BOOK I

CHAPTER I

THE PHYSICAL BASIS OF PERCEPTION

1. Introduction

The ancient Hindus developed a conception of the nervous system, which is mainly to be found in the medical works of Caraka and Suśruta, and in the works on Tantra. Caraka and Suśruta regarded the heart as the seat of consciousness, but the Tántric writers transferred the seat of consciousness to the brain. Caraka had a clear conception of the sensory nerves (manovahā nāḍī) and the motor nerves (ājñāvahā nāḍī). The Tántric writers constantly referred to the centres of different kinds of consciousness. They not only distinguished between the sensory nerves and the motor nerves, but also recognized different kinds of sensory nerves: the olfactory nerves (gandhavahā nāḍī), the optic nerves (rūpavahā nāḍī), the auditory nerves (śabdvahā nāḍī), the gustatory nerves (rasavahā nāḍī), and the tactile nerves (sparśavahā nāḍī).¹

In the philosophical literature of the Hindus we find an elaborate account of the sense-organs in the treatment of the problems of perception. The different schools of philosophers had different views as to the nature, origin, and functions of the sense-organs. Their views were based mostly on their systems of philosophy, though they advanced certain facts of experience in support of their views. The Hindu accounts of the sense-organs are widely different from those of Western physiology, because they are based more on metaphysical speculation than on scientific observation and experiment. In the first Book we shall treat of the nature, origin, and functions of the sense-organs without comprehension of which there cannot be an adequate conception of some important problems of the Indian psychology of perception.

2. The Nature of the Sense-organs

The Buddhists recognize six varieties of consciousness: visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactile, and purely mental.

¹ PSAH., pp. 218-225.
Corresponding to these there are six bases (āśraya): the organs of vision, audition, smelling, tasting, touch, and consciousness itself; and there are six objects (viśaya): colours, sounds, smells, tastes, tangibles, and ideas. The preceding moment of consciousness is the basic element of the next moment of consciousness. Thus there are six sense-organs including consciousness. Consciousness is the faculty of intellect which apprehends non-sensuous objects. It is called the mind. It is immaterial and invisible.

Leaving out the mind, there are five sense-organs. They are the end-organs (golaka). They are the eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue, and the skin. They are made up of a kind of translucent subtle matter. The five sense-organs are made up of five different kinds of atoms. Thus the sense-organs are material but invisible. They are divided into two classes, viz. āprāpyakāri and aprāpyakāri sense-organs. The former apprehend their objects when they come into direct contact with them. The latter apprehend their objects without coming in contact with them. The organs of smell, taste, and touch are āprāpyakāri; they must be in immediate contact with their objects. The organs of vision and audition are aprāpyakāri; they apprehend their objects at a distance. The Buddhists do not hold with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika that the sense-organs are different from the peripheral organs, and the visual organ and the auditory organ come into contact with their objects in order to apprehend them.

The Jaina recognizes five sense-organs. They are of two kinds: objective senses (dravyendriya) and subjective senses (bhāvendriya). The former are the physical sense-organs. The latter are their psychical correlates. They are the invisible faculties of the soul. A physical sense-organ (dravyendriya) consists of two parts, viz. the organ itself and its protecting environment. The former is called nirvṛti. The latter is called upakarana. Each of these is of two kinds, internal and external. The internal organ is the soul itself which is embodied in the sense-organ. The external organ is the physical organ which is permeated by the soul. The internal environment of the visual organ is the pupil.
of the eye. The external environment is the eyelid.\textsuperscript{12} The subjective senses (bhāvendriya) are of two kinds: labdhi and upayoga.\textsuperscript{13} "Labdhi is the manifestation of the sense-faculty by the partial destruction, subsidence, and operation of the knowledge-obscuring karma relating to that sense. Upayoga is the conscious attention of the soul directed to that sense."\textsuperscript{14} There are five sense-organs: organs of touch, taste, smell, vision, and audition.\textsuperscript{15} The tactual organ pervades the whole body. The Jaina does not regard the mind as a sense-organ.\textsuperscript{16} He conceives the soul as pervading the whole body. A particular kind of sense-perception is generated in the soul through that part of it which is associated with a particular sense-organ. Of the physical sense-organs the visual organ is aprāpyakāri; it does not come into direct contact with its objects.\textsuperscript{17} On this point the Jaina agrees with the Buddhist. The Jaina holds that the visual organ apprehends objects at a distance with the help of light. But he does not explain the nature of the action of light upon the visual organ. All the other sense-organs are prāpyakāri; they come into direct contact with their objects.\textsuperscript{18} But the direct contact may be gross (sthūla) or subtle (sūkṣma). The organs of touch and taste come into contact with gross objects. But the organs of smell and hearing come into contact with subtle objects. The organ of smell has direct contact with minute particles of the object smelt. The organ of hearing has direct contact with merely a kind of motion. Sound is due to the knocking of one physical object against another. It is the agitation set up by this knock. The auditory organ comes into contact with this motion.\textsuperscript{19}

Vijñānabhikṣu says, "An Indriya is the instrument of the Lord of the body or the soul. The essential nature of a sense-organ consists in its instrumentality (in producing cognitions and actions) and in being an effect of ahāmākāra (egoism)."\textsuperscript{20} Kapila speaks of eleven sense-organs: five organs of knowledge (buddhindriya), five organs of action (karmendriya), and the internal organ or mind (manas).\textsuperscript{21} Isvarakṛṣṇa also sometimes mentions eleven sense-organs: the sensory organs, the motor organs, and the mind

\textsuperscript{12} TSV., p. 326.
\textsuperscript{13} U.T.S., ii, 18.
\textsuperscript{14} J. L. Jaini, U.T.S., 65. See PKM., p. 61.
\textsuperscript{15} U.T.S., ii, 19.
\textsuperscript{16} Anindriyaḥ manaḥ. PMV., ii, 5.
\textsuperscript{17} Rūpaḥ paśyatyasamprastam. Tattvārthasāra, ii, 49, p. 69 (Calcutta).
\textsuperscript{18} Tattvārthasāra, ii, 49.
\textsuperscript{19} PKSI., p. xxxviii.
\textsuperscript{20} SFB., ii, 19.
\textsuperscript{21} SS. and SFB., ii, 19.
which partakes of the nature of both and is thus a sensori-motor organ. And sometimes he mentions thirteen sense-organs adding buddhi and ahamkāra to the above list. Manas, buddhi, and ahamkāra are the three forms of the internal organ. The Sāmkhya recognizes two classes of sense-organs, external and internal. It divides the external sense-organs into two classes: organs of cognition (buddhindriya) and organs of action (karmendriya). The visual organ, the auditory organ, the olfactory organ, the gustatory organ, and the tactful organ are the organs of cognition. The vocal organ, the prehensive organ, the locomotive organ, the evacuative organ, and the generative organ are the organs of action. By these organs of cognition and action the Śāmkhya does not mean the gross material organs, e.g. the eye, the ear, etc., and hands, feet, etc. By these it means determinate modifications of the indeterminate mind-stuff (ahamkāra or egoism). The gross material organs, e.g. the eye, the ear, etc., and hands, feet, etc., are the seats of those determinate sensory and motor psychophysical impulses. By the buddhindriyas the Śāmkhya means the determinate sensory psychophysical impulses which go out to the external objects and receive impressions from them, and by the karmendriyas it means the determinate motor psychophysical impulses which react upon the objects perceived. The sense-organs are not products of gross matter (bhautika) but of ahamkāra (egoism) which, though not spiritual, may be called mental or psychophysical. Hence the distinction between the organs of knowledge and the organs of action is ultimately based upon the primary distinction between the sensory and motor mechanisms of the psychophysical organism, by which it knows the external world and reacts upon it.

The internal organs are the instruments of elaboration. The mind presides over both the sensory and motor organs. The external senses give immediate impressions of their objects. These discrete impressions are synthesized by manas by assimilation and discrimination. Then they are referred to the unity of apperception by ahamkāra. Then they are determined by buddhi which hands them over to the self and reacts upon them.

Vyasa refers to two kinds of sense-organs, viz. gross organs and

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23 SK., 26-7.  
24 SK., 26; SS., ii, 19.  
25 Chapter VIII.  
26 SK., 32-3.  
27 PSAH., pp. 10-11.
subtle organs.²⁷ Vijñānabhikṣu says that buddhi and ahamkāra are subtle (sūkṣma) sense-organs, and that the five organs of cognition, the five organs of action, and the central sensory or manas are gross (sthūla) sense-organs.²⁸ Vyāsa says that the five cognitive organs, the five motor organs, and the manas which apprehends all objects are the determinate modifications of indeterminate egoism (asmitā).²⁹

The sense-organs are not the same as their physiological sites or end-organs (adhisīṭhāna). The Buddhists wrongly hold that the sense-organs are nothing but the end-organs. They are super-sensuous.³⁰ Aniruddha argues that, if the sense-organs were identical with their physical seats, one whose ears have been cut off would be unable to hear, and one whose eyes are affected with cataract would be able to see.³¹ So the sense-organs are not identical with their sites.

The sense-organs are not material (bhautika) but are products of ahamkāra (egoism).³² Aniruddha says that the Naiyāyikas labour under a misconception when they argue that the sense-organs are made up of those material elements which are apprehended by them.³³

3. The Origin of the Sense-organs

According to the Sāṁkhya, Prakṛti, the equilibrium of sattva (essence), rajas (energy) and tamas (inertia) is the ultimate ground of all existence. Buddhi evolves out of Prakṛti when the equilibrium of sattva, rajas, and tamas is disturbed by a transcendental influence of the Self (puruṣa) for the sake of which all evolution takes place. Buddhi is the cosmic matter of experience: it is the undifferentiated matrix of the subjective series and the objective series.³⁴ From buddhi evolves ahamkāra (the empirical ego) which gives rise to the eleven sense-organs and the subtle elements (tanmātra) of matter under the influence of sattva, rajas, and tamas.³⁵ Iśvarakṛṣṇa holds that all the eleven sense-organs evolve out of ahamkāra by the preponderance of sattva; that five tanmātras evolve out of ahamkāra by the preponderance of tamas; and

²⁷ YBh., ii, 18.
²⁸ Mahadahamkārau sūkṣmendriyaṃ ekādaśa sthūlendriyāpi. YV., ii, 18. See also Chāyāvṛtti, ii, 18.
²⁹ YBh., ii, 19.
³⁰ SSV., ii, 23.
³¹ SSV., v, 84.
³² SS., ii, 23.
³³ SS., ii, 20; v, 84.
³⁴ PSAH., p. 10.
³⁵ SS., ii, 16-18.
that both the sense-organs and the tanmātras evolve with the help of rajas. Vācaspatimīśra elaborates this view. The cognitive organs (buddhīndriya) are the instruments of knowledge. So they are endowed with the quality of manifesting objects. They are also capable of quick movement. The cognitive organs quickly move out to distant objects. The motor organs (karmendriya) also are capable of quick action. And these properties of illumination and light movement are the distinctive properties of sattva. Hence the preponderating element in the constitution of the sense-organs is sattva, though they evolve out of ahamkāra. The five tanmātras also evolve out of ahamkāra; but the preponderating element in their constitution is tamas (inertia) because they are extremely inert in their nature. The preponderance of sattva in ahamkāra gives rise to the sense-organs, and the preponderance of tamas in ahamkāra gives rise to the tanmātras. But if sattva and rajas do everything, what is the use rajas? Rajas (energy) is necessary to give impetus to sattva (essence) and tamas (inertia) to perform their functions. They cannot act without the help of rajas. When rajas sets them in motion on account of its characteristic property of energizing they perform their functions. Hence both the sense-organs (sāttvīc) and the tanmātras (īāmasīc) evolve out of ahamkāra with the help of rajas. Aniruddha also holds that the eleven sense-organs are evolved from ahamkāra under the influence of sattva. But Vijñānabhikṣu holds that the mind (manas) is evolved from ahamkāra owing to the preponderance of sattva; that the five cognitive organs and the five motor organs evolve out of ahamkāra owing to the preponderance of rajas; and that the five tanmātras evolve out of ahamkāra owing to the preponderance of tamas. Bālarāma holds that all the sense-organs have the preponderance of sattva, but that there are different degrees of its preponderance. The mind arises from ahamkāra when sattva is most preponderant; the organs of knowledge arise from ahamkāra when sattva is less preponderant; and the organs of action arise from ahamkāra when sattva is least preponderant.

4. The Principal and Subordinate Organs

The three internal organs, buddhi, ahamkāra, and manas, are the principal sense-organs, since they apprehend all objects past,
present, and future. The external senses are the subordinate organs, since they apprehend only present objects. The former are called gatekeepers, while the latter are called the gateways of knowledge.\textsuperscript{41} \textit{Buddhi} is the principal organ not only in comparison with the external organs but also with the internal organs of \textit{manas} and \textit{ahamkāra}.\textsuperscript{42} Superiority and inferiority depend upon functions; they are relative terms.\textsuperscript{43} \textit{Manas} is the chief organ in relation to the functions of the external senses; \textit{ahamkāra} is the chief organ in relation to the function of \textit{manas}; and \textit{buddhi} is the chief organ in relation to the function of \textit{ahamkāra}.\textsuperscript{44} \textit{Buddhi} is the chief organ for the following reasons. Firstly, \textit{buddhi} directly brings about the experience of the self (\textit{puruśa}), while the other senses do it through the mediation of \textit{buddhi}.\textsuperscript{45} \textit{Buddhi} is the immediate instrument among all the external and internal senses, and makes over the object to the self, even as among a host of servants some one person becomes the prime minister while the others are his subordinate officers.\textsuperscript{46} Secondly, \textit{buddhi} pervades all the sense-organs, and never fails to produce the result in the shape of knowledge.\textsuperscript{47} Thirdly, \textit{buddhi} alone is the receptacle of all subconscious impressions (\textit{saṁskāra}). The external organs cannot retain the residua, for in that case the blind and the deaf would not be able to remember things seen and heard in the past. \textit{Manas} and \textit{ahamkāra} also cannot retain subconscious impressions because even after their dissolution by means of knowledge of Truth (\textit{tattvajñāna}) recollection persists. Hence \textit{buddhi} has pre-eminence over all.\textsuperscript{48} Fourthly, the superiority of \textit{buddhi} is inferred from the possibility of recollection which is of the nature of meditation, the highest of all mental functions. Recollection is the function of \textit{buddhi}.\textsuperscript{49} Thus \textit{buddhi} is the chief organ and all the other senses are secondary organs.

If \textit{buddhi} is the principal organ, why should we not regard it as the only sense-organ and dispense with the other sense-organs? \textit{Vijñānavabhikṣu} replies that without the help of the external senses \textit{buddhi} cannot serve as an instrument in all sense-activities, since in that case the blind would be able to see, the deaf would be able to hear, and so on.\textsuperscript{50} Kapila holds that the ten external senses

\textsuperscript{41} SK., 35, and Gauḍapāda Bhāṣya.  
\textsuperscript{42} STK., 35.  
\textsuperscript{44} SPB., ii, 45.  
\textsuperscript{46} SPB., ii, 40.  
\textsuperscript{48} SPB., ii, 42.  
\textsuperscript{43} SS., ii, 45.  
\textsuperscript{45} SSVM., ii, 39.  
\textsuperscript{47} SPB., ii, 41.  
\textsuperscript{49} SPB., ii, 43.  
\textsuperscript{50} SPB., ii, 44.
may be regarded as different modifications of the chief organ, manas, owing to the difference of the modifications of the constituent guṇas, sattva, rajas, and tamas.51 Just as one and the same person assumes many rôles in association with different persons, so manas also becomes manifold, through association with different sense-organs being particularized by the functions of the different senses by reason of its becoming one with the senses. This diverse modification of the mind is due to the diverse modification of the constituent guṇas.52

The Sāṁkhya holds that the sense-organs are prāpyakāri; that they move out to their objects in the form of vṛtti or modifications, assume their forms, and apprehend them. The vṛttis of the senses cannot be perceived. But their existence can be inferred from the fact that the sense-organs cannot apprehend their objects without being related to them, even as a lamp cannot illumine objects without being related to them. If the sense-organs be said to apprehend their objects without being related to them, then they may apprehend all objects, distant and hidden. But this is not a fact. Hence the sense-organs must be conceived as moving out to their objects and assuming their forms without leaving connection with the body. And this is possible only by means of a peculiar modification of the senses called vṛtti. Thus the existence of vṛtti is established. It connects the senses with their objects.53 The vṛtti is neither a part nor a quality of the senses. If it were a part it would not be able to bring about the connection of the visual organ with distant objects like the sun. If it were a quality it would not be able to move out to the object. Thus the vṛtti of a sense-organ, though existing in it, is different from its part of quality. Hence, it is established that the vṛtti of buddhi also is, like the flame of a lamp, a transformation quite of the nature of a substance which, by means of its transparency, is capable of receiving images of the forms of objects.54

Suśruta holds with Sāṁkhya that there are eleven sense-organs: five organs of knowledge, five organs of action, and the mind which partakes of the nature of both.55 The sense-organs evolve out of ahamkāra under the influence of rajas (energy).56

51 SS., ii, 27. 52 SPB., ii, 25, and ii, 27.
53 SPB., v, 104; SS., v, 106, and SPB., v, 106.
54 SPB., v, 107.
55 Suśrutasaṁhitā, Sārīrasaṁhitā, i. 4-5.
56 Ibid., 2-3.
Caraka also holds that there are eleven sense-organs, five sensory organs, five motor organs, and one internal organ or manas. Sometimes he mentions twelve sense-organs: five organs of knowledge, five organs of action, manas and buddhi. The mind is atomic and one in each body. It is different from the external senses. It is sometimes called sattva. Its functions are regulated by the contact of its objects with the soul. And it controls the functions of the external senses. They can apprehend their respective objects when they are led by the mind. The functions of the mind are the apprehension of objects through the external senses, subjecting them to control, comparison, and ratiocination. Then buddhi ascertains the nature of the objects. Certain knowledge is the function of buddhi. When buddhi has brought about definite apprehension one begins to act, guided by buddhi.

Caraka says: "There are five sense-organs, five materials that constitute the senses, five seats of the senses, five objects of the senses, and five kinds of perception obtained through the senses." Here evidently he speaks of the organs of knowledge. The organs of vision, audition, smell, taste, and touch are the five sense-organs. The materials that enter into the composition of the five senses are light, ether, earth, water, and air respectively. The physical seats of the five senses are the two eyes, the two ears, the nose, the tongue, and the skin. The sense-organs are not the same as the peripheral organs which are their seats. The objects of the five senses are colour, sound, odour, taste, and touch. Visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, and tactual perceptions are five kinds of sense-perception. As to the composition of the external senses Caraka seems to be in agreement with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view. But he does not wholly agree with it. According to him one particular element does not enter into the composition of a particular sense-organ; but all the primal elements exist in each sense-organ, though only one element predominates in the composition of a particular sense-organ. Thus light especially enters into the composition of the visual organ, ether into that of the auditory organ, earth into that of the olfactory organ, water into that of the gustatory organ and air into that of the tactual

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87 Carakasamhita, sarīrasthāna, i, 6, and 30.
88 Ibid., i, 26.
89 Ibid., i, 7.
90 Carakasamhita, Sūtrasūtra, viii, 2-3.
91 Ibid., sarīrasthāna, i, 7-8.
92 Ibid., Sūtrasūtra, viii, 2.
93 Ibid., viii, 4.
organ. The particular sense-organ into whose composition a particular element especially enters apprehends that particular object which has that element for its essence, since both partake of the same nature, and one is invested with greater power over the other.\textsuperscript{64} Light especially enters into the composition of the visual organ: so it can apprehend colour which has light for its essence. Both the visual organ and colour partake of the nature of light, the former being more powerful than the latter. Hence the visual organ can apprehend colour. Such is the case with the auditory organ and sound, and so with the others. This doctrine of Caraka is kindred to the Nyāya-Vaisēṣika doctrine. But Caraka does not regard the sense-organs as products of matter as the Nyāya-Vaisēṣika holds. He traces the origin of the senses to ahamkāra after the Sāmkhya. His cosmology is the same as that of the Sāmkhya.\textsuperscript{65} Thus Caraka’s views as to the nature, kinds, and functions of the sense-organs are partly similar to the Sāmkhya view, and partly to the Nyāya-Vaisēṣika view.

