self-luminous? It may be urged that the self is manifested even in dreamless sleep, with its natural bliss. Otherwise, on waking from sleep we cannot have the recollection that we slept well. What, then, is the difference between dreamless sleep and waking consciousness? The Vedāntist urges that in dreamless sleep the self alone is manifested, neither the organism, nor the sense-organs, nor external objects, but in waking consciousness all these are manifested, while in dream-consciousness only the self and the mind are manifested. But the Bhāṭṭa points out that this is contradicted by our experience. On waking from sleep we have a consciousness that we apprehended nothing during deep sleep. So it cannot be held that the self is manifested in dreamless sleep. On waking from sleep we have a consciousness that we slept well, not because the self is manifested with its essential bliss in dreamless sleep, but because of the absence of pain at the time. Hence, the self cannot be regarded as self-luminous, as Saṃkara holds, but it must be regarded as the object of internal perception or self-consciousness (mānasapratyakṣagamyā evāyam).

7. The Prābhākara Mīmāṁsaka

According to the Prābhākara, consciousness is self-luminous, or, it manifests itself; and in manifesting itself it manifests both its knowing self and known object. Neither the self nor external objects are self-luminous; both of them are manifested by consciousness which is self-luminous. The self is directly manifested by every act of cognition, presentative or representative. There can be no consciousness of an object apart from the consciousness of the self; every act of cognition is appropriated by the self; all experience is the the self's experience. In every act of cognition there is a triple consciousness, a consciousness of the self (ahānāvittī), a consciousness of an object (viśayāvittī), and self-conscious awareness (svaśārangivittī). Thus, in every act of cognition there is a direct and immediate knowledge of the self, not as an object of knowledge, but as the knowing subject; the self can never be known as an object of knowledge. But though there is always a direct and immediate knowledge of the self in every act of cognition, there is not always a direct and immediate knowledge of an external object. An object is not directly presented to consciousness in recollection and inference. But

\[\text{SD.}, \; \text{pp. 487-90.}\]
though an object is indirectly revealed to consciousness in representative and inferential cognitions, all experience, be it representative or representative, perceptual or inferential, is directly and immediately presented to consciousness. In other words, though in indirect knowledge its object is not directly presented to consciousness, yet the indirect knowledge itself is directly presented to consciousness. And because there is a direct and immediate knowledge of every act of cognition, be it immediate or mediate, there is also a direct and immediate knowledge of the self in every act of cognition, immediate or mediate. Thus, every act of cognition directly reveals the self in directly revealing itself. But we must not suppose that this cognition requires another cognition for its direct and immediate presentation to consciousness. It is self-luminous; it directly reveals itself. There is no regressus ad infinitum in the consciousness of experience. According to Prabhākara, consciousness is self-luminous; there is no consciousness of consciousness as the Naiyāyika supposes; consciousness is self-aware or self-manifesting; consciousness itself is self-consciousness. If there were a consciousness of consciousness, there would be a consciousness of that consciousness and so on ad infinitum.

Thus there is a difference between the apprehension of the self and that of an object. There is always a direct and immediate knowledge of the self in every act of cognition, representative, representative, or inferential; but there is not always a direct and immediate knowledge of an object, e.g. in recollection and inference. But both the self and an object are non-luminous, and are manifested by consciousness. Thus, Prabhākara regards consciousness as an external relation between the self and the not-self. There is also a difference between the apprehension of an object and that of a cognition; an object is sometimes directly presented to consciousness, and sometimes indirectly revealed to consciousness; but a cognition is always directly and immediately presented to consciousness. And there is also a difference between the apprehension of the self and that of a cognition. There is a direct and immediate knowledge of the self and the cognition both. But the self is apprehended by a cognition as its knowing subject, but the cognition is not apprehended by any other cognition; it apprehends itself. Thus, both the self and an object are non-luminous as they are manifested by consciousness. But consciousness itself is self-luminous as it manifests itself. Without consciousness
neither the object nor the self can be manifested. In dreamless sleep there is no consciousness; so neither the self nor any object is manifested in deep sleep. It cannot be said that the self does not exist in deep sleep, for, in that case, there would be no recognition of personal identity on waking from sleep. If the self were self-luminous, as the Vedântist holds, then it would be manifested in deep sleep. But since it is not manifested in deep sleep, it must be regarded as non-luminous. But consciousness is self-luminous; it is not manifested in deep sleep because it does not exist at that time.54

