perceive all objects of knowledge through the knowledge of their generic character, we cannot perceive their mutual differences through this kind of intercourse and hence we cannot become omniscient.\(^7\) (ii) *The Intercourse through Association (jñāna-lakṣaṇa-sannikarṣa).* Sometimes an object is not present to a sense-organ, but is revived in memory; and through the medium of its idea revived we perceive the object. This is called the intercourse through association, which brings about an indirect perception of the object. For instance, when we see a piece of sandal-wood we perceive that it is fragrant. What is the cause of this visual perception of fragrant sandal? Here, there is a conjunction of the visual organ with the piece of sandal-wood, which gives rise to the direct visual perception of the sandal\(^8\); but the fragrance of the sandal cannot come into contact with the visual organ, and so there cannot be direct visual perception of its fragrance. But the visual perception of the sandal brings to consciousness the idea of fragrance by association, which serves as the extraordinary intercourse in the visual perception of the fragrant sandal. This will be explained more elaborately in the next chapter.

There is a difference between the intercourse through the knowledge of generic character (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-sannikarṣa*) and the intercourse through the knowledge of an object revived in memory (*jñāna-lakṣaṇa-sannikarṣa*), though in both there is the intercourse through knowledge. In the former, the knowledge of the generic character (e.g. *dhūmatva*) does not bring about the perception of itself but of its substrata, i.e. the individual objects of all times and places (e.g. all cases of smoke), which are possessed of the generic nature. In the latter, the knowledge of an object (e.g. fragrance of sandal) revived in memory does not bring about the perception of its substratum (e.g. sandal) but of the object itself (fragrance).\(^9\)

Some have urged that the visual perception of fragrant sandal may be explained by the intercourse through the knowledge of generic character (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-sannikarṣa*). For instance, when we see a piece of sandal, the visual perception of the sandal reminds us of its fragrance (*saurābha*) perceived in the past, and


\(^8\) The visual qualities of the sandal-wood.

\(^9\) SM., p. 282.
the generic character of fragrance (saurabhatva) which abides in the sandal in the relation of inherence (samavāya) and inherent-inherence (samaveta-samavāya) respectively. The recollection of the generic nature of fragrance (saurabhatva) through the intercourse through the generic character (sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-sannikarṣa) produces in us the perception of all individual fragrances, including the fragrance of this piece of sandal. To this objection the Neo-Naiyāyika replies, that though through the intercourse of the knowledge of the generic nature of fragrance (sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-sannikarṣa) we may perceive the fragrance of the sandal, we cannot perceive through this intercourse the generic nature of fragrance itself, owing to the absence of the intercourse of the visual organ with fragrance. Had there been the generic nature of the generic nature of fragrance (saurabhatvatva), we could have perceived the generic nature of fragrance (saurabhatva) through the intercourse of the knowledge of its generic character (sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-sannikarṣa). But, in fact, there is no generic character of the generic character of fragrance. Hence we cannot perceive the generic character of fragrance through the intercourse of the knowledge of its generic character which is non-existent. So we must admit that there is another extraordinary intercourse through association (jñāna-lakṣaṇa-sannikarṣa) to account for our perception of the generic character of the fragrance of the sandal. In illusory perception generally there is the intercourse through association (jñāna-lakṣaṇa-sannikarṣa). For instance, in the illusory perception of silver in a nacre, no silver comes into contact with the visual organ; but still the idea of silver revives in memory by association produces the visual perception of silver.10

(iii) The Intercourse produced by Meditation (Yogaja-sannikarṣa). Besides the intercourse through the knowledge of generic character and the intercourse through association, there is another extraordinary intercourse of the sense-organs with their objects, produced by meditation (yogaja-sannikarṣa). This kind of intercourse again is of two kinds: (1) the intercourse in the perception of a person who is in an ecstatic condition (yukta), and (2) the intercourse in the perception of a person who is out of the ecstatic condition (yuñjāna). The nature of yogic perception (yogi-pratyakṣa) will be fully discussed in a subsequent chapter.11

11 SM., pp. 284-5; Chapter XVII.
4. The Mīmāṁsaka

Gāga Bhaṭṭa holds that there are three kinds of intercourse between the sense-organs and their objects, (1) union (sāmyoga), (2) united-inherence (sāmyukta-samavāya), and (3) united-inherent-inherence (sāmyukta-samaveta-samavāya). Substances are perceived through their conjunction with the sense-organs. The qualities, actions, and generalities inhering in the substances are perceived through united-inherence (sāmyukta-samavāya). The communities of these qualities and actions are perceived through united-inherent-inherence (sāmyukta-samaveta-samavāya). So far the Mīmāṁsaka agrees with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. But he does not recognize inherence and inherent-inherence. According to him, sound is not perceived through inherence (samavāya) as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds, because sound is not a quality but a substance; so it is perceived through conjunction (sāmyoga) with the ear. And consequently the generic character of sound also is not perceived through inherent-inherence; it is perceived through united-inherence like the generic character of any other substance (e.g. a jar). Thus, according to the Mīmāṁsaka, there are only three kinds of intercourse between the sense-organs and their objects.¹²

Śālikānātha holds that there are three kinds of sense-object-intercourse, viz. union (sāmyoga), united inherence (sāmyukta-samavāya), and inherence (samavāya).¹³

5. The Vedānta

According to the Śaṅkārite, there is no relation of inherence (samavāya). Inherence, according to him, is nothing but identity or co-essentiality (tādātmya). So the Śaṅkārite recognizes the following six kinds of intercourse between the sense-organs and their objects. (1) Sāmyoga.—For instance, the visual perception of a jar is due to its direct conjunction with the visual organ. (2) Sāmyukta-tādātmya.—For instance, the perception of colour is due to its co-essentiality or identity with something (e.g. a jar) which is in conjunction with the visual organ. (3) Sāmyukta-bhinnatādātmya.—For instance, the perception of the generic character of colour (ṛupatvā) is due to its co-essentiality with

¹² Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi, p. 20. ¹³ PP., p. 46.
something (e.g. colour) which is co-essential with that (e.g. a jar) which is in conjunction with the visual organ. (4) Tādātmya. —For instance, the perception of sound is due to its co-essentiality with the sense-organ, viz. the ear-drum, which is pervaded by ether (ākāśa). (5) Tādātmyavadabhinnatva.—For instance, the perception of the generic character of sound (śabdatva) is due to its co-essentiality with something (e.g. sound) which, again, is co-essential with the sense-organ, viz. the ear-drum, which is pervaded by ether (ākāśa). (6) Višeṣya-Višeṣana-bhāva.—For instance, the perception of the absence of a jar on the ground is due to the absence qualifying something (e.g. the ground) which is, therefore, possessed of this qualification (e.g. the absence of the jar).  

Thus the Saṅkārīte’s concepts of samyoga, samyukta-tādātmya, samyuktābhinnna-tādātmya, tādātmya, tādātmyavadabhinnatva, and višeṣya-višeṣana-bhāva correspond to the Naiyāyika’s concepts of samyoga, samyukta-samavāya, samyukta-samavetasa-mavāya, samavāya, samavetasa-mavāya, and višeṣya-višeṣana-sambandha respectively.

The Rāmānujīst holds that there are only two kinds of sense-object-intercourse, viz. samyoga and samyuktāśrayaṇa. The perception of substances is due to their conjunction with the appropriate sense-organs; the perception of their qualities is due to the contact of the sense-organs with the substances in which the qualities subsist. The qualities are brought into relation with the sense-organs through the direct contact of their substances with the senses.  

The Vallabhite recognizes five kinds of sense-object-intercourse, viz. samyoga, tādātmya, samyukta-tādātmya, samyukta-višeṣanatā, and svarūpa. The perception of a jar is due to its contact (samyoga) with the visual organ. The perception of the colour of a jar is due to the contact of the visual organ with the jar which is identical with its colour. The internal perception of cognition, pleasure, and other properties of the mind (svadharma) is due to the relation of identity (tādātmya); there is identity between the mind and its properties. The perception of the absence of a jar on the ground is due to the contact of the visual organ with the ground, which is the locus of the absence

14 VP. and Śikhāmaṇi, p. 87.
15 Nyāyapariśuddhi, p. 77.
of the jar. "The locus is perceived by contact, saṁyoga, the negation as a predicate of the locus."\textsuperscript{16} The perception of the mental modes (vṛtti) is due to svarūpasambandha; they are perceived in themselves without implying any relation beyond themselves.\textsuperscript{17}

Janārđana Bhaṭṭa, a follower of Madhva, refutes all kinds of sense-object-intercourse except union (saṁyoga). We directly perceive objects and their qualities through the sense-organs. There is a direct contact of all perceptible objects with the sense-organs. And contact implies union. There are no other intervening relations between the senses and their objects. "The guṇa (quality) is identical with the gunin (substance), and no relation can be conceived among them. Saṁavāya is refuted as involving an infinite regress and with the refutation of saṁavāya, the forms of saṁavāya can have no hold. Abhāva (non-existence) is directly perceived, and we require no conception of relation."\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{16} CSV., p. 242.
\textsuperscript{17} PR., pp. 117-18. CSV., pp. 242-43.
\textsuperscript{18} CSV., p. 237.
CHAPTER V

ACQUIRED PERCEPTION

1. Introduction

In the last chapter we have found that, according to the Neo-Naiyāyikas, there are not only different kinds of ordinary intercourse between the sense-organs and their objects, but also there are three kinds of extraordinary intercourse. For instance, the visual perception of fragrant sandal is explained by the Neo-Naiyāyikas as due to an extraordinary intercourse through the knowledge of fragrance, though it is not the proper object of the visual organ. In Western psychology such a perception is generally regarded as an acquired perception. And this acquired perception has been analysed by the different schools of Indian philosophers and explained in slightly different ways. According to the Jaina, the so-called acquired perception is a complex psychosis made up of presentative and representative processes mechanically associated with each other and involving judgment and inference. According to the Vedāntist also, it is a psychic compound made up of presentative and representative elements integrated together into a compound perception. But, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, an acquired perception is a single integral pulse of consciousness which is presentative in character, though it is preceded by recollection. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika does not admit the possibility of a psychic compound of distinct psychic entities. Let us now discuss these different views about acquired perception.

2. The Jaina

The Jaina regards the visual perception of fragrant sandal as a case of acquired perception. The visual organ alone cannot produce the perception of fragrant sandal, since fragrance cannot be apprehended by the visual organ. Nor can the visual organ produce this perception, even in co-operation with the recollection of fragrance; for, in that case, odour will be apprehended by the
visual organ, which is impossible. The perception of odour cannot be produced by the visual organ. So the perception of fragrant sandal can neither be perceived by the visual organ singly, nor in co-operation with the recollection of odour.\(^1\) We have, indeed, an apprehension of fragrant sandal after the operation of the visual organ in co-operation with the recollection of fragrance. But from this it does not follow that it is a simple psychosis of the nature of visual perception produced by the visual organ. In fact, it is a complex psychosis of presentative and representative processes mixed up together. It is a mixed mode of consciousness made up of presentative and representative elements mechanically associated with each other. There is an integrative association of two co-ordinate and co-existent elements, the visual percept of the sandal and the idea of fragrance freely reproduced in memory. The apprehension of fragrant sandal is simply a sum of two distinct psychic entities, the present optic sensation of the sandal plus an image of its fragrance reproduced from past experience by association and integrated together into a complex psychosis. And not only so; it involves a judgment and an inference. Though the sandal is perceived by the visual organ, and the fragrance is reproduced in memory by the law of association, the apprehension of the sandal as qualified by fragrance, or fragrant sandal, involves a process of judgment and an inference. Thus, according to the Jaina, in the acquired perception of fragrant sandal there is a free association of ideas, judgment, and inference. An acquired perception is rather an act of inference than perception, though it depends on both perception and recollection.\(^2\) This account of an acquired perception is similar to the account of the associationist psychology of the west.

3. The Śaṅkara Vedāntist

The Śaṅkarite also holds that the visual perception of fragrant sandal is not a simple psychosis but a psychic compound of a presentative element and a representative element. It is a mixed

\(^1\) Na hi parimalasmanapasya vyapakṣaṁ locanaṁ surabhi candanamiti pratyayamutpaḍayati . . . gandhasyaśī locanajñānaviśayatvaprassāṅgāt. PKM., p. 150. See also p. 143.

\(^2\) Gandhasmananaskāri locanavipārāṇantaram surabhi candanamiti- pratyaya-pratīteḥ. Tanna pratyakṣenāsau pratiyate. PKM., p. 150.
mode of consciousness made up of a perceptual consciousness and a non-perceptual consciousness. There is a presentation of the sandal (i.e. its visual qualities) through the visual organ; and there is a representation of fragrance, since it cannot be perceived by the visual organ; these two heterogeneous elements are mixed up together and produce the compound perception of fragrant sandal. This psychic compound is not of the nature of a chemical compound but of the nature of a mechanical mixture. The presentative element and the representative element do not lose their identity in the mixed mode. The Naiyāyika may urge that if we recognize a mixed mode of presentative and representative processes, then presentation and representation will not be regarded as natural kinds. There cannot be an intermixture of natural kinds. But the Śaṅkarite contends that there is no contradiction in the intermixture of presentative and representative elements in perception. The Naiyāyika prejudice against intermixture of natural kinds (saṁkārya) does not find place in the Vedāntic monism. It may be asked: In the visual perception of fragrant sandal is the apprehension of fragrance presentative or non-presentative? It may be said that it can be neither. It cannot be presentative because here the apprehending mental mode does not assume the form of fragrance and identity itself with it, which is a condition of perception, according to the Śaṅkarite. Nor can it be non-presentative, because the conditions of non-presentative knowledge are absent. For example, the knowledge of invariable concomitance between sandal and fragrance being absent, there can be no inference of fragrance in the visual perception of fragrant sandal. But the Śaṅkarite holds that the apprehension of fragrance must be non-presentative; for if fragrance of this piece of sandal were already perceived, then the apprehension of fragrance in this case would be a recollection (smṛti), and if it were not already perceived, then the apprehension of fragrance in this case would be inferential. It can never be presentative because fragrance is not an object of visual perception. Thus, according to the Śaṅkarite, the visual perception of fragrant sandal is a mixed mode of consciousness made up of a presentative element and a representative element. It is a compound perception.

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3 Surabhicandanamityādijñānamapi candanakhandānēc parokṣam, saur-bhāmēc parokṣam. VP., p. 67.
4 VP., p. 68.
5 Śikhāmaṇi, p. 67.
in which an idea is tied to a percept. It is a presentative-representative complex. In this way the visual perception of sweet mangoes also may be explained.\(^6\)

The Śaṅkarite does not hold that such an experience is not a kind of perception at all but a case of inference. According to him, even an act of inference involves an element of perception as a constituent factor; for instance, in the inferential cognition of fire in a mountain the apprehension of fire is inferential, but the apprehension of the mountain is perceptual; these two psychoses are the integral factors of inferential knowledge. So, here, an act of perception involves an element of recollection and sometimes an act of inference as an integral factor.\(^7\) Herein lies the difference between the Jaina and the Vedāntist in their views of acquired perception.

4. *The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*

According to both the Jaina and the Śaṅkarite, the visual perception of fragrant sandal is a psychic compound of presentative and representative processes. But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, like William James, does not admit the possibility of a mixed mode of consciousness. Every psychosis is simple. There cannot be a psychic compound of simultaneous psychoses owing to the atomic nature of the *manas*, without which there can be no psychosis at all. According to this view, the visual perception of fragrant sandal is a simple psychosis, though it is preceded by the visual perception of the sandal and the recollection of its fragrance. It is an integral pulse of consciousness in the language of William James.

Srīdhara refutes the theory of psychic fusion in explaining an acquired perception. In the visual perception of fragrant sandal, fragrance is the qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*) and sandal is the qualified object (*viśeṣya*). Some hold that both the qualification and the qualified object—the fragrance and the sandal—are apprehended by a single compound psychosis. They explain this perception in the following manner. The visual organ cannot apprehend odour (fragrance), and the olfactory organ cannot apprehend the

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\(^6\) Sikhāmaṇi, p. 68.

\(^7\) Sikhāmaṇi and Mañiprabhā, pp. 68-9.
sandal (i.e. the visual qualities of the sandal); and hence these
two sense-organs cannot apprehend the relationship between
fragrance and the sandal, since the perception of relationship
depends upon the perception of the two factors related. But just
as the single psychosis of recognition, which is a kind of percep-
tion, is produced by a sense-organ in co-operation with the
sub-conscious impressions of past experience, and thus apprehends
both the past and the present, so the visual perception of fragrant
sandal is produced jointly by the visual organ and the olfactory
organ, and hence it apprehends both the sandal and its fragrance.
This requires a word of explanation. According to this view, the
visual perception of fragrant sandal is a compound perception
involving two factors, viz. the visual perception of the sandal : n l
the recollection of fragrance. Here the second psychosis depends
upon the past experience of fragrance produced by the olfactory
organ. Thus ultimately the visual perception of fragrant sandal
is produced by both the visual organ and the olfactory organ.
But Śridhara contends that this explanation is not satisfactory.
A cognition is not made up of parts; if it were so, then one part
of it could be produced by the olfactory organ, and the other by
the visual organ. But, in fact, there can be no composite con-
sciousness. A cognition is a simple psychosis. And if such a
simple psychosis produced by both the visual organ and the
olfactory organ apprehends the sandal as well as its fragrance,
then from this it will follow that the odour (fragrance) is
apprehended by the visual organ, and the sandal (apart from
fragrance) by the olfactory organ; because that thing is appre-
hended by an organ which is the object of the cognition produced
by that organ. But since the internal organ (manas) is atomic,
it cannot operate upon the two sense-organs at one and the same
time. Hence it must be admitted by : all that in the visual
perception of fragrant sandal at first the fragrance of the sandal
(viśeṣana) is perceived by the olfactory organ, and then afterwards
the visual organ produces the visual perception of the sandal alone
(viśeṣya) in co-operation with the previous olfactory perception
of fragrance.¹

¹ NK., p. 117.
² Cūrāḥa gandha gṛhīte pasāttadgraṇāsahakāriṇā caṣuṣā kevala-
viśeṣyālambanamavedham viśeṣyajñānām janyate ityakāmenāpyabhyupagān-
tavyam. NK., p. 117.
Jayanta Bhaṭṭa also gives a similar account of acquired perception. He analyses the visual perception of a fragrant flower. In this perception there is a visual perception of the flower, but not of its fragrance, since odour is not an object of visual perception. So there cannot be a visual perception of the flower as qualified by fragrance, or the fragrant flower. What happens in this case is that the present visual perception of the flower is qualified by the previous cognition of the fragrance produced by the olfactory organ on a previous occasion, and the flower is perceived as fragrant not by the visual organ, because it cannot apprehend odour, but by the internal organ (manas). Thus, according to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, though there is a visual perception of the flower, there is not a visual perception of the fragrant flower. The visual presentation of the flower is qualified by the idea of fragrance perceived in the past by the olfactory organ, and the single unitary perception of the fragrant flower is not produced by the visual organ but by the internal organ (manas), even as the single unitary process of recognition—which is a kind of qualified perception or a perception produced by peripheral stimulation qualified by the recollection of a past experience—is produced by the internal organ (manas). Thus Jayanta Bhaṭṭa regards an acquired perception as a new type of a synthetic unity of apperception. It may be objected that the flower is qualified by present qualifications. But the fragrance that is manifested in consciousness in the perception of the fragrant flower does not exist at present, but existed in the past and was apprehended by the olfactory organ. How can a past qualification qualify a present object? Jayanta Bhaṭṭa replies that just as after eating ninety-nine fruits we come to the hundredth fruit and recognize it as such, only because the perception of this fruit is qualified by the previous perceptions of the ninety-nine fruits which no longer exist, so in the perception of a fragrant flower the present visual perception of the flower is qualified by the previous olfactory perception of fragrance.