The Śāmkarite agrees with the Sāmkhya in recognizing five organs of knowledge, five organs of action, and the internal organ.\textsuperscript{66} The Sāmkhya recognizes three forms of the internal organ, buddhi, ahamkāra, and manas. But the Śāmkarite admits four forms of the internal organ, manas, buddhi, ahamkāra, and citta. Though the internal organ is one and the same, it assumes different forms according to its diverse functions. When it has the function of doubt or indetermination it is called manas. When it has the function of determination it is called buddhi. When it produces the notion of ego in consciousness it is called ahamkāra. And when it has the function of recollection it is called citta. These functions are different modifications of the same internal organ (antahkarana). This is the view of Śāktaism also.\textsuperscript{67}

The five organs of knowledge are made up the sāttvica\textsuperscript{68} part of the unquintuplied material elements. The organs of vision, audition, smell, taste, and touch are made up of the sāttvica parts of light, ether, earth, water, and air respectively in an uncombined state.\textsuperscript{69} The organs of action are made up of the rājasīca\textsuperscript{70} part of the unquintuplied material elements. The organ of speech,
hands, feet, the excretive organ, and the generative organ are made up of the rājasic parts of ether, air, light, water, and earth respectively in an uncombined state. The internal organs are made up of the sāttvic parts of the five material elements combined.

The Rāmānujist recognizes eleven sense-organs: five organs of cognition, five organs of action, and the mind. The Sāṁkhya admits three internal organs, and the Śaṅkarite admits four internal organs. Both these views are wrong. The so-called internal organs are nothing but different functions of one and the same internal organ, manas. Sometimes the manas is included in the organs of knowledge.

5. The Different Views about the nature of the Sense-organs

The author of Vivaranaprameyasaṁgraha discusses the nature of the sense-organs. The Buddhists hold that the sense-organs are the peripheral organs, viz., the eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue, and the skin. It is the sockets (golaka) in the body that constitute the sense-organs. The Mīmāṁsakas hold that the sense-organs consist in the faculty of potency (śakti) abiding in the sockets. The mere end-organs do not constitute the sense-organs. Others hold that the sense-organs are distinct from both the end-organs and their potency, and are distinct substances by themselves.

The Śaṅkarite rejects the first theory on the ground that certain animals (e.g. serpents) can hear, though they do not possess the ear-hole, and that the plants which are believed to be sentient living beings are devoid of end-organs or sockets. For the same reason the Mīmāṁsaka theory also is rejected. The Mīmāṁsaka argues that the law of parsimony demands that we should assume the existence of potency (śakti) only, and not of the sense-organs endued with a potency. But the Śaṅkarite contends that it is needless to assume the existence of the potency also; that the law of parsimony, if rigidly applied, will lead us to assume the existence only of the self capable of knowing things in succession. The self is all-pervading; so it can produce cognitions in the end-organs.

71 ACK., p. 65.
72 Tattvatraya, p. 54 and p. 70.
73 YMD., p. 16; NSA., p. 16.
74 Ibid., p. 62; VP., p. 357.
75 TMK., p. 94.
76 VPS., p. 185.
The Mīmāṁsaka himself admits that the self has modifications of consciousness (jñānaparināma) only in those parts of the body in which there are end-organs. Thus the Mīmāṁsaka argument ultimately leads to the denial of the sense-organs altogether. So the Mīmāṁsaka doctrine is not tenable. The third theory also is not acceptable. There is no proof of the existence of the sense-organs as distinct substances quite different from the sockets. It may be argued that perceptions of colour and the like are due to the action of the self, and since an action always requires an instrument, the self must require the instrumentality of the sense-organs to perceive colour and the like. This argument is wrong. The reason is over-wide. The self acts upon the sense-organs to incite them to action; but in doing so it does not require any instrument. If it did it would lead to infinite regress. So the third theory also cannot be maintained. But the Śaṅkarite believes in the existence of sense-organs as something different from the peripheral organs on the authority of the scriptures.\(^7\)

Gautama establishes the existence of five sense-organs on the following grounds: In the first place, the existence of five sense-organs is inferred from five distinct functions.\(^8\) Vātsyāyana argues that there are five purposes (prayojana) of the senses: touching, seeing, smelling, tasting, and hearing; these five purposes require five distinct sense-organs, viz. the tactual organ, the visual organ, the olfactory organ, the gustatory organ, and the auditory organ. Touch is apprehended by the tactual organ; but it does not apprehend colour. So we infer the existence of the visual organ which serves the purpose of apprehending colour. Similarly, touch and colour are apprehended by the tactual organ and the visual organ respectively; but these organs do not apprehend odour. So we infer the existence of the olfactory organ which serves the purpose of apprehending odour. In the same manner, touch, colour, and odour are apprehended by the tactual organ, the visual organ, and the olfactory organ respectively; but these organs do not apprehend taste. So we infer the existence of the gustatory organ which serves the purpose of apprehending taste. Lastly, touch, colour, odour, and taste are apprehended by the tactual organ, the visual organ, the olfactory organ, and the gustatory organ respectively; but these organs do not apprehend sound. So we infer the existence of the auditory organ which serves the purpose

\(^7\) VPS., pp. 185-6. \(^8\) Indriyārthapañcatvāt. NS., iii, 1, 58.
of apprehending sound. The function of one sense-organ cannot be performed by another. So the existence of five sense-organs is inferred from five kinds of sense-activities. In the second place, the existence of the five sense-organs is inferred from the five-fold character of the signs in the shape of perceptions, the sites, the processes, the forms, and the constituents.

Firstly, there are five different kinds of perception, visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, and tactual, from which we infer the existence of five sense-organs. Secondly, there are five sense-organs corresponding to the five sites (adhiśthāna) or end-organs. The tactual organ, which is indicated by the perception of touch, has its seat throughout the body. The visual organ issuing out to the object as indicated by the perception of colour has its site in the pupil of the eye. The olfactory organ has its site in the nose. The gustatory organ has its site in the tongue. The auditory organ has its site in the cavity of the ear. The diversity of the sense-organs is proved by the diversity of their locations. Things with distinct locations are always found to be distinct as in the case of jars. If the whole body were the seat of all the sense-organs, then deafness, blindness, and the like would be impossible. But if the different sense-organs are held to have different sites, the site of one organ being destroyed the other organs may remain unaffected so that a deaf or blind person will not necessarily be deprived of all the sense-organs. Thus, this theory does not involve any incongruity. This argument shows that the sense-organs are different from their physical seats (golaka). Thirdly, the five sense-organs involve different processes (gati). The visual organ, which is of the nature of light, issues out of the pupil and moves out to the objects endued with colour. The tactual organ, the gustatory organ, and the olfactory organ come into contact with their objects resting in their own sites. The do not move out to their objects like the visual organ. The auditory organ also does not move out to its object. Sound travels from its place of origin to the auditory organ in a series of waves. This argument shows that all the sense-organs are prāpyakāri; they apprehend their objects by coming into direct contact with them. Fourthly, the five sense-organs have different magnitudes (ākṛtī). The olfactory

9 NBh., iii, 1, 58.
10 NBh., iii, 1, 62.
11 NBh., iii, 1, 62.
12 NS., iii, 1, 62.
13 NV., p. 394.
organ, the gustatory organ, and the tactual organ have the magnitudes of their sites; they are coextensive with their seats. The visual organ, though located in the pupil, issues out of it and pervades its object. So it is not coextensive with its site but with the field of vision. The auditory organ is nothing but ākāśa, which is all-pervading; still it cannot apprehend all sounds because its scope is restricted by the disabilities of the substratum in which it subsists. The all-pervading ākāśa located in the ear-hole owing to the adṛśta of a person assumes the rôle of the auditory organ, and produces the perception of sound through it. Lastly, the five sense-organs have their origin (jāti) in five material elements. The olfactory organ is made up of earth and apprehends smell which is its characteristic quality. The gustatory organ is made up of water and apprehends taste which is its characteristic quality. The visual organ is made up of light and apprehends colour which is its characteristic quality. And the auditory organ is nothing but ākāśa and apprehends sound which is its characteristic quality. There is a community of nature between the sense-organs and their objects. A sense-organ apprehends the distinctive quality of that substance which enters into its constitution. The Vaiśeṣika also agrees with this view.

Gautama does not distinctly mention anywhere that the mind (manas) is a sense-organ. But Vātsyāyana points out that Gautama's definition of perception, as a non-erroneous cognition produced by the intercourse of the sense-organs with their objects, inexpressible by words and well-defined, implies that the mind is a sense-organ. If by the sense-organs he means only the external senses his definition will apply only to the perceptions of external objects. But Gautama does not give a separate definition of internal perception of pleasure and the like. This shows that his definition covers both external perception and internal perception, and the mind is a sense-organ. Vātsyāyana includes the mind in the sense-organs and points out its distinction from the external senses. Viśvanātha regards the mind as a sense-organ. He argues that the perception of pleasure must be produced through an instrument just as the visual perception of colour is produced through the instrument of the eyes; and this instrument is the mind (manas) which is thus a sense-organ (karana).²⁷ Praśastapāda

²⁴ NBh., iii, 1, 62; NM., p. 477. ²⁵ NBh., i, 1, 4.
²⁶ NBh., i, 1, 4. ²⁷ SM., 85.
describes the mind as the internal organ (antahkarana). He argues that pleasure and pain are not perceived through the external senses; but that they must be perceived through an instrument, and that is the mind.\textsuperscript{48} \textsuperscript{49} Śaṅkaramiśra also gives the same argument.

A sense-organ is defined by the Mīmāṁsaka as that which, rightly operating upon its object, produces direct presentations. There are two kinds of sense-organs, external and internal. There are five external organs: the olfactory organ, the gustatory organ, the visual organ, the tactual organ, and the auditory organ. Of these the first four are made up of earth, water, light, and air respectively. So far the Mīmāṁsaka agrees with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika regards the auditory organ as of the nature of ether (ākāśa), while the Mīmāṁsaka regards it as a portion of space (dīk) confined within the ear-hole. There is only one internal organ, viz., the mind (manas). The mind is atomic in nature, because of the impossibility of simultaneous cognitions. It is called the internal organ, since it operates independently in the perception of the self and its qualities. But in the perception of external objects it acts in co-operation with the external senses, since being an internal organ it cannot come into contact with external objects. It depends upon marks of inference (liṅga) to produce inferential cognitions, and upon subconscious impressions (samskāra) to bring about recollections.\textsuperscript{50}

Thus the Mīmāṁsaka view of the nature and functions of the sense-organs resembles the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view.

The Śāmkhya and the Vedāntist hold that the vocal organ, the prehensive organ, the locomotive organ, the excretive organ, and the generative organ are the organs of action (karmendriya). They are regarded as sense-organs because they are the instruments which produce the functions of speaking, grasping, walking, evacuation, and sexual intercourse respectively. The function of one cannot be done by another.

But Jayanta urges that if these organs are regarded as sense-organs, many other organs also should be regarded as such. The throat has the function of swallowing food; the breasts have the function of embracing; the shoulders have the function of carrying burdens. So they also must be regarded as sense-organs. If

\textsuperscript{48} PBh., pp. 152-3; Kir., p. 153. \textsuperscript{49} VSU., iii, 2, 2. \textsuperscript{50} SD., pp. 115-16.
it is argued that these functions can be done by other organs also, then it may equally be argued that eating and drinking can sometimes be done by hands and feet, swallowing food by the anus, and the grasping of things by the mouth. The functions of the so-called motor organs are sometimes done by other organs also. But the function of one cognitive organ (buddhāndriya) can never be done by another. A person whose eyeballs have been taken out of their sockets can never perceive colour. But a person can grasp and walk a little even with his hands and feet amputated. Besides, walking is not the function of feet alone; it can also be done by hands. If the different parts of the body having different functions in the shape of actions are said to be motor organs, then throat, breast, shoulder, etc., also should be included in the motor organs.\textsuperscript{91} Vidyānandin argues that the so-called motor organs are included in the tactual organ.\textsuperscript{92} Hence there is no necessity of supposing the existence of the so-called motor organs.

Jayanta argues that one internal organ, manas, is quite adequate. It is needless to assume three internal organs, manas, ahaṁkāra, and buddhi. Buddhi is of the nature of cognition, and so it is of the nature of an operation of an instrument. Hence it cannot be an instrument of cognition. Ahaṁkāra (egoism) also is an object of cognition; so it cannot be an instrument of cognition. Therefore, there is only one internal organ, viz., manas.\textsuperscript{93} Vidyānandin argues that buddhi and ahaṁkāra cannot be regarded as sense-organs, since they are modifications of the soul and results of the sense-organs and the mind.\textsuperscript{94} Venkatañātha argues that the so-called internal organs of buddhi and ahaṁkāra are functions of the mind which is the only internal organ.\textsuperscript{95}

Gautama does not include the manas (mind) in the list of sense-organs.\textsuperscript{96} He mentions it separately among the objects of valid knowledge (prameya).\textsuperscript{97} Kaṇāda is silent upon the point. But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers generally regard the manas as the internal organ through which we perceive pleasure and pain.\textsuperscript{98} The Mīmāṁsakas also recognize the manas as the internal organ. They call it the internal organ, since it operates independently

\textsuperscript{91} NM., pp. 482-3 \hspace{1em} \textsuperscript{92} NVT., p. 372. \hspace{1em} \textsuperscript{93} TSV., p. 326. \hspace{1em} \textsuperscript{94} NM., p. 483. \hspace{1em} \textsuperscript{95} TSV., p. 326. \hspace{1em} \textsuperscript{96} TMK., p. 94. \hspace{1em} \textsuperscript{97} NS., 1, 1, 12. \hspace{1em} \textsuperscript{98} NBh. and NV., 1, 1, 4; NM., p. 484; SM., p. 397; VSU., ill, 2, 2.
in the perception of the self and its qualities. But in the perception of external objects it acts in co-operation with the external senses, since being an internal organ it cannot come into contact with external objects. The Sāṁkhya also regards the manas as an internal sense-organ. Iśvarakṛṣṇa says that the manas is a sensori-motor organ (ubhayātmakam manah); it partakes of the nature of both the organs of knowledge and the organs of action. The Vedāntists also generally recognize the manas as a sense-organ. The Rāmānujjists regard the manas as the internal organ of knowledge, which is the cause of recollection. They differ from the Sāṁkhya which regards the manas as partaking of the nature of both the organs of knowledge and the organs of action. They differ from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika in holding that the manas is not the organ of internal perception (mānasa-pratyakṣa), since there is no internal perception at all. Śaṁkara admits that the manas is a sense-organ because it is distinctly laid down in the Smṛti. Manu says: “There are eleven sense-organs of which the eleventh organ is the manas.” Vācaspatimīśra also holds the same view. But some Śaṁkarites hold a contrary view.

The authors of Vedāntaparibhāṣā, Advaitabrahmasiddhi, and Advaitacintākaustubha hold that the manas is not a sense-organ on the authority of the Śruti. “The objects are greater than the sense-organs, and the manas is greater than the senses.” In this text the manas is given a higher place than the sense-organs. So it cannot be regarded as a sense-organ. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika argues that the manas should be regarded as a sense-organ, since it is the organ of the perception of pleasure and pain. Perception is always of sensuous origin. There can be no perception without a sense-organ. The author of Vedāntaparibhāṣā argues that the perception of pleasure and pain does not necessarily imply that the manas is a sense-organ through which the self perceives pleasure and pain. The perceptual character of a cognition does not consist in its being produced by a sense-organ. In that case, inferential cognition also would be regarded as perception, since it is produced by the mind. The perceptual character of a

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99 ŚD., pp. 115-16.
100 YMD., p. 16.
101 NP., p. 76.
102 Manusāṁhitā, ii, 89-92.
103 VP., pp. 49-51.
104 SK., 27.
105 NSA., pp. 16-17.
106 S.B., ii, 4, 17.
108 Bhāmati, ii, 4, 17.
cognition depends on the identification of the apprehending mental
mode with the perceived object.\textsuperscript{108}

The Jaina also does not regard the manas as a sense-organ.
It is called anindriya. It is not a sense-organ.\textsuperscript{109} Vidyānandin
argues that the mind is not a sense-organ because it is different
from the sense-organs. The sense-organs apprehend specific
objects. One sense-organ cannot apprehend the objects of
another. But the mind can apprehend all objects. So it cannot
be regarded as a sense-organ. It may be argued that the mind
is an instrument (karana) of cognition, and so it must be regarded
as a sense-organ. But in that case smoke also would be a sense-
organ, since it is an instrument (karana) of cognition, being a
mark (liṅga) of inference. Hence it is wrong to include the mind
in the sense-organs.\textsuperscript{110}

6. The External Organs and the Internal Organ or Organs

The Sāmkhya regards the internal organ as threefold in
character. It assumes the forms of buddhi, ahaṁkāra, and manas
according as its functions differ. Isvarakṛṣṇa holds that the exter-
nal organs can apprehend only the present. But the internal
organs can apprehend the present, the past, and the future.\textsuperscript{111}
Gaudapāda makes it clear by examples. The visual organ appre-
hends only the present colour, neither past nor future colours.
The auditory organ apprehends the present sound, neither past
nor future sounds. The tractual organ, the gustatory organ, and
the olfactory organ apprehend respectively the present touch,
taste, and odour, but not past or future ones. This is the case
with the motor organs also. The vocal organ utters only present
sounds, but not past or future ones. The hands can grasp only
the present jars, but not the past or future ones. The feet can
walk upon only the present road, but not upon past or future ones.
The excretive and generative organs can perform their functions
only at present. The functions of the external organs are con-
fined only to the present time. They cannot carry us forward to
the future and backward to the past. For this we have to fall
back upon the internal organs. The manas assimilates and

\textsuperscript{108} VP., pp. 52-8; ABS., p. 156; Chapter VII.
\textsuperscript{109} DS., p. 13; PMV., ii, 5.
\textsuperscript{110} TSV., p. 326.
\textsuperscript{111} Sāmpratakālam bāhyam trikālam ābhyantram karaṇam. SK., 33.
discriminates the present as well as past and future objects. The ahamkāra refers the present as well as past and future objects to the unity of the empirical ego. The buddhi determines the nature of present, past, and future objects. The internal organs bring us in contact with the past and the future as with the present. Vācaspatimiśra refers to it in Bhāmati. He holds that the immediate past and the immediate future should be included in the present owing to their close proximity to it. He seems to believe in the specious present, which is a meeting point of the present, the past, and the future. And this tract of time is an object of sense-perception.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika believes in only one internal organ or manas. What is the difference between the mind and the external senses? Vātsyāyana mentions three points of difference. In the first place, the external sense-organs are material, but the mind is immaterial. The mind is not material, since it is not of the nature of an effect, and so does not possess any quality of matter. In the second place, the external senses apprehend only a limited number of objects (niyatavisaya), but the mind apprehends all objects (sarvavisaya). For instance, colours, sounds, tastes, odours, and touch are apprehended by the visual organ, the auditory organ, the gustatory organ, the olfactory organ, and the tactual organ respectively. But all these are apprehended by the mind. It guides all the external senses in the apprehension of their objects and directly apprehends pleasure, pain, and the like. Vyāsa also holds that the manas apprehends all objects (sarvārtha).

