constituted by them. The impressions of the words are revived together and produce recollection of a sentence. Thus the isolated impressions of individual letters and words produce a collective recollection of the whole sentence. The meaning of a sentence is comprehended in this way.\textsuperscript{118}

6. The Effects of Recollection

Praśastapāda mentions the following effects of recollection:
(1) Recollection is the cause of recalling what remains behind of a previous cognition (śesānuvyavasāya). Śrīdhara interprets the term in this manner. Recollection consists in the revival of the impressions of previous cognitions by the perception of suggestive signs (liṅgadarśana). They revive the particular impressions because they were always perceived in the past together with the objects, the impressions of which are left in the self. The first cognition of a suggestive sign is the cause of recalling the object suggested by it because of recollection of the invariable concomitance between the suggestive sign and the suggested object.\textsuperscript{117} Śrīdhara thinks that recollection involves inference and recollection of its ground, viz. invariable concomitance (vyāpti). But this view is wrong. Recollection does not involve conscious or unconscious inference of the object suggested by the indicative sign or cue due to recollection of the invariable concomitance between them. In recollection there is suggestion, but neither inference nor knowledge of its ground. (2) Recollection of an object is the cause of remembrance of other objects associated with it (anusmaraṇa). Recollection of the first word of a sentence is the cause of remembrance of the second word because of its association with the first word. This is an example of contiguous association. One idea suggests another idea associated with it. This is called anusmaraṇa. It literally means after-recollection in which the recollection of one idea leads to the recollection of another idea associated with it. Suggestion and association are involved in memory. (3) Recollection is the cause of desire. The recollection of an object which afforded pleasure in the past is the cause of desire for it. This implies that pleasure can produce an impression.

\textsuperscript{118} KR., p. 134.
\textsuperscript{117} Prabhāṣa-pājata-liṅgajānāpekṣayā tadantarpāvyanumeyajñānam taṣya hetur vyāptismaraṇam. NK., p. 257.
which can be revived by the recollection of the object which afforded pleasure in the past. (4) Recollection is the cause of aversion. The recollection of an object which caused pain on a previous occasion is the cause of aversion to it. This implies that pain can produce an impression which can be revived by the recollection of the object which produced pain in the past. Pleasure and pain can produce impressions which are revived not only by the perception of the objects which caused them in the past, but also by the recollection of them.\footnote{Śrīdhara suggests here that feelings are not directly remembered, but that they are remembered through the medium of cognitions. First there is the recollection of objects; then the feelings caused by them in the past are remembered. Thus feelings are remembered through the intermediate agency of cognitions. Cognitions are directly remembered. But feelings cannot be directly remembered. They depend upon cognitions for their recollection.}

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7. Suggestion and Association

Milinda-pañha clearly gives the ideas of suggestion and association. "The King (Milinda) said: 'Does memory, Nāgāsenā, always arise subjectively, or is it stirred up by suggestion from outside?' 'Both the one and the other.' 'But does not that amount to all memory being subjective in origin, and never artificial?' 'If, O King, there were no artificial memory, then artisans would have no need of practice, or art, or schooling, and teachers would be useless. But the contrary is the case.' 'Very good, Nāgasena.'"\footnote{Śrīṣūnuvyavasāyecchānusmaranā-dveṣahetuḥ. P Bh., p. 256. Sukha-sādhanatva-śmrīr itceṣāhetuḥ. Duḥkha-sādhaka-smaragam dveṣahetuḥ. NK., p. 257.}

Memory depends upon subjective as well as objective conditions. The force of association of ideas is a subjective condition. One idea is suggested by another idea with which it was associated in the past experience. Or, it is revived by the perception of a suggestive sign or cue, which is an external stimulus. A teacher gives a suggestion to a pupil, which revives the idea of an object perceived by him in the past. The same action repeatedly performed by an artist is ingrained in his organism as a habit, which

\footnote{The Questions of King Milinda, Part I, pp. 120-1.}
facilitates the recollection of it in future. Repetition is an objective condition of recollection.

Milandapaña speaks of habit and association both as conditions of recollection. "Now give me an illustration of thought arising where sight is because of habit. 'What do you think, great King, if one cart went ahead which way would a second cart go?' 'The same as the first.' 'But would the first tell the second to go where it went, or the second tell the first that it would go where it had gone?' 'No, Sir. There would be no communication between the two. The second would follow the first out of habit.' 'Just so, great King, with sight and thought.' 'Now give me an illustration of how thought arises, where sight has arisen, through association.' 'In the art of calculating by using the joints of fingers as signs or marks, in the art of arithmetic, pure and simple, and in the art of writing, O King, the beginner is clumsy. But after a certain time with attention and practice he becomes expert. Just so is it that, where sight has arisen, thought too by association springs up.'"  

8. Loss of Memory

Forgetfulness is due to the destruction of the impressions of past experiences. Śrīnivāsa mentions the lapse of a long time, disease, and the effacement of impressions as the causes of forgetfulness. 121 (1) Impressions are effaced by the lapse of a long time after the original perceptions. They gradually fade away, if they are not strengthened by repeated similar perceptions. (2) Sickness also weakens impressions which are gradually obliterated and lead to forgetfulness. The healthy condition of the body is a condition of memory. Sickness is a condition of forgetfulness. (3) The obscuration or destruction of impressions is a cause of the loss of memory.

Śrīdhara and Śaṅkara Miśra mention the following causes of the effacement of impressions. (4) Impressions are effaced by contrary cognitions. 122 When Caitra is mistaken for Maitra, the illusory cognition of Maitra produces an impression of Maitra

120 Pp. 189-92.
121 Kāladaṅghyād vyādhyādinaḥ vā saṃskārapramoṣāt śmrtyabhāvāḥ. YMD., p. 4.
122 Saṃskāraḥ kvacit virodhi-jñāna-pravartyaḥ. KR., p. 132. Pratīpakṣa-
jñāmena saṃskāro vināśyate. NK., p. 208.
which is counteracted by the repeated contrary cognition that this is not Maitra but Caitra. Thus the impression of a wrong cognition is counteracted by the corresponding right cognition. (5) Impressions are obliterated by intoxication. The impressions of past experiences of intoxicated persons are found to be obliterated. There is lapse of memory under the influence of intoxication. Mental equilibrium is completely lost in an intoxicated condition. A certain amount of mental equipoise is a condition of memory. (6) Impressions are effaced by intense pain. The impressions of the past life are effaced by the intense pain of death. Intense pain causes lapse of memory in this life. (7) Impressions are effaced by intense pleasure also. A person enjoying excessive pleasure forgets other things. There is lapse of memory even under the influence of excessive pleasure. Thus forgetfulness is determined by feelings. (8) Impressions are effaced by anger. In a state of rage (roṣa) a person loses his mental equipoise, and consequently cannot remember things. Thus forgetfulness is influenced by strong emotions. Mahādeva Paṇḍita mentions five causes of the destruction of impressions, viz. recollections of a similar nature, contrary cognitions, intoxication, intense pain, and a long interval of time. (9) When the mind of a person is pre-occupied with something else, he cannot recall an object. Pre-occupation of the mind with something resists the revival of impressions of other things. When the mind is under the influence of the excitement of gambling and the like, he forgets what he has learnt. When the excitement is continuous, the impressions of other things gradually fade away and disappear. (10) The Bhagavad Gītā traces the lapse of memory to delusion, and the impairment of intellect to the loss of memory. Delusion is non-discrimination between right and wrong due to anger. It induces the lapse of memory which destroys the power of discriminating between right and wrong. The power of recollection can again be regained by destroying delusion due to ignorance.

123 Kvaṭi tīvraduhkhaniivartyaḥ. KR., p. 132. NK., p. 268.
124 Bhogāsaktaśya pūrvavṛttā-smṛtyabhāvāt. NK., p. 268.
125 NK., p. 268; KR., p. 132.
126 Nyāyasāra, p. 103.
127 Dyūtād-vyasanāpaṇaśya pūrvādhiita-vismaraṇāt. NK., p. 268.
129 Naśto mohaḥ smṛtir labdhaḥ. BG., XVIII, 73.
proper mental modes owing to the increase of contrary thoughts, or produces improper mental modes.\textsuperscript{131}

(11) Caraka describes epilepsy (apasmāra) as a disease in which there is unconsciousness accompanied by abnormal actions, which is caused by the lapse of memory, and loss of intelligence and purity (sattva). He ascribes it to the provocation of the bodily humours owing to the excess of energy (rajas) and inertia (tamas). The bodily humours, being excited by lust, anger, fear, avarice, joy, grief, apprehension and anxiety, attack the heart and the seats of the sense-organs, and thus bring about lapse of memory and consciousness. Thus the provocation of the bodily humours, the loss of mental equipoise, and the preponderance of energy and delusion are the causes of loss of memory. Habitual commission of immoral actions, performance of bodily actions in an unnatural manner, and violation of the principles of dietetics cause epilepsy.\textsuperscript{132}

A past apprehension is the cause of recollection through its impression which is its causal operation. Some are of the opinion that it is the cause of recollection not as an apprehension, but as a cognition (jñāna), because otherwise there would be no recollection after recollection, in that the first impression of the past apprehension is destroyed by a similar recollection. But the first recollection, they argue, produces an impression, which produces another recollection. Viśvanātha criticizes this view thus: Where many objects were perceived together in the past, and subsequently some of them were remembered in succession, and not all of them, the recollection of the whole lot has not yet destroyed its impression, which is destroyed by a length of time, disease, or its last recollection, which is its ultimate effect. This view does not make successive recollections impossible. Nor does it make a stronger impression impossible on account of repeated recollections, because the strength of an impression means the quick appearance of an excitant (udbodhaka). The same impression continues to exist in the self, until the last recollection is produced. It is better to assume the existence of one impression of a past apprehension which is destroyed by the last recollection than to assume the existence of a series of similar impressions and similar

\textsuperscript{131} Madhusūdana's commentary on \textit{BG.}, ii, 73.
\textsuperscript{132} Caraka Samhitā, XI, 8, 4.
recollections which destroy them. The parsimony of a hypotheses demands it.\textsuperscript{133}

9. The Nature of Imagination: Memory and Imagination: Reverie

Vācaspati Miśra makes a distinction between recollection and imagination. The former cognizes an object perceived in the past in the same order; it cognizes either the entire object or less than it; but it does not cognize more than what was perceived; it never transcends the limits of past experience.\textsuperscript{134} The latter transcends the limits of past experience. It introduces a new order into the contents of past experience. It rearranges them into a new pattern. Memory supplies the material of imagination.

Vyāsa divides recollection into two kinds: recollection of an imagined object (bhāvita-smartavyā) and recollection of an unimagined object (abhāvita-smartavyā). Dream is recollection of imagined objects. Waking recall is recollection of unimagined or real objects. In dream there is the imagination of unreal objects. In waking recollection there is the reproduction of real objects perceived in the past.\textsuperscript{135} Thus Vyāsa distinguishes between memory and imagination.

Mādhava-cārya Vidyārānya defines recollection as the reproduction of the contents of past experience in the same order in which they were perceived in the past. A person read the Vedas repeatedly in the past, retains their impressions in his mind, and recalls them in the same order in which he learnt them. This mental process is called recollection. A person is not free (svatantra) in recall. In spite of his best efforts to concentrate his mind on a particular forgotten sentence, he fails to recall it. The sentence which has to be recalled cannot be remembered otherwise. If another sentence is called up, it will not be the proper sentence of the Vedas. Nor can the sentences of them learned frequently be forgotten by an effort of the will. Sometimes after a period of mourning when the study of the Vedas is prohibited, some sentences of them are recalled automatically without an effort.

\textsuperscript{133} SM., pp. 395-6. TSN., p. 92; Bhāskarodayā, pp. 179-81.
\textsuperscript{134} Smṛṭir na pūrṇānubhav-a-maryādām atikrāmati, tadviśayā tadūnviśayānām na tu tadadhikaviśayā. TV., i, 1, 11.
\textsuperscript{135} YBh., i, 1, 11.
of the will. Hence, spontaneous recollection depends upon the mere revival of a particular impression, which must conform to the order in which the object was perceived in the past. It cannot alter the order of the past experience. It cannot be made or unmade by the will of a person. But imagination is unrestrained; it cognizes real or unreal attributes of perceived or unperceived objects. It is found in revery, phantasy, or daydream. A person is free in imagination, and not tied to the order of the past experience. It does not depend upon any other conditions than the mind and free volition. Building castles in the air (manorājya) cannot be restrained by the command of a king or by the scriptures. Free imagination is not subject to any conditions. In it the contents of past experiences are rearranged in any order which is pleasing to the agent. There is no hindrance to the imagination of unreal objects, which depends upon his free will. Day-dreams, reveries, or phantasies are false and do not conform to the environment. They are creations of the normal mind, whereas hallucinations are creations of the diseased or abnormal mind.

10. The Nature of Vikalpa

Patañjali defines vikalpa as a mental mode which cognizes a cognition conforming to a word and devoid of an object. When we speak of a sky flower, we have a cognition conforming to the word, though there is no real object corresponding to it. A word produces a cognition, even though its object is non-existent. In a valid cognition there are three factors: (1) an object; (2) a word; and (3) a cognition. But in vikalpa there are two factors: (1) a word; and (2) a cognition. It is not valid knowledge, because its object is non-existent, and because it ascribes difference to non-
difference and non-difference to difference. Difference and non-difference are not real. Vikalpa is a mere semblance of them.144

Vikalpa resembles an illusion in that in both there is the knowledge of an object as it is not. But there is a difference between them. When an illusion is contradicted by a sublating cognition, it ceases to produce an action. Ordinary persons have such sublating cognitions. But they have no sublating cognitions which contradict vikalpa. Only learned persons have such sublating cognitions. Hence, vikalpa does not cease to produce actions, though it is produced by a mere word.145

The imagination of ‘the head of Rāhu’ attributes difference to non-different things. ‘Rāhu’, an imaginary demon, is nothing but a ‘head’. There is no difference between them. The imagination of a ‘distracted mind’ attributes non-difference to different entities. ‘Distraction’ is a state of the ‘mind’. They are different from each other. But they are stated to be non-different from each other. We speak of ‘the consciousness of a self’. Here we attribute difference to non-different entities, because ‘consciousness’ is the essential nature of a ‘self’, which is nothing but consciousness.146 We speak of ‘a self as devoid of the attributes of objects’ and of an ‘inactive self’ though the Yoga identifies negation or absence (abhāva) with its locus. So these are examples of vikalpa.147 The cognitions of ‘sky flower’, ‘horn of a hair’ and the like also are vikalpas, since these objects are non-existent, and yet there are cognitions of them.148

Vikalpa is the cognition of a non-existent object which is spoken of by a word. It serves a useful purpose. Many do not recognize it as distinct from an illusion (viparyaya). Bhojarāja regards it as definite knowledge, which does not depend on the real nature of its object.149 But it is different from an illusion which is contradicted by a sublating cognition. ‘The illusion ‘this is silver’ is contradicted by the sublating cognition ‘this is not silver’. But the vikalpa ‘consciousness of a self’ does not vanish, because it is not generally sublated. Hence an illusion should be

144 TV., i, 1, 9; YV., i, 1, 9.
1 Na viparyayopārohi, vastusūnyatve’pi śabda-jāna-māhātmya-nibandhano vyavahāro citrāyate. YBh., i, 1, 9. TV.; Chāyā, i, 1, 9.
145 RM., i, 1, 9.
146 Chāyā, i, 1, 9.
147 YV., i, 1, 9.
148 Vastunās tathātvam anapekṣamāno-dhyavasaśayo vikalpaḥ. RM., i, 1, 9.
defined as the knowledge of an object as different from what it is, which does not conform to words and cognitions. The Vaiśeṣikas regard vikalpa as a particular kind of attributed cognition (āhārya-jñāna), and include it in invalid cognition (mithyā jñāna). But the Yoga regards it as a distinct cognition, which is either indeterminate or determinate.150 The Sāmkhya regards vikalpa (c. g. a man’s horn) as invalid because it cognizes a non-existent object which is incapable of producing a valid cognition and an effective action.151


Presumption is the assumption of a fact which reconciles an apparent inconsistency between two facts. A person is not found to eat in the day, and yet he is fat. Fasting and fatness of the body cannot be reconciled with each other, unless his eating at night is assumed. This is the framing of a hypothesis which involves intellective imagination.152 If one hypothesis is adequate to explain the apparent inconsistency, it is irrational to make more assumptions.153 This is the parsimony of hypotheses (kalpanā-lāghava). But the law of parsimony does not hold good, if the existence of many entities is established by valid knowledge.154 The existence of many sense-organs is proved by valid knowledge. So the existence of one sense-organ cannot be assumed for the sake of the parsimony of hypotheses. Presumption illustrates intellective imagination which is conducive to intellectual advancement.