Thus Jayanta Bhaṭṭa holds that there cannot be a visual perception of a fragrant flower, since odour can never be perceived

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10 Locanagocare'pi kundakusume tadaviṣayagandhaviśeṣite bāhyendriyad-vārakagrahaṇamaghaṭamānami manasameva surabhi kusumamānita jānānam. NM., p. 461.
11 Ibid., p. 461.
by the visual organ. When the flower is perceived by the visual organ, and the idea of fragrance is revived from past experience, the fragrant flower is perceived by the central sensory (manas), which can apprehend all sensible objects, colour, odour, etc. But this is rather avoiding the difficulty. When we see a flower, or a piece of sandal-wood, we distinctly feel that it is fragrant. We distinctly feel that we have a visual perception of the fragrant flower or the fragrant sandal.

The Neo-Naiyāyikas, Gaṅgeśa and his followers, hold that when we see a piece of sandal-wood and feel that it is fragrant, we have not an internal perception of fragrant sandal through the manas, as Jayanta Bhaṭṭa holds, but a distinctly visual perception of the fragrant sandal. But how can we have a visual perception of fragrant sandal, since fragrance can never be an object of visual perception? Gaṅgeśa replies that the visual perception of fragrant sandal is not an ordinary perception (laukika-pratyakṣa) due to an ordinary intercourse (laukika-sannikāraṇa), but that it is an extraordinary perception (alaukika pratyakṣa) due to an extraordinary intercourse (alaukika sannikāraṇa). There cannot be an ordinary intercourse of the visual organ with the fragrance of the sandal, since odour is not an object of visual perception. But the fragrance of the sandal revived in memory by association constitutes an extraordinary intercourse called jñāna-laksana-sannikāraṇa, and through it gives rise to the visual perception of the fragrant sandal. Here, though there is an ordinary intercourse of the visual organ with the sandal—and thus there is a direct visual perception of the sandal—there is an extraordinary intercourse through the idea of fragrance revived in memory by association, and thus there arises a visual perception of the fragrant sandal. Thus the Neo-Naiyāyika differs from Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, who holds that though the sandal is perceived by the visual organ, the fragrant sandal is not perceived by it but by the manas, when there is a visual perception of the sandal with a recollection of its fragrance perceived by the olfactory organ in the past.13

Vardhamāna distinguishes between the visual perception of fragrant sandal and the olfactory perception of the fragrance of sandal. Sometimes we see a piece of sandal and at once perceive

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that it is fragrant. And sometimes we smell an odour and at once perceive that it is the fragrance of sandal. The former perception is produced by the visual organ in co-operation with the recollection of fragrance perceived by the olfactory organ on a previous occasion. And the latter perception is produced by the olfactory organ in co-operation with the recollection of sandal perceived by the visual organ in the past.\textsuperscript{13}

According to both the earlier and later Naiyāyikas, the perception of fragrant sandal is a single unitary presentation; it is not a compound of presentative and representative elements but a presentation qualified by a representative process which is its immediate antecedent. The Naiyāyika does not admit a mixed mode of consciousness, which is admitted by the Śāṅkaraite. According to him, there is no simultaneity of psychoses owing to the atomic nature of the manas, and, moreover, there cannot be an intermixture of two heterogenous psychoses, e.g. a presentative process and a representative process. This has been clearly pointed out by Udayana.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{13 NKSP.}, p. 105.
\textsuperscript{14 NKs.}, p. 104.
CHAPTER VI

RECOGNITION.

1. The Nature of Recognition

The process of recognition has been analysed by all the schools of Indian thinkers from both the standpoints of psychology and epistemology. Here we shall attempt only a psychological analysis of recognition from the different standpoints of Indian thinkers.

Recognition is a complex psychosis depending upon presentative and representative processes. It depends both upon peripheral stimulation and ideal reproduction of a past experience. A cognition produced by peripheral stimulation is admitted by all to be perception, and a cognition reproduced in imagination by the revival of the impressions of past experience is admitted by all to be recollection. But recognition is a complex psychosis which depends both upon peripheral stimulation and reproduction of a past experience. Is it, then, to be regarded as a single psychosis or two psychoses? If it is a single psychosis, is it a kind of perception, or quite a new psychosis? The Buddhist holds that recognition is not a single unitary psychosis, but a mechanical composition of two psychoses, presentative and representative. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the Mīmāṃsaka, and the Vedāntist hold that recognition is a single psychosis of the nature of perception. According to them, it is a qualified perception. According to the Jaina, recognition is a single psychosis, but it is not a kind of perception; it is a unique psychosis; it is neither presentative nor representative, nor both, but sui generis; it is a chemical compound, as it were, of presentation and representation, different from both. Let us now consider the different views of recognition in detail.

2. The Buddhist

When we perceive a pot and recognize it to be an object of our past experience, we have a recognition consciousness such as
"this is that pot'. Is this recognition a single psychosis or a combination of two psychoses, presentative and representative? If it is a single psychosis, the Buddhist asks, what is its cause? (1) The sense-organ cannot be the cause of recognition, since it requires a present object for its stimulation to produce a cognition; it can never come into contact with a past object and so cannot account for the consciousness of thatness or the past condition of the object involved in recognition. (2) The subconscious impressions (sāṃskāra) left by previous perceptions cannot be the cause of recognition, because they refer to past perceptions of which they are residua, and therefore cannot account for the consciousness of thisness or the present condition of the object involved in recognition. (3) Nor can recognition be brought about by the co-operation of the sense-organ with subconscious impressions, because they are found to operate separately and produce different effects. The sense-organ always produces direct apprehension, and subconscious impressions always produce memory; so they can never bring about a single effect in the shape of recognition, when they co-operate with each other.¹

Hence recognition is not a single psychosis produced either by the sense-organs or by subconscious impressions or by both together, but it involves two discrete psychoses, presentative and representative, mechanically associated with each other. It cannot be a single unitary process, for one and the same psychosis cannot apprehend the past as well as the present condition of an object, and thus can never apprehend its identity in the past and the present. It is a mechanical composition of presentative and representative processes, of which the former apprehends the present character of its object and the latter apprehends its past character. We have no psychosis to apprehend the identity of an object in the past and the present. Even if we concede that recognition is a single psychosis, what is the nature of its object? If it apprehends a past object, it does not differ from recollection; if it apprehends a future object, it does not differ from constructive imagination; if it apprehends only what exists at the present moment, then it does not recognize the identity of its object in the past and the present; and it is self-contradictory to hold that it can apprehend an object as existing in the past, the present,
and the future.² For the same reason it cannot be held that recognition apprehends an object as qualified by a previous cognition, for a past cognition does not exist at present, and therefore cannot qualify the object of the present cognition; and if the past cognition, which is supposed to qualify the object of recognition, is not at all apprehended as past, an object cannot be perceived as qualified by the previous cognition in an act of recognition. Thus recognition cannot be regarded as a kind of qualified perception.³ It consists of two distinct psychoses, presentative and representative.

3. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika regards cognition as a single unitary process. It apprehends both the past condition of its object and its present condition by a synthetic act of apperception. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa severely criticizes the Buddhist theory of recognition. The Buddhist argues that there is no recognition as a single psychosis, because there is no cause of recognition. The effect cannot exist if there is no cause of it. But this is reversing the order of things. We may infer a cause of a given effect, but we cannot deny the existence of the effect, even if we cannot account for it. Though neither sense-organs nor subconscious impressions by themselves can account for the fact of recognition, still when they co-operate with each other, their co-operation can account for it. Though sense-organs can produce only perception, and subconscious impressions can produce only recollection, yet when they co-operate with each other, they can produce recognition, which is a kind of qualified perception.⁴

What is the object of recognition, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika? The object of recognition is something existing at present but also qualified by the past time. Thus recognition apprehends both the past and present character of its object.⁵ But the Buddhist contends that it is self-contradictory to suppose that one and the same mental process, viz. recognition, apprehends the past as well as the present character of its object, inasmuch as

² NM., p. 449.
³ NM., p. 449.
⁴ NM., p. 459.
⁵ Aññatakālaviśiṣṭo vartamānakalāvacchinnaścārtha etasyāmavabhāsate.
the past and the present cannot exist at the same time, and so cannot simultaneously qualify an object. The past is past; it does not exist at present; both the past and the present cannot be apprehended by the same act of recognition, and qualify its object. The Naiyāyika replies that the past is apprehended as past, and the present is apprehended as present by recognition; so that the object of recognition is one and the same, being qualified by the past and the present both. Hence there is no contradiction in holding that recognition apprehends an object qualified by the past and the present both. But the Buddhist contends that a presentative cognition produced by peripheral stimulation cannot apprehend an object qualified by the past time. The Naiyāyika replies that the object which existed in the past exists at present also; so that in recognition the object is presented to consciousness as existing at present and also qualified by the past. And there is nothing incongruous in this. When we eat a number of fruits, say, one hundred, and after eating ninety-nine fruits come to the hundredth fruit, we have the consciousness of having eaten ninety-nine fruits, so that the cognition of the hundredth fruit is qualified by the fruits which existed in the past, many seconds before the hundredth fruit is eaten, and the number hundred recognized; and even though what is past is not present at the time, yet the relation which the object had with the past time is certainly present in the object, and the qualification of an object by its relation to the past time is all that is necessary for recognition apprehending an object as qualified by the past time.

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, recognition is perceptual in character, though it is produced by the sense-organs with the help of subconscious impressions. For, according to him, whatever mental state is produced by peripheral stimulation is an immediate, presentative or perceptual cognition. Recognition is produced by peripheral stimulation, though with the help of subconscious impressions left by previous perceptions; hence it must be regarded as a kind of presentative cognition or perception. Though the sense-organs by themselves cannot produce the cognition of a past object, yet in co-operation with the subconscious impressions of past experience they can produce the cognition of:

6 NM, pp. 459-60.
7 NM, pp. 459-460.
an object as qualified by the past time. Hence recognition is defined by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa as the perception of a present object qualified by the past time, due to the contact of a sense-organ with the present object, or as the perception of a present object, as modified by its past cognition. Just as the visual perception of a flower is modified by the previous olfactory perception of its fragrance, which is not perceived by the visual organ at the present, and thus brings about the indirect visual perception of a fragrant flower through the manas, so in recognition the perception of a present object is modified by a past cognition reproduced in imagination. Though pure perception is produced by the peripheral organs, and pure recollection is produced by subconscious impressions, yet recognition is produced by the co-operation of both, and the object of recognition is perceived through the manas, as qualified by the past cognition of the object. Sivāditya also defines recognition as the apprehension of an object as qualified by the past time. Mādhava Sarasvatī regards recognition as the apprehension of an object as qualified by the present and the past time. Viśvanātha refers to a doctrine which regards recollection as a cause of recognition, since a subconscious impression without being revived cannot bring about recognition, and it is better to hold that a recollection, rather than a revived impression, is the cause of recognition.

Thus recognition is not a mixed mode of consciousness made up of presentative and representative elements, for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika does not admit the simultaneity of two or more cognitions owing to the atomic nature of the manas. According to his view, recognition is a single presentative cognition or perception, but qualified by the past time or by the past cognition of the object. Recognition, therefore, is a kind of qualified perception.

4. The Mimāṁsaka and the Advaita Vedāntist

Kumārila agrees with the Naiyāyika in regarding recognition as a presentative cognition. He puts forward the following reason. Whatever cognition is produced by peripheral stimulation is presentative or perceptual in nature. Recognition is present

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*NM*, p. 461.  
*SP*, p. 68.  
MB*, p. 25.  
SM*, p. 497.
when there is peripheral stimulation. Though recognition is preceded by an act of recollection, it is not to be regarded as non-perceptual in character, inasmuch as it is produced by the contact of sense-organ with a present object. There is no injunction that only such a cognition is to be regarded as a perception, as is prior to recollection. Nor is the operation of the sense-organs, after recollection, precluded by any valid reason. Thus the fact of following upon recollection cannot deprive a cognition of its perceptual character, if it is produced by peripheral stimulation. For these reasons, Kumārila regards every cognition as a perception, which is produced by peripheral stimulation, whether it appears before or after recollection. Hence he regards recognition as a kind of perception.\textsuperscript{12}

The Śamkarite agrees with the Naiyāyika and the Mīmāṃsaka in holding that recognition is a perceptual cognition produced by peripheral stimulation and subconscious impressions co-operating together. Akhaṅḍānanda Muni asks: What is the cause of recognition? Is it produced by the residua of past experience? Or is it produced by peripheral stimulation? Or is it produced by both together? The first alternative is false. Residua of past experience can apprehend only the past condition of an object; they cannot apprehend the distinctive character of the object as determined by the present time and space. The second alternative also is false. The sense-organs can apprehend only the present condition of the object; they cannot apprehend the distinctive character of the object as determined by the past time and space. And the Buddhist contends that the third alternative also is false for the following reason. If recognition were produced by peripheral stimulation and subconscious impressions together, it would be characterized by the dual nature of perception and recollection, and thus would not be able to apprehend the identity of the object in the past and the present. According to the Buddhist, one and the same cognition cannot be both immediate and mediate, presentative and representative. But the Vedāntist believes in the fusion of psychoses, and thus regards recognition as a single complex psychosis apprehending the identity of an object in the past and the present, due to peripheral stimulation in co-operation with subconscious impressions. Akhaṅḍānanda Muni points out that though recognition is

\textsuperscript{12} ŚV., iv, 234-7.
produced by the co-operation of peripheral stimulation and subconscious impressions, it is perceptual in character and does not involve the twofold element of perception and recollection, for recollection is produced by subconscious impressions alone. But it may be objected that if recognition is perceptual in character, it cannot apprehend the past condition of the object, which is involved in recognition. The Vedāntist replies that recognition apprehends the past condition of the object, because it is not produced by peripheral stimulation alone but by peripheral stimulation together with subconscious impressions.\footnote{\textit{Tattvadīpana}, p. 273. See also \textit{Tattvapradīpikā}, pp. 214-15.}

Thus both the Vedāntist and the Naiyāyika regard recognition as a kind of perception. But there is a slight difference between the two views. According to the Vedāntist, recognition is a single complex psychosis containing representative and representative elements; it is a representative-representative process. According to the Naiyāyika, recognition is a simple psychosis which is representative in character; it does not contain both representative and representative elements; it is a kind of perception which is produced by peripheral stimulation and subconscious impressions together. The Vedāntist believes in the fusion of elementary psychoses into a composite psychosis. But the Naiyāyika cannot believe in psychic fusion for two reasons. In the first place, two psychoses cannot be simultaneously present in the self, owing to the atomic nature of the manas. In the second place, perception and memory are entirely different kinds of psychoses, and there can be no intermixture of two distinct classes. But the Vedāntist does not believe in the atomic nature of the manas, and he has no prejudice against the intermixture of distinct kinds of psychoses. So he believes in the simultaneous occurrence of two distinct kinds of psychoses and their fusion into a unitary composite psychosis. Herein lies the difference between the Naiyāyika view of recognition and the Vedāntist view.

5. The Jaina

The Jaina regards recognition as a single unitary psychosis produced by perception and recollection both, which apprehends the identity of an object in the past and present. It is neither of the nature of perception nor of the nature of recollection, nor a
mechanical association of perception and recollection both, nor a composite psychosis containing the twofold element of perception and recollection. It is a unique psychosis; it is sui generis; it is a single unitary psychosis produced by perception and recollection both. Perception apprehends the present condition of an object. Recollection apprehends the past condition of an object. Recognition which is quite a new psychosis apprehends the identity of an object in the past and the present. So recognition is different from perception and recollection and its object also is different from that of perception and recollection. Thus the Jaina differs from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the Mimāṁsaka and the Vedāntist, who regard recognition as a kind of perception, and from the Buddhist, who regards it as a mechanical association of two distinct psychoses, viz. perception and recollection.

The Jaina criticizes the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the Mimāṁsaka and the Vedāntist regard recognition as a kind of perception. But it cannot be regarded as a kind of perception. For, wherever peripheral stimulation is present, perception is present, and wherever peripheral stimulation is absent, perception is absent. But wherever peripheral stimulation is present, recognition is not present, and wherever peripheral stimulation is absent, recognition is not absent. In other words, recognition does not directly follow upon peripheral stimulation. If it did, then we should have recognition even at the time of the perception of an individual object for the first time. Nor can it be said that recognition is produced by a sense-organ in co-operation with the recollection of the object owing to the revival of the residua left by the previous perceptions of the object, because perception is quite independent of memory. If perception did depend upon memory, it would never apprehend an object which was never perceived in the past—it would never apprehend a new object. It may be argued, recognition is different from recollection, since it apprehends an object existing here and now; and hence it is a kind of perception. The Jaina contends, perception is produced by peripheral stimulation; and peripheral stimulation is possible only when the stimulus is present; and hence perception apprehends only a present object. But as recognition apprehends the identity of an object in the past and the present, its object cannot be apprehended by perception which depends upon the stimulation of a sense-organ by a present object. It has been
urged that the recollection of an object of past experience gives rise to a cognition in response to peripheral stimulation, which is called recognition. Thus recognition is a kind of perception, inasmuch as it is produced by peripheral stimulation not independently, but in co-operation with the recollection of a past experience. But this also is impossible. A perception can never apprehend the past condition of an object. So it cannot incorporate in itself the recollection of past experience. In fact, recognition is neither perception nor recollection, but a sui generis psychosis produced by both. It is not a kind of perception, since it is not direct and immediate knowledge.

