considered, there is no mathematical point of time, but only a tract of time. That time must be regarded as present which is grasped by a single continuous impression without a break or interruption. And such an unbroken and uninterrupted impression apprehends the present as an unbroken and uninterrupted block or duration of time. Hence the sensible present is not an instant, but has a length of duration.

The Buddhists may argue that even according to the Naiyāyika there cannot be a stable consciousness (sthirajñāna) but only a series of momentary impressions; and that he cannot hold that there can be a perception of the ‘specious present’. Though all Naiyāyikas hold that a psychosis extends over three moments—the moment of production, the moment of existence, and the moment of destruction—and that there can be no simultaneity of psychoses owing to the atomic nature of the central sensory (manas), yet there are some Naiyāyikas who hold that a continuous and uniform impression is not destroyed at the third moment.\(^{14}\) Besides, the temporal mark of a consciousness need not necessarily correspond with the temporal mark of its object. An object is apprehended by consciousness as having a continued existence. A pulse of consciousness, though existing at present, can apprehend the past as well as the future as past and future.\(^{15}\) The feeling of the past is not a past feeling; and the feeling of the future is not a future feeling. For instance, a present recollection apprehends the past; a present flash of intuition (prātiṣṭha jñāna) apprehends the future; and a present inference apprehends both the past and the future. The Buddhists may argue that the operation of the sense-organs does not exist for more than a single moment; and that in the absence of a continued peripheral action there cannot be a perception of an extended time or the ‘specious present’. The Naiyāyika replies that peripheral action does not exist for a moment, but continues for some time. The perception of an object depends upon the intercourse of a sense-organ with an object, and this intercourse is not momentary, but persists for some time; peripheral stimulation is not a momentary act, but a somewhat prolonged process; and consequently perception does not apprehend an instant or a ‘time-point’, but a tract

\(^{14}\) NM., p. 463.
\(^{15}\) जानात्मृ वर्तमानकलामाप्यतिष्ठकलाग्रिः भवति. NM., p. 463.
of time with a certain duration. According to Vātsyāyana, sometimes the present is perceived as unmixed with the past and the future, for instance, when we perceive that a substance exists; and sometimes the present is perceived as mixed up with the past and the future, for instance, when we perceive the continuity of an action, e.g. cooking, cutting, etc. Thus Vātsyāyana admits that the present is sometimes perceived as having a certain duration.**

According to the Vedāntists, too, a continuous and uniform impression (dārāvahikabuddhi) is a single unitary psychosis with a certain duration; it is not a series of momentary impressions in rapid succession, as the Buddhists hold. In the continuous impression of a jar the mental mode which assumes the form of the jar is one and undivided as long as the jar is presented to consciousness without any flickering of attention, and is not interrupted by another psychosis. It is not made up of many momentary psychoses, because according to the Vedāntist, a psychosis continues in the field of consciousness as long as the mind does not assume the form of a different object. So the Vedāntist also admits that a continuous and uniform presentation does not apprehend an instantaneous present, but an extended present with a certain duration.*** Thus the Vedāntists and some Naiyāyikas hold that the sensible present has duration, while the Buddhists hold that the sensible present is instantaneous or momentary. Certainly the former view is psychologically correct. The Buddhists deny the ‘specious present’ because it contradicts their fundamental doctrine of momentariness.

This psychological discussion of the ‘specious present’ in the medieval philosophical literature of India anticipates the same kind of discussion in the modern psychology of the West. Professor William James borrowed the word ‘specious present’ from E. R. Clay and gave currency to it. He expresses his view most beautifully as follows: “The practically cognized present is no knife-edge, but a saddle-back, with a certain breadth of its own on which we sit perched, and from which we look in two directions into time. The unit of composition of our perception of time is a duration, with a bow and a stern, as it were, a rearward and a forward looking end.”****

**NBh., ii, 1, 41. HIP., i, pp. 377-86.
CHAPTER X

PERCEPTION OF THE UNIVERSAL (JATI), INDIAN NOMINALISM AND REALISM

1. Introduction

The problem of the universal and the individual has been approached in the West from the psychological, logical, and metaphysical points of view. The Indian thinkers also have investigated the problem from these different standpoints, not in abstract isolation from one another, but in their synthetic unity. The psychological aspect of this question, as understood by the different schools of Indian philosophers, is incomprehensible without a metaphysical consideration of it. So we shall attempt here a psychological study of the problem with reference to its metaphysical basis.

In the Western thought, there are mainly three theories of the universal, viz. nominalism, conceptualism, and realism. According to nominalism, the individuals alone are real—there are only individual things in nature, and particular ideas in the mind; there is no universal at all in reality—only the name is general. According to conceptualism, there are only individual things in nature without any universal class-essence in them, but the mind has the power of forming a concept or abstract general idea of individual things. Thus, according to it, there is no universal in nature, but the universal exists in the mind in the form of a concept or general idea. According to realism, the universal exists both in nature and in the mind; there is a universal or class-essence in the individual things of nature, and there is a universal notion or concept in the mind corresponding to the class-essence in nature. Thus, according to nominalism, there is no universal at all either in nature or in the mind; according to conceptualism, the universal exists only in the mind; according to realism, the universal exists both in nature and in the mind. Besides these main theories there are certain intermediate positions.

Among the Indian thinkers also we find a perpetual conflict between realists and nominalists. The Buddhists are thorough-
going nominalists. The Naiyāyikas the Vaiśeṣikas, and the Mīmāṁsakas (Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara) represent different schools of realism. The Jaina is a nominalist tending towards realism. Rāmānuja also is a nominalist with a bent for realism. According to the Buddhists, specific individuals (sva[śa]a) alone are real; they are apprehended by indeterminate perception; there is no universal or class-essence at all in the specific individuals; the universal notion is an unreal abstraction of the mind; it is a conceptual construction of the mind to carry on the practical purposes of our life. The Buddhists are the most uncompromising nominalists. The Naiyāyikas, the Vaiśeṣikas, the Bhāṭṭas, and the Prābhākaras hold that there is a real universal or class-essence in the individual objects of nature. But there is a difference of opinion as to the relation of the universal to the individual. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Prābhākara regard the universal as different from the individual, and the relation between them as that of inherence, the latter being the substrate of the former. The Bhāṭṭa, on the other hand, holds that the universal is both different from, and identical with, the individual; that the relation between the two is that of identity-in-difference. The Jaina holds that there can be no universal notion in the mind, unless there is a real universal in nature. The universal notion is not an unreal fiction of the mind as the Buddhists suppose; it is real, and consequently it must be based on reality. Corresponding to a universal notion in the mind, there must be a real universal in nature. But what is the nature of the real universal? It is not a class-essence. The Jaina does not recognize its existence. There can be no one, eternal, ubiquitous class-essence in the individuals belonging to the same class, as the realists suppose. So far the Jaina agrees with the Buddhist and supports nominalism. But he differs from the Buddhist in that he recognizes the real existence of similarity among the individual members of the same class. The likeness is the objective ground of a universal notion. To this extent, the Jaina tends towards realism. Rāmānuja also holds a similar doctrine. According to him, individuals alone are real; there is no class-essence in them; but there is a close resemblance (sau[ṛṣy]a) among them in the shape of certain definite configurations (sain[ṭhāna]a) of parts among the individuals. Thus, Rāmānuja agrees with the Jaina in holding that there is a real likeness among the individual things belonging to the same
class. Rāmānuja only gives an interpretation of the likeness among the individual members of a class. Thus, both the Jaina and Rāmānuja are not out-and-out nominalists like the Buddhists, though they deny the existence of a class-essence; they are nominalists with a leaning towards realism. They are advocates of modified nominalism. All Indian realists agree in holding that the universal is an object of perception; it can be perceived through the sense-organs; it is not an ideal construction of the mind. The experience of the universal is not conceptual, but perceptual. This is seldom admitted by the Western realists. The Indian realists differ from one another only in their views as to the relation of the universal to the individuals.

2. The Buddhist doctrine of Nominalism

The universal in the form of a class-essence (jāti) can never be an object of perception. A perceptible object produces the perception of it in the mind. But the universal (jāti) is eternal; so it cannot produce its cognition. If, in spite of being eternal, the universal produces a cognition, it will never cease to do so; and, consequently, the cognition of no other object will be possible. Moreover, the universal can never be perceived, for perception has for its object only the momentary specific individuals (sva-laksana) unconnected with other individuals preceding and succeeding them. By the universal we mean that feature which is common to a whole class of objects. If such a universal character exists at all, it can be known only after collecting all the individual objects belonging to a class and ascertaining their common character. Thus, the knowledge of the universal presupposes that of all the individuals in which it exists. How, then, can such a universal be known by indeterminate perception (nirvikalpa pratyakṣa), which arises just after the contact of an object with a sense-organ, and is quite independent of any other cognition, preceding or succeeding it? If it is apprehended by determinate perception (svvikalpa pratyakṣa), it is unreal for that very reason. According to the Buddhist, indeterminate perception alone is valid as it is free from all forms and categories (vikalpa); determinate perception is invalid as it is not free from thought-determinations. Thus, the universal can be apprehended neither by indeterminate

1  S.D., p. 381.
perception nor by determinate perception. Nor can it be proved by inference (anumāna) and verbal cognition (sabda), for these two have for their objects the unreal forms of ideal construction (vikalpa), and as such cannot apprehend the ontological reality. Hence specific individuals alone are real, since they are apprehended by indeterminate perception. The universal is nothing but a mere form of determinate cognition having no real existence in the world.

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the universal is different from the individual; it inheres in the latter which is its substratum; there is one, eternal, ubiquitous universal among the members of a class. The Buddhist criticizes this view thus: First, things which are different from one another must occupy different portions of space. But the universal is never perceived to occupy a space different from that of the individual. So the universal must not be different from the individual. Moreover, things which are different from one another can be perceived apart from one another. For instance, a cloth can be perceived apart from a jar as they are different from each other. But the universal can never be perceived apart from the individual. Hence the universal cannot be different from the individual. Secondly, it may be said that though the universal is different from the individual, it cannot be perceived apart from the individual simply because the former exists in the latter. But this is impossible. The universal can never exist in the individual. If it does so, does it exist in each individual wholly or partly? Both the alternatives are untenable. If the universal exists in its entirety in one individual, then it cannot exist in any other individual, and being one, it cannot exist entirely in many individuals. Evidently, if the universal exhausts itself in one particular, it cannot exist in another without being produced anew. But this is absurd. The universal is eternal; it cannot be produced at all. Nor can it exist partly in all the individuals, for it has no parts. Then, again, it is not possible for the same universal to exist partly in the past, present, and future individuals. Thirdly, even supposing that the universal exists in the individual, does it exist everywhere in all the individuals, or only in its proper objectives? For instance, does the universal cow (gotva) exist in all individuals belonging

1 NM., pp. 297-8. HIP., ii, p. 400.
2 Vikalpikāramāraṃ sāmānyam, alikam va. SD., pp. 381-2.
to different classes, e.g. cows, horses, etc. (sarvasarvakata)? Or, does it exist only in all the individual cows (pinadasarvakata)? If a universal (e.g. the genus of cow or gotua) existed in all the individuals belonging to different classes (e.g. horses, cows, buffaloes, etc.), then we should perceive the genus of cow (gotua) in horses, that of horse (asvatva) in cows, and so on, and thus there would be an utter confusion or intermixture of genera (sanakaryya). It may be said that though a universal exists in all the individuals belonging to different classes, the individuals belonging to a particular class have the power of manifesting a particular universal. For instance, only the individual cows can manifest the universal cow (gotua), which is ubiquitous (sarvasarvakata). But according to the Buddhist idealist, existence consists in its being perceived. If the universal exists everywhere, it should be perceived everywhere. Even if a universal, though all-pervading, can be manifested only by certain individuals, it does not follow that this universal must be perceived only in those individuals. If certain individuals manifest a universal which is ubiquitous, they must manifest it as it truly is. A lamp manifests certain objects. It does not follow from this that these objects are perceived in the lamp. Likewise, certain individuals manifest a universal. It does not prove that the universal must be perceived in those individuals. If, on the other hand, a universal exists only in all its proper subjects (pinadasarvakata or svavyakti-sarvakata), how can it be perceived in a newly born individual? For instance, if the genus of cow (gotua) exists only in all individual cows, how can it be perceived in a newly born cow, if it did not exist in that place before the individual was born? The universal cannot be born along with the individual as it is eternal. Nor can it come from any other individual, because, first, it is without any form (amurtta), and consequently incapable of movement, and, secondly, it is not perceived in the individual from which it comes. Nor can it be said that the universal exists partly in the individual from which it comes, and partly in the newly born individual to which it comes, because the universal is without any parts. And thus when an individual is destroyed, the universal does not remain in that place, because it is not perceived there. Nor is it destroyed along with the individual, because it is eternal. Nor does it go to some other individual because, first, it is without any

*Cf. Berkeley.*
form (amūrta) and consequently incapable of movement, and secondly, it cannot enter into another individual in which it already exists. Fourthly, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that the relation between the universal and the individual is one of inherence (samavāya); that the universal inheres in the individual. The Buddhist denies the relation of inherence altogether, and identifies it with identity (tādātmya). Inherence, according to the Vaiśeṣika, is the relation between two entities which can never be perceived apart from each other, e.g. the relation between a substance and its qualities, or that between the constituent parts and the composite whole, or that between the universal and the individual, etc. The Buddhist holds that those entities, which are not perceived apart from each other, are not different from each other. Simultaneity and inseparability of perceptions constitute a test of identity. The universal can never be perceived apart from the individual; hence they are not different from each other. Lastly, if the universal inheres in the individual, we must have such a perception as 'there is the universal cow in this individual cow' (iha gavi gotvam). But, as a matter of fact, every one perceives a cow as 'this is a cow' (iyam gauḥ), and not as 'there is the class 'cow' in this particular cow' (iha gavi gotvam). This clearly shows that the individual is not the substratum of the universal, but identical with it. Nor can it be said that the universal is the inner essence of the individual, because the former is entirely different from the latter. One, eternal, and ubiquitous universal cannot be the essence of many, non-eternal, and discrete and isolated individuals. If even such contradictory things, as the universal and the individual, were identical with each other, then cows and horses also would be identical with each other, and thus there would be an utter confusion in the whole world. Thus, the Buddhist comes to the conclusion that the universal can never be different from the individual.  

The Buddhists criticize the Śrotriyas view. According to the Śrotriyas, there is a rūpa-rūpi-lakṣaṇa-sambandha between the universal and the individual. But this also cannot be proved. If the universal is the rūpa of the individual which is the rūpin in relation to the former, what is meant by rūpa? Does it mean colour (suklādi), or form (ākāra), or essential nature (svabhāva)?

(1) If the universal were the colour of the individual, then colourless

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"NM., pp. 298-300; sD., pp. 379-380. HIP., i, pp. 596-7."
substances such as air, mind etc., qualities, and actions would have no universality in them. But, as a matter of fact, they are supposed to have universality in them. (2) If the universal were the form of the individual, then the formless qualities would have no universality in them though they are supposed to have it. (3) If the universal were the essential nature of the individual, then they would not be different from each other. An object is never perceived as different from its essential nature. Hence the universal is not different from the individual. If there is any difference between them, there is a difference in name, but not in substance.

Then, again, is the rūpa a different substance from the rūpin? Or, is it the same substance as the rūpin? Or, is it the property of the rūpin? (4) The first alternative is untenable. The universal, which is the rūpa of the individual (rūpin), is never perceived as a substance different from the individual (vastvantaram). (5) The second alternative contradicts the position of the opponent. If the universal is the same substance as the individual (vastueva), then they are identical with each other, and it is useless to speak of the rūpa-rūpi-lakṣaṇa-sambandha between them. (6) The third alternative also is untenable. If the universal is the property of the individual (vastudharma), it should be perceived as distinct from the individual. But, in fact, it is never perceived as distinct from the individual. And if the universal is inseparable from the individual, it is useless to speak of a relation called rūpa-rūpi-lakṣaṇa-sambandha between them, for they are not different from each other. Still, if it be insisted that there is a rūpa-rūpi-lakṣaṇa relation between the universal and the individual, the Śrōtriyas cannot distinguish it from conjunction and inherence. Hence the Buddhists come to the conclusion that there cannot be a rūpa-rūpi-lakṣaṇa relation between the universal and the individual.¹

The Buddhists criticize the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka realism. According to the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka, there is a relation of identity-in-difference between the universal and the individual. The universal is both different from the individual, and identical with it. The perception of an object involves two elements, viz. assimilation (anugama) and discrimination (vyāpratīti). This dual character of perception must correspond to the dual character of

¹ NM., p. 299. HIF., I, p. 397.
its object. Universality is the objective ground of assimilation, and individuality is the objective ground of discrimination. So the object of perception must be both universal and particular. The Buddhist urges that it is self-contradictory to assert that one and the same object can be both universal and particular, one and many, eternal and temporary, existent and non-existent. Such an object is never found in experience; it is a fiction of the imagination. One and the same object can never be multiform in character. There is only one form in an object, viz. individuality that is real. The universality of an object is merely an unreal form superimposed upon the object by determinate cognition. It is the specific individuality (svalakṣaṇa), pure and simple, unmixed with universality, that is perceived just after the contact of the object with a sense-organ. Hence specific individuality alone is real; and universality is unreal. It cannot be said that both the characters of an object, viz. universality and individuality, are perceived, and, therefore, both of them are real. For, in that case, the double moon also would be real because it is perceived. According to the Buddhist, perception is always indeterminate; and indeterminate perception can never apprehend an object with the dual character of universality and individuality. It can apprehend only the specific individuality of an object, and never its universality, because, like all things, it has a momentary existence, and, consequently, it cannot apprehend that feature of the object which it has in common with many other objects. Thus, specific individuals alone are real, since they are apprehended by indeterminate perception; the universal is an unreal form of imagination.

The Buddhist refutes the realists' objections. First, the realist urges, just as various specific individuals are admitted to account for a variety of indeterminate perceptions, so various universals or class-essences (e.g. gotva, aśvatva, etc.) must be admitted to account for various determinate cognitions (e.g. of cows, horses, and the like). The Buddhist argues, the variety of determinate cognitions, too, can be explained by the variety of specific individuals. According to them, specific individuals are the causes of indeterminate perceptions, and indeterminate perceptions, again, are the causes of determinate cognitions; so that a variety of specific individuals produces a variety of indeterminate cognitions, which, in its turn, produces a variety of determinate cognitions.

