proximity among the words. If they are uttered at long intervals, they do not make a sentence. 'Irrigate the field with fire'. There is no compatibility of 'irrigate' with 'fire'. So this is not a sentence. 'Irrigate the field with water'. This is a sentence as the words are compatible with one another. A person says at the time of eating, 'Bring salindhava'. The word means either salt or a horse. He means by it salt here. So expectancy, proximity, compatibility and the speaker's intention are the auxiliary causes of verbal knowledge.123

Viśvanātha makes the following observations on verbal knowledge. The known words are not the principal cause (karaṇa), but the knowledge of the component words is so. If a silent person mentally recites a verse, he knows the meaning of the sentence, though words are not present here. The recollection of the objects denoted by the words is the causal operation (vyāpāra) which immediately produces verbal knowledge. The perception of the objects denoted by the words is not the causal operation. If that were so, a person perceiving them and acquainted with the meanings of words would have verbal knowledge. The words produce the recollection of the objects by their denotative power (vṛtti). Vṛtti is either denotation (sakti) or implication (lakṣaṇā). Words and objects were associated with each other in a person's past experience. He hears the words now and remembers the objects according to the law of contiguity. Sakti is the relation between a word and its object, which depends upon a convention (saṅketa). It is a volition of God. The ancient Nyāya does not regard a recent convention as a volition of God. The Navya Nyāya regards a convention as a mere volition, and not as a volition of God,124 and maintains that recent conventions also have denotative power.125 The Nyāya gives the realistic interpretation of a sentence. (2) Some maintain that a sentence is not external and distinct from the component letters and words, but a mere subjective cognition in the form of a sentence (anusamhāra-buddhi), which cognizes a series of letters and words in a single grasp. This is the idealistic interpretation of a sentence.126 (3) The Śābdika regards a sentence as one, indivisible.

123 TA., p. 18; TK., p. 15.
124 Navyās tu śvarecchā na saktiḥ kim tvicchaiva. SM., p. 361.
125 SM., pp. 360-1.
126 Anusamhārti vāyasya. PKM., p. 134. YBh., iii, 17. SV., Vākyādhi-karaṇa, 118; NR., 118.
partless sentence-form (vākyasphota), which is devoid of words but manifested by them. He considers the import of a sentence also to be one and indivisible (akhandārtha).\(^{137}\) This is the transcendental interpretation of a sentence, since a sentence-form is supersensible but comprehended by the intellect or reason (buddhi). (4) The Jaina defines a sentence as an independent aggregate of words dependent on one another, which does not depend upon the words of another sentence, and which is partly different and partly non-different from the component words.\(^{138}\) He distinguishes between a subjective sentence (bhāvavākya) and an objective sentence (dravyavākya).

23. The Śābdika doctrine of Sentence-form (Vākyasphota) and its Criticism

A sentence, according to the Śābdika, is one, indivisible, partless sentence-form (vākyasphota). There are no words in a sentence, as there are no letters in a word, and there are no parts in a letter. As a sentence is partless, so its meaning also is partless. The import of a sentence is really undivided and devoid of distinctions. But it appears to have distinctions owing to the limiting adjuncts (upādhi) of the meanings of the words.\(^{139}\) A word-form is manifested by many kinds of articulate sounds, which are similar to those that manifest another sentence-form. The cognitions of the parts of a sentence are illusory due to the similarity of the manifesting sounds.\(^{140}\) A word-form (padasphota) is cognized by the knowledge of a word; a sentence-form is manifested by the knowledge of a sentence. A word-form manifests the meaning of a word; a sentence-form manifests the meaning of a sentence.\(^{141}\) An indivisible sentence manifests an indivisible meaning.

Kumārila criticizes the Śābdika doctrine of a sentence-form in the following way. The Śābdika, who regards a sentence

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\(^{137}\) Eko' navayavaḥ śabdo vākyam. PKM., p. 134. VPD., Ch. II. YBh., iii, 17.

\(^{138}\) Padānāṁ tadapekṣānāṁ nirapekṣaḥ samudāyo vākyam. Padabhyaḥ kathaścīd bhinnam abhinnaḥ ca vākyam. PKM., pp. 133, 135.

\(^{139}\) Avikalpe'pi vākyārthe vikalpā bhāvanāśrayāḥ.

\(^{140}\) Samudāyo'nhiṃheyaḥ syād avikalpasamuccayaḥ. VPD., ii; ṢDP., p. 610.

\(^{141}\) SV., Vākyādhyikāranā, 119, 123; NR., 119, 123.

or its meaning as external, indivisible and partless, maintains that the cognitions of its parts, words and their meanings, are illusory. Even if they are considered to be illusory, he cannot explain how they are thought to be real. If the parts of a sentence are not existent and separate, then there can be no similarity among them which may produce the illusion of parts. If there is similarity among them, then they are existent, and a sentence is not devoid of parts. If the parts were non-existent, then all sentences would be similar to one another, which is absurd! A sentence has no parts, but it appears to have similarity of parts, even as the cognition of a picture, which has no parts, appears to have similarity of parts (e.g. colours). This argument is wrong, since the object of the cognition has parts, though the cognition has no parts. The letters and words of a sentence are non-existent, and therefore cannot be similar to one another, and have any temporal order. If they are non-existent, then one non-serial, indivisible sentence-form cannot produce the cognition of many successive letters and words. The Śābdika doctrine of one indivisible sentence-form manifesting its meaning violates the parsimony of hypotheses, for an infinite number of sentence-forms invested with infinite imperceptible powers manifest infinite meanings. It is more rational to assume that a small number of words and their meanings produce an infinite number of sentences and their meanings.¹⁴² Pārthasārathi Miśra urges, that the parts of a sentence are known, and that the context determines the meaning of a sentence. There is a distinction of means and ends in Vedic and Tantric injunctive sentences. They become useless, if sentences are partless and indivisible. An action depends upon the knowledge of the means and the end to be realized by them. Therefore the meaning of a sentence is not indivisible. It consists of a collection of many meanings of the component words. Or, it is qualified by their meanings. It is not uncaused; nor is it due to convention (sāmketa). It is produced and made known by the remembered meanings of the component words. It is also determined by the context. Hence an injunctive sentence is valid, and the doctrine of Vākyasphota is untenable.¹⁴³ This is the Mīmāṁsaka criticism of the Śābdika doctrine.

Prabhācandra urges, that the doctrine of Vākyasphota is a

¹⁴³ ŚD., pp. 610-1.
mere fiction of the imagination, since it cannot be proved by any means of valid knowledge, and a sentence-form cannot produce the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence.\(^{144}\) This is the Jaina criticism of the Śābdika doctrine.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa criticizes the doctrine of Vākyasphoṭa. A sentence is not devoid of parts, since it contradicts our experience. In every sentence different words and their meanings are distinctly manifested to consciousness. The experience cannot be said to be illusory, as it is not contradicted by a sublative cognition. The illusion cannot be said to be due to similarity, since it presupposes the existence of some entities which are similar to one another. So the parts of some sentence must exist. A sentence may be said to be partless like the cognition of picture. This is a false analogy. The cognition of a picture is partless; but its object, the picture, has parts. Hence a sentence and its meaning are not partless. It is foolish to argue that a sentence and a word have no parts as letters have parts, and that if the former have parts, then the latter also have parts. Apprehension and non-apprehension determine the nature of an object; it is so as it is apprehended, and it is not so as it is not apprehended. If the argument mentioned above be valid, then the argument that atoms also have parts because jars have parts is valid. The parts of words and sentences are perceived, and so they are existent. But the parts of letters are not perceived, and so they are non-existent. A sentence is produced and destroyed when its component words are produced and destroyed. The meaning of a sentence is produced and destroyed when its component words are produced and destroyed. Similarly, the parts of a word also are real. Hence a sentence and its meaning have parts. The doctrine of a sentence-form is irrational.\(^{145}\) This is the Nyāya criticism of the Śābdika doctrine.

\[24.\text{The Doctrine that a Sentence is a Cognition (Anusamhṛti)}\]

A sentence is a construction of the intellect. The first word, the last word, and the other words are dependent on one another. But the sentence composed by them is a creation of the intellect. It is a reflection (anusamhṛti) on the successive letters formed

\[^{144}\text{PKM., p. 134.}\]

\[^{145}\text{NM., pp. 383-4.}\]
into words. It cognizes the successive letters and words in a single grasp.\textsuperscript{144} After they are uttered, a cognition is produced by the appearance of the relation of a substance, a genus, a quality, and an action to one another, which is the meaning of a sentence.

But there can be no cognition without an object ultimately. So there must be an external sentence corresponding to the cognition. This is Kumārila’s criticism of the doctrine. The Jaina distinguishes between a subjective sentence (bhāvavākyā) and an objective sentence (dravyavākyā). The cognition of a sentence is a subjective sentence. It is a modification of the self invested with the impressions (samskāra) of the cognitions of the preceding letters and perceiving the last letter through the auditory organ. But it is not an objective sentence. A rational person cannot regard a cognition as an external sentence, since it contradicts our experience. An external sentence is real and cognized by the cognition. Hence a sentence cannot be regarded as a mere cognition.\textsuperscript{147} This is Prabhāchandra’s criticism.