The Jaina criticizes the Buddhist view. The Buddhist holds that recognition is not a single psychosis, but a mechanical association of two distinct psychoses, presentative and representative, there being no third kind of cognition different from perception and memory, which may be called recognition. The Jaina contends that recognition is distinctly felt as a single unitary process produced by perception and memory both, which apprehends the identity of an object in the midst of past and present modifications. Recollection cannot apprehend the identity of an object in the past and the present, since it can apprehend only the past condition of an object. Nor can perception apprehend the identity of an object in the past and the present, since it can apprehend only the present condition of an object. And if it is said that a determinate cognition arising out of the residua of both perception and recollection apprehends the identity of an object in the past and the present, then that is nothing but recognition which is quite a new psychosis.

The Buddhist himself admits the possibility of a psychic fusion in the consciousness of a motley colour (citrajñāna) in which many cognitions of blue, yellow, etc., are fused together. Why, then, should he object to the possibility of a new psychosis of recognition produced by presentation and representation both? Even supposing that recognition consists of two discrete psychoses—presentative and representative—mechanically associated with each other, are they felt in consciousness as interpenetrating each other, or in mechanical juxtaposition with each other? In the

14 PKM., p. 97.
15 Darsānasamānakāraṇakaṁ saṅkalanaṁ prayābyahijñām. PMS., p. 2.
16 Smarānaprayākaṇjayasya pūrvottara-vivartavartya-kadravyavaiśayasya saṅkalāna-jñānasya iñkasya prayābya-hijñānatvena upratītatvāt. PKM., p. 97.
former case, recognition will be felt either as perception or as recollection. In the latter, it will be felt as a dual consciousness, both presentative and representative, distinct from each other. But, in fact, recognition is never felt either as perception or recollection or both together. Hence it must be regarded as a unique psychosis differing from both perception and recollection. And the object of recognition is neither a past object nor a present object, but the identity of an object in the past and the present, which can never be apprehended by perception and recollection.

According to the Jaina, there is a sort of mental chemistry in the production of the state of recognition; it is not a result of mechanical composition and association of presentative and representative processes, as the Buddhist supposes. Recognition is sui generis. It is a compound psychosis, no doubt, but, like a chemical compound, it differs in quality from its constituent elements. It differs from perception and recollection both, and is yet a combination of the two psychoses. Prabhācandra includes all kinds of presentative-representative cognition of relations in recognition. The perceptions of identity, similarity, dissimilarity, relation of sign and signate, etc., are involved in recognition. It implies the elaborative processes of comparison, assimilation, discrimination, spatial and temporal localization. Prabhācandra agrees with Herbert Spencer and William James in holding that not only the ultimate feelings and sensations are presentations, but that the relations among them also are presentations. The relational processes do not imply the synthetic activity of the understanding, and consequently are not necessarily involved in the operations of conceptual thinking. Thus Prabhācandra differs from Bradley and Green who regard relational processes as the synthetic operations of the understanding. But it is contended that it is self-contradictory to say that one and the same psychosis has two temporal marks. The Jaina replies that if there is dual nature in the process of recognition, it is not self-contradictory, because the manifoldness of one and the same object of knowledge is usual, since contradiction is the very essence of the reality. The manifoldness of recognition is a datum; we cannot deny its existence or explain it away.

17 PKM., pp. 97-9.
18 PMS., p. 2, and PKM., p. 97.
BOOK IV

CHAPTER VII

THEORIES OF PERCEPTION

1. The Buddhist Theory of Perception

There are four schools of Buddhists. The Vaibhāṣikas hold that the external world is an object of perception. They maintain the independent existence of nature and mind; nature is extra-mental and is immediately perceived by the mind. The Sautrāntikas also hold that the external world exists. But according to them, it is not an object of direct perception. The external objects produce presentations in the mind through which we infer the existence of external objects. From the epistemological point of view, both the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas are realists; but the former are advocates of direct realism, while the latter are advocates of indirect realism or representationism. The Yogācāras do not believe in the existence of extra-mental objects. According to them, the immediate objects of our consciousness are the ideas of the mind; these ideas can never carry us beyond themselves to extra-mental objects. Thus the Yogācāras are subjective idealists. The Mādhyamikas annul the existence of mind and matter, subject and object, and go beyond them to the void (śūnya) which is beyond the scope of intellectual knowledge. Thus the Mādhyamikas are nihilists. But here we are not concerned with the epistemological theories of perception. We shall deal here only with the psychological analysis of perception given by the Buddhists. The only Buddhist work in which we find a psychological analysis of perception is Nyāyabindu of Dharmakīrti with its commentaries. Here the subject has been treated probably from the Sautrāntika point of view.¹

Diṅnāga defined perception in his Pramāṇa-samuccaya as the cognition which is free from kalpanās or mental concepts, e.g. name, class, and the like.² Dharmakīrti defined perception as the

¹ BP., p. 308.
² Pratyakṣam kalpanāpōḍhānaṁ nāmajātyādyaśarṣyaḥ.
non-erroneous cognition devoid of mental concepts or kalpanās. Perception must be non-erroneous. This is the logical condition of valid perception. But here we shall not discuss the conditions of valid perception. So far as its psychological nature is concerned, perceptual cognition must be free from mental constructs (kalpanā). Perception is direct or immediate knowledge. If perception is defined as the cognition produced by the sense-object-contact, as the Naiyāyika does, mental perception will be excluded from the category of perception. Perception is direct presentation of an object (sāksātkārijñānam). Perception must be free from kalpanās. But what is kalpanā? Kalpanā, according to Dharmakīrti, is a name which denotes an object. Perception, therefore, must be free from all association with names. It must be inarticulate, nameless, or indeterminate perception. Names are artificial verbal signs which are assigned by the mind to the objects of perception, when it recognizes them as members of a particular class or as the same as perceived before. To associate an object of perception with a name, therefore, is to remember similar objects perceived in the past and recognize them. This is not produced by the object of perception. When the sense-organs come into contact with their appropriate objects, they produce direct presentations or perceptual cognitions. The objects are presented to the mind, when they come into contact with the proper sense-organs. But the act of recognition or assigning a name to the object of perception is not directly produced by the sense-object-contact. Names of objects are never presented to the sense-organs. They are never presented to the senses by the objects of perception. The acts of recognition and naming involve the unification of the objects of present experience with the objects of past experience, so that they are not directly produced by objects coming into contact with the proper sense-organs, for past objects can never be presented to the senses.

Sometimes though the objects of perception are not associated with definite names, they are capable of being associated with names. For instance, though an infant does not know the names of objects, and as such his perception is not associated with any name, it may not be free from mental construct (kalpanā). Even an infant does not begin to suck the breast of his mother, until

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Kalpanāpodham abhrantām pratyakṣam. NB., p. 11.

NBT., p. 12.
he recognizes the breast to be the same as experienced before. Thus perception must be free from all association with names, and it must not involve any content of consciousness which may be represented by names; it must not involve naming and recognition; it must not contain any ideal factor or mental construct. It must be the direct and immediate presentation of an object, free from all elaborative or interpretative processes. It must represent only the given element in experience. It must not import anything new into the given order from within the mind from past experience.  

The Naiyāyikas and others hold that indeterminate perception apprehends the qualified object (viśeṣya) and qualifications (viśeṣana), but not their relations to each other. But the Buddhist contends that indeterminate perception does not at all apprehend the qualifications of its object, viz. generality, substantiability, quality, action, and name, but it simply apprehends the mere object apart from its qualifications. It cannot apprehend both the qualified object and its qualifications. It merely apprehends the specific individuality of an object (svaḻakṣaṇa) devoid of all qualifications. The specific individuality of an object is unique and sui generis; it is quite different from anything other than itself; it can never be expressed by words; it is apprehended only by perception. So perception is always indeterminate. There is no determinate perception. The so-called determinate perception is not perceptual in character because it is not produced by peripheral stimulation. It is produced by the recollection of the name of the object perceived. Between peripheral stimulation and the determinate cognition there is an intervening factor of the recollection of the name. So the determinate cognition is not purely presentative in character, but it is a presentative-representative process. But the Buddhist regards perception as entirely free from factors of imagination. So he does not admit the possibility of determinate perception.  

Dharmakirti recognizes four kinds of perception: sense-perception (indriyajñāna), mental perception (manovijñāna), self-consciousness (svasaṁvedana), and yogic perception (yogipratyakṣa). Sense-perception is produced by the sense-organs. It is an "immediate feltness"; a bare sensation. It gives rise to mental

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*a NB. and NBT., pp. 13-14. See also BP., p. 309.  
*b See Chapter II.  
*BP., p. 310.
perception which immediately succeeds it, and belongs to the same series. Mental perception is due to four causes: the objective datum, e.g. external stimulus (ālambana-pratyaya), the co-operative cause (sahakāripratyaya), e.g. light in visual perception, the dominant cause, e.g. the sense-organ (adhipati-pratyaya), and the immediate cause, e.g. the immediately preceding cognition (samanantarapratyaya). Dharmottara distinguishes mental perception from sense-perception. When the visual organ has ceased to operate, we have mental perception. So long as the visual organ continues to operate, the perception of colour is nothing but sense-perception.7 So mental perception is continuous with sense-perception, and immediately follows upon it. Self-consciousness is the perception of the mind and mental states like pleasure and pain. The direct and immediate apprehension of mental states is of the nature of self-conscious awareness (svasaṁvedana). They are not perceived by other cognitions, as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds. They are directly perceived by themselves. Self-consciousness is perception, since it directly intuits itself, is devoid of concepts, and free from error.8 Yogic perception is the direct intuition of the real, due to intense meditation on the four truths of Buddhism.9 We shall discuss the Buddhist doctrine of yogic intuition later on.10

2. The Jaina Theory of Perception

The Jaina recognizes only two kinds of valid knowledge: direct knowledge (aparokṣa) and indirect knowledge (parokṣa).11 Knowledge is direct when it is immediate or distinct. Knowledge is indirect when it is mediate. Perception is direct or immediate knowledge because it is directly derived from the senses and the mind, while mediate knowledge (e.g. inferential knowledge, verbal knowledge, etc.) is derived through the medium of some other knowledge. Māṇikyanandin defines perception as distinct apprehension (viśadam pratyaksam).12 What is the meaning of distinctness? That knowledge is distinct, which is not mediated by

7 NBT., p. 19.
8 Tacca jñānarūpaṁ vedanamātmanāḥ sākṣātkāri nirvikalpakam abhrāntam. NBT., p. 20; BP., p. 317.
9 NBT., pp. 20-1.
10 Chapter XVII.
11 PMS., ii, 1-2.
12 PMS., ii, 3.
some other kind of knowledge. And that knowledge is distinct, which apprehends an object in all its details.\(^{13}\) Perception is of two kinds: sāmvyayāhārika pratyakṣa and mukhya pratyakṣa.\(^{14}\) The former is the ordinary perception of everyday life. The latter is super-normal perception. Sāmvyayāhārika pratyakṣa, again, is of two kinds: perception produced by the senses (indriya-nibandhana) and perception not produced by the senses (anindriya-nibandhana).\(^{15}\) The Jaina regards the eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue, and the skin only as sense-organs. He does not regard the mind (manas) as a sense-organ. The mind is called no-sense-organ (anindriya). Hence the two varieties of ordinary perception are sense-perception and mental perception. Mukhya pratyakṣa is of three kinds: avadhi or clairvoyant perception of objects at a distance of time and space, manahparyaya or telepathic knowledge of thoughts in other minds, and kevala or infinite knowledge unlimited by time and space, or omniscience.\(^{16}\) All of them are perceptual in nature.

The Jaina distinguishes between dārsana and jñāna. Dārsana is the simple apprehension of an object. Just after peripheral stimulation there is the bare cognition of an object in a general way. It apprehends only its general features (sattāmātra) and not its particular features. Jñāna is the apprehension of the special features of an object. Dārsana is the “knowledge of acquaintance”, while jñāna is the “knowledge about” an object. Dārsana is called indeterminate perception (nirvikalpa jñāna) in other systems of philosophy. But the Jaina does not recognize it as jñāna or knowledge. Jñāna is always determinate; it must have a definite form (sākāra); it must apprehend the special features (viṣeṣa) of its object.\(^{17}\) So the Jaina does not regard dārsana as indeterminate perception, because perception is always definite and determinate.

In our ordinary perception (sāmvyayāhārika pratyakṣa) there are four stages: (1) Avagraha, (2) Thā, (3) Avāya, and (4) Dhāraṇā.\(^{18}\) Just after dārsana there is avagraha. Dārsana is the simple apprehension of an object in a general way. When a stimulus

\(^{13}\) PMS., ii, 4.
\(^{14}\) PMS., ii, 5, 11. PNT., ii, 4-5.
\(^{15}\) PMS., ii, 5.
\(^{16}\) PNT., ii, 19, 20, and 23.
\(^{17}\) DSV., 4.
\(^{18}\) PNT., ii, 6. U.T.S., i, 15.
acts upon a sense-organ, there is an excitation in consciousness, and the person is barely conscious of the mere existence (sattāmātra) of an object. This is darśana. It is indistinct and indefinite. Just after this simple apprehension there is the cognition of an object together with its general and special features (e.g. white colour). This is avagraha. It grasps the details of an object. But it does not apprehend all the details of the object. It excites a desire in the person to know more about the object. This desire to know the particulars of the object is called īhā. It is a desire to know whether the object is this or that. In the stage of avagraha we have the perception of white colour. But in the stage of īhā we desire to know whether the white object is a row of herons or a flag. Then there is avāya. It is the ascertainment of the true nature of the object. "In the third stage, avāya, there is a definite finding of the particulars which we desired to know in the second stage. The second stage (avagraha) is merely an attempt to know the particulars, while the third stage consists in the ascertainment of these particulars." When we observe the upward and downward movement of the birds and the fluttering of their wings we definitely know that there is a row of herons and not a flag. Avāya is the definite perception of an object as this and not that. It involves assimilation and discrimination. In it we clearly perceive the similarities of the object with other objects perceived in the past, and its differences from others. It involves the recognition of an object as belonging to a definite class. It is definite and determinate perception. Then it gives rise to dhāranā or retention. "Dhāranā consists of the lasting impression which results after the object, with its particulars, is definitely ascertained. It is this impression (svarṣkāra), which enables us to remember the object afterwards." Retention is the cause of recollection. Thus the Jaina recognizes four stages of ordinary perception: avagraha or the perception of some features of an object; īhā or the desire to know more about it; avāya or the definite ascertainment of its real nature; and dhāranā or retention of the perception. Of these the last can hardly be regarded as a stage in perception. Avāya or definite and determinate perception should be regarded as the last stage

19 PNT., ii, 7. SS., i, 15. 20 DS., p. 15. 21 PNT., ii, 8. 22 SS., i, 15. 23 PNT., ii, 9. 24 SS., i, 15. 25 DS., p. 15.
of perception. The Jaina does not recognizes *darśana* as a distinct stage in perception. It is quite different from *jnāna* or knowledge. And perception is a kind of *jnāna*. *Darśana* is presupposed by perception but not involved in it. Perception gives us knowledge of an object with its qualities and relations. Different accounts are given by different authors, of the four stages of perception given above.

Thus the Jaina theory of perception differs from the Buddhist theory mainly in that perception, according to the latter, is the direct presentation of an object, while, according to the former, it is presentative-representative. According to the Buddhist perception is always indeterminate, while according to the Jaina perception is always determinate. According to the Buddhists, perception is the immediate knowledge of the specific individual (*svalakṣana*) devoid of all association with names or facts of past experience. According to the Jaina, however, perception is the presentative-representative cognition of extra-mental objects and their relations to one another. According to the Buddhists, perception does not represent the relations of extra-mental objects; these are imported by thought or imagination from within the mind into the sense-data to bring about determinate cognitions, which are, therefore, not perceptual in character. According to the Jaina, on the other hand, the extra-mental objects and their relations to one another are facts of direct and immediate experience. The Jaina, therefore, agrees with James and Herbert Spencer in holding that relations are not imposed by the intellect upon the raw sense-materials to convert them into a system of intelligible experience, but that they are embedded in direct and immediate experience as contents of consciousness.