¹NM., pp. 300-301.
Thus, it is needless to suppose a variety of universals to account for a variety of determinate cognitions as the realist supposes. Secondly, the realist argues, if universals are nothing but unreal forms of imagination, they cannot serve the practical purposes of our life. According to the Buddhist, every thing is momentary, and so the specific individuals (svalakṣaṇa) are momentary. Hence the specific individual, which is apprehended by indeterminate perception, is destroyed at that very moment, and no action is possible with regard to that object; and that individual with regard to which there is an action is destroyed at that very moment, and so it cannot be attained. Hence one individual is perceived, while there is action on another individual, and thus practical actions are not in keeping with the real nature of things. Unreal forms of determinate cognitions cannot serve the practical purposes of our life. The Buddhist argues, even the unreal forms (vikalpa) of determinate cognitions can serve the practical purposes of our life; just as the cognition of a gem produced by the ray of a gem leads to the actual attainment of the gem, and thus serves a practical purpose of our life, so determinate cognitions produced by indeterminate perceptions of specific individuals and, consequently, having a semblance of specific individuals which are capable of evoking effective actions, lead those who are desirous of effective actions to the attainment of those specific individuals. Thus, determinate cognitions, though not in keeping with the real nature of specific individuals, indirectly lead to the actual attainment of them, and in this way serve the practical purposes of our life. Hence it cannot be said that determinate cognitions, having no real things for their objects, but having unreal forms (vikalpa) superimposed on them, cannot serve the practical purposes of our life. Thus, in spite of the non-existence of universals, practical actions can follow from unreal determinate cognitions. Thirdly, the realist may contend that discrete specific individuals can never produce a universal notion in the mind. Specific individuals, which are absolutely different from one another, cannot produce one and the same universal notion, if the universal does not really exist. If they can produce a universal notion, in spite of their absolute difference, the realist asks why certain individuals produce the universal notion of cow, while certain other individuals produce the universal notion of horse, and why all individuals do not produce all universal notions. The Buddhist retorts that the
realist cannot explain how the individuals, which are different from one another, have an identical essence in the form of the universal, and how they can be the substrata of the same universal, and how they can manifest the same universal; and how certain individuals are related to a certain universal, and not all individuals are related to all universals. If the realist argues that certain individuals, by their very nature, are related to a certain universal, and not all individuals are related to all universals, then it may equally be argued that certain individuals, by their very nature, produce the same universal notion in the form 'this is a cow', 'this is a cow', and so on, in spite of the non-existence of the universal. Thus the Buddhist does not believe in the existence of the universal. He regards the notion of the universal as a conceptual construction (vikalpa).

3. The Modified Nominalism of the Jaina

The Buddhist believes only in specific individuals which are like themselves. He does not believe in the universal. He is an uncompromising nominalist. According to him, individuals alone are real; there is no universal or class-essence in them; they are characterized by themselves; there is not even likeness among them. The Jaina agrees with the Buddhist in denying the existence of a class-essence in the individuals belonging to the same class; but he differs from the latter in recognizing the existence of common characters or resemblances among them, which he regards as the real universal. The Jaina does not go so far as to say that specific individuals alone are real, and that there is no similarity among them. According to him, there is similarity among the individuals belonging to the same class, which is the real universal; there is no universal class-essence among them. This doctrine may be compared with J. S. Mill's nominalism. According to Mill, though there is not a universal class-essence among the individuals belonging to the same class, still there are certain fundamental qualities common to them all; and in thinking of general terms, though we have concrete images before the mind, we concentrate our attention on the fundamental attributes common to them, and recognize them as common to the whole class. Thus the Jaina is neither an uncompromising, nominalist

AD., pp. 382-5. SBNT., pp. 1-19; 94-102.
nor an uncompromising realist. The Buddhist are out-and-out nominalists. They recognize the existence of specific individuals only. They entirely deny the existence of the universal. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Mīmāṁsaka, on the other hand, recognize the existence of one, eternal, and ubiquitous universal in the individuals. They are out-and-out realists. The Jaina holds an intermediate position. He also recognizes the reality of the universal; but, according to him, it is not one, eternal, and ubiquitous, as the realists hold, but it is multiform, non-eternal, and limited; and it is nothing but the common character or similarity among the different individuals belonging to the same class. The Jaina does not recognize the existence of any other universal than this common character which is perceived through the sense-organs like colours and the like, and is the cause of the universal notion which has no other object than this. The difference between the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Mīmāṁsaka, on the one hand, and the Jaina, on the other, is that according to the former, the universal notion has its objective counterpart in the class-essence in the individuals, which is different from them, and is one, eternal, and ubiquitous, while according to the latter, the universal notion has its objective counterpart in the common character of many individuals, which is not one, but many, existing in many individuals—not eternal, but temporary, being produced and destroyed along with the individual in which it exists—and not all-pervading, but confined only to the individual in which it exists. Thus the Jaina is neither an uncompromising nominalist like the Buddhist nor an uncompromising realist like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Mīmāṁsaka. He is an advocate of modified nominalism.

According to the Jaina, an object of knowledge is both universal and particular (sāmānya-viśeṣa). It is not merely universal like the Being or Brahman of Śaṅkara; nor is it merely particular like the specific individuals (svalakṣaṇa) of the Buddhist. It is characterized both by common characters (sāmānya) and by distinctive characters (viśeṣa). Our consciousness of similarity (anuvṛtti-pratyaya) has for its object common characters (sāmānya), and our consciousness of difference (vyāvṛtti-pratyaya) has for its object distinctive characters (viśeṣa). The consciousness of an object involves assimilation and discrimination both. Assimilation is due to common characters, and discrimination is due to
uncommon characters. Hence an object of knowledge is both universal and particular, since it is characterized by common and uncommon characters both. The common characters, again, which constitute the real universal (sāmānya), according to the Jaina, are of two kinds, viz., tiryak sāmānya and ērdhvatā sāmānya. By tiryak sāmānya he means similar modifications (sadyāparināmas-tiryak), e.g. dewlap and the like in cows. By ērdhvatā sāmānya he means the permanent substance which abides in the midst of past, present, and future modifications (parāparavivartavyāpi-dravyamūrdhvatā), e.g. earth in its various modifications. So the common characters of an object are constituted by its permanent substance which persists in the midst of all its modifications, and its modifications which are similar to those of other like objects. And these are the real universal; there is no other universal than these common characters.

Prabhācandra criticizes the Buddhist doctrine of nominalism thus: First, the Buddhist argues, the universal is not perceived apart from the individual; hence it does not exist. But the Jaina urges, the universal is as much an object of perception as the individual; it is an object of uncontradicted experience in the form of assimilative perception, just as the individual is an object of uncontradicted experience in the form of discriminative perception. Just as the exclusive perception of particularity cannot be denied, so the inclusive perception of universality also cannot be denied. Both these experiences are uncontradicted; and the verdict of uncontradicted experience can never be called in question. Hence, uncontradicted assimilative perception establishes the real existence of the universal (sāmānya) common to many individuals, which cannot be apprehended by discriminative perception. Secondly, the Buddhist argues that there is no universal apart from the individual, for there are not two distinct cognitions of the universal and the individual. But there is a difference between the cognition of universality and that of individuality, the Jaina urges, for all of us perceive the difference. There are two distinct cognitions of the universal and the individual. It is true that both of them are perceived at the same time and in the same object. But that does not prove that they are apprehended by one and the same cognition. For, in that case, the colour and

PMS., p. 5.
PKM., pp. 136 ff.
Ibid., p. 5.
the taste of a cake perceived at the same time would be apprehended by a single cognition. But, as a matter of fact, the cognitions of the colour and the taste, though simultaneous, are different from each other. Nor can it be argued that the universal is identical with the individual, since both of them are perceived at the same time through the same sense-organ. For, in that case, the wind would be identical with the sun since sometimes both of them are perceived at the same time through the tactual organ. In fact, the difference between two objects is proved by the difference in their cognitions. And there is a difference between the cognition of the universal and that of the individual: the former is inclusive, while the latter is exclusive in nature. Hence the universal is different from the individual. Moreover, sometimes we perceive only the common character (e.g. tallness) of two objects (e.g. a post and a man), but cannot perceive their distinctive characters as in doubtful perception. This conclusively proves that the cognition of the universal is different from that of the individual. And this difference in cognitions proves the real difference in their objects. Thus the universal must be different from the individual. Thirdly, the Buddhist contends that the experience of universality (anugatapratibhāsa) does not necessarily imply the real existence of the universal, for it can be produced by different individuals. But the experience of universality is never possible, the Jaina urges, without the real existence of the universal; for otherwise it would not be experienced in the same form in all times and places. Moreover, individuals are different from one another; difference constitutes the essential nature of individuals. So they cannot produce the experience of universality. Still, if the Buddhist insists that different individuals can produce the experience of universality, then for the same reason, different horses will produce the universal notion of 'cow', which is absurd. Fourthly, the Buddhist contends that though individuals are absolutely different from one another, and devoid of common characters, still the preclusion of certain individuals (e.g. cows) from those individuals which are neither their causes nor effects (e.g. horses, buffaloes, etc.) is the cause of the experience of universality (e.g. 'cow') and the consequent action. But the Jaina replies, the negation of contradictories is not at all possible in those individuals which are devoid of common characters; hence it must be the cause of the
experience of universality. Moreover, the negative conception of the 'negation of contradictories' can never lead to practical action, which always follows from positive cognitions. Besides, if the experience of universality is possible without the real existence of the universal in nature, then, for the same reason, the experience of individuality also will be possible without the real existence of the individual in nature, which is not admitted by the Buddhist. Hence, if discriminative perceptions have for their objects discrete individuals, then assimilative perceptions too must have for their objects real universals. Thus the universal has a real existence in nature. Fifthly, the Buddhist argues, though there is no real universal in the individuals, the experience of universality is due to the illusory identification of different individuals owing to the similarity of the actions produced by them; for instance, though different cows have no real identity among them, yet they seem to be identical in nature, since all of them produce similar actions, e.g. milking, carrying, etc. But the Jaina replies, different individuals produce different actions; if it is said that the identity of the actions produced by different individuals is due to the similarity of other actions, then it will lead to regressus ad infinitum; even the cognitions produced by different individuals are different from one another; so they cannot account for the experience of universality. Lastly, the Buddhist argues, the illusory identity of different indeterminate perceptions is due to their producing one and the same universal notion; and the illusory identity of different individuals is due to the illusory identity of the indeterminate perceptions which are produced by different individuals. Thus, according to him, an illusory identity is superimposed on the different indeterminate perceptions produced by different individuals, because of the identity of the universal notion produced by them; and an illusory identity is superimposed on the different individuals on account of the illusory identity of their effects, viz. indeterminate perceptions. Thus an identity is superimposed on indeterminate perceptions, though they are absolutely different from one another, and this superimposed identity, again, is superimposed on specific individuals which are absolutely different from one another. The Jaina replies that this theory of the superimposition of a superimposition is, indeed, a nice hypothesis, which does not appeal to reason but to blind faith! As a matter of fact, indeterminate perceptions, which are absolutely different
from one another, can never produce one and the same universal notion. Had it been so, the indeterminate perceptions of horses and other animals too would have produced the universal notion of 'cow'. So, it is wrong to argue that the illusory identity of different individuals is due to the illusory identity of the indeterminate perceptions of these individuals, and that the illusory identity of the indeterminate perceptions is due to their producing one and the same universal notion. Hence the Jaina concludes that the universal really exists in the world in the form of common characters (sadbṛṣaparināma), since it is an object of uncontradicted experience.\textsuperscript{12}

The Jaina criticizes the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realism. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds there is a real universal in the individuals, and that it is one, eternal, and ubiquitous. But this doctrine is refuted by the Jaina almost by the same arguments which have been advanced by the Buddhist to prove the non-existence of the universal. The Jaina does not believe in any other universal than likeness, since likeness alone is an object of perception, and nothing beyond likeness is perceived. And this universal in the form of likeness is not one but many, since it exists in many individuals; it is not eternal but temporary, since it is produced and destroyed along with the individual in which it exists; it is not ubiquitous but limited, since it is confined to the individual in which it exists. It cannot be argued that the cognition of the universal notion itself proves the existence of one, eternal, and ubiquitous universal. For, what does it mean? Does it mean that wherever there is a universal notion, there is such a universal? Or, does it mean that wherever there is such a universal, there is a universal notion? The first meaning is not possible. It cannot be held that wherever we have a universal notion, there is a real universal corresponding to it. For, we have a universal notion of universals such as the generic character of cows (gotvā), the general character of horses (aśvata), etc.; but the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika does not admit the existence of a universal of universals. Then, again, we have the universal notion of the different kinds of negation or non-existence, viz., antecedent non-existence, subsequent non-existence, mutual non-existence, and absolute non-existence. But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika does not admit the existence of the universal of negation. These universals of universals and

\textsuperscript{12} PKM., pp. 136-7.
negations can be explained by the common characters in the different universals and the different kinds of negation respectively. Hence there is no other universal than common character. The second meaning also is impossible. It cannot be held that wherever there is a real universal in the world, there is a corresponding universal notion in the mind; for, though there is not a real universal in the cooks in the form of their generic character (pācakatva), according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, still there is the universal notion of ‘cook’ (pācakah, pācaka ityādi). Such a universal notion is not produced by the function (karma) of the cooks, for functions differ with each cook; and different causes can never produce the same effect. Nor can it be produced by the community of functions (karmasāmānya), for, if it is possible at all, it can produce the universal notion of cooking but not of the cook.13

Hence the universal notion cannot have for its object one, eternal, and ubiquitous universal existing in different individuals. There is no other universal than the common character or similarity, which is not one in many individuals, but differs with each individual in which it exists. And such a universal in the form of a common character differs in each individual like its distinctive characters. Just as an individual is distinguished from other individuals by virtue of its distinctive character, so it is assimilated to other individuals by virtue of those characters which it has in common with them; and these common characters are perceived in the form ‘this is similar to that’, ‘that is similar to this’, and so on. Just as the distinctive characters of individuals lead to effective actions by producing discriminative perceptions in the mind, so the common characters of individuals lead to effective actions by producing assimilative perceptions in it.14

The Jaina refutes the Mīmāṃsaka objections. First, if the common character or similarity constitutes universality, the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka asks why we perceive an individual cow as ‘this is a cow’, and not as ‘this is like a cow’. The Jaina replies that we have such a perception because of the superimposition of identity or similarity (abhedopacārāt); that the Bhāṭṭa cannot explain such a perception as ‘this is like that’, ‘the white cow is like the black cow’. If he argues that we have such a perception, because of their relation to the same universal, then we shall have such a

13 PKM., p. 139.  
14 PKM., p. 140.
perception as 'these two individuals are possessed of the same universal'. The Jaina holds that we have such a perception as 'this is a cow', and not as 'this is like a cow', because of the superimposed identity between the two individuals on account of their common characters. Secondly, if an individual is perceived to be like another individual on account of their common characters, the Bhāṭṭa asks how these common characters, again, can be perceived as like one another. If it is because of other common characters among these common characters, then it will lead to infinite regress. The Jaina replies that just as distinctive characters can be perceived as distinct from one another without supposing other distinctive characters among them, so the common characters among individuals can be perceived as like one another without supposing any other common character among them; that the hypothesis of any other universal than the common characters among individuals is unwarranted by the facts of experience.15

4. The Modified Nominalism of Rāmānuja

Rāmānuja holds almost the same view as the Jaina does, as regards the universal. According to him, there is no other universal (jāti) than a configuration or arrangement of parts (saṁsthāna) among the individuals; but there is a likeness in the configuration of individuals. In individual objects there are points of likeness, but not a universal class-essence (jāti). Rāmānuja entirely denies the existence of a class-essence, but he admits the existence of fundamental likeness or close resemblance. Fundamental likeness (sausādṛśya) is that property of the object, which is the unconditional and invariable condition of the use of the word 'much alike' (susādraśa). If likeness is not a property of an object, it is no likeness at all. If it exists as a property in another object, then it leads to infinite regress. Therefore, there is no class-essence in individuals, but only a similarity among certain individuals. And even among these individuals not a single quality is found to belong to all the individuals of a class (e.g. cows). How, then, can we define fundamental likeness (sausādṛśya) among them? Rāmānuja holds that the individual members of a class are not found to possess a definite quality in common, but

15 PKM, p. 140.
that they resemble one another in the greatest number of qualities. This doctrine reminds us of Mill’s doctrine of Natural Kinds, according to which the members of the same class have the greatest number of resemblances among them, and differ from the members of a different class in the largest number of points. Rāmānuja further maintains that there is not only no identity of class-essence among the different individuals of a class, but that there is not even an identity of name among them. Thus Rāmānuja goes further than Hume and Mill, when he holds that even the name is not general among the individuals of a class. When we say ‘cow’, we mean different cows in different times and spaces. A is like B; B is like C; C is like D. Thus there is not a single likeness among A, B, C, and D; but there are the different likenesses because the correlative terms differ in each case. Rāmānuja, thus, is an advocate of thorough-going nominalism. But he does not go the length of saying that there is no likeness at all among the specific individuals, which are absolutely different from one another. Thus the Buddhists are the most uncompromising nominalists. Rāmānuja is a bit less uncompromising, and the Jain is still less so. If the Buddhists be regarded as typical exponents of thorough-going nominalism, the Jaina and Rāmānuja both may be regarded as advocates of modified nominalism.

According to Rāmānuja, at the stage of indeterminate perception, i.e. the perception of the first individual of a class, we perceive a particular arrangement of parts (samsthāna) which is the distinctive character of the whole class, but we do not recognize it to be the common character of all the individuals belonging to the class, for at that time we have not yet perceived any other individual. Thus, even in indeterminate perception the universal character of an object is known, but not as universal, for, according to Rāmānuja, there is no other universal than a particular collocation of parts, which is common to all the individuals of a class, and this class-character in the form of a particular collocation of parts (samsthāna-rūpaṣātīyādi) is as much an object of sense-perception as the individual object (pīṇḍa) itself; and, moreover, the individual which has a particular collocation of parts can never be perceived apart from the particular arrangement of parts. Hence, according to Rāmānuja, both universality and individuality are apprehended by the indeterminate perception of an object, but
the universality is not recognized to be the common character of all the individuals belonging to the class. The common character is known to be common only at the stage of determinate perception or the perception of the second, the third, and the subsequent individuals.18

5. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Realism

Kaṇāda defines universality and particularity as mental concepts; they are relative to the understanding (sāmānyam viśeṣa iti buddhyapekṣam).19 By universality he means a mark or quality by which the understanding assimilates a number of objects and forms a group or class. By particularity, he means a mark or quality by which the understanding differentiates one object from others. Universality and particularity are real entities. Universality (sāmānya) has a real existence in the form of common qualities in individual objects. Thus Kaṇāda and the later Vaiśeṣikas agree with the Naiyāyikas and advocate realism.

The Buddhist holds with Hobbes that universality lies only in name; that it is an unreal fiction of imagination (vikalpa). He is a nominalist. The Jaina and Rāmānuja hold that the universal is real; that it exists in the individuals in the form of common characters; and that there is no other universal besides these. They are modified nominalists. Kaṇāda holds that universality and particularity are relative to the understanding, though corresponding to them there are common qualities and individual peculiarities respectively in individual objects. The later Vaiśeṣikas, however, are realists. They lay stress on the reality of the class-essence in the individuals.