In the third place, the external senses are of the nature of sense-organs owing to the fact that they are endued with the same qualities as are apprehended by them. For instance, the olfactory organ is endued with the quality of odour, and consequently it can apprehend odour. The visual organ can apprehend colour, because it is endued with the quality of colour. The gustatory organ is endued with the quality of taste and so it can apprehend taste. The auditory organ is endued with the quality of sound, and so it can apprehend sound. And the tactual organ can apprehend touch, because it is endued with the quality of touch.

112 Gaudapāda Bhāṣya on SK., 33. 113 Bhāmati, ii, 4, 17.
114 Vartamānasmipamātismatamānāgatamapi vartamānam. STK., 33. See Chapter IX.
115 NM., p. 497.
116 V Bh., ii, 19.
But the mind is not endued with the qualities of pleasure, pain etc., which are apprehended by the mind.117

Uddyotakara recognizes only the second point of difference between the mind and the external sense-organs. He rejects the other two points of difference. Vātsyāyana holds that the external sense-organs are material, but that the mind is immaterial. But this is not right. In fact, the mind is neither material nor immaterial: materiality and immateriality are properties of products; what is produced out of matter is material, and what is not produced out of matter, but out of something else is immaterial. As a matter of fact, however, the mind is not a product at all, and as such it can be neither material nor immaterial. Moreover, the auditory organ, which is an external sense-organ, is not material, since it is not a product of matter, but ākāśa itself. So the auditory organ also is neither material nor immaterial.

But this objection of Uddyotakara is based on a misconception of the meaning of the word "material". It may mean either a product of matter (bhutajanya) or of the nature of matter (bhutātmaka). In the latter sense, the auditory organ also is material, since it is of the nature of ākāśa (ether), though it is not a product of it. In the former sense, all the other sense-organs are material. The tactual organ is a product of air; the visual organ is a product of light; the olfactory organ is a product of earth; and the gustatory organ is a product of water. Further, Vātsyāyana holds that the external senses are sense-organs because they are endued with certain distinctive qualities, but that the mind is a sense-organ without being endued with any specific quality. But Uddyotakara disputes this point also. For the auditory organ also does not, through its own quality of sound, apprehend a sound exterior to itself, as the other external senses do. For instance, the olfactory organ apprehends an odour exterior to itself, through the odour inherent in itself. But the auditory organ apprehends a sound which is not exterior to itself, but which is actually produced within the ear itself. Hence Uddyotakara concludes that there is only one point of difference between the mind and the external sense-organs; the external senses can apprehend only certain specific objects, but the mind can apprehend all objects. And it is proved by the following reasons. Firstly, the mind is the substratum of the conjunction with the condition of

117 NBh., i, 1, 4.
recollection. Secondly, it is the substratum of the conjunction which brings about the cognition of pleasure and the like. And thirdly, it presides over all other sense-organs.\textsuperscript{118}

7. \textit{Are the External Sense-organs Prāpyakāri or Aprāpyakāri?}

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the Mīmāṃsaka, the Sāṁkhya, and the Vedāntist hold that all the sense-organs are prāpyakāri; they apprehend their objects when they come in direct contact with them. This doctrine is called the doctrine of prāpyakāritā. But the Buddhist holds that the visual organ and the auditory organ are aprāpyakāri; they apprehend their objects at a distance without coming in contact with them. All the other sense-organs are prāpyakāri; they apprehend their objects when they come in contact with them. The Jaina holds that only the visual organ is aprāpyakāri; it apprehends its object at a distance with the help of light without getting at it.

According to the Buddhist, the visual organ is the eyeball or the pupil of the eye (golaka), and it can apprehend its object without coming in direct contact with it, because the eyeball can never go out of its socket to the object existing at a distance. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, on the other hand, all the sense-organs are prāpyakāri; they can apprehend their objects only when they come in direct contact with them. Thus the visual organ cannot apprehend its object without coming in direct contact with it. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that the visual organ is not the eyeball or the pupil of the eye which is the seat (golaka or adhiśṭhāna) of the visual organ which is of the nature of light (tejas); and that this ray of light goes out of the pupil to the object at a distance and comes in direct contact with it.

The Buddhist offers the following criticism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of prāpyakāritā. Firstly, the sense-organs are nothing but end-organs (golaka) which are within the range of perception. They are not mysterious entities behind these peripheral organs. So the visual organ is nothing but the pupil of the eye through which we see visible objects. And the pupil can never go out of the eye to the object, and come into direct contact with it. Secondly, the visual organ cannot come into direct contact with its object in order to apprehend it, for in that

\textsuperscript{118} NV., i, 1, 4.
case it would not be able to apprehend an object bigger than itself. But, as a matter of fact, the visual organ can apprehend vast objects like mountains and the like. Thirdly, the visual organ apprehends the branches of a tree and the moon at the same time; it takes the same length of time to apprehend these objects though they are at different distances. If the eye goes out to its object in order to apprehend it, then it must take less time to apprehend a near object, and more time to apprehend a distant object. But, in fact, the eye apprehends the branches of a tree and the moon at the same time; it does not take more time to apprehend the moon than to apprehend the branches; just on opening our eyes we see both the objects at the same time. Fourthly, the eye cannot go out to its object; for if it could go out to its object of apprehension, it would never be able to apprehend objects hidden behind glass, mica, etc., as it would be obstructed by them. Hence the Buddhist concludes that the visual organ can never go out to its object to apprehend it; it apprehends its object from a distance without getting at it.

Udayana criticises the above arguments of the Buddhist in Kiranāvali. Firstly, what apprehends or manifests an object must come into direct contact with it. A lamp manifests an object only because the light comes into direct contact with it. The visual organ is of the nature of light, and so the ray of light must go out of the pupil to the object in order to apprehend it. Secondly, the light of the visual organ issues out of the pupil, and spreads out, and thus can cover a vast object. Hence the field of vision is not co-extensive with the eyeball or the pupil of the eye. Thirdly, it is wrong to argue that a near object and a distant object can be perceived through the visual organ in the same space of time. There must be some difference in the moments of time required in the apprehension of the two objects, though it is not distinctly felt by us. Light is an extremely light substance, and its motion is inconceivably swift. So even the distant moon is seen just on opening the eyes. Some hold that the light of the visual organ, issuing out of the pupil, becomes blended with the external light, and thus comes into contact with far and near objects simultaneously, so that the eye can apprehend the branches and the moon at the same time. But this is not a correct explanation. On this hypothesis, the visual organ

\textsuperscript{110} Kir., p. 74.
would be able to apprehend those objects which are hidden from our view, e.g., objects behind our back. But it can never apprehend these objects. Fourthly, glass, mica, etc., are transparent by their very nature, and so they cannot obstruct the passage of light. Hence the light of the visual organ can penetrate these substances and apprehend objects hidden behind them. Hence the visual organ must be supposed to go out to its object and come into direct contact with it.\textsuperscript{120} The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika does not regard the auditory organ as moving out to sounds, which are held to travel to the ear; either sounds reach the ear in concentric circles of waves like the waves of water or they shoot out in all directions like the filaments of a kadamba.\textsuperscript{121}

The Sāṃkhya also holds that the sense-organs are prāpyakaři: they get at their objects in order to apprehend them. All schools of philosophers admit that the organs of touch, taste, and smell come into direct contact with their objects. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that the visual organ moves out to its objects, but that the auditory organ does not. The Sāṃkhya differs from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika in holding that the sense-organs come into contact with their objects through their functions (vr̥tti), and that the auditory organ also moves out to sounds through its function like the visual organ.

The Buddhists argue that the visual organ does not move out to its object, since we see objects through glass, mica, and crystal; and that the auditory organ does not move out to its objects, since we hear sounds at a distance. The Sāṃkhya refutes this view. Kapila contends that the sense-organs do not apprehend objects which they do not reach, because of their not reaching, or because they would reach everything.\textsuperscript{122} Aniruddha explains this argument. The sense-organs do not manifest those objects which they do not reach, because they have the nature of manifesting only what they reach or come into contact with. The visual organ goes out to objects hidden by glass, mica, and crystal in the form of vr̥tti; these substances do not obstruct the passage of the vr̥tti on account of their transparencies. The auditory organ is connected with sound by means of its function, which moves out to it. It does not apprehend sound at a distance without reaching out to it. The sense-organs apprehend objects at a

\textsuperscript{120} Kir., pp. 74-5. \\
\textsuperscript{121} BhP., 166. \\
\textsuperscript{122} SS., v, 104.
distance by means of their functions. If it is argued that the sense-organs do not apprehend objects at a distance because they do not reach out to them, as in the case of hidden objects, then it may be pointed out that this disability of the sense-organs (i.e., their not moving out to their objects) will affect not only the cognitions of distant and hidden objects but also those of unhidden objects as well, since the disability must operate equally in both the cases. But, in fact, the cognitions of unhidden objects are never so affected. Therefore, it cannot be maintained that the sense-organs do not reach out to their objects. If, on the other hand, it is argued that the sense-organs apprehend objects even without reaching out to them, then they will apprehend everything which exists within the universe, since there is no distinction in this respect with regard to all things.\textsuperscript{128} Hence the Sāmkhya concludes that all sense-organs get at their objects.

The Sāmkhya holds with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika that the visual organ moves out to its object. But it does not hold like it that the visual organ is made up of light, though it has the power of gliding, since the phenomenon of movement of the visual organ can be explained by its function.\textsuperscript{124} Aniruddha says that the fact that the visual organ moves out to distant objects, like light, and manifests them, leads to the misconception that it is made up of light. But, in reality, the visual organ is related to its objects through its function.\textsuperscript{125} Vijñānabhikṣu says that the visual organ, though not made up of light, shoots out to distant objects like the sun by means of its particular modification (ṛtti) without altogether leaving the body, even as the vital air (prāṇa) moves out from the tip of the nose up to a certain distance by means of its particular modification without altogether leaving the body.\textsuperscript{126}

Kumārila criticizes the Buddhist and Sāmkhya theories of auditory perception. The Buddhist holds that the auditory organ apprehends sounds without coming into contact with them. Kumārila contends that in that case all sounds near and distant would be equally perceptible, since they are equal in having no contact with the auditory organ. In that case, both near and distant sounds could be either perceived or unperceived; there would be no sequence in the perception of sounds, near sounds

\textsuperscript{128} SSV., v, 104.
\textsuperscript{124} SS., v, 105.
\textsuperscript{125} SSV., v, 105.
\textsuperscript{126} SPB., v, 105.
being first perceived and then distant sounds; and sounds coming from different distances would not have different degrees of intensity. This shows that sounds must come into contact with the auditory organ in order to be perceived.\textsuperscript{187}

The Sāṃkhya holds that the auditory organ moves out to the region where sounds are produced through its vyāti. Kumārila contends that the Sāṃkhya doctrine involves the assumption of two imperceptible things. The so-called vyāti or function of the auditory organ is imperceptible, and its movement also is imperceptible. It is difficult to conceive how a modification is produced in the auditory organ by a distant sound. The Sāṃkhya may argue that the auditory organ moves out to distant sounds, owing to its all-pervading nature, being a product of all-pervading ahamkāra. Kumārila contends that this fact would apply equally well to very distant sounds, and hence all sounds would be heard equally well. Moreover, the function of the auditory organ, being immaterial, could not be obstructed by any material obstacles, and hence even intercepted sounds would be heard.\textsuperscript{188} Thus the Sāṃkhya theory is untenable. Kumārila holds that sound travels through the air and reaches the space in the ear, and then produces a modification (sāmskāra) in it. This theory explains many facts about auditory perception. Sounds are carried to the ear through the air. So when the air is intercepted by obstacles sounds cannot be heard. The air moves along in a certain order of sequence, and hence we first hear sounds near at hand, and then distant sounds, and near sounds are intense and distant sounds are faint.\textsuperscript{189}

The Śāṅkarācārya also holds that the sense-organs are prāpyakāri. They apprehend their objects when they come into contact with them. Of the five external senses, the olfactory organ, the gustatory organ, and the tactual organ apprehend their objects, remaining in their seats. But the visual organ and the auditory organ go out to their appropriate objects and apprehend them. Even the auditory organ can move outward to sounds because it is the all-pervading ether limited by the ear-hole. Just as the visual organ, which is of the nature of light and very transparent, can move outward to its object and apprehend it, so the auditory

\textsuperscript{187} SV., pp. 760-1; see Chapter VIII.  \textsuperscript{188} SV., pp. 359-360; also NR.  \textsuperscript{189} SV., p. 763.
organ also, which is of the nature of ether, can move out to its object and apprehend it.

The Śaṅkarite differs from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika in his view of the nature of the auditory organ. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that a sound is produced somewhere in space and spreads in concentric circles like the waves of water and ultimately strikes the drum of the ear, and thus produces the auditory perception of sound. But the Śaṅkarite urges that had it been the case, we should apprehend the sound as in the ear, and not in the place in which it is generated. But, in fact, we always perceive a sound in such a form as “I hear a sound there” and not “in the ear”. This conclusively proves that the auditory organ also, like the visual organ, moves out to the object and apprehends it. The Śaṅkarite thinks that it is unnecessary to assume an infinite series of sounds coming from the original place in concentric or spherical circles to the auditory organ to produce the auditory perception of the original sound. The law of parsimony requires that there must be a connection between the sound produced somewhere in space and the auditory organ. And the connection can be easily established by supposing that it is the auditory organ itself that goes outward to the sound and apprehends it. In fact, it is the translucent antahkarāṇa (internal organ) which streams out through the orifices of the visual organ and the auditory organ and gets at the visible objects and sounds. The Rāmānujist also holds the same view.

The Vedāntists agree with the Śaṅkhya on this point.

8. Are the External Sense-organs Physical (bhautika) or Psychical (āhaṃkārika)?

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that the external sense-organs are material (bhautika) in nature. But the Śaṅkhya disputes this view on the following grounds. In the first place, the sense-organs are prāpyakāri; they apprehend their objects only when they come into contact with them. If the sense-organs were products of gross matter, they could never go out to distant objects and apprehend them. But, as a matter of fact, some sense-organs (e.g. the visual organ) can apprehend distant objects, and hence they must reach out to them. And they can move out to distant

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180 BhP., 165-6.
181 VP., pp. 180-1; also Śikhāmapī. TMK., pp. 104 ff.
objects if they are products of āhayānā (egoism) and as such capable of expansion. So the Sāṁkhya concludes that the sense-organs are psychical, being products of āhaṁkāra, reach out to distant objects in the form of functions (ūrtti) which are modified into the forms of these objects. In the second place, if the sense-organs were material they would apprehend only those objects which are of their size. But, as a matter of fact, they can apprehend objects which are larger or smaller than themselves. This proves that the sense-organs are not products of matter but of āhaṁkāra. In the third place, material objects like lamps, which manifest other objects, also manifest themselves. So, if the sense-organs were material, they would be able to manifest not only other objects but also their own nature. But they cannot manifest themselves; the sense-organs are not objects of sense-perception. So they are not material.¹⁸⁴ They are products of āhaṁkāra. The Rāmānujaist also agrees with this view.¹⁸⁵

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa refutes these arguments thus. The first argument is based on a false assumption. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika agrees with the Sāṁkhya in holding that the sense-organs are prāpyakāri; they come into contact with their objects in order to apprehend them. But the sense-organs are not the peripheral organs or the physical seats of eyes, etc. For example, the visual organ is not the pupil but the ray of light (tejas) which has its seat in the pupil. And the ray of light can easily stretch out to a distant object and apprehend it, since its motion is extremely swift. So the sense-organs need not necessarily be psychical (āhaṁkārika) in order to get at their objects; they may be material (bhautika) and yet prāpyakāri. The second argument also is without foundation. The sense-organs cannot be said to be psychical (āhaṁkārika) because they can apprehend objects bigger or smaller than themselves. They can do so even if they are material. For example, the visual organ, which is of the nature of light, can expand and apprehend a larger object. The expansion of an object is not the sign of its psychical character. The third argument also is beside the mark. The different sense-organs apprehend different qualities. Every sense-organ does not apprehend all qualities. The sense-organs can apprehend only those qualities of their objects, which inhere in themselves. For instance, smell inhere in the olfactory organ; so it can apprehend

¹⁸⁴ NM., pp. 477-8. ¹⁸⁵ TMK., p. 91.
only the smell of an object. But it cannot apprehend its own smell. It is by virtue of its own inherent smell that it can apprehend smell in its object. If the sense-organs were devoid of qualities, they would not be able to apprehend anything at all, and they would cease to be sense-organs. Thus the sense-organs can apprehend other objects but not themselves. Hence the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika concludes that the sense-organs are material.

Some maintain that there is only one sense-organ; that it appears to be many owing to the difference of upādhis or limitations. Kapila refers to this view and criticizes it. Aniruddha argues that though there is a difference of upādhis we must also admit that there is a real difference of powers, and that if the difference of powers is real, the plurality of sense-organs also is real. Vijñānabhikṣu argues that the theory of one sense-organ performing different functions through diversity of powers amounts to the assumption of a plurality of sense-organs, since these different powers also have the character of sense-organs. Hence there is not a single sense-organ.

9. Is the Tactual Organ the only Sense-organ?

Caraka holds that the organ of touch pervades all the sense-organs. They are modifications of the sense of touch. All the sense-organs apprehend their objects when they come into contact with them, and contact is nothing but touch. Thus the sense of touch is conterminous with all the senses. It is perpetually connected with the mind which presides over all the external senses. Vācaspatimiśra refers a similar doctrine to some Śāmkhyas who hold that there are seven sense-organs: the tactual organ which is the only organ of knowledge and capable of apprehending various objects like color, etc., five organs of action, and the mind (manas). Gautama also refers to the doctrine that the sense of touch is the only sense-organ and criticizes it. Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara, and others elaborate his arguments. Some hold that the sense of touch is the only sense-organ, since

133 NM., p. 478-481.
134 SSV., ii, 24.
135 śaktināmapindriyatvāt. SPB., ii, 24.
136 Carakasamhitā, Śūtrasthāna, xi, 32.
137 Tanmātrameva hi buddhīndriyamanekarūpagrahaṇasamarthamekam. Bhāmaṭi, ii, 2, 10.
138 NS., iii, 1, 52-7.
all the seats (adhiṣṭhāna) of sense-organs are pervaded by the tactual organ, so that in the presence of the sense of touch there is perception and in its absence there is no perception at all. So the tactual organ is the only sense-organ.\textsuperscript{143}

This doctrine cannot be maintained on the following grounds. It contradicts the facts of actual experience. If the tactual organ were the only sense-organ, it would be able to apprehend all sensible objects, so that colour would be perceived by the blind, sound by the deaf, and so forth. But, as a matter of fact, the blind can never see colour, the deaf can never hear sound, and so on. Hence the tactual organ is not the only sense-organ.\textsuperscript{144}

But it may be urged that the various sense-organs are only special parts of the tactual organ, which is the only sense-organ. The different kinds of sensible objects are perceived through its different parts, so that when these particular parts are destroyed we cannot perceive the corresponding objects. The blind fail to see colours because the particular part of the tactual organ which was located in the eye and was the means of colour-perception has been destroyed. The deaf cannot hear sounds because the particular part of the tactual organ which was located in the ear-hole and was the means of sound-perception has been destroyed. This view is self-contradictory. If the perception of colours, sounds, etc., is held to be brought about by different parts of the tactual organ, then it contradicts the doctrine that the tactual organ is the only sense-organ. Are the so-called special parts of the tactual organ of the nature of sense-organs or not? If they are, then there are many sense-organs, and the doctrine of a single sense-organ falls to the ground. If they are not, then colours, sounds, etc., cannot be regarded as perceptible by the senses.\textsuperscript{145}

The hypothesis of a single sense-organ with different parts endowed with different powers amounts to the assumption of many sense-organs.\textsuperscript{146} Further, the tactual organ cannot be regarded as the only sense-organ because, in that case, there would be simultaneous perception of colour, sound, and the like. The soul would come into contact with the mind, the mind with the single sense of touch, and the tactual organ with colour, sound, etc. Thus there would be simultaneous perception of them all. But it is not a fact of experience. Colour, sound, etc., are never

\textsuperscript{143} \textit{NBh.}, iii, 1, 52.
\textsuperscript{144} \textit{NV.}, pp. 389-390.
\textsuperscript{145} \textit{NBh.}, iii, 1, 53.
\textsuperscript{146} \textit{NM.}, p. 482.
perceived at the same time.\textsuperscript{147} Hence there is not a single sense-organ which apprehends all kinds of sensible objects.\textsuperscript{148} Moreover, the doctrine of a single sense-organ involves a contradiction. The tactual organ is \textit{prāpyakāri}; it can apprehend only those objects which it comes into contact with; it cannot apprehend distant objects. But colour and sound can be perceived from a great distance. How, then, can they be perceived through the tactual organ? If they are perceived through it though it does not come into contact with them, it should apprehend touch also without coming into contact with it. Or, if the tactual organ can apprehend touch when it comes into contact with it, it should apprehend colour and sound also when it comes into contact with them. It should not operate on touch, colour, and sound in different ways. But it may be argued that the tactual organ is \textit{prāpyakāri} in apprehending touch and \textit{aṇprāpyakāri} in apprehending colour and sound. If the tactual organ can apprehend colour without coming into contact with it, it should perceive hidden as well as unhidden colours, which is not a fact; and the perception of colour near at hand and the non-perception of colour at a distance would remain unexplained.\textsuperscript{149} Moreover, if the sense of touch is the only sense-organ, its derangement or destruction will make all perception impossible.\textsuperscript{150} But, in fact, we find that though one sense-organ is deranged or destroyed, we can perceive through the other sense-organs. Hence there is not a single sense of touch.