The Prâbhâkara rejects the Vedântist doctrine of the self-luminous self for the following reasons: Firstly, the self is not manifested in deep sleep, though it exists as pure esse at that time. Secondly, all the phenomena of our experience can be explained by the theory of self-luminous consciousness and, therefore, it is needless to assume the self-luminosity of the self. Thirdly, the self is not of the nature of consciousness, as the Vedântist holds, but it is the substratê of consciousness.55

The Prâbhâkara criticizes Kumârila's view. According to Kumârila, the self is as much an object of perception as an external object. An external object is perceived by external perception; but the self is perceived by internal perception. There is no contradiction in the self being both the subject of knowledge and the object of knowledge; for the self is a conscious substance, and as conscious it is the subject of consciousness, and as a substance it is the object of consciousness; the element of substance in the self is the known object and the element of consciousness in the self is the knowing subject. The Prâbhâkara urges that this view is untenable. What Kumârila calls the substantial element in the self is unconscious, and so cannot be a self at all. Thus, there remains only the conscious element; and if this conscious element be the object of knowledge, then the self becomes the knowing subject and the known object at the same time, and thus Kumârila cannot avoid self-contradiction. Nor can it be said that the conscious element in the self is capable of undergoing a change so as to have simultaneously the character of the knowing subject and the known object, because the self is not made up of parts and so cannot undergo any change.56

54 PP., pp. 56-8.
55 PSPM., p. 80.
Therefore, it must be held that the self is immediately known not as the object of consciousness as Kumārila holds, but as the knowing subject or substrate of consciousness. The Prābhākara rejects Kumārila’s theory on the following grounds: Firstly, the self is always the knower; it can never be an object of knowledge. It is self-contradictory to suppose that the self can be both subject and object of the same act of knowledge.67 Secondly, as the self is directly revealed in every cognition of an object as its cognizer, it is needless to assume another cognition, viz. internal perception which should directly reveal the self as its object.68 The Prābhākara’s view may briefly be compared with that of the Buddhist idealist. According to both of them, consciousness is self-luminous. But according to the Buddhist idealist, consciousness alone is real, which is polarized into subject and object, which are unreal. But according to the Prābhākara, both subject and object are real and manifested by consciousness which is self-luminous.

8. The Jaina

The Jaina maintains, with the Prābhākara, that a cognition is always appropriated by the self, and it reveals itself, the self, and its object; that every act of cognition cognizes itself, the cognizing subject and the cognized object. But he differs from the Prābhākara’s view that consciousness alone is self-luminous, which reveals the cognizing subject and the cognized object, which are equally non-luminous. The Jaina does not regard the self as non-luminous. According to him, in the cognition I know the jar through my self; it is not the cognition of the jar that reveals the self and the jar, as the Prābhākara holds, but it is the self which reveals itself through itself, the jar, and the cognition of the jar. In this cognition the cognizer, T or the self, the instrument ‘myself’ and the result ‘knowing’ are as much objects of perception as the cognized object, e.g. the jar. In this cognition I am directly conscious of myself as qualified by the cognition of the jar; so my self is as much an object of perception as the jar and the cognition of the jar. Just as we cannot deny the perception of the cognition and the object, so we cannot deny the perception of the cognizing subject. The cognition and the cognizing self are directly revealed in our experience. Hence, they

67 PP., p. 151.
68 PP., p. 151, and VPS., p. 54.
cannot but be regarded as objects of consciousness. For what-
ever is revealed in our experience is cognized, and whatever is
cognized is an object of consciousness. It is self-contradictory to
suppose that the self and its cognition are not objects of percep-
tion, though they are directly revealed in our experience.