The Naiyāyikas also recognize the existence of the universal as distinct from the individual. The universal is related to the individual by the relation of inherence. There is one universal in all the individuals belonging to the same class. Though it exists in them, it is independent of them. It is not born with them; nor does it perish with them. It is unborn and imperishable. This doctrine of eternal universals resembles the realism of Plato. The universals of the Naiyāyika are eternal types like the Ideas of Plato; the individuals are born and destroyed, but the universals subsist for ever. But still the Naiyāyika does not

18 RB., i, 1, 1, and śrutapraṇāśikā.
19 V.S., i, 2. 3.
support the Platonic doctrine of *universalia ante rem*. Plato's Ideas exist in the transcendental world as eternal archetypes, while his individuals exist in the sensible world; his Ideas are truly real, but his individuals are mere shadows of the Ideas, and as such unreal. The Naiyāyika's individuals are as real as his universals; both of them have ontological reality. Moreover, Plato's Ideas are not immanent in the individuals so long as they exist; but the Naiyāyika's universals exist in the individuals as their formative principles; they are immanent in them so long as they exist; there is an intimate and inseparable relation between them, called inherence (*samaṃvaya*). Thus the Naiyāyika supports the Aristotelian view of *universalia in re*. But his universal is one and eternal, while his individuals are many and non-eternal; the universal subsists before the individuals are born and after the individuals are destroyed. So far the Naiyāyika supports the Platonic doctrine of *universalia ante rem*. Thus his realism is a peculiar blend of Platonic and Aristotelian realism.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa shows that the universal is as much an object of perception as the individual is. According to the Buddhists, the specific individual (*svalaksana*) alone is an object of perception; the universal is never perceived; it is an unreal fiction of imagination (*vikalpa*). The Naiyāyika argues that the universal cannot be said to be unreal, since, like the individual, it is an object of uncontradicted and undoubted perception produced by the peripheral contact of an object with a sense-organ. The universal is as much an object of indeterminate perception as the individual is. If the individual alone were the object of indeterminate perception, the universal could not suddenly enter into distinct consciousness at the stage of determinate perception. If it is urged that the universal is simply a name, and as such only a *vikalpa* or an unreal form of imagination, then the Naiyāyika replies that the universality of an object can be apprehended, ever when the name of the object is not yet known. For instance, when a man coming from the Deccan, where there are no camels, suddenly sees a number of camels, he perceives the universality of the camels, though he does not know their names. Though a man does not know the name of a number of objects belonging to the same class when he perceives them for the first time, he can perceive both their common and distinctive features. At the first sight of four fingers we perceive them both as similar
to, and different from, one another. So it cannot be argued that through perception we can apprehend only the particularity of an object, and not its universality. Moreover, if at the time of perceiving the first individual belonging to a class only its distinctive feature is perceived, then we cannot recognize the second individual perceived at some other time as belonging to the same class. The Buddhist may argue that the recollection of the first individual at the time of perceiving the second individual is the cause of recognition; the recognition of the second individual is a complex presentative-representative process involving the perception of this individual and the recollection of the first individual. But the Naiyāyika points out that the second individual, according to the Buddhist, is quite different from the first, and has no similarity with it. So the recollection of the first individual at the time of perceiving the second individual cannot help us in recognizing the second individual. If it has anything to do with the recognition of the second individual as belonging to the same class, then, at first, there must be a perception of both the common and distinctive features of the first individual. Thus at the first stage of indeterminate perception just after peripheral stimulation the universality of an object is as much perceived as its particularity, and hence universality can never be denied. Universality is as real as particularity is, since both of them are objects of indeterminate perception, which is a purely immediate and unsophisticated experience.

If it is urged that at the stage of indeterminate perception we cannot distinctly point out the common feature of an object, then it may equally be argued that at this stage we cannot also point out the distinctive feature of the object. If it is urged that community cannot be perceived at the stage of indeterminate perception, because the perception of community depends upon the perception of those objects which have common qualities, then it may equally be argued that particularity of an object too cannot be perceived at this stage, because the perception of its particularity too depends upon the perception of those objects from which it is distinguished. If the community of an object cannot be perceived, because it depends upon the assimilation of this object to other like objects, then its particularity also cannot be perceived, because it depends upon the discrimination of this object from other disparate objects. If the particularity of specific individuality
(svalakṣaṇa) of an object is perceived at the stage of indeterminate perception, its universality too must be perceived at the same time.

But if we apprehend an object, pure and simple, in its bare nakedness, stripped of its common and distinctive features at the stage of indeterminate perception, what is the exact nature of its object? Evidently it cannot be determined at the stage of indeterminate perception, which is purely an immediate experience. It can be determined only at the stage of determinate perception, which clearly shows that both universality and particularity are objects of indeterminate perception. In fact, indeterminate perception is the immediate experience of the common and distinctive features of an object as mere that is, and not as what is; these are apprehended as unrelated to one another. In determinate perception we apprehend these common and distinctive features as what is or as related to one another. Indeterminate perception is the pure immediate apprehension of objects and their qualities, both common and particular, per se. Determinate perception is the clear apprehension of the objects and their qualities inter se. It has been argued that it is self-contradictory to assert that one and the same object is characterized by contradictory qualities such as universality and particularity. But, in fact, there is no contradiction here, because we do not perceive the contradiction. Neither the perception of community contradicts that of particularity, nor does the perception of particularity contradict that of universality; hence both the perceptions are real, and none of them is illusory.¹⁸

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa criticizes the Buddhist doctrine thus: First, the Buddhists argue that the universal is not different from the individual, because they are not perceived to occupy different portions of space, like a jar and a cloth. But this is false. The universal is not perceived to occupy a space different from that of the individual, not because it does not exist, but because it exists only in the individual, which is its substratum. Secondly, the Buddhists argue that the universal cannot exist in the individual, because it cannot be conceived to exist in the individual either wholly or partly. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa replies that the universal does exist in each individual wholly. It cannot be said that if the universal exists wholly in a particular individual, it cannot exist in any other individual because it has already exhausted itself in

¹⁸ NM., pp. 309-311.
the former individual; for we do perceive the universal in each
individual, and the fact of our uncontradicted experience can
never be challenged; and the universal can never exist partly in
each individual, because it has no parts. Thirdly, the Buddhists
argue that a universal can neither be all-pervading nor limited to
certain individuals belonging to the same class; that it can neither
exist in all individuals to whatever class they may belong, nor
can it exist in all its proper objectives. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa replies
that a universal exists everywhere, not only in its proper subjects,
but in all the particulars. But it cannot be perceived in all the
individuals, because it is not manifested by all of them; a parti-
cular universal (e.g. genus of cow or gotva) is manifested by a
number of particular individuals (e.g. cows); and in the absence
of these manifesting individuals, the universal is not perceived.
And an individual can manifest a universal, only when it is per-
ceived; unperceived individuals can never manifest a universal.
Thus, though a universal exists everywhere, it cannot be perceived
everywhere because the manifesting agents are not present every-
where. A universal is perceived wherever its manifesting agents
or individuals are perceived, because individuals can manifest a
universal only in that particular space and at that particular
time, where and when those individuals are perceived. So we are
not to suppose that the universal 'cow' did not exist in the partic-
cular cow just born, before its birth, but it comes into it when it
is born, since the universal is incapable of movement. And there
is no harm in admitting that a universal exists only in its proper
subjects. Whenever a particular individual comes to exist, it
comes to be related to the universal. Though the universal is
eternal, its relation to a particular individual comes into existence
only at that moment when the individual comes into being.
Fourthly, the Buddhists argue that the universal cannot inhere
in the individual, as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds, since there is no
relation of inherence; that inherence (samaṅgāya) is nothing but
identity (tadātmaya). The Buddhists deny the possibility of any
other relation than identity between two entities which are in-
sparable from each other, e.g. substance and quality, universal
and particular, and so on. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa replies that insepara-
bility of two things does not prove their identity. Though a
substance and its quality are inseparable, being never perceived
apart from each other, one is perceived as distinct from the other.
Likewise, though the universal is never perceived apart from the individual, they cannot be regarded as identical with each other, since they are perceived as distinct from each other. Therefore, the difference of the universal from the individual is proved by the difference in their perceptions. Fifthly, the Buddhists argue that only specific individuality is real, since it is the object of indeterminate perception; that universality is the product of conceptual construction (vikālaṃpa), and consequently unreal. To this Jayanta Bhaṭṭa replies that universality and individuality both are real, inasmuch as both of them are objects of uncontradicted experience. The Buddhists cannot deny the reality of universality. What is his complaint against the perception of universality? He does not deny the universal notion (anuvṛttiṃāna). What, then, is the power (sakti) in the individual, which produces such a universal notion? And if there is such a power in the individual, is it different from the individual, or identical with it? Is it eternal or non-eternal? Is it perceptible, or inerable? If it is different from the individual, it must be universal; if not, the individual can never produce the universal notion. If it is eternal, it is universal, since the individuals are born and destroyed; and if it is non-eternal, and as such identical with the individual, it can never produce the universal notion. If it is perceptible, the universal is real, and if it is inerable, then also the universal is real. Sixthly, the Buddhists may argue that just as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that a particular universal (e.g. the class-essence of cows or "gotva) can exist only in some particular individuals (e.g. cows), so it may be said that some particular individuals (e.g. cows) can produce a universal notion (e.g. of the class "cow"), though in reality there is no universality in them. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa urges that this argument is absurd. If there is a peculiarity (atiṣaya) in a cognition, there must be a corresponding peculiarity (atiṣaya) in its object. If you admit that a peculiarity in the effect is produced by a corresponding peculiarity in its cause, then you must admit that the universality of a notion must be produced by a corresponding peculiarity in its object, viz. universality. Hence the universal is real.19 Lastly, the Buddhists may argue that the unity in the individuals is not the unity of their universality, but it is the unity of the individuals themselves. Śrīdhara replies that this is not possible. For, if there were no

19 NM., pp. 311-14.
universality, there could be no unity among the individuals, or their causes, or their effects or actions. If the unity in the individuals were due to the unity of their causes, then there would be no unity among the individuals which are produced by different causes, e.g. fire produced by the friction of wood, fire produced by electricity, etc. So, also, if the unity among the individuals were due to the unity or sameness of their effects, then there would be a unity even among heterogeneous individuals; for instance, both cows and buffaloes give us milk; hence cows would be regarded as the same as the buffaloes. Hence the unity in the individuals must be due to the universal in them. The universal can never be denied. It is a fact of uncontradicted experience. So the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika affirms the reality of the universal.

6. The Prābhākara Realism

The Prābhākara holds that the universal (jāti) is real, since we recognize an essential identity among a number of individuals which are perceived as different from one another; that the same-ness in the midst of differences proves the existence of the universal in them. It exists in each individual entirely, since we recognize the same class-character in every individual. It is distinct from the individuals in which it subsists. It is eternal. It is an object of sense-perception. It is never perceived apart from the individual. So far the Prābhākara agrees with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. But he differs from the latter in holding that the relation of inherence (samaṇḍya) between the universal and the individual is not eternal. When a new individual of a class is born, a new relation of inherence is generated, by which the individual is brought into relation with the universal (jāti) that exists in other individuals. And when an individual is destroyed, the relation of inherence between this individual and the universal is destroyed. Moreover, according to the Vaiśeṣika, there is the summum genus (parā jāti), viz. Being or existence which is supposed to be the common character of all entities. The Prābhākara does not recognize the existence of the highest genus, viz. Being (sattā), since we have no consciousness of it. We have to admit that there is such a jāti as substance, because we perceive a number of individual substances as having certain characters in

10 NK., p. 318.
11 PP., p. 17 and p. 87.
12 PP., p. 17.
common. But we have no such consciousness of *sattā* or pure being; we do not perceive a number of things as merely 'existing'; and so we cannot admit that there can be such a *jāti* as pure being or *sattā*. When we speak of an individual object as existing (*sat*), we do not mean that it has any class-character as being (*sat*); but we mean simply that the individual has its specific existence (*svarūpasattā*) or individuality.²⁴

Prabhākara agrees with Kumārila in holding that the universal (*jāti*) is real and is an object of sense-perception. But he differs from Kumārila in his view of the relation between the universal and the individual. According to Prabhākara, the universal is different from the individual. But according to Kumārila, the universal is both different from, and identical with, the individual. According to the former, there is a relation of difference between the universal and the individual, while according to the latter, there is a relation of identity-in-difference. Prabhākara objects to the Bhāṭṭa theory of identity-in-difference between the universal and the individual for the following reason. If both the universal and the individual were perceived by one and the same act of cognition without contradicting each other, then the theory would be regarded as valid. But they cannot be perceived as such. One and the same act of cognition cannot apprehend both the difference and the identity between the universal and the individual. Just as when we perceive the difference between the universal and the individual, we also perceive both the members of the relation (i.e. the universal and the individual) as distinct, so when we perceive the identity between the two, we should perceive only one of them, either the universal or the individual because of their identity.²⁵ In such a case, a single object, viz. either the universal or the individual would give rise to two cognitions of both the universal and the individual and their identity with each other. But it is not possible either for the universal to produce a cognition of its identity with the individual, nor is it possible for the individual to produce a cognition of its identity with the universal. So it cannot be said that both difference and identity are apprehended by one and the same act of cognition. Hence the universal must be regarded as different from the individual.²⁶

²⁴ *PP*, pp. 29-30.  
²⁵ *PP*, p. 20.  
²⁶ *SD*, pp. 395-6.
7. The Bhāṭṭa Realism

We have already seen that Kumārila agrees with Prabhākara in holding that the universal (jāti) is real. Its existence can never be denied, because it is an object of sense-perception. Whenever we perceive an object, we perceive it as belonging to a particular class. The act of perception involves assimilation as well as discrimination. It is inclusive (anuvṛtta) as well as exclusive (vyāvṛtta). The element of assimilation in perception clearly shows that in the object of perception there must be a class-character or universality. The reality of the universal in the object of perception is the ground of assimilation. The reality of the universal is also proved by inference and other sources of valid knowledge which are based upon it. The ground of inference and other kinds of knowledge is universality (jāti). So they confirm the reality of the universal far from contradicting it. If they contradict the existence of universality on which they are based, they contradict their own existence.27

Kumārila does not hold with the Buddhist that the universal is non-different from, or identical with, the individual. Nor does he hold with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Prabhākara that the universal is different from the individual. According to him, the universal is both different from, and identical with, the individual.28 He does not hold with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika that there is a relation of inference between the universal and the individual. He rejects the relation of inference altogether. A relationship, according to him, can exist only between things which are distinct entities, but inference is regarded as a relation between things which are inseparable, and hence it is impossible.29 Kumārila rejects the Jaina view of the universal as similarity, because similarity cannot exist without universality.30 He rejects also the view of the universal as a particular arrangement of parts, because configurations of parts are destructible, but the class-character is indestructible.

The Bhāṭṭa Mimāṃsaka criticizes the Buddhist view. The Buddhists argue that if the universal is different from the individual, it must be perceived as different from it. But, as a matter of fact, the universal is never perceived as different from the

27 SD., pp. 386-7.
28 SD., pp. 392 and 398.
29 Keith, Karma-Mimamsa, p. 58.
30 SD., p. 409.
individual. And if the universal is non-different from the individual, then the individual alone is real, and there is no universal apart from the individual. The Buddhists set forth their argument in the following way: "What is real must be either different or non-different; the universal is neither different nor non-different from the individual; therefore the universal must be unreal." But there can be no inference, the Bhāṭṭa argues, if there is not an apprehension of universal concomitance between the major term and the middle term; so, in the above argument the universal concomitance between the major term and the middle term has already been apprehended; otherwise there would be no such inference. The major term here is 'the genus of reality' (vastutva) and the middle term is 'difference and non-difference' (bhedābheda). And the apprehension of uniform connection between 'the genus of reality' (vastutva) and 'difference and non-difference' (bhedābheda) establishes the existence of community (jāti), for vastutva is of the nature of jāti. Otherwise, the Buddhist cannot argue that the reality (vastutva) of the universal is not possible because of the non-apprehension of its difference and non-difference from the individual. When he argues that there is a universal concomitance between 'vastutva' (major term) and 'difference and non-difference' (middle term), he admits the reality of vastutva, and consequently of community (sāmānya), because vastutva is of the nature of a universal. Thus the very act of inference by which the Buddhists prove the unreality of the universal presupposes its existence. But the Buddhist may urge, the term vastu (reality) has not for its object vastutva (the genus of vastu or reality), but it is due to a phenomenal condition (aupādhika); that the Bhāṭṭa cannot say that the term vastu (reality) has vastutva (the genus of reality) for its object, which is of the nature of a universal. The Bhāṭṭa replies that the above argument of the Buddhists is not admissible: that if there is no vastutva, call it a jāti or upādhi, it must presuppose the existence of the universal; for the inference depends upon the existence of vastutva, and this is called jāti by the realist. Otherwise, even the non-existence of vastutva (reality) in a sāmānya (universality) cannot be proved. The negation of sāmānya cannot be proved without assuming the sāmānya (community) itself. If words are only due to accidental conditions

\[ SD., \text{ pp. 387-8.} \]

\[ \text{Ibid., p. 388, and also SDP.} \]
(aufādhika), they cannot have the power of denoting objects. According to the Buddhists, everything in the world is individual in nature; therefore, the individuals which are absolutely different from one another cannot constitute the denotation of words. The Buddhists hold that there is one condition or mark (upāphit) which is one and the same in different individuals, viz. apprehensibility. But that which remains identical in the midst of different individuals is nothing but the universal. Hence the reality of the universal is established by perception and inference both.\[^{33}\]

The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka criticizes the Jaina doctrine. The Jaina holds that there is no need of assuming a separate existence of the universal; it consists in the similarity of individuals. Pārthasaṅrathimīśra urges that the universality cannot consist in similarity (na ca sādṛṣyameva sāmānyam).\[^{34}\] Because, in the first place, if universality consisted merely in the similarity of individuals, then we would perceive an individual cow in the form 'this is like a cow', and not in the form 'this is a cow'. But, as a matter of fact, we never perceive a cow as 'this is like a cow'. Hence universality cannot be identified with similarity, as the Jaina supposes. And, in the second place, even similarity among different individuals is not possible, if there is no real universal among them, for similarity means common qualities. Similarity is not possible apart from universality. Those things are similar to one another, which possess properties in common. Thus similarity does not constitute universality (sāmānyya), but follows from it. For instance, a cow is similar to a gavaya (wild ox); their parts are different from one another, so that the parts of the cow cannot exist in the parts of the gavaya; therefore, a certain property (dharma) must be supposed to exist in the different parts of the cow and the gavaya, so that their similarity may be perceived in spite of their difference; and that common property is called universality. Hence it cannot be held, with the Jaina, that mere similarity among things constitutes their universality or community (sāmānyya).\[^{35}\]

The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka criticizes the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine. Is the universal different or non-different from the individual? According to the Buddhists, the universal is non-different from the individual which alone is real. The Buddhist doctrine

\[^{33}\] SD., pp. 388-9, and also SDP.\[^{34}\] SD. and SDP., p. 409.\[^{35}\] SD. and SDP., p. 409.
has already been refuted. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, on the other hand, holds that the universal is different from the individual; but that it is not perceived apart from the individual, because it is inseparably related to it. What is the relation between the universal and the individual? It is inherence. What is inherence? It is a relation between two objects which are inseparably connected with each other, and which gives rise to such cognition as 'here it is'.