\textsuperscript{147} This is the Nyāya View.
\textsuperscript{148} NBh., iii, 1, 57.
\textsuperscript{149} NBh., iii, 1, 57.
\textsuperscript{150} NV., p. 391.
BOOK II

CHAPTER II

INDETERMINATE PERCEPTION AND DETERMINATE PERCEPTION

1. Introduction

The Indian thinkers generally recognize two distinct stages of perception, indeterminate (nirvikalpa) and determinate (savikalpa). The former is the immediate apprehension of the mere form of an object, while the latter is the mediate perception of the object with its different properties and their relations to one another. The former is an undifferentiated and non-relational mode of consciousness devoid of assimilation and discrimination, analysis and synthesis. The latter is a differentiated and relational mode of consciousness involving assimilation and discrimination, analysis and synthesis. The former is purely sensory and presentative, while the latter is presentative-representative. The former is dumb and inarticulate—free from verbal images. The latter is vocal and articulate—dressed in the garb of verbal images. The former is abstract and indeterminate, while the latter is concrete and determinate. The former is what William James calls “knowledge of acquaintance”, and the latter is what he calls “knowledge-about”.

The distinction between indeterminate perception and determinate perception has for centuries engaged the attention of all schools of Indian thinkers, both from the psychological and epistemological points of view. Here we shall attempt a psychological analysis of these two stages of perception from the Indian standpoint. Though almost all the systems of Indian thought recognize the existence of indeterminate perception and determinate perception, they hold slightly different views on the nature of these two types of perception.

According to Sāṅkārā, indeterminate perception apprehends the mere “Being”; it can apprehend neither an individual object nor its properties; it is absolutely indeterminate. According to the Buddhists, perception is always indeterminate; there is no determinate perception; the so-called determinate perception is
not perceptual in character. Indeterminate perception apprehends the specific individuality of an object (sva lakṣaṇa) devoid of its generic character and other qualifications. Kumārila, the founder of the Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā, holds that indeterminate perception apprehends the individual (vyakti), which is the substrate of its generic character (sāmānyya) and specific character (viśeṣa). Prabhākara, the founder of the Prabhākara school of Mīmāṃsā, holds that indeterminate perception apprehends both the generic character and the specific character of its object as an undistinguishable mass. Pārthaśāratimīśra, a follower of Kumārila, holds that indeterminate perception is the immediate apprehension of an object with its multiform properties such as generality, substantiality, quality, action, and name, but not as related to each other. Vācaspatimīśra represents the Sāmkhya view of indeterminate perception as the simple apprehension of an object, pure and simple, unqualified by its properties. The earlier Vaiśešikas hold that indeterminate perception is the immediate cognition of the generic and specific characters of its object undifferentiated from each other. The earlier Naiyāyikas hold that there is no difference between indeterminate perception and determinate perception except that the former does not apprehend the name of its object. Both of them apprehend substantiality, generality, action, and quality. The later Nyāya-Vaiśešika holds that indeterminate perception apprehends an object and its properties as unrelated to each other. The Neo-Sāmkarite also holds that indeterminate perception is the non-relational apprehension of an object which is not necessarily sensuous in character. Rāmānuja holds a different view. He regards indeterminate perception as relational apprehension which apprehends the first individual of a class with its generic character in the shape of a structure (samsthāna) and also its relation to the individual. Thus most of the schools of Indian philosophers admit the existence of indeterminate perception, though they hold different views as to its nature and object. But Madhva and Vallabha, the founders of minor schools of Vaiśešika, deny the existence of indeterminate perception. They regard all perception as determinate. The Śābdikas also hold the same view. They hold that there can be no thought without language, and hence no nameless, indeterminate perception. No one denies the existence of determinate perception; only the Buddhist holds that the so-called
determinate perception is not perceptual in character. We shall consider these different views in detail.

2. The Different Views

According to Śaṅkara, indeterminate perception cannot apprehend any qualifications whatsoever. It cannot apprehend even an object (e.g. mere jar, ghaṭa), and its generic nature (e.g. mere jariness, ghaṭatva) unrelated to each other, as some hold; for the apprehension of these qualifications presupposes the apprehension of their difference, and difference means mutual non-existence, which is not apprehended even by determinate perception. So it can never be apprehended by indeterminate perception. Non-existence is apprehended by non-perception (anupalabdhī). Hence indeterminate perception apprehends the mere undifferentiated "Being" (sattā), which is identical with universal consciousness. Thus Śaṅkara regards indeterminate perception as absolutely indeterminate or devoid of all determinations. It neither apprehends an individual object nor its qualities; it merely apprehends "Being" or existence (sannātavāśayam).¹

Some hold that indeterminate perception apprehends an object (viśeṣya) and its qualifications (viśeṣāṇa) but not their relations to each other. But the Buddhist holds that indeterminate perception does not at all apprehend the qualifications of its object, viz. generality, substantiality, quality, action, and name. They are the forms of thought (vikalpa). Perception is always presentative and hence indeterminate; it is free from all forms and determinations. It merely apprehends the specific individuality of its object (svaṇāṣaṇā) devoid of all qualifications.² The so-called determinate perception is not perceptual in character, since it is a presentative-representative process and not produced by peripheral stimulation alone. The recollection of a name intervenes between the purely sensory presentation of an object and the determinate cognition of it as qualified by its name. So the determinate cognition of a qualified object cannot be regarded as a perceptual process.³ Thus the Buddhist agrees with Śaṅkara in holding that indeterminate perception cannot apprehend the qualifications of its object. But he differs from Śaṅkara in so far as he holds that

¹ SD., pp. 126-7.
² NM., p. 92; SDP., p. 139.
³ PP., p. 49.
indeterminate perception does not apprehend the mere "Being", but the specific individuality of an object. Hence the indeterminate perception of the Buddhists is more determinate than that of Śaṅkara.

Kumārila, a Mīmāṁsaka, holds that immediately after peripheral stimulation there is an undefined and indeterminate perception of an object, pure and simple, similar to the simple apprehension of a baby or a dumb person. It arises purely out of the object itself (suddhavastuja). It apprehends only an individual object which is the substratum of generic and specific characters. Even in indeterminate perception there is the apprehension of an object in its two-fold aspect, generic and specific; but there is no distinct apprehension of the generic character as generic, and the specific character as specific. But is it not self-contradictory to say that indeterminate perception apprehends an object, in its two-fold aspect, generic and specific, but yet it cannot apprehend its generic character as generic and specific character as specific? Kumārila points out that there is no contradiction here. The generic character is common to many individuals. The specific character is peculiar to one individual. The former is inclusive, while the latter is exclusive. Inclusiveness of the generic character and exclusiveness of the specific character are not apprehended by indeterminate perception, since it apprehends only one individual. It cannot apprehend its object as specific, since it cannot distinguish it from other objects: nor can it apprehend its object as generic, since it cannot assimilate it to other objects. It apprehends an object, pure and simple, not as qualified by its generic and specific characters. They qualify the object of indeterminate perception, which is their substratum, but they are not apprehended by it as qualifying its object. All that Kumārila means by mentioning the two-fold aspect of the object of indeterminate perception is to define the character of the object, and to emphasize that its object has a two-fold aspect, generic and specific.

Prabhākara, a Mīmāṁsaka, holds that indeterminate perception apprehends not merely the individual object, which is the substrate of its generic and specific characters, but it apprehends also the generic and specific characters of its object without

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4 Na viśeṣo na sāmānyam tadānīmanubhūyate. Tayorādhārabhūṭa tu vyaktirevāvasīyate.—ŚV., Sūtra, iv, 113. See also Sūtra, iv, 112, and 118, and NR.
apprehending their distinction. It is not an object of inference; it is felt as perception. The Buddhist is wrong in holding that indeterminate perception apprehends merely the specific individuality (śvalaksana), since we are distinctively conscious of the generic character (jāti) in it. Śaṅkara also is wrong in holding that it apprehends merely the generic character (sāmānyamātra), since we are distinctively conscious of the specific character in it. It apprehends the bare nature (svarūpamātra) of the generic character or community and the specific character or particularity but not their distinction from each other. Community (sāmānya) is inclusive (anugata) in character; it is common to many individuals; and particularity (vīśeṣa) is exclusive (vyavṛtta) in character; it is confined to a particular individual. The former is the ground of assimilation, and the latter, of discrimination. Indeterminate perception is the immediate apprehension of an object with its generic and specific characters. But since it is devoid of assimilation and discrimination, it cannot distinguish the two from each other and apprehend the object as belonging to a definite class. Indeterminate perception does not involve assimilation, discrimination, recollection, and recognition.

But how is it that the generic character and the specific character of an object are apprehended by indeterminate perception, but not their distinction? Prabhākara replies that the apprehension of two different objects does not necessarily imply the apprehension of their difference; that the apprehension of the difference between two objects involves an additional factor, viz. the apprehension of the distinctive characters of both these objects. Though indeterminate perception apprehends both the generic and specific characters of its object, it cannot apprehend the difference between the two, because, having a single individual for its object, it cannot apprehend their distinctive characters, viz. inclusiveness and exclusiveness respectively.

But determinate perception apprehends the generic character of its object as generic and its specific character as specific, because it assimilates its object to other like objects and distinguishes it from other unlike objects. But it may be objected that in determinate perception also only one individual object is present to a sense-organ. Hence determinate perception also cannot apprehend the generic character as generic and the specific character
as specific, since it presupposes an apprehension of other like and unlike objects which are not present to the sense-organ. Prabhākara gives this reply. The sense-organs, being material and unconscious, cannot apprehend objects; nor can cognitions by themselves apprehend objects; it is the self which apprehends all that can be apprehended. And after indeterminate perception of an object the self remembers some other objects of the same class, from which it differs in some respects, and which it resembles in others, by reviving the subconscious impressions of previous perceptions of these objects. And thus the self comes to have a determinate perception of an object as belonging to a particular class. Indeterminate perception apprehends the bare nature of the generic and specific characters but not the difference between them. But determinate perception distinguishes them from each other and apprehends its object as qualified by them. It apprehends the qualified object and the qualifying properties in the subject-predicate relation.

Pārthasārathiṇīśra, a follower of Kumārila, holds a slightly different view. Kumārila holds that indeterminate perception apprehends an individual object (vyakti) in which the generic character (sāmānyā) and the specific character (vīśeṣa) subsist. Prabhākara holds that indeterminate perception apprehends both the generic character and the specific character of its object but not their distinction from each other. Pārthasārathiṇīśra holds that indeterminate perception is an undifferentiated and non-relational apprehension of an object with its multiple forms and properties, viz. genus, substance, quality, action, and name. Determinate perception breaks up this undifferentiated sensory matrix into its component factors, viz. the qualified object and its qualifying properties, differentiates them from and relates them to each other, and integrates them into the unity of a determinate percept. It apprehends an object as belonging to a particular class (e.g. 'this is a cow'), as being qualified by a particular substance (e.g. 'this is with a staff'), as being endowed with a particular quality (e.g. 'this

PP., pp. 54-5.
Sāmānyavīśeṣau dve vastunī pratīpadyamānām pratyakṣaṁ pratha-
mamuttapadyate . . . Savikalpanu tatr̥ṭhabhāvī te eva vastunī sāmānyavīśe-
ṣātmanā pratīpadyate. PP., p. 54 and p. 55.
Nirvikalpaṁ maneṅkākaṁ vastu sammughdham gr̥ñāti, savikalpakaṁ 
vekaiṅkākaṁ jātyādikam vivicya viṣayikaroti. ŚD., p. 140.
is white'), as doing a particular action (e.g. 'this is going'), and as bearing a particular name (e.g. 'this is Dittha').

Gāgā Bhaṭṭa also holds a similar view. He defines indeterminate perception as the apprehension of an object and its properties as unrelated to each other. For instance, it apprehends a jar (ghaṭa) and its generic character (ghaṭatva), but not as related to each other. It does not apprehend its object as a qualified substance and its generic character as its qualifying property. Just after the contact of an object with a sense-organ there is the apprehension of the mere individual object in which the generic character and the specific character are not yet differentiated from each other. Gāgā Bhaṭṭa's view resembles that of Viśvanātha, who holds that indeterminate perception apprehends an object (ghaṭa) and its generic character (ghaṭatva) as unrelated to each other. It also resembles the view of Prabhākara, who holds that indeterminate perception apprehends an object in which the generic character (sāmānyā) and the specific character (viśeṣa) are not distinguished from each other.

Gāgā Bhaṭṭa holds that indeterminate perception is a distinct apprehension that there is something. Some hold that indeterminate perception is an object of inference. It is inferred from the determinate perception of a qualified object, which presupposes indeterminate perception of its qualifying properties. Others hold that there is no need of assuming the existence of indeterminate perception to account for determinate perception: that the intercourse of an object and its qualifications with the sense-organs is the condition of determinate perception. The indeterminate perception of qualifications is not the condition of the determinate perception of a qualified object. Gāgā Bhaṭṭa holds that indeterminate perception is a distinct psychological process, which apprehends an undifferentiated mass of many properties which are not related to the object in the subject-predicate relation. Gāgā Bhaṭṭa defines determinate perception as the apprehension of a qualified object, its qualifications, and the relation between the two. This definition closely resembles that of Nilakanṭha. Gāgā Bhaṭṭa accepts the Neo-Naiyāyika definition of determinate perception. Like Pārthasārathimīśra, he

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8 SD., pp. 139-140.
9 Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi, p. 21.
divides determinate perception into five kinds, according as it apprehends an object as qualified by a genus, a substance, an attribute, an action, and a name. These are the views of the Mīmāṁsāsakas.

Aniruddha maintains that perception is of two kinds, indeterminate and determinate. The Buddhists do not recognize determinate perception. They define perception as a non-erroneous cognition free from imagination (kālpanā). Imagination is the apprehension of an object as associated with name, class, and other vikalpas or categories. And the so-called determinate perception involves such factors of imagination. So it cannot be regarded as perception. Perception is entirely free from imagination.

Aniruddha criticizes the Buddhist theory of perception. He urges that the Buddhist definition of perception is wrong. Perception is direct and immediate apprehension of an object. It is produced by conditions of direct and immediate knowledge, not vitiated by any defect. And this direct apprehension or perception is either indeterminate or determinate. Indeterminate perception is the immediate apprehension of an object free from all association of name, class, and the like. It is purely presentative in character. It is free from representative elements. But determinate perception is a presentative-representative process. It involves the recollection of name, class, etc., of the object, which were perceived in the past and are brought back to consciousness by the law of similarity. The visual perception of an object reminds us of its name heard in the past; it reminds us of the class to which it belongs, and so on. And this visual perception of an object as having a particular name, and belonging to a particular class, is called by a special name, viz. determinate perception, because it contains an additional factor of representation of name and class. The Buddhists may argue that the so-called determinate perception involves an element of representation, and so cannot be regarded as perception. But Aniruddha contends that the representative element does no harm to the conditions of perception, nor does it in any way vitiate the perceptual character of the cognition. The name of an object revived

11 Bhāṭṭacintāmani, p. 21.
12 Aduṭṭhasākaśkāripamājanakāmagrījanitāṁ pratyakṣam. SSV., i, 89.
13 SSV., i, 89.
in memory by the visual perception of it does not vitiate the perceptual character of the determinate cognition. A name is an arbitrary mark of an object. It cannot obscure its intrinsic character. So the determinate perception of an object as bearing a particular name can apprehend its real nature, though it involves the recollection of its name.

Vācaśpatimiśra recognizes the distinction between indeterminate and determinate perception. He defines indeterminate perception as the first act of immediate cognition which apprehends an object, pure and simple, devoid of the relationship between the qualified object and its qualifications. And he defines determinate perception as the definite cognition of an object as qualified by its generic character, specific character, and other properties. Indeterminate perception is the function of the external senses; they give us a non-relational apprehension of an object unqualified by its properties. Determinate perception is the function of manas or the central sensory. It distinguishes the generic character from the specific character, and apprehends its object as qualified by them. The external senses are the organs of indeterminate perception, while manas is the organ of determinate perception. The external senses apprehend an object as merely 'this', not as 'like this' or 'unlike this'. Assimilation and discrimination which are involved in determinate perception are the functions of mānas.

Vijñānavādīn also distinguishes between indeterminate and determinate perception. But his view is slightly different from that of Vācaśpati. According to Vācaśpati, we have indeterminate perception through the external senses, which give us only an unconnected mass of presentations, and then we have determinate perception through the internal organ of manas, which converts it into a concrete object of perception by assimilation and discrimination. Vijñānavādīn, on the other hand, holds that we have both indeterminate and determinate perception through the external senses. Manas does not play any part in determinate perception. Up to the stage of determinate perception the external senses do everything. Assimilation and discrimination, analysis and synthesis are not the functions of manas, but of the external senses. Vijñānavādīn cites the authority of Vyāsa, who holds

14 Sarbābhā hi smaryāmāpī pratyakṣatvam na bādhate. Sam Śāntiḥ sā taṣṭāḥ śi na rūpācchādanakṣamā.—SV., i, 89.
15 STK., 27.
that we perceive an object as endowed with generic and specific characters (sāmānyavīśeṣātmā) through the external senses.\footnote{SPB., ii. 32.}\footnote{Sāmānyavīśeṣajñānotpaṭtvibhaktamālocanamātraṁ pratyakṣaṁ pramā- \nnaṁ asminnaṁ at pramāṇāntaramasti aphalarūpataṁ. Pēh., p. 187.}\footnote{Svarūpaśālocanamātraṁ grahaṇamātraṁ vikalparahitaṁ pratyak-
ṣaṁātramiti yāvat. NK., p. 189.} Vācaspati seems to be in the right. We can hardly ascribe the interpretative processes of assimilation and discrimination to the external senses. They are essentially the functions of manas. These are the Sāmkhya views.