25. Prabhākar’s doctrine of Anvītābhidhāna and Criticism of Abhīhitānavyavāda

Prabhākara is an advocate of the doctrine of Anvītābhidhāna. According to him, the words of a sentence denote their meanings as related to one another, from which the meaning of a sentence is known; they do not denote their separate meanings unrelated to one another. They cannot constitute a sentence, if they do not denote its unitary meaning. The meanings of words are not learnt from the usage of the elders. But the meanings of sentences are learnt from their speech and actions. The meanings of words are learnt from those of sentences which are spoken by certain elder persons (prayojaka uṛddha) acquainted with their meanings and the actions of bringing and removing certain objects performed by other elder persons (prayojya uṛddha) in execution of their commands.\textsuperscript{148}

Prabhākara criticizes the doctrine of Abhīhitānavaya advocated by Kumārila and the Naiyāyika, who maintain that the words of a sentence denote their separate meanings. If words

\textsuperscript{144} YBh., iii, 17; PKM., p. 134; SV., Vākyādhikaṣṭha, NR., 118.
\textsuperscript{147} PKM., p. 134.
\textsuperscript{148} Vākyārthamāryākāvyti, p. 2.
denote their separate meanings, they can do so only when their meanings are learnt from the behaviour of the elders (urdhva-vyavahāra), which consists in their speech in the shape of a sentence, since a word only is not used in speech. A speaker speaks in a sentence in order to communicate related meanings. A hearer also comprehends related meanings of a sentence. So related meanings are learnt from a spoken sentence. All component words collectively denote the meaning of a sentence. This is the doctrine of Anvīṭābhidhāna. If the last word denotes the unitary meaning of a sentence unrelated to the meanings of the other words, then all words do not produce such knowledge. It is wrong to argue that if the first word denotes the integral meaning of a sentence, the subsequent words are needless, because one word without the other words cannot denote it. Each word persists in exercising causal operation until the knowledge of the unitary meaning of a sentence is produced so that no word is needless. Then let a sentence and its meaning be partless. This is not possible, since words singly denote their own meanings, but they collectively produce the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence, which is a collection of words denoting one meaning. Prabhākara does not deny the meanings of words in producing the integral meaning of a sentence, which do not cease to function until the related meaning of it is produced. But he does not admit that words denote their separate meanings. The meanings of words apart from a sentence are not learnt, since there is no means of knowing them. The utterance of the second and subsequent words is not unnecessary, for their proximity is necessary for producing the integral meaning of a sentence. As all causes of action jointly produce an action, so all words collectively produce the meaning of a sentence. The unrelated meanings of words of a sentence cannot be learnt. No relation can be established among them, because there is no means of doing so. Expectancy, proximity and compatibility cannot be said to relate the meanings of words to one another. Words and their meanings are unconscious and cannot therefore have expectancy. It is absurd to say that a word expects another word or that a meaning expects another meaning. A person's expectancy

149 Samhātyārtham abhidadhāti padāni vākyam. NM., p. 397.
150 Vākyārthapratiṣṭilī ṣaṁghātākāryam, svākāryāṁ tu pādāṛtha-

pratiṣṭilī. NM., p. 397.
or desire after a sentence has been heard cannot establish a relation among the separate meanings of the constituent words. If it does so, then the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence is not due to words, and is non-verbal. Hence the words denote the meanings related to one another. Mutual relations among the meanings of words are known from the cognitions of the related meanings of words. There is no other means of knowing them. We learn the related meanings of words from the sentences spoken by the elders who are acquainted with their meanings. Hence the doctrine of Abhihitānvaya is not tenable.\footnote{NM., pp. 396-9.}

26. The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā Criticism of Anvitābhidhānadvāda

Kumārila criticizes Prabhākara’s doctrine of Anvitābhidhāna. Words do not denote related (ānvita) meanings, because when a word is uttered, its own meaning only is apprehended. Hence the words of a sentence denote their separate meanings unrelated to one another. The meanings of words being known from the words, which are related to one another by proximity, expectancy and compatibility, produce the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence. When the former are present, the latter is produced.\footnote{ŚV., Vākyādikaraṇa, NR., 104, 110-1.}

According to Anvitābhidhānadvāda, the unity of a sentence is due to the unity of its integral meaning denoted by the component words and the unity of purpose. Pārthasārathi Miśra urges that on this view ‘should perform a sacrifice heaven result animal fire god’ is a sentence, since all the words are connected with the performance of a particular sacrifice with a particular substance to a particular god with the object of achieving a particular end. He urges further, that a Vedic injunctive sentence is one because it embodies one purpose, but that its oneness is not perceived, but inferred from its context. Similarly, the unity of the sentence ‘Bring a cow’ is not perceived. The unity of a sentence is due to the unity of its meaning produced by the component words which denote their separate meanings, and do not cease to function. The words directly denote their separate meanings, and imply the related meaning of a sentence.\footnote{Padābhikitaḥ padārthair lakṣaṇayā vākyārthaḥ pratipadcyate. SD., p. 604.}
is the view of Pārthasārathi Miśra. It may be argued, that in the sentence 'Devadatta, bring a cow' 'Devadatta' and 'a cow' being known by perception and their expectancy, proximity and compatibility being present, there is no knowledge of the mutual relations among the meanings of the words, that therefore the meanings of words do not produce the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence; but that the words themselves denote the related meanings. Pārthasārathi contends that Prabhākara's doctrine also suffers from the same difficulty, since 'Devadatta' and 'a cow' being perceived, and expectancy, proximity and compatibility being present, the two words cannot denote the mutual relations among their meanings, because they are not actually present, but are remembered only. Hence Prabhākara's doctrine that words denote their related meaning is untenable.\textsuperscript{154}

27. The Nyāya Criticism of Anvītābhidhānavāda

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa criticizes the doctrine of Anvītābhidhāna thus: Prabhākara maintains, that we learn the meanings of sentences uttered by elder persons acquainted with their meanings. Jayanta urges, that then we must learn the meaning of each sentence afresh; but that if we learn the meanings of words of a sentence, then the meaning of each new sentence need not be learnt afresh. Prabhākara does not maintain, like the Śābdika, that the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence is independent of the meanings of the component words. He admits that the meanings of the words collectively produce the meaning of a sentence. The meaning of a word is said to be related to the meanings of other words which are expected, proximate and compatible. A word does not always jointly produce a unitary meaning of a sentence, but it denotes its own meaning only. It does not renounce its meaning when it is combined with other expected, proximate and compatible words. Its limited meaning is known by the double method of agreement. Again, when one word is not used, the unitary meaning of a sentence is not produced. It is known from the intention of the speaker. Prabhākara advocates the doctrine of Anvītābhidhāna because he does not consider the intention of the speaker. But his doctrine is wrong since words always possess

the power of denoting their limited meanings. It is self-contradictory to maintain that a word denotes a related meaning (saṁsṛṣṭārtha) without denoting its limited meaning, for the knowledge of a relation presupposes that of the relata. If it denotes its limited meaning as well as the related meaning, then it may as well denote all meanings. Hence a word does not denote all meanings, or a related meaning; but its separate limited meaning only; it can manifest an unrelated object, but not a related object. The doctrine of Anvīābhidhāna is irrational. 155

28. The Nyāya and Kumārila's doctrine of Abhīhitānvaya

The Nyāya advocates the doctrine of Abhīhitānvaya according to which the words of a sentence denote their separate meanings, and convey the knowledge of their relations to one another when expectancy, proximity and compatibility of the words are considered. The meaning of a sentence is known after the meanings of its component words are known. It is not known if the meanings of the words are not known. The words mean a substance, a quality, an action, or a genus. The import of a sentence is comprehended when the relations among the objects denoted by the words are known. The meanings of words are known from the sentences uttered by some elder persons and acted upon by other elder persons acquainted with their meanings. Otherwise the meaning of each sentence would have to be learnt anew, and sentences being infinite in number, comprehension of their meanings would not be possible. Hence there would be extinction of the use of sentences. It is found that the meanings of the new verses of a poet are comprehended. The comprehension of them depends upon that of the meanings of the constituent words. But it would not be possible, if a sentence and its meaning were learnt from the speech and actions of the elders. Hence words do not denote their meanings related to one another. If they did so, the first word would denote the meaning of the sentence, and the subsequent words would be needless. But it contradicts our experience. If the proximity of the other words be said to be the cause of the first word's denoting the meaning of the sentence, then it is so by its mere existence or by denoting

155 NM., pp. 400-1.
the meanings of other words. It cannot be so by its mere existence, since then proximity would not differ from non-proximity. Mere proximity whose relation to the words is not known cannot render any aid to the first word. If it is so by denoting the meanings of other words, then the separate meanings denoted by the component words are related to one another by virtue of their proximity, expectancy and compatibility. A word is related to those other words which it expects, which are proximate to it, and which are compatible with it. Hence the separate meanings denoted by the words are related to one another. The words denote their separate limited meanings; and then they collectively produce the related meaning of a sentence. They do not denote the related meaning of a sentence. They produce the knowledge of its integral meaning. The relations of the meanings of words are not denoted by them; but they are known from a sentence. The Nyāya doctrine of Abhīhitānvaya is better than Prabhākara’s doctrine of Anviti-abhidhāna, because it does not make the second and subsequent words unnecessary, and because it is not vitiated by the defects of the doctrine.

Kumārila also advocates the doctrine of Abhīhitānvaya. The words denote their separate meanings from which the meaning of a sentence is known. They never denote the related meaning of a sentence. They do not lose their meanings in the meaning of a sentence, which is known from them due to the power of the intention of the speaker. The knowledge of the meanings of the words is verbal (śabda), since it is produced by words. But the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence is not directly produced by them. But it is not non-verbal (aśabda) for that reason. It is verbal inasmuch as the causal operation of the intention of the speaker conveyed by the words has not yet ceased to operate. Hence the words are indirectly the cause of the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence. The component words, according to Pārthasāratī Miśra, denote their separate meanings, which collec-
tively produce the unitary meaning of a sentence; they do not
directly denote the related meaning of a sentence.}

29. Anvīyamānābhidhānavāda and Abhidhiyamānānāvayavāda

According to the doctrine of Anvīyamānābhidhāna, words
denote their separate meanings which are related to one another.
According to Abhidhiyamānānāvaya, words relate the separate
meanings which are denoted by them. Jayanta criticizes these
views, and urges that both are wrong, since the two separate acts
of denoting (abhidhāna) and relating (anvaya) are not experienced.
They are either successive or simultaneous. They do not exist
simultaneously, as they are not experienced together. When
words are used, the act of relating their objects is not perceived.
If they are successive, then either the act of denotation is prior
to the act of relating or the act of relation is prior to the act of
denotation. In the first alternative, the doctrine is nothing but
Abhihitānvaya. In the second alternative, the doctrine is
nothing but Anvītābhidhāna. They are not Abhidhiyamānānvaya
and Anvīyamānābhidhāna respectively. The act of denotation is
one, which is known by experts. The act of relating the objects
denoted by words is not possible without their denotation. There
is nothing new in these two doctrines. They are vitiated by the
defects of the doctrines of Abhihitānvaya and Anvayābhidhāna.

