ADDENDA.

P. 52, 55. It is not easy, within a reasonable compass, to give a perfectly accurate account of Napier’s views as to the intentions of the Ameers during the period referred to in the text; for his conclusions varied from time to time according to the information which he received, and perhaps also according to his own humour. Early in November, for instance, he wrote, “They say they will fight,—J’en doute!” but on the 26th of the same month he remarked, in a letter to Lord Ellenborough, “I am entirely of your Lordship’s opinion that all the defensive measures of the Ameers are only so till an opportunity offers of making them offensive.” The prevailing bent of his opinion, however, was that they were only waiting for a favourable opportunity to fight. . . (See Life, vol. ii., pp. 236, 246, 248, 250, 257-58, 279, and Correspondence relative to Sinde. [1838-43], No. 410, 418, 422, 445,—which contain virtually the whole of the evidence on this point for November-December, 1842).

P. 54. It was not till January 28, 1843, that Napier wrote to the Governor-General about the undue demands which had found their way into the treaty; and he then said that the matter had only been brought to his notice on the previous day. (Enclosures to Secret Letters from the Governor-General, 1843,—No. 2,—8-13, 28 Jan. 1843). But Outram, in his Commentary, states most positively that he pointed out the facts to Napier on November 12, 1842, directly Napier showed him the draft; and there can be no doubt that Napier, who appears to have been impatient of attending to the complicated details of the treaty, forgot, if he did not neglect, to report to the Governor-General what Outram had said.
P. 70. It is possible, no doubt, that the Ameers of Hyderabad, although, as Napier was aware, they had, before January 30, 1843, refused to receive or aid those of Khyrpore, might in any case have been prevailed upon to support them; but the fact remains that Napier did nothing to prevent the alliance.

The passage in one of Outram’s letters (J. n. 26, 1843), which, I think, may have misled Napier, ran as follows:—“I... hope I may possibly do something at Hyderabad, both with the Upper and Lower Scinde Ameers, should you send me there.” On the 22nd, however, he had asked Napier to let him go to Hyderabad, expressly on the ground that he might prevent the Ameers of Lower Scinde from “giving aid or refuge” to their kinsmen; and this request he had renewed on the 24th. Moreover, in his Commentary, he over and over again charged Napier with having caused the most serious harm, (1) by not consenting in time to let him try to prevent the Upper Scinde Ameers from throwing themselves on the hospitality of those of Hyderabad, and (2) by actually ordering them to go either. Writing was notoriously not Outram’s forte: he wrote long letters, and had to write in a hurry; and I can only conclude that, in his letter of the 26th, what he meant to say was that he hoped, if Napier sent him to Hyderabad, to do something for, not with, the Ameers of Khyrpore.

P. 73. Napier afterwards complained that Outram had kept assuring him throughout the negotiations that there was “not a man in arms in Hyderabad.” It is true that Outram, trusting to the assurances of the Ameers (who could not, if they would, have dispersed the Beloochees), told Napier on the 12th of February that all the troops had been dismissed on the previous day: but he repeatedly warned him that, unless he were empowered to give a pledge to the Ameers that the army would not advance beyond Hala, they would, in self-defence, reassemble them.

P. 109. “But it was in the collection of the land-revenue... expense of the Government.” It is very difficult to arrive at the exact truth about Napier’s collection of the land-revenue; for the data, though voluminous, are, as compared, for instance, with those furnished by the Punjaub Board of Administration, insufficient on essential points. The general impression produced by the article in the Calcutta Review on “British
Administration of Scinde” (see note to p. 118, App. M, No. 15, and p. 169) is, I think, too unfavourable: but it seems clear that Napier’s method of collection was needlessly expensive, and that the robbery of which his inexperienced assistants were the victims, was such as a strong revenue officer like John Lawrence would have known how to prevent.

Of course, as the collectors gained experience, they became able to detect the more glaring frauds of their native subordinates.

P. 154. Outram and others have denied that the Ameers were guilty of infanticide: but the testimony of Sir Richard Burton (Sindh, pp. 44, 244) appears to me conclusive.

The statement, “Humble offenders were punished with merciless rigour” (p. 36) needs qualification. Minor offences, e.g., theft, were frequently punished by mutilation: but the Ameers were exceedingly reluctant to indict the penalty of death.