Tarka is hypothetical reasoning. It is the attribution of a generic quality on the attribution of a specific quality.155 It is false knowledge because it involves attribution of what is not known to exist. Smoke is pervaded by fire which is its pervader. Wherever there is smoke there is fire. But wherever there is fire, there is not smoke. If a lake is supposed to have smoke, then it may be supposed to have fire. This kind of supposition is called tarka, which involves imagination. Fire is known to be non-existent

150 YV., Chāyā; Sūtrārthabodhinī, i, 1, 9.
151 SSV., v, 52.
152Upapāda-jñāna upapādaka-kalpanam arthāpattīḥ. VP., p. 307.
154Na kalpanā-virodhaḥ pramāṇa-dṛṣṭasya. SPS., ii, 25.
155Vyāpyātopena vyāpakāropas tarkaḥ. TS., p. 89.
in a lake full of water. So smoke also cannot exist in it. Thus tarka removes doubt, and involves intellective imagination.

Tarka consists in attribution (äropa) which is a kind of āhāryajñāna. 'If there were a jar on the ground, it would be perceived as qualified by the jar.' 'If a lake be smoky, let it be fiery'. Such kinds of knowledge are examples of attribution (äropa). Āhāryajñāna is the false knowledge of an object existing in a place where it is known to be non-existent. Fire is known to be non-existent in a lake, and yet it may be attributed to it. This is an example of āhāryajñāna. Attribution involves intellective imagination.

Hallucinations (mānasa vibhrama) which are solely of mental origin and due to some defects of the mind (manodōsa) involve imagination. In them the impressions of past perceptions are revived by constant brooding (cintā) or by strong passions of lust, grief, etc., and rearranged into a pattern which gives satisfaction to the agent. They involve strong phantastic imagination which does not conform to the environment. Yet hallucinatory images are so vivid and aggressive that they appear to be real objects of perception present to the sense-organs. Hallucinations produced by the repetition of impressions through the central sensory (manas) appear to be very distinct. Persons overloaded by lust, grief, disease, insanity and the like perceive non-existent objects as present before them.\textsuperscript{156} A young man infatuated with intense lust for a woman and separated from her sees his beloved woman here, though she is far away.\textsuperscript{157} Hallucinatory images do not appear to be absolutely non-existent like the image of a hare’s horn. They obtrude themselves upon consciousness as something real and positive, though they are false.\textsuperscript{158}

\textsuperscript{156} NM., p. 105.
\textsuperscript{157} Mānasī manmathonmāda-mahimnā mānini-matiḥ. NM., p. 545. NK., p. 179.
\textsuperscript{158} NM., pp. 89, 185 and 545; NK., p. 178; see Ante, Ch. XIV. Nirādhīṣṭhāne vibhrame manodoṣamātrānubandhini nārthasya sambhavaḥ. NK., p. 179.
CHAPTER XXI

THOUGHT AND LANGUAGE

1. The Nature of Concepts: The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika View

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika recognizes the existence of a genus (jāti) or a community (sāmānyā) in the proper individuals. The genus of cow (goṭva) exists in individual cows. A community is known by assimilative knowledge, while individuals are known by discriminative knowledge.¹ The distinctive characters of many individuals are cognized by discriminative knowledge (vyāvṛttabuddhi), while their common characters are cognized by assimilative knowledge (anuvṛttabuddhi). According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, community as well as individuality is perceived; both assimilative knowledge and discriminative knowledge are perceptual knowledge. But, in fact, its assimilative knowledge corresponds to a concept in western psychology, while its discriminative knowledge corresponds to a percept. Commonness is wider in extent than distinctiveness. Distinctiveness is narrower in extent than commonness.²

The summum genus (parā jāti) is Beinghood (sattā). It is the highest genus which is of the widest extent. The genus of substance (dravyatva), the genus of quality (gunaṭva) and the genus of motion (karmatva) are subordinate genera (aparā jāti). But the genus of substance is higher than the genus of a jar; the genus of quality is higher than the genus of colour; the genus of motion is higher than the genus of upward motion. So the former are higher than the latter, which are the lowest genera (aparā jāti).³

Corresponding to them there is a hierarchy of concepts. The lowest concepts are formed by assimilating the individuals. Higher concepts are formed by assimilating the lower concepts. The highest concept is formed by assimilating the higher concepts. Assimilation depends upon abstraction.⁴

¹ Anuvṛtta-buddhiḥ sāmānyasya, vyāvṛtta-buddhir viśeṣasya. VSU., i, 2, 3.
² Anuvṛttatvam adhika-desa-vṛttitvam, vyāvṛttatvam alpa-desa-vṛttitvam. VSV., i, 2, 3. SM., p. 75.
³ PBh., pp. 311-2; SM., pp. 75-8.
⁴ VSV., i, 2, 3; PBh., pp. 311-2.
A community exists in all its proper individuals; it is identical with itself; it is the cause of the assimilative knowledge of its being common to one, two, many individuals; it is the cause of the common notion or concept of what is identical with itself in many individuals. The highest genus is the cause of the highest concept or the most general idea. A subordinate genus is the cause of assimilative and discriminative knowledge.

Different individuals have distinctive characters, and are distinguished from one another by them. They could not be assimilated to one another and recognized as members of a class, if they had no community in them. Common character produces the common notion or concept. If there were no common character among the individuals of a class, there would be no knowledge of their generic identity. Ideas are of two kinds, particular and general. Particular ideas are formed by discriminative knowledge, while general ideas are formed by assimilative knowledge. General ideas are called concepts. They are formed by the perception of many individuals belonging to the same class, comparison of them with one another, elimination of their distinctive characters, and abstraction of their common characters. They depend upon the past knowledge of the individuals, and the impressions due to their repeated perceptions. They are formed by assimilation of many homogeneous individuals. Concepts are expressed in words.

Gautama says, "A genus is the cause of a common notion or concept". Vātsyāyana asserts that the same genus, which exists in many individuals and holds them together under the same class, is the cause of an inclusive idea or concept (anuvṛtti-pratyaya). Uddyotakara also gives the same proof of the reality of a genus. It is the cause of the production of a concept of many individuals. We have an assimilative knowledge (anuvṛtti-
pratyaya) where there are many like individuals; it is produced by a genus which is different from them. The genus of cow is different from the individual cows, because it is the object of a different cognition or a concept (sāmānya-pratyaya), and because the assimilative cognition is produced by the common cause (e.g. gotva) in the individual cows. There are two kinds of ideas, particular and general. Particular ideas are produced by individuals. General ideas or concepts are produced by individuals. General ideas or concepts are produced by generalities or genera. Common notions or concepts cannot be denied, which are produced by genera. They can never be produced by individuals; nor are they imaginary as the Buddhists maintain.

2. The Buddhist View of the Nature of Concepts

Paṇḍitāsoka criticizes the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of a community being one, eternal, and present in all its individuals. No wise person should believe in such a community as exists in different momentary specific individuals perceived as the cause of a general idea or concept and a general name which represents them all, because there is no evidence to prove it or to disprove it. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realist argues that the existence of a community is proved by the inference: ‘An assimilative cognition of something common to many different individuals is produced by an entity common to them all. There is the assimilative cognition of something common to many different individuals which are produced and devoid of any relation to one another. Therefore it is produced by a community’. The Buddhist urges that this inference cannot prove the reality of a community, since many different cooks produce the one common notion of ‘cook’ though there is no one common entity among them. Even if a community exists in the specific individuals, it cannot be manifested by them, because it is eternal and devoid of an additament (atīṣaya) and consequently independent of auxiliary conditions which cannot render any aid to it. If it has an additament, it is always ubiquitous and therefore incapable of action. Even if it be the cause of action, the actions of the specific individuals e.g., cooks, being different from one another, cannot produce the same

¹ NV, 11, 2, 70.  
² NV, 11, 2, 67.
common notion ‘cook’. Even if different actions can produce a common notion of them, then the different individuals also can produce a common notion of them, though a community does not exist in them. Hence a real community is not the cause of a common notion of it.

The common notion of ‘cook’ cannot be said to be produced by the genus of the actions of ‘cooking’ because one genus cannot be the cause of another common notion or concept, since then any genus would produce any concept. The genus of cooking, it may be argued, being related to cooks through inherent inherence, produces the common notion of ‘cook’. This argument is invalid. The actions of cooking are temporary and destroyed. When they are destroyed, the genus of cooking cannot exist in them and cooks who are their agents. No relation exists between the genus of cooking and cooks; so the former cannot produce the common notion of ‘cook’. Hence the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika inference for the existence of a community is not valid; in involves the fallacy of irregular middle (anaikāntika). The specific individuals, the Buddhist concludes, produce an illusory common notion or concept by the negation of contradictory individuals (apoha).16

The Buddhists do not deny the possibility of a common notion (parāmarśa-pratyaya) which represents many individuals. But they deny the reality of a community in the individuals, which is the cause of the common notion. Panḍitāsoka says: “Community is not perceived in the five fingers which are perceived by the sense-organs. Only the individual fingers in their distinct shapes are perceived, but their community is never perceived. The concept of the so-called one community is produced by the illusion of similarity among different individuals.”17 Generality (jāti) is a mere conceptual construction (kalpana). It is a mere mental construct, which appears to be similar, produced by specific individuals. An identical genus does not exist because it is never perceived.18 But how can only certain individuals produce the common notion of a certain generality, and not all? It is the Law of Nature that certain individuals only produce a certain

14 Sāmānyaduṣaṇādikprasaṅgīti, SBNT., pp. 94-6.
18 Apratītīr abhināpi jātīr nāsti iti buddhir eva tulāyākāra-pratibhāsā sad asadīti sabdāsa ca dṛṣṭaye. NPVP., p. 69.
notion of generality, even as certain drugs cure a certain disease, and not all diseases.

3. The Buddhist View of Kalpanā (Vikalpa) and Abhilāpa

Dharmakīrti defines kalpanā as the experience of a cognition of something which is capable of being associated which a significant word.19 Dharmottara defines abhilāpa as a word which denotes an object, or as a significant word. The form of the signified object is united with the form of the significant word in the same cognition, which apprehends them both. This union is association of an object with a name. An object is capable of being associated with a name, if in its cognition there is the cognition of its being so signified by the name. Some cognition is manifested to consciousness as associated with a word. In the cognition (kalpanā) of the object ‘jar’ in a person who is acquainted with the meaning of the word ‘jar’ it is manifested to consciousness as associated with the word ‘jar’. Some cognition, though unassociated with a word, is manifested to consciousness as capable of being associated with it, like the cognition of an infant who is not acquainted with the meaning of a word. The cognition of an infant born today is not associated with a word, but capable of being associated with it.20

When there is no association of a cognition with a word, how can its capability of being associated with it be determined? It is determined by its irregular experience, which is due to the absence of a uniform rule of experience. A knowable object producing a cognition produces its experience regularly. A colour producing a visual perception produces it regularly. A cognition of vikalpa is not produced by an object. So a vikalpa does not produce its cognition regularly owing to the absence of a cause of uniform experience.21

Dharmakīrti maintains, that determinate perception apprehends a specific individual (svalaksana), while inference cognizes a common character (sāmānyalaksana), which is attributed to the specific individuals.22 Perception is devoid of

20 NBT., pp. 13-4. LV., on SDśm., p. 2.
22 NB., pp. 21 and 24. NBT., p. 24; NPV., p. 34.
conceptual constructs (*kalpanā*). Substance, quality, action, genus and name are *kalpanās*. ‘This is a man with a staff’. ‘This is white’. ‘This man cooks’. ‘This is a cow’. ‘This is Đittha’. These perceptual judgments involve the conceptual constructs of substance, quality, action, genus, and name. They are determinate perceptions. Indeterminate perceptions apprehend the momentary specific individuals only, which are real and devoid of the illusory notions mentioned above. The specific individuals are real, but the conceptual constructs are unreal. They are attributed to the individuals by the intellect (*buddhi*). The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika criticism of the Buddhist doctrine has been given already.

4. **Qualified Cognition (*Viśiṣṭa-buddhi*): Judgment**

When a substance, a quality, and an action are known as qualified by the genus of substance, the genus of quality, and the genus of action respectively, they produce qualified cognitions (*viśiṣṭa-buddhi*). A qualified cognition involves the knowledge of a qualified being (*viśesya*) and a qualification (*viśeṣana*). ‘This is a substance’. ‘This is a quality’. ‘This is an action’. These sentences are expressions of judgments which are qualified cognitions. They involve a subject-predicate relation. ‘This is possessed of a staff’. Here there is a cognition of ‘this’ qualified by a cognition of a ‘staff’ which is a substance. ‘This is white’. Here there is a cognition of ‘this’ qualified by the cognition of ‘white’ which is a quality. ‘This is moving’. Here there is a cognition of ‘this’ qualified by the cognition of ‘motion’ which is an action. There is no knowledge of a qualified being, which is not related to a qualification, and the qualification of which has not been cognized.

‘A conch-shell is white’. The quality of whiteness, the knowledge of whiteness as a qualification of a conch-shell, and the inherence of whiteness in a conch-shell are the causes of the qualified cognition. The knowledge of a substance, i.e., a conch-

23 NPV., p. 35.
24 See *Ante*, Ch., X.
25 Nāgrīṭa-viśeṣanā viśiṣṭa-pratīkā na vā viśeṣaṇa-sambandham antarēṇāti bhavati. VSU., viii, 1, 7.
26 VSU., viii, 1, 8. SM., p. 85; TSN., p. 19; KR., p. 91.
shell, in which whiteness inheres, and the knowledge of whiteness as its quality are the causes of the knowledge 'The conch-shell is white'. The knowledge of 'white' depends upon the knowledge of 'whiteness' as its cause; but it does not cognize 'whiteness'.