30. The doctrine of Anvītābhidhāna in a general way
and Abhihitānvaya in a special way

Some maintain that words denote the related meaning in a
general way, and denote their meanings which are related to one
another in a special way. The word 'cow' denotes its own meaning
related to the meanings of other words in a general way, its
special qualities and actions being unknown. So far the doctrine
is Anvītābhidhāna. The relation of a cow to its special qualities
and actions is known from other words. So far the doctrine is
Abhihitānvaya. Anvītābhidhāna in a general way is vitiated by
the defects of Anvītābhidhāna. Abhihitānvaya in a special way

160 Padāṛthā ekaśka-vidiṣṭārtha-pratipādanāya samāḥtā vākyārttān prati-
pādantī. SD., p. 609.
161 NM., pp. 401-2.
is vitiated by the defects of Abhihitānvaya. Hence this is not a new doctrine.\textsuperscript{162}

31. The Jaina doctrine of the Import of a Sentence and Criticism of Abhihitānvaya

Prabhācandra criticizes Kumārila's doctrine of Abhihitānvaya which maintains that the words denote their separate meanings, and that a sentence means the relation among them. Prabhācandra asks whether the meanings denoted by the words are related to one another by another word or whether they are related to one another by a cognition. The first alternative is not possible, for another word which manifests the meanings of all the words and relates them to one another is absent. The second alternative does not prove Kumārila's thesis, since the knowledge of the words itself is a sentence (bhāvavākya), which comprehends its meaning, but the words are not a sentence. It may be argued, that a sentence is not different from the constituent words, because it is produced indirectly by them, and because the meaning of a sentence is known from the meanings of the words, which are related to one another owing to their presence to the discriminative intellect (apekṣābuddhi). Then, Prabhācandra contends, words are not different from their roots, case-endings, etc., since they are stated when their parts are stated and their meanings are known from the parts, which are related to one another. Kumārila may argue, that a word only is used in common parlance and in the Vedas to convey the meaning of a sentence, but that its roots, etc., are not used; that they are separated from a word in order to show its derivation; and that a word which is partless like a letter, and the parts of which are distinguished from one another by the imagination is known to produce the knowledge of its meaning. Prabhācandra urges that this argument is wrong, because a sentence only is real on a similar ground; that words are separated from it in order to show its construction; and that a sentence only is used in common parlance and in the Vedas to produce the knowledge of objects, which prompts actions to accept or reject them. Hence Prabhācandra concludes, that a word which is experienced as partly different and partly non-different from its parts must be admitted to be so; that it is not

\textsuperscript{162}NM., p. 402.
entirely partless as it cannot be proved; and that a sentence which is experienced as partly different and partly non-different from its component words must be admitted to be so; that a sentence is a collection of mutually dependent words, and independent of other words in another sentence; and that there are two kinds of sentences: (1) an objective sentence (dravyavākya) which is in the form of a statement; and a subjective sentence (bhāvavākya) which is the thought of it. Experience cannot be denied. So Kumārila's doctrine of Abhīhitānvaya is not tenable.\footnote{PKM., p. 135.}
APPENDIX

1. The Jaina views on the Manas (chapter I).—Püjyapāda regards the mind (manas) as not a sense-organ because it is partly a sense-organ and partly not.¹ The external sense-organs can apprehend their objects here and now. But the objects of the mind are not restricted to a particular time and place. The external sense-organs apprehend external objects. But the mind (manas) cannot apprehend external objects. It is called an internal organ, because it does not depend upon the external sense-organs in deliberation on merits and defects of objects and recollection of objects.² There are two kinds of manas: (1) objective mind (dravyamanah) and (2) subjective mind (bhāvamanah). The former depends upon the emergence of infrasensible atoms of karma, which are the modifications of atoms. The latter is the purity of the self, which depends upon subsidence or partial destruction of karma—matter concealing sensuous knowledge.³ The former is composed of atoms which are aids of the self, and incline it to the discrimination of merits and demerits of things, recollection of, and reflection upon, objects due to the subsidence or partial destruction of knowledge-concealing karma-matter. Certain atoms which are aids to the self are modified into the objective mind and constitute dravyamanah. The latter consists in labdhi and upayoga.⁴

The Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika regard the manas as non-material, atomic and devoid of colour and other modifications. Püjyapāda criticizes this view thus. He asks whether the manas is unrelated to the self and the sense-organs or whether it is related to them. In the first alternative, it cannot be an aid to the self, nor can it assist the sense-organs. In the second alternative, being atomic, it is related to a part of the self, and cannot assist it in its other parts. It cannot be said to be connected with different parts of the self in quick succession like a quickly moving firebrand, under the influence of merits and demerits (adyṣṭa), since it is devoid of the power of quick movement. Adyṣṭa is a quality of the self which is incorporeal and unmoving;

¹ Anindriyam mananay. Iṣad indriyam anindriyam. SS., i, 14.
² SS., i, 14.
³ SS., ii, 11.
⁴ SS., v, 19.
it is devoid of movement, and, consequently, cannot generate movement in the manas. A particular substance called air is perceived to be active, endued with touch, and causing motion in an object with which it comes into contact. But the manas is inactive, devoid of touch, and does not cause motion in another object with which it comes into contact. It is corporeal, because it is struck by the roar of a thunder. It cannot be struck by a corporeal substance, if it is not corporeal. It is influenced by the drinking of wine. It is overpowered by phlegm. Hence it is corporeal.\(^5\) Hence the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view of manas is wrong.

Bhaṭṭa Akalanka regards the manas as a sense-organ, because it does not depend upon another sense-organ in its function, viz. examination of merits and defects of objects, even as the eye does not depend upon another sense-organ in apprehending colour. The manas does not cease to be a sense-organ because it is imperceptible. It is imperceptible as it is a modification of a subtle substance. It is inferred from the absence of simultaneous production of many kinds of sensuous perception in spite of the presence of colour, sound, odour, taste and touch. It is inferred from the recollection of an object seen or heard once before.\(^6\) Hence it is a sense-organ. Manas is the internal organ. Its function is not restricted to a specific kind of objects like an external sense-organ. It is not a sense-organ like an external sense-organ. But it is not devoid of the characteristics of a sense-organ.\(^7\)

The author of Jainatarkavārtika does not regard the manas as a sense-organ. He regards the self itself as manas, which may have simultaneous cognitions due to the subsidence or partial destruction of karma-matter which conceals knowledge.\(^8\) A jina has clairvoyant perception of objects at a distance (avadhi) owing to the subsidence or partial destruction of the karma-matter which conceals clairvoyant knowledge due to the conquest of love and hatred. He has telepathic perception of the mental processes of other persons owing to the destruction of the karma-matter which conceals telepathic knowledge (manaḥparyayajñāna). The inclination of the self towards knowledge or its self-luminosity is the invariable precondition of such kinds of knowledge, which do not require the aid of manas. A Yogin can have one synchronous

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\(^{5}\) SS, v, 19.  
\(^{6}\) TRV, i, 5, 19, 4-8.  
\(^{7}\) TRV, i, 5, 14, 2.  
\(^{8}\) Manaḥsaṁjñāsyā jīvasya jñānāvṛti-damakṣayau. JTV, p. 100.
knowledge of common and distinctive features of objects owing to his inclination to know them without its aid. A kevalin also can have an omniscient cognition of all objects simultaneously without a manas. Hence the manas is not the internal organ. The self itself is manas, and nothing else.

Amṛta Sūri recognizes five sense-organs, e.g. tactual, gustatory, olfactory, visual, and auditory. He maintains, that the auxiliary function of manas is assisting the five sense-organs in performing their functions, and that its primary function is the production of mediate knowledge (śrutajñāna), e.g. inferential knowledge and verbal knowledge.10

2. Veṅkaṭanātha’s view of Perception: Indeterminate and Determinate Perception (chapter II).—Veṅkaṭanātha defines perception as immediate knowledge. It is not mediated by any other knowledge. It is free from recollection. It is direct knowledge. It is immediate apprehension. Directness of a cognition consists in its manifesting its object distinctly. Distinctness consists in manifesting an object with its specific individuality.11 Perception is either eternal or non-eternal. Divine perception is eternal. Human perception is non-eternal. It is either yogic perception or non-yogic perception. Yogic perception is produced by a particular excellent merit acquired by the practice of meditation and austerities. It is either ecstatic perception (yukta pratyākṣa) or non-ecstatic perception (viyukta pratyākṣa). The former is produced by the internal organ only in the state of ecstatic union with God. The latter is produced by the internal organ and the external organs in the state of falling off from ecstatic union with God. Veṅkaṭanātha includes sagic intuition (ārṣajñāna) in yogic perception because both are produced by excellent merit.12 Divine perception, perception of the liberated souls, and perception of the souls united with God are independent of the sense-organs. Cognition by its essential nature manifests all objects, but it is obstructed by the veil of ignorance (avidyā), which is partially destroyed by the intercourse of a sense-organ with an object, and completely destroyed by perfect

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9 Ātmaiva mano nānyat. JTVV., p. 100.
10 TSar., ii, 48.
12 Prakṛtādṛṣṭajñāravāścāt. NP., 75. Ibid, pp. 74-5.
knowledge in liberated souls. So their cognitions manifest all objects by their essential nature. The cognitions of sages also manifest all objects because the veil of their ignorance is destroyed by excellent merit due to the practice of austerities. Their supernormal perceptions are non-sensuous. The Yogins have mental perception (mānasa pratyakṣa). Non-yogic perception (ayogi pratyakṣa) is produced by the intercourse of normal external sense-organs with external objects aided by ordinary merit, light and other auxiliary conditions. It is of five kinds, visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, and tactual. Each sense-organ apprehends its own appropriate object.

Normal perception is indeterminate or determinate. Both of them apprehend qualified objects. Only indeterminate perception is devoid of recognition, while determinate perception involves recognition. Indeterminate perception does not apprehend an unqualified object, since a cognition apprehending such an object is never perceived or possible. Even perceptions of babies, dumb persons, birds and beasts apprehend qualified objects, though they are devoid of names. They recognize the objects perceived by them as favourable or unfavourable and either accept them or reject them. The cognition of a qualified object, it may be argued, presupposes the cognition of a qualification, because it is a determinate cognition, like the acquired visual perception of fragrant sandal. This argument is wrong. In indeterminate perception, a substance, an attribute, and the relation between them are perceived through a sense-organ. The cognition produced by the first intercourse of a sense-organ with an object apprehends a qualified object, because it is a cognition. All cognitions apprehend qualified objects. Determinate perception is the cognition which is produced by the sense-organs aided by the revival of subconscious impressions. Indeterminate perception is independent of subconscious impressions. Determinate perception is dependent on them. The perception of the first individual of a class is indeterminate. The perception of the second individual and so on of the same class is determinate.