Praśastapada maintains, that just after the intercourse of an object with a sense-organ there is immediate apprehension of the mere form of the object (svarūpamātra). This is indeterminate perception. It apprehends an object with its generic and specific characters, but does not distinguish them from each other. It is the primal stage of perception. It is not the result of any other prior cognition. It is not of the nature of resultant cognition.\footnote{Sāmānyavīśeṣajñānotpaṭtvibhaktamālocanamātraṁ pratyakṣaṁ pramā- \nnaṁ asminnaṁ at pramāṇāntaramasti aphalarūpataṁ. Pēh., p. 187.}

Śrīdhara clearly brings out the characteristics of indeterminate perception. It is the immediate apprehension of the mere form of an object, which is a purely presentative process free from all determinations and representative elements.\footnote{Svarūpaśālocanamātraṁ grahaṇamātraṁ vikalparahitaṁ pratyak-}

It apprehends both the generic character and the specific character of its object as an indistinguishable mass. It does not analyse its object into its component qualities, generic and specific, distinguish them from each other, and combine them together by a synthetic act of apperception. It apprehends its object with its generic and specific characters, but does not apprehend the generic character as generic and the specific character as specific, since it apprehends a single individual belonging to a class, and cannot therefore assimilate it to other like objects, and distinguish it from other unlike objects. Thus both generic and specific characters are apprehended by indeterminate perception, but they are not differentiated from each other and recognized as such. It is only at the stage of determinate perception that the generic and specific characters are distinguished from each other, and the object is recognized as belonging to a definite class. If the generic and specific characters were not apprehended by indeterminate perception, they could not be distinguished from each other by determinate perception. Hence it cannot be denied that indeterminate perception apprehends both common and distinctive features of an object. But it cannot
recognize them as such because it is a purely presentative process, and consequently cannot revive the subconscious impressions of other individuals perceived in the past. It cannot recognize the generic character of its object as common to the whole class, and its distinctive characters as peculiar to it alone, which distinguish it from all other objects of the same class. Thus Śrīdhara’s view is similar to that of Prabhākara.

Śivāditya agrees with Praśastapada and Śrīdhara in his view on the nature of indeterminate and determinate perception. He defines the former as the apprehension of the bare nature of an object (vastusvarūpamātra), and the latter as the apprehension of an object as qualified by its properties (viśiṣṭa). Śaṅkara Miśra also agrees with Śrīdhara in his view of indeterminate and determinate perception. He holds that in the perception of substances, qualities, and actions there is a determinate consciousness of these individual objects as qualified by their generic characters. And this determinate apprehension presupposes an indeterminate apprehension of the individual objects which are qualified and the generic characters which qualify them. And this indeterminate apprehension is produced by the intercourse of the individual objects (viśeṣa) and their generic characters (sāmānaya) with the sense-organs. This is called indeterminate perception. It apprehends both common characters (sāmānaya) and individual characters (viśeṣa) of its object but not the relation between them. It is only at the stage of determinate perception that this relation is apprehended, and a particular substance, quality, or action is recognized as ‘this is a substance’, ‘this is a quality’, or ‘this is an action’. Determinate perception is due to three causes, viz. indeterminate perception of the qualifying properties, intercourse of the qualified object with a sense-organ, and non-apprehension of the absence of connection between the qualified object and its qualifying properties. Thus Śaṅkara Miśra’s view is substantially the same as that of Śrīdhara. These are the views of the Vaiśeṣika philosophers.

Vātsyāyana recognizes a nameless perception which may be called indeterminate perception. An object may be perceived

19 NK., pp. 189-190.
20 VSU., vii, 1, 6.
21 Viśiṣṭajñāne viśeṣaṇajñānaviśeṣyendriyasannikṣerṣatadubhayāsamsargā- ghrasya kāraṇatvāvadharaṇāt. VSU., viii, 1, 2.
even without an apprehension of its name. When an object is perceived along with its name and their relation to each other, it is said to be apprehended by determinate perception. Determinate perception has the same object as indeterminate perception, but it differs from the latter in apprehending an additional factor, viz. the name of its object revived in memory by association. The former is mixed up with the verbal image of the name of its object, while the latter is free from verbal images.  

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa discusses the different views of indeterminate perception. (1) Some (e.g. Buddhists) hold that the object of indeterminate perception is the specific individual (svalakṣaṇa) as distinct from all other homogeneous and heterogeneous objects. (2) Some (e.g. Śaṁkarā) hold that the object of indeterminate perception is Being which is the *summum genus*. (3) Some (e.g. Śābdikās) hold that the object of indeterminate perception is the word denoting the object, which constitutes its essential nature. (4) Others hold that the object of indeterminate perception is a multiform object qualified by the different forms of quality, action, substance, genus, etc.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa criticizes the Buddhist view. If indeterminate perception apprehends only the specific individuality of its object, how do its common features suddenly enter into the determinate cognition? In fact, the consciousness of generality must be already imbedded in indeterminate perception, which is only brought to relief by determinate perception. The consciousness of the class-character must be implicit in indeterminate perception.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa rejects the Vedāntist view. Mere ‘Being’ or existence (*sattā*) cannot be regarded as the object of indeterminate perception. For, if it apprehends the mere being or bare existence of its object, how can its particular features be perceived? The existence of an object can never be perceived apart from its different qualities.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa rejects the Śābdika view on the ground that indeterminate perception can never apprehend the name of its object, since it presupposes the apprehension of the relation of the

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23 NBh., i, 1, 4.
24 Sajātiya-vijātiya-parāvṛttam svalakṣaṇam. NM., p. 97.
25 Mahāsāmānyam sattā. NM., p. 98.
26 Vāgrūpam tattvam. NM., p. 98.
27 Gunakriyādravyajātibhedādīrūṣitam śabalam vastu. NM., p. 98.
28 NM., p. 98.
29 NM., p. 99.
object to its name, and indeterminate perception, being of the
nature of non-relational apprehension, can never apprehend any
relation. Jayanta's criticism will be given in detail later.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa rejects the fourth view also. It is curious to
hold that indeterminate perception has for its objects all the
different qualities taken together, viz. quality, action, substantiality,
generality, etc. They do not always exist in an object. Sometimes
we perceive generality, sometimes substantiality, sometimes action,
sometimes quality, and so on. So the object of indeterminate
perception cannot be regarded as a multiform object with all its
qualifying properties.

According to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, the object of indeterminate per-
ception is essentially the same as that of determinate perception;
the only difference between them lies in the fact that the former
is devoid of all reference to a name30 and hence free from verbal
images, while the latter apprehends the name of its object and is
thus mixed up with verbal images. Both types of perception
apprehend generality, substantiality, quality, and action. But the
former is nameless, dumb and inarticulate, while the latter is vocal
and articulate. Thus determinate perception differs from indeter-
minate perception only in apprehending the name of its object.31

Bhāśarvajñā defines indeterminate perception as apprehen-
sion of the bare nature of an object immediately after peripheral stimu-
lation.32 Thus he agrees with Praśastapāda and Śivāditya. Vāsu-
deva points out that immediately after the intercourse of an object
with a sense-organ there is no recollection of its relation to a name
and other qualifications. So there is only an immediate apprehen-
sion of the mere existence of the object apart from its qualities.
And this is called indeterminate perception.33 Jayasimhasūri
points out that immediately after sense-object-intercourse there is
an immediate apprehension of the bare existence of an object, which
is free from recollection and cognition of time and special prop-
erties. But, it may be argued, as soon as there is the sense-object-
intercourse, determinate perception emerges into consciousness,
and we are not conscious of indeterminate perception arising before
determinate perception; so there is no indeterminate perception.

30 śabdollekhavivarjita. NM., p. 99.
31 NM., p. 99.
32 Vastusvarūpamātrāvabhāsakam nirvikalpakaṁ yathā prathamākṣasan-
nipātajam jñānam. NSār., p. 4.
33 NSPP., p. 15.
But Jayasimhasūri urges that we are not distinctly conscious of indeterminate perception arising before determinate perception in our adult experience because, owing to habit, as soon as indeterminate perception arises, determinate perception supervenes and shuts out the former from our view. This is the reason why, in our adult experience, as soon as we perceive that an object exists we perceive what it is. But we are distinctly conscious of indeterminate perception in perceiving an entirely new object, where habit does not convert indeterminate perception into determinate perception at once.\(^{34}\)

Bhāsarvajñī defines determinate perception as the apprehension of an object qualified by its qualifications such as name, substance, quality, action, genus, and non-existence. The concept of name (sāvinśā) enters into such a determinate perception as 'this is Devadatta'. The concept of substance (dṛṣṭva) enters into such a determinate perception as 'the man is with a stick'. The concept of quality (guṇa) enters into such determinate perception as 'the cloth is white'. The concept of action (karman) enters into such a determinate perception as 'the man is going'. The concept of genus (sāmānyā) enters into such a determinate perception as 'this is a cow'. The concept of non-existence (abhāva) enters into such a determinate perception as 'the ground is without a jar'.\(^{35}\)

According to Varadarāja, indeterminate perception apprehends an object in itself devoid of all qualifications such as name, class, substance, quality, action, and the like; and determinate perception apprehends an object as qualified by these qualifications.\(^{36}\)

Vāsudeva raises an interesting question. What is the organ of determinate perception? Is it the external sense-organs or the internal organ of manas? If the same external sense-organ apprehends the qualified object (viśeṣya) and its qualifications (viśeṣaṇa), then this sense-organ is the organ of determinate perception. But if the qualified object and its qualifications are apprehended by different external sense-organs, then the internal organ or manas should be regarded as the organ of determinate perception. For example, the visual organ is the organ of the determinate perception of a white cloth, because it apprehends the

\(^{34}\) Abhyāsādaśāyāṁ savikalpaśāṣṭātypādinvānitrāvikalpānupalambhe' pyana-
bhāsādaśāyāṁ tasya sputopalambhāt. NTD., p. 86.
\(^{35}\) NSPP., p. 14.
\(^{36}\) TR., p. 60.
cloth as well as its white colour. But the manas is the organ of the determinate perception of an object with a name such as 'this is Devadatta', because 'this' is apprehended by the visual organ which cannot apprehend its name, and because the name is remembered by the manas. The manas also is the organ of the determinate perception of a fragrant flower, because the flower is apprehended by the visual organ, and its fragrance by the olfactory organ. The manas synthesizes the discrete presentations of the flower and its fragrance given by two different sense-organs into the composite percept of a fragrant flower. This is a type of apperception.\(^7\)

Keśavamīśra describes the process of perception as follows. The self comes into contact with the manas. The manas comes into contact with a sense-organ. And the sense-organ comes into contact with an object. The sense-organ can manifest an object when it gets at, and is related to, the object. Then immediately after the sense-object-intercourse there arises an indeterminate perception of an object as 'this is something'. It is the apprehension of the mere existence of the object devoid of all its qualifications such as name, class, and the like. It is followed by determinate perception. It is the apprehension of the object as qualified by name, class, and other qualifications. It apprehends the relation between the qualified object and the qualifications. It connects them together by the subject-predicate relation. Indeterminate perception is vague and abstract. Determinate perception is definite and concrete. The former is the apprehension of an object as something. The latter is the apprehension of an object as having a certain name, as belonging to a certain class, or as having a certain quality.\(^8\)

Keśavamīśra raises an interesting question here. There are three factors in the production of an effect. There is an instrument (karaṇa); there is an operation of the instrument (vyāpīra); and there is a result of the instrument (phala). When a tree is cut by an axe, the axe is the instrument of cutting; the conjunction of the axe with the tree is the operation of the axe; and the cutting of the tree is the result. So in every act of perception there are three factors. When we have indeterminate perception just after sense-object-contact, the sense-organ is the instrument

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\(^7\) NSPP., p. 14.  
\(^8\) TBh., p. 5.
(karana) of indeterminate perception, the sense-object-contact is
the operation (vyapara) or intermediate agency, and indeterminate
perception is the result (phala) of the operation. When we have
determinate perception after indeterminate perception, the sense-
object-intercourse is the instrument (karana), indeterminate per-
ception is the intermediate agency (vyapara), and determinate
perception is the result (phala). When after determinate percep-
tion we perceive that the object ought to be accepted, or rejected,
or neither accepted nor rejected, indeterminate perception is the
instrument (karana), determinate perception is the intermediate
agency (vyapara), and the apprehension of acceptability, rejecta-
bility, or neutrality of the object is the result (phala).38

Gangeśa defines indeterminate perception as the non-relational
apprehension of an object free from all associations of name,
genus, and the like. Viśvanātha elaborates the view of Gangeśa.
He defines indeterminate perception as the apprehension of an
object and its generic character as unrelated to each other imme-
diately after the intercourse of a sense-organ with the object. For
instance, immediately after the contact of a jar with the visual
organ we cannot perceive it as belonging to the class of jars; we
perceive the mere jar (ghaṭa) and mere jarness (genus of jar,
ghaṭatva) without their mutual connection.39 It is only by deter-
minate perception that we can apprehend the relation between an
object and its generic character, and perceive it as belonging to
a particular class.

According to Viśvanātha, indeterminate perception is not an
object of perception. It is a non-relational mode of consciousness.
It apprehends an object and its generic character, but not the
relation between them. It does not apprehend any subject-
predicate relation. And since it is purely non-relational in
character, it cannot be appropriated by the self. A cognition can
be appropriated by the self only when it apprehends a property
(ghaṭatva) as qualifying an object (ghaṭa). For instance, when
the self has the determinate perception of a jar as qualified by its
generic character, it can appropriate it and distinctly apprehend
it as its own experience. Here the cognition of the jar qualifies
the self-appropriated cognition (anuvyavasaya). The jar qualifies

38 TC., vol. i, p. 809.
39 Prathamaṭaḥ ghaṭaghaṭatvavairvaiśtyānavigāhi jñānam jāyate. tadeva
nirvikalpam. SM., 58.
the cognition of the jar. And the generic character of the jar
(ghaṭatva) qualifies the jar. All these qualifications qualify the
self-appropriated determinate perception of the jar. But in
indeterminate perception there is no apprehension of any qualifica-
tion (viśeṣaṇa) as qualifying an object (viśeṣya). Though it appre-
hends an object and its generic character, it does not apprehend
the relation between them. It cannot apprehend the object as
qualified by its generic character. So in indeterminate perception
of a jar its generic character is not the qualification (prakāra) of
consciousness; and unless there is a qualification of consciousness,
it cannot be appropriated by the self and be an object of distinct
apprehension. Indeterminate perception is not an object of per-
ception. It is supersensuous and imperceptible.\(^{41}\)

Annambhaṭṭa defines indeterminate perception as the imme-
diate apprehension of an object with its properties without
apprehending the relation between them.\(^{42}\) He defines determinate
perception as the apprehension of the relation between the qualified
object (viśeṣya) and its qualifications (viśeṣaṇa), viz. name, genus,
and the like.\(^{43}\) Nīlakaṇṭha holds a slightly different view. He holds
that indeterminate perception is the mere apprehension of an object
(viśeṣya), its qualifications (viśeṣaṇa), and the relation of inherence
(samavāya) without their mutual connection. It does not recog-
nize its object as a qualified thing (viśeṣya), its qualifications as
qualifications (viśeṣaṇa), and the relation of inherence as subsisting
between the two. The mutual connection among these elements
is apprehended by determinate perception. Thus unlike Viśvanātha
and Annambhaṭṭa, Nīlakaṇṭha makes the relation of inherence
also an object of indeterminate perception, though not the con-
nection of this relation with the qualified object and the qualifica-
tions.\(^{44}\) But he agrees with them in regarding indeterminate
perception as an immediate sensory presentation of an object.
These are the views of the Naiyāyikas.

Dharmarājādīhvarindra, the author of Vedāntaparibhāṣā, also
holds that indeterminate perception is the immediate apprehen-
sion of an object without apprehending its relations; but it may
not be sensuous in character.\(^{45}\) The cognitions produced by such

\(^{41}\) SM., 58.
\(^{42}\) Viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-sambandhānāvagāhi jñānam. TSD., p. 30.
\(^{43}\) Nāmajāryādiveṣaṇavīšeṣyasambandhāvagāhi jñānam. Ibid., p. 30.
\(^{44}\) TSN., p. 42.
\(^{45}\) Nirvikalpākam tu samsargānāvagāhi jñānam. VP., p. 89.
sentences as 'this is Devadatta', 'that thou art', etc., are indeterminate perceptions. Determinate perception is the relational apprehension of an object such as 'I know the jar'. But how can these cognitions be perceptual in character, since they are not produced by the sense-organs? Are they not verbal cognitions, since they are produced by sentences? Dharmarājādhvarindra argues, the perceptual character of a cognition does not lie in its sensuous origin, but in the identification of the apprehending mode (pramāṇa-caitanya) with the apprehended object (prameyacaitanya), which is capable of being perceived and present at the time of the cognition. And these characteristics of perception are found also in a cognition produced by such a sentence as 'this is Devadatta'. In this case, Devadatta, the apprehended object, is present to the apprehending mental mode which goes out to the object and identifies itself with its object. So the cognition produced by such a sentence as 'this is Devadatta' satisfies all the conditions of perception, and consequently must be regarded as perceptual in character. Likewise, in the cognition produced by such a sentence as 'that thou art', the cognizing self itself becomes the object of cognition so that there is an identification of the apprehending mental mode with the apprehended object. Hence this cognition also must be regarded as perceptual in character. It may be objected: How can the cognition of such a proposition as 'that thou art' be indeterminate in character? Does it not apprehend the relation between the subject and the predicate? Does it not apprehend the meaning of the subject, the meaning of the predicate, and the relation between the two? If it does not apprehend the relation between the two terms of the proposition, it cannot understand the meaning of the proposition. If it apprehends the relation between the two, then it cannot be regarded as an indeterminate perception. Dharmarājādhvarindra argues that it is not necessary to apprehend the meaning of the subject, the meaning of the predicate and the relation between the two to comprehend the meaning of a proposition. If we can understand only the intention of the speaker, we can understand the meaning of a proposition. The import of a proposition, therefore, is not always understood by apprehending the relation between the different parts of the proposition. Moreover, according to the Śāṅkārācārya, the proposition 'that thou art' is

"Śāṅkāyāna-vādī Śāṅkāyāna-vādī "Vaśīśtyātmik vādī jñānam. VP., p. 89."
an analytical proposition; it is not a synthetic proposition as Rāmānuja and Madhva hold. There is no synthetic relation between the subject and the predicate of this proposition; but there is simply an identity of essence or co-essentiality between the subject and the predicate. In this proposition there is no relation of conjunction, inherence, cause and effect, or any other kind of relation; such a proposition is called an *akhandārtha* proposition, the import of which can be understood without apprehending the relations among its different parts. Hence the perception of the import of such a proposition as 'that thou art' does not apprehend the relation between its subject and predicate; and, therefore, it is non-relational or indeterminate.\(^7\) Thus, according to the Neo-Saṅkarite, any non-relational consciousness of a presentative character, in which there is an identification of the apprehending mental mode with the apprehended object, be it produced by the sense-organs or not, must be regarded as an indeterminate perception.\(^8\) This is the Neo-Saṅkarite view.

But Mahādevānanda Sarasvatī differs from other Saṅkarites. He does not recognize the distinction of indeterminate and determinate perception. The Vaiśeṣikas divide perception into two kinds, viz. indeterminate perception and determinate perception, and regard the former as non-relational apprehension and the latter as relational apprehension. But this view is wrong. There is no proof for the existence of nameless indeterminate perception.\(^9\) The Vaiśeṣikas argue that indeterminate perception is inferred from determinate perception as its invariant condition. Determinate perception is the apprehension of an object as qualified by its properties. But there can be no perception of an object as qualified, unless there is already the perception of its qualifying properties, which is indeterminate. This argument is wrong. The determinate perception of a qualified object is not produced by the indeterminate perception of the qualifications but by the intercourse of the qualifications with the sense-organs.\(^8\) So the hypothesis of indeterminate perception is gratuitous. Mahādevānanda’s view resembles the Sābdika view.

According to Rāmānuja, both indeterminate perception and determinate perception apprehend objects affected with difference.