The Jaina holds that the self is an object of internal perception.
When I feel that 'I am happy', or 'I am unhappy', I have a distinct
and immediate apprehension of the self as an object of internal
perception. But how can it be an object of direct and immediate
apprehension or-perception, though it has no form at all? The
Jaina replies that just as pleasure can be perceived though it is
without any form, so the self also can be perceived though it is
without any form. When pleasure is perceived it is not perceived
apart from the self. It is perceived always as belonging to the
self. Pleasure is never perceived as 'this is pleasure' as a jar is
perceived as 'this is a jar'. Pleasure is always perceived as 'I am
pleased', or 'I have pleasure'. Hence the perception of pleasure
in the form 'I am pleased' not only reveals pleasure but also the
self. Thus, the self is an object of internal perception. This is
another point of difference between the Jaina and the Prābhākara.
The Prābhākara holds that the self is always perceived as the
subject of external perception or object-cognition; that it can
never be perceived as an object of internal perception. The Jaina
holds that the self is manifested both by external perception and
by internal perception.59

9. The Upaniṣads

The Upaniṣads identify the self with the Absolute, the Ātman
with Brahman. The Ātman is not an object of knowledge. In
the Upaniṣads we do not find clear-cut arguments for this doctrine.
But we find certain passages in them, which may be regarded as
symbolical expressions of the following arguments. Firstly, the
Ātman is absolutely unconditioned. It has no attributes. It is
devoid of sound, touch, colour, taste, and smell.60 It is devoid of
all sensible qualities. So it cannot be perceived through the
external sense-organs. It is devoid of pleasure, pain, and the like.
So it cannot be perceived through the internal organ (manas).61
It is undefinable by speech, and unattainable by the outer or

inner senses. Secondly, the Ātman is beyond the categories of space, time, and causality. It contains space but is not spatial; it contains time but is not temporal; it contains causality, but is not subject to the law of causality. It is spaceless, timeless, and causeless. It is the ultimate reality. It is the noumenon. It is beyond the categories of the phenomenal world. So it cannot be comprehended by the intellect which can know only phenomena bound by space, time, and causality. The intellect can give only categorized knowledge. The Ātman is beyond all categories. So it is beyond the grasp of the intellect. Thirdly, the Ātman is the knower of all things and as such cannot be known by anything. How can the knower be known? How can you see the seer of seeing? How can you hear the hearer of hearing? How can you know him through the mind, which impels the mind to know? How can you comprehend him through the intellect, which makes the intellect comprehend? The Ātman is the seer but is not seen; it is the hearer but is not heard; it is the comprehender but is not comprehended; it is the thinker but is not thought. The Ātman is the witness (sākṣīn), the seer (paridraṣṭā), the knower (vijñātī). And the knower can never be known. The subject can never be an object of knowledge. Deussen says: "The Ātman as the knowing subject can never become an object for us, and is therefore itself unknowable." Ranade says: "The Ātman is unknowable because He is the Eternal Subject who knows. How could the Eternal Knower be an object of knowledge?" Fourthly, the Ātman is all-comprehending. It comprehends all relations. It can never be a term of any relation. It embraces the distinction of subject and object, knower and known. How, then, can it be an object of knowledge? The distinction of subject and object is within it; it is not subject to the distinction. It is non-dual. It is one. It is infinite (bhūmā). In it one cannot see any other thing, one cannot hear any other thing, one cannot comprehend any other thing. Where there is duality in appearance, there one smells the other, one sees the other, one hears