38 Ubhayavidam apyetad visiṣṭa-viṣayam. NP., p. 77.
34 Sapratyavamarśapratyakṣaṁ savikalpam. Tadrahitam pratyakṣaṁ nirvikalpam. NP., p. 77.
39 Nirvikalpake dharmavad dharmivacca tatsambandhasyāpyāndriya-katvāviśeṣaṁ grahaṇasambhavat. NP., p. 79.
Indeterminate perception does not apprehend mere Being (samastra) as Śaṅkara wrongly maintains.16

The Advaita Vedāntist disputes the Rāmānujist's view that indeterminate perception apprehends a qualified object, e.g. a jar as a jar. He asks whether the difference of a jar from other objects is apprehended by a momentary indeterminate perception successively or simultaneously. In the first alternative, the difference cannot be apprehended because the different objects which are the substrates of difference were not apprehended at first. In the second alternative, the same first cognition apprehends different objects (dharmin) first, and then their difference (bheda). Thus it operates successively on its object, and does not apprehend it simultaneously. It cannot be held that the first cognition apprehends different objects only (dharminātra) and that the second cognition apprehends their difference (dharma), because the first cognition is destroyed when the second cognition appears, which, consequently, apprehends both different objects and their difference; so that the difficulty of its apprehending both either successively or simultaneously is not obviated. If the first cognition apprehends different objects only (dharminātra) without their difference (dharma), then perception does not apprehend jars, cloths and the like, nor their existence, but it apprehends mere Being which is common to them and their substratum, which is pure consciousness or Brahman. Śrīnivāsa urges, that in that case there would not be the perception of a jar or a cloth as existing, but that of 'existing', 'existing' and the like. Hence perception apprehends both different objects and their difference.17 Vēṅkaṭanātha maintains that an infant does not apprehend an object devoid of a substratum (dharmin) and an attribute (dharma), even though there is no inherence (sama-vāya) between them; and that he perceives them as inseparably related to each other. Indeterminate perception, therefore, apprehends a qualified object. A Rāmānujist does not recognize inherence as a distinct category.18

3. Non-perception (chapter III).—Non-perception is due to the absence of the intercourse of a sense-organ with its object, or its great distance, or great proximity, or hiddenness, or minuteness,

16 NP., pp. 82-3.
17 Nyāyasāra on NP., pp. 82-5.
18 T Mk., p. 597; SAS., p. 598.
or being overpowered, or preoccupation of mind. It is due to inattention (mano'navasthāna) or instability of mind. Inattention is due to an intense emotion. When the mind is overwhelmed with grief, it cannot attend to an object and perceive it, even if it is quite near a person. Inattention is a condition of non-perception.19

4. The Buddhist view of sense-object-contact (chapter VII).—What is called the sense-object-intercourse by the Naiyāyika is called contact by the Buddhist. It is in the nature of a clash between a sense-organ and its object, like the clash between two cymbals or the butting together of two rams. The eye should be regarded as one of the two, the form or object as the other, and the contact as the union of the two. Contact is the dynamic union of a sense-organ and its object. This is the view of Nāgasena.20

5. The Buddhist view of the distinguishing mark of perception (chapter VII).—According to Nāgasena, recognition is the distinguishing mark of perception. "What, Nāgasena, is the distinguishing mark of perception? Recognition, great king." Recognition is the mark of perception."21 A person recognizes an object which he perceives with his eye, or a sound which he hears with his ear, or an odour which he smells with his nose, or a taste which he experiences with his tongue, or a touchable thing which he touches with his body, or a quality that he recognizes by his mind. Thus recognition is the distinguishing mark of perception. Definite perception involves recognition.

Nāgasena maintains also that recognition is the mark of an idea (sāmya). "What is the distinguishing characteristic, Nāgasena, of idea (sāmya)? Recognition, O King. And what does he recognize? Blueness, yellowness, redness, whiteness and brownness."22 When the treasurer of a king enters the treasure, he recognizes the jewels by their colours. So when we perceive different objects, we recognize them by their qualities.

6. The Buddhist view of preadaptation in the perceptual process (chapter VII, 1).—Nāgasena maintains that investigation should precede the perceptual process. A traveller should test the stability of a bamboo bridge before he mounts on to it. Perceptual

19 SSV. 108.
20 The Questions of King Milianda, I, pp. 92-3.
21 Ibid, I, pp. 95, 132.
22 Ibid, I, p. 94.
activity should be preceded by preadjustment of the sense-organs to the object to be perceived by a train of perceptual activity. The perceptual process involves attention. Alertness or set is a condition of attention. Buddhaghosa makes readiness (upatthāna) the mark of mindfulness (sati). Nāgasena regards repetition as a condition of attention.

7. The Jaina theory of Perception (chapter VII, 2).—Vidyānanda Svāmī defines perception as a vivid cognition. Inference and the like are not vivid cognitions. Perception is presentative knowledge. It is of three kinds: (1) sensuous; (2) non-sensuous; and (3) supersensuous. (1) Sensuous perception is produced by the external sense-organs. It is empirical perception (sāṃsvya-vahārika pratyakṣa). It has spatial vividness. Or, its object is vividly perceived in space. (2) Non-sensuous perception is internal or mental perception. It is not produced by the external sense-organs. It has partial vividness. (3) Supersensuous (mukhya) perception is of two kinds: (1) incomplete or partial (vikala); and (2) complete or total (sakala). Incomplete (vikala) perception is of two kinds: (1) perception of distant objects (avadhījñāna); and (2) telepathic perception of the mental processes of other persons (manahparyayajñāna). Complete (sakala) perception is omniscience (kevalajñāna). It is transcendental perception (mukhya pratyakṣa). It is independent of the sense-organs and the mind (manas), transcends temporal distinctions, and vividly apprehends the forms of all objects completely. Transcendental perception is different from empirical perception, which is dependent on the sense-organs and the manas. The knowledge of formless objects is not perception.

Amṛtacandra Sūri defines perception as the cognition of the real form of an object, which depends upon the sense-organs or the mind (manas). A valid cognition apprehends itself and its object definitely. It is of five kinds: (1) matijñāna; (2) śrutajñāna; (3) avadhījñāna; (4) manahparyayajñāna; and (5) kevalajñāna. Hemacandra divides knowledge into immediate and mediate: Perception is immediate knowledge. It is empirical and transcendental. Empirical perception is sensuous and non-sensuous. It consists of four stages: (1) avagraha; (2) ihā; (3) avāya; and (4)

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dhāraṇā. Transcendental perception is of three kinds: (1) avadhi; (2) manahparyaya; and (3) kevala. Mediate knowledge is of five kinds: (1) recollection; (2) recognition; (3) conjecture (ūha); (4) inference; and (5) scriptural testimony.*

8. The Jaina view of Matijñāna.—Brahmadeva defines matijñāna as determinate perception such as 'this is white' which the self acquires with the help of the five sense-organs and the manas which is not a sense-organ. It follows upon an indeterminate perception of the being of an object owing to the subsidence or destruction of the appropriate karma-matter concealing knowledge. This indeterminate perception of an object through a sense-organ is wrongly called intercourse (sannikarṣa) by the Naiyāyika. Matijñāna is determinate perception. Amṛtacandra Sūri includes the internal perception of pleasure and the like, sense-perception, recollection, recognition, knowledge of inseparable relation between a probans and a probandum (ūha), inferential knowledge of the probandum, buddhi, medhā and the like in matijñāna. Vidyānandi Svāmī regards buddhi as the power of comprehending objects, medhā as the power of remembering words, prajñā as a kind of thought which is in the nature of conjecture (ūha) and the negation of contradictories (apoha), and pratibhā as recognition and knowledge of similarity, and includes them in matijñāna. He includes inclusion, presumption, non-apprehension, and comparison in matijñāna. He treats them as kinds of inference.*

9. The Jaina view of Srutajñāna (chapter VII).—Srutajñāna is of two kinds: (1) inferential (śaṅgaja) and verbal (śabdaja). (1) Inferential knowledge is the knowledge of one object (e.g. fire) from that of another object (e.g. smoke). (2) Verbal knowledge is the knowledge of an object (e.g. a jar) from hearing a word (e.g. a jar). This is the view of Brahmadeva. These two kinds of knowledge give us the determinate knowledge of the objects, which are not perceived. Verbal knowledge is of three kinds: (1) verbal knowledge preceded by perception; (2) verbal knowledge preceded by inference; and (3) verbal knowledge preceded by testimony. The first kind is produced by perception aided by the testimony of another person. The second kind is produced by a mark of inference aided by another's testimony. The third

* VRS., p. 206.
** DSV., 44, pp. 169-70; Tsar., i, 19-20; TSV., i, 13, 1-7, p. 188.
kind is produced by another’s testimony only. Śrautajñāna is the knowledge that is derived from the testimony of other persons. This is the view of Śāntyācārya.\textsuperscript{31}

10. Venkaṭanātha’s criticism of Prabhākara’s view that Movement is not an object of perception (chapter VIII).—According to Prabhākara, movement is not perceived, but it is always inferred from the successive positions of an object; a motion (karma) is imperceptible, because it is a motion, like the motion of an atom. Venkaṭanātha refutes this view. He urges, that the inference is not valid, because there is no uniform concomitance between motion and imperceptibility. The motion of the sun is imperceptible because it is at a great distance. All objects, which are perceptible, are not perceived owing to the absence of auxiliary conditions. Further, if motion is imperceptible, then it does not exist. The conjunction of an object with another point of space, which is said to be the effect of motion, would be called motion. It might be regarded as the effect of the cause of what is said to be motion, and the assumption of motion would be needless. Furthermore, the conjunction of a bird with a post would be the effect of motions of both, even as the conjunctions of two wrestlers is the effect of their motions, because motion is nothing but the conjunction of an object with another position. But this contradicts our perception. Hence motion must be regarded as an object of perception, which is different from its effect, viz. conjunction of a moving object with another position.\textsuperscript{32}