3. *The Naiyāyika Theory of Perception*

Gautama defines perception as the non-erroneous cognition produced by the intercourse of the sense-organs with the objects, not associated with any name, and well-defined.\(^{26}\) In this definition the different kinds of perception, the condition of valid perception, and the genesis of perception have been described. Perception is of two kinds, viz., indeterminate (*avyāpadeśya*) and

\(^{26}\) Indriyārthaṁ asannikārtotpattamāṁ *jnānam* *avyāpadeśyam* *avyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakāṁ pratyakṣam. *NS.*, i, i, 4.
determinate (vyavasāyātmaka). We have already discussed the nature of indeterminate (nirvikalpa) and determinate (savikalpa) perception in detail. Here we shall briefly discuss the nature and origin of perception, and not the conditions of valid perception. Perception is that cognition which is produced by the intercourse of the sense-organs with the objects. This is Keśavamisra’s definition. In this definition only the specific condition of perception has been stated. In perception there is not only the contact of the sense-organs with the objects, but also the contact of the sense-organs with manas, and the contact of manas with the self. Thus there is a fourfold contact between the sense-organs and the objects, the sense-organs and manas, and manas and the self. This definition, therefore, does not give us an exhaustive enumeration of all the factors that co-operate in producing perception. It points out only that condition which is the specific cause of perception, and which distinguishes it from all other forms of cognition. It does not mention the other conditions, viz., the contact of manas with the sense-organs, and the contact of manas with the self, because they are common to inference and other forms of cognition also. But it may be contended that the contact of manas with the sense-organs also is a specific condition of perception, which is not present in other forms of cognition. So this condition also should be distinctly mentioned. Vātsyāyana rightly points out that the contact of the sense-organs with the objects is as good a distinctive feature of perception, as the contact of manas with the sense-organs. So when one distinctive feature has been mentioned, there is no need of mentioning the other similar features, since the definition is not meant to be an exhaustive enumeration of all the conditions of perception. Uddyotakara offers other explanations, too. Firstly, the sense-object-contact is the distinctive feature of every individual perception. In every individual perception, which is produced by the sense-object-contact, what differentiates it from every other perception is either the sense-organ concerned, or the object perceived; and each individual perception is called either after the sense-organ, or after the object. For example, the perception of colour is called either visual perception or colour-perception;

37 Indriyārthaśasannikarṣajanyāṁ jñānam pratyakṣam. TS., p. 29.
38 NBh., i, 1, 4.
39 NBh., i, 1, 4.
40 NBh., i, 1, 4.
and no perception is ever called after the mind-sense-contact; the perception of colour, for instance, is never called mental perception. Secondly, the mind-sense-contact is the common factor among all kinds of perception, which are otherwise different. In other words, the contact of the mind with the sense-organs does not differ in different kinds of perception; it remains the same in different kinds of perception. Thirdly, the mind-sense-contact is not mentioned as the distinctive feature of perception, since with regard to perception the mind-sense-contact stands on the same footing as the mind-soul-contact, firstly because individual perceptions are never called either after the mind or after the soul; and secondly because both these contacts subsist in a substratum which is imperceptible by the senses; thirdly because neither of these two contacts belongs to the perceived object; and lastly because both these contacts subsist in the mind. These are the reasons why the mind-sense-contact has not been mentioned in the definition of perception.\footnote{NV., i, 1, 4; S.L., Indian Thought, vol. vi, pp. 135-7.}

An objection has been raised against this definition that it excludes cognition of the self and its qualities of pleasure, pain, etc., from the category of perception, because the mind (manas) is not a sense-organ. Gautama does not mention the mind as a sense-organ, when he enumerates the sense-organs.\footnote{NS., i, 1, 12.} Thus the cognition of pleasure, pain, etc., which is produced through the instrumentality of the mind, cannot be regarded as perception, since the mind is not a sense-organ. But, as a matter of fact, the cognition of pleasure and pain is neither inferential nor verbal, since the conditions of inference and verbal cognition are absent. So it is absolutely necessary that the cognition of pleasure, pain, etc., should be included in perception, and yet the above definition excludes it. Vātsyāyana points out that the cognition of pleasure, pain, etc., is included in perception by Gautama, since perception is defined by him as that kind of cognition which is produced by the contact of the sense-organ and the object, and the mind is a sense-organ. Gautama has not mentioned the mind as a sense-organ when he has enumerated the sense-organs owing to the fact that the mind is different in character from the other sense-organs. What is the difference between the mind and the other sense-organs? Vātsyāyana mentions three points of difference.
In the first place, the external sense-organs are material, while the mind is immaterial. In the second place, the external sense-organs operate upon only a limited number of objects, while the mind is effective on all objects. For instance, colours are apprehended by the visual organ; odours are apprehended by the olfactory organ; tastes are apprehended by the gustatory organ; sounds are apprehended by the auditory organ; and touch is apprehended by the tactual organ. But the mind apprehends all objects. In the third place, the external sense-organs are of the nature of sense-organs owing to the fact that they are endued with the same qualities as are apprehended by them. The olfactory organ is endued with the quality of odour and consequently it can apprehend odour. The visual organ is endued with the quality of colour and consequently can apprehend colour. The gustatory organ is endued with the quality of taste; so it can apprehend taste. The auditory organ is endued with the quality of sound; so it can apprehend sound. And the tactual organ is endued with the quality of touch; so it can apprehend touch. But the mind is not endowed with the qualities of pleasure, pain, etc., which are apprehended by the mind.\textsuperscript{32} Thus when perception is defined as the cognition produced by the contact of the sense-organs with the objects, the cognition of pleasure and pain also is included in perception, inasmuch as the mind is a sense-organ.

Though both the contact of the mind with the self and the contact of the sense-organs with the objects are necessary conditions of all external perceptions, the latter must be regarded as the principal cause. For sometimes a man goes to sleep with the determination that he will wake up at a certain time, and by force of this determination wakes up at that time; but sometimes when a man is awakened from deep sleep either by a very loud sound or by a rude shaking, his waking perceptions of the sound or the touch are primarily due to the contact of the sense-organs with the objects. So predominance must be given not to the mind-soul-contact, but to the sense-object-contact; because in such cases the soul has no desire to know and does not put forth an effort to direct the mind towards the object. Moreover, when a man with his mind entirely preoccupied with one thing, desires to know another thing, he puts forth energy to direct

\textsuperscript{32} NBh. i, 1, 4,
his mind towards the object and perceives it; in such a case we cannot say that the sense-object-contact is the principal cause. But when a man with his mind entirely pre-occupied with one thing suddenly comes to have the cognition of another thing, brought about by the forcible impact of the object upon a sense-organ, without any desire or mental effort on his part, the contact of the sense-organ with the object must be regarded as the principal cause of perception, since in this case there is no desire or effort on the part of the self to know the object. In the case of the man whose mind is pre-occupied, the cognition that suddenly appears is sometimes entirely due to the force of a particular object of sense-perception; its force stands for intensity (śvaratā) and vigour (patuitā); and this force of the object affects the sense-object-contact, and not the mind-soul-contact. This clearly shows that the sense-object-contact is the principal cause of perception. The different kinds of sense-object-contact have already been dealt with. Jayanārāyaṇa holds that the soul is the constituent cause, the mind-soul-contact is the non-constituent cause, and the sense-object-contact is the efficient cause of perception. Thus the Naiyāyika explains the origin of perception by a concatenation of conditions, viz., the sense-object-contact, the mind-sense-contact and the mind-soul-contact. It does not describe the specific functions of the different factors involved in perception, as the Sāṁkhya does. It, indeed, overcomes the Sāṁkhya dualism of buddhi (intelect) and purusa (self) by regarding the former as a quality of the self; but it does not explain the relation between the self and the object, and the correspondence between knowledge-forms and object-forms. An unwarranted and uncritical assumption on which the Naiyāyika theory of knowledge is based is that knowledge is produced, like any other physical effect, out of a collocation of causal conditions: psychic causation and physical causation are quite the same in nature. “The production of knowledge is no transcendental-occurrence, but is one which is similar to the effects produced by the conglomeration and movements of physical causes.”

NBh., ii, 1, 29; E.T., Indian Thought, vol. ii, p. 42.
VSV., viii, 1, 3.
with one another. They have no specific functions in the production of perceptual knowledge; they simply come into contact with one another, and by their mutual contact generate perception.

4. The Neo-Naiyāyika Theory of Perception

The older Naiyāyika defined perception as the non-erroneous cognition produced by the contact of the sense-organs with the objects, not associated with any name, and well-defined. This definition describes the nature of perception as well as the conditions and kinds of perception. Perception is produced by the intercourse of the sense-organs with their appropriate objects. The logical condition of right perception consists in the want of contradiction or in its correspondence with reality. It is of two kinds, indeterminate (avyapadeśya) and determinate (vyavasāyāt-maka). But this definition does not apply to the perception of God or to the perception of Yogis. So Bhāsarvajña defines perception as right and direct or immediate cognition. This definition is peculiar to Bhāsarvajña. Rāgghava points out in his commentary that if we adopt the definition of Gautama, we exclude from perception the direct cognition acquired by the Yogins, which is undoubtedly a perceptual knowledge and yet it is not produced by the intercourse of the sense-organs with the objects. The word aparokṣa in the definition is explained by Rāgghava as the cognition not produced by the word (śabda) or the mark or sign of inference (liṅga), for the former is the instrument of verbal knowledge or knowledge derived from authoritative statement (śabdajñāna), and the latter is the instrument of inferential knowledge (anumiti). Viśvanātha defines perception as the cognition which is not produced through the instrumentality of another cognition. It is direct or immediate knowledge. It is not derived through the medium of some other knowledge. This definition applies to both human perception and divine perception. It excludes inferential knowledge, analogical knowledge, memory and verbal knowledge, because inferential knowledge is produced through the instrumentality of the knowledge of universal concomitance, analogical knowledge is produced

\[\text{NS., i, 1, 4.}\]
\[\text{Samyagaparokṣānubhavasadhanam pratyaksam. NSar., p. 2.}\]
\[\text{Jñānakaranaḥ jñānam pratyaksam. SM., p. 237.}\]
through the instrumentality of the knowledge of similarity, verbal knowledge is produced through the instrumentality of the knowledge of words, and memory is produced through the instrumentality of previous apprehension (anubhava).\(^{41}\)

This is the Neo-Naiyāyika definition of perception. Gaṅgāśa, the founder of Navya Nyāya, defined perception in this way. Perception is direct or immediate knowledge. This is the characteristic of perception. It may be produced by the intercourse of the sense-organs with their proper objects. Or, it may be produced directly by the contact of the mind with the objects owing to certain occult powers of the mind. So it is proper to define perception as direct immediate knowledge not derived through medium of some other knowledge.

5. The Mīmāṃsaka Theory of Perception

Jaimini defines perception as the cognition produced in the self by the intercourse of the sense-organs with objects, and he points out that it cannot apprehend super-sensuous Moral Law (Dharma).\(^{42}\) This definition is practically the same as that of the Naiyāyika. Gautama defines perception as the non-erroneous cognition produced by the sense-object-contact, inexpressible by words, and well-defined. This definition states the conditions and kinds of perception. It shows that perception is of two kinds, viz., indeterminate (avyapadeśya) and determinate (vyayasayātmaka). It lays down the condition of valid perception. Perception must be non-erroneous, in order to be valid. Jaimini’s definition does not describe the different kinds of perception. Nor does it lay down the condition of valid perception. Barring these, the two definitions are practically the same. Annambhaṭṭa defines perception as the cognition produced by the intercourse of the sense-organs with objects.\(^{43}\) This definition is almost identical with that of Jaimini. If we analyse Jaimini’s definition we find that perception requires the existence of (1) a present object of perception, (2) a sense-organ with which the object comes into contact, and (3) the self (puruṣa) in which the cognition is produced. In perception there must be an intercourse between the sense-organs and their objects. And there must be something more. The sense-organs must be connected with the mind, and

\(^{41}\) SM., pp. 237-240. \(^{42}\) M.S., i, 1, 4. \(^{43}\) Ts., p. 29.
the mind with the self. Thus there must be the sense-object-contact, the mind-sense-contact, and the mind-soul-contact in external perception.\textsuperscript{44} The Naiyāyika contends that this definition includes doubtful perception and illusion in perception. Though perception is said to be produced by a real object, and as such excludes hallucinations which are not produced by external stimuli, it does not exclude doubtful perception and illusion which are produced by external stimuli.\textsuperscript{45} Kumārila tries to avoid this objection by saying that samprayoga means the right application of the sense-organs to their objects, so that doubtful perception and illusion are excluded from perception.\textsuperscript{46} Pārthasāratimīśra points out that Jaimini has not defined perception in the above sūtra.\textsuperscript{47} He simply says that perception is not the condition of the apprehension of supersensuous Dharma.\textsuperscript{48} So the Naiyāyika's objection is beside the mark. It cannot be urged that this definition does not include the perception of pleasure, pain, etc., since it does not depend upon the external sense-organs. For it depends upon the contact of pleasure, pain, etc., with the internal organ or mind.\textsuperscript{49}

Prabhākara defines perception as direct apprehension (sāksāt pratitih).\textsuperscript{50} In every act of perception there is a triple consciousness (tripuśīsamvīti), viz., the perception of the knowing self, the known object, and knowledge itself. As regards the objects of perception, they are to be classified into substances, qualities, and classes.\textsuperscript{51} As regards the act of perception itself, it is of two kinds, viz., indeterminate perception and determinate perception.\textsuperscript{52} As regards the knowing self, it is manifested as the knower or subject of all kinds of knowledge, e.g., perceptual, inferential, verbal, etc., because all cognitions are appropriated by the self. And direct apprehension itself also is always self-cognized; it is not cognized by another cognition, as in that case there would be regressus ad infinitum.\textsuperscript{53} According to Prabhākara, consciousness is self-luminous; it manifests both the self and the not-self, the knowing subject and the known object. This is the peculiarity of the Prabhākara doctrine of perception as distinguished from the Bhāṭṭa doctrine of perception explained above.

\footnote{1 YSP., p. 98.} \footnote{2 ŚV., iv, 38.} \footnote{3 ŚD., p. 111; also ŚV., iv, 19.} \footnote{4 PP., p. 51.} \footnote{5 Chapter II.} \footnote{6 NM., pp. 100-101.} \footnote{7 M.S., i, 1, 4.} \footnote{8 ŚD., pp. 111-12.} \footnote{9 PP., p. 52.} \footnote{10 Chapter XII.}
6. The Sāṁkhya Theory of Perception

Kapila defines perception as a cognition which takes the form of an object, being related to it. Vijñānabhikṣu elucidates the definition by saying that perception is the mental function (buddhi-vṛtti) which goes out to the object and is modified by the particular form of that object to which it is related. The mental function itself is not produced by the proximity of the object, but only its particular mode is produced by it, which inheres in the mental function. The mental function goes out, like the flame of a lamp, through the gateways of the sense-organs, to the external object which is proximate to it, and is modified by the particular form of the object. Thus the proximity of an external object to buddhi (intellect) is the indispensable condition of perception in general. And the proximity of the sense-organs is a special condition of external sense-perception. But if the proximity of the object to buddhi were the condition of perception in general, perception would be possible even when there was no contact of the sense-organs. But such perception is unknown. The Sāṁkhya holds that inertia (tamas) of buddhi obstructs its functioning, and when it is overcome by the contact of the sense-organs with objects, or by certain intuitive powers of the Yogins, we come to have mental modes. And it is for this inertia of buddhi that there are no mental modes in dreamless sleep.

Iśvarakṛṣṇa defines perception as determinate cognition of an object, produced by its proximity to a sense-organ. Vācaspatimiśra fully brings out the significance of this definition. In the first place, there must be a real object of perception. This characteristic differentiates perception from illusion. The object transforms the mental mode into its own particular form, which is in itself formless. The objects of perception are both external and internal, external as the gross sensible objects, e.g. earth, water, etc., and internal, as pleasure, pain, and the like. Even the subtle tanmātras, which are infra-sensible to us, are the objects of perception to the Yogan. In the second place, the perception of a particular kind of object (colour, sound, etc.) involves the operation of a particular sense-organ (eye, ear, etc.), which consists

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88 Yatsambandhasiddhānta tadākārolekhi vijñānaṁ tat-pratyakṣam. SPS. i, 89.
84 SPB. i, 89.
86 SPB., i, 91.
88 Prativiṣyādhyavasāyo dṛṣṭam. Sk., 5.
in its intercourse with its object. This characteristic differentiates perception from memory, inference, etc. In the third place, perception not only involves the existence of an object, and the intercourse of a sense-organ with the object, but it also involves the operation of the intellect (buddhi) which produces a definite and determinate cognition of the object. When the sense-organs come into contact with the objects, the inertia (tamas) of the intellect is overcome, and the essence (sattva) springs forth in it, in consequence of which a definite and determinate cognition of the object is produced. This characteristic of perception excludes doubtful cognitions.57

Vācaspatimiṣṭa illustrates the process of perception by an example. Just as the headman of a village collects taxes from the villagers and gives them over to the governor of the province, and the governor hands them over to the minister, and the minister, to the king, so the external sense-organs, having immediate apprehensions of external objects, communicate the immediate impressions to the mind (manas), and the mind reflects upon them and gives them over to the empirical ego (ahamkāra) which appropriates them by its unity of apperception and gives these self-appropriated apperceived impressions of the objects to the intellect (buddhi) for the experience of the self (puruṣa).58 Thus perception involves the functioning of certain organs. It involves the operation of the external sense-organs, the central sensory or the mind (manas), empirical ego (ahamkāra) and the intellect (buddhi).

The sense-organs have only an immediate apprehension (ālocanamātra) of objects.59 Vācaspatimiṣṭa explains this immediate apprehension (ālocanajñāna) as sammugdha-vastu-darsana, i.e. intuitive apprehension of an object as a homogeneous unit. The external sense-organs apprehend an object as an undifferentiated homogeneous unit, as merely this, but not as like this or unlike this.60 But while Vācaspatimiṣṭa interprets the ālocanajñāna as nirvikalpajñāna (indeterminate perception), Vijñānabhinīkṣu interprets it as both nirvikalpa (indeterminate) and savikalpa (determinate) apprehension. Some hold that the external sense-organs produce an immediate, indeterminate apprehension of objects, and regard the definite and determinate apprehension as

57 STK., 5.
58 STK., 28.
59 STK., 36.
60 STK., 28, also STK., 27.
the product of the manas. But Vijñānabhinīkṣu cites the authority of Vyāsa who holds that the sense-organs give us definite and determinate apprehension of objects. Vijñānabhinīkṣu further asserts that there is nothing to contradict the determinate apprehension of the sense-organs.61

When the sense-organ has an immediate apprehension of the object, the mind (manas) reflects upon it, breaks up its object into its component factors, viz. the substance, and its adjuncts, its thatness and whatness, and thus assimilates it to similar objects and discriminates it from disparate objects. Thus Iśvarakṛṣṇa defines the function of manas as reflection or discrimination.62 Vācaspatimīśra explains it thus: The mind carefully reflects upon the object intuitively apprehended by a sense-organ, and determines it as like this and unlike this, and thus discriminates it by relating the object to its properties in the subject-predicate relation (viśeṣāṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva). The first apprehension is simple and immediate, like the apprehension of a child, a dumb person, and the like; it is produced by the mere thing; but when after this, the thing as distinguished from its properties, by its genus and the like, is recognized, that process of determination is the operation of the mind.63 Vijñānabhinīkṣu also describes the function of the mind as determination or ascertainment.64 Thus the function of the mind may be interpreted as the power of selective attention which, by its analytico-synthetic function of dissociation and association, breaks up the non-relational immediate intuition of the object, brings out all the relations involved in it, and thus renders it definite and determinate by assimilation and discrimination. When the mind renders the immediate and indeterminate apprehension of the sense-organs definite and determinate by assimilation and discrimination, the empirical ego (ahāṃkāra) appropriates it, and transforms the impersonal apprehension of the object into a personal experience suffused with egoism. Iśvarakṛṣṇa identifies egoism (ahāṃkāra) with self-appropriation (abhimāna).65 Vācaspatimīśra explains the function of ahāṃkāra thus: “I alone preside over the object that is intuited by the sense-organ, and definitely perceived by the mind, and I have the power over all that is perceived and known, and all those objects

61 SPB., ii, 32. See Chapter II.
62 SK., 27.
63 SPB., i, 71.
64 STK., 27.
65 SK., 24.
are for my use. There is no other supreme except 'I'. I am. This self-appropriation is called *ahamkāra* or egoism from its exclusive application."66 Vijñānabhiṣku also regards self-appropriation as the function of *ahamkāra*.67 When the empirical ego (*ahamkāra*) appropriates the determinate apprehension of the mind to itself by its empirical unity of apperception, the intellect (*buddhi*) assumes a conative attitude to react to it, and resolves what is to be done towards the object. The function of the intellect is the ascertainment of its duty towards the object known. This explanation has been offered by Vācaspatimiśra, who observes: "Every one who deals with an object first intuities it, then reflects upon it, then appropriates it, then resolves, 'this is to be done by me,' and then he proceeds to act. This is familiar to every one." Thus the act of ascertainment that such an act is to be done is the operation of the intellect. This is the specific function of the intellect, not differing from the intellect itself. This will be clear from another example of Vācaspatimiśra, which illustrates the successive operations of the internal and external organs in perception. "In dim light a person at first apprehends the mere object as an undifferentiated unit, then attentively reflects upon it, and determines it to be a terrible thief by his bow and arrow, then thinks him in reference to himself, e.g. 'he is running towards me', and then resolves: 'I must fly from this place.'"68 Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha gives the same explanation of *adhyavasāya* in Sāṁkhya-Candrikā. *Adhyavasāya* is a modified condition of the intellect, as flame is that of a lamp; it is determination in such a form as 'such an act is to be done by me.'69 But Gauḍapāda explains *adhyavasāya* as intellectual determination of the object of perception as belonging to a definite class, such as 'this is a jar', 'this is a cloth', etc.70 Vācaspatimiśra also explains *adhyavasāya* elsewhere as ascertainment or determinate knowledge consequent upon the manifestation of the essence (*sattva*) of the intellect, when the inertia (*tamas*) of the intellect is overcome by the operation of the sense-organs in apprehending their objects.71

According to the Sāṁkhya, external perception involves the co-operation of the internal organs with the external sense-organs.