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"Ibid., iii, 4, 2.
"Ibid., iii, 8, 11.
"Śvet. Up., vi, 14.
"The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads, p. 403.
the other, one addresses the other, one comprehends the other, and one knows the other. But where there is no duality, where everything is realized as the Ātman, how should one smell, see, hear, address, comprehend, and know the other? The Ātman is the one, infinite reality. It is beyond duality. It is beyond distinction. So it cannot be an object of knowledge. "The supreme ātman," says Deussen, "is unknowable, because it is the all-comprehending unity, whereas all knowledge presupposes a duality of subject and object." This conception of the Ātman as beyond the distinction of subject and object is higher than the conception of the Ātman as the Eternal Knower or Subject. Saṅkara advocates this conception. Lastly, though the Upaniṣads make the Ātman absolutely unknowable as the unconditional Brahman, they do not make it so as the inner self (pratyagātman) of man. The Ātman which is hidden in the heart of man (gahvareśṭha) as the inner self is apprehended by ecstatic intuition (adhyātmayoga). God created the sense-organs in such a way that they always turn outwards to external objects: they can never turn inwards to apprehend the inner self. So we cannot perceive the inner self through the sense-organs. But some men can perceive it by withdrawing their senses from the external objects and concentrating their minds on the inner self (pratyagātman). The inner self hidden in all creatures cannot be comprehended by the gross or unrefined intellect. It can be perceived only by yogis or subtle seers through their subtle one-pointed intellect or intuition. The Ātman can be realized by one in meditation through the pure, enlightened heart, where there is the illumination of spiritual vision. The Ātman can be realized only by supra-intellectual intuition (prajñāna). Thus, the inner self of man is inaccessible to the outer and inner senses, manas and buddhi. It is only an object of higher intuition which is above intellect.

10. The Saṅkara-Vedāntist: The Self and Consciousness

Saṅkara develops the Upaniṣadic conception of the Ātman and regards it as the universal light of consciousness. According

73 By. Up., ii. 4, 14.
74 H. N. Dutt, Brahmatattva (Bengali), ch. iii.
75 The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads, p. 79.
76 Kath. Up., ii. 12.
77 Ibid., iv. 1.
78 Ibid., iii, 12.
to Rāmānuja, consciousness is a substance (dravya), and still it is a property of the self, even as a ray of light, though a substance, is a property of the lamp. The Naiṣṭāyika, the Vaiṣeṣika, and Prabhākara hold that consciousness is a quality (guna) of the self. Kumārila holds that consciousness is an action (karma) of the self, because it is the result of its cognitive activity (jñānakarma), and because the cognitive activity and its result, viz. consciousness, should be regarded as one. The Śāṅkhya, on the other hand, holds that consciousness constitutes the very essence (svārūpa) of the self and is not its quality or action. Śaṅkara also holds with the Śāṅkhya that consciousness is neither a substance, nor a quality, nor an action of the self. The self is mere consciousness. It is not a substance to which consciousness belongs either as a quality or an action. Though there is no difference between the self and consciousness, yet we draw a distinction between the two, and speak of 'consciousness' when we wish to emphasize the relation of the self to objects, and we speak of the 'self' simply when we do not want to emphasize that relation. In fact, the self and consciousness are one. The self is of the nature of eternal consciousness.

Let us compare Śaṅkara's doctrine with Prabhākara's views. Prabhākara holds that consciousness is self-luminous, but that the self which is the substrate of consciousness is not self-luminous. Śaṅkara, on the other hand, holds that the self is nothing but consciousness, and as such it is self-luminous. Prabhākara holds that the self is always known as an ego or a knower; that it is identical with the ego. But Śaṅkara holds that the self is the eternal light of consciousness beyond the distinction of ego and non-ego. The self cannot be identical with the ego. If it were so, it would be known as an ego even in dreamless sleep. But, as a matter of fact, there is no such consciousness in dreamless sleep, though all admit that the self persists at that time. Prabhākara argues that there is no 'I'-consciousness in dreamless sleep, because, at that time, there is no consciousness of objects, and there can be no 'I'-consciousness apart from object-consciousness. But the Śaṅkarite asks: In dreamless sleep is there the absence of pure consciousness? Or, is there the absence of empirical