11. Nāgasena’s view of time (chapter IX).—“‘What does the word ‘time’ mean?’ ‘Past time, O King, and present, and future’. ‘But what? Is there such a thing as time?’ ‘There is time which exists, and which not?’ ‘Which then exists, and which not?’ ‘There are constituent potentialities of being, O King, which are past in the sense of having passed away, and ceased to be. To them time is not. But there are conditions of heart which are now producing their effect, or still have in them the inherent possibility of producing effect, or which will otherwise lead to reindividualisation. To them time is. Where there are beings, who, when dead, will not be reborn, there time is not; and where there are beings who are altogether set free, who, having attained

\textsuperscript{31}DSV., 44, p. 170; JTVV., pp. 131-2.
\textsuperscript{32}TMK., p. 693; SĀS., pp. 693-4. See ch. VIII.
Nirvāna in their present life, have come to the end of life, there time is not—because of their having been quite set free'."\(^{33}\)

"The King said: 'What is the root, Nāgasena, of past time, and what of present, and what of future time?' 'Ignorance. By reason of Ignorance came the predispositions (sankhāra), by reason of predispositions consciousness, by reason of consciousness name-and-form, by reason of name-and-form the six organs of sense, by reason of them contact, by reason of contact sensation, by reason of sensation thirst, by reason of thirst craving, by reason of craving becoming, by reason of becoming, birth, by reason of birth, old age, grief, lamentation, sorrow, pain and despair. Thus is it that the ultimate point in the past of all this time is not apparent'."\(^{34}\)

Thus the Buddhist realist, Nāgasena, regards time as relative to our empirical life due to ignorance. When ignorance is completely destroyed by enlightenment, there is no time. The past, the present, and the future are real to ignorant persons, who regard the impermanent as permanent and are whirled in the wheel of birth and death. But to the enlightened who have destroyed the predispositions due to ignorance, there is no distinction of the past, the present, and the future. They are relative to desires due to ignorance. The desire which is in the course of being fulfilled indicates the present time. The desire which has been fulfilled indicates the past time. The desire which craves for fulfilment indicates the future time. To the enlightened person who has uprooted desires there is no time. Thus time is relative to the empirical life of a person.

12. The Yoga conception of time as a construction of the intellect (buddhinirmāṇa) (chapter IX).—Vyāsa regards time as unreal and subjective, a construction of the intellect, which appears to ordinary persons with empirical consciousness as a real entity.\(^{34a}\) The present moment alone is real; the past moments and future moments are non-existent. So they cannot be combined with one another. The past moments and future moments are in the nature of modifications of sattva, rajas and tamas. So time is not an aggregate of the past, the present, and the future.

\(^{33}\) The Questions of King Mūlinda, I, pp. 77-8.
\(^{34}\) Ibid, I, p. 79.
\(^{34a}\) Sā khalvayāṁ kālo vastu śunyo buddhinirmāṇaḥ śabdajñānānapāti laukikāṁ vyutthitadarśanānāṁ vastu varūpa īvāvabhāste. YBḥ., iii, 52.
It is an imaginary collection of moments, which is a construct of the intellect. A moment (ksāna) is the time that is required by an atom to move from one position of space to the next position. Continuity of the series of moments is called succession. There can be no real synthesis of moments, but there can be imaginary synthesis of them by the intellect. Day, night, etc. are imaginary combinations of moments. They are intellectual constructions (buddhinirmāṇa). The Pāthañjalas call the order (karma) of moments time, though it is unreal and subjective, because there is no real aggregate of moments. The Sāṅkhya-Yoga does not consider time to be a real entity, like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

The Pāthañjala views the present, the past, and the future in relation to causal activity in the following manner. The present is engaged in its causal activity. The past is that whose causal activity or manifestation was perceived already. The future is that whose causal activity or manifestation will be perceived afterwards. The past and the future exist at present in a subtle form. The past exists in a sublatent condition in a present substance, the manifestation of which was perceived in the past. The future exists in a latent condition in a present substance, the manifestation of which will be perceived in the future. But the present exists as a manifest modification of a substance which is perceived now. The present modifications are manifest, while the past and future modifications remain unmanifest and hidden in their causes.

13. Puruṣottamañj Mahārāja’s view of the perception of time and space (chapter VIII-IX).—Puruṣottamañj Mahārāja, a follower of Vallabha, maintains that space and time are not directly perceived, but that they are perceived as qualifications of perceived objects. His view agrees with that of Pārthasārathi Misra, a follower of Kumāra.

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34b Buddhikalpitaḥ samāhāraḥ. YV., p. 252.
35 Tatpravāhavicchedas tu kramaḥ, ksānatatkramayor nāsti vastu- samāhāra iti buddhisamāhāro muhūrtāhorātādayah. YBh., iii, 52.
36 YBh., iii, 52.
37 Bhaviṣyadvayaktikam anāgatam, anubhūtavyaktikam atītam, svavyā- pāropādham vartamānam. YBh., iv, 12.
38 Svenaiva vyaṅgyena svarūpenānāgatam asti, svena cānubhūtavyayaktikena svarūpenātītam iti, vartamānasyayādhvanaḥ svarūpavyaktir iti. YBh., iv. 12.
39 YBh., iv, 13.
40 Dikkālau grāhyārthavideśaṅatayava grhyete, na sākṣat. PR., p. 110.
41 See ante, pp. 140-2, 149.
14. The Jaina view of a self-aware cognition (chapter IX).—The Buddhists regard a self-aware cognition (svasanivedana pratyakṣa) as a distinct kind of perception. But the Jaina does not regard it as a distinct perception, since it is common to all cognitions. Sensuous perception perceives itself and another object. It is one perception, and does not consist of two cognitions, viz. a cognition of an object and a cognition of that cognition. Mental perception also is one and self-aware. Transcendental perception also is one and self-aware. Otherwise each kind of perception would consist of two cognitions, and would not apprehend itself and its object. Hence a self-aware perception has no other object than itself. It is not a distinct kind of perception.

Vidyānanda Svāmī propounds this view.

Amritacandra Sūri defines a valid cognition as the determinate cognition of itself and its object. It is a determinate cognition of the real nature of its object, and it cognizes itself. According to the Naiyāyika, a cognition cognizes an object, but does not cognize itself; it requires another cognition (anuvyavasāya) to cognize it. But the Jaina maintains that a cognition cognizes itself and its object. If it does not cognize itself, it cannot cognize an object. The Advaita Vedānta maintains that a cognition cognizes an object, but that it is cognized by the witness self (kevalaśākṣivedya). He further maintains, that the integral knowledge (samyagjñāna) cognizes pure universal consciousness or Brahman, but that it does not cognize any object. The Jaina does not believe in Brahman, but he believes in the omniscient cognition of an individual self, which cognizes itself and all objects in their real nature. Omnicience is attained by a person on the complete destruction of karma-matter which encrusts the soul.

15. Rāmānuja’s view that a cognition is self-luminous (chapter XI).—Rāmānuja regards a cognition as self-manifest or self-cognized (svaprakāsa). A cognition, he argues, manifests itself by virtue of its being; it does not require another cognition to apprehend it. A jar is manifested by a cognition which is different from it. But a present cognition is never experienced as unmanifest. If it were unmanifest, it would require another cognition to apprehend it. The opponent may argue thus: When a

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43 Tasya sakala-jñāna-sādhāraṇa-svarūpapatvāt. PRP., p. 68.
44 Na tato'rthāntaraṁ svasanivedana-pratyakṣaṁ. PRP., p. 68.
45 Samyag jñānam svārthavyavasāyātyātmakaṁ viduḥ. Tatvārthasaṁ, i, 18.
cognition is produced, there is the manifestation of an object only in it, but there is no manifestation of the cognition, which is not an object of valid knowledge. The existence of a cognition is a condition of the manifestation of an object, like the intercourse of a sense-organ with it. Hence a cognition is inferred from an adventitious peculiarity called manifestness (prakāśa) in an object. If a cognition were perceived by another cognition, then it would be insentient like an object. But a cognition is admitted to be sentient. What is sentience? It is an entity in the presence of which there is no absence of manifestation. Rāmānuja urges, that this argument is wrong, because the non-absence of manifestation is possible in the case of pleasure and pain. Existent pleasure and pain are never unperceived or unknown. Hence a cognition is perceived by itself, and not perceived by another cognition. Manifestation is a property of a cognition, which does not depend upon another valid knowledge. It manifests an object by virtue of its relation to itself. It is the cause of the manifestation of an object without depending on other conditions. Hence a cognition is self-manifest; it manifests itself by virtue of its existence.\(^4\)

16. Veṅkaṭanātha's criticism of Kumārika's doctrine of Cognizedness (jñātata) or Manifestness (prākatya) (chapter XI).—Kumārika maintains, that a property called manifestness is produced in an object by its relation to a cognition. Veṅkaṭanātha criticizes it thus. Knowledge is always favourable to action. This favourableness is sometimes natural; sometimes it is an object of a cognition. It is natural in a self-manifest entity. It is an object of a cognition in an entity which is manifested by another. A cognized object is manifested by a cognition abiding in a self, even as a desired object or a hated object is qualified by desire or hate abiding in a self. Cognizedness is not produced in a cognized object, even as desiredness or hatedness is not produced in a desired or hated object. Further, past and future objects are cognized, but cognizedness cannot be produced in them. The argument that a cognitive act must produce cognizedness or manifestness in its object because an action must produce a result in its object is wrong, since desire or hate does not produce

\(^{44}\) Anubhūtir ātmanaḥ prakāśamānatvā, 'prakāśate' iti vyavahāre ca svayam eva hetuḥ. RB, I, I, I.