\(^7\) VP., pp. 90-101, and Śikṣāmani. \(^8\) Chapter VIII. ACK., p. 141. \(^8\) Viṣeṣaṇaśaṅkaraśādviśiṣṭajñānopapateḥ. Ibid., p. 141.
Indeterminate perception is not the apprehension of an absolutely unqualified and undifferenced object or mere 'Being', as Śāṅkara holds, nor the apprehension of a qualified object and its qualifications unrelated to each other, as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṁsaka hold, but it consists in the apprehension of an object qualified by some difference or qualification. It can never apprehend an object devoid of all difference or qualifications, but of some qualifications.\(^{61}\) We never perceive an entirely unqualified object, and, moreover, it is impossible; for discrimination is the most fundamental condition of all consciousness, and consequently no consciousness is possible without some distinction. We can never perceive an object without apprehending some special feature of the object, e.g. the particular arrangement of its parts (samsthāṇa-viṣeṣa). We can never perceive a cow without apprehending the peculiar arrangement of her parts, e.g. dewlap and the like. Indeterminate perception must apprehend an object qualified by some qualities, e.g. its generic character in the shape of a particular configuration (samsthāṇa) of its parts, etc., because in determinate perception only those qualities which were apprehended by indeterminate perception are remembered and recognized.\(^{62}\) The only difference between indeterminate perception and determinate perception lies in the fact that the former is the perception of the first individual among a number of objects belonging to the same class, while the latter is the perception of the second individual, the third individual, and so on. In the perception of the first cow, there is indeed the apprehension of the class-character of the cow in the shape of her particular configuration, viz. dewlap and the like, but there is no consciousness of this generic character being common to all the cows, since there is no perception of other cows except the first cow in indeterminate perception. But in the perception of the second individual, the third individual, and so on, this generic character is recognized as the common character of the whole class. In the indeterminate perception of the first individual there is an apprehension of its generic character in the shape of a particular arrangement of parts, but it is not recognized as common to the whole class. Thus what was indeterminate in the perception of

\(^{61}\) Nirvikalpamāni nāma kaścidviṣeṣeṇa viyuktasya grahaṇam na sarvaviṣeṣaratibhāsa. R.B., i, 1, 1.

\(^{62}\) Nirvikalpamapi saviveṣaviṣayameva, savikalpake svasminnamohūta-pādārthaviṣeṣātpratīciṣṭhānabhetutvāt. R.B., i, 1, 1.
the first individual of a class becomes determinate in the perception of the second individual, the third individual, and so on. Hence, the former is called indeterminate perception, and the latter, determinate perception. In indeterminate perception there is the apprehension of the generic character in the shape of a particular structure, since an object having a structure (saṁsthānin) can never be perceived apart from its structure (saṁsthāna). In determinate perception we perceive in addition to the object possessing a structure, and the structure itself, the character of the structure as being common to the whole class.53

Veṅkaṭanātha elaborates the view of Rāmānuja. He defines indeterminate perception as perception devoid of recognition, and determinate perception as perception involving recognition. The former is pure perception, while the latter is cognitive perception. The former is a presentative process, while the latter is a presentative-representative process.54 The object of both indeterminate and determinate perception is qualified (viśīṣṭa) or affected with difference. Indeterminate perception does not apprehend an unqualified object as some suppose. We are never conscious of a cognition apprehending an unqualified object. Nor is there a proof for its existence. It is generally held that perceptions of the dumb, babies, and animals are nameless and indeterminate, and apprehend unqualified objects.55 Veṅkaṭanātha admits that these perceptions are indeterminate and devoid of the apprehension of names. But he does not admit that they apprehend unqualified objects. Babies and animals do not, of course, perceive objects as having particular names. But they do perceive them as having certain qualities. They never perceive unqualified objects. They react to different objects in different ways. They appropriate those objects which are beneficial to them, and avoid those which are injurious to them. This clearly proves that they never perceive objects without qualities.

The Naiyāyikas, the Mīmāṁsakas and others hold that indeterminate perception apprehends an unqualified object. But Veṅkaṭanātha asks: Does it apprehend an unqualified object because it does not apprehend the qualifications (viśeṣaṇa), or the

53 R.B., i, 1, 1.
54 Saprtyayamārgapratyakṣam sa víkālapam. Tadrahitam pratyakṣam
nirvikālapam. NP., p. 77.
55 ŚV., iv. 112.
qualified object (viṣeṣya), or the relation between the two (viṣeṣaṇa-viṣeṣyasambandha)? It does apprehend qualifications. We can never have a cognition without an object. An objectless cognition is a logical abstraction. It is never a concrete fact of experience. And no cognition of an object, pure and simple, without qualifications is possible. So indeterminate perception cannot but apprehend objects with their qualifications. In fact, even the Naiyāyika admits that indeterminate perception apprehends objects and their qualifications, but not their relation to each other. But what is the nature of this relation? It is either inherence or svārūpa-sambandha. If it is inherence, as the Naiyāyika supposes, why should he hold that it is apprehended by determinate perception, and not by indeterminate perception? There is nothing to hinder the apprehension of the relation of inherence by indeterminate perception. If it apprehends the qualified object (dharmin) and the qualifications (dharma) through the sense-organs because of their fitness (yogyaṭā) and intercourse with the sense-organs, it may as well apprehend the relation of inherence between them for the same reason. If the relation cannot be apprehended by indeterminate perception, it can neither be apprehended by determinate perception. The Naiyāyika should not arbitrarily reserve the apprehension of the relation of inherence for determinate perception. If the relation between the qualified object and the qualifications is svārūpa-sambandha, then as soon as indeterminate perception apprehends them it also apprehends the relation between them. Svārūpa-sambandha is not an external relation. It is internal and constitutive. It constitutes the essence of the terms it relates. So as soon as indeterminate perception apprehends the terms of the relation, it also apprehends the relation between them. Thus indeterminate perception apprehends not only the qualified object and the qualifications but also the relation between them. Both indeterminate and determinate perceptions are of the nature of relational consciousness, and apprehend qualified objects. The only difference between them lies in the fact that the former is free from representative elements, while the latter involves memory and recognition.

Indeterminate perception, according to Śaṅkara, is a purely non-relational apprehension which apprehends the mere 'Being'
(sattā). The Buddhist makes it more determinate by regarding the specific individual (svalakṣaṇa) as its object. The indeterminate perception of Kumārila also is more determinate than that of Śaṅkara, since it apprehends an individual object in which the generic character and the specific character subsist. Prabhākara and Śrīdhara make it more determinate, since they make it apprehend the generic character and the specific character as undistinguished from each other. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa makes it more determinate, and regards it as a nameless perception which apprehends generality, quality, action, etc. Pārthasārathimisīra makes it more determinate since he makes it apprehend an object with its multiple forms such as genus, substance, quality, action, and name, but not in subject-predicate relation. The Śaṅkarīte, the Buddhist, the Sāṃkhya, the Mīmāṃsaka, and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika regard indeterminate perception as non-relational apprehension.

But Rāmānuja regards it as relational apprehension, which apprehends the generic character of an object in the shape of a structure (samsthaṇa) and also the relation of the structure to the object itself. Indeterminate perception apprehends an object not devoid of all qualifications but as qualified by some qualifications. It apprehends the relation between its object and some qualifications. Vaiśeṣikīṭha also holds that indeterminate perception apprehends not only the qualified object and its qualifications, but also relation between them. Thus the Rāmānujist does not regard indeterminate perception as a non-relational mode of consciousness, as all others hold, but as a relational experience. This is almost a denial of indeterminate perception. But if the indeterminate perception of the Rāmānujist has a semblance of indeterminateness, Madhva, Vallabha, and Bhaṭṭṛhari deny the possibility of indeterminate perception altogether.

The Madhva Vedāntist regards all perception as determinate. He defines perception as the concrete apprehension of an object with its determinate forms. It is of eight kinds. It may be the apprehension of an object as qualified by a substance, or a quality, or an action, or a name, or generality, or particularity, or inherence, or non-existence. Perception is always concrete and determinate; it is never without any form. The Madhva Vedāntist does not recognize formless, indeterminate, non-relational apprehension.28

The Vallabhite also does not admit the possibility of indeterminate perception. Puruṣottamaśaī Mahārāja, a follower of Vallabha, asserts that all knowledge is determinate. All knowledge is in the form of judgment, and all judgment involves a subject-predicate relation. So perceptual judgment also is a determinate relational consciousness involving a subject-predicate relation. Determinate relational consciousness does not presuppose indeterminate consciousness of the terms of the relation. The consciousness of the terms of the relation is as determinate as the consciousness of the relation. For example, determinate perception of a man with a stick does not presuppose indeterminate perception of the stick, but definite and determinate perception of it. Otherwise the stick can never be used as a term of the relation. Puruṣottamaśaī Mahārāja recognizes two kinds of determinate perception: (1) viśiṣṭabuddhi, and (2) samūhāvalambana. Viśiṣṭabuddhi is the determinate apprehension of an object as qualified by some properties. It may assume another form called viśiṣṭavaiśiṣṭya-buddhi. It is the qualified form of determinate apprehension. It apprehends an object (e.g. man) qualified by a qualification (daṇḍin), which again is qualified by another qualification (daṇḍa). Viśiṣṭavaiśiṣṭya-buddhi is more complex than viśiṣṭabuddhi. Both are determinate and relational consciousness. The former is qualified relational consciousness, while the latter is unqualified relational consciousness. Viśiṣṭabuddhi apprehends the relation between a subject and a predicate. Viśiṣṭavaiśiṣṭya-buddhi apprehends the relation between a subject and a predicate, which, in its turn, involves a subject-predicate relation. Samūnālambanabuddhi is the determinate consciousness of the relation of a qualified object and its qualification, e.g. a man, a stick, and the conjunction between them. It assumes another form. The determinate consciousness of a collection of objects such as a jar, a cloth, and a pillar is qualified form of samūhālambanabuddhi or combining consciousness. It is called viśiṣṭasaṃmūhālambana-buddhi.  

3. The Sābdika denial of Indeterminate Perception

According to Bhartṛhari, an object is identical with its name; so when an object is apprehended, it is apprehended

**PR., p. 9.**

**PR., p. 13.**
along with its name. There can be no thought without language. All cognitions are, as it were, interpenetrated by names. Even children and dumb persons perceive objects along with their names known in their previous births. Hence there can be no nameless or indeterminate perception.\textsuperscript{61} Further, the Śābdikas argue that all practical uses and actions follow upon determinate perceptions; hence there is no need of assuming the existence of indeterminate perception.\textsuperscript{62}

Vācaspatimiśra elaborately criticizes the Śābdi ka doctrine. If objects are identical with their names, as the Śābdi ka holds, are they identical with the eternal sound (śabda Brahma) or with conventional words which are heard? The first alternative is untenable. We never perceive the identity of sensible sounds with the supersensible eternal sound. The second alternative also cannot be maintained. If objects are identical with their names, then children and dumb persons can never perceive objects, since they never perceive names. It is absurd to hold that they perceive the identity of objects with their names heard in their past lives. Moreover, different cognitions are produced by different objects, and not by different names. A visual perception can apprehend only a colour; it can never apprehend a sound or a name. Likewise an auditory perception can apprehend only a sound; it can never apprehend a colour. If an object, say, a colour, were identical with its name, then a blind man would perceive colour through his auditory organ as he perceives its name through it; and a deaf man also would perceive a name through his visual organ as he perceives the object through it. But this is absurd. Hence Vācaspatimiśra concludes that those who have not yet learned the meanings of words, or the relation of words to their objects, must have nameless, indeterminate perception of objects. Even those who are well versed in the meanings of words, have at first a nameless, indeterminate perception of an object, which revives the subconscious impression of its name perceived in the past, and, together with the recollection of the name, forms determinate perception.\textsuperscript{63}

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa wrongly represents the Śābdi ka view of percep-

\textsuperscript{61} Na so'sṭi prayayo loke yaḥ śabdānumgamādiṣte. Anuviddhamiva jñānath sarvah śabdāna gāmyate. VPD., i. 123.
\textsuperscript{62} Vyavāsāyātmakatvena sarvasya vyavahārayayogyatvāt. NK., 189. HIP., I, pp. 474-5.
\textsuperscript{63} NVTT., pp. 63-4. HIP., I, pp. 475-6.
tion and criticizes it. He says that according to some, the object of indeterminate perception is the word or name which constitutes the essence of the object.\textsuperscript{44} Evidently he refers to the Śābdika doctrine here, according to which, all cognitions apprehend objects together with their names; there is no nameless apprehension. Indeterminate perception, which is supposed to be nameless, is impossible. So the Śābdika does not hold that the object of indeterminate perception is the word or name, but he denies the existence of indeterminate perception altogether. However, Jayanta argues that the Śābdika is wrong in holding that all cognitions apprehend objects with their names because they constitute their very essence. Indeterminate perception can never apprehend the name of an object. If we perceive an object through the visual organ, it is absurd to suppose that we perceive also its name through it. A name can never be an object of visual perception. Moreover, we can never comprehend the meaning of a name unless we apprehend the relation between the name and the object denoted by it. There can never be the comprehension of a name, if the relation between the name and its object has not already been apprehended, or if being perceived in the past it is forgotten, or the impression left by the previous perception is not revived. But in indeterminate perception the relation between its object and its name is not apprehended; nor does it revive the name in memory by association. It is a purely non-relational presentative cognition. Hence it cannot apprehend the name of an object.\textsuperscript{45}

Varadarāja also repeats the arguments of Vācaspati and Jayanta. The Śābdika doctrine, that there can be no cognition of an object without its name, contradicts an actual fact of experience. We do perceive an object even without knowing its name. And even if we know the name of an object, at first we perceive the object in itself, apart from its name, just after its contact with a sense-organ, and then remember its name perceived in the past. The object was seen in the past and its name was heard, and the relation between them was perceived. Thus an association was established between the idea of the object and the idea of its name. Now just after peripheral stimulation the object is perceived apart from its name; and then the perception of the object reminds us of its name. And when the name is remembered, the object is

\textsuperscript{44} Vāgrūpam apare tattvam prameyam tasya manvate. NM., p. 98.
\textsuperscript{45} NM., p. 99. HLP., I, pp. 476-7.
perceived as qualified by its name. And this is determinate perception. The recollection of the name is due to no other condition than indeterminate perception of the object apart from its name owing to association and revival of the subconscious impression of the name. Thus determinate perception of an object qualified by its name presupposes indeterminate perception of the object in itself apart from its name.

4. Proof of the Existence of Indeterminate Perception

Pārthasārathiśrīra argues that the denial of indeterminate perception is contradicted by our experience. Just after the contact of an object with the sense-organ we do experience an immediate cognition of an object devoid of all relations, viz. the relation between the qualified and the qualifications, in which there is not yet a differentiation of the generic characters from the specific characters. If there were no indeterminate perception there would be no determinate perception too. For determinate perception is the apprehension of the relation between the qualified object and the qualifying properties, and the apprehension of this relation depends upon the previous perception of the terms of the relation, viz. the qualified object and the qualifications. Unless these are implicitly known together by indeterminate perception they can never be differentiated from, and related to, each other by determinate perception. So indeterminate perception must be the invariable antecedent of determinate perception. In the determinate perception of an object we remember the particular class to which it belongs and the particular name which it bears, which were already apprehended implicitly by indeterminate perception, and refer them to the object present to the sense-organs. If the class and the name were not perceived at all, they could never be remembered. Hence we must admit the existence of indeterminate perception.

The Neo-Naiyāyikas hold that indeterminate perception is not an object of perception. There can be no perception of

44 Saṁjñāinirvikalpakameva sābacarvāt saṁskārodadvadārā pratiyogisamjñāsamṛṣṭihetub. Saśarasāgraḥa on TR., p. 62.
45 TR., pp. 61-2.
46 Pratīṁo hi vayamakṣasannipātanantaramaviviktrasāmānyavideṣavibhāgaṁ saṁmuḍaghaṁ trastragocaramālocananajājanam. SD., p. 125.
47 Vikalpayatā hi purvaunubhūtam jātivedesāṁ saṁjñāvedesāṁ cānumśrtya tena puraḥsthitaṁ vastu vikalpayatavyam. SD., p. 125.
indeterminate perception, because there can be no self-appropriation (anuvyāvasāya) of it. Indeterminate perception is purely non-relational in character; if it were related to the self, it would cease to be non-relational and indeterminate. It can be known only by inference. The determinate perception of an object as qualified by some qualifications presupposes an indeterminate perception of the qualifications of the object, without which there can be no determinate perception. Viśvanātha’s argument has already been given in detail. If it is urged that the perception of the qualifications also is determinate, then it would presuppose the perception of the qualifications of those qualifications and so on ad infinitum. To avoid this infinite regress we must admit that the perception of the qualifications of an object, which is presupposed by the determinate perception of the object as qualified by the qualifications, is indeterminate. Jānakinātha elaborates this argument further. The cognition of a qualified object (viśiṣṭajñāna) presupposes the cognition of qualifications (viśeṣanajñāna), which is its cause. And this cognition is indeterminate. When we have a determinate perception ‘this is a jar’, the jar is perceived as possessed of its generic character. This perceptual judgment presupposes the cognition of the genus of jar (ghaṭatva or jarness). If there were no cognition of the qualification (jarness) there would not be the cognition of the qualified object (e.g. ‘this is a jar’). And when there is the cognition of the mere qualification (jarness), there is not yet the cognition of a qualified object. The apprehension of the qualification is entirely indeterminate. This is indeterminate perception. It is presupposed by determinate perception. It is childish to argue that the determinate cognition of the qualification (jarness) in the past life is the cause of determinate perception of a qualified object in this life, because the cause must be an immediate antecedent of the effect. A cognition in the past life has nothing to do with a cognition in this life. It is also foolish to argue that the divine cognition of the qualification (jarness) is the cause of the determinate perception of the jar, since the two cognitions of the qualified object and the qualification abide in different substrata; they must co-inhere in the same substratum to be related to each other as cause and effect. The cognition of a qualification (e.g. a stick) in one
person is not the cause of the cognition of a qualified object (e.g. a man with a stick) in another person. The determinate recollection of the qualification (jarness) also cannot be the cause of the determinate perception of a qualified object (jar). Even this determinate cognition is not possible without the cognition of qualifications. A determinate cognition is always produced by the cognition of qualifications. And even the determinate recollection is not possible without the previous cognition of qualifications. The recollection of the qualification cannot be indeterminate. There can be no recollection without previous perception. And if there is no determinate perception of the qualification, there can be no recollection of it. Recollection depends upon previous perception. If it depends upon previous recollection, it will lead to infinite regress. Besides, if the qualification is not remembered, the determinate perception of a qualified object is not possible. And the conditions of the determinate perception of a qualified object being absent, and the conditions of the immediate apprehension of the qualifications (e.g. jar and the genus of jar) being present, there is nothing to hinder the production of the immediate apprehension of the qualifications. And this immediate apprehension is called indeterminate perception.\textsuperscript{71}

Let us briefly review the main doctrines of indeterminate and determinate perception. According to the older Naiyāyikas, indeterminate perception is the perception of an object without a name, while determinate perception is the perception of an object together with its name. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa emphasizes this doctrine in unequivocal terms. The object of indeterminate perception is essentially the same as that of determinate perception; the only difference between them lies in the fact that the former apprehends an object without a name, while the latter apprehends an object together with its name; both of them apprehend substance, generality, quality, and action.\textsuperscript{72} But according to Śrīdhara, Prabhākara, Pārthasārathimisra, Neo-Naiyāyikas, and Neo-Śaṅkarites, indeterminate perception is the immediate apprehension of an object and its qualifications without their mutual relation, while determinate perception is the apprehension of an object as qualified by its qualifications with their mutual relations. Indeterminate perception is an undifferentiated and non-relational mode of apprehension, while determinate perception is a relational and discriminative

\textsuperscript{71} NSM., pp. 20-5. \textsuperscript{72} NM., p. 99.
apprehension of an object. In indeterminate perception we are merely conscious of the terms of relations in an object viz. generality, particularity, substantiality, quality, action, etc.; but we are not conscious of the relations among the terms. Indeterminate perception apprehends an object and its qualifications as mere *thats*, and not as *whats*, while determinate perception apprehends them as *whats*. In the language of William James, in indeterminate perception we have a 'knowledge of acquaintance' with the 'bare immediate natures' without their relations, while in determinate perception we have a 'knowledge-about' them and of their relations *inter se*.