The knowledge of a substance as qualified by an attribute depends upon the knowledge of the attribute.

But the knowledge of 'this is a pitcher' occurring after the knowledge 'this is a post' is not its effect, because a 'post' is not a qualification of a 'pitcher'. But where one substance is qualified by another, the knowledge of the substance which is a qualification (viśeṣaṇa) is the cause of the knowledge of the substance which is a qualified being (viśeṣya).

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika regards substance, quality, action, and genus as real existents, whereas the Buddhist regards them as mere conceptual constructs (kalpanā, vikalpa) attributed by the intellect to the specific individuals which are real.

Qualified cognitions involve judgments which are syntheses of two or more ideas into complex psychoses. They involve a subject-predicate relation, in which a substance is qualified by another substance, or a quality, or an action, but in which a quality is not qualified by a quality, or an action is not qualified by an action. A qualified cognition is a knowledge that apprehends a subject, a predicate, and the relation subsisting between them. It is a relational knowledge as distinguished from a non-relational knowledge.

Some maintain that a qualified being (viśeṣya) and a qualification (viśeṣaṇa) are cognized by one and the same cognition. How can they account for the visual perception of fragrant sandal? Śrīdhara urges, that the visual organ cannot perceive fragrance; that the olfactory organ cannot perceive a substance, e.g. sandal; and that they together cannot perceive the relation between them in that the knowledge of relation presupposes that of the relata. The visual perception of fragrant sandal, it may be argued, is produced jointly by the visual organ and the olfactory organ, and apprehends both sandal and fragrance. This argument, Śrīdhara urges, is not sound, since the cognition is devoid of parts. If it were made of parts, one part of it might be

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37 VSB., viii, 1, 10. 38 VSU., viii, 1, 10.
39 VSB., viii, 1, 10. 40 VS., VSU., viii, 1, 10.
41 Viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣayor ekajñānālambanatvam. NK., p. 116.
42 See Aṣṭe, ch., V.
produced by the visual organ, and the other part might be pro-
duced by the olfactory organ. But, in fact, the cognition is one
and undivided, and cannot be produced by the two sense-organs.
Further, if one cognition produced by the two sense-organs
apprehended both sandal and fragrance, then odour would be
apprehended by the visual organ, and a substance would be
apprehended by the olfactory organ which, according to the
Vaiśeṣika, apprehends smell only. Hence fragrance is perceived
by the olfactory organ first, and then the visual organ aided by
the olfactory perception of fragrance produces the visual percep-
tion of sandal only.\(^33\) If a substance only were apprehended, it
may be argued, by the cognition of a qualified being (\textit{vīşesyajñāna}), then even in the absence of a qualification (\textit{vīşesāna}), there
would be a qualified cognition (\textit{vīşiṣṭajñāna}). But this is not
possible. It may be argued, that the cognition of a qualified being
(\textit{vīşesyajñāna}) is not produced in the absence of a qualification
(\textit{vīşesāna}), because it is the cause of the qualified cognition. Still
the qualified cognition (\textit{vīşiṣṭajñāna}) does not differ from the cog-
nition of substance, because a cognition cannot have a specific
character unless its object has a specific character. The cognition
of a qualified being does not apprehend a substance only, but it
apprehends a qualified substance,—qualifiedness being something
over and above the mere nature of a substance. The cognition
of a person bearing a staff is not that of a person only, or that
of his conjunction with a staff only, but that of a person being
qualified by a staff.\(^34\) The qualification, e.g. a staff distinguishes
the person from other persons.

A qualification (\textit{vīşesāna}) is different from a distinguishing
feature (\textit{upalakṣāna}). Both distinguish an object from other
objects. But the former produces the knowledge of its being sub-
ordinate to the object that it qualifies, whereas the latter does
not produce the knowledge of its being subordinate to the object
that it distinguishes. In the cognition of a person bearing a staff
the person is the principal factor to whom the staff is subordinate.
But in the cognition of a saint wearing matted hair it is not
subordinate to him.\(^35\) Qualified cognitions involve judgments
which are expressed in sentences.

\(^{33}\text{NK., p. 117.}\)
\(^{34}\text{Na vīśesyajñānasya dravyasvarūpamātram ālaṃbanaḥ brūmaḥ kīh
tu vīşiṣṭāṃ vīşiṣṭatā ca svarūpātirekīṇi eva. NK., p. 117.}\)
\(^{35}\text{NK., p. 117.}\)
5. Reasoning or Inference

Inference is the mental process of thinking by which the self passes to a new judgment from certain given judgments. It is inductive-deductive, and arrives at a new truth. It is preceded by perception, Vātsyāyana says, the perception of a probans or sign (liṅga) and that of a uniform relation between it and a probandum (sādhya). It is produced by the perception of a sign (e.g. smoke) and the recollection of invariable concomitance between the sign and the probandum (e.g. fire). An unperceived object is inferred by this process.\(^{36}\) Inference differs from perception in that the former apprehends present, past, remote and future objects whereas the latter apprehends present objects only.\(^{37}\)

The Nyāya recognizes two kinds of inference: (1) inference for oneself and (2) inference for others. The former is a psychological process while the latter is a logical process. The former involves the following mental processes: A person himself perceives an invariable concomitance between smoke and fire by repeated observation (bhūyodarśana), for instance, in a kitchen and other places, approaches a hill, doubts whether there is a fire on it, perceives a smoke on it, recollects the invariable concomitance that wherever there is smoke there is fire, knows that the hill has a smoke that is pervaded by a fire, and then knows that the hill has a fire. This knowledge is inferential.\(^{38}\) This is an example of an inference for oneself. It is inductive-deductive. It involves the process of generalization from particular instances observed and application of the general principle to a fresh particular instance. The invariable concomitance is the result of repeated observation of the copresence of a probans and a probandum and the absence of the knowledge of contrary instances. Wherever a smoke is perceived a fire is perceived, and wherever a fire is found to be absent a smoke also is found to be absent. But how can a uniform relation between smoke and fire be known in the absence of the knowledge of all cases of smoke and all cases of fire? Gaṅgeśa, the founder of Nāyika Nyāya, recognizes an extraordinary intercourse (alaukika sannikārṣa) called the intercourse characterized by generality (sāmānyalakṣanā pratyāsatti) which enables a person to perceive all cases of smoke through the

\(^{36}\) Smṛtyā liṅgadarśanena ca apratyakṣo rtho' numīyate. NBh., i, 1, 5.

\(^{37}\) Ibid, i, 1, 5.

\(^{38}\) TŚ., p. 50.
genus of smoke, and all cases of fire through the genus of fire.\footnote{TS., p. 50; TSD., pp. 50-1; SM., pp. 86-8; see ante, ch. iv. HIP., i, pp. 724-7.}

The knowledge of invariable concomitance between a probans and a probandum, according to Navya Nyāya, is the principal cause (karaṇa) of inferential knowledge; and the knowledge of the probans being pervaded by the probandum and existing in the subject of inference (paksā) is the causal operation (vyāpāra) which immediately produces inferential knowledge. It depends upon the perception of a probans in the subject of inference (e.g. 'the hill has smoke'), the recollection of a uniform relation between them (vyāpti-smarana) (e.g. 'wherever there is smoke there is fire'), and the knowledge of the existence of the probans pervaded by the pobandum in the subject of inference (e.g. 'the hill has smoke pervaded by fire'). The perception of smoke in a kitchen is the first consideration of sign or reason (liṅga-parāmarśa). The perception of smoke on a hill is the second consideration of reason. The perception of smoke pervaded by fire on a hill is the third consideration of sign or reason.\footnote{TK., p. 10.} It depends upon the knowledge of invariable concomitance between smoke and fire.

But Dharmarājādhvarindra, an Advaita Vedāntin, defines inferential knowledge as the knowledge which is produced by the knowledge of invariable concomitance as the knowledge of invariable concomitance.\footnote{Anumitis tu vyāptijñānatvena vyāptijñānajanyā VP., p. 186.} The knowledge of invariable concomitance is the principal cause (karaṇa) of inferential knowledge; the impression (sāṁskāra) of this knowledge is the causal operation (vyāpāra) which immediately produces it. The third consideration of sign or reason (tṛtiya-liṅga-parāmarśa) is not the principal cause of inferential knowledge as the Navya Nyāya maintains. It is not even its cause, far less its principal cause.

The self's mental perception (anuvyavasāya) of the knowledge of invariable concomitance is not the cause of inferential knowledge, since the knowledge of invariable concomitance is the cause of its anuvyavasāya as its object. The recollection of invariable concomitance is not the cause of inferential knowledge, since it cognizes an object similar to that of the knowledge of invariable concomitance. Verbal knowledge of invariable concomitance is not the cause of inferential knowledge, since it produces the
knowledge of an object denoted by the word vyāptijñāna. But the knowledge of invariable concomitance as the knowledge of invariable concomitance is the principal cause of inferential knowledge. It is immediately produced by the impression (sanskāra) of the knowledge of invariable concomitance as such. But it is not recollection for that reason because a recollection is produced by its prior non-existence or an impression only. A recollection is produced by the destruction of an impression. But the inferential knowledge 'the hill is fiery' is produced by the revival of the impression of the knowledge 'smoke is pervaded by fire'. But why should the impression of the knowledge of invariable concomitance be a cause of inferential knowledge, since the recollection of invariable concomitance is its cause? Dharmarājādhvarīndra replies, that even when there is the recollection of invariable concomitance the impression of its knowledge also is its cause because a recollection does not always destroy an impression in that there is a series of recollections. When the impression is not revived, there can be no inferential knowledge. The revival of the impression of the knowledge of invariable concomitance is an auxiliary cause of inferential knowledge. First there is the perception 'the hill is smoky', then there is the revival of the impression of the perception of invariable concomitance between smoke and fire; then there is the inferential knowledge 'the hill is fiery'. There is neither the recollection of invariable concomitance nor the qualified knowledge 'the hill has smoke pervaded by fire', since there is no evidence for its existence and it violates the parsimony of hypotheses. Thus the Advaita Vedānta rejects the Navya Nyāya doctrine that the recollection of invariable concomitance and the qualified knowledge of the existence of a probans pervaded by a probandum in the subject of inference are the causes of inferential knowledge. In the knowledge 'the hill is fiery' the knowledge of the hill is perceptual, but the knowledge of fieriness is inferential.\(^\text{42}\)

According to Prabhākara, the perception 'the hill is smoky' and the recollection of invariable concomitance 'smoke is pervaded by fire' are the causes of the inferential knowledge 'the hill is fiery'. The knowledge of the existence of smoke pervaded by fire in the hill, which is said to be the principal cause of inferential knowledge by the Navya Nyāya, is not necessary for the

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\(^{42}\) \text{VP., pp. 186-98; Sikkhāmapāl, pp. 186-98.}
inferential knowledge. The two cognitions are adequate to produce it, and the hypothesis of the third consideration of sign or reason or qualified consideration (viśiṣṭaparāmarśa) violates the law of parsimony. Gaṅgeśa criticizes Prabhākara’s view.43

The Advaita Vedānta defines invariable concomitance as the copresence of a probans and a probandum in all their loci. It is known by the observation of their copresence and the non-observation of contrary instances. The observation of copresence may be single or numerous. The number does not count much. The observation of copresence is the main condition, but the non-observation of contrary instances is essential.44 Prabhākara regards repeated observation (bhūyodarśana) as the means of knowing invariable concomitance. Gaṅgeśa criticizes this view. He regards the observation of concomitance and the absence of knowledge of non-concomitance aided by hypothetical reasoning as the means of knowing invariable concomitance.45


Keśavamiśra defines a word as a collection of letters. By a collection here is meant that all letters are cognized by a single cognition.46 Pārthasārathi Miśra also regards a word as nothing but letters.47 Prabhācandra defines a word as a collection of letters, which are dependent on one another, but independent of the letters of another word.48 But the Yoga and the Śābdika define it as a single, indivisible, partless, and eternal word-from (padasphota) which is cognized by a thought-form, and manifested by successive and momentary letter-sounds.49

A word, according to some Buddhists, denotes the negation of contradictory individuals (apoha). It denotes, according to Ratnakirti, a positive individual qualified by the negation of contradictory individuals. According to the Jaina, it denotes a multiform (anekānta) object with its positive and negative nature, and general and particular characteristics. According to some, it

43 TCA., p. 493. HIP., i, pp. 731-2.
44 VP., pp. 198-201.
45 TCA., pp. 210-1; HIP., i, pp. 711-3.
46 TBh., p. 14.
47 Varpā eva śabdāḥ. SD., p. 368.
48 PKM., p. 133.
49 YBh., iii, 17; TV.; YV., iii, 17; VPD., i, 73.
word and its object is unreal because *apoha* is neither an internal cognition nor an external object, but a mere attributed form which colours a determinate cognition. But how can an attributed form colour a determinate cognition, though there is no external object? The Buddhist replies that the attributed form as perceived (*drśya*) does not colour a determinate cognition. A specific individual is apprehended by indeterminate perception, but it cannot be apprehended by determinate cognitions (*vikalpa*). They apprehend the shadows of the specific individuals. They apprehend mere differentiation (*vyāvṛtti*) or negation as the negated objects are not perceived. It may be argued, that negation and negated objects are non-different from each other; that negated objects being specific individuals, determinate cognitions apprehending negations (*vyāvṛtti*) apprehend the specific individuals which are negated; and that therefore indeterminate perceptions and determinate cognitions equally apprehend specific individuals. But this argument is invalid, since determinate cognitions do not apprehend specific individuals which are differentiated or negated, and negation is not real but a mere attributed form. If negation were real, then determinate cognitions apprehending real specific individuals would be faulty. But the negation is not real; so there is no difficulty. The Buddhist concludes, that the determinate cognitions of ‘cow’ succeeding the indeterminate perceptions of individual cows apprehend the forms differentiated from those of heterogeneous individuals; or that they apprehend the negation of contradictories. Words produce verbal cognitions (*vikalpa*) which cognize negations of contradictories (*apoha*). *Apoha* is an attributed form, which is not external as it is attributed, nor internal as it is not in the nature of consciousness. So it is not real, and because it is unreal it is merely attributed. When it is wrongly regarded as real and in the nature of a negation (*abhāva*), many difficulties arise needlessly. The definite nature of the object of a verbal cognition in such a form as ‘this is indeed a cow, and not a horse’ is not possible without the negation of other objects. Hence a word denotes the negation of contradictories, and a verbal cognition cognizes the

33 *Aropitan kim cā kāramātraṁ vikalpoparafiṣṭakam.* NM., p. 306.
34 *Atakāryaparāvṛttiṣṭiṣṭakam eva vikalpāṁ āvatiṣṭhte ityevāṁ yuktyā teṣāṁ apohaviṣṭatvam ucyate.* NM., p. 307.
35 *Soṣay āropitakāro na bahir āropitavād eva nāntaḥ abodha-rūpaṁ.* NM., p. 307.
differentiation of an object from other objects. It does not apprehend an external object, but an attributed form. It is an internal form which is not external, but is manifested to consciousness as external. There is no other similarity between an external object and an attributed internal form than an appearance of differentiation (vyāvṛtticchāyā). Verbal cognitions apprehend differentiation or negation. The Yogācāras regard āpoha as an internal form of cognition, which is a reflection (pratibimba) of a determinate or verbal cognition (vikalpa), and, though internal, appears to be like an external object, and to differ owing to the difference of various impressions (vāsanā), and thus serves the practical purposes of our life. It is called āpoha because it is related to the reflection of differentiation. The Mādhyamikas regard āpoha as an attributed form which is neither external nor internal because of its relation to an appearance of differentiation. According to both, specific individuals are not cognized by determinate or verbal cognitions (vikalpa). The false identification of the object of indeterminate perception (dṛśya) and that of determinate cognition (vikalpa) induces a person to act. Hence a word denotes āpoha which is a reflection or semblance of vikalpa. An illusion of generality is produced by the specific individuals perceived being not differentiated from one another. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa gives this account of the Buddhist doctrine of āpoha as denoted by a word.