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**TMK., pp. 399-400.**
**S.B., ii, 3, 18.**
**VPS., p. 57.**
**VPS., p. 58.**
**Jñāḥ nityacaitanyā' yamāṭmā. S.B., ii, 3, 18.**
consciousness which depends on the affection of the self by objects? The first alternative is impossible, since pure consciousness is eternal and so can never be suspended. The second alternative also is excluded, since the consciousness of the self does not depend on the affection of the self by objects. So the Śaṅkarite maintains, that the self is not identical with the ego, and that it is not manifested as an ego in dreamless sleep because it remains in that state as pure self-luminous consciousness above the distinction of ego and non-ego. “When a man, on waking from dreamless sleep, reflects ‘I slept well’, he transfers the I-character which belongs to all waking cognition to the state of deep sleep in which the self, freed for the time from all shackles of egoity was abiding in its own blissful nature and associated only with general non-particularized nescience, not with any of its special modifications.”\footnote{In dreamless sleep egoism (ahaṁkāra) is resolved into general nescience (avidyā); at the time of waking it is formed again out of nescience. So in waking life there is ego-consciousness, but in dreamless sleep there is none.} Thus Śaṅkara differs from Prabhākara in his conception of the self. According to Prabhākara, the self is identical with the ego; egoism constitutes the essence of the self; I-consciousness is a permanent characteristic of the self; in all cognitions of objects the self is revealed as the subject of knowledge or ego. According to Śaṅkara, on the other hand, the self is consciousness, pure and simple; it is neither the substrate of consciousness nor the subject of consciousness; it is neither a conscious substance nor a conscious subject or ego. The self is the pure light of consciousness which is self-luminous; it is above the distinction of ego and non-ego, subject and object. But though the self is pure self-luminous consciousness, it appears as an ego when it is determined by the limiting condition of the internal organ (antaḥkaraṇa) modified into egoism (ahaṁkāra), and cannot distinguish its pure essence from its phenomenal appearance as an ego. Egoism does not constitute the essence of the self, as Prabhākara holds, but it is a modification of the internal organ (antaḥkaraṇa) which is an evolute of nescience. It is an adventitious mark of the self, which is superimposed on it by nescience. The self which is one, eternal, changeless consciousness can neither be a knower (jñātr), nor an agent (kartr), nor an enjoyer (bhoktr),
since these imply agency, activity, and change which cannot belong to the changeless and eternal self. These are phenomenal appearances of the self superimposed on it by nescience.

Śaṅkara draws a distinction between the jīva and the Ātman. The Ātman is the eternal light of consciousness. The jīva is the eternal consciousness as limited by the organism, sense-organs, manas, and āhamkāra. The Ātman is the pure consciousness which is the presupposition of all experience; it is presupposed by experience of all objects, and as such is entirely non-objective. But the jīva is both subject and object, knower and known, ego and non-ego. It is both I and me. The Ātman is never an object of consciousness. The jīva is an object of self-consciousness (asmātpratyaya). The Ātman becomes an object of self-consciousness, when it loses its purity and is determined by the limiting conditions of body, sense-organ and the like. When it is freed from all these fetters, it is not an object of self-consciousness. The Ātman as the inner self (pratyagātman) is apprehended by immediate intuition.88

Śaṅkara says that even as fire cannot burn itself so the Ātman cannot know itself. The Ātman is not of the nature of an object; so it can never be an object of knowledge.87 It cannot be perceived through the sense-organs, since it is the witness of all perceptible objects.88 It is not an object of mental perception or intellectual comprehension.89 The Ātman cannot be an object of its own apprehension, since being without parts it cannot be split up into the knowing subject (jñātṛ) and the known object (jñeya) at the same time.90 But though it can never be an object of empirical knowledge, it can be apprehended by higher intuition. The yogis have a vision of the Ātman, which is undefinable and beyond all phenomenal appearances by meditation (saṁrādhanā). Meditation consists in devotion, concentration of mind and ecstatic intuition.91 Govindaṇanda says, “The Ātman can be realized by intuition.”92