\(^{45}\) Svasarogyatva prakāśāramānavat. Ibid, i, I, I.
desiredness or hatedness in its object. The cognition of acceptability or avoidability or neutrality of an object cognized is the only result of the cognition, which is experienced. Cognizedness or manifestness is not experienced in it. Hence there is no manifestness in an object of a cognition.\textsuperscript{47}

Kumārila argues, that a cognition is neither apprehended by itself nor by a mental perception, but that it is inferred from its result, viz. manifestation of its object.\textsuperscript{48} Veṅkaṭanātha urges, that the inference is invalid because there is no difference between the probans, viz. manifestation of an object and the probandum, viz. cognition. Manifestation of an object may be said to be the probans and manifestation in the self may be said to be the probandum. Even if there were such a difference between them, the manifestation of an object would be produced by the same collocation of conditions as would produce the cognition; and there would be no action without the manifestation of an object. Therefore the cognition would be useless. It is neither the cause of action on an object nor the cause of its manifestation, since both depend upon other conditions. Hence a cognition is not inferred from the manifestation of its object.\textsuperscript{49}

17. Veṅkaṭanātha’s view of Self-luminosity of a Cognition (chapter XI).—Veṅkaṭanātha, as a follower of Rāmānuja, maintains that a cognition is self-luminous or self-apprehended, which involves a knowing self and a known object; that it manifests itself and an object; that it is conducive to an action which does not depend upon another cognition apprehending it.\textsuperscript{50} A cognition manifests itself because it is a cognition. It apprehends itself without depending upon another cognition apprehending it (anuvāyasāya) as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika maintains. A cognition apprehends itself and other objects, even as the cognition of an omniscient self apprehends itself and other objects. If an omniscient cognition did not apprehend itself, it would not be omniscient or all-knowing. Some maintain, that the omniscient cognition is apprehended by itself (svaśānvedya), but that it does not manifest itself (svapraṇāsa). Veṅkaṭanātha urges, that self-luminosity of a cognition does not imply that it is a knowing

\textsuperscript{47} TMK., p. 658; SAS., p. 658.
\textsuperscript{48} Buddhā arthapraṇāsādnumitiḥ. TMK., p. 394.
\textsuperscript{49} TMK., p. 394; SAS., p. 394.
\textsuperscript{50} Svayamitaramatir buddhiḥ TMK., p. 389. Buddhā svayamśiddha svagocarajñāna-nirapekṣa-vyavahārānugūṇā. SAS., 389.
subject or a known object; that a cognition does not manifest itself as a knower or a known object; but that its conduciveness to an action is independent of another cognition apprehending it, which cannot be denied. Some maintain, that omniscience of God consists of two cognitions,—one apprehending itself and the other apprehending the entire universe. Venkatanātha urges, that there is no proof for the existence of two cognitions of God; that the existence of one omniscient cognition of God is proved by other valid arguments; and that one omniscient cognition of God is enough to apprehend itself and all other objects, so that the assumption of two cognitions in God is needless. Some maintain, that God’s cognition apprehends the entire universe, but does not apprehend itself, because a cognition does not manifest itself. Venkatanātha urges, that if God did not know his cognition, then he would not know it to be his cognition, and others’ cognitions as not his cognitions, and he would not know some objects as objects of his knowledge, and other objects as not objects of his knowledge, and thus he would cease to be omniscient; and that in that case an unconscious cognition of a conscious self would act, and that an unconscious unseen principle (adṛśta) of a conscious self would act, and that the Vedic testimony about the omniscience of God would be contradicted. Venkatanātha further urges, that the denial of self-luminosity of a cognition would make continuous cognition (dharavāhikabuddhi) impossible, because a continuous cognition apprehends itself; and that if it did not apprehend itself, but were apprehended by another cognition, then there would be a breach in its continuity. The existence of a continuous cognition is proved by its valid recollection in the form ‘I perceived an object for such a long time’. It may be argued, that it is self-contradictory to regard a cognition as self-luminous, because it cannot act upon itself, even as a fire cannot burn itself, or as an axe cannot cut itself, or as a finger cannot touch itself. Venkatanātha urges, that a cognition apprehends itself, even as a self apprehends itself, or as a perceived object is apprehended by a perception, and produces the perception that apprehends it. Hence a cognition is self-manifest.51

18. Venkatanātha’s criticism of the doctrine that denies the apprehendedness of a cognition (chapter XI).—Some deny the apprehendedness (vedyata) of a cognition in order to save its

51 SAS., pp. 390-1; TMK., p. 389.
self-manifestness (suṣayamprakāśatva). They maintain, that a self-manifest cognition is not known by itself, but that it is known by a recollection, or a testimony, or an inference, or a yogic perception. The recollection ‘I perceived Devadatta’ apprehends the previous cognition. Testimony or verbal cognition apprehends another cognition. Cognitions of others are inferred from their behaviour. A yogic perception apprehends another cognition. But Veṅkaṭanātha disputes this view. If a cognition is self-manifest because it is a cognition, then it is self-contradictory to maintain that it is not known by itself. ‘Apprehension (anuḥbhūti) is self-manifest because it is in the nature of apprehension’. Is the apprehension indicated by the subject of inference, the probandum, or the probans? Or, is it not indicated by them? In the first alternative, a cognition is known by itself. In the second alternative, the opponent’s antithesis is not proved. If a cognition is said to be indicated by them, erroneously, but not in reality, then even this illusory apprehendness presupposes its real apprehendness. If the real apprehendness of a cognition be not proved, its illusory apprehendness cannot be established.\(^\text{52}\) If a cognition were apprehended, it may be argued, it would be sentient (jāda). Veṅkaṭanātha criticizes this objection thus. A cognition is either known by testimony, or it is not known by it. If it is known by testimony, then it is not sentient. If it is not known by testimony, then it contradicts its own statement. Further, is the so-called sentience (1) mere apprehendness or (2) being proved by a cognition apprehending it or (3) the absence of self-manifestness or (4) the absence of connection with the state of being unknown? The first alternative is desirable. Veṅkaṭanātha admits that a cognition is apprehended, but that apprehendness is not sentience. The second alternative is wrong. A cognition known definitely is proved independently of another cognition apprehending it; it apprehends itself. The third alternative also is false. The absence of self-manifestness is another name for sentient. The fourth alternative is a desirable contingency. A cognition is not apprehended by another cognition during its existence.\(^\text{53}\) Therefore apprehendness is not sentience. Further, if cognitions were not

\(^{52}\) TMK., p. 392; SAS., pp. 392-3.

\(^{53}\) Na hi buddhir vidyamāṇāvasthāyāṁ svabuddhyantaraviditā. SAS., p. 393.
apprehended, then a teacher could not educate a pupil, because their cognitions would not be apprehended by each other, and the opponent also would not be able to make his views known to others. Hence the view that a cognition is not apprehended is wrong.\(^{54}\)

Veṅkaṭanātha refers to a view of an old school that there is no mental perception. The self and its cognitions, according to them, are self-luminous. Pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and volition are not different from their cognitions which are produced by their causes. The cognitions of past apprehensions are recollections. The mind cannot operate independently of the external sense-organs in the perception of external objects, which are different from the self, pleasure and the like.\(^{55}\)

19. Keśavamiśra's view of cognitions (chapter XI).—Keśavamiśra divides cognitions into apprehension (anubhava) and recollection (smṛtri). Apprehension is valid or invalid. Valid apprehension is perception, inference, comparison and testimony. Invalid apprehension is of three kinds viz. doubt, hypothetical reasoning (tarka) and error or illusion. Recollection is valid or invalid. All cognitions are formless. Forms are not produced by their objects in their cognitions. The existence of objects is not inferred from the forms of cognitions as the Sautrāntikas maintain, since their forms are not perceived, but objects are perceived as jars and the like. All cognitions manifest their objects, and do not cognize other objects. Particular cognitions apprehend particular objects, and are determined by them. Cognitions are known as cognizing objects, and not as unrelated to them.\(^{56}\)

20. The Sāṁkhya and the Advaita Vedānta views on the Nature of Dreams (chapter XV).—The Sāṁkhya advocates the representative theory of dreams. Vijñānabhikṣu regards dreams as recollections during sleep. They are the modifications of buddhi, which are produced by impressions (sāṁskāra) only.\(^{57}\) They are not produced by the external sense-organs or by the external stimuli. They are of central origin, and in the nature of false recollections.

Sāṅkara, the Advaita Vedāntist, regards dreams as false cognitions of unreal objects. The mind (manas) creates, by its

\(^{54}\) SAS., p. 393.  
\(^{55}\) NP., p. 76.  
\(^{56}\) TBh., pp. 29-30.  
\(^{57}\) SPB., i, 148.
own power, the knower and the known. Dreams do not conform to the proper time, place, and causes of real objects. A person dreams of objects hundreds of miles away, which it is not possible for him to travel. So there is no correspondence between the place of dreams and that of their objects. A person dreaming at night dreams of objects in the day. A dream occurring in a few seconds cognizes events occurring in several years. So there is no correspondence between the time of dreams and that of their objects. Perceptible objects are perceived through the external sense-organs, and produced by their causes. But objects (e.g. chariots) of dream-cognitions are not perceived through the external sense-organs, and cannot be produced by their causes (e.g. wood) in a moment. So there is no correspondence between the causes of dreams and those of their objects. Further, dreams are contradicted by waking perceptions, while real objects corresponding to dream-objects are not contradicted. Hence dream-cognitions are false. Dreams are recollections due to the revival of the impressions of waking perceptions of objects, which therefore appear to be like them. Dreams with their objects are produced by the impressions of waking perceptions when the external sense-organs cease to operate. The empirical self limited by the subtle body (tājasa) experiences dream-cognitions. Śaṅkara is an advocate of the representative theory of dream.

Śaṅkara regards the subtle body (liṅga deha) as the vehicle of the experience of dreams. It contains the potencies of actions and the impressions of waking cognitions, and makes the empirical self enjoy the fruits of actions. It is the limiting adjunct of the empirical self, until it realizes its essential nature. Dreams are the manifestations of the subtle body. The self-luminous pure self is manifested as an agent with the help of the impressions (vāsanā) of waking perceptions of objects in dream with the subtle body as its organ. But the pure self is detached. This is Śaṅkara's view. Rāmatīrtha Yati also maintains, tha in the dream-state the subtle body invested with the impressions of

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69 VCM., 172.
69 Māyāmātraṁ svapna-darsanam. S.B., iii, 2, 3.
69 VCM., 99.
69 VCM., 100-3.
waking cognitions is the limiting adjunct of the empirical self. Suresvara also maintains that the taijasā or empirical self limited by the subtle body is the knower of dreams. The subtle body is its organ of experience. Dream is a mental mode which is manifested to consciousness in the form of a knowing self and a known object. Anandagiri also defines dreams as cognitions of objects produced by the impressions of waking experiences when the external sense-organs cease to operate. Mādhavācārya Vidyārānyya regards dreams as illusions during light sleep. They are modes of the mind (antahkarana) tainted by sleep, which are produced by impressions (saṁskāra) revived by merits and demerits (adrśta). They abide in pure consciousness limited by modes of the mind.