Pārthasārathimiśra offers the following criticism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine: (1) The universal is said to inhere in the individual; inherence is the relation between two entities inseparably connected with each other, which gives rise to such a cognition as 'here it is'. But when we perceive a cow, we have such a perception as 'this is a cow' (iyam gauḥ) and not as 'here is the class-essence of cow (gotuva) in the individual cow' (iha gavi gotvam). This clearly shows that the universal is identical with the individual—it is not entirely different from the individual. (2) Then, again, what is meant by inseparable connection (ayutasiddhi)? It is the negation or absence of separable connection (yutasisuddhi). What, again, is separable connection (yuttasiddhi)? Does it mean the capacity for separate or independent movements (prthaggamattva)? Or, does it mean subsistence in different substrates (prthagāśrayāśrayitva)? In either case, argues Pārthasārathimiśra, there would be no relation between the composite whole (avayavā) and its component parts (avayava), because there can be a movement in the parts without a movement in the whole, and because the whole and its parts inhere in different substrates—the whole inhere in its parts and the parts inhere in their component atoms. Likewise, the universal and the individual too have different substrates, because the substrate of the universal is the individual, and the substrates of the individual are the parts of the individual. Hence Pārthasārathimiśra concludes that inherence is such a relation between the container and the contained that the latter produces a corresponding cognition in the former. The universal inhere in the individual. This means that the universal (e.g. class-essence of cow, or gotuva) produces an apprehension of it in the individual (e.g. an individual cow or

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28 Ayutasiddhāṁmaṁharpṛtyayahetūḥ sambandhaḥ. ŚD., p. 390.
29 Yena sambandhenādheyaśmādhāre svānurūpāṁ buddhiṁ janayati sa sambandhaḥ samvāya iti. ŚD., pp. 391-2.
goyakti). But if the universal produces an apprehension of it in the individual, for instance, if an individual cow is perceived as belonging to the class ‘cow’, then we cannot admit a difference between the individual and the universal. We must admit a non-difference or identity between the two on the basis of perception. (3) The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika may urge that the universal is ‘inclusive’ (anuvṛtta), while the individual is ‘exclusive’ (vyāvṛtta). The universal is common to many individuals, but the individuals are different from one another. For instance, the class-essence of cow (gōtvā) is one and the same in all the individual cows; but the individual cows are different from one another. How, then, can the universal be identical with the individual? If the two are identical with each other, they must be of the same nature; either the universal must be ‘exclusive’ like the individual or the individual must be ‘inclusive’ like the universal. In other words, if the universal is identical with the individual, either the universal will differ in different individuals, or the individual will be common to many individuals. Pārthasārathimśira retorts: If the universal is absolutely different from the individual, how can the individual be perceived as universal? How can an individual cow be perceived as belonging to the class ‘cow’ when we perceive a cow as ‘this is a cow’? This can never be explained by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, according to whom, the universal is absolutely different from the individual, though the former inheres in the latter. But the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsaka has no difficulty in explaining it. If the different characters of the universal and the individual, viz. ‘inclusiveness’ and ‘exclusiveness’ prove the difference between the two, the ‘likeness’ (tādṛṣṭya) between the universal and the individual as shown by the perception of an individual as belonging to a particular class proves their identity. Thus the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsaka concludes that there is a relation of identity-in-difference between the universal and the individual; the universal is both different from, and identical with, the individual. (4) The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika may urge: How can identity and difference both subsist in one and the same object? Is it not self-contradictory to assert that the universal is both different from the individual, and identical with it? The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsaka argues that there is no contradiction here, for both difference and identity are perceived together by a single act of perception; that if difference and identity were perceived by two cognitions, one contradicting
the other, like the two cognitions ‘this is silver’ and ‘this is not silver’, then there would be a contradiction. But neither the perception of difference contradicts the perception of identity, nor does the perception of identity contradict the perception of difference. Hence both of them are valid. In the perception ‘this is a cow’, there are two cognitions, viz. the cognition of ‘this’ (iṣyāṁ buddhi) and the cognition of ‘cow’ (gobuddhi); these two cognitions have two different objects; the former has an ‘individual’ (an individual cow or golvyaṅki) for its object, while the latter has a universal (the class-essence of cow or gotva) for its object. Thus the twofold perception of an object such as ‘this is a cow’ proves the dual character of the object, viz. both its individuality and universality. Hence the universal cannot be different from the individual.28

The Bhāṣṭṭa Mīmāṁsaka criticizes Prabhākara’s objections. Prabhākara has argued that one and the same act of cognition cannot apprehend both the difference and the identity between the universal and the individual. His argument has already been given in detail. Pārthasaśārathimśra contends that this argument is baseless. The cognition of two objects does not necessarily involve the cognition of their difference. For sometimes two objects are perceived, but not the difference between the two; for instance, when two trees are perceived from a distance, the difference between the two is not perceived. When an individual member of a class is perceived for the first time, both the individual and the universal are perceived, but not the difference between the two. When another individual belonging to the same class is perceived, it is assimilated to the first individual as belonging to the same class, and differentiated from it as being a different individual; and it is then alone that the difference between the individual and the universal is perceived. Hence it is unreasonable to hold that the cognition of two objects necessarily involves the cognition of their difference. Similarly, it is unreasonable to hold that the cognition of a single object necessarily involves the cognition of its identity. For instance, when a person is perceived from a distance, we have a doubtful cognition such as ‘Is he Devadatta or Yajñadatta?’ Thus a single object gives rise to two cognitions. Hence it cannot be held that the cognition of two objects necessarily involves the cognition of their

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28 ŚD., pp. 390-4.
difference, or the cognition of a single object necessarily involves
the cognition of its identity. But the cognition in the form ‘this
is another’ apprehends difference; and the cognition in the form
‘this is no other’ apprehends identity. A person who perceives
both a white cow and a piebald cow has a cognition in such a
form as ‘this is a cow and this also is a cow’, and so he perceives
the identity between the two; and he has also a cognition in such
a form as ‘the white cow is different from the piebald cow’ and
thus apprehends their difference. Hence we conclude that the
universal is both different from the individual, and identical
with it.\textsuperscript{49}

Prabhākara may urge that the universal is eternal, while the
individual is non-eternal—the universal is common to many indi-
viduals, while the individuals are different from one another.
How, then, can the universal be identical with the individual? If
they were identical with each other, in spite of their opposite
characters, the universal would be non-eternal and different in
different individuals, and the individual would be eternal and
common to many individuals, and thus there would be an utter
confusion in the whole world. Pārthasārathimśra replies that
there is no contradiction here. A multiform object may be eternal
in some, and non-eternal in other, respects; it may be identical
with other objects in some respects, and different from them in
others. The universal considered as an individual is non-eternal;
and the individual considered as a universal is eternal. So there
is no contradiction here.\textsuperscript{50} Thus, according to the Bhāṭṭa, the
universal is not identical with the individual, as the Buddhists
hold, nor is it different from the individual, as the Nyāya-
Vaiśeṣika holds, but it is different from the individual in some
respects, and identical with it in others. The relation between
the two is identity-in-difference. The Bhāṭṭa realism closely
resembles the realism of Aristotle and Hegel, according to whom,
the universal cannot exist apart from the individuals, and the
individuals cannot exist apart from the universal; the universal
is the inner essence of the individuals, and the individuals are
the outer expressions of the universal; the universal and the
individual are abstractions apart from each other; the universal
is neither wholly identical with the individuals, nor wholly

\textsuperscript{49} SD., pp. 395-8.
\textsuperscript{50} SD., p. 399.
different from them; in fact, they together constitute the concrete reality.

Pārthasārathimśra sets forth two reasons for the Bhāṭṭa doctrine of identity-in-difference between the universal and the individual. In the first place, in the cognition 'this is a cow' the co-inherence (sāmānādhikaraṇya) of the two elements, viz. 'this' (an individual cow) and 'cow' (the class-essence of cow) in the same object proves the identity between the individual and the universal. And the fact that the two cognitions of 'this' and 'cow' are not synonymous with each other proves the difference between the individual and the universal. Hence there is no contradiction in holding that the universal is both different from, and identical with, the individual. In the second place, the universal is different from the individual in some respects, and identical with it in others. If the universal were both different and non-different from the individual in respect of the same qualities, there would be a contradiction. But just as one and the same object can be both long and short in comparison with different objects, so one and the same universal can be both different and non-different from the individual in different respects. For instance, when we have such a perception as 'this piebald cow is a cow', we perceive the individual cow as identical with the universal 'cow'. But when we have such a perception as 'that white cow is not a piebald cow', the universal 'cow' (gotva) is perceived as different from the individual cow. The universal 'cow' (gotva) differs from a white cow in respect of a black cow, but not in its essential nature. An individual cow differs from the universal 'cow' (gotva) in respect of certain qualities, actions, and other universals, but not in its essential nature. And one individual cow differs from another individual cow in its specific nature, but not in its generic nature. Hence there is no contradiction in holding that the universal is both different from, and identical with, the individual.41

8. The Modified Realism of Śaṅkara

According to Śaṅkara, Brahman alone is ultimately real, which is one, universal, eternal, and ubiquitous Being. He admits no other real universal than Being which is Brahman. But he admits the existence of other universals in the phenomenal world.

41 S.D., pp. 393-5.
There are the universals of cows and other substances, qualities, and actions; these universals are not born. Only individual substances, individual qualities, and individual actions are generated; but their universal essences are not born. They are the archetypal forms, as it were, of the individual substances, qualities, and actions. But these archetypal forms or universals are not eternal in the sense in which Brahman is eternal. Brahman is beyond time, space, and causation; it is beyond all change and becoming. But the universals of individual substances, qualities, and actions have an empirical existence in the phenomenal world. They are the evolutes of nescience and as such phenomenal appearances from the standpoint of Brahman. Their reality is inferior to that of Brahman but superior to that of individual objects. They are, like the Ideas of Plato, the types which are progressively realized in individual objects of the sensible world. The individuals are born and perish, but the universals are unborn. They are the models according to which God moulds the sensible world.

The later Sāṅkarites, however, do not recognize the existence of the universal, because it can neither be perceived nor inferred. The perception of one and the same form (e.g. 'cow') in different individuals (e.g. cows) cannot be regarded as a proof of the existence of the universal ('cow'). If it is regarded so, does it mean that we have the apprehension of 'cow' in one individual cow as much as in another individual cow? Or does it mean that we have the apprehension of one and the same nature of cow in all individual cows? Or does it mean that we apprehend that the different individuals possess one and the same property? The first alternative is not tenable. Just as we apprehend the same form of the moon in different pots of water in which it is reflected though there is no universal moon, so we may apprehend the same form of cow in different cows though there is no universal cow (gotvā) in them. The second alternative also is not tenable. It is not possible for us to determine the nature that is common to all individuals of the same kind. Even if we were able to

42 Na hi gavādivyaktānāmutpattimattve tadākṛtānāmapyutpattimattvam syāt, dravyaguṇakarmāṇām hi vyaktaya evotpadyante nākṛtayaḥ. SBDs., i, 3, 28.
43 Pratyakṣādananumāṇād vā na jātiḥ sedhium arhati. Tattvapradīpikā, p. 303.
44 Na tāvat gaurāgaurityabhinnākārāgrahi pratyakṣāṁ jātāu pramāṇam. Ibid., p. 303.
ascertain the common quality, it would be useless to postulate a jāti or class-essence which is different from the common quality. The third alternative also is untenable. When we perceive a man with a stick we perceive the man as possessing a stick. But when we perceive an individual cow, in which the class-essence is supposed to exist, we never perceive the cow as possessing the class-essence (gotra). It may be urged that we perceive at least the same configuration or arrangement of parts (e.g. dewlap, etc.) in different cows. But this resemblance in configuration of parts is not the universal or class-essence of the realist. Hence the universal can never be perceived. Nor can it be inferred. Citsukha sets forth the same arguments as the Buddhists have advanced against the existence of the universal (jāti).\(^45\)

\(^{45}\) Tattvapradipika, p. 303.
CHAPTER XI
PERCEPTION OF COGNITION

1. Introduction

According to Kumārila, an act of cognition cannot be directly perceived; it is inferred from cognizedness (jñātatā) or manifestness (prākatya) produced by the cognition in the object. According to some Mīmāṃsakas, the act of cognition is inferred from the consciousness of its object; it is not an object of perception. According to Prabhākara, a cognition is directly perceived by itself; every cognition perceives itself, the cognizing self and cognized object. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, a cognition is an object of perception; but it is not perceived by itself but by another cognition through the internal organ or mind; we perceive a cognition by internal perception through the mind, just as we perceive an external object by external perception through the external senses. According to the Jaina, a cognition is perceived by itself in apprehending its object; it is not perceived by any other cognition. According to the Buddhist idealist, a cognition is self-luminous; it apprehends itself but not an external object as there is no such object; a cognition is not apprehended by the self because there is no self at all. According to the Sāmkhya-Pātañjala, a cognition is not perceived by another cognition but by the self because a cognition is unconscious. According to Śaṅkara, a cognition is not perceived by another cognition but by itself; it is self-luminous.

2. The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka

Pārthasārathimiśra gives an exposition of Kumārila's doctrine of inferability of cognition. According to the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka, a cognition cannot be perceived, but it is inferred from the result of cognition, viz. cognizedness (jñātatā) or manifestness (prākatya) in the object. For instance, when we know a jar we have an apprehension that the jar is cognized by us; and from this cognizedness of the object we infer the existence of the cognition; a cognition is inferred from the cognizedness of its object.¹ Pārthasārathi gives

¹ Jātatātānumeyath jāśnam.
three arguments for the existence of cognition. In the first place, an action involves four factors, viz. an agent of action (kārtṛ), an object of action (karma), an instrument of action (karaṇa), and a result of action (phala) which inheres in the object. An act of knowledge, therefore, has an agent or subject of knowledge or knower (jñātṛ), an object of knowledge (jñeya), an instrumental cognition (karaṇajñāna), and a result of knowledge, viz. cognizedness (jñātata) in the object. Just as the act of cooking produces cookedness in the object cooked, so the act of cognition (jñānakriyā) produces cognizedness (jñātata) in its object, and from this cognizedness as an effect we infer the existence of its cause, viz. cognition. Thus a cognition cannot be perceived either by itself or by any other cognition, but is inferred from the cognizedness in its object.² In the second place, a cognition is inferred from the relation between the knowing subject (ātman) and the known object (arthā), which is apprehended by internal perception. If there is not an adventitious condition intervening between the self and the object, how is it possible for the self to be related to the object? Therefore, from the specific relation between the subject and the object involved in knowledge we infer the existence of cognition. Here, cognition or consciousness is hypostatized as a third term between the self and the not-self, which relates the two to each other.³ Even those who hold that all cognitions are self-luminous (svaprakāsa) must admit that this relation between the self and the not-self, which is involved in knowledge, is an object of internal perception. Otherwise, it cannot be said “the jar is cognized by me”. This self-appropriated cognition is not possible unless we know the relation between the cognizing self and the cognized object and the relation between the cognition and its object. No other object can be spoken of than what is manifested to consciousness. If it is urged that a cognition is self-luminous, and its object is manifested by the cognition, by what is the relation between the cognition and its object manifested? It may be urged that this relation too is manifested by the same cognition. But Pārthaśārathi points out that when the cognition is produced, the relation between the cognition and its object does not yet come into existence. The relation of a cognition to its

² SD., pp. 201-2.
object consists in its manifesting the object; it is no other than this. So when a cognition is produced and its object is manifested, the relation that is produced between the two cannot be the object of that cognition as it has ceased to operate. It cannot be argued that at first the cognition manifests its object, and then it manifests its relation to the object, since the cognition is momentary. Nor can it be argued that the relation between the cognition and its object is self-luminous, because there is no proof of its self-luminosity. Hence, Pārthasārathi concludes that the relation between the self and the object, which is an object of internal perception, proves the existence of a cognition, and this relation cannot be denied by any one. In the third place, the existence of a cognition is inferred from the peculiarity (atiśaya) produced by the cognition in its object. This peculiarity must be admitted even by those who hold that the cognizer, the cognized object, and the cognition are manifested by consciousness. From this peculiarity (atiśaya) produced in the object by a cognition we infer the existence of the cognition itself. Hence a cognition can be perceived neither by itself nor by any other cognition.

Keśavamīśra gives an exposition of the Bhātta doctrine and criticizes it. He states the Bhātta argument in a slightly different form. When I know a jar the cognition of the jar produces in it a peculiar property, viz. cognizedness (jñātatā). After the cognition of the jar is produced, the cognizedness of the jar is recognized in such a form as 'the jar is cognized by me'. The peculiar property of cognizedness is produced in the jar when the cognition of the jar is already produced, and cognizedness is not produced in the jar when the cognition of the jar is not produced. So the existence of cognizedness is proved by the method of double agreement. Cognizedness is not possible without cognition; the effect cannot be produced without the cause. Thus cognizedness proves the existence of cognition as its cause by means of presumption (arthāpatti).

Śrīdhara criticizes Kumārila's view. (1) Kumārila commits the fallacy of hysteron proteron: when he argues that a cognition is inferred from cognizedness in its object. An object is cognized

* Mānasapratyakṣagamya'rtena sāhātmanah sambandho jñānam kalpayati. SD., p. 204.
* Arthagato jñānajanyo'tiśayah kalpayati jñānam. SD., p. 205.
* TŚh., p. 17.
when it is related to a cognition. Its cognizedness (jñātata) consists in its relationship with the cognition (jñānasambandha). We cannot apprehend cognizedness unless we apprehend the cognition itself. The apprehension of a relation presupposes the apprehension of the terms of the relation. In order to apprehend cognizedness, which consists in the relation of an object to a cognition, we must already apprehend the object and the cognition which are related to each other. Cognizedness presupposes cognition, and apprehension of cognizedness presupposes the apprehension of cognition. So cognition can never be inferred from cognizedness.

The Bhatta may argue that we must admit a peculiar property called cognizedness (jñātalā) in an object in order to account for the regularity in the relations of cognitions to their objects. A particular cognition apprehends a particular object and not any other. The cognition of a jar apprehends the jar, and not a cloth. What is the reason of this? The Bhatta answers that the cognition of a jar produces cognizedness in the jar, and not in a cloth. So it apprehends a jar, and not a cloth. It is cognizedness (jñātata) that relates particular cognitions to particular objects. An object is apprehended by that cognition which produces cognizedness in it. So we must admit cognizedness in an object of cognition, which relates the cognition to the object. (2) Udayana contends that even cognizedness is not possible without some regularity in the natural relation between cognitions and their objects. The Bhatta argues that a particular cognition apprehends a particular object because it produces cognizedness in it, and not in any other object. Udayana asks: Why should a particular cognition produce cognizedness in a particular object and not in any other? It may be argued that a particular cognition produces cognizedness in that object which is apprehended by it. Udayana says that the argument involves circular reasoning. A cognition apprehends a particular object because it produces cognizedness in it, and a cognition produces cognizedness in a particular object because it apprehends it. Thus the objectivity (viṣayata) of an object depends upon its cognizedness (jñātata), and its cognizedness depends upon its objectivity. Udayana argues that it is needless to assume the existence of cognizedness. The so-called cognizedness of an object is nothing but its objectivity or the

1 NK., p. 96.
2 Svabhāvaniyamābhāvādupakaro’hi durghaṭaḥ. NKS., p. 63.
character of being an object of cognition. There is a natural relation between a cognition and its object so that the former apprehends the latter. Vācaspatimisra also offers a similar criticism. The Bhāṭṭa holds that an object is apprehended by that cognition which produces cognizancedness in it. Vācaspatimisra contends that there is no need of cognizancedness in the object. The so-called cognizancedness is held to be related to the object neither by conjunction nor by inherence but by natural relation. And if cognizancedness is related to the object by natural relation, the cognition also may be related to it by natural relation, and there is no need of assuming the intervening factor of cognizancedness between the cognition and its object. Sīvāditya also holds that cognizancedness is nothing but the relation between a cognition and its object, and that there is no proof of its existence apart from this relation. Kesāvamisra also argues that cognizancedness is nothing but the character of being the object of cognition. When we apprehend a jar we do not apprehend its cognizancedness; but we simply apprehend that the jar is the object of cognition. There is no cognizancedness apart from its objectivity.

