual guarantee of both parties for the due performance of the treaty. The British secured Salsette but restored the territory conquered since the treaty of Purandhar. Raghunath Rao was granted a generous pension by the Poona Government. The Peshwa and the English undertook that their allies should maintain peace with one another. It was provided in the treaty that Haidar was to be obliged to relinquish the territory he had conquered from the English and the Nawab of Arcot. This article was never acted upon and the treaty itself was not ratified at Poona until after the death of Haidar in December, 1782. "The Maratha prime minister (i.e., Nana Fadnavis), a man of high degree in statecraft, saw that by holding it in suspense over the belligerents he could keep in his hands the balance of power between Haidar Ali or Tipu and Hastings." The treaty gave the British 'peace with the Marathas for twenty years' and possession of Salsette, but the war imposed a heavy financial burden.

THE SECOND ANGO-MYSORE WAR (1780-84)

The Second Anglo-Mysore war began in July, 1780. Though the Nizam and Bhonsle did not co-operate, Haidar succeeded in giving the British, in the words of MacLeod, second in command at Madras, ‘a damned rap over the knuckles’. He entered the Carnatic with an army of about 90,000. The
Madras Government was unprepared and in the opening stages of the campaign its Commander-in-Chief, Sir Hector Munro, the well-known hero of Buxar, showed the greatest indecision, amounting almost to imbecility. Haidar created a circle of desolation around Madras, its lines of communications, and round Vellore. It was not wanton and indiscriminate destruction but a war measure. With certain exceptions due to the exigencies of the military situation, the country he conquered below the ghats was as well protected as possible. Assisted by his son Tipu, he overwhelmed at Pollilore a detachment of about 4,000 under Baillie that was marching from Guntur to Conjeveram to join Munro. Munro fidgeted in indecision within the hearing of the guns and after this disaster withdrew as precipitately as he could to Madras.

When Warren Hastings heard of this state of things he made a supreme effort. He sent Sir Eyre Coote, with reinforcements in men and money, to lead the campaign against Haidar Ali. A French fleet under D'Orves appeared on the Madras coast. When Sir Eyre Coote arrived with his army at Cuddalore from Madras, the French fleet put a stop to his supplies coming by the sea. Haidar with his army cut off his communications by land. Coote's position at Cuddalore resembled that of Cornwallis at Yorktown, but for some inexplicable reason D'Orves sailed away and Coote could now secure provisions from Madras by sea. On account of the incapacity of the French admiral, Haidar missed the greatest opportunity of his career. The Cuddalore escapade of Coote must be regarded as one of the greatest events in Indo-British history.

After this Coote gained three victories over Haidar in succession—Porto Novo (1st July, 1781), second battle of Pollilore (August 27th, 1781), Sholingur (September 27th, 1781). But these British victories did not lead to much. Haidar merely lost the ground on which he stood. With his swift cavalry he commanded the communications, and the British were not able to move into the interior from the seacoast because they could not get sufficient supplies. Early in 1782 a powerful French squadron appeared in the Indian Ocean under the brilliant Admiral de Suffrein. Five indecisive actions were fought between him and the British admiral Sir Edward Hughes. But as a consequence of these engagements superiority rested
with the French. According to the French plan Bussy, the old French leader of the days of Dupleix and Lally, was to land with an army and co-operate with Haidar, but he did not land until after Haidar’s death. Either by bad management or bad fortune France never had in India an able general or an able admiral at the right moment. Suffrein arrived off Pondicherry a year too late, while at the summit of Haidar’s fortune the indolent or cowardly D’Orves robbed Haidar of an otherwise certain triumph.

In his campaign of 1782, Haidar had only one major victory to boast of: Tipu surrounded a detachment of 2,000 under Braithwaite at Tanjore and compelled their surrender. Haidar died in December, 1782. The war continued even after his death. But peace was concluded between England and France in June, 1783. A British attempt to take Bidnur failed disastrously. Tipu besieged Mangalore which the British had occupied. A British army under Colonel Fullarton occupied Coimbatore in November, 1783. Lord Macartney, Governor of Madras, became impatient to conclude a treaty and Tipu agreed. The treaty of Mangalore (March, 1784) concluded the war on the basis of the mutual restitution of conquests and liberation of prisoners of war. Hastings did not like the terms of this treaty.

ACHIEVEMENT OF HASTINGS

In connection with the First Anglo-Maratha and the Second Anglo-Mysore Wars Warren Hastings made the following claim, “I had no more concern in the origin and commencement of the Maratha war than the Lord Advocate of Scotland. . . . I have been the instrument of saving one Presidency from infamy and both from annihilation.” Considering the part he played in saving the Bombay and Madras Presidencies the claim must be regarded as modest.

FOR FURTHER STUDY

Grant Duff, History of the Mahrattas (edited by S. M. Edwardes), Vols. I-II.
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Sir Alfred Lyall, Warren Hastings.