Ratnakīrti (1000 A.D.), the Buddhist author of Apohasiddhi, maintains that a word denotes a positive individual qualified by the negation of contradictory individuals. What is the meaning of āpoha? Etymologically it means either the exclusion of this individual (e.g. cow) from another contradictory individual (e.g. non-cow), or the exclusion of another contradictory individual from this individual, or the exclusion of another contradiction individual in this individual. Does āpoha refer to an external object differentiated from heterogeneous objects, or to the internal form of a cognition, or to mere differentiation from other objects? The first two alternatives are false because a word denotes something positive. The third alternative also is false, since it is

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“Vyāvṛttivīśayā eva vikalpāḥ phalato bhavati. NM., pp. 307-8.”

“Vyāvṛtticchāyāyogāḥ tad āpoha iti vyavahriyate. NM., p. 308.”

“Soyam nāntaro na bāhvo’ nya eva kaś cid āropita ākāro vyāvṛtticchāyā-yogād apohasabdārtha ucyate. NM., p. 308.”

“NM., pp. 306-9.”
contradicted by experience. The verbal knowledge of a fire existing on a hill derived from testimony does not refer merely to the non-existence of a non-fire, but to the positive existence of a fire. What is contradicted by perception cannot be proved by any other pramāṇa.

It may be argued, that though there is no common notion (vikalpa) in the form of the experience of negation (nivṛtti) or differentiation, yet the cognition of differentiating objects itself is the cognition of differentiation. But an experience of a qualified object (viśeṣa-pratīti) is not the experience of a qualification (viśeṣa-nāḥ-pratīti) involved in it. Just as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika regards a common notion (vikalpa-buddhi) as the cognition of a community (sāmānyabuddhi) because of the distinct cognition of a common form of many individuals, so the cognition of differentiation or negation (nivṛttibuddhi) involved in the cognition of differentiating objects may be said to generate the empirical use of the experience of negation (apohapratīti-vyavahāra). If there is a regular cognition of a positive community because of a distinct cognition of a common form of many individuals, then there may be a regular experience of negation because of the absence of the cognition of the form of negation (abhāva). Hence, if there be a cognition of the form of negation in spite of the absence of the experience in the form ‘I experience negation’ then none can deny the existence of the experience of negation. Otherwise, if there were no experience of negation, there would not be the empirical use of such experience, and the cognition of the form of cow would give rise to the cognition of a horse.

It is said that the cognition of differentiation or negation is involved in the cognition of differentiating objects as a qualification. If a common notion of ‘cow’ (vikalpa) takes the form that it is differentiated from ‘non-cows’, then the cognition of differentiation may enter into it as its qualification. But the common notion is the experience of ‘cow’, which is positive in content. If the act of differentiation be present in the common notion as a qualification, but be not manifested to consciousness, then the regularity in the common notions representing positive contents cannot be accounted for. Ratnakīrti maintains, that the word apoha does not mean either a positive object only, or mere
differentiation from other objects, but a positive object qualified by differentiation from other objects.69

According to Vidhivādins, the word ‘cow’ denotes a positive individual cow; and then its differentiation from ‘non-cows’ is determined. According to Pratiṣedhayādins, the word ‘cow’ denotes the negation of ‘non-cows’. Ratnakīrti rejects both these views because the verbal experience of the word ‘cow’ is devoid of sequence; because no one knows its positive import (e.g. cow) first, and then knows its differentiation from ‘non-cows’ by presumption; because no one knows the negation of ‘non-cows’ first, and then a positive individual ‘cow’ differentiated from them; and because the knowledge of ‘a cow’ is itself the knowledge of its being differentiated from ‘non-cows’.60 When on hearing the word ‘cow’ a ‘cow’ is known, it is known as qualified by the negation of ‘non-cows’. Both a ‘cow’ and the negation of ‘non-cows’ are known at the same time when the word ‘cow’ is heard. If the verbal knowledge of a ‘cow’ does not cognize the negation of ‘non-cows’, it cannot induce a person to avoid other individuals. He may fasten a horse when he is asked to tie a cow. Hence a word denotes a positive object qualified by the negation of contradictory individuals.61 This is the view of Ratnakīrti.

Dharmottara (900 A.D.) maintains, that an object with an attributed externality is positively or negatively denoted by a word.62 His view is stated by Vācaspati thus: The form which is imagined by the intellect (buddhi) to differentiate a specific individual from others is not external to the mind. Yet if it were not external, then a determinate cognition of a person desirous of an external object would not induce him to act on it. Hence, an unreal external object is an object of a determinate cognition; its externality consists in the non-apprehension of the difference of external objects, but not in the apprehension of the non-difference of external objects.63 If an external object were apprehended by a determinate cognition, its non-difference could not be apprehended by it. Hence determinate cognitions following

60 Goḥ pratipāttrī iti anyāpoḍhapratipāttir ucayate. Ibid. p. 3.
61 Ibid., pp. 1-4.
62 Aropitasya bāhyatvasya vidhiṇīṣedhau. Ibid, pp. 16-7
63 Alīkaśabāyam eṣāṁ viṣayaḥ bāhya-bhedāgraḥas ca asya bāhyatvaṁ na punar bāhyābhedagrahaḥ. NVTT., ii, 2, 63; p. 339.
upon indeterminate perceptions do not apprehend the difference of external specific individuals—their externality being attributed to them by the imagination; and the unreal and attributed common forms of specific individuals induce a person to act on external objects as if they were real, and make him attain them. Determinate cognitions (vikalpa) cannot apprehend the mutual differences of their objects. Nor can other determinate cognitions apprehend them. So a person imagines non-difference among the objects of determinate cognitions, which produces non-difference among determinate cognitions. This non-difference produces non-difference among the indeterminate perceptions, which are the causes of the determinate cognitions. This non-difference is due to the non-difference among the specific individuals which are the causes of the indeterminate perceptions. So it is said: "Non-different cognitions are the causes of a common notion; so non-different specific individuals are the causes of a common notion." Hence an unreal external object is apprehended by a determinate or verbal cognition and denoted by a word.  

It is in the nature of the negation of other heterogeneous individuals.

Ratnakīrti refutes the view of Dharmottara. If an object definitely known by a determinate cognition is not manifested to consciousness, why is it said to be definitely known by it? It may be replied, that an object is cognized by a determinate cognition without being manifested to consciousness in the same sense in which an object is acted upon without being manifested to consciousness. But how can a voluntary action be restricted to a particular object, and avoid other objects, though it is not manifested to consciousness? Though the world is not known, yet a determinate cognition of water, being produced by a particular collocation of causal conditions, has a definite form, is endowed with a definite power, and prompts a voluntary action on water only, even as a smoke produces the mediate or inferential knowledge of a fire. Different objects are invested with different natures, which are cognized by different pramāṇas. There is no intermixture of powers of the different pramāṇas with regard to the same objects. Hence, the object, which is cognized by a determinate cognition, and imprints its form on it,

"Tat siddham ailikam bāhyam visayo vikalpānam sabdānām ceti. NVTT., p. 340."
is the cause of action on it. Voluntary action on an object is not due to the attribution of externality to it owing to similarity so that the attribution of an external form to the form of a cognition may produce a voluntary action on it. It is wrong to argue that a cognition, being produced owing to the maturation of an impression (vāsanā), functions as an external object, though it does not apprehend it. Hence, the positive import of a word is an object which is differentiated from other heterogeneous individuals, and qualified by the negation of contradictory individuals. A word denotes a positive individual qualified by the negation of contradictory individuals. It has a positive import and a negative import. Every significant word denotes an object which is definitely known by a determinate cognition, and differentiated from contradictory individuals. An external specific individual, which is cognized by a determinate cognition, is denoted by a word. It is the principal object of its denotation. The negation of the contradictory individuals is the subordinate object of its denotation.

The followers of Kumārila maintain, that an individual object cannot be a community (sāmānyya) since it consists of parts; that a genus (e.g. treeness) is denoted by a word (e.g. tree), whose existence or non-existence in particular individuals is not yet ascertained; and that the genus is related to existence or non-existence in individuals known from other words ‘exists’ (asti) or ‘does not exist’ (nāsti). Ratnakīrti criticizes this view. When an eternal genus is denoted by a word and known by a verbal cognition, it cannot be said to be related to existence or non-existence in individuals not yet ascertained. Perception and verbal cognition manifest their objects in different ways; they are different means of valid knowledge and endured with different powers. So perception does not depend upon the word (asti) in order to manifest the existence of its object; but verbal cognition depends upon the word (asti) to convey the knowledge of the existence of an object. If perception and verbal cognition

"Sabdais tāvan mukhyam ākhyāyate rtha Statrāpohas tadgunaṭvena gamyāh. Ibid, p. 19."
apprehend the same nature of an object, then they cease to be different cognitions. Indeterminate perception and determinate cognition are different from each other, and consequently apprehend different objects. The former apprehends a specific individual, whereas the latter apprehends substance, qualities, actions, generality and name which are conceptual constructs. If a verbal cognition apprehends a specific individual apprehended by indeterminate perception, then it is like indeterminate perception. But, in fact, it is not like indeterminate perception, and therefore cannot apprehend a specific individual. The word 'tree', it may be argued, conveys the knowledge of the genus of tree, and that the word 'asti' is necessary to convey the knowledge of its 'being'. Ratnakīrti urges, that this argument is wrong for the following reasons. A specific individual is apprehended by indeterminate perception as devoid of parts; so its genus cannot be known by the verbal cognition of a word, and its positive nature and negative nature cannot be known by another pramāṇa. Perception also may be said to depend upon another pramāṇa to strengthen it. Ratnakīrti replies, that the perception of an object which was never perceived before requires the support of another pramāṇa because it is uncertain knowledge. But determinate cognition (vikalpa) itself is certain knowledge, and apprehends its object definitely, and therefore does not require the support of any other pramāṇa. Sometimes it depends upon verbal cognition and inference. But they cannot cognize the nature of its object. It may be argued, that genus and other qualities are different from one another and from the specific individual in which they subsist; that when a tree is known through its one attribute of genus, it is not known as endowed with another attribute; and that therefore its other attributes, blueness, motion, tallness, etc. are known by the verbal cognitions of the corresponding words. Ratnakīrti urges, that an entire specific individual is apprehended by indeterminate perception; that the difference between the substrate and its attributes in the perceived object is not apprehended by indeterminate perception; and that the difference between them is imaginary. He further urges that the so-called inherence of attributes in their substrate is riddled with contradictions. So we must seek proximity between them, which renders an aid to them. Proximity (pratyāsottti) is close contact. Just as when a substrate is perceived with all its
attributes, being in close contact with the sense-organs, so when a substrate is known by a verbal cognition and an inference because of the invariable concomitance between a word and its object or a probans and a probandum being known, all its attributes are known because proximity is present here also as in perception. Hence a word does not denote a genus, but it denotes a specific individual as a positive entity qualified by the negation of contradictory individuals.\textsuperscript{68}

Vācaspati Miśra argues, that when a being qualified by an accidental attribute is known, its being qualified by another attribute is not known. Ratnakīrti urges, that the intrinsic nature of an object is different from its accidental attributes (upādhi). Neither a substance nor the accidental qualities constitute the intrinsic nature (svabhāva). If an accidental attribute be non-different from a substance, it cannot be invested with another accidental attribute. If there is a difference between a substance (dharmin) and its attribute (dharma), then only the knowledge of a favouring factor (upakāraka) will involve the knowledge of a favoured factor (upakārya). It is not proper to assume an invariable concomitance by nature between a substance and its attributes like the causal relation between a smoke and a fire. Moreover, a substance and its attributes also are not proved to exist. If they are so proved, they will constitute the intrinsic nature. Hence Vācaspati Miśra’s view is wrong.\textsuperscript{69}

Nyāyabhūṣaṇa criticizes the Buddhist view that the difference between a substance and an attribute is due to close proximity between them so that when a favouring factor is known, a favoured factor also is known. He points out that, on the Buddhist view, the knowledge of the sun, a favouring factor, would involve the knowledge of all objects illumined by it, the favoured factor, which is not a fact. Ratnakīrti urges, that Nyāyabhūṣaṇa’s objection is based on a misconception of the Buddhist view; that when a substance is known, according to the Buddhist, its attributes, existing in the same place, which are aided by it are known; that therefore when the sun is known, other objects in different places, though favoured by it, may not be known. Therefore, when the nature of an object is perceived through one attribute only, Ratnakīrti concludes, it is perceived in its entirety; consequently its positive nature and negative nature need not be

\textsuperscript{68} Ibid, pp. 9-10. \textsuperscript{69} Ibid, pp. 10-1.
known by another word. But it is known by a verbal cognition of another word. Hence a specific individual is not apprehended by determinate cognition, inference, or verbal cognition; it is apprehended by indeterminate perception only.