The Bhāṭṭa may urge that the jar is said to be the object of cognition because it is the substratum of cognizancedness produced by the cognition. The objectivity of the jar cannot be of the nature of identity. The jar cannot be said to be an object of cognition because there is an identity between the jar and its cognition. There can be no identity between an object and its cognition because the former is the object (viṣaya) and the latter is the subject (viṣayān). If by the objectivity of a thing we mean that a cognition is produced by it, then objectivity will belong to the sense-organs and other conditions which produce a cognition. This leads us to conclude that something is produced in the jar by the cognition, by virtue of which the jar alone, and nothing else, becomes the object of consciousness, and this is called cognizancedness. Thus cognizancedness is not only perceived through the sense-organs but is also inferred from the possibility of the objectivity (viṣayātā) of an object. Kesāvamisra disputes this view. He argues that subjectivity and objectivity follow from the very nature of things. There is such a natural peculiarity in

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1 Svabhāvaviseṣa eva viṣayatāniyāmakāḥ, anyathā jñātatādāhīne'pl niyamānupapattih iti svabhāva eva niyatāmakāḥ. NKSH., p. 64.
10 KU., pp. 143-4.
11 Jñātā jñānaviṣayasyasambandha eva. SP., p. 30.
a cognition and its object that the former is the subject (*viṣayin*) and the latter is the object (*viṣaya*) in relation to the other. An object does not require cognizedness in it to be apprehended by a cognition. (3) Otherwise, argues Keśavamiśra, past and future objects could never be the objects of cognition, since it is not possible for any cognition to produce cognizedness in them. It is not possible for a property to be produced in an object at a time when the object does not exist; a property cannot exist without a substratum. Cognizedness is a property of the object; hence it can never be produced, in past and future objects, though they can be apprehended. Udayana also urges that a cognition can produce cognizedness in present objects but not in past and future ones, though they are apprehended. We have recollection of the past and expectation of the future at present. But the present recollection or expectation can never produce cognizedness in past or future objects, since they do not exist at present. This clearly shows that an object is apprehended by a cognition though it does not produce cognizedness in it. So we must admit that there is a natural relation of subject (*viṣayin*) and object (*viṣaya*) between a cognition and its object. The Bhaṭṭa argues that the act of cognition produces in its object a peculiar condition known as cognizedness, just as the act of cooking produces in rice the condition of cookedness. “And this cognizedness being a property of the object is known along with the object itself.” (4) But Śrīdhara urges that this is a false analogy. In the case of rice we distinctly perceive cookedness in the rice in its being changed from *tandula* (uncooked rice) to *odana* (cooked rice); but in the case of the object in question we do not perceive any such cognizedness. As for the direct perceptibility (*aparokṣarūpataḥ*) of an object and its capability of being accepted or rejected, these also consist in its relationship to cognition; they are not properties of some other property of the object, viz. cognizedness. (5) Śrīdhara further argues that just as when an object is known, there is produced in it a peculiar property called cognizedness, so

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12 In Western philosophy the self is described as the subject of knowledge. But in Indian philosophy sometimes a cognition is called the subject (*viṣayin*) in relation to its object (*viṣaya*). 
13 Svabhāvādeva viṣayaviṣayitopapatteh. Arthajñayoretādṛṣṭa eva svabhāviko viṣeṣah yenānayoviṣayaviṣayibhāvaḥ. T Bh., p. 17.
14 T Bh., p. 17.
15 Svabhāva eva tatra niyāmakah. NK SH., p. 64.
16 Dr. Gangānātha Jī, E.T. of NK., p. 21.
when this cognizedness is known, another cognizedness must be produced in that cognizedness, and so on ad infinitum. If cognizedness be regarded as self-luminous, in order to avoid this infinite regress, then we may as well admit that the cognition itself is self-luminous. It may be argued that an object has an existence extending over the past, the present, and the future; but when it is cognized it is cognized as belonging to the present. And cognizedness is nothing but the condition of the object determined by the present time; and this being an effect of the cognition is the mark for the inference of the cognition. (6) But Śrīdhara contends that by ‘the condition of the object determined by the present time’ (vartamānāvacchinatā) we mean its condition qualified by that time (vartamānakālaviśiṣṭatā); and this belongs to the object by its very nature; and this condition is not produced, but only known by cognition. The Bhāṭṭa may argue, cognition is of the nature of an action, and an action always produces a result in its object; so the act of cognition must produce a result in its object in the shape of cognizedness. (7) Udayana contends that all actions do not produce results in their objects. For instance, an arrow penetrates the ether, but its motion cannot produce a result in it. So here the reason is over-wide. Moreover, an action is always of the nature of motion (spanda), but cognition is not of the nature of motion. So here the reason is non-existent. If an action means the operation of an instrument, then the sense-organs, marks of inference, words, etc., do not produce a peculiar result in an object but in the self. Varadarāja also argues, cognition is not of the nature of an action; it is of the nature of a quality produced by the operation of the sense-organs and the like, which inheres in an all-pervading substance, the self, like pleasure. Thus it cannot be argued that cognizedness in an object is inferred from its cognition because it is of the nature of an action. The Bhāṭṭa may argue that determinate cognition (viśeṣabuddhi) is determinate because it apprehends the relation between the qualified object (viśesya) and its qualification (viśeṣana). So the determinate perception of a jar as cognized (jñāto ghataḥ) apprehends the relation

17 See also TBh., p. 17.
19 NKS., iv, p. 11.
20 TR., p. 52.
between the jar (viśeṣya) and the cognition of it (viśeṣana); and the relation is cognizedness. Thus determinate perception proves the existence of cognizedness which constitutes the relation between a cognition and its object. (8) Udayana contends that determinate perception apprehends the natural relation between a cognition and its object, which may be called objectivity (viṣayatā); it apprehends an object as apprehended by a cognition. It is needless to assume the existence of cognizedness to account for determinate perception. If determinate perception of a cognized object requires cognizedness in the object, then determinate perception of a finished (kṛta) jar or a desired (iṣṭa) jar will require finishedness or desiredness in the jar. If such a peculiar property is thought to be needless the peculiar property of cognizedness also is equally needless. Determinate perception of an object as cognized apprehends the natural relation between itself and its object, which is called viṣayatā or objectivity. There is a svarūpasambandha between a cognition and its object by virtue of which the former is the subject (viṣayin) and the latter is the object (viṣaya). There is no tertium quid in the form of cognizedness between a cognition and its object. The natural relation between a cognition and its object by virtue of which the former apprehends the latter is called viṣayatā. It is needless to assume cognizedness (jñātata) apart from objectivity (viṣayatā).21 The so-called cognizedness (jñātata) is nothing but objectivity (viṣayatā) which constitutes the svarūpasambandha between a cognition and its object.22

The Jaina criticizes Kumārila’s doctrine. Kumārila argues, if cognition is regarded as perceptible it will be regarded as an object (karma); and as an object of cognition it will require another instrumental cognition (karana-jñāna) because every action on an object requires an instrument; and if that instrumental cognition is regarded as an object of perception, it will require another instrumental cognition, and so on ad infinitum. If this instrumental cognition through which a cognition is cognized is imperceptible, then the first cognition of an object also may be regarded as imperceptible, but yet capable of manifesting its object. One and the same act of cognition cannot be the object (karma) of cognition and the instrument (karana) of cognition.

21 NKS., iv.
22 Tarkaprakāsa on NSM., p. 30.
Hence a cognition cannot be regarded as an object of perception; it is imperceptible.\textsuperscript{23}

Prabhācandra, a Jaina philosopher, criticizes Kumārila’s argument thus: (1) The cognizer (\textit{pramāṭṛ}) and the cognition or cognitive act (\textit{pramāṇa}), and the resultant cognition (\textit{pramiti}) are as perceptible as the object of cognition (\textit{prameya}), for we distinctly perceive these factors of knowledge in our experience. In the cognition ‘I know the jar through myself’, the cognizer ‘I’, the instrument ‘myself’, and the result ‘knowing’ are as much objects of perception as the cognized object, \textit{viz.} ‘the jar’. There is no hard and fast rule that whatever is perceived must be perceived as an \textit{object (karma) of perception}. For, in that case, there would be no perception of the self which is never perceived as a cognized object (\textit{karma}), but always as a cognizer (\textit{kṛtr}). And if the self can be perceived as a cognizer, and not as an object of cognition, the cognition also may be perceived not as an object of perception, but as an instrument of perception.

(2) It may be argued that the cognition through which an object is manifested to consciousness is simply an instrument (\textit{karāṇa}) of the manifestation of the object, but it is not perceptible. Then it may as well be argued that the self which is manifested as the cognizer is simply the agent (\textit{kṛtr}) of cognition, but it is not perceptible. But the Bhāṭṭa recognizes the perceptibility of the self. So he should as well admit the perceptibility of cognition. The self is perceived as a cognizer or the agent (\textit{krtṛ}) of the \textit{act of cognition}. And the cognition is perceived as the instrument (\textit{karāṇa}) of cognizing an object. Moreover, if the self is perceptible it can cognize an external object by itself. What, then, is the use of postulating an imperceptible cognition between the cognizing self and the cognized object? It may be urged, an agent can never produce an action without an instrument, and so the self as the agent of the act of cognition requires the instrumentality of a cognition to apprehend an object. In that case, the instruments of internal and external organs would be quite adequate to bring about the consciousness of an object. So there is no use of assuming an imperceptible cognition to serve the purpose of an instrument here.

(3) If no action is possible without an instrument, what is the instrument in the cognition of the self by itself? If the self itself is the instrument of self-cognition, then let it be the instrument of

\textsuperscript{23} PKM., p. 31.
object-cognition too. There is no use of assuming an imperceptible cognition. Hence the cognition through which an object is known must be regarded as perceptible. (4) If the Bhāṭṭa admits that both the self and the resultant cognition (phalajñāna) of the object can be perceived, though they do not appear in consciousness as the object (karma) of cognition, but as the agent and the result of cognition respectively, he must also admit that the instrumental cognition or cognitive act (karaṇajñāna) too can be perceived, not as an object of cognition but as an instrument of cognition. (5) Again, according to the Bhāṭṭa, the instrumental cognition (karaṇajñāna) is not entirely different from the cognizer (karaṇa) and the resultant cognition (phalajñāna); so if the latter are perceptible the former also must be regarded as perceptible. If the instrumental cognition differs from the cognizer and the resultant cognition not as a form of cognition, but only as an instrument, then the instrumental cognition cannot be said to be imperceptible; for as cognition it does not differ from the cognizer and the resultant cognition; and so if the latter are regarded as perceptible the former also must be regarded so. (6) Moreover, the self and the cognition (karaṇajñāna) through which it knows an object are directly revealed in our experience. So they cannot but be regarded as objects of consciousness; for whatever is revealed in our experience is cognized, and whatever is cognized is an object of consciousness.\(^{34}\) It is self-contradictory to suppose that the self and its cognition are not objects of perception though they are directly revealed in our experience. If the cognitive act cannot be perceived as an object (karma) of consciousness though it is directly revealed in our experience, it cannot be an object of consciousness through another instrumental cognition. Hence the cognitive act must be regarded as an object of perception. (7) In the cognition 'I know the jar' I am directly conscious of myself as qualified by the cognition of the jar. So my cognition of the jar is as much an object of perception as my self and the jar. Just as we cannot deny the perception of the object, so we cannot deny the perception of its cognition. If there is no perception of the cognition of the jar there can be no perception of the jar itself. An unperceived cognition can never manifest an object. (8) Then, what is the nature of cognizedness from which the cognitive act is said to be

\(^{34}\) Prātiyamāṇatvam hi grāhyatvam tadeva karmavam. PKM., p. 31.
inferred? Is it a property of the object (arthadharma)? Or is it a property of the cognition (jñānadharma)? It cannot be a property of the object, for, in that case, it would persist in the object like its other properties (e.g. blueness) even when it is not cognized by a particular person. But, as a matter of fact, cognizedness does not persist in the object at any other time than when it is cognized. And when the object is cognized by a person, its cognizedness appears at that time as the private property of the particular person (svāsādhāraṇavisaya). It is never found to exist in the object as the public property of many cognizers (anekapramātṛsādhāraṇavisaya). Hence cognizedness cannot be a property of the object. Nor can cognizedness be a property of the cognition, since the cognitive act of which it is supposed to be a property is imperceptible according to the Bhāṭṭa, and what is imperceptible can never be the substrate of cognizedness.\footnote{PKM., pp. 31-2.} 

(9) Is cognizedness, then, of the nature of consciousness (jñāna-svabhāva), or of the nature of an object (arthasvabhāva)? Is it subjective or objective? If the former, then as consciousness it must be imperceptible like the act of cognition; and so it cannot serve as the mark (liṅga) of inferring the cognitive act. Moreover, it is foolish to argue that though the act of cognition (karanañjñāna) is imperceptible, cognizedness is an object of perception in spite of its being of the nature of consciousness. If the act of cognition cannot be an object of perception because it is of the nature of consciousness, cognizedness too cannot be an object of perception for the same reason. If, then, cognizedness is of the nature of an object (arthasvabhāva), it is nothing but the manifestness (arthapraṇātya) of the object. But an object cannot be manifested if the cognition by which it is manifested is itself unmanifested. If the cognition itself is unperceived, it can never manifest its object.\footnote{PKM., p. 32. See also SVM., pp. 88-90.} Hence the Jaina concludes that a cognition must cognize itself in order to cognize an object; it manifests itself and its object (svaparapraṇāsaka).

Venkaṭanātha, a follower of Rāmānuja, criticizes Kumārila's view. The Bhāṭṭa holds that cognition is inferred from cognizedness (jñātata) or manifestation (praṇātya) of an object. Venkaṭanātha urges, a cognition is nothing but the manifestation of an
object; so the former cannot be inferred from the latter. It may be argued that the cognition or manifestation in the self is inferred from manifestation in the object. The former is the object of inference and the latter is the mark of inference. But, if in spite of the presence of cognition or manifestation in the self, manifestation in the object (prākātya) is thought to be necessary in order to make it an object of speech and action, then let all the conditions which are said to produce cognition be regarded as the immediate cause of manifestation in the object. What, then, is the use of cognition? It is neither necessary for the use of an object nor for its manifestation. Thus the Bhāṭṭa doctrine leads to the negation of cognition, which is absurd. So cognition is not inferred from manifestation of an object.

Śrīdhara considers another doctrine which is kindred to the Bhāṭṭa doctrine. Some hold that the act of cognition is inferred from the consciousness of objects. We are conscious of objects; and this consciousness is not possible without an act of cognition. The cognitive act, therefore, is inferred from the consciousness of objects. Bhāskara refers to this doctrine in his commentary on the Bhahmasūtra. He says that this doctrine is held by some Mīmāṁsakas. According to them, the act of cognition (jñānakriyā) is the cause of the consciousness of objects (viṣayasaṁvedana). This doctrine slightly differs from the Bhāṭṭa theory. The Bhāṭṭa holds that the act of cognition is inferred from cognizedness (jñātata) which is a peculiar property of the object produced by the cognition. But according to this theory, the act of cognition is inferred from the consciousness of an object (viṣayasaṁvedana) which is a property of the self.

Śrīdhara criticizes this view. (1) He rightly points out that there is nothing to choose between the two doctrines. They are of a piece with each other. Where does the so-called consciousness of an object (viṣayasaṁvedana) reside? It abides either in the object or in the self. It cannot inhere in the object because it is unconscious. Nor can it inhere in the self, for in that case there would be no difference between the cognitive act and the consciousness of an object both inhering in the self. Hence it

27 Arthaprakāśo buddhiḥ. TMK., p. 394.
28 TMK., p. 394.
29 Viṣayasaṁvedanānumeyam jñānam. NK., p. 97.
30 Bhāskara's commentary on B.S., p. 6.
cannot be argued that the former is inferred from the latter. It may be urged that there is some difference between the two so that the former can be inferred from the latter. The act of cognition is the activity of the cognizing self (jñātavyāpāra) by which it apprehends an object. Cognitive activity is the cause, and consciousness of an object is the effect. The cause is inferred from the effect. (2) Śrīdhara contends that if such an activity of the cognizing self (jñātvyāpāra) exists it is either non-eternal or eternal. If it is non-eternal it must have a cause. The Mīmāṃsaka argues that the intercourse of an object with the sense-organ aided by the contact of manas with the self is the cause of cognitive activity (jñānakriyā) which, in its turn, is the cause of object-consciousness (viśaya-saṁvedana). Śrīdhara urges that the sense-object-contact aided by the mind-soul-contact may as well be regarded as the cause of object-consciousness. It is needless to assume another intermediate cause in the shape of cognitive activity (jñātvyāpāra) to produce object-consciousness. If, on the other hand, the cognitive act is held to be eternal, then also it is a needless hypothesis. Consciousness of an object is not eternal. Sometimes it appears and sometimes it does not appear. So it is non-eternal. Its occasional appearance is due to certain accessory conditions, viz. the occasional contact of objects with the sense-organs and the like. And as these conditions can adequately account for the consciousness of objects it is needless to assume any eternal cognitive act as its cause. In fact, the apprehension of the object (arthāvabodha) and all subsequent activity (vyavahāra) bearing on the object can be accomplished by the consciousness of the object itself. Hence, the existence of cognitive activity which is said to be inferred from consciousness of an object is a gratuitous assumption. It may be argued that consciousness of an object cannot inhere in the self because consciousness does not constitute the essential nature of the self. Consciousness of an object is produced by the object, the sense-organs, manas, and the self. If the self is essentially unconscious it is on a par with the other conditions of consciousness, viz. the object, the sense-organs, and manas, which are unconscious. The self has no special efficacy in the production of consciousness. So there is no special reason why consciousness should inhere in the self, and not in the sense-organs, and the like. (3) Śrīdhara contends that everything cannot be proved. Reason has ultimate limits. It
cannot get over the Law of Nature (*svabhāvanīyama*). Though consciousness is produced by the self, *maṇas*, the sense-organs, and the object, it is the Law of Nature that consciousness inures in the self and not in others, even as a cloth produced by threads and the shuttle inures in the threads and not in the shuttle. Threads are not the cloth, but still the cloth inures in the threads. Likewise, the self is not of the nature of consciousness, but still consciousness inures in the self. Thus it cannot be argued that consciousness cannot inure in the self. Hence Āśrīdhara concludes that cognition is not inferred from consciousness of an object.\(^{31}\)

(4) Bhāskara also repeats substantially the same arguments against the above Mīmāṁsaka doctrine. It is needless to assume the cognitive act (*jñānakṛtya*). There is nothing to prove its existence. What is the cause of the cognitive act? These Mīmāṁsakas hold that the sense-organs produce the cognitive act which, again, produces consciousness of objects (*viṣayasāṁvedana*). Bhāskara urges that there is no use assuming the production of the cognitive act by the sense-organs. They may as well directly produce consciousness of objects. What is the use of the intermediate process of the act of cognition? When there is the action of objects on the sense-organs there is consciousness of the objects, and when there is no action of objects on the sense-organs there is no consciousness of the objects. So the method of double agreement proves that the sense-organs are the cause of consciousness of objects. If they require an intermediate process of cognitive act to produce consciousness of objects, then this cognitive act will require another cognitive act, and so on *ad infinitum*. To avoid this infinite regress we must admit that the sense-organs directly produce consciousness of objects. (5) The advocates of the doctrine hold that the act of cognition (*jñānakṛtya*) is inferred from consciousness of objects (*viṣayasāṁvedana*). Bhāskara asks: What is the mark of inference here? It cannot be consciousness, since the relation between consciousness and the act of cognition is not apprehended because the latter is imperceptible. If the act of cognition is perceived there is no need of assuming that it is inferred from consciousness of objects. Thus Bhāskara concludes that consciousness of objects is itself cognition; there is no act of cognition different from it; and that the subsequent action on objects in the form of their acceptance or rejection is the result

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31 NK., p. 97.
of consciousness of objects. Hence the hypothesis of the act of
cognition is entirely useless."