P. 226. I have got some slight additional information about Hodson’s Rugby days from two of his old schoolfellows, both of whom have since achieved high distinction, and one knew him very well, and liked him. He had literary tastes: one of the earliest recollections of his former intimate friend is of having heard him read, with enthusiasm, some verses by Clough. He was not, says this informant, a boy of any high principle, though he was susceptible of good impressions. Strange to say, though he did good service as a preceptor in Cotton's house, he was not remarkable among his schoolfellows for courage,—at least in the football field. (See Mr. Thomas Hughes's article on Hodson in vol. 59 of Fraser's Magazine.)

P. 178. I might have added, in the foot note to this page, that George Lawrence, as many old Indians could testify, would have been the last man to make a statement injuriously affecting the honour of another, unless he had been certain of its truth.

P. 188. The story,—originally published by Mr. Bosworth Smith (Appendix to Life of Lord Lawrence, pp. 513, 517),—of Hodson's having spent the pay of one of his subalterns, and of what followed, is told on the authority of the subaltern himself (now a Major-General), to whom I applied for confirmation of its truth.
Pp. 208-9. The words, "secretly, and doubtless . . . . . . care to reveal" (p. 208), coupled with the foot note to p. 209, will, I think, have made it clear that my informant had no positive proof that Hodson received a bribe for the unauthorised guarantee of safety which he gave to the Queen. But, to prevent any possible misconception, I write this note. What my informant positively vouches for is that the guarantee, which, I repeat, he himself saw, was given before the Royal Family left the Palace of Delhi. The Queen, when casually asked what she had paid Hodson, only laughed. But my informant agrees with me that Hodson must have received a quid pro quo; and, indeed, that he did so is self-evident (see note to p. 209). The fact of Hodson's having already given the unauthorised guarantee accounts for the persistence with which he urged Wilson to let him promise the King his life. He did not think it necessary to make any such request in the case of the princes.

P. 214. "The orders I received," wrote Hodson, in a letter to his wife, "were such that I did not dare to act upon the dictates of my own judgement to the extent of killing the King when he had given himself up." These words appear inconsistent with his own statement,—already quoted in a foot note to p. 208,—"General Wilson refused to send troops in pursuit of him (the King), and to avoid greater calamities I then, and not till then, asked and obtained permission to offer him his wretched life, on the ground, and solely on the ground, that there was no other way of getting him into our possession." They also appear inconsistent with the testimony of Colonel Turnbull (p. 208, note) and of another officer, both of whom have told me that they heard Hodson urge Wilson to let him promise the King his life. Possibly the inconsistency is to be accounted for by assuming that Hodson, when he wrote the letter to his wife, wished it to be thought that he had reluctantly submitted to a positive order to promise the King his life, lest people might suppose that he had had secret reasons of his own for giving the promise. For, as he has told us himself (Rev. G. Hodson's Hodson of Hodson's Horse, p. 231), he was blamed for giving it: people who believed that the King was responsible for the murder of Europeans, were naturally anxious that he should be tried, and, if he were found guilty, hanged; and of course it
was for this reason that Wilson was reluctant to make any terms with him. If Hodson really meant that his "own judgement" would have led him to kill the King when he had given himself up, his admission amounted to this:—that his own judgement would have led him to kill one whom he himself described as "very old and infirm and a mere tool in the hands of" the princes; whom he had induced to surrender by a promise which he had himself asked his General for permission to give; and to whom moreover he had already secretly given a guarantee of safety (see pp. 208-9); in other words, that he would have committed murder aggravated by flagrant breach of faith! One need not, however, believe that he was so black as he painted himself. Doubtless he would, as he said, "have much rather brought the King into Delhi dead than alive,"—if he had been free to gratify his inclination. Had he not fettered himself by giving the unauthorised guarantee of safety to the Queen, his "judgement" would doubtless have led him to slew the King, as he slew the princes. At least, if this is a calumny, he was himself the author of it. But it is hardly credible that, whatever Wilson's "orders" had been, he would have gone so far as to kill the King after giving the Queen that secret guarantee.

P. 259. In the last paragraph of the life of Sir W. Napier (written in 1884) the words, "Napier sorrowfully acknowledged that for him it had been too great," were partly suggested by some recollections of his, recorded by his biographer (vol. ii. p. 443),* which, perhaps, will hardly bear such an interpretation.