Ratnakīrti further contends that generality (sāmānyā) also is not apprehended by a verbal cognition. The word 'cow' denotes an animal with a dewlap, horns, a tail and the like which are perceived together because its differences from other cows are not yet known. But these peculiar limbs do not constitute the generality of cow. The genus of cow is devoid of any form. The aggregate of a dewlap, horns, a tail and the like, though different in different individuals, is made one by the specific individuals in which they exist. So it is called a generality, though it is not really so. An external object with these limbs only is never perceived. So the idea of such common limbs is illusory. Hence, let this idea be a mode of the intellect (buddhi) under the influence of an impression (vāsanā) of it, or, let this illusory idea manifest such a common form; or, let the specific individuals produce a common notion because of the differences among homogeneous individuals being not known; or, let the common notion be due to the obscuration of memory (smrtīpramōsa). But in fact, the common notion or concept is absolutely objectless; there is no generality corresponding to it in specific individuals. It is wrong to argue, that if there were no generality in specific individuals, a concept would be produced without a cause, because the collocation of causal conditions, which produces non-different cognitions of some individuals, aided by the past perceptions and recollections of the previous similar individuals, produces an objectless concept. Therefore a genus is not apprehended by a verbal cognition. Nor is it apprehended by perception or inference. Because a genus is imperceptible its uniform concomitance with a sign (liṅga) cannot be perceived. So—the existence of a genus cannot be inferred like that of the sense-organs. A common notion or concept, as an effect, does not prove the existence of a genus as its cause. It is produced by many specific individuals which produce non-different perceptions. According to the Buddhist, the individuals which are different from the so-called genus in their nature and independent of it are the causes

10 Ibid, p. 11.
of a common notion or concept, even as according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika a genus which is one, independent of, and different from, another genus, is the cause of a concept.\textsuperscript{72}

Triločana, the teacher of Vācaspati Miśra, maintains, that generality, which is the inheritance of a genus in its substrates or individuals, is the cause of a concept and a common name. Ratnakīrti urges, that the individuals can produce a concept and a common name, and that the assumption of a generality or genus is unnecessary. He urges further, that inheritance is not possible because it is known as ‘a genus subsisting in an individual’ which involves the knowledge of two entities that are never found in our experience. Hence Ratnakīrti concludes that a genus is a mere conceptual construct without any foundation in a object. The Mīmāṁsaka and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika argue, that a common notion must be produced by and accord with a common object, i.e. a genus which is common to different individuals; and that otherwise different individuals, which produce different cognitions, cannot produce a common notion. Ratnakīrti challenges the validity of this argument on the ground that a common notion and a general name are produced by the nature of the specific individuals differentiated from the heterogeneous individuals without the existence of any common object in the shape of a generality or a genus.\textsuperscript{73} Hence the individuals in whose close contact with a sense-organ a genus is said to be known to pervade them are the cause of the verbal cognition of a name. A generality is not perceived even in dream. So if it is presumed to exist, it is better to presume a close contact with a sense-organ to be the cause of a general concept without the additional assumption of generality. The existence of generality may be said to be proved by the following inference. A determinate cognition of a qualified object (vīśeṣya) is preceded by the cognition of a qualification (vīśeṣanā). ‘This is a cow’. It is the cognition of a qualified object (vīśiṣṭabuddhi). So it must be preceded by the cognition of the genus of cow which is the qualification of ‘this’ individual. Thus the reality of a genus is proved as a qualification of an individual perceived. Ratnakīrti urges, that the difference between a qualified object and its qualification is imaginary; and that

\textsuperscript{72}Ibid, pp. 11-3.
\textsuperscript{73}Anuvṛttam antareṇāpi abhidhāna-pratyānuvṛttēr atadṛpa-parāvṛttasvārāpviśeṣāt avāsyāṁ svikārasya sādhitatvāt. Ibid, p. 14.
the use of the sentence 'this is a cow' is due to the apprehension of an individual cow differentiated from non-cows, which is not the cognition of a generality. Hence the inference for the existence of a genus is not valid.\textsuperscript{46}

Vācaspati Mīśra maintains, that the individuals in which a genus subsists, are objects of verbal cognitions and denoted by words;\textsuperscript{45} that the forms of an individual and a genus are differentiated from those of other heterogeneous individuals and their genera; and that therefore when a person hears the words 'tie a cow', he does not tie a horse. Rantakirti, a younger contemporary of Vācaspati, criticizes his view. If the form of an individual is differentiated from those of other heterogeneous individuals, then a word may denote a positive individual with its negation of other heterogeneous individuals, and a common notion may cognize them, and the assumption of a genus subsisting in the individual is needless. If the form of an individual be said to be differentiated from other heterogeneous individuals on the strength of its genus or the series of its causes, then let it be so. But in both cases there is the knowledge of its differentiation from other heterogeneous individuals in the knowledge of an object. The doctrine that a word denotes a positive object 'cow' differentiated from 'non-cows' does not involve mutual dependence (anyonyāśraya). But Vācaspati's doctrine that a word denotes an individual possessed of a genus involves mutual dependence. If an individual cow is not known, the genus of cow cannot be known. If the genus of cow is not known, then its being denoted by the word 'cow' cannot be known. But the doctrine that a word denotes an individual which is perceived, on which a common form is imposed by a common notion (vikalpa-buddhi) which is a conceptual construct, does not involve mutual dependence. There is no common form in an individual in the shape of a genus; but it is an imaginary form superimposed by a concept on it.\textsuperscript{5a} It is in the nature of the negation of contradictory individuals. There is no contradiction between an individual differentiated from contradictory individuals and the differentiation from them, because they are not exclusive of each other, and because they coexist in

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid, pp. 13-6.
\textsuperscript{45} Jātimatyo vyaktayo vikalpānāṁ śabdānāṁ gocaraḥ. NVTT., ii, 2, 63, p. 341.
\textsuperscript{5a} Yaḥ sarva-vyakti-sādhāraṇa iva bahir adhyasto vikalpa-buddhyākāraḥ. SBNT., p. 5.
the same locus. Nor do they cease to be related as a qualified object (viṣeṣya) and its qualification (viṣeṣaṇa). A positive individual ‘cow’ is a qualified object, and the negation of ‘non-cows’ is a qualification. The former as qualified by the latter is denoted by the word ‘cow’. There is contradiction between a jar and its absence, but not between the ground and the absence of a jar. Similarly, there is no contradiction between an individual cow and the negation of non-cows. They can coexist in the same locus. Thus a word denotes a positive individual qualified by the negation of contradictory individuals. When a positive object is denoted by a word, it is known as qualified by the negation of contradictories. Vācaspati argues, that a verbal cognition apprehends an individual in which a genus subsists. Ratnakīrti urges, that it cannot apprehend an external individual which is apprehended by indeterminate perception only. If an external individual were denoted by a word, then its cognition could not be in the form of an assertion or a negation. If it is always positive, then it is useless to speak of its existence and it is incapable of non-existence. If, on the other hand, it is always negative, then it is useless to speak of its non-existence and it is incapable of existence. But we speak of ‘existence’ and ‘non-existence’ in this connection. Hence a verbal cognition cannot apprehend a form common to the existence and non-existence of external objects; or, it cannot apprehend the generality of an external object. A genus which is said to be denoted by a word cannot be common to the existence and non-existence of external objects. The existence of a genus is said to consist in its being related to a present proper individual. Its non-existence is said to consist in its being related to past and future proper individuals. So its being common to existing and non-existing individuals is an irregular middle because the non-existing individuals are doubtful or accidental. Vācaspati lays stress on the genus which is denoted by a word, and so admits that an individual is not denoted by a word. But everywhere a word denotes the existence of its object through an individual. It conveys the knowledge of an individual as existing. It is absurd to argue that the existence of a genus consists in its being related to a present proper individual. If a genus cannot be denoted by a word, an individual with a genus

76 Tasmād aohaḥdarmanyāधि vidhīrūpāsyā śabdād avagatiḥ. Ibid, p. 6.
77 Apohaśabdenānyāṣpoḥaviditāḥ vidhīr ucyate. Ibid, p. 6.
subsisting in it also cannot be denoted by it. Hence Vācaspati’s view is wrong.78

8. The Nyāya Criticism of the Buddhist doctrine of Apoha

Uddyotakara states the Buddhist doctrine of apoha thus: A word denotes the negation of contradictory individuals, which may be called a genus. The word ‘genus’ does not denote the reality of a genus.79 Or, a word denotes the negation of the object denoted by other words.80 Uddyotakara refutes this view. (1) If the positive import of a word is known, then only it can be denied of another object. Negation presupposes affirmation. The word ‘cow’ is said to denote a ‘non-cow’. But until a ‘cow’ is known there is the absence of the knowledge of a ‘cow’ and a ‘non-cow’. (2) In the so-called negation of the contradictory (anyāpoha) e.g. ‘this is not a non-cow’, does the word ‘cow’ mean a positive entity or a negative entity? If it means a positive entity, does it mean a ‘cow’ or a ‘non-cow’? If it means a ‘cow’, there is no dispute. If it means a ‘non-cow’, then it shows a curious skill in manipulating the meanings of words! The word ‘cow’ does not mean a negative entity (abhāva), because absence cannot be the object of a command and the directed person’s knowledge of its meaning. No one knows an absence on hearing a command. No one directs another person about an absence. (3) The doctrine of apoha does not apply to all words. The word ‘all’ cannot denote the negation of ‘non-all’, because ‘non-all’ does not exist, which may be denied by the word ‘all.’ (4) Further, does the negation ‘this is not a non-cow’ denote a ‘cow’ or a ‘non-cow’? If the former, then a ‘cow’ cannot be absent from a ‘non-cow’. If the latter, then the negation of ‘non-cow’ cannot produce the knowledge of ‘cow’. (5) If a ‘non-cow’ is denied of a ‘cow’ in such a form as ‘A non-cow is not a cow’, then who asserts that ‘a cow is a non-cow’, which is denied of another? Or, how can a ‘non-cow’ be denied of a ‘cow’ without knowing that ‘a cow is a cow’? The denial of a ‘non-cow’ of a ‘cow’ presupposes the affirmation of a ‘cow’ of a ‘cow’. (6) Furthermore, is the negation of a ‘non-cow’ in a ‘cow’ distinct or non-distinct

78 Ibid, pp. 4-
79 NV., ii, 2, 67.
80 Anyaśabdārthāpohāḥ śabdārthāḥ. NV., ii, 2, 67.
from it? If it is distinct from it, has it a substrate or not? If it subsists in a 'cow', then the word 'cow' is its quality, and there is no co-existence of 'cow' and 'negation of non-cow' in the same locus. If the negation of a 'non-cow' has no substrate, then it is meaningless. If it is non-distinct from a 'cow', then it is nothing but a 'cow'. Is the negation of a 'non-cow' one or many in regard to every cow? If it is one which is related to many cows, then it is nothing but the genus of cow. If it is many, then it is infinite in number like the individuals in which it exists, and cannot convey any general meaning. (7) Is the negation of contradictory individuals (apoha) capable of being denoted by a word (vācya) or incapable of being denoted by it? In the first alternative, a word denotes the negation of contradictory individuals, which denotes another negation, and so on to infinity, and thus leads to infinite regress. If exclusion (apoha) denotes the negation of non-exclusion (anapoha), then also it leads to infinite regress. In the second alternative, the negation of a 'non-cow' is not denoted by a word, and yet negates the imports of other words, and thus involves self-contradiction. (8) Moreover, the Buddhists who advocate the doctrine of apoha cannot account for the coexistence of a substance and its quality. The words 'blue lotus' mean, according to them, the negation of 'non-blue' and the negation of 'non-lotus' which do not coexist in the same locus. 'Non-blue' means 'white'; 'non-lotus' means a red jovā flower; they do not coexist. But, according to the Naiyāyika, the words 'blue lotus' denote a positive substance in which the quality of 'blue' and the genus of 'lotus' subsist, but not the negation of 'non-blue' and the negation of 'non-lotus'. The assumption of the negation of contradictory individuals hinders the operation of the means of valid knowledge. Hence the Buddhist doctrine of apoha is not right.\footnote{NV\textsc{v}, ii, 2, 67. NV\textsc{t}, p. 344.}

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa criticizes the Buddhist doctrine of apoha in the following manner. (1) Jayanta asks whether the Buddhist advocates the doctrine of apoha because an external generality or genus does not exist or because there is no experience of it. The Buddhist admits that there is an experience of apoha which takes the place of what is called a genus. But a genus, Jayanta urges, is not non-existent because it is perceived, like a specific individual, by an uncontradicted and undoubted perception due to the
intercourse of the sense-organs with it. (2) The perception of
generality, like that of specific individuality, is unexceptionable.
Therefore a generality is undeniable like a specific individuality.
There is no need of assuming its existence because it is perceived.
If it were inferred from its effect, then there might be a need
for its assumption. (3) Jayanta asks whether the power of pro-
ducing a common notion (anuvrtti-ijnāna) is distinct or indistinct
from the individuals, subsistent in them or independent of them,
eternal or non-eternal, perceptible or inferable. He replies that
it is distinct from them, independent of them, eternal and per-
ceptible. It is a genus subsisting in the individuals, which pro-
duces a common notion or concept. (4) It is wrong to argue
that certain individuals (e.g. cows) produce a certain common
notion of a 'cow', even as the genus of 'cow' is said to exist in
certain individuals (e.g. cows), because a peculiarity in a cognition
cannot be produced without a peculiarity in an object. If a
peculiarity in an object is proved, the reality of a genus is un-
deniable. (5) It is wrong to argue that one common notion is
produced by the accidental quality of producing one and the
same effect, since the production of the same effect by the specific
individuals is not proved. The Buddhists argue that the deter-
minate cognitions of the specific individuals are non-different from
one another because they produce one common thought. This
argument is wrong because oneness of common thought cannot
be produced by many indeterminate perceptions of individuals
collectively, which produce many determinate cognitions that are
apprehended as different from one another; and because they
do not produce any other effect by virtue of which they may
acquire oneness; further because the so-called oneness of the
determinate cognitions is not apprehended by indeterminate
perception which apprehends a specific individual only; and
because it is not apprehended by another determinate cognition
(vikalpa) in that all determinate cognitions are incapable of appre-
hending difference and non-difference inasmuch as they apprehend
their own forms or unreal attributed forms. (6) There is the
identity of the determinate cognitions, it may be argued, on
account of the non-apprehension of the difference of the forms

18 NM., p. 309.
19 Viṣayāśiṣayavatirekeṇa prayyāśiṣayānupapatteḥ. NM., p. 314.
20 NM., pp. 313-4.
21 Ekaprayavamārasaya heturvād dhīr abhedint. NM., p. 314.
apprehended by them, even as a determinate cognition following upon an indeterminate perception of an individual cow apprehends the form of 'cow' like another determinate cognition following upon another indeterminate perception of another individual cow, and the object of the determinate cognitions is said to be one because of its non-difference. Even if the determinate cognitions apprehend the forms, the difference of the objects is not manifested to consciousness. So a determinate cognition mixes up the different indeterminate perceptions, because it cannot apprehend the difference of the specific individuals which are apprehended by indeterminate perceptions. Jayanta refutes this argument. Determinate cognitions are momentary and therefore different from one another. The form which is apprehended by the determinate cognitions, the difference of which is not apprehended, is either distinct or non-distinct from them. If it is distinct from them, it is nothing but a generality. It cannot be said to be a distinctive character due to its unreality, since there is no evidence for its unreality. If the form is non-distinct from them, then determinate cognitions exist in their real nature, and cannot have identity. If they have identity, they cannot mix up different indeterminate perceptions of specific individuals. The determinate cognition of the same form cannot be produced without the admission of a generality. It cannot be produced by the identity of effects or the identity of determinate cognitions. Hence it is wrong to maintain that cognitions are non-different from one another because they produce the same common notion. All arguments advanced to prove that verbal cognitions and words have for their objects negations of contradictories (apoha) are false.66 (7) According to the Nyāya an object continues to exist for some time and is endued with different qualities so that endued with some qualities it is apprehended by indeterminate perception, and endued with other qualities it is apprehended by determinate perception. It has different powers which it manifests with the aid of different auxiliary conditions. So the objects of indeterminate perception and determinate cognitions are not identical. Even if an object is apprehended entirely by an indeterminate perception, it may be apprehended anew by a determinate perception. If an unreal external object in the nature of the negation of contradictory individuals (anyāpoha) be said to be