3. Prabhākara

Prabhākara holds that in every act of cognition three things
are apprehended. Every object-cognition reveals the object, itself
and the subject (tripūṭipratyakṣa). The object is apprehended
when it is related to a cognition; the cognition reveals the object.
And the cognition reveals itself; it is self-luminous. It not only
reveals itself and its object but also the self which is its substrate.
Cognition may be compared to light. Light reveals an object to
which it is related. So cognition reveals an object to which it is
related. Light does not require any other object to reveal it; it
is self-luminous; it reveals itself. Likewise, cognition does not
require any other cognition to apprehend it; it is self-luminous;
it apprehends itself. Light not only reveals itself and its object
but also the wick of a lamp which is its substrate. Similarly,
cognition not only reveals itself and its object but also the self
which is its substrate. Thus a cognition apprehends itself, its
object, and its subject. Every act of cognition involves object-
consciousness, subject-consciousness, and cognition-consciousness
or self-conscious awareness. But cognition does not cognize
itself as an object of cognition but as cognition.

Śrīdhara criticizes Prabhākara’s doctrine thus: Every cogni-
tion does not reveal the self and itself. For instance, in the visual
perception ‘this is a jar’ the self and the cognition are not appre-
hended; there is simply the apprehension of the jar. This is
the primary cognition of an object. But sometimes this cognition
is appropriated by the self and apprehended in the form ‘I know
the jar’. This is the secondary cognition of an object. It reveals
the object, the subject, and itself. In the primary cognition of
the jar only the jar is apprehended through the visual organ.
But in the secondary cognition of the jar there is the mental
perception of the jar as qualified by the cognition and the self.

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23 Bhāskara’s Bhāṣya on B.S., pp. 6-7.
24 N.K., p. 91. See Chapter XII.
25 Ghaṭopiyamityetasmin pratiyamāne jñātrjñānayanorapratibhāsanāt. N.K.,
p. 91.
26 Ghatamahāṇ ānāṃ mā jñāne jñātrjñānāvīṣṭasyārthasya mānasaprat-
yakṣatā, N.K., p. 92.
In the visual perception of the jar, the self and the cognition are not apprehended. If they were apprehended along with the jar they would become objects of visual perception, which is not possible. They are perceived by the mind as qualifying the object of perception when it is appropriated by the self. A cognition is not necessarily self-cognition. Consciousness does not necessarily involve self-consciousness.\textsuperscript{45}

4. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that a cognition is not inferred from the cognizedness of its object, as the Bhāṭṭa holds. Nor is it cognized by itself, as the Buddhist idealist, the Jaina, and the Vedāntist hold. A cognition is perceived by another cognition which is called anuvyavasāya. A cognition is directly apprehended by internal perception. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, therefore, a cognition can never turn upon itself to make itself the object of cognition. Though a cognition manifests another object (para-prakāśaka), it can never manifest itself (svapra-kāśaka); it is other-manifesting but never self-manifesting. But though a cognition is not manifested by itself, it can be manifested by another cognition.\textsuperscript{46} A cognition is perceived by another cognition through the mind.

Prabhācandra criticizes the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine thus: (I) The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that a cognition is perceived by another cognition, as it is an object of valid knowledge like a cloth.\textsuperscript{47} Just as an external object is known by a cognition, so a cognition is known by another cognition. According to the Bhāṭṭa, the act of cognition can never turn upon itself and make it an object of apprehension; it is inferred from the result of the cognitive act in the object, viz. apprehendedness; there is a cognitive act between the self and the object of cognition, which is not perceptible. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that a cognition cannot, indeed, turn upon itself and make it an object of its own apprehension, but that it can be apprehended by another cognition. The Jaina argues that just as pleasure is not cognized by another cognition but by itself, and the divine cognition is not cognized

\textsuperscript{1} NK., 91-2. See Pārthasārathi’s criticism of Prabhākara’s doctrine in Chā

\textsuperscript{45} Yānakān jñānāntara-veda-yam. PKM., p. 34.

\textsuperscript{46} Yānakān jñānāntara-veda-yam pramey-avāt paṭādivat. PKM., p. 34.
by another cognition but by itself, so a cognition too in the self must be regarded as self-cognized, and not cognized by any other cognition. If a cognition in us is cognized by another cognition, then this cognition must be cognized by another cognition and so on ad infinitum. (2) The Naiyāyika may argue that there is no infinite regress here. For in God there are two cognitions, one of which apprehends the entire universe, and the other apprehends that cognition; there is no need of postulating any other cognition in God. The Jaina asks: If there are only two cognitions in God, is the second cognition in God, which apprehends His first cognition of the entire universe, perceived or not? If it is not perceived, then how is it possible for it to perceive the first cognition? If the second cognition of God can perceive His first cognition, though it is not itself perceived, then the first cognition of God too may perceive the entire universe, though this cognition is not itself perceived. If the second cognition in God also is perceived, is it perceived by itself or by some other cognition? If it is perceived by itself, then the first cognition too may be perceived by itself? If the second cognition in God is perceived by another cognition, then this third cognition too will be perceived by another cognition and so on ad infinitum. If the second cognition of God is perceived by the first cognition, then there will be a circular reasoning; for, in that case, the first cognition would be perceived by the second cognition, and the second cognition would be perceived by the first cognition. Hence the divine cognition must be regarded as self-luminous or self-cognizing; it must apprehend itself in apprehending the entire universe. (3) The Naiyāyika may argue that there is a difference between the divine cognition and the human cognition, and consequently, an attribute of the former cannot be ascribed to the latter; if the divine cognition is self-luminous, and thus both manifests itself and other objects (svaparaprakāśaka), the human cognition cannot be regarded as self-luminous. For if you ascribe a divine attribute to a human being, then you might as well argue that because God is omniscient, man must be so. The Jaina contends that this argument is fallacious. Consciousness, by its very essential nature, both manifests itself and other objects (svaparaprakāśaka); this is the common and essential characteristic of all consciousness; this is not a special characteristic of the divine consciousness. If the self- and object-manifesting character
(svaparaprakāśakatva) is regarded as a special characteristic of the divine consciousness because it is simply found in God, then it may equally be argued that because svaparaprakāśakatva is found in the sun, it cannot be an attribute of a lamp. (4) It may be argued that if the human cognitions are of the nature of the divine cognition, then the former will be as omniscient as the latter. But this argument is unsound. Omniscience is not a general characteristic of all cognitions, like svaparaprakāśakatva, but it is the special characteristic of the divine cognition. The above argument is as unsound as that because a lamp illumines both itself and other objects like the sun, it should as well illumine the whole world like the sun. If it be argued that though both the lamp and the sun manifest themselves as well as other objects, the former manifests only a few objects owing to its limited capacity (yogyaṭāvasat), then it should equally be argued that though both the human consciousness and the divine consciousness manifest themselves as well as other objects, the former manifests only a few objects owing to its limited capacity. Hence the Jaina concludes that the human cognition is as self-manifesting and other-manifesting (svaparaprakāśaka) as the divine cognition, for both of them are of the nature of consciousness, which by its very essential nature both manifests itself and its object. (5) The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that the cognition of an object is cognized by another cognition (anuvyavasāya). But the existence of the second cognition (anuvyavasāya) can never be proved by valid knowledge. If it does exist, is it known by perception or by inference? It can never be known by perception. For perception always depends upon the contact of the object of perception with a sense-organ. But anuvyavasāya can never come in contact with the external sense-organs; nor can it come in contact with the internal organ of mind, which is supposed to be the organ of its perception. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika argues: The mind is in contact with the self; and the cognition inheres in the self; hence there is a relation of saṁyukta-saṁavāya or united-inherence between the cognition and the self; and the perception of the cognition is produced by this relation. The Jaina replies that this argument is not right, for the existence of the mind cannot be proved. It may be argued that the existence of the mind can be proved by the following inference: The cognition of the cognition of a jar is produced by its contact with
the internal organ or mind, for it is a perceptible cognition, like
the cognition of colour produced by its contact with the visual
organ. The Jaina urges that this argument is fallacious, for the
‘mark’ of inference or the middle term is not proved to exist.
The ‘mark’ of inference here is the ‘perceptibility of the cognition
of the cognition of a jar’. If it is proved by the existence of the
mind, then there will be a circle in reasoning; the perceptibility
of the cognition of the cognition of an object will be inferred
from the existence of the mind, and the existence of the mind,
in its turn, will be inferred from the perceptibility of that cog-
nition. Moreover, not only the perceptibility of the cognition of
the cognition of an object is unproved, but that cognition
(anuvyavasāya) itself is not proved. We never perceive that the
cognition of a jar is perceived by some other cognition; it is always
perceived by itself. External objects, indeed, first come in con-
tact with the sense-organs, and then produce their cognitions. But
we do not perceive that the mental states of pleasure, etc., are first
produced in the self when they are quite unknown; then they
come in contact with the mind, and then they are perceived
through the mind. Pleasure and pain are perceived just after
the perception of their external causes, viz., desirable and un-
desirable objects respectively; they are not perceived by another
cognition different from them; they are cognized by themselves.
Likewise the cognition of an external object is not perceived by
another cognition, but by itself; it cognizes itself as well as its
object. (6) Even supposing that a cognition is perceived by
another cognition, does the second cognition arise when the first
cognition continues to exist or when it is destroyed? The first
alternative is impossible, for, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika,
cognitions are always successive; they are never simultaneous.
The second alternative also is impossible; for if the second cog-
nition arises when the first cognition is no longer in existence, what
will be cognized by the second cognition? If it cognizes the non-
existent first cognition; then it is illusory like the cognition
of the double moon. (7) Then, again, is the second cognition
perceived or not? If it is perceived, is it perceived by itself or by
some other cognition? If it is perceived by itself, the first cogni-
tion, i.e. the cognition of an external object too may be perceived
by itself and there is no use of postulating the second cognition.
If the second cognition is perceived by another cognition, then
that cognition also will be perceived by another and so on *ad infinitum*; thus there will be a *regressus ad infinitum*. If the second cognition is not perceived, then how can this unperceived cognition perceive the first cognition? If a cognition can be perceived by another cognition which is not perceived, then my cognition can be perceived by another's cognition unknown to me. But this is absurd. (8) The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika may argue that just as the sense-organs, which are not themselves perceived, can produce the apprehension of an object, so the second cognition can produce the apprehension of the first cognition, though it is not itself perceived, and that in this sense it apprehends the first cognition. But this is a childish argument. For, in that case, it may as well be argued that the first cognition of an external object apprehends its object, though it is not itself perceived. But this is not admitted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. This is the doctrine of the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka, according to whom an unperceived cognition can apprehend an object. Hence the Jaina concludes that a cognition cognizes itself and its object. It illuminates both itself and its object (*svapraprakāśaka*).

5. **The Sāmkhya-Pātañjala**

A cognition is a psychic function or a function of the *buddhi*. The *buddhi* is unconscious, and as such it cannot be an object of its own consciousness. Just as the other sense-organs and sensible objects are unconscious and as such are manifested by the self which alone is conscious, so the unconscious *buddhi* also must be regarded as an object of the apprehension of the self; it is not manifested by itself but can only be manifested by the self. A cognition, therefore, which is nothing but an unconscious psychic function or mental mode cannot apprehend itself; nor can it apprehend an object. It is apprehended by the self. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that a cognition is apprehended by another cognition. But by what is this second cognition cognized? If it is cognized by another cognition, then the third cognition will require another cognition to apprehend it, and so on *ad infinitum*. Thus the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika hypothesis of *anuvyavasāya* leads to infinite regress. Moreover, it leads to the confusion of memory. If a

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28 PKM., pp. 34 ff.
29 YS., iv, 19, and YBh., iv, 19.
cognition is cognized by another cognition, then there are as many psychic traces or residua (*samśkāra*) as there are cognitions of cognitions, and there are as many reminiscences as there are residua; thus the doctrine of *anuvyavasāya* leads to the confusion of memory.\(^{41}\) According to the Śāmkhya-Pātañjala, it is the self that apprehends an object, and apprehends the cognition of the object. But how can the self, which is inactive according to the Śāmkhya-Pātañjala, know a cognition? According to Vācaspatimisra, the self is reflected on the unconscious mental mode owing to the proximity of the mind to the self and its transparency, its inertia (*tamas*) and energy (*rajas*) being completely overpowered by its essence (*sattva*), and thus some sort of relation is established between the self and the mental mode, by virtue of which the self apprehends the mental mode, though it is inactive. According to Vijñānabhinux, on the other hand, the self is reflected on the mental mode, and this reflection in the mental mode is reflected back on the self, so that there is a double reflection of the self on the mental mode and of the mental mode on the self, and thus some sort of direct relationship is established between the self and the mental mode. Thus, according to the Śāmkhya-Pātañjala, a cognition or mental mode is apprehended only by the self; it cannot be apprehended by another cognition or by itself as it is unconscious.

6. *The Saṃkara-Vedāntist*

According to the Saṃkara-Vedānta, a mental mode (*uṛṇa*) must have an object (*viśaya*); but the object may be either itself or other than itself. A mental mode may either apprehend an external object, when it is modified into the object, or it may apprehend itself (*sva viṣayavṛtti*). The Saṃkarite does not admit that there is a cognition of a cognition; a cognition, according to him, is self-luminous; it is not manifested by any other cognition. There is no intervening mental mode (*uṛṇa*) between a cognitive process and the cognition of this cognitive process. There is a direct and immediate consciousness of a cognition; a cognition is directly apprehended by itself. If we represent the object as \(O\) and the cognition of the object as \(S\), then, according to the Saṃkarite, we do not go beyond \(S^O\) to \(S^O^O\); nor do we go to \(SO\) simply; the

\(\text{\textsuperscript{41}}\) YS., iv, 21, and YBh., iv, 21.
cognition of a mental mode may be represented as So. In the apprehension of a mental mode there is a direct intellectual intuition (kevalasāksīvedyatva). The Śaṅkarite holds that a cognition which is itself unperceived can never apprehend an object, as the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka holds. A cognition cannot also be the object of another cognition (anuvyāvasāya) as a cognition is not of the nature of an unconscious object; a cognition is conscious, while an object is unconscious; a cognition, therefore, cannot be regarded as an object of another cognition. Besides, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of anuvyāvasāya leads to infinite regress. A cognition is self-luminous.

The Buddhist idealist also holds that cognitions are self-luminous. But his view is not the same as that of the Śaṅkarite. According to the former, a cognition cognizes itself; it manifests itself. According to the latter, a cognition is not apprehended or manifested by any other cognition. If a cognition can make itself an object of cognition, then it can as well be an object of another cognition. Hence the Śaṅkarite holds that a cognition is self-luminous (svaprajñā), not in the sense that it is an object of its own apprehension, as the Buddhist holds, but in the sense that it is not manifested by any other cognition. The conception of self-luminosity is positive, according to the Buddhist; it is negative, according to the Śaṅkarite. The Śaṅkarite doctrine closely resembles the doctrine of Prabhākara, according to whom cognitions are self-luminous. By this Prabhākara means that a cognition is not an object of another cognition; it is not cognized as an object of its own cognition; a cognition is cognized, no doubt, but it is cognized as a cognition, not as something cognized.

Rāmānuja criticizes Śaṅkara’s doctrine. (1) Śaṅkara holds that consciousness alone is ultimately real and it is self-luminous. There is no self apart from consciousness and there is no object apart from consciousness. Consciousness is above the distinction of subject and object, which have only an empirical reality. And this consciousness is self-luminous; it manifests or apprehends itself. Rāmānuja disputes this view, and urges that consciousness is not possible without the knowing self and the known object, both of which are real. There is no objectless consciousness (nirvīśayā saṁvit). Consciousness and its object are perceived as different

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42 VP., pp. 79-82.
from each other; one apprehends and the other is apprehended; they are correlative to each other. So to annul the object altogether contradicts the clear testimony of consciousness.\footnote{Anubhūtidadviṣayayoṣca viṣayaviṣayabhāvena bhedasya pratyakṣasaiddhatvāt abādhitavrācca anubhūtireva satītyetadapi nirastam. R.B., i, 1, 1.} (2) Śamkara holds that consciousness is self-luminous; it apprehends itself; it is never an object of any other consciousness. This is true under certain conditions. Consciousness manifests itself to the cognizing self when it apprehends an object. It does not manifest itself to all selves at all times. The consciousness of one person is inferred by another from his behaviour; so it becomes an object of inferential cognition. And our own past states of consciousness too become the objects of our present recollection. So consciousness is not necessarily self-luminous.\footnote{R.B., i, 1, 1.} Consciousness does not lose its nature simply because it becomes an object of consciousness. The essential nature of consciousness consists in its manifesting itself at the present moment through its own being to its substrate, or in being instrumental in proving its own object by its own being.\footnote{R.B., i, 1, 1. Tilmant; É.T. of R.B. p. 48.}
Chapter XII

PERCEPTION OF THE SELF

1. Introduction

Can the Atman or self be perceived? This question has been answered in different ways by different schools of Indian Philosophers. The Cārvāka holds that there is no self at all, and that it can neither be perceived nor inferred. The Buddhist idealist recognizes the distinction of subject and object only within consciousness. He does not recognize any permanent self apart from the ever-changing stream of consciousness. The Naiyāyika recognizes the self as a substance endued with the qualities of cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and effort. Some earlier Naiyāyikas hold that the self can never be an object of perception; that it is known by an act of inference from its qualities. The Vaiśeṣika, too, is of the same opinion. But he admits that the self can be object of yogic intuition. The Sāṁkhya holds that the self is an object of inference; that it is inferred as an original (bimba) from its reflection (pratibimba) in buddhi. The Pātañjala holds that the self can be an object of higher intuition (prātiprajañāna). The Neo-Naiyāyika holds that the self is an object of internal perception (mānasapratyakṣa); that it can be perceived only through the mind in relation to its distinctive qualities. The Bhāṭṭa Mīmarṣaka also holds that the self is an object of internal perception or self-consciousness (ahampratyaya). The Prabhākara Mīmarṣaka holds that the self is revealed in every act of knowledge as the knowing subject or ego; that it is known as the subject of perception and not as the object of perception; and that it is known not as the subject of internal perception or self-consciousness, but of external perception, since there can be no self-consciousness apart from object-consciousness. The Jaina holds that the self is an object of internal perception; that it is perceived as the subject which has pleasure, pain, and the like. In external perception also the self knows itself through itself as having the

1 This chapter is an elaboration of an article published in Meerut College Magazine, January, 1924.
cognition of an object. The Upaniṣads regard the self as an object of higher intuition. Śaṅkara holds that the self is pure consciousness above the distinction of ego and non-ego, and that it is known by an immediate, intuitive consciousness. Rāmānuja holds that the self is nothing but the knower or ego, and that it is known as such by perception. He rejects Śaṅkara’s concept of the self as pure consciousness.