5. Proof of the Existence of Determinate Perception

The Buddhists deny the perceptual character of the determinate cognition following upon a peripheral stimulation, and regard indeterminate cognition alone as truly perceptual in character. According to them, perception is always indeterminate; the determinate cognition following upon an indeterminate perception cannot be regarded as perceptual in character, since it depends upon the recollection of the name denoting its object, and not upon the direct contact of an object with a sense-organ. Between peripheral stimulation and the determinate cognition of an object there is an intervening factor of the recollection of the name of the object. The determinate cognition, therefore, is not directly produced by peripheral stimulation but by the recollection of the name of its object; it is not a purely sensory presentation but a complex of a sensory presentation and a memory-image; it is not purely presentative but presentative-representative.73 This objection of the Buddhists is more apparent than real. Peripheral stimulation is the principal cause of the determinate cognition, and the recollection of the name is only an auxiliary cause. Peripheral stimulation by itself cannot produce a determinate cognition; it requires the help of the recollection of the name of the object to bring about a determinate cognition.74 A determinate cognition is produced by peripheral stimulation, for the sense-organ continues to operate at the time of this cognition, and produces a direct presentation of an object. Thus a determinate cognition is perceptual in character, because it is produced by peripheral stimulation which does not cease at the time of the determinate cognition, and because it

73 NK., p. 191.  
74 NK., pp. 191—2.
consists in the direct presentation of an object, which is not possible without peripheral stimulation. Thus, though a determinate cognition apprehends an object connected with a name, it cannot but be regarded as perceptual in character, because it is produced by peripheral stimulation and brings about a direct and distinct manifestation of its object, as an indeterminate cognition does. The Buddhists contend that a determinate cognition is not a direct presentation; that it is an indirect cognition of its object, since it is not directly produced by peripheral stimulation. Sridhara argues: Cognitions are indirect whenever they are not produced by peripheral stimulation or the contact of an object with a sense-organ, as we find in the case of inferential cognitions; but a determinate cognition is produced by peripheral stimulation; hence it cannot be regarded as an indirect cognition. The Buddhists may argue, a cognition is non-perceptual, if it is preceded by recollection, like an inferential cognition; a determinate cognition is preceded by recollection, and hence it is non-perceptual in character. Sridhara criticizes it. If sensuousness is ever perceived, it is perceived only in a determinate cognition, and hence it cannot be denied. And a determinate cognition is perceptual in character, not only because it is produced by peripheral stimulation, and directly manifests an object, but also because we find in it no such factors as inferential mark and so forth as we find in inference.

The Buddhists argue that it is self-contradictory to assert that a cognition is determinate (vikalpa) and, at the same time, a direct presentation (aparokṣavabhāsa). A direct presentation consists in the apprehension of the specific individuality of an object (svaḷakṣaṇa), and the specific individuality is apprehended only by indeterminate perception, and not by determinate cognition. A determinate cognition apprehends an object connected with a word; and because a word is not connected with the specific individuality, being a conventional sign for many objects in general, a determinate cognition cannot apprehend the specific individuality of an object. If a word could denote the specific individuality of an object, it would bring about a direct presentation of it even without the operation of the sense-organs, and we should have a perception

56 Savikalpamapyanuparatendriyavyāpārasya jāyamānamaparokṣavabhāsatvāt pratyakṣaṁe vac. SD., p. 119. See also PP., p. 56.
57 NK., p. 193.
58 NK., p. 191.
of it. But, in fact, it does not bring about a direct presentation. Hence a determinate cognition, too, which apprehends an object connected with a word, cannot apprehend its specific individuality. And because it cannot apprehend the specific individuality of an object, it is not a direct presentation (āparokṣāvabhāsa), and because it is not a direct presentation, it is not a distinct cognition or perception (viśadāvabhāsa). \(^9\) But when we see a cow with our eyes wide open and have a determinate perception such as 'this is a cow', is it not a direct presentation (āparokṣāvabhāsa) or a distinct perception (viśadāvabhāsa)? The Buddhists urge that such a determinate cognition is not really a direct and distinct presentation, but it appears to be so, inasmuch as it borrows a semblance of directness (āparokṣya) and distinctness (vaiṣadya) from its connection with the immediately preceding indeterminate perception, which is a direct and distinct presentation of the specific individuality of its object. \(^8\) If the directness or distinctness of a determinate cognition following upon an indeterminate perception were not derived from its connection with the immediately preceding indeterminate perception—if it were not an adventitious mark of a determinate cognition but its intrinsic character, then even verbal and inferential cognitions too, which are not connected with indeterminate perceptions, would be regarded as direct cognitions because they are determinate cognitions. But they are regarded by none as direct cognitions. Hence only the indeterminate cognition of the specific individual (svaḷakṣaṇa) produced by peripheral stimulation is perceptual in character; the determinate cognition following upon an indeterminate perception cannot be regarded as perceptual in nature, since it contains representative elements and is not of the nature of a direct and distinct cognition. There is only indeterminate perception, and no determinate perception.

Pārthaśārathimśra criticizes the Buddhist view. When we perceive a cow with our eyes wide open, we have a direct apprehension of the cow as a cow; we feel it as a direct presentation. And the directness of this presentation is not an adventitious character of the determinate cognition due to its connection with an indeterminate perception, as the Buddhists suppose, but it is an intrinsic character of the determinate cognition, constituting its essential nature. And it cannot be proved that the directness of the determinate cognition is due to its connection with an indeterminate

\(^9\) SD., pp. 119-120.

\(^8\) SD., p. 121.
perception. The Buddhists labour under a misconception that
directness or indirectness of a cognition is due to the nature of
its object, when they argue that a cognition is direct if it appre-
hends the specific individual, and that a cognition is indirect if
it fails to apprehend the specific individual. Were it so, then
generality (sāmānya) would always be apprehended by an indirect
cognition (e.g. inference), and the specific individual (svalakṣaṇa)
would always be apprehended by a direct cognition or perception.
But, as a matter of fact, we know generality both by perception
and inference, and the specific individual also both by perception
and inference. Even the same object may be apprehended both
by a direct cognition and an indirect cognition; when it is known
through a sense-organ it is known by a direct cognition; and when
it is known through marks of inference, and so forth, it is known
by an indirect cognition. Hence the directness or indirectness of
a cognition is not due to the nature of its object, but to the
instrument of the cognition. If the cognition of an object is
brought about by peripheral stimulation, it is direct, and if it is
produced by words, marks of inference, and so forth, it is indirect.
When a determinate cognition is produced by peripheral stimula-
tion, even with the help of recollection, we must regard it as a
direct cognition or perception, just as an indeterminate cognition
produced by peripheral stimulation is regarded as a direct cogni-
tion or perception. Hence directness is not the special characteris-
tic of indeterminate perception alone, but also of determinate
perception, since both of them are produced by peripheral stimu-
lation. Though determinate perception is not purely presentative
in character, being a complex of presentative and representative
processes, it must be regarded as perceptual in character, because
the presentative element in it preponderates over the representative
element owing to peripheral stimulation. Hence we must admit
that determinate cognition produced by peripheral stimulation is
of the nature of perception.

6. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Analysis of a Definite and Determinate
Perception

We have distinguished between indeterminate perception and
determinate perception. We have found that indeterminate

\[\text{Na hyayam parokṣāparokṣavibhāgo viṣayasatyah.} \text{ SīD., p. 122.}\]
\[\text{SīD., and SīDp., pp. 122-4.}\]
perception is a purely presentative cognition of an object, devoid of assimilation and discrimination, while determinate perception is a complex presentative-representative process, involving a direct perception of an object, and assimilation of it to other like objects, and discrimination of it from other unlike objects reproduced in memory by association. Thus determinate perception involves a presentative element and a representative element. When it is definite and certain, it involves an act of recognition of the particular class to which its object belongs; and it also involves a feeling-tone either pleasant or unpleasant, and also a conative attitude of the self to react to the object for its appropriation or rejection.\footnote{NM., pp. 66-7.}

Some hold that a full-fledged perception involves an element of inference also. According to them, a complete perception involves the following process: (1) At first after the peripheral contact of a sense-organ with an object, e.g. a fruit, we perceive the fruit. (2) Then we remember that this kind of fruit (e.g. kapittha) gave us pleasure in the past. (3) Then after recollection we have a parāmarśajñāna (knowledge that the middle term which is an invariable concomitant of the major term exists in, or is related to, the minor term), such as ‘this fruit belongs to the class of kapitthas’. (4) After this parāmarśajñāna we infer the pleasure-giving property (sukhasādhanatva) of the kapitthā fruit perceived, such as ‘therefore, the fruit perceived must be pleasure-giving’. The process of inference may be shown as follows: All kapitthas are pleasure-giving; the fruit perceived is a kapittha: therefore, the fruit perceived must be pleasure-giving. (5) Then after this act of inference, there is another act of inference such as the following: All pleasure-giving things are acceptable (upādeya); the kapittha perceived is pleasure-giving; therefore, the kapittha perceived is acceptable. And when we have come to know that the fruit perceived is acceptable, the perception of the fruit produced by peripheral stimulation has vanished, and no trace of the perception is left. Therefore a complete act of perception must be regarded as rather an act of inference than an act of perception, inasmuch as the knowledge of the acceptability of the object of perception is the result of inference.\footnote{NM., p. 66.}

Vācaspatimiśra admits that this is the order of the successive steps of a complete perception. At first the perception of the fruit
is produced by the peripheral contact of a sense-organ with the object. Then this perception brings about a recollection of the pleasure-giving property (sukhasādhanaṃsvatāṃ) of this kind of fruit. Then this recollection in co-operation with the intercourse of the sense-organ with the object produces a parāmarsajñāna that ‘this fruit belongs to the class of kapittha’. Then this parāmarsajñāna produces an inferential cognition that ‘this kapittha must be pleasure-giving’. Then this inferential cognition, in co-operation with the sense-object-contact, brings about the perception that ‘this kapittha is acceptable’. Thus, according to Vācaspatimiśra, a complete act of perception involves not only an element of recollection but also an element of inference. But he contends that, on this ground, perception should not be identified with inference because the act of inference involved in a complete perception is not independent of sense-perception produced by peripheral stimulation; that it co-operates with the peripheral contact of a sense-organ with its object to produce the perception that ‘the object perceived is acceptable’. Though recollection and inference are involved in a complete act of perception, they enter as constituent elements into the perceptive process not independently of peripheral stimulation; they always act in co-operation with peripheral excitation or sense-object-contact, and thus produce, after all, a complex perception which involves memory and inference as integral factors. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, whatever mental state is produced by sense-object-intercourse must be regarded as perception, though it involves memory and inference.

Others, however, hold that perception never involves an element of inference. According to them, at first there is a sensuous perception of an object, e.g. a fruit, produced by sense-object-intercourse. Then this perception brings about a recollection that this kind of fruit is pleasure-giving. And when this recollection is produced, the initial perception is destroyed; but when it is being destroyed, it produces a definite knowledge that ‘the fruit perceived is pleasure-giving’. And this knowledge of the pleasurableness of the fruit perceived is nothing but the knowledge of its acceptability, because acceptability is nothing but pleasurableness. Hence there is no parāmarsajñāna, or inference, in an act of perception. What is the use of postulating

10 NM., pp. 66-7.
an element of inference in perception, which is never experienced? Thus, according to some, though perception involves recollection, it does not involve inference. But it may be objected, that pleasurableness of an object cannot be an object of perception, inasmuch as the power of yielding pleasure is imperceptible; that, therefore, pleasurableness of an object is inferred from the knowledge that it belongs to a particular class of pleasurable objects. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa urges that if pleasurableness of an object is known by an inference, then that inference also must be proved by another inference, and so on ad infinitum. In fact, there is no supersensible power (śakti); hence pleasurableness of an object is known by direct perception.

But when we see an object through the eyes, we do not perceive its pleasurableness through the eyes. How, then, can we perceive through the eyes that the fruit is pleasurable? Jayanta Bhaṭṭa replies that pleasurableness of the object is not perceived through the eyes, but through the mind. Thus there is no need of assuming an inference in an act of perception to know the pleasurableness and acceptability of the object of perception.\textsuperscript{67}

\textsuperscript{66} NM., p. 67.
\textsuperscript{67} NM., p. 69; HIP., I, p. 473.
CHAPTER III

THE OBJECTS AND CONDITIONS OF PERCEPTION

1. The Objects of Perception

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika divides perception mainly into two kinds, viz. external perception and internal perception. External perception is derived through the external senses, and internal perception through the mind (manas). External perception is of five kinds, viz. olfactory, gustatory, auditory, visual, and tactual perception. The objects of these different kinds of external perception are respectively the qualities of odour, taste, sound, colour, and touch as well as their generalities and negations. The objects of internal perception are the qualities of pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, cognition, and volition. Substances can be perceived only by the visual organ and the tactual organ; the remaining sense-organs are capable of perceiving qualities only.\(^1\) Let us briefly consider the objects of these different kinds of perceptions.

(1) Olfactory Perception.—Through the olfactory organ we cannot perceive a substance which is the substratum of odour. We have olfactory perception of odour, the genus of odour, the genus of fragrance, and the genus of bad odour. We can never perceive potential or infra-sensible (anudbhūta) odour; we can perceive odour only when it is in an appreciable degree (udbhūta).

(2) Gustatory Perception.—Through the gustatory organ we cannot perceive a substance which is the substratum of taste. We can perceive taste and the genus of taste through the gustatory organ. But we can perceive taste only when it is in an appreciable degree (udbhūta); we cannot perceive inappreciable or unmanifested (anudbhūta) taste.

(3) Auditory Perception.—Through the auditory organ we cannot perceive ākāśa (ether) which is the substrate of sound. We can perceive only sound and the genus of sound through the auditory organ. But we can perceive sound only when it is in an appreciable degree (udbhūta). We cannot perceive unmanifest (anudbhūta) sound.

(4) Visual Perception.—Through the visual organ we perceive not only colours but also

\(^1\) SM., pp. 242-4.
coloured substances. Appreciable colours (*udbhūtarūpa*), substances possessed of appreciable colours, separateness, number, disjunction, conjunction, priority, posteriority, viscidity, liquidity, and magnitude are the objects of visual perception. The movement, the genus, and the inherence existing in visible things are also the objects of visual perception. The conjunction of light with visible objects and appreciable colour are the conditions of visual perception. The heat of summer is infra-visible because it has not an appreciable colour; but it is an object of tactual perception because it has the quality of appreciable touch. (5) **Tactual Perception.**—Through the tactual organ we perceive substances as well as qualities. Appreciable touch (*udbhūtasparśa*) with its genus and substances endued with appreciable touch are the objects of tactual perception. All objects of visual perception other than colour and the genus of colour are the objects of tactual perception. For example, separateness, number, disjunction, conjunction, priority, posteriority, viscidity, fluidity, magnitude and the movements and the universals which subsist in tangible objects are the objects of tactual perception. (6) **Internal Perception.**—Pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, cognition, and volition are the objects of internal perception. They are perceived through the mind (*manas*) along with the genus of pleasure, the genus of pain, etc. The self also is an object of internal perception. The conjunction of the mind with the self is the condition of the perception of the self. The united inherence of the mind in the self is the cause of the perception of the qualities of the self. But according to the older Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the self is not an object of perception but an object of inference; it can be perceived only by the yogin.

There are certain objects which can be perceived through the visual organ and the tactual organ both. Numbers, magnitudes, separateness, conjunction and disjunction, priority and posteriority, motion, viscidity, fluidity, velocity, and their universals are both visible and tangible, if they inhere in substances having appreciable colours. These are invisible and intangible in uncoloured or inappropriate substances.

Thus certain objects, e.g. colour, sound, odour, taste, and

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*S.M., pp. 243-5; also SMD.*
*SM., p. 253.*
*VSU. and VSV., iv, 11-12.*

*See Chapter IV.*
*See Chapter XII.*
touch are perceived through one sense-organ. Certain other objects, e.g. numbers, magnitudes, etc., are perceived through two sense-organs, viz. the visual organ and the tactual organ. Pleasure, pain, etc., are the objects of internal perception. Existence (sattā) and the genus of quality (gunaṭva) are perceived through all the sense-organs.

2. The Condition of Knowledge

According to the later Vaiśeṣika, the condition of knowledge in general is the contact of the mind or central sensory with the tactual organ. But what is the proof of this? In dreamless sleep the mind gives up its connection with the tactual organ, which is aerial in nature, and retires into the nerve of purītak, which is free from air, where it cannot bring about any cognition. But it may be urged that the mind cannot produce cognition in dreamless sleep because there is no condition of cognition at that time. Supposing that the mind brings about cognition in deep sleep, what kind of cognition is produced by it? Does it bring about apprehension (anubhrava) or recollection (smarāṇa)? It cannot bring about perception, since the conditions of perception are absent. There cannot be any visual perception in dreamless sleep, as there is no contact of the visual organ with the mind. For the same reason there cannot be any other kind of external perception. Nor can there be an internal perception, since there are no cognitions at that time, and in the absence of cognitions there cannot be the perception of the self as well. In dreamless sleep there can be no inference, as the knowledge of invariable concomitance is absent; nor can there be analogy as the knowledge of similarity is absent; nor can there be verbal cognition as the knowledge of words is absent. Thus there can be no apprehension in deep sleep, since all the conditions of apprehension are absent. Nor can there be recollection in deep sleep, as there is no suggestive force (udbodhaka) at the time to revive the subconscious traces of previous perceptions. Thus there can be no cognition in deep sleep, either in the form of apprehension or recollection, because the conditions are non-existent. What, then, is the necessity of postulating the contact of the mind with the tactual organ as the general condition of all knowledge? Viśvanātha contends that it

cannot be said that there is no possibility of cognition in deep sleep, for the individual acts of cognition, volition, etc., which are the psychoses immediately preceding deep sleep, can be apprehended during sleep and the self can be perceived in relation to them. And there is no evidence to prove that the psychoses immediately preceding deep sleep are supra-sensible (asindriya); nor is there any evidence to prove that those cognitions which immediately precede deep slumber are indeterminate (nirvikalpa) and hence supra-sensible (asindriya). Hence we must reasonably conclude that there is no cognition in deep slumber, because there is no contact of the mind with the tactual organ at that time, the mind retiring into the nerve of puritat, which is free from air and consequently free from contact with the tactual organ.