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66 STK., 23.
67 STK., 30.
68 SKG., 23.
69 SPB., i, 72.
70 Sāṁkhya-candrikā, 23.
71 STK., 5.
But the internal organs are not to be regarded as three different and independent substances or faculties, but only as antahkarana in its three grades of functions. Buddhī, ahamkāra, and manas are one in nature; they together constitute the one internal organ (antahkarana). The Sāṁkhya does not believe in faculty psychology. Vijñānabhinīśu clearly brings out the organic unity of these three internal organs and their functions. Every one has, at first, a definite knowledge (niścayajñāna) of an object, and then thinks it in reference to himself in this way: ‘Here am I’, ‘this is to be done by me.’ Thus self-apperception (abhimāna) is an effect of determinate knowledge (niścayajñāna). The function of the empirical ego (ahamkāra) is self-appropriation (abhimāna) and that of the intellect (buddhi) is determinate knowledge (niścayajñāna); but self-appropriation is the effect of determinate knowledge, since it is invariably preceded by determinate knowledge. And if the functions of two substances are related to each other as cause and effect, the substrata of these functions too must be related to each other as cause and effect. So empirical ego (ahamkāra), the substratum of self-appropriation (abhimāna), must be the effect of the intellect (buddhi), the substratum of determinate knowledge (niścayajñāna). Hence though the internal organ (antahkarana) is one and the same, it appears in its threefold character as it has three distinct functions. Buddhī, ahamkāra, and manas are three successive functional modifications of one and the same antahkarana. Vijñānabhinīśu supposes that self-appropriation follows upon determinate knowledge. But Vācaspatamisra interprets adhyāyasāya as the volition of the agent to react to the object of perception in a definite way, and holds that this volition follows upon self-appropriated knowledge.

The relation of the external organs to the internal organs has been well defined by calling the former the gateways of knowledge and the latter the gatekeepers. The external organs receive immediate impressions from external objects, and communicate them to the internal organ (antahkarana) which, in its different functions of reflection (manana), self-apperception (abhimāna), and determination (adhyāyasāya), makes them definite and determinate, and receives them for the experience

72 SPB., i, 64.
73 SK., 35; see Chapter I.
of the self. The external sense-organs come into contact with external objects and thereby supply us with the 'manifold of intuitions' in the language of Kant. The function of the particular senses is simple apprehension. What they apprehend is a mere manifold, a congeries of discrete impressions, though each apprehends only a manifold of a particular kind. The mind operates on this 'manifold of intuitions' and synthesizes the congeries of discrete impressions into distinct aggregates or groups. Until the discrete sensations given by sensibility (or the external senses) are formed into groups, there can be no perception of them as things. It is the function of the mind (manas) to form these groups and thereby to transform a certain number of sensations into one distinct percept. Then the fluctuating sensations are referred to the unity of the empirical ego, when the consciousness supervenes that the sensations are mine, that I perceive. This self-apperception is the function of the empirical ego (ahamkāra). The perception is not complete, till the object has been determined by a further process of thought, till it has been identified by reference to the category to which it belongs. It is the function of the intellect (buddhi) to define and ascertain objects by recognizing that they realize a certain type. And it is the intellect which imports the empirical relations of space and time, which are nothing but the constructions or categories of the understanding (buddhi-nirmāna) into the spaceless and timeless continuum of discrete impressions synthesized by the mind into distinct groups and referred to the unity of the empirical ego. When the percept has been fully determined in this way, it is presented by the intellect to the self (puruṣa), in order that it may have an experience of it. According to Kant, sensibility supplies us with mere 'manifold of intuitions'; the unity of the manifold is contributed entirely by the understanding. According to the Sāṁkhyā, synthesis proceeds from the three internal organs, mind, empirical ego, and the intellect or understanding. According to Kant, time and space are the forms of sensibility. According to the Sāṁkhyā-Yoga, they are the categories of the understanding. But according to both, knowledge is the joint product of sensibility and understanding (or the intellect). But the Sāṁkhyā does not oppose sensibility and understanding to each other; sensibility, mind, self-apperception, and understanding all are the channels of perception; all these
are opposed to the self (puruṣa) which alone is conscious—sensibility, mind, empirical ego, and intellect being but insentient evolutes of Prakṛti for the experience of the self.

We have explained the function of the external and internal organs in the process of perception. But how is it that the external and internal organs, which are insentient principles, can have conscious apprehension of objects? It is the self (puruṣa) that makes them apprehend objects. According to the Śāmkhya-Yoga, perception depends upon two metaphysical conditions. In the first place, it implies the existence of an extra-mental object. In the second place, it implies the existence of the self (puruṣa). Vyāsa observes, the object is independent of the mind and common to all persons; and the minds, too, are independent of objects, which operate for the experience of the self; the experience of the self (in the form of the knowledge of an object) arises from the relation of the mind to the object.75 The Buddhists, however, deny the existence of the self and hold that the mind is self-conscious and self-luminous. But the Śāmkhya-Yoga holds that the mind (citta) is not self-luminous, since it is an object of consciousness.76 Just as the other sense-organs and sensible objects are not self-luminous, inasmuch as they are objects of consciousness, so the mind, too, is not self-luminous inasmuch as it is an object of consciousness. The mind cannot be self-conscious (svābhāsa) because it is the effect of the unconscious prakṛti. How, then, can it manifest the object? The Śāmkhya-Yoga admits the existence of the self (puruṣa) as the cognizer of the mind. The essence of the self is consciousness; it is not an attribute of the self. The self-luminous self is reflected upon the unconscious mind (buddhi) and mistakes the state of the mind for its own state.77 The self is neither entirely similar to the mind nor entirely different from it. It is different from the mind for the following reasons. Firstly, the mind (buddhi) undergoes modification, since its objects are sometimes known and sometimes unknown; but the self is immutable, since its object, the mind is always known. Secondly, the self realizes its own end; but the mind (buddhi) realizes the end of the self, which is different from it, since it co-operates with the body and

75 YBh., iv, 16.
76 Na tat svābhāsaṁ drṣyatvāt. YBh., iv, 19.
77 Here we take the word 'mind' in the sense of buddhi (intellect).
the sense-organs. Thirdly, the mind (buddhi) takes the forms of all insentient objects which are the combinations of the three ultimate reals, viz. essence (sattva), energy (rajas), and inertia (tamas), and thus apprehends them. Hence the mind itself is made up of the three fundamental reals and is thus insentient; but the self is the witness of the unconscious buddhi and the ultimate reals. But if the self is not quite similar to the mind (buddhi), it is not quite different from it, since the self, though pure in itself, knows the state of the unconscious mind (buddhi) intelligized by the reflection of the self in it, and erroneously supposes it to be its own state. The buddhi, though unconscious in its nature, is intelligized by the reflection of the self-luminous puruṣa. But on this point there are two slightly different views. Vācaspatimisra holds that the self-conscious puruṣa is reflected on the unconscious buddhi and thus intelligizes it. Vijñānabhikṣu, on the other hand, holds that not only is the self reflected on the buddhi in its particular state, but the illuminated mode of the buddhi, too, is reflected back on the self. Thus there is mutual reflection of the self on the buddhi and of the buddhi on the self. Thus the Sāṃkhya-Yoga avoids the theory of interaction, but it does not commit itself to the theory of psycho-physical parallelism, since there is a mutual reflection of the conscious self and the unconscious buddhi upon each other.

The Sāṃkhya doctrine of perception is based upon dualistic metaphysics. But the Sāṃkhya does not advocate the Cartesian dualism of matter and mind because both these are made up of the same stuff, viz. the ultimate reals, e.g. sattva, rajas and tamas, and both are unconscious. The Sāṃkhya dualism is the dualism of puruṣa (conscious self) and prakṛti (unconscious primal nature) of which buddhi is an evolute. The Sāṃkhya dualism is not the uncompromising dualism of the Cartesians. The dualism of the Sāṃkhya is modified by the admission that there are different grades of existence among the modifications of prakṛti, the highest of which is buddhi. Buddhi is unconscious, no doubt, but it is so transparent and light owing to the predominance of sattva that it can catch the reflection of the puruṣa, whereas gross material objects cannot reflect the light of the puruṣa owing to the predominance of mass-stuff (tamas), the factor of obstruction. Thus, according to the Sāṃkhya, buddhi is an intermediate reality.

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" YDh., ii, 20. **See Chapter XII."
between gross matter and the conscious *purusa*, which partakes of the nature of both; it is unconscious like gross material objects, but it is transparent like the self-luminous *purusa*. It is only in *buddhi* that the conscious *purusa* and the unconscious material objects come into contact with each other. This supposition may be compared with the hypothesis of Descartes, that it is only in the pineal gland of the brain that the body and the mind, which are entirely heterogeneous in nature, can interact upon each other. The Sāmkhya, however, does not believe in the theory of interaction. Nor does it believe in the theory of parallelism. It advocates an intermediate theory which partakes of the nature of both. It advocates the theory of mutual reflection\(^{60}\) of the conscious *purusa* on the unconscious *buddhi* and of the unconscious but intelligized *buddhi* on the conscious *purusa*. Thus the conscious *purusa* seems to act upon the unconscious *buddhi*, when it is reflected on it; and the unconscious *buddhi* seems to act upon the conscious *purusa*, when the intelligized *buddhi* is reflected on the conscious *purusa*. The Sāmkhya doctrine of mutual reflection of *purusa* and *buddhi* on each other thus looks like the theory of interaction. And since corresponding to the consciousness of the self there is a modification of the unconscious *buddhi* and corresponding to the modification of *buddhi* there is a consciousness of the self, the Sāmkhya theory looks like the theory of parallelism. But really it is neither of the two. *Buddhi* is unconscious but active; but *purusa* is conscious but inactive. But the inactive *purusa* erroneously regards itself as active owing to the reflection of active *buddhi* on it, and the unconscious *buddhi* seems to be conscious owing to its proximity to the conscious *purusa*.\(^{61}\) But how is contact or proximity possible between two beings, which are entirely heterogeneous in nature and thus independent of each other? Though *purusa* and *buddhi* are heterogeneous, they stand in a definite relation to each other. They are related to each other as a means to an end; *buddhi* serves the purpose of the *purusa*; the activity of *buddhi* is for the realization of an end of the *purusa*. Thus though the self is changeless and inactive and consequently cannot act upon the unconscious *buddhi* to make it conscious, still it reflects itself upon the transparent essence of the *buddhi* (*buddhisattva*), when

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\(^{60}\) This is the doctrine of Vijñānabhairu. See Chapter XII.

\(^{61}\) SPB., i, 87, 99, and 104.
it is transformed into the form of its object, and appears to have the same function in itself, and the unconscious buddhi appears to be conscious by receiving the reflection of the purusa.\textsuperscript{83}

We have discussed at length the relation of purusa to buddhi. Let us consider the general relation of the organs of perception, both external and internal, to the purusa and to their appropriate objects. Why do the organs of perception act at all? What induces them to perform their respective functions? They are not guided by the purusa in performing their functions. The external and internal organs perform their respective functions for the accomplishment of the purpose of the purusa. They have a spontaneous disposition to realize the ends of the purusa and perform their respective functions by mutual incitements.\textsuperscript{83} There is an unconscious adaptation of the external and internal organs to their appropriate objects, and there is also an unconscious adaptation of the organs of perception to the self.\textsuperscript{84} Vācaspatimiśra explains the operation of the sense-organs by the thirst for enjoyment (bhogatṛṣṇā). So long as it persists in the mind, the sense-organs apprehend their proper objects for the enjoyment of the 'self; but when it is uprooted from the mind, the activity of the sense-organs ceases and consequently there is the cessation of the enjoyment of the purusa too. Vyāsa says that even as an inactive loadstone attracts a piece of iron to it by its own power, so the objects, though inactive in themselves, attract the active mind by their own influence, relate it to themselves, and transform it into their forms. Hence that object which colours the mind in a particular state is known by it in that state and all other objects are unknown.\textsuperscript{85}

We may summarize the conditions of perception thus: (1) A real object of perception must exist. This characteristic distinguishes perception from illusion. (2) The external sense-organs yield an immediate apprehension of their objects. (3) Manas reflects upon this immediate apprehension of the external sense-organs and makes it definite by assimilation and discrimination. (4) Ahamkāra (empirical ego) appropriates to itself this determinate apprehension of the mind and refers it to the empirical unity of apperception. (5) Buddhi (intellect) resolves what is to be done towards the object perceived; it is the will to react to

\textsuperscript{83} YBh., ii, 20.  
\textsuperscript{84} STK., 31.  
\textsuperscript{85} SK., 31.  
\textsuperscript{86} YBh., iv, 17.
the object perceived. (6) The puruṣa (self) enjoys the perception of the object. It is the transcendent principle of intelligence which intelligizes the unconscious buddhi and makes perceptive consciousness possible. Perception, therefore, involves many processes from the mere sense-cognition to the conative attitude of the mind to react to the object perceived; it involves immediate apprehension as well as many interpretative processes.

7. The Vedānta Theory of Perception

According to the Advaita Vedānta, there is one universal, eternal, ubiquitous, changeless light of consciousness, which is called Brahman. This eternal consciousness is modalized in three ways. (1) It is modalized by different objects and called object-consciousness (viṣaya-caitanya). (2) It is modalized by mental modes and called cognitive-consciousness (pramāṇa-caitanya). (3) And it is modalized by different minds and called cognizing-consciousness (pramātur Caitanya). Thus though there is only one universal consciousness, it is determined by the mind or internal organ (antaḥkaraṇa), the activities of the mind or mental modes (antaḥkaranavyṛti), and the objects cognized (viṣaya). These are the determinants of the universal light of consciousness.⁶⁶

Perception, according to the Śaṅkarite, is only caitanya or consciousness.⁶⁷ Though the universal and eternal consciousness (Brahman) can never be produced, the empirical modalities of this consciousness as determined by the mental modes may be said to be produced by the sense-organs; for the sense-organs produce the mental mode or activity of the internal organ, which serves to manifest and modalize the eternal light of consciousness. And the activity of the mind or internal organ is said to be cognition (jñāna), inasmuch as it serves the purpose of qualifying or determining the consciousness.⁶⁸

Perception involves the function (vr̥tti) of the internal organ (antaḥkaraṇa). The translucent antaḥkaraṇa, which is of the nature of light (taijasa), moves out to the object through the channel of the sense-organs, and is modified into its form. This modification of the internal organ into the form of the object cognized is called vr̥tti. Vr̥tti, therefore, is the mental mode which apprehends the object.⁶⁹ This out-going of the apprehending

⁶⁶ VP., pp. 55-6.
⁶⁷ VP., p. 41.
⁶⁸ VP., p. 42.
⁶⁹ VP., p. 57.
mental mode (urtti) to the object is involved only in perception. In inference and other kinds of cognition the mental mode does not go out to the object. For instance, in the case of inference of fire from smoke, the mental mode (urtti) does not go out to the fire, since the visual organ does not come into contact with the fire but with the smoke. But in the case of the perception of a jar, the mental mode which apprehends the jar goes out to the jar, is modified into its form, and occupies the same position in space with it. So the consciousness determined by the apprehending mental mode becomes identified with the consciousness determined by the jar, since the determinants of the two consciousnesses having an identity of locus cannot bring about any difference in the consciousness determined by them. Thus in the perception of the jar, the consciousness modalized by the jar (ghatavacchinnacaitanya) is identified with the consciousness modalized by the mental mode which is modified into the form of the jar (ghatvāravacchinnacaitanya). In other words, there is an identification of the apprehending mental mode (pramāṇacaitanya) with the object (viśaya-caitanya)—of the perceptive-consciousness with the percept.96

There is a distinction between the bare perception of an object and the perception of the object as object. In the former there is only an identification of the cognitive-consciousness (pramāṇacaitanya) with the object-consciousness (viśaya-caitanya). But in the latter there is not only an identification of the cognitive-consciousness with the object-consciousness, but also an identification of the cognitive-consciousness (pramāṇa-caitanya) with the cognizing-consciousness (pramāṭr-caitanya). In the apprehending mental mode is referred to the empirical self (pramāṇa) and identified with it. But it may be objected that in the perception 'I see this' the empirical self or I-consciousness (aham) is clearly distinguished from the empirical object or this-consciousness (idam). How, then, can the former be identified with the latter? The Śaṅkārite points out that the perception of an object depends on the identification of the object-consciousness (viśaya-caitanya) with the cognitive-consciousness (pramāṇa-caitanya), which is not different from the cognizing-consciousness (pramāṭr-caitanya), or that the consciousness determined by the activity of the internal organ (antaḥkaranavrttiya-

96 VP., pp. 58-9.
vacchinnacaitanya) is not different from the consciousness determined by the internal organ itself (antaḥkaraṇavacchinnacaitanya). Thus in the perception of an object as object, not only the object-consciousness is identified with the cognitive-consciousness, but also the cognitive-consciousness is identified with the cognizing-consciousness, so that the object-consciousness becomes identified with the cognizing-consciousness or self-consciousness.