2. The Cārvākas and the Buddhist Idealists

The Cārvākas do not recognize the existence of the self as an independent entity. Sadānanda speaks of four schools of Cārvākas. Some Cārvākas identify the self with the gross body. Some Cārvākas identify it with the external sense-organs. Some Cārvākas identify it with the vital force. And other Cārvākas identify it with the mind. Thus the Cārvākas do not regard the self as an independent entity.2 Jayanta Bhaṭṭa says that the Cārvākas regard consciousness as a by-product of unconscious elements, e.g. earth, water, fire, and air. Just as intoxicating liquor is produced by unintoxicating rice, molasses, etc., so consciousness is produced by unconscious, material elements. There is no self endowed with consciousness, since there is no proof of its existence. It cannot be perceived through the external sense-organs, like jars, etc.; nor can it be perceived through the mind. And inference is not recognized by the Cārvākas as a means of valid knowledge. Moreover, there is no mark of inference. Hence the self can neither be perceived nor inferred.3

Th Buddhist idealists (Yogācāras) regard the self as a series of cognitions or ideas. Cognitions alone are ultimately real. They are polarized into subject and object, which are not ultimately real. There is no self apart from cognitions; and there are no objects apart from cognitions; cognitions apprehend themselves as their own objects. Cognitions are self-luminous or self-aware. They reveal neither the self nor the not-self apart from them. There is no self apart from the ever-changing stream of cognitions. And there are no extra-mental objects apart from cognitions. The distinction between subject and object is a creation of individual consciousness within itself; it is not a relation between two

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3 NM., p. 429.
independent entities. Hence, the problem of perception of the self as a permanent intelligent principle does not puzzle the Buddhist idealists, though they cannot explain, as Śaṅkara points out, how momentary cognitions can become subjects and objects of each other.  

3. The Naiyāyikas  

According to the Naiyāyikas, the self is a permanent substance in which cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and volition inhere. It is not a series of cognitions, but a permanent principle in which they exist. It is not a stream of consciousness, but an abiding substance which becomes conscious at times. All Naiyāyikas admit that the self is an object of inference. But some of the earlier Naiyāyikas hold that the self is an object of perception as well, while others deny it. Gautama makes the self an object of inference. It is inferred from its qualities such as pleasure, pain, cognition, desire, aversion, and volition. Gautama nowhere mentions in the sūtras whether the self is an object of perception or not. Vātsyāyana makes apparently conflicting statements about this question. In one place he says, “The self is not apprehended by perception.” In another place he says, “The self is perceived by the yogin through a particular kind of conjunction between the self and manas owing to the ecstasy of meditation. The self is an object of yogic perception.” These two statements apparently conflict with each other. But they can be easily harmonized. The self is not an object of normal perception. It cannot be perceived by ordinary persons through the internal organ. But it can be perceived only by the yogin in a state of ecstasy. So the self is not an object of normal internal perception but of supernormal perception. Here by the self Vātsyāyana means the pure self free from its connection with the organism. Udayana has made it clear in Nyāyavārttikā atītparyapariprātiṣuddhi. He raises the question why Vātsyāyana should deny the normal perception of the self when, as a matter of fact, it is always an object of mental perception, being always perceived as T along with every cognition; and

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4 Jñānameva grāhyagrāhakasaṁvittihedavadiva lakṣyate. Ibid., p. 540.  
5 S.B., ii, 2, 28.  
6 NS., i, 1, 10.  
7 Ātmā tāvat pratyakṣato na grhyate. NBh., i, 1, 9.  
8 Pratyakṣam yuvijñānyā yogaśamādhijamātmanasasthāḥ tathyogaviśeṣād ātmā pratyakṣa iti. NBh., i, 1, 3.
answers that we have indeed the notion of 'I' along with every cognition through mental perception; but that it may be taken as referring to the body. The empirical self or the self as connected with the organism is the object of mental perception. The pure self apart from the body cannot be apprehended by mental perception. Mental perception is not a sufficient proof of the existence of the pure self apart from the body, so long as it is not strengthened by other means of knowledge, inference, etc. This is the answer from the standpoint of those Naiyāyikas who do not regard the self as an object of normal perception. But some Naiyāyikas hold that one's own self is always an object of mental perception. From their standpoint the self of any other person is not an object of perception. Uddyotakara, however, holds that the self is an object of perception. It is directly perceived through the internal organ. This direct knowledge of the self is perceptual in character inasmuch as it is independent of the recollection of the relation between a major term and a minor term, and it varies with the variations in the character of its object. Inferential knowledge depends on the recollection of the invariable concomitance of the major and the minor terms. The internal perception of the self is independent of any such recollection. Besides, the perception of an object varies with the variation in the character of its object. The perception of a blue object will vary if the object becomes yellow. Likewise, the internal perception of the self varies according as the character of the self varies. The perception of the self as 'I am happy' is different from the perception of the self as 'I am unhappy'. So the self is an object of self-consciousness (ahaṁpratyaya) which is of the nature of direct perception. Uddyotakara does not draw a distinction between the self apart from the body and the self connected with the body, between the pure self and the empirical self. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa says that according to some Naiyāyikas and the Aupavāraṣas, the self is an object of internal perception or self-consciousness (ahaṁpratyaya). But Jayanta himself holds that the self cannot be established by perception. It is not an object of self-consciousness. Our self-consciousness has the body for its object. The self is established

10 NV., iii, p. 344. Tadevamahāhaṁpratyayaviśayatvādātmā tāvat pratyakṣaḥ. Ibid., p. 345. Also NVTT., pp. 350-1.
11 NM., p. 429.
by inference. Thus Jayanta’s view is opposed to that of Uddyotakara. Udayana, however, agrees with Uddyotakara, and holds that the self is perceived through manas just as colour is perceived through the visual organ, both of them being of the nature of direct and immediate knowledge. The later Naiyāyikas also hold that the self is an object of mental perception. Laugākṣi Bhāskara holds that the self is perceived as ‘I’ owing to its ordinary conjunction with manas. Keśavamīśra also holds the same view. But in case of diversity of opinion as to the perceptibility of the self, the self is inferred from its qualities. Viśvanātha also makes the self an object of mental perception. But he lays down a condition. The self apart from its specific qualities cannot be perceived through manas. It is perceived through manas only as endowed with its specific qualities such as pleasure, pain, and the like. The self is always perceived as ‘I know’, ‘I will’, etc. It is never perceived apart from its qualities. The self is the object of self-consciousness. The body is not the object of self-consciousness. Thus Viśvanātha’s view is opposed to that of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa. Jagadīśa Bhaṭṭācārya holds the same view as Viśvanātha. He also holds that the self is perceived through the manas as ‘I am happy’ and the like.

According to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa and some earlier Naiyāyikas, the self is not an object of perception but an object of inference. The self is the substance in which cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and effort inhere; it is the substratum of these qualities. We cannot perceive the self. But we can infer it from its qualities. The qualities of the self are the marks of inference. Jayanta offers the following criticism of the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka doctrine that the self is an object of internal perception: Firstly, how can the self be the subject as well as the object of one and the same act of cognition? If one and the same act of cognition cannot be polarized into the subject and the object, as the Buddhist idealist holds, then, for the same reason, one and the same self also cannot be bifurcated into the subject and the object of the same act of knowledge.

13 Ātmā pratyākṣo nāvadhāryate, asmadādināmahampratyayasya śarīrāvalambanāt. Anumānāt tu pratīptavavyaḥ. NKL., p. 5.
14 LV., p. 8.
15 TBḥ., p. 18.
16 SM., p. 62.
17 BhP. and SM., 49.
18 Abhānkaśoḥuhamitipratyayāḥ tasyāśrayo viṣaya ātmā na śarīrādirītī. SM., p. 233.
19 TA., p. 6.
Secondly, the Bhāṭṭa urges that the same self is the subject in one condition and the object in a different condition. The self is the subject, in so far as it is conscious; and it is the object, in so far as it is a substance. The self is a conscious substance; as conscious it is the subject or cognizer; as a substance it is the object cognized. But this is unreasonable. If substantiality constitutes the object of consciousness, then the self can never be the subject or knower; for the self is as much a substance as a jar is, and if the jar as a substance is simply the object of consciousness, but never its subject, then, on the same ground, the self also as a substance is simply the object of consciousness, but it can never be the subject or knower. Thirdly, it may be urged by Kumārila that the pure form of transcendental consciousness in the subject or knower, and that when it is empirically modified, qualified, or determined in various ways, it becomes the object of consciousness. The pure transcendental consciousness is the subject, and its empirical modification is the object. Elsewhere, there is simply the consciousness of an object apart from the subject. Thus we may distinguish three factors: (i) a pure subject ($suddhā jñātrī), (ii) a pure object ($suddha-visayagrahanam), and (iii) the subject as modified by the object, which is a mixed mode ($gaṭāvacchinna jñātrī). But this argument also is unsubstantial. In the consciousness ‘this is a jar’ there is simply a consciousness of an object. Then, when this consciousness is appropriated by the self, there arises a consciousness ‘I know the jar’. Here, there is merely a self-appropriation of the consciousness of the jar, or there is simply a consciousness of the consciousness of the jar; it does not refer to the noumenal substrate or the self. (4) Fourthly, Kumārila may urge that in the consciousness ‘I know the jar’ there are three elements: (i) the consciousness of the ‘jar’; (ii) the consciousness of ‘knowing the jar’, and (iii) the consciousness of ‘I’ or the ‘self’. In one and the same unitary act of consciousness, one part cannot be valid, and the other invalid. In the same consciousness ‘I know the jar’, the consciousness of ‘jar’, and the consciousness of ‘knowing the jar’ cannot be said to be valid, and the consciousness of ‘I’ or the self to be invalid. If the first and second parts are valid, the third part also must be regarded as valid. In other words, we must

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10 Dravyādīsvarūpamātmano grāhyam jñātrūpam ca grāhakam. NM., p. 430.
11 Ghaṭāvacchinna hi jñātrī grāhyā sudhāvai tu jñātrī grāhikā. NM., p. 430.
admit that there is a consciousness of the self as an object of 'I'-consciousness or self-consciousness (ahamvitt). The Naiyāyika contends that the self can never be both subject and object of one and the same act of consciousness. In the consciousness 'I know the jar' there are three parts: (i) 'I', (ii) 'know', and (iii) 'the jar'. The second and third parts evidently refer to the object (viśayaniśthameva); if the first part viz. 'I' refers to the self, then the self remains in its pure, indeterminate form both as subject and object in the same condition. Hence it cannot be maintained that the self becomes the subject in one condition and the object in a different condition. If there is no difference in the essential nature of the self, how can it be both subject and object? If it is insisted that the pure, unmodalized self assumes the forms of subject and object under different conditions, then this doctrine does not differ from Buddhist idealism, according to which one and the same cognition is its subject as well as its object. Hence, the Naiyāyika holds that the self can never be known as an object of self-consciousness; that it is known only by inference; the subject can never enter into the object-stream; it always stands apart. This reminds us of the doctrine of Kant, according to whom the category of substantiability cannot be applied to the self. But the Naiyāyika himself regards the self as a substance endowed with qualities, though he does not admit that it is an object of perception.\(^{22}\)

According to Śaṅkara, the self is essentially conscious; it is one, eternal, ubiquitous, undifferentiated consciousness. It is not manifested by fleeting states of consciousness, as a jar is manifested by some transient state of consciousness. But it manifests itself; or, it is self-luminous. Consciousness constitutes the essential nature of the self; it is natural or essential to the self, and not an adventitious or accidental property of it. The self is not conscious owing to its connection with consciousness produced by the internal organ or the external organs; it is not inert in itself like matter, which is endowed with consciousness, as the Nyāya-Vaiṣeṣika holds. If the self were conscious owing to its connection with the consciousness produced by the sense-organs, then an external object, too, e.g. a jar, would be conscious owing to its connection with the consciousness produced by it. The self is the light of consciousness; it lights up everything; but it does not depend upon any-

\(^{22}\) NM., pp. 430-1.
thing to manifest itself. Other objects depend upon many factors for their manifestation, but the self is self-luminous or self-manifesting; it is not caused or conditioned by anything else; it is unconditioned, uncaused, and independent. The self can never be an object of consciousness; it is the pure, unmodalized, or transcendent consciousness above the phenomenal distinction of subject and object. Consciousness is here hypostatized as a third term existing independently of subject and object. Consciousness alone is ultimately real in its pure, unmodalized, or transcendent form; the distinction of subject and object within this ultimate reality has only empirical reality.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa criticizes it as follows: Firstly, the Śaṅkarite holds that the self is of the nature of unconditioned consciousness. But has anybody ever experienced unconditioned or transcendent consciousness? Our consciousness is produced by an external organ or by the internal organ. Hence we can never conceive of a self whose essence is transcendent consciousness. Secondly, the Śaṅkarite holds that the self, the essence of which is transcendent consciousness, is self-luminous. But if the self is self-luminous, why is it that I am conscious only of my own self, and not of other selves? What is the reason for it? Then, again, if I am conscious of my own self, it is apprehended by me, and if it is apprehended, it must be apprehended as the object of apprehension (anubhava-karma). Thirdly, the Śaṅkarite may urge that the self is not the object of perception; that it cannot be presented to consciousness as an object, but it can be known by immediate intuitive consciousness (aparokṣajñāna). But this is self-contradictory. Perception means the same thing as direct and immediate consciousness. If it is said that the self cannot be the object of perceptual or presentative consciousness, then it cannot be an object of immediate and intuitive consciousness for the same reason. It is self-contradictory to say that the self is not an object of perception, but that it is an object of immediate intuition. Fourthly, the Śaṅkarite may urge that the self is luminous, and hence it is known by an immediate intuition. If so, then a luminous lamp too would manifest itself to a blind man, though unperceived by him. If the lamp manifests itself only to him by whom it is apprehended, then the self too must be regarded as manifesting itself, only when it is apprehended. If the self manifests itself, it must also be

**Pratyakṣaśca na bhavati aparokṣaśca bhavatīti citram. NM., p. 432.**
apprehended; and as apprehended it must be regarded as an object of apprehension. Thus, the self becomes both subject and object of consciousness, and cannot be regarded as pure, unmodalized or transcendentual consciousness above the distinction of subject and object. Fifthly, the Śaṅkarite holds that the self is of the nature of consciousness which is self-luminous; that it manifests itself and is not manifested by any other thing. Thus both the self and consciousness, which constitutes its essence, are self-luminous. But if it were self-luminous, it would become both subject and object of consciousness, which is impossible. And, in fact, no body is ever conscious of two self-luminous entities, viz. the self-luminous self and the self-luminous consciousness. Lastly, the Śaṅkarite holds that consciousness constitutes the essence of the self; that it is natural or essential to the self, not accidental to it. But this does not stand to reason. That is to be regarded as conscious (cetana), which has consciousness of an object (citā yogāt), and that is to be regarded as unconscious (jaḍa), which has no consciousness of an object. And there is no other consciousness than the consciousness of an object. If an object, too, were held to be self-luminous, then every object in the world would manifest itself to every one, and thus every one would be omniscient. Hence, we must admit that consciousness is not essential to the self, but its adventitious property; that the self is not conscious in itself, but it is endued with consciousness which is produced by various causes and inheres in it. But why should consciousness inhere in the self, and not in the object which produces it? Jayanta replies that this is the nature of consciousness that it inheres in the self and not in the object. There are certain acts which inhere only in their agents or subjects and never in their objects, e.g. the act of going. So the act of consciousness, by its very nature, inheres in its subject, viz. the self, and not in its object. And the inexorable law of nature (vastusvabhāva) cannot be called in question. Jayanta, therefore, concludes that consciousness does not constitute the essential nature of the self; that the self is not an object of internal perception (mānasa pratyakṣa) or immediate intuition (aparokṣa-jñāna); that the self is an object of inference, and that the qualities of the self, e.g. cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and volition are the mark of inference.