66 NM., pp. 314-5.
denoted by a word and apprehended by a verbal cognition, Kumārila's objections against it are unassailable. If in order to remove these objections a mere attributed form with the reflections of determinate cognitions tinged with the appearance of a negation be assumed, it is incapable of inducing a person to act on the object denoted by a word. A vikalpa is in the nature of a cognition and transparent by nature. It cannot be tainted unless it comes into contact with something else, either as an internal impression (vāsanā) or as an external object. That it is neither an internal impression nor an external object, but something which tinges a mere cognition is an illusory concept made by fraudulent persons. Objects colour their cognitions; but impressions produced by the cognitions of objects cannot colour them. Cognitions may be coloured by certain objects which may exist in some other place, but they can never be coloured by attributed forms which are absolutely non-existent. Further, absolutely non-existent forms cannot be attributed. The Buddhist argues, that determinate cognitions following upon indeterminate perceptions operating on their objects are unable to apprehend the individual objects differentiated from other objects, but apprehend mere differentiation (vyārtyātmāra); that determinate cognitions apprehend differentiation or negation only because their objects are differentiated from other objects homogeneous with the perceived individuals (drśya) and from heterogeneous objects (vikalpa). If the objects of determinate cognitions are related to both perceived individuals and vikalpas, then they simply apprehend what has already been apprehended, and become useless. Determinate cognitions are indeed useless as means of valid knowledge; or they apprehend other objects. But that they partly apprehend differentiation and partly do not cannot be believed. The negation of homogeneous individuals and the negation of heterogeneous entities are not different in their nature, so that a determinate cognition may apprehend the one and not the other. If a determinate cognition apprehended an object differentiated from other individuals which are homogeneous with the perceived individual, and from other heterogeneous entities (vikalpa), then it would apprehend a specific individual like an indeterminate perception, and there would be no inference and verbal cognition owing to the absence of any knowledge of the relations due to the reality of generalities (sāmānya). (8) If the negation or
differentiation be external, then Kumārila’s objections stand. If it be internal, then it cannot be related to and colour a determinate cognition (vikalpa). That it is neither external nor internal is a fiction of the imagination. If it is a non-entity, then it cannot be related to and colour a determinate cognition, since an absolutely non-existent entity, like the horns of a hair, is not an object of speech and action. If it is an entity, it must be either external or internal. Hence the hypothesis of an attributed form, which is neither external nor internal, is irrational and unwarranted. (9) The cognition produced by the word ‘cow’ when it is heard apprehends the mere generality of cow unrelated to the words ‘existence’ and ‘non-existence’. But it may be related to existence or non-existence denoted by the corresponding words in order to satisfy the desire to know more about the object. If the real nature of an object is not definitely known, then its distinction from other objects is investigated. ‘A jar is really a jar, and not a cloth.’ But from this it does not follow that a verbal cognition apprehends the negation of the contradictories (apoha). (10) The Buddhist maintains, that a person acts on an external object because he identifies the object of an indeterminate perception (dṛṣṭya) with that of a determinate cognition (vikalpa). Jayanta urges, that if the identification is the absence of the knowledge of distinct cognitions, then, being akin to swoon and the like, it cannot give rise to action; that if it is an object of action, then it is perceived (dṛṣṭya), and the assumption of the negation of contradictories (apoha) is unnecessary; that if it is an unreal imaginary object of a determinate cognition which is manifested to consciousness in its own form, then no conscious person can act upon it; that if it is apprehended as a perceptible object (dṛṣṭya), then it gives rise to a contrary cognition, which is not non-distinction of cognition (aviveka); and that this contrary cognition is not false, because it is not contradicted like the illusory cognition of water in the rays of the sun in a desert. Jayanta further urges that an object cannot be said to be attained as an ultimate consequence of the indeterminate perception of a momentary specific individual, even as a gem is said to be attained as an ultimate consequence of the indeterminate perception of its ray. He concludes, that a determinate perception which apprehends a qualified external object is valid; and that when an individual (vyakti) endowed with a configuration (ākṛti)
and possessed of a genus (jāti) is apprehended by a verbal cognition when a word is heard, a person acts upon it. Hence the Buddhist doctrine of apoha is not tenable.\footnote{NM., pp. 315-7.}

9. The Mīmāṃsaaka Criticism of the Buddhist doctrine of Apoha

Kumārila offers the following criticism of the Buddhist doctrine of apoha. (1) If exclusion (apoha) is absence (abhāva), then it is not known independently, like a jar, and subsists in another substrate. What is its substrate? The specific individual is not its substrate, because it is not an object of determinate cognition. Nor is the aggregate of all specific individuals the substrate of the negation of non-cows, because it is not possible. The specific individuals are infinite in number in different times and places, and can never be observed in thousands of years. Therefore the aggregate also does not subsist in them. Hence something unique existing entirely in all specific individuals is the substrate of the negation of non-cows. That is nothing but the genus of cow; if its reality is admitted, then the assumption of the negation of non-cows is needless. (2) The doctrine of apoha leads to infinite regress. The word ‘cow’ denotes the negation of ‘non-cows’ e.g., horses, etc., which also are not known as positive entities, but only by the negation of non-horses, and so on to infinity. Thus an apoha cannot be apprehended by a determinate cognition. Indeterminate perception cannot induce an agent to act upon an object. Thus the doctrine of apoha leads to an extinction of practical life. (3) It would make all words synonymous, since they are in the nature of negations of contradictories without any difference. The argument that negations of contradictories are different from one another is wrong, since they are not different from one another. If they are different from one another, then they are real like specific individuals. But the Buddhists do not consider them to be real. (4) The Buddhist may retort, that ‘generalities’ of the Naiyāyika, being denoted by words and not differing from one another, are synonymous with one another; and that therefore the doctrines of apoha and sāmānya are vitiated by the same defect. Kumārila replies, that generalities are positive in their nature, devoid of
the natures of other generalities, and consequently different from one another; but that negations of contradictories, being merely in the nature of absence (abhāva), do not differ from one another. (5) If negations of contradictories be said to differ from one another because their substrates are different from one another, then the negations differ with every specific individual. If there are as many negations as there are specific individuals, then they cannot serve the purpose of generality. (6) Negations of contradictories, it may be argued, cease to be identical with one another, because their difference depends upon the difference of the objects negated. This argument is wrong, because the difference of apohas due to the difference of negated objects does not destroy their identity inasmuch as such difference of apohas is not real, but attributed. The difference of apohas cannot be due to the difference of negated objects (apohya). (7) The argument that the negation of ‘cow’ is the basis of the classification of ‘non-cows’ is wrong, because the ‘cow’ is already known as a positive being by denying which ‘non-cows’ are known. The denial of ‘non-cow’ presupposes the affirmation of ‘cow’. If a ‘cow’ is known already, the assumption of ‘non-cow’ and the negation of ‘non-cow’ are needless. (8) If a specific individual cow is known already to exist, it does not require a word to denote it. If the genus of cow is known already to exist, then the assumption of the negation of contradictories is unnecessary. (9) The difference of apohas cannot be due to the difference of the negated objects, because their nature cannot be known. Are ‘non-cows’, e.g. horses negated in their general nature or special nature? They are not negated in their special nature, because they are not denoted by words. Nor are they negated in their general nature, because in that case they would be in the nature of absence, being the negations of contradictories. But there can be no negation of a negation. If a negation be negated, it leads to a positive affirmation, and a word denotes a positive entity. (10) Is the negation (apoha) of the negated (apohya), e.g. non-cows or horses different or non-different from them? If it is different from them, then it is a positive entity. If it is non-different from them, then it is the same as the negated, and thus a ‘cow’ is the same as a ‘non-cow’. (11) The doctrine of apoha cannot account for the coexistence of a qualified object (vīśeyya) and a qualification (vīśeṣana), for instance, a ‘lotus’ and ‘blue’, because two negations cannot
function in regard to the same object. (12) A negation of contradictories has no denotative power. The words ‘non-existent’, ‘unknown’ etc., do not denote the negations of contradictories because they cannot be ascertained. Nothing ‘non-existent’ or ‘unknown’ is known, which may be differentiated from others. If it is known, then it is existent and known. The existent cannot be negated by the word ‘existent’; and the known cannot be negated by the word ‘known’. An unknown entity is absolutely incapable of being negated. It cannot be said to be imagined, because its existence is known as soon as it is imagined. (13) What is denoted by the word *apoha* (negation)? It denotes the negation of non-negation (*anapoha*). What is the nature of non-negation? Why is it not *apoha*? If it is not *apoha*, what is its nature? These questions cannot be answered. The *apohas* of negative words, prefixes, verbs and the like are not thinkable. What is the *apoha* of ‘is cooking’ is not known. (14) General words, it may be argued, are denoted by the negation of contradictories (*apoha*), which are considered by some as denoting genera or individuals in which genera subsist. If general words denote external objects, they may denote genera as well. If they are without any basis in external objects, or consist in mere cognitions, the word ‘genus’ also may be objectless or a mere cognition, and the assumption of *apoha* is needless.88

10. The Jaina View of the Import of a Word

Prabhācandra defines a word as an independent aggregate of letters which are dependent on one another. It does not depend upon the letters of another word.89 Māṇikyanandin observes that a word produces the knowledge of an object owing to the natural relation of signifying and being signified between them and convention.90 An object of valid knowledge is individual and general; it is characterized by common characters and distinctive characters because it is apprehended by assimilative knowledge and discriminative knowledge, and because it prompts fruitful actions in the shape of the attainment of good and the rejection of evil.91 Similar modifications constitute generality.

88 NM., pp. 303-6. SV.. Apohavāda.
89 PKM., p. 133.
90 FMS., iii. 95; PMLV., iii. 95.
91 FMS., iii. 1-2.
The Jaina does not believe in a genus which is considered by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika to be one, eternal, and inherent in many individuals. Vidyānanda Svāmī holds that a word denotes an aspect of a multiform (anekānta) object. 'A jar exists'. 'A jar does not exist'. Here particular aspects of an object are denoted by words occurring in positive and negative sentences. If words denoted objects endowed with one definite nature (ekānta), they would falsify their real nature, since they are multiform in their nature. Words denote both positive and negative characters of their objects. If they denoted their positive characters only, they would falsify their nature because they have positive characters at particular times, in particular places, and under particular circumstances. A word denotes its object, and negates other objects. The word 'jar' denotes a jar, and negates a cloth and other objects. So it denotes a multiform object. If it denoted its object in its general character and devoid of its distinctive characters, then its object would be unreal inasmuch as there is no generality without distinctive characters. If a word denoted a generality (sāmānyya) directly, and indirectly denoted an individual, then also its object would be unreal since one word cannot denote another object which is denoted by another word. A word denotes both general and distinctive characters of an object. The positive character of an object is not inconsistent with its negative character, both of which are denoted by a word. The acceptable nature of one object is not inconsistent with the avoidable character of another object. Hence a word denotes a multiform object with its general and distinctive characters and positive and negative characters. This doctrine is consistent with Syādvāda advocated by the Jaina thinkers.

Kundakunda Svāmī regards a sound as an aggregate of atoms or as an effect produced by it. It is an aggregate of innumerable atoms. It is produced by the modification of large aggregates which are struck by one another. It is perceived by the auditory organ which is a physical sense-organ (dravyendriya). The Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika regard sound as a quality of ākāśa. But the Jaina criticizes this view. If sound were a quality of ākāśa, it would not be perceived through the auditory organ because, ākāśa being incorporeal, its quality is incorporeal and

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incapable of being perceived through a sense-organ. Sounds are of two kinds, human and non-human. Human sounds are uttered by persons. Non-human sounds are made by natural objects (e.g. clouds). Or, sounds are of two kinds, language and non-language. Linguistic sounds either consist of letters or do not. Sanskrit, Prāktā, Ārya, and Mleccha languages consist of letters. Sounds uttered by animals endowed with two sense-organs and supernormal sounds of an omniscient person are devoid of letters.

11. Ākṛtivāda

The Ākṛtivādins maintain that a word denotes a form, configuration (ākṛti), or arrangement of parts (avayava-sanniveśa). The meaning of a word is ascertained by its use and cognition. The elders use the word ‘cow’ to denote a particular kind of object on which they act. The hearers also know that the word denotes that particular kind of object. It is applied to an individual with a dewlap and the like, but not to one with manes. So it denotes an individual with a peculiar arrangement of parts. Further, the word ‘cow’ denotes a perceived object; perception apprehends a configuration; the peculiar arrangement of parts in an individual cow, which is different from that of a horse, is perceived through a sense-organ. A word denotes a configuration, since it denotes a perceptible object. Furthermore, a configuration only can be related to the act of command through an individual which is possessed of it. A genus subsisting in all its proper individuals which manifest it cannot be brought or removed. But a configuration which is common to all individuals coming under the same genus can be brought or removed. Hence a word denotes a configuration.

Vātsyāyana urges, that an individual, which is the substrate of a genus, is denoted by a word. It has a configuration. But a genus does not subsist in it. So a configuration is not denoted by a word. ‘Bring a cow’. ‘Give a cow’. In these sentences the word ‘cow’ does not denote an earthen cow, since the genus of cow does not subsist in it. Hence a word does not denote a configuration.

" TRV., V, 6, 24; p. 231. " TRV., V, 24, 6; p. 231.
" NBh., NV., ii, 2, 64; NM., p. 318; SBNT., pp. 11-2; ḨĪP., i, p. 572.
" NBh., ii, 2, 65-6.
Jayanta Bhaṭṭa criticizes the view of the Ākṛtivādins. Configurations differ in different individuals. There are innumerable individuals, and consequently their configurations are innumerable. So the uniform relation of words to configurations cannot be known. The word ‘cow’ does not denote the configuration of white cows, since in its absence it denotes the configuration of black cows, which is perceived. There is no configuration common to all individual cows in the world, because it can never be known in that they are infinite in number. Further, there can be no action on a configuration to carry out a command; nor is it capable of action. Only an individual can act and be acted upon. If a person is commanded to bring a cow, he does not bring a painted cow or an earthen cow, though it has the peculiar configuration. Hence the doctrine that a word denotes a configuration is wrong.99

12. Vyaktivāda: Criticism of Jātivāda

The Vyaktivādin advances the following arguments to prove that a word denotes an individual. ‘A cow exists or sits’. An individual cow only can exist or sit. The genus of cow is incorporeal and motionless. But individual cows are corporeal and moving. A ‘collection of cows’ is a collection of individual cows, because the genus of cow is one. ‘He is giving a cow to a Vaidya’. An individual cow only can be given or received, since the genus of cow is incorporeal and motionless and incapable of being given or received. ‘Kauṇḍinya’s cow’ is an individual cow belonging to Kauṇḍinya. An individual cow only can be owned, but the genus of cow cannot. ‘Ten cows’ mean ten individual cows which can be enumerated. Number does not apply to the genus of cow. ‘A cow is increasing or decreasing in bulk’. An individual cow only is capable of increase or decrease. The genus of cow is incapable of it, since it is incorporeal. ‘A cow is white’. An individual cow only can be white. The genus of cow is devoid of qualities. Qualities can subsist in a substance only. ‘The pleasure of a cow’ means the pleasure of an individual cow. The genus of cow cannot have pleasure. ‘A cow gives birth to a calf’. An individual cow only can produce a calf. The genus of cow is eternal, and consequently incapable of producing or being

99 NM., p. 318.
produced. An individual only can be the substrate of a genus, and be an object of action, while a configuration cannot be the abode of a genus, and is incapable of being acted on. So a configuration cannot be denoted by a word. An individual only is an object of use and command. It can be an object of action, e.g. acquisition, destruction, etc. But a genus cannot be acquired or destroyed. Even others admit that a word denotes a perceptible object, and that perception does not apprehend a mere genus, but an individual in which a genus subsists.