Here the identification of the object-consciousness (prameyacaitanya) with the self-consciousness (pramāyacaitanya) does not mean the absolute identity of the two. All that it intends to convey is that the being of the object is not independent of, and separate from, the being of the self. The object becomes a percept, only when there is an identity of the knowing subject with the known object. When I see a jar, the jar becomes identified, in point of being, with my being; hence the jar becomes an object of my perception. In the perception 'I see the jar', though there is a distinction between my self and the jar, the being of the jar (ghaṭasattā) is not independent of, and separate from, the being of my self (pramāya-sattā). The object is not identical with the self, nor is it an evolute or modification of the self. But the object being superimposed on the object-consciousness (viṣaya-caitanya), the being of the object is identical with the being of its substratum, viz. the object-consciousness, since the Śaṅkarite does not admit that the being of a superimposed entity (āropitasattā) is separate from the being of its substratum (adhiṣṭhāna-sattā). Thus the being of the substratum of the percept is identical with the being of the percept. The substratum of the percept is the object-consciousness (viṣaya-caitanya).

The object-consciousness is identical with the cognitive-consciousness (pramāya-caitanya), because when the mental mode is modified into the form of the object, the consciousness determined by the mental mode (pramāya-caitanya) is identified with the consciousness determined by the object (viṣaya-caitanya). The cognitive-consciousness (pramāya-caitanya), again, is identical with the cognizing-consciousness or self-consciousness (pramāya-caitanya), because the former is the consciousness determined by the activity (vr̥tti) of the internal organ (antaḥkaraṇa), while the latter is the consciousness determined by the internal organ itself, and there is not a real difference between the internal organ and its activity. Thus the object-consciousness is identical with the
self-consciousness, and hence the being of the object perceived is identical with the being of the percipient self. The self-consciousness (pramāṇa-caitanya) is the substratum of the percept, so that the being of the percept is identical with the being of the self. Thus the perception of an object as distinct from the self and yet related to it involves the identification of the object-consciousness (viśaya-caitanya) with the cognitive-consciousness (pramāṇa-caitanya) and the self-consciousness (pramāṇa-caitanya).\(^1\)

In other words, it involves the identification of the perceived object with the apprehending mental mode and the percipient self. We may graphically represent the Śaṅkarite doctrine of perception by the following equations: (1) The object-consciousness (viśaya-caitanya) = the cognitive-consciousness (pramāṇa-caitanya or antahkaraṇavṛtttyavacchinna-caitanya). The cognitive-consciousness (antahkaraṇavṛtttyavacchinna-caitanya) = the cognizing-consciousness or self-consciousness (antahkaranāvacchinnacaitanya). ; The object-consciousness (viśaya-caitanya) = the self-consciousness (pramāṇa-caitanya). (2) The being of the cognized object (viśayasattā) = the being of the substratum of the cognized object (viśyādhiṣṭhānasattā) or the being of the object-consciousness (viśaya-caitanya-sattā). The being of the object-consciousness (viśayacaitanya-sattā) = the being of the self-consciousness (pramāṇa-caitanya-sattā). ; The being of the cognized object (viśyasattā) = the being of the cognizing self (pramāṇa-sattā).

Just as in external perception the object-consciousness is identified with the cognitive-consciousness, so in the internal perception of pleasure the consciousness determined by pleasure is identified with the consciousness determined by the mental mode apprehending the pleasure. Here both the consciousness determined by the pleasure and the consciousness determined by the mental mode are determined by limitations which subsist in the same substratum. In other words, the pleasure and the apprehending mental mode, both of which are determinants of universal consciousness, subsist in one and the same substratum, viz. the internal organ.\(^2\) Thus both in external perception and internal perception there is an identification of the object-consciousness with the cognitive-consciousness and the self-consciousness. According to the Śaṅkarite, this is the most fundamental

\(^1\) *VP*, pp. 58-9, and pp. 75-7.

\(^2\) *VP*, p. 59.
condition of perception. Thus mental states of pleasure and pain are perceived by the self with the aid of their corresponding mental modes (vṛtti). But though pleasure and pain are perceived with the aid of their corresponding vṛttis, these vṛttis themselves are directly perceived by the self without the intervention of other vṛttis. If one vṛtti requires another vṛtti for its apprehension, then that will require a third vṛtti and so on ad infinitum. So, according to the Śaṅkarite, vṛttis or mental modes are cognized by direct intellectual intuition (kevalaśākṣīvedya), in which the adventitious processes are not necessary. The mind and its qualities, viz. pleasure and pain, are directly perceived by the witness (sākṣin) through the agency of the corresponding vṛttis or mental modes, but the vṛttis themselves are directly perceived by the witness (sākṣin) not through the medium of other intervening vṛttis.⁵³

In the perception of an object the mind (antaḥkaraṇa) streaming out of the sense-orifices of the organism reaches the object, and is determined into a mode (vṛtti) by taking the form of the object, which occupies the same position in space with the object. In this way there is a correspondence between the mental order and the given order.⁵⁴ The apprehending mental mode (vṛtti) and the object (viśaya) are distinct from each other, but still they correspond with each other in occupying the same position in space, and the mental mode (vṛtti) having the same form as that of the object. In fact, according to the Śaṅkarite, there is not an ultimate distinction between the mind and the object, both of them being the products of nescience (māyā, avidyā) and determinants of the one universal, eternal consciousness. It is by means of the empirical mental mode (vṛtti) that the mind comes to be related to the object. The vṛtti, therefore, relates the mind to the object. But it is not a tertium quid between two unrelated terms. The vṛtti is an empirical mode of the mind, which takes the form of the object. Therefore it is the meeting-place, as it were, of the two substances, the mind and the object. It is not different from the mind, because it is a mode of the mind. It is not different from the object, because it is the transformation of the mind into the form of the object, i.e. it incorporates the form of the object in itself. Thus the mental

⁵³ VP., pp. 79-82. See Chapter XI.
mode, being identified with the object, occupies the same position in space. In perception the mind and the object occupy the same space-position; they have an identity of locus. This distinguishes perception from inference. In inference the mind does not go out to the object inferred to take the form of the object. It merely thinks of the inferred object but does not go out to meet it. But in perception the mind goes out to the object and is transformed into its shape. Professor Bhattacharyya rightly observes: "The distinction is practically that drawn in modern psychology, only viewed from the point of view of the Self's spontaneity, that in perception the given element and its interpretation are welded together in a unity, while in inference they are kept distinct. In perception, the self as invested with the mental mode becomes further materialized into the particular function of the sense-organ excited by the particular stimulus."

In perception the apprehending mental mode (vṛtti) and the object (viṣaya) should not only occupy the same position in space but also the same position in time. The mental mode in the form of a perceptive process occupies the present moment in time. So the object of perception also should occupy the present moment in time. The perceptive process and the perceived object should occupy the same time-position. Otherwise the perception of pleasure would be quite the same as the recollection of pleasure. In the perception of pleasure the pleasure (viṣaya) and the apprehending mental mode (vṛtti) occupy the same space-position. In the recollection of pleasure also the pleasure remembered (viṣaya) and the recollection of pleasure (vṛtti) occupy the same space-position. How, then, can we distinguish the perception of pleasure from the recollection of pleasure? We can do so if we admit another condition of perception. In the act of perception, the perceptive process and the perceived object must occupy the same time-position. In the recollection of pleasure, the pleasure, which is the object of recollection, exists in the past, while the apprehending mental mode (vṛtti) in the form of recollection exists at present, so that the two are not co-eval. Hence, in order to exclude the act of recollection from the act of perception, we must lay down another condition of perception, viz. the object of perception must exist in the present time."

"Studies in Vedantism, p. 54.
"VP., pp. 59-60.
In order to exclude the śabdajñāna or knowledge through authoritative statement by means of which we can apprehend supersensuous objects such as spiritual merit and demerit (dharmaḍharama), we must add another qualification to the object of perception. The object of perception must be yogya or capable of being perceived; it must not be by its very nature imperceptible (ayogya). Spiritual merit and demerit are as much qualities of the mind as pleasure and pain. Why, then, are not the former perceived, while the latter are perceived? The Saṅkarite replies that the former are, by their very nature, imperceptible. What is capable (yogya) of being perceived and what is incapable (ayogya) of being perceived can be known only by the result of our attempt to perceive them. Some objects are perceptible by their very nature, while others are imperceptible by their very nature. Thus the direct perceptibility of an object consists in the fact that the subjective consciousness underlying the apprehending mental mode becomes united with the consciousness underlying the object, the object existing in the present space and time and capable of being perceived through a specific sense-organ, and the apprehending mental mode also having the same form as that of the object.

The author of Vedāntaparibhāṣā divides perception into two kinds, viz. sensuous (indriyajanya) perception and non-sensuous (indriyājanya) perception. The former is produced by the sense-organs, while the latter is not. Dharmarājadhvarīndra regards the external senses only as sense-organs. He does not regard the mind as a sense-organ. So by sensuous perception he means external perception, and by non-sensuous perception he means internal perception. We have sensuous perception of external objects, and non-sensuous perception of pleasure, pain, and the like. But the Naiyāyika may object that if the mind is not a sense-organ, we cannot speak of the perception of pleasure and pain, because perception is always produced by a sense-organ. The Saṅkarite replies that the perception of pleasure and pain does not necessarily imply that the mind is a sense-organ through which the self perceives pleasure and pain. The directness (sāksāttvam) of a cognition does not consist in its being produced by a sense-organ.

**VP., pp. 61-2.**
**VP., p. 74.**
**VP., p. 177.**
If it did so, then inferential cognition also would be regarded as direct perception, since it is produced by the mind which is regarded by the Naiyāyika as a sense-organ. Moreover, God has no sense-organ, but still He has perception. Hence the Naiyāyika contention is absolutely unfounded. According to the Śaṅkarite, production by a sense-organ (indriyajñayatā) is neither a sufficing condition nor a necessary condition of perception (pratyakṣa-jñāna); the directness of a cognition (sākṣātva) or its perceptual character (pratyakṣatva) depends on the identification of the cognitive-consciousness with the object-consciousness, or of the apprehending mental mode with the perceived object.\textsuperscript{100}

The Śaṅkarite divides perception, again, into the perception of an object (jñeyapratyakṣa) and the perception of a cognition (jñānapratyakṣa). The former is perceived through the medium of a mental mode (vṛtti). The latter is perceived in itself without the intervention of a mental mode.\textsuperscript{101} The Śaṅkarite recognizes the distinction between indeterminate (nirvikalpa) perception and determinate (savikalpa) perception. We have already dealt with them.\textsuperscript{102} The Śaṅkarite divides perception into two other kinds, viz. the perception of the witness self (jīvasākṣātipratyakṣa) and the perception of the divine witness (Iśvarasākṣātipratyakṣa).\textsuperscript{103} We shall deal with them in the last chapter.

We have seen that a mental mode (vṛtti) relates the percepient self to the perceived object. It reveals the consciousness underlying the object. Without it there can be no perception of an object, mental or extra-mental. Pleasure and pain are perceived through the corresponding mental modes, and external objects also are perceived through the corresponding mental modes (vṛtti). And vṛtti is the modification of the internal organ (antahkarana) into the form of the object. Therefore, without antahkarana there can be no perception. But if the empirical self (jīva) perceives an object through the instrumentality of a function (vṛtti) of the internal organ (antahkarana), what is the use of the sense-organs? The Śaṅkarite holds that the intercourse of the sense-organs with external objects is necessary for perceiving them, since it is the cause of the mental mode (vṛtti) which reveals the object-consciousness. If the consciousness underlying the object is not revealed, it cannot be perceived.

\textsuperscript{100} VP., p. 52.
\textsuperscript{101} VP., pp. 79-82.
\textsuperscript{102} VP., p. 89; Chapter II.
\textsuperscript{103} VP., p. 102.
And if a mental mode (*vṛtti*) does not move out to the object and remove the veil of nescience which conceals the consciousness underlying the object, the object-consciousness cannot be revealed. And a mental mode (*vṛtti*) is not possible, if there is no intercourse of the sense-organs with the objects of perception. It is the sense-object-intercourse that produces a mental mode (*vṛtti*) which is necessary for perception. This is the function of the sense-organs in perception. We have already discussed the different kinds of sense-object-intercourse recognized by the Śaṅkarite.

The Śaṅkarite agrees with the Śaṅkhya in holding that the mind (*antaḥkaraṇa*) goes out to the object and assumes its form, so that the form of the object corresponds to the form of the apprehending mental mode. This account of the Śaṅkhya-Vedānta runs counter to the account of Western psychology, according to which, the object comes into contact with a sense-organ and produces an affection in it, which is carried to the brain, and this affection produces an impression in the mind. Western psychology gives priority to the object which acts upon the mind or subject. The Śaṅkhya-Vedānta, on the other hand, gives priority to the mind or subject which goes out to the object, acts upon it, and assumes its form. The physiological account of the perceptual process is extremely vague. There is a yawning gulf between the cerebral process and the mental process. It cannot be bridged over. How the cortical vibration in the sensory centre in the brain produces a sensation in the mind is a mystery. The Śaṅkhya-Vedānta mitigates the uncompromising dualism of matter and spirit by admitting that *buddhi* or *antaḥkaraṇa* is an intermediate reality between unconscious matter and conscious spirit. It is material, no doubt, but it is made up of very subtle matter, and is, so to say, a hyper-physical entity. It is plastic and translucent in nature and reflects the light of consciousness, on the one hand, and assumes the form of the object, on the other. According to the Śaṅkhya-Vedānta, the object does not break in upon the mind and imprint its form on it, but the mind goes out to the object and assumes its form. Thus, though both subject and object are necessary for perception, dominance is given to the subject, and the object is regarded as subordinate to

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\[104\] VP., p. 87.
\[105\] Chapter IV.
the subject. Subject and object, therefore, cannot be regarded as co-ordinate terms in knowledge, but the subject is always the dominant factor. The supreme importance of the vṛtti of the mind in perception proves the dominance of the subject-element. The object can never have priority to the subject. But the subject (mind) can pour itself into the object and incorporate it in itself. This is what is intended by the Śāṅkhya-Vedānta, when it holds that the mind goes out to the object and assumes its form. And it is much easier to conceive the out-going of the mind intelligized by the conscious self to the object than the in-coming of the unconscious object to the mind. Moreover, according to the Śāṅkarite, both the object and the mind (antahkarana) have only an empirical existence, being modifications of nescience; but the mind has this advantage over the object that it has the power of reflecting the light of consciousness in itself and thus appearing to be conscious. So the mind is supposed to go out to the object and assume its form. Thus the hypothesis of vṛtti is not entirely unreasonable.

Some object that all objects are capable of being illumined by the light (prasāda) of the witness self (sāksin). What, then, is the use of the vṛtti or mental mode? Even though it may be necessary to postulate the vṛtti to assume the form of the object, there is no need of admitting that the vṛtti moves outward to the object of cognition. Just as it is held that the witness self (sāksin) illumines an object of inference, which is not present to a sense-organ through the agency of a vṛtti which does not move out to the object, so it may be held that the witness self illumines the object of direct perception, which is present to a sense-organ, with the aid of a vṛtti which does not move out to the object perceived. This theory does not obliterate the distinction between perceptual knowledge and non-perceptual knowledge. The difference between the two lies in the fact that the former is produced through the instrumentality of the sense-organs, while the latter is not produced through the instrumentality of them.108

This objection has been refuted in three ways by the Vedāntists. (1) Some Vedāntists hold that in perceptual knowledge the light of consciousness determined by the object of perception illumines the object, since the object-consciousness (viśaya-caitanya) is the substratum of the object and hence this

alone can illumine it. The cognizing-consciousness (pramāṇa-castiṃya) or the consciousness determined by the internal organ cannot illumine the object, because it does not constitute the essence of the object, and is not related to it by the relation of identity in essence (tādāṁmya). And it is the apprehending mental mode (uṣṭti) that moves out to the object, removes the veil of nescience that conceals the object-consciousness, and reveals it. When the object-consciousness is thus revealed by the uṣṭti, it illumines the object. But in non-perceptual knowledge there is no sense-object-intercourse which is the cause of the moving out of the uṣṭti of the mind; so the consciousness determined by the mental mode, which does not move out to the object, illumines the non-presented object.\textsuperscript{107} (2) Other Vedāntists hold that just as the perception of pleasure, pain, etc., is due to these being in direct relation to the principle of consciousness underlying them, so the perception of external objects is due to these objects being in direct relation to the light of consciousness underlying them, and the outward movement of the uṣṭti of the internal organ is necessary for disclosing the consciousness that underlies these objects. Thus the direct cognition of external objects is due to the direct relation between these objects and the consciousness underlying them. But if the object-consciousness is not disclosed, it cannot be directly related to external objects of which it is the substratum. And the object-consciousness is disclosed by the uṣṭti of the internal organ which moves out to the external objects, removes the veil of nescience, and reveals the light of consciousness underlying them.\textsuperscript{108} (3) Other Vedāntists hold that in the perceptual knowledge of an object we perceive a certain vividness (spaṣṭatā) which is lacking in the object of non-perceptual knowledge. Thus though we might hear of the sweetness and fragrance of the mango from a trustworthy person even a hundred times, our knowledge of the sweetness and fragrance would lack in vividness. This vividness in the object of direct sensuous perception is due to the fact that the consciousness underlying the object, which is disclosed by the mental mode (uṣṭti) moving out to the object, is identical in essence with the object itself. In other words, the vividness of the object perceived is due to the disclosure of the object-consciousness which consists

\textsuperscript{107} SLS., pp. 335-6.
\textsuperscript{108} SLS., p. 336.
in the removal of the veil of nescience which conceals it; and this removal of the veil of nescience is due to the *vṛtti* moving out to the object. The absence of vividness in the object of non-perceptual knowledge is due to the fact that no *vṛtti* moves out to the object, and thus does not disclose the identity of the object with the consciousness underlying it.\(^{109}\) So the outward movement of the *vṛtti* to an object is the necessary condition only of the direct knowledge of the object.