* NM., pp. 431-2.
4. The Vaiśeṣika

Kaṇḍāda holds that the self is not an object of normal perception, but of supernormal perception. It cannot be perceived through the internal organ (manas) owing to its ordinary conjunction with the self. But Kaṇḍāda admits that the self can be perceived by the yogīs through a particular kind of conjunction between the self and manas. This conjunction is due to a peculiar power (dharma) born of meditation. Thus, the self is an object of higher intuition. Śaṅkara Miśra holds that the self in its essential nature is an object of higher intuition; but that the self as modified by its own specific qualities is an object of internal perception. I directly perceive through manas 'I am sorry', 'I am happy', 'I know', 'I will', 'I desire'. I cannot perceive the self as modified by these specific qualities through the external senses; I perceive it through the internal organ when the external organs do not operate. So there is a direct perception of the self as modified by its specific qualities through the internal organ. This knowledge of the self is perceptual in character, since it is directly produced by the internal organ. It is neither inferential nor verbal. It is not inferential knowledge, since it is not produced by a mark of inference. It is not verbal knowledge, since it is not produced by any verbal authority. It is in the nature of direct internal perception derived through the internal organ. But Śaṅkara Miśra does not make the pure self an object of normal internal perception. He also, like Kaṇḍāda, makes it an object of yogic perception. But he admits that sometimes ordinary men like us also have flashes of intuition of the pure self; but that it is so much obscured by nescience (avidyā) that it is as good as non-existent. It is especially to be found in yogis who have a direct perception of the pure self owing to a particular conjunction of the self with the internal organ brought about by a peculiar power born of meditation. Śrīdhara also holds that the pure self free from all attributes is not an object of normal internal perception. His conception of the self approaches that of Śaṅkara. The self is

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26 Tatrātmā manasācāprayakṣe. VS., viii, 1, 2.
27 VSU., viii, 1, 2.
28 Atmanyātmanam anasoḥ samyogaviśeṣād ātmapratyakṣam. VS., ix, 1, 11, and VSU., ix, 1, 11.
29 VSU., iii, 2, 14.
30 Ibid., ix, 1, 11.
known to us as 'I' and 'mine', as the doer and the possessor. But these are not the essential attributes of the self; they are rather accidents of the self due to its connection with the limitations of the body. The notions of 'I' and 'mine', subject and ego are false conceptions of the self. The self in itself is not an ego. The ego or subject is the empirical self or the self limited by the organism. The empirical self is an object of normal internal perception. But the pure self is not an object of normal perception. It is perceived by the yogis alone. It is an object of higher intuition. The real nature of the self free from all impositions of 'I' and 'mine' is perceived by a yogin, when he withdraws his mind from the external organs, concentrates it on an aspect of the self, and constantly meditates upon the self with undivided attention.30

5. The Sāmkhya-Pāñjikala

According to the Sāmkhya-Pāñjikala, consciousness is the essence of the self which is self-luminous. But the self cannot know its essential nature, so long as it illusorily identifies itself with the unconscious buddhi on which it casts its reflection and gives it an appearance of a conscious self. The self knows an external object in the following manner. The transparent buddhi goes out to the object through the channel of a sense-organ, and assumes its form, but it cannot manifest the object as it is unconscious; it manifests the object to the self only when a reflection of the self is cast upon the function of the unconscious buddhi modified into the form of the object. Thus the self knows an external object only through the mental modification on which it casts its reflection. This is the view of Vācaspatimiśra.31 Vijñānakāśyapa maintains, that the self casts its reflection on the unconscious buddhi functioning in a particular way; that the mental function which takes in the reflection of the self and assumes its form is reflected back on the self; and that it is through this reflection that the self knows an external object.32

Now, the question is: Can the self know itself? Though the self is self-luminous, it cannot know itself directly so long as it is connected with the organism. Ordinarily, the self infers its existence through its reflection in buddhi. Just as I cannot see my

30 NK., p. 196.
31 TV., i, 7; ii, 17; ii, 20; iv, 22.
32 YV., i, 4, pp. 12-13; SPB., i, 87, i, 99; DHIP., I, p. 260; YF., p. 165.
own face but infer its existence from its reflection in a mirror, so I cannot perceive my self but infer its existence from its reflection in buddhi, inasmuch as a reflection (pratibimba) must have an original (bimba). But Patañjali asserts, that when we develop the power of concentration, we may have supernormal intuition (pratibha jñāna) of the self through its reflection in buddhi. But how can the self know itself through an unconscious mental modification though it takes in the reflection of the self? Vācaspati holds that the self can know itself only when attention is entirely withdrawn from the mental mode in which the self is reflected, and is wholly concentrated on the reflection, of the self in the pure essence (sattva) of buddhi, its inertia (tamas) and energy (rajas) being completely overpowered. Thus, the self knows itself only through its reflection in the pure essence of buddhi, viewed apart from the unconscious mental mode which takes in the reflection of the self. The self is always the knower, the witness (sāksin), the seer or spectator (draśtr); so it can never turn back upon itself and make itself an object of knowledge (drśya). Then, what is the knowing subject and what is the known object in the supernormal intuition of the self? Vyāsa asserts, that the self cannot be manifested or known by the essence (sattva) of buddhi as buddhi is unconscious; but what is the self which knows itself through its reflection in the pure essence of buddhi. If we call the self in its pure essence the pure or transcendental self, and the mental mode in which the self is reflected the empirical self, then the pure self can know the empirical self, but the empirical self can never know the pure self. Vācaspatimiśra asserts, that the self is reflected in the unconscious essence of buddhi, so that the mental mode may be said to have the self for its object in the sense in which a mirror in which a face is reflected is said to have the face for its object; that the mental mode cannot be said to have the self for its object in the sense that it manifests or apprehends the self, inasmuch as the unconscious mental mode can never manifest the conscious self. Vācaspati says, “The notion of self-knowledge consists in making the object of knowledge, the reflection of the Puruṣa into the

VPS., p. 54. Na ca puruṣapratyayena buddhisattvātmanā puruṣo drṣyate puruṣa eva pratayah svātmāvalambanāḥ pañyatā. YBh., iii, 35.

TV., p. 245. See also Maniperbhā, p. 64 and Bhavāvytī, p. 55. (Calcutta, 1903). 3 Y.Bh. iii, 35.
buddhi." Again, he says, "In the trance cognition the object of knowledge is the Self reflected into the buddhi. It is different from the real Self, because it becomes the support of that Self (ātmā)." The self, in its pure essence, is the subject of self-apprehension, and the pure essence of buddhi which takes in the reflection of the self and is modified into its form is the object of self-apprehension, so that the subject and the object of self-apprehension are not the same. In other words, the transcendental self is the subject of self-apprehension, and the empirical self is the object of self-apprehension. Thus, Vācaspati avoids self-contradiction in the view that the self can be both subject and object of knowledge. Nāgęśa also corroborates the view of Vācaspatimışra. He asks: In the apprehension of the self is it buddhi which knows the self, or, is it the self which knows itself? In the first alternative, buddhi would be conscious, which is not admitted by the Sāmkhya-Pātañjala. In the second alternative, the self would be both subject and object of knowledge which is self-contradictory. Nāgęśa says that the second alternative does not involve self-contradiction. The self cannot be known by the mental mode in which the self is reflected because it is unconscious. But it is the self itself which knows the mental mode which is modified into the form of the self and is reflected in the self. Thus the self has knowledge of itself in the form of the reflection in itself, of the mental mode which takes in the reflection of the self and which is modified into the form of the self. Here, in the apprehension of the self by the self there is no self-contradiction, for there is a difference between the self as the subject and the self as the object. The self as it is determined by the empirical mental mode modified into its form, or the empirical self is the object, and the self as it is in itself undetermined by any mental mode, or the transcendental self is the subject. The self in itself can never be an object of knowledge. The transcendental self is always a knower; it can never be an object known. Thus Nāgęśa substantially agrees with Vācaspatimśra's view that the pure self is the subject of self-apprehension, and the empirical self is the object of self-apprehension. But he differs from the latter in holding that the mental mode in which the self

**Rama Prasad, E. T. TV., pp. 229-230.**

**Ibid., p. 293.**

**TV., ill. 35, p. 245.**
is reflected is reflected back in the self. On this point he agrees with Vijñānabhikṣu.\textsuperscript{48}

According to Vācaspatimiśra, the self is reflected in the essence of buddhi which is modified into the form of the self. But, according to Vijñānabhikṣu, the self is reflected in the essence of buddhi functioning in a particular manner, and the mental function too, in which the self is reflected, is reflected back in the self. Thus, according to Vijñānabhikṣu, the self knows itself through the reflection, in itself, of the mental mode, which takes in the reflection of the self and is modified into its form, just as it knows an external object (e.g. a jar) through the reflection, in itself, of the mental mode which assumes the form of the object.\textsuperscript{39} He says, “We must admit that just as there is a reflection of buddhi in the self, so there is a reflection of the self in buddhi also; otherwise, the self’s experience would not be possible.”\textsuperscript{40} But how does he avoid self-contradiction, if the self knows itself through the reflection, in itself, of the mental mode which assumes the form of the self? He says that there is no contradiction in the cognition of the self by the self, inasmuch as the self is essentially self-luminous, and hence it can be both the illuminating agent and the illumined object, the knowing subject as well as the known object. There is no inconsistency in the relation between the self as a knowing subject and the self as a known object, because the self is essentially self-luminous, and that which is of the nature of illumination (prakāśa) is itself illumined; there is no contradiction in it. But a relation always implies two terms; how can there be relation of the self to itself—of the self as the subject to the self as the known object? Vijñānabhikṣu holds that though there is no real difference in the nature of the self, yet we may distinguish the self in its pure essence, as the original (bimba), from the reflection of the mental mode in the self, as an image of the self (prati-bimba). Of these two aspects of the self, which is the knowing subject and which is the known object? Vijñānabhikṣu holds that the self as determined by the mental mode which is modified into the form of the self is the knowing subject, and the self, in its pure essence, free from all determinations, is the known object.\textsuperscript{41} Thus Vijñānabhikṣu goes against the views of Vyāsa.

\textsuperscript{48} Chyaś on YS. (Benares, 1907), p. 174.
\textsuperscript{39} YV, pp. 231-2.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., p. 13.
\textsuperscript{41} Atmākāra-vṛttvyacchinnasya jñātītvāt kevalasya jñeyatvāt. Ibid., p. 232.
Vācaspati, and Nāgēśa who regard the pure self as the subject of self-apprehension, and the empirical self as the object of self-apprehension. He says that the self is self-luminous, because it illumines itself, or knows itself as an object of knowledge. The self is not, indeed, an object of an ordinary mental function, but it is an object of supernormal yogic intuition. But still Vijnānabhikṣu’s interpretation does not seem to be in keeping with the spirit of the Sāmkhya-Pātañjala distinction between the knower (dṛṣṭṛ) and the known (dṛṣṭya), the self (puruṣa) and the not-self (prakṛti).

6. The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka

There seems to be a difference between Kumārila and his followers on this question. Kumārila maintains, that the self is of the nature of pure consciousness and is illumined by itself; that it is self-luminous or manifested by itself. But Pārthaśārathi-miśra, a follower of Kumārila, holds that the self is an object of mental perception. This distinction is not recognized by all. Dr. Gaṅgānātha Jhā, and Dr. S. N. Das Gupta represent Kumārila as holding that the self is an object of mental perception. “Kumārila holds,” says Dr. G. N. Jha, “that the Soul is not self-luminous, but known by mental perception (Sastradīpikā, p. 101).” 42 Dr. S. N. Das Gupta says, “Kumārilla thinks that the soul which is distinct from the body is perceived by a mental perception (mānasapratyakṣa).” Kumārila agrees with Prabhākara in holding that soul is not self-illuminating (svayamprakāśa). 43 But Dr. P. Sastrī rightly points out that according to Kumārila, the self is self-illumined. Kumārila clearly says, “The self is a light which illumines itself. When it is said to be imperceptible (agrāhya) the epithet apparently means that the self is imperceptible to all; but as the Śruti says that it is self-illumined (atmajyoti), we conclude that it is imperceptible only to others and not to itself.” 44 Again he says, “The notion of ‘I’ (which is all the notion that we have of the soul) always points to the mere existence of the Soul, which is of the nature of pure consciousness.” 45 Kumārila seems

42 PSPM., p. 80.
43 DHPR., I, p. 400 and p. 401. See also YP., p. 143.
44 Atmanāvam prakāśyoyamātma jyotirtritam. SV., Ātmavāda, 142.
Quoted by P. Sastrī in IFM., p. 91.
45 Jha, E. T. of Tantravārttika, p. 516, referred to by Keith in KM., p. 71 n.
to accept the doctrine of self-illumination of the self from Śavara-
bhāṣya. Śavara says, "The Atman is known by itself (svasaṁ-
tvedya); it is incapable of being seen or shown by others."46

But Pārthasārathi says, "The self or the knower, which is
distinct from the body, is an object of self-consciousness in the
form of mental perception."47 This distinction between Kumārila’s
view and that of his followers is not generally recognized. The
author of Sarvasiddhāntasamgraha credits Kumārila with the view
that the self is an object of mental perception.48 So we shall take
Pārthasārathi as the typical exponent of the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsaka
view. According to the Bhāṭṭa, the self is not an object of
inference as some Naiyāyikas hold; nor is it an object of imme-
diate intuition as Śāṅkara holds; nor is it perceived as the subject
of object-cognitions as Prabhākara holds. According to him, the
self is an object of mental perception (mānasapratyakṣa) or self-
consciousness (ahampratyaya).

The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsaka criticizes the Naiyāyika doctrine
thus: Firstly, some Naiyāyikas hold that the self cannot be an
object of perception, because it cannot be the subject and the
object of the same act of knowledge. The Bhāṭṭa asks: How,
then, can the self be an object of inference? Here, the self knows
itself by inference through itself. The self is the subject of
inference, the object of inference, and the instrument of inference.
Thus, it cannot be held that the self is always the subject and
never the object of knowledge. If in inference the self can be
both the subject (anumāṇ) and the object of inference (anumeya)
at the same time, it may also be regarded as an object of percep-
tion, when it is both the knower and the known. If the self
can be known by inference, it may as well be known by percep-
tion. Secondly, if it be argued that the self cannot be perceived
because it has no form (rūpa), then it may equally be argued that
pleasure and the like cannot be perceived because they are with-
out any form. And if the latter can be perceived, though
without any form, then the former also can be perceived, though
devoid of any form. And as a matter of fact, pleasure, etc., are
never perceived apart from the self to which they belong.
Pleasure is perceived as pleasure of the self; we have no

46 Quoted by P. Sastri in IMP., p. 97.
47 Śarīrāṅkīrito mānasapratyakṣarūpāhaṁpratyayagamyo jūśā. Sā, p. 479.
48 Manaṅkaraṇaṅkutam pratyakṣenāvāsiyate. viii, 37. See KM., p. 71.
-consciousness of mere pleasure such as 'this is pleasure'; but we have a consciousness of pleasure always in such a form as 'I have pleasure'. Thus pleasure and the like are not perceived apart from the self, but they are perceived as belonging to it, and thus manifest themselves as well as the self to which they belong. Thirdly, sometimes an external object is known together with its knowledge; the consciousness of the object is appropriated by the self. In this self-appropriation of the consciousness of the object, there is not only a consciousness of the object, but also a consciousness of the self which has consciousness. In this act of cognition there is the apprehension of an object as qualified by the consciousness of the self (jñātr-jñānaviśiṣṭarthagraha). There cannot be a consciousness of a qualified object, without apprehending the qualifications which qualify the object. In the cognition 'I know the object' the qualified object cannot be known unless its qualifications viz. the consciousness and the self are already known. Thus the self must be regarded as an object of consciousness. Fourthly, if the self is not perceived already, it can never be remembered afterwards; and if it cannot be remembered it cannot be an object of inference. Thus the self must be regarded as an object of perception.⁴⁹

The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsaka criticizes Prabhākara’s doctrine thus: According to the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsaka, the self is the object of internal perception or T-—consciousness. But Prabhākara argues that the self cannot be the subject as well as the object of consciousness; that it is self-contradictory to suppose that the self is the object of perception, inasmuch as the self cannot be both the percipient and the perceived. Prabhākara holds that there is no T-—consciousness (ahamvitti) apart from the consciousness of objects (ghatādīvitti). So the self cannot be regarded as the object of T-—consciousness, which is different from object-consciousness. According to him, in every act of consciousness there are three factors: (i) the consciousness of an object or object-consciousness (viṣayavitti), (ii) the consciousness of the subject or the self (ahamvitti), and (iii) the self-conscious awareness or consciousness of consciousness (svasaṁvitti). There is a triple consciousness (tripuṣī-saṁviti) in every act of consciousness. There is no consciousness of an object, pure and simple, apart from the consciousness of the self. There can be no consciousness of an

⁴⁹ NM., pp. 433-4.
object which is not appropriated by the self. There is no consciousness of an object which does not reveal the self. In every act of cognition the self is revealed not as the object of knowledge, but as the subject of knowledge or the knower (jñāty). It is self-contradictory to suppose that the self can be perceived as an object of consciousness; the self is always the knower; so it can never be a known object.

Pārthasārathimisra, a Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsaka, asks what Prabhākara means by self-contradiction in the self, if it is both subject and object of perception. Prabhākara evidently means, that the self is simply the agent (karti) of the act of cognition; that it is not the object (karma) of the act of cognition; or that the act of cognition cannot produce its result (svaphala) in the self. Pārthasarathi asks: What is the result of the act of cognition? It is manifestation or illumination (bhūsana). And it exists in the self which is the agent of the act of cognition. The self is manifested by the act of cognition. And since it is manifested by the act of cognition, it is the object of consciousness. If it is not manifested by the act of cognition, it cannot be said to be revealed by it. Thus, if the self is revealed by an act of consciousness, as Prabhākara holds, then it is both subject and object of consciousness, and so Prabhākara also cannot avoid self-contradiction.\(^{80}\) According to the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsaka, the self is not manifested in every consciousness of an object; the object-consciousness (viṣayavitti) is not always appropriated by the self. For instance, sometimes I know that 'this is a jar', but I do not know that I know the jar. So, the Bhāṭṭa holds that though the self is manifested when an object is known, it is not manifested either as the subject (karti) or as the object (karma) of this object-consciousness (viṣayavitti), but along with this object-consciousness there is sometimes another distinct consciousness, viz. self-consciousness (mānasāhaṁpratyaya) of which the self is the object.\(^{81}\)

Prabhākara is right in so far as the self is always implicitly involved in the consciousness of the not-self or object; and the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsaka is right in so far as the self is not always explicitly manifested in the consciousness of the not-self, but it is explicitly manifested only in self-consciousness or Ṭ—consciousness which cannot be identified with mere object-consciousness.

\(^{80}\) SD., pp. 479-482.
\(^{81}\) Ibid., p. 482, and SDP.
Self-consciousness is certainly a higher degree of conscious life than the mere consciousness of an object; it involves an additional factor of self-appropriation. Hence, the self may be regarded as the object of the self-consciousness, as the Bhāṭṭa holds, rather than the subject of object-consciousness, as Prabhākara holds.

Prabhākara tries to avoid self-contradiction in the nature of the self by supposing that the self cannot be both subject and object of knowledge, but it is only the subject of knowledge. If so, then there can be neither recollection nor recognition of the self. Both in recollection and in recognition it is the object of recollection and recognition that appears in consciousness, and not their subject. In these representative processes it is the object presented to consciousness in our past experience that is represented to consciousness. Hence, in the recollection and recognition of the self it is the self apprehended as an object of previous perception that is represented to consciousness as the object of present recollection and recognition. If, in the recognition of the self, the self were not known as the object of recognition, then the act of recognition would be objectless. But there can be no consciousness without an object. Hence, the Bhāṭṭa concludes that the self must be regarded as an object of self-consciousness. But how can the self be subject and object at the same time? Is it not self-contradictory? According to the Bhāṭṭa, the self as a conscious entity is the subject, and as a substance it is the object. Thus he tries to avoid self-contradiction.52 This view may be contrasted with that of Kant, according to whom the self is the subject or knower, but not an object or substance.

The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsaka criticizes Śaṅkara's doctrine. Śaṅkara maintains, that consciousness constitutes the essence of the self which is self-luminous or self-manifesting; that it does not depend for its manifestation on any other condition. How, then, can it be the object of consciousness? How can the self which is self-luminous be manifested by consciousness? The Bhāṭṭa retorts: If the self is self-luminous because it is of the nature of consciousness, then why should pleasure and the like be not regarded as self-luminous? Besides, if the self were self-luminous by its very nature, then it would never cease to be so, and it would manifest itself even in dreamless sleep. But, in fact, the self is not manifested in deep sleep. How, then, can it be regarded as

52 SD., p. 487, and SDP.