86 S.B., iii, 2, 23.
89 S.B., Br. Up., iii, 8, 11.
91 Enamātmānam nirastasamastaprāpāṃcam avyaktam saṁrādhanakāle padyanti yogīnaḥ. S.B., iii, 2, 24.
Vācaspāti discusses this question in Bhāmatī. According to him, the inner self (pratyagātman) is an object of higher intuition, but the jīva or individual soul, which is its phenomenal appearance, is an object of self-consciousness (ahampratyaya). The inner self (pratyagātman) is self-luminous, non-objective, and partless; still when it is determined by the gross body, subtle body, sense-organs, manas, and buddhi, which are the products of beginningless undefinable, avidyā, though unlimited, it appears as limited, though single, it appears as multiple, though inactive, it appears as active, though not an enjoyer, it appears as an enjoyer, though not an object of consciousness, it appears as an object of self-consciousness, and is manifested to us in the condition of a jīva. The Ātman is unlimited. But when it is limited by buddhi and other conditions, and cannot distinguish itself from these limiting conditions, it appears as a jīva. And the jīva is a knower (jñāty), a doer (kartya), and an enjoyer (bhoktya). It is of a composite character. It is self and not-self, subject and object, knower and known. As pure consciousness (ciddātmā) it is self-luminous, and not an object of self-consciousness. But as conditioned by the limiting adjuncts of buddhi and the like, it is an object of self-consciousness. Though the jīva is non-different from the Ātman, it is entangled in empirical life as limited by certain conditions. The active agent, which is the object of self-consciousness, is the jīvātman, which is determined by the aggregate of limiting conditions. The paramātman, which is the witness of this empirical self, is not an object of self-consciousness. Self-consciousness (ahampratyaya) is a mental mode which is unconscious. And this unconscious mental mode can never manifest the Ātman. It is the Ātman that manifests the mental mode of self-consciousness. It is the presupposition of all experience, and so can never be an object of experience. It is the presupposition of self-consciousness, and so can never be an object of self-consciousness. According to Vācaspāti, the inner self is of the nature of pure consciousness and manifests all things, but it is

[Bhāmatī, i, l, 1. P., 38.]

[jīva hi ciddāmataya svayaṃprakāśataya āvīṣayopyaupaśādikena rūpena āvīṣaya iti bhāvaḥ. Bhāmatī, i, l, 1 (Bombay. 1917), p. 39.]

[Ahampratyaśayayo yaḥ kartā kāryakāraṇasanghātopyahi jīvātma, tataśāśītvā paramātmano'hampratyayāvīṣayatvasya pratyuktavat. Bhāmatī, l, l, 4, p. 134.]

[Na hyātmā nyārthaḥ, anyat tu sarvamātmārtham. Ibid., p. 134.]
not manifested by any other thing. Still we must admit that
it is apprehended by immediate intuition. Otherwise, all things
would be unmanifested to us, since they are manifested by the
inner self, and this would lead to utter ignorance of the whole
universe.87

Ānandagiri regards the Ātman as self-luminous, and the not-
self (anātman) as the object of its consciousness. The Ātman,
which is of the nature of consciousness, is manifested as the
witness (sākṣīn). It cannot be said that the Ātman is not at all
an object of consciousness like the void. Though it is not an
object of self-consciousness (asmatpratyaya), it is apprehended
by immediate intuition.88

Govindānanda holds that the jīva is apprehended by self-con-
sciousness.89 But how can the jīva be the knowing subject and
the known object at the same time? Apyayadīkṣīta holds that
the jīva as determined by the mental modes of pleasure, pain,
and the like is the object of self-consciousness, and as determined
by antahkarana is the knowing subject. So there is no contra-
diction here.90

Padmapāda raises the question of contradiction in the appre-
hension of the Ātman by itself. The Ātman is the self (viṣayin);
the object is the not-self (viṣaya). There is an essential difference
between the two. The Ātman is of the nature of consciousness.
The object is unconscious. The Ātman is internal (pratyak) but
the object is external (parāk). Consciousness is directed inward
to the self; but it is directed outward to the object. The object
is of the nature of this (idam); but the Ātman is of the nature
of not-this (anidam). The object is the common property of
everybody's experience. The Ātman is not a property of anyone's
experience. How can the single, partless Ātman break up into
two such contradictory parts as the knowing subject and the
known object? Padmapāda answers that the Ātman is not an
object of self-consciousness; that egoism (ahamkāra) which is of
dual character of subject and object is the object of self-