\* SLS., p. 337 and pp. 339-40. See also S.L.
BOOK V

CHAPTER VIII

PERCEPTION OF SPACE AND MOVEMENT

1. Introduction

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that there is one, eternal, ubiquitous space, which is not an object of perception. It is inferred from the spatial characters of proximity (aparatva) and remoteness (paratva). But the spatial characters of position, direction, and distance can be perceived directly through vision and touch. The Mīmāṁsākas also hold that these can be perceived directly through vision and touch. According to them, the spatial characters of direction and distance can be directly perceived through the auditory organ also. The Saṁkhya-Pātañjala, on the other hand, holds that space and time are the categories of the understanding or constructions of the intellect (buddhinirmāṇa) according to which it understands the phenomenal world. It is the understanding which imports the empirical relations of space, time, and causality into the world of reals, viz. intelligence-stuff (sattva) energy-stuff (rajas) and matter-stuff (tamas). When we have intellectual intuition (nirvicāra nirvikalpaprajñā), we apprehend the reals as they are in themselves without the imported empirical relations of space, time, and causality.¹ According to Śaṅkara also, space, time, and causality are categories of the understanding, according to which the world of phenomena is interpreted. According to the Buddhist idealists, space and time apart from concrete presentations are ideal constructions of the mind.

2. The Mīmāṁsaka: Direct Auditory Perception of Direction, Distance and Position

Space must be distinguished as deśa (locus) and dīk (direction). According to the Mīmāṁsaka, both locus and direction are

¹ PSAH., p. 21.
directly perceived through the auditory organ, though they are perceived as qualifying adjuncts (viśesāṇa) of sounds. The Mīmāṃsākāra holds that the ear-drum or the auditory organ is prāpyakāri, which produces the perception of a sound, only when it actually comes into contact with the sound. The ear does not go out to its object, viz. the sound which is at a distance, but the sound is produced in a certain point of space at a distance and propagated to the ear-drum through the air-waves. Thus the ear-drum never comes into contact with the locus of a sound; it comes into contact with the sound, when it is carried into it through the air-waves. Thus we perceive a sound, only when the sound is carried to the ear-drum through the air waves. But can there be a direct perception of the locus (deśa) of the sound through the ear-drum? The ear-drum produces the perception of a sound when it is in actual contact with the sound, which is propagated to the ear-drum through the air-waves from another point of space. So the audible sound may be said to have its locus in the ear-drum itself. But is a sound perceived to have its locus in the ear-drum? Or, is it perceived to have its locus in another point of space? We find in our actual experience that sound is never perceived without a local colouring; and it is never perceived as having its locus in the ear-drum. It is always perceived as having its locus in another point of space. But if the ear-drum can never produce the auditory perception of a sound without coming into direct contact with the sound, and if it can never go out to the locus of the sound, where it is produced (śabdottātideśa), it cannot produce the perception of a sound having its locus in a distant point of space. All that it can do is to produce the perception of a sound having its locus in the ear-drum, because the perception of the sound is produced only when the sound is not in its original locus, i.e. the point of space where it was produced, but when it is in the ear-drum. But, as a matter of fact, we never perceive a sound as having its locus in the ear-drum, but in another point of space outside it. Sounds coming from different directions are perceived as having different local characters. Whenever sounds are perceived, they are perceived as coming from particular directions; they are never perceived without their local characters. We have a distinct auditory perception in such a form as ‘the sound comes from this direction’. Thus when sounds come into the ear-drum from different directions,
they come into it not as mere sounds, but as coloured by the different directions from which they come. And the ear-drum, being in contact with these sounds, is in contact with their different local colourings too, and, consequently, it produces the perception of different sounds with different local characters. Thus though the ear-drum cannot come into actual contact with the direction of a sound, yet it can produce the perception of the sound with the local character of its direction. This is the reason why we perceive audible sounds not as seated in the ear-drum but coming from different directions outside it.

According to the Mīmāṃsaka, therefore, just as sounds are directly perceived through the ear, so also the directions from which they come. We never perceive sounds, pure and simple, but sounds with their different local characters; and hence through these local characters of sounds we directly perceive the different directions from which they come. But though according to the Mīmāṃsaka there is a direct auditory perception of direction, we must not suppose that, according to him, there can be a direct auditory perception of direction apart from, and independently of, the perception of sounds. Just as there can be no independent perception of time through the sense-organs apart from the perception of their appropriate objects, so there can be no independent perception of space in the form of direction through the ear apart from the perception of sounds. Thus we perceive space as direction through the auditory organ, not as an independent entity, but only as a qualifying adjunct of sounds which are coloured by the directions from which they come. Hence, according to the Mīmāṃsaka, we have a direct auditory perception of space in the form of direction. The Naiyāyika also holds that direction is perceived through the perceptions of east, west, and the like.

The local position of an object can be determined, if its direction and distance from us can be ascertained, because the local position of an object is nothing but its position in a point of space in a particular direction and at a particular distance

8 Yatastu diśa śāgata dhavanayastayā viśeśatāḥ sābdanti, bodhayati, sā hi dik śrotaprāptyā sakya devatā śrotreṇa grahitum. SāD., p. 554.
8 Yadyapi na svātantreyena diśa śrotagraṇhayataṃ tathāpi sābdē grhyamāne tadviśeṣanatayā digapi śrotreṇa grhyate. SāD., p. 554.
4 SāD., pp. 553-4.
* NM., p. 137.
from us. Thus the local position of an object in relation to us involves its direction and distance from us. We have already seen that, according to the Mīmāṁsaka, the direction of a sound can be directly perceived as the local character of the sound through the auditory organ. But how can distance be perceived through the ear? Sounds coming from a proximate point of space are perceived as most intense (śūra) but their intensity becomes feeble and more feeble as they come from greater and greater distances. Thus sounds are perceived as having different degrees of intensity according to their varying distances. And through these different degrees of intensity of sound-sensations we directly perceive the distances from which they come. And as we directly perceive the directions of sounds through the local characters of acoustic sensations, and their distances through the different degrees of their intensity, we can easily infer the original position of sounds. As a matter of fact, whenever we perceive sounds, we directly perceive their directions as well as distances through their different local characters and different degrees of intensity respectively, and, consequently, we vaguely perceive their local positions too. But the local positions of sounds cannot be exactly ascertained without an act of inference from the directions and distances of sounds.

3. The Mīmāṁsaka Explanation of the Extra-organic Localization of Sounds

According to the Mīmāṁsaka, the perception of a sound is produced only when it has come into the ear-drump which is in direct contact with it; it cannot be perceived when it is in its own original position outside the ear-drump. Thus the real seat (paramārthiḥdeśa) of an audible sound is the ear-drump; it can never be the place where it was originally produced (dhvanyut-pattideśa). Still we perceive an audible sound as having its seat not in the ear-drump, but in the original position in space. For this the Mīmāṁsaka offers the following reason. When the sound comes into the ear-drump, it comes with a particular local colouring, qualified by the direction and position from which it comes,

*Dhvanayaśca krameṇa mandibhavanatāḥ pratyāsannād dūrād dūratārāccā desādāgatastivram mandam mandaratam ca ābdām bodhayaṃ. SD., pp. 554-5.*

pp. 554-5.
and, consequently, we perceive the sound with a particular local character and a particular degree of intensity through which we directly perceive the direction and the original position of the sound. And thus because of the non-apprehension of the real seat of an audible sound, viz. the locus of the ear-drum, and because of the apprehension of the original position of the sound through its local character and intensity, we mistake the original position of the sound for its real seat. Thus in the extra-organic localization of sounds there is an error of judgment. Just as in the illusory perception of silver in a shell we perceive the shell before our eyes, but we reproduce the silver in memory perceived in another place owing to their similarity and erroneously connect the position of the shell with silver, though in reality there is no connection between the two, so we erroneously connect an audible sound with its original position in space outside the ear-drum, though, in fact, the ear-drum itself is the real seat of the audible sound. Thus in the perception of a sound in such a form as ‘there is a sound at such a distance to the east’ there is an extra-organic localization of the sound in which there is an illusory projection of the sound into the point of space in which the sound was originally produced.\(^8\)

According to the Buddhists, though the olfactory organ, the gustatory organ, and the tactual organ apprehend their objects, viz. smell, taste, and touch respectively, when there is a direct contact of the objects with the sense-organs, the visual organ and the auditory organ are aprāpyakāri, i.e. they can apprehend their objects without coming into direct contact with them.\(^9\). Thus a sound need not come from its locus of origin into the ear-drum in order to be perceived as the Mīmāṁsākā supposes; but it can be perceived through the ear though it is at a distance from the sound. And as there is a real connection between a sound and its place of origin, the extra-organic localization of a sound-sensation is not illusory. There is no error of judgment in referring a sound-sensation to a particular point of space where the sound was originally produced.\(^10\)

Kumārila criticizes the Buddhist view thus: On the Buddhist hypothesis, we cannot account for the apprehension of a

\(^8\) SD, and SDP, p. 555.
\(^9\) See Chapter I.
\(^10\) SD, and SDP, p. 557.
sound by a person near at hand and the non-apprehension of it by a person far away from it. And also, on the Buddhist view, we cannot account for the fact that a sound is first perceived by a person near it, and then perceived by a person far away from it; nor can we account for the fact that sounds have different degrees of intensity (śūramandaśāvyāvastha) according as they come from greater and greater distances. If the ear could apprehend a sound even from a distance without coming into direct contact with it as the Buddhists suppose, then all sounds far and near would be simultaneously perceived through the ear, and there would be no such order in the perception of sounds as the sounds proximate to the ear are perceived first and then those which are at a distance. But these are the facts of experience. First we perceive those sounds which are near us, and then we perceive those which are at a distance. The same sound is first perceived by a person near it, and then by one at a distance. This order of succession in the perception of sounds can never be explained by the Buddhist theory. If the ear could apprehend a sound from a distance without coming into direct contact with it, then it would simultaneously apprehend all sounds far and near. Hence the Buddhist theory is not sound.\textsuperscript{11}

4. \textit{The Mimāṃsaka and the Vaiśeṣika: Perception of Movement.}

The Prābhākara holds that movement is not an object of perception; that it is inferred from disjunction and conjunction which are its effects. Salikāṭātha says: "We do not perceive anything over and above disjunctions and conjunctions in a moving substance. The movement in a moving object is inferred from its disjunctions and conjunctions."\textsuperscript{12} When an object moves, what we actually perceive is not its movement, but only its disjunctions and conjunctions with certain points in space, from which we infer the existence of movement. Movement is not the same thing as disjunctions and conjunctions, since the former subsist in the moving object, while the latter subsist in outside space.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{11} SD. and ŚDP., pp. 557-8; ŚV., pp. 760-1.
\textsuperscript{12} Pratyākṣaṇa hi gacchati dravye vibhāgasanyogātiriktvāśeṣānu-paladheḥ. Yastvayaḥ gacchati pratyayah sa vibhāgasanyognānumitakṣayā-lambanah. PP., p. 79.
\textsuperscript{13} PSPM., p. 91.
Pārthasārathimiśra, a Bhātta Mīmāṁsaka, on the other hand, holds that movement is an object of perception. The Prābhakara argues, we perceive only the disjunction of an object from one point of space and its conjunction with another point of space which did not exist in the object before; so they must spring out of a cause which is inferred from the effect, and that cause is movement; we never perceive movement but infer it from its effect. The substance itself cannot be regarded as the cause of its disjunctions and conjunctions, since it was there even before they came into being. Pārthasārathimiśra contends that movement can never be inferred, since it could be inferred only as the immaterial cause (asamavāyikāraṇa) of the conjunctions and disjunctions of a thing with points in space, and this would mean that movement would be cognized as subsisting in the thing as well as in space; but, as a matter of fact, we never cognize movement in space but only in the moving thing. So movement cannot be regarded as an object of inference. The Prābhakara argues that we do not perceive anything over and above the conjunctions and disjunctions of a moving object. Pārthasārathimiśra contends that when a snake moves on the ground both the snake and the ground have conjunctions and disjunctions; but that still we apprehend that the snake is moving, and not the ground. Hence the object of apprehension is the movement of the snake which is responsible for our cognition that the snake is moving, and not the ground. And this movement can never be an object of inference. It is an object of perception.

Kanāda holds that movement is an object of visual perception when it inheres in a coloured substance. Šaṅkaramiśra points out that it is an object of visual and tactual perception both. Movement cannot be perceived through vision and touch when it inheres in an uncoloured substance. According to the older Vaiśeṣikas, colour or form (rūpa) is a condition of both visual and tactual perception. But the later Vaiśeṣikas discard this doctrine. They make manifest colour a condition of visual perception, and manifest touch a condition of tactual perception. But both the schools hold that movement is an object of visual

14 SD., pp. 267-8. 15 PSM., pp. 91-2. 16 SD., p. 274. 17 VS., iv, 1, 11. 18 VS., iv, 1, 11. 19 VS., and VSV., iv, 1, 12. 20 VSV., pp. 373-4; BhP. and SM., 54-6; see Chapter III.
and tactual perception under certain conditions. This doctrine finds favour also with the Western psychologists.

Śridhara quotes a passage from Prakaraṇaṅgaṅcikā explaining the Prābhākara doctrine of inferability of movement, and subjects it to severe criticism.21 His criticism is substantially the same as that of Pārthasārathimīśra. The Prābhākara argues, we do not perceive anything apart from disjunctions and conjunctions in a moving object; movement is not perceived, but inferred from disjunctions and conjunctions. This argument is unsubstantial. If movement of an object is said to be inferred from disjunctions and conjunctions, it should be inferred as subsisting both in the object and in what it moves, since disjunctions and conjunctions belong to both of them. For instance, when a monkey moves from the root of a tree to its top and again from the top to the root, we ought to infer that the tree is moving as well as the monkey, since the disjunctions and conjunctions inhere as much in the tree as in the monkey. But we never infer that the tree is moving.22 When we suddenly perceive a flash of lightning at night in the midst of dense darkness we perceive its movement, but not its conjunctions and disjunctions with points of space.23 Hence movement is an object of perception.

21 PP., 79; NK., p. 194.
22 NK., p. 194.
23 NK., p. 195.
Chapter IX

Perception of Time

1. Introduction

In this chapter we shall deal with perceptual time as distinguished from conceptual time, or with the time apprehended by perception as distinguished from the time of ideal construction. We shall not consider the nature of time as a reality. The Indian philosophers maintain that time is a coefficient of all consciousness including external perception and internal perception. But they do not recognize the perception of time as an independent entity. According to them, there is no sense for empty time apart from events or changes; succession and duration are the two important constituents of time. So some Naiyāyikas and the Vedāntists analyse the perception of time into the perception of succession and the perception of duration. They derive the perception of succession from the perception of changes, and the perception of duration from the perception of the 'spacious present'. And they regard the perception of the 'spacious present' as the nucleus of all our time-consciousness. They derive the conception of the past and the future from the perception of the 'spacious present' in which there is an echo of the immediate past and a foretaste of the immediate future. In it there is a rudimentary consciousness of the past and the future which are clearly brought to consciousness by memory and expectation respectively. The Buddhists, however, do not believe in duration and the 'spacious present'. They believe only in succession and the mathematical present. They recognize succession alone as the only constituent of time, and identify the perception of time with the perception of succession. And they regard the perception of succession as identical with the perception of changes. They do not believe in time apart from changes. They identify time with succession, and succession with changes. Thus they identify perception of time with the perception of changes. They do not believe in the perception of time as a qualifying adjunct of all events or changes. But the consciousness of change is not
identical with change-consciousness. The consciousness of transition is not the same as transition-consciousness. So the Buddhists try their best to derive duration from succession, and explain away the unity and continuity of time. Let us now discuss the main problems of temporal perception.

2. Is Time an Object of Perception?

The first question that arises in connection with temporal perception is whether time is an object of perception or not. According to the Vedāntists, time is a coefficient of all perception. The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas and some Naiyāyikas too hold that time is perceived by both the external and the internal sense-organs as a qualification of their objects of perception.

Jayanta Bhāṭṭa has discussed the possibility of the visual perception of time. Can time be an object of visual perception? According to the Vaiśeṣika, an object of visual perception must have extensity or appreciable magnitude (mahattva) and manifest or sensible colour (udbhūtarūpadattva). But time is colourless. How, then, can it be an object of visual perception? The Naiyāyika asks how colour is perceived though it is colourless. Certainly an object has colour which inheres in it; but colour itself has no colour inhering in it. And if colour can be perceived, though it is colourless, then time also can be an object of visual perception, though it is colourless. Jayanta Bhāṭṭa argues, time is perceived through the visual organ; it is a fact of experience, and so it cannot be denied, though we may not account for it; a fact of experience cannot be argued out of existence. As a matter of fact, that is visible which can be perceived through the visual organ, be it coloured or colourless; and time can be perceived through the visual organ, though it is colourless; hence none can deny the visual perception of time.

Rāmakṛṣṇadhvari, the author of Śikhāmani, rightly points out that if we deny the visual perception of time because it is colourless, then we cannot account for our visual perception of an object as existing at present, e.g. 'the jar exists now'. If the present time were not an object of this perception, then there would be no certainty as to the time in which the jar is perceived.

¹ Chapter III.
² NM., pp. 136-7; see also VP., p. 20.
to exist, but there would be a doubt whether the jar exists at present or not. But, in fact, the jar is definitely perceived as existing now; the actual perception of the jar is not vitiated by the least doubt whether the jar exists at present or not. Such an undoubted perception of an object as existing 'now' clearly shows that besides the object, an element of time also, viz. the present time, enters into the visual perception of the object. But if time is regarded as an object of visual perception, though it is colourless, because of our visual perception of an object as existing 'now', then it may equally be argued that ākāśa (ether) also is an object of visual perception, because of our visual perception of a row of herons in ākāśa. But ākāśa is not admitted to be an object of perception; it is regarded as a supersensible object which is inferred from sound as its substrate. And if, in spite of our visual perception of a row of herons in ākāśa, ākāśa is not regarded as an object of visual perception, or of any kind of perception, whatsoever, then why should time be regarded as an object of visual perception, because of our visual perception of an object as existing 'now'? It may be argued that the visual perception of a row of herons in ākāśa is an acquired perception like the visual perception of fragrant sandal. Just as in the visual perception of fragrant sandal the visual presentation of the sandal (i.e. its visual qualities) is blended with the representation of its fragrance perceived by the olfactory organ on a previous occasion and revived in memory by the sight of the sandal, so in the visual perception of a row of herons in ākāśa, the visual perception of the row of herons (valākā) is blended with the idea of ākāśa which is represented to consciousness by another cognition by association, and so ākāśa is not an object of visual perception. But if this argument is valid, then it may as well be argued that the element of time which enters into every perceptive process is not an object of perception, but it is represented in consciousness by another cognition, with which it is associated in experience, and thus the element of time entering into every perception is not an object of direct perception. The truth is that the visual perception of an object as existing 'now' is not an acquired perception like the acquired perception of fragrant sandal, because in this perception the element of time (now) is felt as an object

*Śīkhāmaṇi and Maṇiprabhā on VP., p. 25.
*Ibid., p. 76.
of direct visual perception; nor is it like the visual perception of a row of herons in ākāśa, because ākāśa does not enter into the perception as a qualification (viśeṣāna) of its object. The present time is perceived as a qualification of every object of perception. Whenever an object, event, or action is perceived, it is not perceived as timeless, but as existing or occurring in time, or qualified by the present time. And time is not only an object of visual perception, but of all kinds of perception. It is perceived by all the sense-organs, external and internal, as a qualification of their objects. Here we are reminded of Kant's doctrine that time is the form of external and internal perception.