If a word denotes a genus, it may be asked, why a person does not bring an earthen cow when he is directed to bring a cow since the genus of cow is present everywhere. It may be replied that, though the genus of cow is present everywhere, it is manifested by the individual cows only. An individual cow with a dewlap and the like manifests the genus of cow; but an earthen cow does not manifest it. But the peculiar arrangement of parts exists in an earthen cow, and yet it is not denoted by the word 'cow'. It does not denote a configuration because, in that case, there can be no coexistence of white colour and the like in the same locus when it is denoted by another word. Qualities do not exist in a configuration. But white colour and the genus of cow coexist in an individual cow. Hence an individual is denoted by a word, and it produces a particular idea.

13. Jātivāda: Criticism of Vyaktivāda

The Mīmāṁsaka and the Advaita Vedāntist maintain that a word denotes a genus (jāti). Kumārila argues: If an individual distinct from a genus were denoted by a word, no uniform relation could be established between them, since individuals are infinite in number. But if a word denotes a genus, it may denote an individual through its genus which qualifies it. Thus a relation can be established between a word and its object. A generality is common to many individuals, and produces a common notion or concept. It is denoted by a word. Prabhākara also maintains that a word denotes a genus. The genus of cow only is denoted by the word 'cow'. An individual cow being denoted by it contains a greater number of elements. So it is

100 NS., NBh., ii, 2, 62. 101 NM., pp. 319-20. 102 SV., NR., Akṛtvāda, 1, 3-4.
not denoted by the word 'cow'. Maṇḍana Miśra regards a genus as the primary meaning of a word, and an individual in which a genus subsists as its secondary meaning.

According to the Advaita Vedāntists, a word denotes a genus, and not an individual. It cannot denote an individual, since individuals are innumerable. But whenever it denotes a genus, it denotes an individual as well, since a genus is apprehended by that cognition which apprehends an individual. Or, a word has a natural power of denoting an individual, but it is not cognized by us. But its power of denoting a genus is cognized by us. A word is known to denote a genus and produces the knowledge of it. To maintain that a word is also known to denote an individual violates the law of parsimony, because no sooner than a genus is known to be denoted by a word an individual also is known. So the knowledge of an individual being denoted by a word is unnecessary. That is expressible by a word (vācya), which is the object of its denotative power which is cognized. Hence a genus is expressible by a word, but an individual is not. Though the word 'cow' denotes the genus of cow, it implies an individual.

Vātsyāyana gives the following arguments of the Jātvādīn. An individual does not exist without a genus subsisting in it. An individual without being qualified by a genus is not denoted by a word. But it is denoted by it as qualified by a genus. A genus is capable of movement, increase, decrease, enumeration, collection, production and the like through the individuals in which it subsists. An earthen cow is not denoted by the word 'cow' because the genus of cow does not subsist in it, though an individual and a configuration exist.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa gives the following arguments of the Mīmāṁsaka against the doctrine that a word denotes an individual: The Mīmāṁsaka asks whether a word denotes a mere individual or whether it denotes a qualified individual, and replies that it does not denote a mere individual, because the word 'cow' is not applied by speakers to any individual (e.g., a horse) and because the hearers do not know any individual when they hear the word. The word 'cow' may be said to denote an individual.

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105 S.B., i, 3, 28; VP, ch. IV.
106 NBh, ii, 2, 62, 66.
cow qualified by the genus of cow. Then the genus of cow is denoted by the word, and not an individual; because if a word denotes an individual, another individual cannot be denoted by it; and because if it denotes another individual also, then it denotes an entity common to all individuals, and not one individual only. If an individual were denoted by a word, individual cows would be perceived as ‘this is a cow’, ‘this is a cow’, etc., and not as ‘this is also a cow’. The uniform perception of cows as cows may be said to be due to the existence of a genus in them. Is it known or unknown? It is not unknown because then it would not serve any purpose. If it is known, it is known either through a word or through some other means of valid knowledge. It cannot be known by any other pramāṇa, since it is absent. If it were known through a word, then the word might denote it in the beginning. The word ‘cow’ may be said to denote a genus (gotra) as a qualification (viśeṣa) and an individual cow as a qualified substance (viśeṣya). But it cannot denote innumerable individual cows as qualified substances and their genus as a qualification. There is no other means of knowing individual cows so that a word may denote them as qualified by a genus. The experiences of an individual and a genus are not denied for every one has both these experiences. But a word cannot denote an individual and a genus both. If it did, it would imply one by denoting the other. Then the word ‘cow’ either denotes the genus and implies an individual; or, it denotes an individual and implies a genus. If the genus is a qualification, then it is known before an individual is known, and can be denoted by a word. If it is known through a word, an individual also can be known through it. Then a word does not denote both a genus and an individual directly.¹⁸⁷

We know the genus of cow, it may be argued, as a qualification, and an individual cow as a qualified substance when we hear the word cow, even as we know a person bearing a staff when we hear the word ‘daṇḍin’. This is not an appropriate example. The word ‘daṇḍin’ denotes both a staff (viśeṣa) and a person with a staff (viśeṣya). It does not denote a staff which is a qualification; the word ‘daṇḍa’ does not denote a person, that is a qualified substance. But the word ‘cow’ denotes the genus of cow, a qualification, and an individual cow, a qualified substance.

¹⁸⁷ NM., p. 320.
When it denotes an individual cow (vīśeṣya), it depends upon another pramāṇa to produce the knowledge of the genus of cow (vīśeṣaṇa). When it denotes a genus, it implies an individual to produce the knowledge of it. There is nothing wrong in it. When a word being uttered, an individual is known,—whether it is known through a word or a genus,—it is not perceived, but known by reasoning. A word denoting a genus and an individual is not experienced. A genus is known through the perception of an individual; an individual is known through the perception of a genus, which is known through a word also. An individual only is not an object of action. A genus also can be an object of action. 'Make a sacrifice with an animal'. An incorporeal genus can be an object of action, even as incorporeal qualities and actions are the means of actions. A genus can be an object of action by suggesting an individual. Though it is incorporeal, it acts through an individual, even as the self, though incorporeal, acts through its body and sense-organs. Hence the Mīmāṃsaka concludes that a word denotes a genus.108


Gautama says, "An individual, a configuration, and a genus are denoted by a word."109 Sometimes a genus is its principal import, and an individual is its subordinate import. 'The cow ought not to be touched with feet'. Here the cow means the genus of cow or all cows. Sometimes an individual is the principal meaning, and a genus is a subordinate meaning. 'Bind a cow'. Here a cow means an individual cow. Sometimes a configuration is the principal meaning, and an individual is a subordinate meaning, and a genus is not denoted at all. 'Make an earthen cow'. Here a configuration is the chief import of the word 'cow', and an individual is its subordinate meaning. It does not denote the genus of cow, which is non-existent in an earthen cow. Sometimes a word denotes an individual only, because it has no genus in that it is one. The word 'Dittha' denotes a particular individual because it is a proper name (sāṃśijñā) and devoid of a genus.110

109 Vyākhyākṛtijñāyas tu padārthah. NS., ii, 2, 68.
110 NM., pp. 325-6.
Jayanta Bhaṭṭa criticizes the Mīmāṃsā and the Advaita Vedānta view that a word denotes a genus. A word occurring in a sentence has a case, a gender, and a number. But a genus cannot have any of them. It is wrong to argue that a genus can have these through an individual which is implied by a word, for a word, which is uttered only once, cannot denote a genus at first, then imply an individual, and then denote a case, a gender, and a number through an individual inasmuch as the sequence of such experiences is not cognized. A self, though incorporeal, may become an agent as related to a cognition and a volition. But a genus, though incorporeal, has no direct relation to an action, and consequently cannot have a case that is always related to an action. We perceive an individual qualified by a genus and related to a number. So an individual qualified by a genus is denoted by a word. The genus is a qualification (viśesana) of an individual which is a qualified substance (viśesya). A word does not denote a mere genus, but an individual qualified by it. Nor does it denote a mere individual unqualified by a genus, if it is not one. Both a genus and an individual are perceived through a sense-organ. It cannot be said that a genus is perceived while an individual is inferred, because it is contradicted by experience. If it were so, then qualities only being perceived, a substance would be inferred. But, in fact, a substance and qualities both are perceived. Similarly, a word denotes both a genus and an individual, and not a mere genus. ‘The cow is white’. The sentence means that the genus of cow and white colour coexist in the individual cow. If a word denotes an individual in which a genus subsists, then only a genus and a quality can coexist in the same substrate. Hence a word does not denote a mere genus.\textsuperscript{111}

15. The Yoga doctrine of Sphoṭa

Vyāsa (400 A.D.) expounds the doctrine of word-forms (pada-sphoṭa) and sentence-forms (vākyasphoṭa) in the Yogabhāṣya. There are three kinds of sounds: (1) articulate letter-sounds (vāraṇa) uttered by the vocal organs; (2) audible sounds (dhwani), which are modifications of air perceived by the auditory organ;

and (3) a word-image or a thought-form, which is a mental mode, and apprehends all the component letters at a time. This is called a word or word-form which signifies an object. The first two kinds of sounds do not signify it. The articulate sounds and the audible sounds are produced successively, and do not coexist together. Nor are they aided by one another. So they do not constitute a word, and signify an object. All letters can signify all objects. The same letter combined with other letters in a particular order is modified into a significant word-form (śabdāshphota), and signifies a definite object. It is a single thought-form which apprehends all the component letters in a single grasp,—which are determined by a convention (saṅketa), and from which the temporal order of the audible sounds has been withdrawn,—and signifies an object. It is one, the object of a single cognition, uttered by a single effort, devoid of parts, letters and temporal order, notional, and presented to the mind by the last letter aided by the impressions of the preceding letters. A word is devoid of parts. But the articulate letters-sounds (varṇa) appear to the intellects (buddhi) of persons invested with the impressions (vāsanā) of the words used by the people from beginningless time as its parts. A word (śabda), a cognition (jñāna), and an object (artha) are erroneously identified with one another. A convention is the mutual superimposition of a word and its object upon each other, which is in the nature of recollection.

Vācaspati Miśra rightly asserts that a word-form is not a word-image or a thought-form, but that it is manifested or cognized by the intellect or a thought-form and manifested by audible sounds. Vijnānabhinī also is of the same opinion. He regards a word-form as cognized by the intellect only, and manifested by a single effort and successive letters. Nāgāsa states that it

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113 Tatra vāg varṇeṣevārthavati, śrotraṁ ca dhvani-pariṇāmaṁātra-viṣyaṁ, padam punar nādānuṣaṁhāra-buddhi-nirgrāhyam. YBh., iii, 17.
114 Varṇaḥ punar ekaikāḥ padātmā sarvābhāmānāsaktāprācitaḥ. Ibid, iii, 17.
115 Tad ekaṁ padam ekabuddhi-viṣaya ekaprayatnākṣiptam abhāgaṁ akramam avarṇam bauddham antyavarna-pratyaya-vyāpāropasthāpitam. Ibid, iii, 17.
is called a *sphoṭa* because it manifests an object. Thus a word-form is not a mere verbal image or a thought-form, but an objective sound-essence which is cognized by it. Vyāsa appears to regard it as subjective and notional (*buddha*).

16. The Śābdika doctrine of *Sphoṭa* (*Padasphoṭa*)

Bhartrhari (600 A.D.—650 A.D.), the great grammarian-philosopher, recognizes the reality of a letter-form (*varṇasphoṭa*), a word-form (*padasphoṭa*), and a sentence-form (*vākyasphoṭa*). One letter-form is manifested by many parts of a letter-sound (*varṇa*). One word-form is manifested by many letters. One sentence-form is manifested by many words. But parts of a letter-sound do not exist in a letter-form which is one, indivisible and partless; letters do not exist in a word-form which is one, indivisible and partless; words do not exist in a sentence-form which is one, indivisible and partless.

The constituent letters of a word do not produce the knowledge of the object denoted by it, because each letter cannot produce it. Nor can the aggregate of them produce it, since there can be no aggregate of the successively produced momentary letters which are immediately destroyed. There can be no collection of the simultaneously produced letters, because the same person cannot produce different efforts in the different vocal organs to produce them simultaneously. Nor can the last letter aided by the preceding letters produce the knowledge of the object, since the preceding letters cannot render any aid to it as they are destroyed as soon as they are produced. Just as the preceding letters cannot render an aid to the last letter, so their perceptions and impressions (*sāṁskāra*) of these perceptions also cannot render an aid to it as they also are destroyed as soon as they are produced. Further, the impressions of the perceptions of the preceding letters can produce the recollections of these letters only, but cannot produce the knowledge of another object (e.g. a cow). Nor can the recollections produced by the impressions of the preceding letters render an aid to the last letter,

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117 Chāḍā on YS, iii, 17.
118 Pade na varpā vidyante varṇēṣvavayāvāḥ na ca. VPD, i, 73; BPR, i, 73; HIP, i, pp. 870-1.
since they cannot be produced simultaneously and they cannot co-exist together if they are produced successively as they also are produced and destroyed. Nor can all the impressions of the preceding letters produce one recollection only with the aid of the last letter, for then the impressions of conflicting perceptions of many objects will produce one recollection only, which is not found in our experience. Nor can the last letter (e.g. \( w \)) independently of the other letters (e.g. \( c \) and \( o \)) produce the knowledge of the object (e.g. cow), since the other letters will then be useless. Hence the constituent letters can neither collectively nor distributively produce the knowledge of an object denoted by a word. The last letter combined with the impressions produced by the perceptions of the preceding letters cannot produce such knowledge, for a letter can produce the knowledge of an object if its relation to the object is already perceived. But the impressions are imperceptible, and consequently the last letter combined with them also is imperceptible. The last letter combined with the recollections of the preceding letters due to their impressions also cannot produce such knowledge, since the recollections also are successive.\(^{119}\) The assumption of the imperceptible impressions of all letters except the last one violates the parsimony of hypotheses. A word-form (\( padasphota \)) which is manifested by the successively uttered letters produces the knowledge of the object denoted by the word. Though it is imperceptible, it is presumed to exist in order to account for such knowledge. To argue that letters only are perceived and that a word-form distinct from them is not perceived is wrong, because oneness of a word is perceived, which does not accord with letters, since they are different from one another and oneness and multiplicity which are contradictory to each other cannot coexist in the same object. Oneness of a word cannot be due to its producing the knowledge of one object because it involves mutual dependence. Oneness of a word is due to oneness of the object denoted by it; and oneness of the object denoted by a word is due to oneness of the word. Hence a word is not in the nature of letters, but a word-form (\( padasphota \)).\(^{120}\) It must be assumed to exist in order to account for the knowledge of an object denoted by a word. It is manifested to auditory perception as

\(^{119}\) YBP., Bombay, 1915, p. 95; S.B., i, 3, 28.
\(^{120}\) YBP., p. 95; FKM., p. 131.
one, partless, and devoid of sequence, because there is the experience of one meaning after hearing the word. This perception cannot have letters for its object, since many letters which are different from one another cannot produce one perception. Nor has it a generality (e.g. the genus of letters) for its object, because it cannot produce the knowledge of one definite object. Nor is it illusory as it is not contradicted. Nor is it non-existent inasmuch as it is an uncontradicted perception. The word-form (padasphoṭa) must be admitted to be eternal. If it were non-eternal, then it would be destroyed after being perceived at the time when a convention (sāṃketa) is made, and the word 'cow' being heard at some other time and in some other place would not produce the knowledge of the object (e.g. a cow), because a word-form which has not been made a convention cannot produce the knowledge of an object. If it could do so, then a person coming from an island where there are no cows would have the knowledge of a cow on hearing the word 'cow' and making a convention would be unnecessary. But both these contingencies are unthinkable. Hence a word-form is eternal.