But if the contact of the mind with the tactual organ, which is aerial in nature, be regarded as the general condition of all knowledge, then either visual perception and gustatory perception must involve tactual perception, because at the time of visual or gustatory perception there is the contact of the tactual organ (tvak) with an object as well as the contact of the mind with the tactual organ, or there will be no cognition at all, owing to the inhibition of both visual or gustatory perception and tactual perception by each other. To explain this difficulty, some argue, the contact of the mind with the tactual organ is, no doubt, the condition of knowledge in general, but visual perception does not involve tactual perception, because the conditions of visual perception inhibit the emergence of tactual perception. Others, again, suppose that the contact of the mind with the skin (carman) and not with the tactual organ (tvak) is the condition of all knowledge. According to them, the absence of consciousness in deep sleep is due to the absence of the contact of the mind with the skin, and the absence of tactual perception at the time of visual perception is due to the absence of the contact of the mind with the tactual organ, which is aerial in nature, though there is the contact of the mind with the skin.9

3. The General Conditions of External Perception

The older Vaiśeṣikas hold that external perception depends upon the following conditions: (1) The object of external perception

must have extensity (mahattva) or appreciable magnitude. Atoms are imperceptible, because they have no appreciable magnitude. (2) The object of external perception must consist of many substances. It must be a composite of many parts (anekadravyavat). A mote is perceptible but an atom is not, because the former has magnitude while the latter has none. A mote has magnitude because it is composed of many parts. An atom has no magnitude because it does not consist of parts. Therefore, an object, in order to be perceived, must not be a simple, indivisible atom, but a composite substance in which a plurality of substances co-inhere. It must be composed of many parts and consequently it must have an appreciable magnitude.10 (3) The object of perception must have colour (rūpa). The air is made up of many parts, and so it has an appreciable magnitude. But still it is not perceived through the visual organ because it is devoid of the impression of colour. The term 'impression of colour' (rūpasamaskāra) means inherence of colour (rūpasamavāya), or appreciability of colour (rūpodbhava), or non-obscuration of colour (rūpanabhibhava). The light of the eye has colour and magnitude. But it is not visible because there is not appreciable or manifested colour in it. The light of a meteor also has colour and magnitude. But it is not visible in midday because it is obscured by the stronger light of the sun.11

The older Vaiśeṣikas hold that manifest or appreciable colour (udbhūtarūpa) is a necessary condition of every kind of external perception of a substance. But the later Vaiśeṣikas hold that manifest or appreciable colour is the necessary condition of visual perception only, and that manifest or appreciable touch (udbhūtasparśa) is the necessary condition of tactual perception, and so on. This is proved by the double method of agreement in presence and agreement in absence. What, then, is the general condition of all kinds of external perception? Either there is none, or it is the possession of a distinctive quality (viśeṣāguna) other than sound and those which exist in the self. Ether (ākāsa) cannot be an object of sense-perception, though it is endowed with a distinctive quality, viz. sound. The self is not an object of external perception, though it is endowed with the distinctive qualities of pleasure, pain, cognition, desire, aversion, and volition. So the possession of any other distinctive quality than sound and the

10 V.S. and VSU., iv, 1, 6. 11 V.S. and VSU., iv, 1, 7.
qualities of the self may be regarded as the general condition of all kinds of external perception.\textsuperscript{12}

The older Vaiśeṣikas may argue that there is a parsimony of hypotheses, if colour be regarded as the general condition of all kinds of external perception. But, in that case, air would not be an object of tactual perception as it is devoid of colour. If the opponent admits that air cannot be an object of tactual perception, then it may be argued that there is a parsimony of hypotheses even if we suppose that appreciable touch (udbhūtasparśa) is the general condition of all kinds of external perception. If the opponent contends that on this view a ray of light would not be an object of visual perception as it is devoid of appreciable touch, why should we not admit that it cannot be an object of visual perception, just as the opponent admits that air cannot be an object of tactual perception? In fact, just as we perceive a ray of light through our visual organ, so we perceive air through our tactual organ; these are the facts of experience; the tactual perception of air is as much a fact of experience as the visual perception of a ray of light is. So neither colour nor touch is the general condition of all kinds of external perception of substances.\textsuperscript{13}

The later Vaiśeṣikas agree with the older Vaiśeṣikas in holding that extensive magnitude (mahattva) is the general condition of six kinds of perception.\textsuperscript{14} Extensity is the cause of the perception of a substance in consequence of its inherence in it. It is the cause of the perception of the qualities, actions, and generalities inhering in substances in consequence of its inherent-inherence or inherence in the qualities, etc., which inhere in substances. It is the cause of the perception of the genus of quality (gunatva), the genus of actions (karmatva), etc., which inhere in qualities and actions respectively, which, again, inhere in substances in consequence of their inherent-inherent-inherence.\textsuperscript{15} By mahattva we mean proportionate extensity, neither infinite magnitude nor atomic magnitudes. Neither all-pervading ether nor atoms are perceptible.

4. The Conditions of Visual, Tactual, Olfactory, and Gustatory Perceptions

The older Vaiśeṣikas hold that perception of colour depends on two conditions, viz. co-inherence of many substances (anekadra-

\textsuperscript{12} SM., p. 245.
\textsuperscript{13} SM., pp. 245-6.
\textsuperscript{14} BhP., 58.
\textsuperscript{15} SM., p. 256.
vyasamanāya) and particularity of colour (rūpaviśeṣa). We cannot perceive the colour of an atom (paramāṇu) and of a dyad (dvāṇuka), since an atom does not consist of parts, and a dyad is composed of two atoms only. The colour of an atom and a dyad cannot be perceived, because they are not composed of many substances or a plurality of substances do not inhere in them. Perception, therefore, depends on the co-inherence of a plurality of substances in its object. Triads, quadrads and the like are objects of perception. Besides the co-inherence of a plurality of substances (anekadravyasamanāya) there is another condition of the perception of colour, viz. particularity of colour (rūpaviśeṣa). 'Particularity of colour' means particularity abiding in colour. It has three forms, viz. appreciability (udbhūtattva), non-obscurcation (anabhībhūtattva), and the genus of colour (rūpatva). We have no visual perception of taste, touch, etc., because they are devoid of the genus of colour (rūpatva). There can be no visual perception of the light of the eye owing to the absence of appreciability (udbhūtattva). According to Viśvānatha, conjunction with light (āloka-saṃyoga) and appreciable colour (udbhūtarūpa) are the conditions of visual perception.

According to the older Vaiśeṣikas, tactual, olfactory, and gustatory perceptions also depend upon similar conditions. Just as visual perception of colour depends on a particularity of colour (rūpaviśeṣa), that is, on the distinctive qualities of non-obscurcation (anabhībhūtattva), manifestness (udbhūtattva), or the genus of colour (rūpatva), so the gustatory perception of taste depends on a particularity of taste (rasaviśeṣa), i.e. on the peculiar qualities of non-obscurcation, appreciability, and the genus of taste. There are similar conditions also in other kinds of external perception (viz. olfactory and tactual) which also depend upon the co-inhesion of a plurality of substances. Those smells, tastes, and touches are not apprehended, which are infra-sensible to the organs of smell, taste, and touch. In a stone we cannot apprehend smell and taste, because these are inappreciable to the corresponding sense-organs. But in the ashes of a stone we can perceive its smell and taste, because they are there in an appreciable degree. Some hold that we can apprehend the smell and taste of a stone, no doubt, but not distinctly. We cannot perceive the light (tejas)

16 V.S., iv, 1, 8.
17 VSU., iv, 1, 8.
in hot water, since it is inappreciable or obscured by touch. Likewise we cannot perceive the colour, taste, and touch in comminuted camphor, campaka perfume, etc., owing to their inappreciability. In gold the colour is appreciable; but its whiteness and brightness are much obscured.\textsuperscript{19} But it may be urged: Gravity inheres in a composite object made up of many substances, which has thus extensive magnitude and colour; but why is it not perceived through the visual organ? It cannot be perceived because the genus of colour (rūpatva) and appreciability are not existent in gravity. Praśastapāda and others hold that gravity is supra-sensible (ānindriya). But Vallāvācārya holds that gravity is not an object of visual perception, but of tactual perception.\textsuperscript{20}

The Mīmāṁsāka accepts the Vaiśeṣika view of the conditions of perception. Extensive magnitude (mahattva) is the general condition of all kinds of external perception. In the perception of a substance, extensity is a condition through inherence. In the perception of qualities, actions, and universals, it is a condition through inherent-inherence. In the perception of the universals of qualities and actions, it is a condition through inherent-inherent-inherence.\textsuperscript{21} Appreciable colour and the conjunction of light with manifest or unobscured colour are the conditions of visual perception. Some hold that extensive magnitude and manifest or unobscured colour are not the conditions of the visual perception of time. The manifest or appreciable touch is the condition of tactual perception. Colour is not a condition of tactual perception. So air also is an object of tactual perception, though devoid of colour. Manifest colour is not the general condition of every kind of external perception, as the older Vaiśeṣika holds. It is a condition of visual perception only. Some hold that extensity is a condition of internal perception too. Others hold that it is not a condition of internal perception. Some hold that motion is not an object of perception, but an object of inference. Hence extensity is not a condition of the perception of motion, according to them.\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{19} VSU., iv, 1, 9.  
\textsuperscript{20} VSU., iv, 1, 10.  
\textsuperscript{21} See Chapter IV.  
\textsuperscript{22} Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi, p. 21.
BOOK III

CHAPTER IV

PERCEPTION AND SANNIKARŚA

(Or Intercourse of the Sense-organs with their Objects)

1. Introduction

In this Book we shall deal with the different kinds of intercourse of the sense-organs with their objects, acquired perception, and recognition. Perception is presentative knowledge, which depends upon the presentation of an object to the self. And most Indian philosophers are of the opinion that for the presentation of an object it must enter into some sort of relation with a sense-organ. Perception depends upon some sort of intercourse (sannikarśa) or dynamic communion between its object and a particular sense-organ. External perception depends upon the intercourse between external objects and the external sense-organs. And internal perception depends upon the intercourse between the self or its qualities and the internal organ (manas). The objects of perception may be material or spiritual substances (dravya), their qualities (guna), and actions (karma), and their generic characters (jati). These diverse objects of perception must enter into direct or indirect relation with the external sense-organs or the internal organ according to their nature. The Indian philosophers hold the peculiar doctrine that substances alone can enter into direct communion with the appropriate sense-organs; and that the qualities, actions, and communities inhering in them can enter into communion with the sense-organs through the medium of the substances in which they inhere. And the communities of qualities and actions can enter into communion with the sense-organs through the qualities or actions in which they inhere, which, again, inhere in substances. Thus the abstract qualities are related to the concrete qualities which, again, are related to a substance; and a substance alone can have a direct intercourse with a sense-organ. Thus some sort of direct or indirect relation-
must be established between the perceptible objects and the appropriate sense-organs. In all kinds of perception the objects must be directly or indirectly presented to consciousness. Let us discuss the different views in connection with the intercourse of the sense-organs with their objects.

2. The Earlier Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika

According to the earlier Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, perception depends upon the intercourse (sannikāraṇa) of the sense-organs with their objects. Sannikāraṇa is the function of the sense-organs by means of which they enter into a particular relation with their appropriate objects and bring about the perception of the objects. This intercourse between the sense-organs and their objects is of six kinds so far as our ordinary perception is concerned, viz. (1) union (samyoga), (2) united-inherence (samyuktā-samavāya), (3) united-inherent-inherence (samyuktā-samaveta-samavāya), (4) inherence (samavāya), (5) inherent-inherence (samaveta-samavāya), and (6) the relation of qualification and the qualified (viṣeṣaṇatā). These different kinds of sense-object-intercourse (indriyārtha-sannikāraṇa) are illustrated in the following examples. (1) Union (samyoga). The perception of a substance (dravya) is due to its union with a sense-organ. For instance, in the visual perception of a jar there is a union of the visual organ with the jar.1 The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika does not hold with the western psychologists that a substance is perceived through its qualities. He holds a contrary view. According to him, qualities are perceived through the substances in which they inhere. (2) United-inherence or inherence in that which is in union (samyuktā-samavāya). The perception of a quality or an action is due to its inherence in a substance which is in union with a sense-organ. For instance, in the visual perception of the colour of a jar there is a union of the visual organ with the jar in which colour inhere. (3) United-inherent-inherence, i.e. inherence in that which inheres in what is in union (samyuktā-samaveta-samavāya). For instance, in the visual perception of the generic character of the colour (rūpaevā) of a jar, there is a union of the visual organ with the jar in which inheres colour in which again inheres the generic character of colour.

1 A ray of light goes out of the visual organ to the object and comes into contact with it. See Chapter I.
(4) Inherence (samavāya). For instance, in the auditory perception of sound there is the inherence of sound in the sense-organ, viz. the ear-drum which is pervaded by ākāśa (ether), the substratum of sound. (5) Inherent-inherence, i.e. inherence in that which inheres in a sense-organ (samaveta-samavāya). For instance, in the auditory perception of the generic character of sound (sabdāvata) there is the inherence of the generic nature of sound in sound which again inheres in ākāśa (ether) of the ear-drum. (6) The relation of qualification and the qualified (viśeṣanatā or viśeṣya-viśeṣana-sambandha). For instance, in the perception of the absence of a jar on the ground, there is a union of the visual organ with the ground which is qualified by the absence of the jar. According to the Naiyāyika, inherence (samavāya) and negation (abhāva) are perceived through this kind of intercourse. But, according to the Vaiśeṣika, inherence is not an object of perception; it is an object of inference. So, according to him, negation alone can be perceived through this kind of intercourse. \(^3\)

"All that is the object of perception must fall within one or other of these modes of contact. The divergence of modes rests on ontological theories: the eye, for instance, as a substance can come into direct conjunction with another substance, but only indirectly with colour which inheres in that substance, and at a further remove with the class concept which inheres in the colour which inheres in the object with which the eye is in conjunction." \(^3\)

The last kind of the sense-object-intercourse, i.e. viśeṣanatā is of several kinds. (i) Samyukta-viśeṣanatā. For instance, the visual perception of the absence of a jar on the ground is due to its qualifying the ground which is in direct contact with the visual organ. Thus a negation also must directly or indirectly enter into relation with a substance which is in direct contact with a sense-organ. (ii) Samyukta-samaveta-viśeṣanatā. For instance, the perception of the absence of taste in colour is due to its qualifying that which inheres in something in contact with a sense-organ. Here, the absence of taste qualifies colour; colour inheres in a substance; and the substance is in direct conjunction with a sense-organ. (iii) Samyukta-samaveta-samaveta-viśeṣanatā. For instance, the perception of the absence of colour in the generic nature of number is due to its qualifying that which inheres in something inhering in that which is in direct contact with a

\(^3\) H.I.L., p. 412.  
\(^3\) L.L.A., p. 75.
sense-organ. The absence of colour qualifies the generic nature of number; the generic nature of number inhere in number; number inhere in a substance, and the substance is in direct conjunction with a sense-organ. (iv) Saṁyukta-samaveta-viśeṣaṁatā. For instance, the perception of the absence of rasatva or the generic nature of taste in rūpattva or the generic nature of colour is due to its qualifying the qualification existing in something inhere in that which is in conjunction with a sense-organ.

(v) Viśeṣaṁatā. For instance, the perception of the absence of sound is due to its qualifying the sense-organ, viz. the ear-drum pervaded by ākāśa (ether) which is the substratum of sound. (vi) Samaveta-viśeṣaṁatā. For instance, the perception of the absence of the sound ‘kha’ in the sound ‘ka’ is due to its qualifying that which inhere in the sense-organ, viz. the ear-drum. The absence of the sound ‘kha’ qualifies the sound ‘ka’ which inhere in the ether of the ear-drum. (vii) Saṁaveta-saṁaveta-viśeṣaṁatā. For instance, the perception of the absence of ‘khatva’ (the generic nature of the sound ‘kha’) in ‘gatva’ (the generic nature of the sound ‘ga’) is due to its qualifying that which inhere in something inhere in a sense-organ. Here the absence of ‘khatva’ qualifies ‘gatva’; ‘gatva’ inhere in ‘ga’; and the sound ‘ga’ inhere in the ether of the ear-drum. (viii) Viśeṣaṁ-viśeṣaṁatā. For instance, the perception of the absence of ‘gatva’ in the absence of ‘katva’ is due to its qualifying that which qualifies a sense-organ. The absence of ‘gatva’ qualifies the absence of ‘katva’; the absence of ‘katva’ qualifies the ether of the ear-drum. (ix) Saṁyukta-viśeṣaṁa-viśeṣaṁatā. For instance, the perception of the absence of a cloth from the absence of a jar is due to its qualifying that which qualifies something in conjunction with a sense-organ. The absence of a cloth qualifies the absence of a jar; the absence of a jar qualifies the ground; and the ground is in conjunction with the visual organ.

Some people regard either union (conjunction) or inherence only as the cause of perception; and deny the intervening relationships described above. But, the earlier Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika generally admits six kinds of intercourse between the sense-organs and their objects, viz. union, united-inherence, united-inherent-inherence, inherence, inherent-inherence, and the relation of the

4 NK., p. 195.
qualified and the qualification. Substances are perceived through the first kind of *sannikarśa*; qualities, actions, etc., through the second; the genus of qualities, through the third; sound, through the fourth; the genus of sound, through the fifth; and the absence of a substance, through the sixth. All objects of perception must depend upon one or other of these kinds of sense-object-intercourse.

3. *The Later Nyāya-Vaiṣeṣika or the Neo-Naiyāyika (alaukika sannikarśa)*

In addition to the above six kinds of intercourse, which are called ordinary intercourse (*laukika sannikarśa*), the Neo-Naiyāyikas recognize three other kinds of extraordinary intercourse (*alaukika-sannikarśa*) between the sense-organs and their objects. Ordinary sensuous perception depends upon one of the six kinds of ordinary intercourse between an external or internal sense-organ and its object. But super-sensuous perception is not produced by any of these six kinds of ordinary intercourse; it is produced by an extraordinary intercourse. The extraordinary intercourse is of three kinds: (1) the intercourse (with all individual objects of a particular class) through their generic character (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-sannikarśa*), which brings about the perception of these individual objects at all times and places; (2) the intercourse (with an object not present to a sense-organ) through its idea revived in memory (*jñāna-lakṣaṇa-sannikarśa*) which brings about an indirect perception of that object; (3) the intercourse with remote, subtle, past, and future objects produced by meditation (*yogaja-sannikarśa*), which brings about the perception of these objects. Let us explain these different kinds of extraordinary intercourse. (i) *The Intercourse through the Knowledge of Generic Character (Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-sannikarśa)*. Sometimes through the knowledge of the generic nature of an individual we perceive all other individuals of that kind at all times and all places, which are possessed of the same generic nature. In such a case, the knowledge of the generic nature (*sāmānya*) of an object constitutes the extraordinary intercourse. When, for instance, we see a particular case of smoke with the visual organ, and perceive its generic character (*dhūmatva*), we have a perception of smoke of

*NK*, p. 195.
all times and all places. In this perception there is an ordinary intercourse, viz. union (saṁyoga) between the visual organ and the particular case of smoke, and there is an ordinary intercourse, viz. united-inherence (saṁyuktasamavāya) between the visual organ and the generic character of this smoke; but the intercourse between the visual organ and all cases of smoke of all times and all places is not an ordinary one; it is an extraordinary intercourse because there cannot be an ordinary intercourse of the visual organ with all cases of smoke of all times and all places. The extraordinary intercourse consists here in the knowledge of the generic character of smoke (dhūmatva), which is possessed by all cases of smoke of all times and all places. This kind of intercourse, which consists in the knowledge of a generic character, is called an extraordinary intercourse through the knowledge of a generic character (saṁānya-lakṣaṇa-sannikarṣa).

But what is the use of admitting such an extraordinary perception of all the objects at all times and all places possessed of a generic character, and for that reason, an extraordinary intercourse of the sense-organs with their objects? The following reply is given. The connection between a particular case of smoke and fire was perceived in a kitchen, but not the connection between all cases of smoke and fire, since all other cases of smoke were unperceived at the time; and, if all cases of smoke and all cases of fire were not perceived through an extraordinary intercourse, then there would not arise any doubt whether all cases of smoke are accompanied by fire; and, unless there is such a doubt, there can be no inference that this case of smoke is attended by fire, which removes the doubt. According to Viśvanātha, when all cases of smoke are brought to consciousness through their generic character (e.g. dhūmatva), which is perceived owing to its inheritance in the smoke which is in conjunction with the visual organ, there arises a doubt in us as to the invariable concomitance between fire and the cases of smoke in other times and places, which are not in direct contact with the visual organ. It may be objected that if there were an extraordinary intercourse with all objects through the knowledge of their generic character, we should become omniscient, inasmuch as in perceiving an object of knowledge (prameya) we could perceive, through the knowledge of its generic character (prameyatva), all objects of knowledge of all times and places. But Viśvanātha urges that though we can