3. No Perception of Time as an Independent Entity

But though time is an object of perception, it is never perceived as an independent entity. One of the essential characteristics of time is succession, and succession is never perceived apart from changes. So we can never perceive time apart from actions or changes which occur in time. The temporal marks of before and after, sooner and later, etc., are never perceived apart from actions or changes. And if there is no distinct perception of time apart from that of changes, are we to say that there is no perception of time, but only a perception of changes? Is time nothing but change or action? Some hold that time apart from action is a fiction of imagination; that time is identical with action or change; that time and action are synonymous. Hence there is no perception of time at all, but only that of actions (kāryamātrāvalambana).

The Naiyāyika admits that there is no perception of time apart from that of actions. But from this it does not follow that there is no perception of time at all; for an element of time always enters into the perception of actions as a constituent factor; actions are never perceived without being qualified by time; actions unqualified by time or timeless actions are never perceived. The perception of time is inseparable from the perception of actions; but they are not identical with each other. Hence the legitimate conclusion is that time cannot be perceived as an independent entity, but only as a qualifying adjunct.

* NM., p. 136. NKSP., p. 41.
(viṣeṣaṇa) of events or actions; there is no perception of empty time devoid of all sensible content, but only of filled time or time filled with some sensible matter. Just as there is no perception of mere actions unqualified by time, so there is no perception of empty time devoid of all sensible content. When we perceive succession or simultaneousness, sooner or later, we do not perceive mere actions, but we perceive something else which qualifies these actions, and that is time. Time, therefore, is perceived not as an independent entity, but as a qualification of the objects of perception; there is no perception of empty time. But, it may be asked, if time is an object of perception, why it is perceived not as an independent entity, but only as a qualification of perceptible objects. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa replies that it is the very nature of time (vastusvabhāva) that it can be perceived only as a qualification of perceptible objects, and not as an independent entity like a jar; and that the nature of things (vastusvabhāva) or the law of nature can never be called in question. This is the final limit of explanation. We can never account for the ultimate nature of things. So time is an object of perception. The Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka also admits that time cannot be perceived by the sense-organs as an independent entity, but that it is perceived by all the sense-organs as a qualification (viṣeṣaṇa) of their own objects. This psychological analysis of the perception of time is parallel to that of William James. “We have no sense,” he says, “for empty time. . . . We can no more intuit a duration than we can intuit an extension devoid of all sensible content.” Kant’s notion of a pure intuition of time without any sensible matter is psychologically false.

4. Perception of the Present

Some (Nāgarjuna) deny the existence of the present time and consequently of the perception of the present. When a fruit falls to the ground, it is detached from its stalk and comes gradually nearer and nearer to the ground, traversing a certain space and gradually passing from one position to another, say, from a to b, from b to c, and so on until it comes to the ground.

NM., p. 136.  
When the fruit has passed from \( a \) to \( b \), the space between \( a \) and \( b \) is the space traversed, and the time related to that traversed space is that which has been passed through (\textit{patitakāla} or the past); and when the fruit will pass from \( b \) to \( c \), the space between \( b \) and \( c \) is the space to be traversed, and the time related to this space is that which is to be passed through (\textit{patitavyakāla} or the future); and apart from these two spaces, the traversed space and the space to be traversed, there is no third space left intervening between them which may be perceived as being traversed and give rise to the perception of the present time. So the present time does not exist. Here by the present time is meant the mathematical time-point which is the boundary line between the past and future. But such a time-point is never an object of actual perception. Hence there is no present time at all.\textsuperscript{11} This argument reminds us of Zeno's dialectic against the possibility of motion.

But Vātsyāyana rightly points out that time cannot be conceived in terms of space but only in terms of action.\textsuperscript{12} Thus Vātsyāyana anticipates Bergson in holding that there can be no spatial representation of time. According to him, time is perceived as qualifying an action; an action is perceived as occurring in time. When, for instance, the action of falling has ceased, and is no more, it is perceived as past; and when the action of falling is going to happen and not yet commenced, it is perceived as future; and when the action of falling is going on, it is perceived as present. Thus time-consciousness is found in the perception of action. When an action is \textit{no more}, it is perceived as \textit{past}; when it is \textit{not yet} begun, it is perceived as \textit{future}; and when it is \textit{going on}, it is perceived as \textit{present}.\textsuperscript{13} If an action is \textit{never} perceived as going on, it cannot be perceived as no more or as not yet. For instance, if the action of falling is not perceived as going on, it cannot be perceived as having ceased, or as going to happen. As a matter of fact, what is meant by the past time or the time 'that has been fallen through' (\textit{patitakāla}), in the present case, is that the action of falling is over or no more; and what is meant by the future time or the

\textsuperscript{12} Nādhvavyāṅgah kālay kim tarbi? Kriyāvyāṅgah. Ibid., ii, 1, 38.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., ii, 1, 38.
time 'to be fallen through' (patitavyakāla) is that the action of falling is going to happen and not yet begun, so that at both these points of time, past and future, the object is devoid of action; but when we perceive that the fruit is in the process of falling, we perceive the object in action. Thus time is perceived not in terms of space but in terms of actions; when they are perceived as going on or in the process of happening, they are perceived as present; when they are perceived as over or no more, they are perceived as past, and when they are perceived as going to happen and not yet begun, they are perceived as future. The consciousness of the present is the nucleus of the consciousness of the past and the future; the past and the future are built upon the present. Time is perceived only through an action; the actual happening of an action is perceived as present; and unless an action is perceived as happening or present, it can never be perceived as past or future, inasmuch as the action does not really exist in the past or in the future but only in the present. Hence the perception of the present cannot be denied as all our time-consciousness is centred in it.¹⁴

The whole controversy hinges on the meaning of the present time. Vātsyāyana takes it in the sense of the 'specious present' or felt present which is a tract of time. His opponent takes it in the sense of the mathematical time-point or indivisible instant which is never a fact of actual experience. Vātsyāyana is right in so far as he gives a psychological explanation of the specious present which is the basis of our conception of the past and future. He anticipates the most modern psychological analysis of our time-consciousness in western psychology. A few quotations from books on modern western psychology will not be out of place here.

"Let anyone try," says William James, "to notice or attend to, the present moment of time. One of the most baffling experiences occurs. Where is it, this present? It has melted in our grasp, fled ere we could touch it, gone in the instant of becoming. . . . It is only as entering into the living and moving organization of a much wider tract of time that the strict present is apprehended at all. It is, in fact, an altogether ideal abstraction, not only never realized in sense, but probably never even conceived of by those unaccustomed to philosophic meditation.

¹⁴NBh. and NV., ii, 1, 38.
Reflection leads us to the conclusion that it must exist, but that it does exist can never be a fact of our immediate experience. The only fact of our immediate experience is what Mr. E. R. Clay has well called 'the specious present'.”  Elsewhere he says, “The original paragon and prototype of all conceived times is the specious present, the short duration of which we are immediately and incessantly sensible.”  J. M. Baldwin also bears out this view of James. He says, “subjectively, each individual constructs his own time-order from the standpoint of the ‘specious’ or felt present by means of images in which past and future, not actually present, are represented. It is only from this standpoint that the terms past and future have proper meaning. In this construction are included not only the times of the individuals’ private experiences, but all times which may be dated from the present ‘now’.”

Vatsyāyana’s account of the perception of the time-series closely resembles that of Volkmann and Stout. “‘No more’ and ‘not yet,’” says Volkmann, “are the proper time-feelings, and we are aware of time in no other way than through these feelings.” This doctrine of Volkmann has been elaborated by Stout, who has beautifully expressed his view as follows: “Actual sensation is the mark or stamp of present time. The present time as distinguished from the past or future, is the time which contains the moment of actual sensation. . . . Distinction between past, present, and future can only be apprehended in a rudimentary way at the perceptual level. But there is, even at this level, what we may call a ‘not yet’ consciousness and a ‘no more’ consciousness. The ‘not yet’ consciousness is contained in the prospective attitude of attention, in the pre-adaptation for what is to come which it involves. This ‘not yet’ consciousness is emphasized when conation is delayed or obstructed, as when the dog is kept waiting for its bone. The ‘no more’ consciousness emerges most distinctly when conation is abruptly disappointed or frustrated. With the advent of ideal representation the ‘no more’ and the ‘not yet’ experiences become much more definite.” Ladd says, “It is

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16 Ibid., p. 631.
18 *Psychology*, 87, quoted by James in his *Principles of Psychology*, vol. i, p. 631.
by the combination of imaging and thinking, in which every con-
ceptual process consists, that the vague consciousness of a 'Still-
there' is converted into the conception of 'the present'; the con-
sciousness of the 'now-going' or 'just-gone', into the conception
of 'the past'; and the consciousness of the 'not yet there', with its
affective accompaniment of expectation or dread, into the concep-
tion of 'the future'.”

5. The Sensible Present is Instantaneous (The Buddhist View)

Time has two essential characteristics, viz. succession and dura-
tion. But the Buddhists do not recognize the existence of duration
or block of time. They identify time with mere succession of ideas.
The Buddhists hold with Berkeley and Hume that there is no
abstract time apart from presentations. Time is not a substantive
reality, as the Naiyāyikas hold, but it is a cluster of successive
presentations; an abstract time apart from momentary impressions
is an artificial conceptual construction. And according to the Bud-
dhists, there are no continuous and uniform impressions (dhāra-
vāhika-jñāna), but only a series of detached and discrete impressions,
a perpetual flux of successive presentations (kṣaṇabhaṅgura-jñāna).
Continuity is only an illusory appearance due to our slurring over
the landmarks of impressions owing to their similarity. Moment-
ary sensations alone are real; there is no continuity among discrete
sensations. The seeming continuity of impressions is nothing
more than the rapid succession of impressions owing to the
rapidity and uniformity of stimulations. Thus the Buddhist
document is quite the same as that of David Hume. Time may
be viewed either as mono-dimensional or as bi-dimensional. Either
it may be regarded as having only linear extension or succession,
or it may be regarded as having simultaneity and succession both.
The Buddhists hold that there is no synchronousness or simul-
taneity; that there is only succession or sequence among our
presentations. So a momentary presentation can neither appre-
 hend the past nor the future, but it apprehends only the present
which has no duration. Thus, according to the Buddhists, the
sensible present has no duration; it is an instant or a “time-
point”.

Psychology Descriptive and Explanatory, p. 497.
Pratyakṣasya hi kṣaṇa eko grāhyaḥ. NBT., p. 22.
The Vedāntists and some Naiyāyikas hold that the sensible present is not a mathematical point of time but has a certain duration; the sensible present is a tract of time extending over a few moments—it is an extended present or the 'specious present' (vītata eva kālāḥ). According to them the 'specious present' having a certain duration yields us one unitary presentation without flickering of attention. But the Buddhists hold that there is no 'specious present'; that the present has no duration; that it is instantaneous or momentary inasmuch as our impressions are momentary. Our presentations are not somewhat prolonged processes, but instantaneous or non-enduring events. And there are no continuous and uniform impressions, as the Vedāntists and some Naiyāyikas hold.

According to Prabhākara, in the consciousness 'I know this' (aham idam jānāmi) there is a simultaneity of three presentations, viz. the presentation of the knower (I), the presentation of the known object (this), and the presentation of knowledge or the relation between the knower and the known. This is Prabhākara's doctrine of Tripūṭi Samvit or triple consciousness. But the Buddhists argue, the three elements are not simultaneous; but they are discrete and detached from one another; there is no relation among them; there can be no relation between the knower and the known. They hold that at first there is a particularized presentation (sākāra-jñāna) of 'I' (aham), then that of 'this' (idam), and then that of 'knowing' (jānāmi). Thus these discrete and momentary impressions flow in succession. But when the first impression of 'I' vanishes, it leaves a residuum (vāsanā) which colours and modifies the second impression of 'this'; and when the second impression vanishes, it leaves a residuum which colours and modifies the third impression. Thus though these three impressions are discrete and isolated from one another, there is a cumulative presentation of these momentary impressions owing to the transference of residua from the preceding impressions to the succeeding ones (vāsanā-saṅkrama)—the residua of the former colouring or modifying the latter (upaplava). Thus the Buddhists have invented the hypotheses of residua (vāsanā), transference of residua (vāsanāsāṅkrama), and modification of impressions by residua (upaplava) to explain away the fact of continuity or the consciousness of transition; a succession of presentations is

22 NM., p. 450.
certainly not the consciousness of succession. The Buddhists do not explain, but explain away the fact of unity and continuity of consciousness. The Buddhists examine the perceptive process and show that perception cannot apprehend the 'specious present'. A perception is nothing but a presentation; and a presentation is the presentation of a single moment; it cannot apprehend the past and the future. If there is a series of presentations, $a$, $b$, $c$, etc., is it the antecedent presentation $b$ (uttaravijñāna), or is it the succeeding presentation $b$ that takes hold of the preceding presentation by the hind part, as it were? The Buddhists answer that $b$ can neither take hold of $c$, nor can it take hold of $a$. The past as past is not present; and the future as future is not present. Hence the present presentation can neither apprehend the past nor the future presentation, and, consequently, there can be no perception of the past and future. But the Buddhists hold that the past enters into the present at the time of passing away, and the future also enters into the present, though it is not yet come, so that the present presentation is an echo of the immediate past and a foretaste of the immediate future. Thus the Buddhists surreptitiously introduce an element of linking or transition between the past and the present, and between the present and the future to explain our consciousness of the continuity of time. But though they admit that the past and the future enter into the present, they insist that it is only the present that is perceived and not the past or the future which enters into the present. Such is the nature of our experience that it unfolds successively—one presentation appearing and then disappearing. And in this series of presentations an antecedent state (pūrvadāsā) cannot come into contact with a subsequent state (aparadāsā), and a subsequent state cannot come into contact with an antecedent state. All sense-presentations apprehend the present alone which is instantaneous or momentary.

Some Naiyāyikas hold that sometimes the present is perceived as extended or with a certain duration, for instance, when we perceive a continuous action, e.g. cooking, reading, etc.

sensible present is not momentary, but has a certain length of duration (vartamānakṣaṇo dīrghah); it is not made up of a single moment, but composed of a number of moments (nānāksanag-anātmaka). The Buddhists urge that time cannot be a composite whole made up of parts; it cannot be a cluster of simultaneous presentations because there is no simultaneity among presentations. Time is not bi-dimensional, as some Naiyāyikas hold, but it is mono-dimensional. There is no simultaneity, but only succession among our presentations. It is foolish to hold that perception apprehends an extended present with a certain duration. The Naiyāyika and the Vedāntist hold that a continuous and uniform impression bears clear testimony to the unbroken and uninterrupted existence of its object; and that consequently, it apprehends an extended present with a certain duration. The Buddhists object that there is no uniform impression (avicchinnadṛṣṭi). Every impression is momentary; there cannot be a continuous impression. When there is a rapid succession of momentary impressions, they appear to be continuous, though they are not really so. And because there is no continuous impression, there can be no perception of the ‘specious present’ with a certain duration. Even if there were a continuous impression, it would not be able to apprehend the ‘specious present’, because an object must be presented to consciousness in order that we may have a presentative knowledge of the object, and the object cannot be presented to consciousness for more than one moment, since all objects are momentary. But, as a matter of fact, there can be no continuous and uniform impression; consciousness must always apprehend itself as momentary; and not only consciousness is momentary, but also the consciousness of the momentariness of consciousness is momentary. Here the Buddhists differ from the Neo-Hegelians, Green, and others, who suppose that the consciousness of the relation of impressions must be enduring; momentary impressions are apprehended as momentary by a consciousness which must be permanent. Thus, according to the Buddhists, all presentations are momentary, and as such they can apprehend only the present which has not a

Ibid., p. 451. "Psychologically considered, there is no such thing as a 'mathematical point of time'—no time that is not enduring time." Ladd: Psychology Descriptive and Explanatory, p. 311.


Ibid., p. 452.
length of duration, but is constituted by a single moment; the sensible present, therefore, is instantaneous or momentary.  

6. The Sensible Present has Duration (The Naiyāyika on the Vedāntist View)

The Buddhists recognize only one aspect of time, viz. succession. They try to explain away the other aspect of time, viz., duration. But some Naiyāyikas and the Vedāntists clearly recognize the importance of duration apart from which succession has no meaning. The Buddhists have argued that a presentation cannot apprehend the past and the future as they are not presented to consciousness; that it can apprehend only the present which is constituted by a single moment. The Naiyāyika urges that even a momentary glance (nimēṣa-dṛṣṭi) can apprehend the continued existence of an object. Why should, then, perception be regarded as apprehending the instantaneous present? Even supposing that a momentary glance cannot apprehend the past and the future, but only the present, what is the span of the present time perceived by a continuous and uniform impression (animeṣa-dṛṣṭi)? Is it a time-point or a tract of time? Is it an instant or a length of duration? The sensible present continues as long as the continuous and uniform impression persists without an oscillation of attention, and as long as it is not interrupted by another impression; so that this single unitary presentation apprehends not an instantaneous present but a lengthened or extended present with a certain duration.

The Buddhists may urge that such an extended present is a tract of time made up of a number of moments; but that the present is really a single moment; that the immediately preceding moment is past and the immediately succeeding moment is future, which cannot therefore be perceived. The Naiyāyika replies that in determining the span of the sensible present we must not assume at the outset that it is momentary, but that we must determine it by an appeal to experience. A psychological investigation must not be guided by metaphysical speculation; but metaphysics must be based on psychology. Psychologically

81 Kṣaṇikagrāhī prayākṣamiti siddham. Ibid., p. 452.
82 NM., p. 462.
83 Animeṣadarśtinā dṛṣṭyavicchedādavicchinnasattāka eva dṛṣyate iti na kṣaṇikagrāhī prayākṣam. Ibid., p. 463.