17. The Jaina Criticism of the Śābdika doctrine of Sphoṭa

Prabhācandra criticizes the Śābdika doctrine of a word-form (padasphoṭa). The Jaina maintains, that the last letter qualified by the destruction of the preceding letters perceived through the auditory organ produces the knowledge of the object denoted by a word, and that, therefore, the utterance of the preceding letters is not needless. A negation can be an auxiliary cause of an effect. For instance, the negation of the conjunction of a stem and a fruit is a cause of the fall of the fruit. A motion qualified by the negation of a prior conjunction is an auxiliary cause of a subsequent conjunction. The conjunction of a fire with the atoms of earth qualified by the destruction of their previous black colour produces red colour in them. Or, the last letter aided by the impressions (sāṃskāra) of the perceptions of the preceding letters, and qualified by the negation of the perceptions of the preceding letters, produces the knowledge of the object denoted by a word. An impression of the perception of a preceding letter (e.g. c or o), it may be objected, cannot produce
the knowledge of another object (e.g. cow). This objection, Prabhācandra urges, is without any foundation, since the last letter modified by the impression of the perception of the preceding letter is found to produce the knowledge of the object denoted by a word. The impression of the perception of the preceding letter renders an aid to the last letter with the help of other conditions. The first letter (e.g. c) produces a cognition, which produces an impression. Then the cognition of the second letter (e.g. o) is produced. It is qualified by the impression of the preceding cognition, and produces an impression, which is qualified. Then the cognition of the last letter (e.g. w) is produced. It is qualified by the impression of the cognition of the second letter. The last letter aided by the last impression produces the knowledge of the object denoted by the word 'cow'. Or, the experiences of the preceding letters and their impressions are not destroyed, but continue to exist and modify the last letter. Or, the last letter depending on the recollection produced by the impression of the cognition of the preceding letter produces the knowledge of the object denoted by a word. The Śābdika argues, that when a word-form (padasphoṭa) is present, the knowledge of the import of a word is present; that when the former is absent, the latter is absent; and that, therefore, a word-form is the cause of the knowledge of the import of a word. But Prabhācandra contends, that the assumption of an imperceptible cause is justified when a perceptible cause cannot account for the production of an effect; and that the last letter qualified by the impression of the preceding letter can adequately account for the knowledge of the import of a word. He contends further, that all the component letters of a word, collectively or distributively, are unable to manifest a word-form, because they are produced and destroyed successively, and consequently do not coexist together, and because the first letter manifesting the word-form completely, the second and the subsequent letters become unnecessary. To argue that the utterance of the second and the subsequent letters is not unnecessary because the last letter manifests the word-form while it is refined by the preceding letters is wrong, since the nature of refinement as distinguished from manifestation is not known. Hence the Śābdika doctrine of a word-form (padasphoṭa) is not tenable. 183

183 P.K.M., p. 132.
18. The Mīmāṃsaka Criticism of the Śābdika doctrine of Sphoṭa (Padasphoṭa)

Kumārila criticizes the Śābdika doctrine of Sphoṭa elaborately. Pārthasārathi Miśra sums up his arguments in the following manner. A word which is nothing but letters or letter-sounds is perceived through the auditory organ. Nothing over and above them is manifested by auditory perception. The so-called word-form (padasphoṭa) is capable of being perceived, and yet it is not perceived. Hence it does not exist. The Śābdika who assumes the existence of a word-form has to further assume the impressions of letters. All letters manifest a word-form. But they are successive and consequently can co-exist through the impressions of the preceding letters. So the Śābdika must assume the existence of impressions (saṃskāra). If a word-form is manifested by each letter of a word—the preceding letters indistinctly manifesting it and the succeeding letters manifesting it more and more distinctly, then the second and the other subsequent letters are not needless. But, in that case, the succeeding letters capable of manifesting a word-form distinctly would manifest it, and the preceding letters would be useless. If the letters manifest a word-form partly, then it is not indivisible and partless. It may be argued, that a word-form is not distinctly manifested all at once, but that it is first indistinctly manifested, and more and more distinctly manifested as the letters are heard again and again. This argument is wrong for, in that case, a word-form would be manifested by the repeated preceding letters or by the repeated succeeding letters, and all letters would not be necessary. Further, if each letter manifested a word-form, then the preceding letters would distinctly manifest it, and the succeeding letters would indistinctly manifest it, or the letters uttered in a reverse order would manifest it. In order to avoid these difficulties the Śābdika must admit that a word-form is manifested by the last letter aided by the impressions of the preceding letters. So he must admit the reality of impressions (saṃskāra) in addition to that of an imperceptible word-form. Thus he violates the parsimony of hypotheses. According to the Mīmāṃsaka, the impressions of the letters produce collectively one recollection which cognizes all letters and produces the knowledge of the import of a word.
But this is not possible for the Sābdika, who holds that there are four kinds of words (vāk): (1) ṭārā, (2) paśyanā, (3) madhyāmā, and (4) vaikharī. The first is Sabdabrahma called Bindu abiding in mūlābhāra at the bottom of the spinal cord; it is in the nature of refined air in this plexus. The second abides in a plexus in the spinal cord near the navel; it is manifested by air and known by the mind (manas). The third abides in a plexus in the cord near the heart; it is a word-form (śabdaphoṭa), which is subtle and inaudible through the auditory organ, manifested by air, and cognizable by the intellect (buddhi) in the course of mental recitation of a mantra or a divine name. The fourth abides in a plexus in the cord near the throat, rises upward through air, strikes the head, returns, and is heard by the auditory organ. It is an audible word. Articulate sounds (nāda), either being known, or remembered, or existing, manifest a word-form. They are not perceived through the auditory organ, and cannot, therefore, manifest a word-form. Their recollection also cannot manifest it because they are not perceived. They cannot be said to refine the auditory organ by their mere existence and thus manifest a word-form, for they are successive and cannot exist simultaneously. So they can exist simultaneously through their impressions only, and the assumption of impressions of letters is indispensable. It may be argued, that the impressions which are the causes of recollections are unable to manifest a word-form, but that the refinements of the auditory organ manifest it like the letters, and that the assumption of other impressions is not necessary. This argument is wrong because the refinements are momentary, and cannot therefore manifest it collectively. If each refinement manifests it, then the first refinement manifesting it, the later refinements are needless. Or, the conjunction of the auditory organ with a letter itself is its refinement. But it is momentary because letters-sounds are mobile. So other abiding impressions must be assumed to exist. Hence a word is not an entity over and above its component letters; a word-form is non-existent. According to the Mīmāṁsaka the letters being remembered signify the object denoted by a word. The order of succession among them also is its auxiliary condition. Otherwise the letters being uttered in a reverse order would produce the knowledge of the meaning.

\[122\] ADP., p. 374; NM., pp. 373-4.
of a word. Hence the remembered letters invested with the order attributed to them by the letter-sounds which manifest them signify the object denoted by a word.124

19. The Vaiśeṣika Criticism of the Śābdika doctrine of Sphoṭa (Padaśphoṭa)

Śrīdhara criticizes the Śābdika doctrine of Sphoṭa. When a word is uttered, its letter-sounds are heard in succession. Nothing over and above them is perceived. If a word-form is perceived after the letters are perceived, then the perception of letters is illusory, and that the word-form is valid. But the former is never contradicted by the latter, as the illusory perception of silver is contradicted by the valid perception of a nacre. A word-form is neither perceived nor known by any other pramāṇa. It cannot be said to be assumed to account for the knowledge of the meaning of a word. If a word-form being unperceived could produce such knowledge, it would always do so. It being perceived also cannot produce it for it is not perceived. The letters perceived and aided by their impressions can produce the knowledge of the meaning of a word. Though the letters are momentary, yet their impressions being produced successively produce such knowledge jointly. Or, the last letter aided by the impression or recollection of the preceding letter produces such knowledge.125 The Nyāya also maintains, that though impressions produce recollections, yet they can produce other effects. The Śābdika assumes the existence of a word-form and its power of producing the knowledge of the import of a word with the aid of the impressions of the component letters, and thus violates the parsimony of hypotheses. Hence the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika hypothesis is better than the Śābdika hypothesis of Sphoṭa.126

20. The Naiyāyika Criticism of the Śābdika doctrine of Sphoṭa

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa criticizes the Śābdika doctrine of Sphoṭa. The successive letters of a word only are perceived, but a word-form is not perceived. Nor is it inferred from the experience of the meaning of a word for it is produced by the successive letters

124 ŠD., and ŠDP., pp. 370-7. ŠV., Sphoṭavāda.
125 Pūrvavānasattākāraśaśaranaṇayor anyataraśāpekaśo'ntyo vāṁḥ pratyāśa-kaḥ. NK., p. 270.
126 Ibid., pp. 269-71. HIP., i, pp. 891-3.
which are perceived. A single letter cannot produce such knowledge. But all letters can jointly produce it. It is wrong to argue that all letters cannot collectively produce such knowledge because they are successive, for successive causes are often found to produce an effect jointly. For instance, many successive morsels of food jointly produce one satisfaction. They are successive and yet conjointly produce such an effect. Similarly, successive letters collectively produce the experience of the meaning of a word. Though the preceding letters are past and the last letter is present, yet the former render an aid to the latter. Therefore all letters jointly produce the knowledge of the import of a word, even as many successive momentary acts jointly produce an effect. The aggregate of successive letters is as imaginary as the aggregate of successive acts. Or, the mental cumulative knowledge (saṃkalanājñāna) of all letters, which is produced after the successive letters are perceived, produces the knowledge of the meaning of a word. When Devadatta has eaten a hundred mangoes, he has a cumulative mental representative knowledge (mānasa anyvyavasāya) of all these mangoes. Such a cumulative knowledge (saṃuccayajñāna) of a collection of objects exists, which is neither doubtful nor uncontradicted. The cumulative knowledge of the perceived last letter and the remembered preceding letters is variegated, and apprehends existing and non-existent letters. It is produced after the successive letters are perceived, and produces the knowledge of the import of a word. It may be argued, that the impressions of letters can produce the recollections of them, but that they cannot produce the comprehension of the meaning of a word. This argument is wrong because it is not a command of the king that impressions can produce recollections only. An impression is not an independent substance, but a power of the self produced in it by the apprehension of an object, which is inferred from recollection that is its effect. This power can produce another effect viz., the knowledge of the meaning of a word. The self has such knowledge after having the impressions of the perceptions of the component letters. So an impression is not the power of recollection only. But it is a quality of the self called vāsanā which can produce the knowledge of the meaning of a word like recollection. The letters and their perceptions are past; another word-form is not perceived; but there is the knowledge of the meaning of a word.
It is produced by the impressions of letters. But why should impressions be the causes of apprehension (anubhava)? There is no rule that they must always produce recollections. Just as impressions are inferred from recollections as their causes, so they are inferred from the apprehension of the meaning of a word as its cause. Or, the impressions of letters produce such apprehension through recollections; the perception of the last letter and the recollections of the preceding letters, or the perceived letter and the remembered letters, produce such apprehension. But recollections of letters also, it may be argued, are produced successively as they follow the order of the original perceptions, and cannot, therefore, coexist together and collectively produce such apprehension. This argument is invalid, since the self affected by the successive impressions of the letters remembers at once all of them, and acquires the apprehension of the meaning of the word. The Śābdika also admits the impressions of letters in order to account for the manifestation of a word-form. But he makes a number of needless assumptions e.g., a unique word-form, its existence, its distinctness from the letters, and its partlessness. Further, a word-form is said to be indistinctly manifested by the first letter, and more distinctly manifested by the succeeding letters. But because it is partless and indivisible, it is entirely and distinctly manifested by the first letter, and the other letters are needless. If it is partially manifested by the different letters, then it is not partless. If a succession of letters be said to manifest a word-form, it may as well produce the knowledge of the import of a word, and a word-form is not necessary for it. Furthermore, the validity of verbal knowledge depends upon the reliability of the speaker of the words. But a word-form is eternal and not created by a reliable person. So it is not valid. Hence the non-eternal letters of a word, which are uttered by a trustworthy person, produce the valid knowledge of the meaning of a word.

21. The Advaita Vedānta Criticism of the Śābdika doctrine of Sphota

The component letters of a word successively produced and heard can produce the knowledge of the meaning of a word.

197 Smṛtyamēpanubhūyamān
198 NM., pp. 374-8.
199 mako'rtahaprayayah NM., p. 377.
200 Ibid. p. 366.
So the assumption of a word-form (padasphota) is unnecessary. It cannot be said to be apprehended by the perception of the last word modified by the impressions of the preceding letters, since it apprehends all the letters, and not a word-form. The one cognition of 'cow', which is produced just after the perceptions of the successive letters, apprehends nothing but these. What is called the one unique perception of a word-form is a mere recollection of all letters. But how can many letters be cognized by one cognition? That is not impossible. The one cognition of a line of trees, a forest, an army, a hundred, or a thousand cognizes many objects. Similarly, a series of successive letters (e.g. c, o, and w) can be cognized by one cognition. But if all letters constituted a word and were cognized by one cognition, then the same letters in different orders (e.g. 'pot' and 'top') would produce the knowledge of the same object. But, in fact, they produce the cognitions of different objects. Saṃkara replies, that the same letters in the same order convey the same meaning, but that they in a different order convey a different meaning because they become different when they are in a different order. The letters in a particular order are cognized by the cognition of a word, even as ants in a particular order are cognized by the cognition of a line. The assumption of a word-form is unnecessary because it contradicts our experience and postulates a needless imperceptible entity.  

22. The Nature and Import of a Sentence (Vākyārtha)  

(1) The Nyāya defines a sentence as a collection of words, which has a single meaning. The mutual relation of the objects denoted by the component words is signified by it. The knowledge of the words is the principal cause (karaṇa); the presentation of the imports of the words is its causal operation (vyāpāra); and expectancy, compatibility, proximity and knowledge of the intention of the speaker are the auxiliary causes of the knowledge of the import of a sentence. Verbal knowledge is the result (phale) of these causes. The words 'a jar' do not make a sentence; they expect other words to make a complete sense. Devadatta, bring a jar'. This is a sentence. There must be close

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189 Sphoṭavādīnas tu dṛṣṭahānir adṛṣṭakalpanā ca. S.B., i, 3, 28.  
181 Vākyam padaśamihah. TS., p. 68. TK., p. 15.  
183 Padopasthitānāh mithāh saṅgo vākyārthāh. TK., p. 15.