Padmapāda maintains that the mind (manas) tainted by sleep and aided by particular impressions revived by merits and demerits (adrśta) produces false cognitions of unreal objects, which are called dreams. The power of nescience (avidyā) abiding in the immediate consciousness limited by the dream-objects is transformed into dream-cognitions. But if it were so, it is objected, the objects of dream-cognitions would be manifested to consciousness as within the mind. This objection is not sound, since dream-objects are not extra-mental. But dream-objects are perceived as external to the mind like the objects of waking perceptions, and cannot, therefore, be within the mind. This objection is not valid, because space or externality is an unreal construction of imagination. Even in waking perceptions the perceptibility of an object does not differ from its valid, subjective, immediate apprehension, because they are manifested in this form. Hence, even in waking experience an object is apprehended together with a subjective immediate apprehension. Otherwise an insentient object would not be manifested. The appearance of externality in dream-objects is projected by cosmic nescience (māyā) like that of the empirical objects. Pure consciousness (caitanya) is partless and non-spatial. It is the substratum of the whole universe of phenomenal objects which appear to be external to one another. In fact, subjectivity and objectivity are mere appearances, which are projected by cosmic nescience. Or, space and

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44 Svapne jāgrad-vāsanāmayam liṅga-darīram upādhiḥ. VMR., p. 111.
45 Grāhya-grāhaka-rūpam sphurantam svapna ucyate. PKV., 38.
46 Pāṇcitkaranavivarana, pp. 53-4.
47 Adhiśhānam vṛttyavacchinnam caitanyam eva. VFS., p. 39.
ākāśa, which are the substrates of appearances, are mere constructions of the mind.\footnote{Digākṣāu manomātragocarau vidyete. Pañcapādikā, p. 11. Ibid, pp. 10-1.} Raṅgoji Bhaṭṭa (1700 A.D.) maintains that dream-objects are produced in the witness self (sākṣin) limited by the internal organ (antaḥkaraṇa). They are the modifications of the cosmic nescience (mūlājñāna). There is no evidence of any other entity being their material cause. The dream-objects have illusory existence (prātiṣhāṣikasattā), and are sublated by waking perception. They have no empirical existence (vyāvahārika sattā), because they are produced by nescience (ajñāna) tainted by sleep. The nescience which is the cause of dream objects does not disappear until a contradictory waking perception appears. Raṅgoji Bhaṭṭa maintains that cognitions of dream-objects are cognized by the witness self which is self-manifest.\footnote{Śvāpaṇa-padārtha-jñānam api svaprapāśa-sākṣaye. Advaitacintāmaṇi, p. 22.} No other cognition of dream-cognitions can exist at the time. Dream-cognitions, according to Raṅgoji Bhaṭṭa, are not recollections, since they are sometimes not recollections of objects perceived in a particular place at a particular past time.\footnote{Ibid, p. 22.} \footnote{Ibid, pp. 23-4.} Dream-creations are not real. The empirical self (jīva) experiences pleasure and pain by creating dream-objects out of his own nescience. They are manifested by the witness self limited by the adjunct of the internal organ.\footnote{Nidrādīdősādūṣīṣyādṛṣṭā-śāmudbodhita-samskāra - viśeṣa - sacivasvā - antaḥkaraṇaṣya yāḥ samākāraṇūrūpā vṛttayaś tādṛg antaḥkaraṇa-samskārata-caitanyasthāvidyāśakti-vijñamaḥbha-viṣyākārās tābhīḥ sūkṣma-viṣeṣyāṣa jñagrad-vāsanā-maṇḍa śard asphutān anubhavataḥ. VMR., p. 107.} Rāmatīrtha Yati maintains, that dreams are the modes of the mind tainted by sleep, similar to the impressions of waking cognitions, which are revived by merits and demerits. The empirical (taijasa) self limited by the subtle body experiences subtle objects created by the power of avidyā abiding in the pure consciousness limited by the mind. Dream-objects are subtle and composed of the impressions of waking cognitions. They are experienced slightly indistinctly.\footnote{Na svapnaḥ snṛṭir aparokṣāvabhiṣītātvā. VMR., p. 107.} Rāmatīrtha Yati does not regard dreams as recollections, since they are manifested to consciousness as immediate presentations.\footnote{Ibid, p. 22.} But they are not valid perceptions, since they are not produced by the right intercourse...
of the sense-organs with their objects. Nor are they deep sleep, since they are distinct cognitions of objects. Nor are they waking cognitions, because they do not conform to the time, place, and causes found in the waking condition. The objects of dreams are constructed by the impressions of waking cognitions; they are unreal.\(^{14}\)

Mahādevānanda Sarasvatī regards dreams as the cognitions of objects produced by the impressions of waking perceptions when the external sense-organs cease to operate and merits and demerits capable of producing the waking experience of pleasure and pain cannot produce any effects.\(^{15}\) But dreams are not recollections, but perceptions. They are illusory perceptions during light sleep.\(^{16}\) Thus Śaṅkara’s followers do not advocate his representative theory of dreams.

Rāmānuja treats dreams as illusory perceptions produced by the sense-organs overcome by the defect of sleep, which are contradicted by waking perceptions.\(^{17}\) God creates dream-objects by a mere fiat of will, which are perceived by a dreamer, and persist so long as they are perceived.\(^{18}\) According to Mādhva, dream-cognitions are false, but the creation of dream-objects is real and devoid of any material. Puruṣottamājī Mahārāja criticizes this view. If the creation of dream-objects is real, then dream-cognitions of them are true. If the creation of dream-objects were devoid of any material and yet real, then magical acts devoid of any material also would be real. A person dreams that his head has been cut off. If the dream-cognition were false, but the act of cutting were real, then the dreamer would die. Hence the Mādhva view is wrong.\(^{19}\) Puroṣottamaṇjī Mahārāja maintains that the creation of dream-objects is a mere appearance, and not real; that dream-objects are created by God out of the stuff of nescience (māyā) with the instrument of māyā; and that dreams are the cognitions of dream-objects, which are perceptual in character, since they are not sometimes recollections of waking perceptions (e.g. cutting off one’s head).\(^{20}\)

\(^{14}\) VMR., p. 107.
\(^{15}\) Jāgrad-bhogapradā-karmoparame sati indriyoparame jāgrad-anubhava-janya-samakārodbhūta-visayas tajñānāvasthā svapnāvasthā. ACK., pp. 89-90.
\(^{16}\) Svapna tvanubhava eva na smṛtih. ACK., p. 265.
\(^{17}\) Svapna-jāññāni hi nirdūḍi-duṣṭa-karaṇa-janyāni bhūdhānā ca. R.B. ii, 2, 28.
\(^{18}\) Svapnādṛśa-anubhāvyatayā tatkēśa-mātrāvasthānā erjate. R.B. iii, 2, 3.
\(^{19}\) PR., p. 23.
\(^{20}\) PR., p. 24.
21. **Puruṣottamaś Mahārāja’s view of the perception of the Atman or Self** (chapter XII).—The pure self cannot be perceived without resorting to the means prescribed by the scriptures. Only the attributes of the self are perceived through the internal organ (manas). The pure self is not an object of normal perception because it is ubiquitous, like ether, (ākāśa). One’s own self is not an object of normal perception because it is a knowing self. It is inferred by the method of agreement like another’s self. It is not perceived because it is atomic or subtle. It is inferred like an atom. The ego-consciousness is illusory because the self is erroneously identified with egoism (ahamkāra). The pure self can be intuited after continuous practice of meditation.

22. **The Sāṁkhya view of the perception of the Self** (chapter XII, 5).—Listening to the scriptures about the nature of the self (śravaṇa), reflection (manana) on the self with the help of rational proofs after knowing its nature from the testimony of the scriptures, and meditation (dhyāna) on the self are the means of intuited the self. Indirect knowledge derived from testimony is strengthened by rational reflection. Then it is further strengthened by meditation (nīdīdhyaśana). It is the concentration of the mind on the self. These three are the causes of the intuition (darsana) of the self. It is not sense-perception, but higher supra-rational intuition. The first two yield general knowledge. The third gives particular or detailed knowledge. The self is intuited when the sense-organs are controlled and withdrawn from their objects and the mind is controlled and not affected by joys and sorrows and absorbed in the self, and primal desires for sons, wealth and happiness are uprooted. Hence the pure self is not an object of normal perception, but of ecstatic intuition.

23. **The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view of the intuition of the pure self** (chapter XII).—The pure self, according to some later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers, can be apprehended by supra-rational intuition, which is higher immediate apprehension. It is the effect of listening to the scriptures, reflection on their instruction, and meditation on the self. Jagadīśa regards reflection (manana) as

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*FR.* p. 110.

1. śrotavyaḥ frutivākyebhyo
   Māntavyaḥ cāṣeṣṭhiḥ
   Margvāḥ ca matatāḥ dhāvaya
   Ete dārśanabhatavāḥ. SSV, ii, 1.

2. SSV, ii, 2.
inference of the self as different from the not-self.\textsuperscript{44} Mādhava Sarasvati regards it as reasoning which excludes contrary thoughts and opposite alternatives.\textsuperscript{45} The pure self devoid of empirical contents—cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and volition can be intuited. This intuition is the effect of rational reflection and intense meditation. Saṅkara Miśra also maintains, that the pure self can be intuited through the internal organ (manas) with the aid of merit brought about by meditation, when it is in conjunction with the self. Though we have flashes of perception also of the self, they are almost non-existent because they are concealed by false knowledge (avidyā).\textsuperscript{46}

24. Vasubandhu's view of four kinds of Meditation (chapter XVII, 7).—Vasubandhu mentions four kinds of meditation. The first meditation involves discrimination (vicāra), zest (prīti), and pleasure (sukha). The second meditation involves zest and pleasure. The third meditation involves pleasure only. The fourth meditation is devoid of discrimination, zest, and pleasure.\textsuperscript{47} Vasubandhu mentions four kinds of pure meditation free from impurities. The first pure meditation involves reflection (vītarka), discrimination (vicāra), zest (prīti), pleasure (sukha), and trance (samādhi). The second pure meditation involves zest, pleasure, trance, and tranquillity (adhyātmaprāsāda). The third pure meditation involves neutral feeling (upekṣa), recollection (smṛti), wisdom (sānprajñāna), pleasure, and trance. The fourth pure meditation involves refinement of neutral feeling, refinement of recollection, feeling of non-pleasure, feeling of non-pain, and trance.\textsuperscript{48}

Nāgasena maintains that passions and evil thoughts are destroyed by meditation. Ideas of lust, ideas of anger, ideas of cruelty, various bad thoughts, that spring from evil dispositions of pride, self-righteousness, wrong views, and doubt are dispelled by meditation.\textsuperscript{49}

25. Omniscience of the Buddha on Reflection (chapter XVII, 7).—According to Nāgasena, the Buddha was omniscient even when he did not know all things for he could know them on reflection. He did not know all things at all times. His

\textsuperscript{44} TA., p. 1.
\textsuperscript{45} MB., p. 32.
\textsuperscript{46} VSU., ix, 1, 11.
\textsuperscript{48} AK., AKV., viii, 7-8.
\textsuperscript{49} The Questions of King Milinda, II, pp. 222-3.
omniscience was dependent on reflection. "Venerable Nāgasena, was the Buddha omniscient?' 'Yes, O King, he was. But the insight of knowledge was not always and continually with him: The omniscience of the Blessed One was dependent on reflection. But if he did reflect, he knew whatever he wanted to know.'" "The knowledge of the Blessed One, O King, is dependent upon reflection, and it is on reflection that he knows whatever he wishes to know.'" "And although it is by reflection that they know whatever they want to know, yet even when they are not reflecting, the Blessed Buddhas are not, even then, anything other than omniscient.'" The omniscience of the Buddha dependent on reflection is similar to the non-ecstatic intuition (yuñjāna pratyakṣa) of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Only the Buddhist does not believe in God. It is similar to the transcendental perception of an omniscient person conceived by the Jainas who also does not believe in God.

26. The Jaina view of Avadhijnāna (chapter XVII, 8).—Amṛtabhandra Sūri defines avadhijnāna as the immediate knowledge of corporeal objects independently of the sense-organs and the mind (manas). Matijñāna and śrutajñāna depend on them, and are therefore mediate knowledge (parokṣajñāna). But avadhi-jñāna is supersensuous, valid, immediate knowledge of corporeal objects. It is the first stage of supernormal perception due to the subsidence or partial destruction of the karma-matter concealing avadhijnāna in ordinary persons. But jinas or tīrthaṅkaras have avadhijnāna from their birth. Their clairvoyant perception is innate. Avadhijnāna can apprehend atoms.

27. The Jaina view of Manahparyayajñāna (Chapter XVII, 8).—Amṛtabhandra Sūri defines manahparyayajñāna as the supersensuous and very vivid immediate knowledge of the objects of other persons' mental processes independently of the sense-organs and the mind (manas). The mental processes are more subtle than atoms. So manahparyayajñāna is higher than avadhijnāna. There are two kinds of manahparyayajñāna: (1) rjumati and (2) vipulamati. The former perceives the present simple thoughts of others' minds. The latter perceives the past, future, complex and subtle thoughts of others' minds. The latter is purer than

Ibid., I, pp. 160-1.
Parāsakthi vinā jñānam rūpiṇāh bhanito vadhīḥ. TŚar., i, 25.
TŚar., i, 27.
TŚar., i, 28.
the former because it perceives more subtle mental processes. It persists till the advent of omniscience, because the subsidence or destruction of the \textit{karma-matter} concealing knowledge is so stable that it does not stop, but the former may disappear. There is a greater purity of character in \textit{vipulamati} than in \textit{tjumati}.\textsuperscript{33}

\textit{Manahparyayajñāna} differs from \textit{avadhijñāna}. (1) A person in the first four stages of \textit{gunasthāna} may have \textit{avadhijñāna}. But a person in the sixth stage of \textit{gunasthāna} may have \textit{manahparyayajñāna}. (2) The sphere of \textit{avadhijñāna} extends to numberless islands. But the sphere of \textit{manahparyayajñāna} consists of the region of human beings. (3) \textit{Avadhijñāna} perceives subtle corporeal objects like atoms. But \textit{manahparyayajñāna} perceives subtler incorporeal objects like others' mental processes. (4) The latter requires greater purity of the self than the former does.\textsuperscript{34}

28. \textit{The Jaina view of Kevalajñāna} (chapter XVII, 8).—Amṛtacandra Sūri defines \textit{kevalajñāna} as the particular determinate knowledge of all objects, which is produced by the innate purity of the self, which is due to the complete destruction of all \textit{karma-matter} concealing knowledge, which is devoid of succession, and which is independent of the sense-organs and the mind (\textit{manas}) and other conditions.\textsuperscript{35} It is omniscience. Umāsvāmī traces it to the destruction of delusion and hindrances to the general and detailed knowledge of all objects. Vidyānandi Svāmī asserts that it apprehends all objects distinctly, certainly and simultaneously with their modifications in their real nature owing to the complete destruction of the \textit{viil} of \textit{karma-matter} encrusting the self.\textsuperscript{36}

29. \textit{The Jaina view of the relation of five kinds of knowledge} (chapter XVII, 8).—An intelligent person can know all substances with some of their modes through \textit{matijñāna} and \textit{brutajñāna}. He can know corporeal substances with some of their modes through \textit{avadhijñāna}. Infinitesimal parts of corporeal substances, which are perceived by \textit{avadhijñāna}, can be perceived by \textit{manahparyayajñāna}. All substances with their modes are perceived by \textit{kevalajñāna}.\textsuperscript{37}

All these five kinds of knowledge cannot exist simultaneously in any person. In some persons the first two, three, or four kinds

\textsuperscript{33} TŚar., i, 29.
\textsuperscript{34} TŚar., i, 30.
\textsuperscript{35} \textit{Asahāyān śvarūpottathāṁ nidāvanāmate akramam.}
\textit{Gaṅgākara-karma-sayoppanaṁ kevalam sarvabhāvam.} TŚar., i, 30-1.
\textsuperscript{36} TVS., i, 29, 1-2, p. 251.
\textsuperscript{37} TŚar., i, 31-3.
of knowledge can exist synchronously. Kevalajñāna is one, and
cannot exist with other kinds of knowledge. So long as the
karma-matter concealing knowledge persists, a person has know-
ledge of some objects sometimes through the first two, or three,
or four kinds of knowledge owing to its subsidence or destruction
for the time being. When the karma-matter concealing knowledge
is completely destroyed, he has complete knowledge of all objects
with their modes, which ceases to be fragmentary. So long as
the knowledge-concealing karma-matter is not completely de-
stroyed, and the karma-matter concealing avadhijñāna and manah-
paryayajñāna persists, matijñāna and śrutajñāna may exist owing
to the subsidence or destruction of the karma-matter concealing
them. If there is the subsidence or destruction of the karma-
matter concealing avadhijñāna, such knowledge may also emerge.
At that time three kinds of knowledge exist simultaneously. If
there is the subsidence or destruction of the karma-matter con-
cealing manahparyayajñāna, such knowledge also may appear.
At that time four kinds of knowledge exist simultaneously.88

30. Recollection and Recognition (chapter XX).—Hema-
candra defines recollection as a representative cognition of an
object perceived in the past due to the revival of its subconscious
impression, which assumes the form of 'that'.89 He defines recogni-
tion as a composite cognition produced by perception and
recollection both.100 'He is that Jinadatta'. 'A wild cow is like
a cow'. 'This cow belongs to that variety'. Such cognitions are
recognition. But Annabhāṣṭa holds that recognition is produced
by the sense-object-intercourse aided by a subconscious impres-
sion, but that recollection is produced by a subconscious impression
only.101 He does not regard recognition as an effect of perception
and recollection. This is the difference between the Jaina view
and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view.

31. Nāgasena's views on the marks of Reflection, Investiga-
tion, Reasoning, and Wisdom (chapter XXI, 5).—'What is the distin-
guishing characteristic, Nāgasena, of reflection (vitakka)?' The
effecting of an aim'. 'Give me an illustration'. It is like the

88 Tīrūt, i, 34.
89 Sanskāra-prabodha-sambhūtam anubhūtārtha-vijayaṁ tadityākkhaṁ
vedanāṁ evam. VRS, p. 206.
90 Anubhāva-evam-bhūtakṣam sankalanaṁtaman jñānāṁ paryabhijñānam.
VRS, p. 206.
101 TSB, p. 35.
case of a carpenter, great king, who fixes in a joint a well-fashioned piece of good. Thus is it that the effecting of an aim is the mark of reflection. 'Very good, Nāgasena.'

In reflection the mind focusses its attention on an aim, and selects the proper means for the realization of it.

"What is the distinguishing characteristic, Nāgasena, of investigation (vicāra)?' Threshing out again and again. 'Give me an illustration'. 'It is like the case of the copper vessel, which, when it is being beaten into shape, makes a sound again and again as it gradually gathers shape. The beating into shape is to be regarded as reflection, and the sounding again and again as investigation. Thus is it, great King, that threshing out again and again is the mark of investigation. 'Very good, Nāgasena.'"

Investigation is repeated deliberation on the different courses of action for the realization of an end. Reflection is the concentration of the mind on an end. These two mental processes go together.

"The King said: 'What is the characteristic mark of reasoning and what of wisdom?' 'Reasoning has always comprehension as its mark; but wisdom has cutting off.' The recluse by his thinking grasps his mind, and by his wisdom cuts off his failings. In this way is the comprehension the characteristic of reasoning, but cutting off of wisdom.' Here Nāgasena speaks of practical reason by which the nature, causes and conditions of one's evil propensities are known, and of wisdom by which one eradicates them. Desires and passions are due to ignorance. When it is completely destroyed by wisdom, they are destroyed for ever. Enlightenment also is another mark of wisdom. "How is enlightenment its mark? 'When wisdom springs up in the heart, O King, it dispels the darkness of ignorance, it causes the radiance of knowledge to arise, it makes the light of intelligence to shine forth, it makes the Noble Truths plain. Wisdom puts an end to evil dispositions.'" Thus wisdom destroys evil dispositions and brings about enlightenment. Discrimination is the mark of reason."