87 Avāśyaṃ cidātmanyāparoṣbhyupetaveyāḥ tadapratyayāṃ sarvasyāpra-
thanena jagadāndhyaprasangat. Ibid, i, 1, 1, p. 39.
88 Asmatpratyayāviṣayatvēpyaparoṣkatvā ekāntenāviṣayatvābhāvāt.
Nyāyaniṃnaya, i, 1, 1.
89 Yo'hamdhīgamyāḥ sa kartā sa eva jīvaḥ. Ratnaprabhā, ii, 3, 38.
90 Ahamsukhyādyānuḥbhavāt sukhādiviṣṭatarupeṇa karmavām, antah-
karṇaviṣṭatarupeṇa karttvām. Kalpataruśarimāla, i, 1, 1, p. 39.
consciousness. He says that the Ātman cannot be the knowing subject and the known object because they are of contradictory characters. The light of the sun is self-luminous; it illuminates all things, but is not illumined by any other thing. But its reflection in the mirror is illumined by the light of the sun. Likewise, the Ātman is the universal light of consciousness. It is self-luminous. It manifests all objects, but is not manifested by any other object. But its reflection in ahamkāra is manifested by the Ātman through the mental mode of self-consciousness. So the Ātman is not the object of self-consciousness. It is ahamkāra (egoism) or the antahkaranā superimposed on the Ātman that is the object of self-consciousness. According to Vidyāraṇya also, the Ātman cannot be apprehended by itself because it does not possess the dual character of subject and object. But ahamkāra is of a dual character; even as a piece of iron modified by contact with fire appears to have the dual character of iron and fire, so the antahkaraṇa being superimposed on the Ātman which is reflected in it in the form of ahamkāra appears to have the dual character of subject and object. It is of a composite character. It is, as it were, a mixture of self and not-self. It is the antahkaraṇa superimposed on the Ātman, or the Ātman as reflected in, and determined by, the antahkaraṇa. The Ātman which is the presupposition of all experience of objects is the conscious and non-objective element, and the antahkaraṇa which is superimposed on the self and is impregnated with the reflection of the self is the unconscious and objective element in ahamkāra. So ahamkāra is the object of self-consciousness.

<sup>103</sup> Anantakṛṣṇa Śāstri gives a similar account of the Śaṅkarite view of Ātma-pratyakṣa in his lucid and elaborate introduction to Vedāntaparibhāṣā. In the cognition 'I am conscious', 'I' does not stand for the Ātman but for egoism (ahamkāra) with which it is erroneously identified. In self-consciousness (ahampratyaya) the Ātman as reflected in egoism (ahamkāra) is manifested.<sup>104</sup> Rāmānuja objects that if the Ātman is not the ego (aham) or 'I', it cannot be the inner-

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<sup>101</sup> Asmatpratyayatvābhimato hāṁkāraḥ. Sa cedamanidarrtupavastugarbhar sa ṛṣvalokasākṣiṁ. Pañcapādikā, p. 17.

<sup>102</sup> Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa, p. 49.

<sup>103</sup> VPS., p. 53.

<sup>104</sup> Ahampratyaye hi ahamkārasaṁvalitam caityamavabhāṣate. Introduction, VP., (Calcutta University edition, 1930), p. 29.
self or the seer. The Śāṅkaraite urges that the object of self-consciousness is the Ātman as determined by egoism, and that the subject of self-consciousness is the universal consciousness as conditioned by egoism. Egoism enters as a constituent element into the object-self, but not into the subject-self, of which it is only a limiting adjunct. Universal consciousness is the ultimate reality. It is subject-object-less. It is beyond the distinction of subject and object. It has really neither subject (nirāśraya) nor object (nirvīśaya). The pure light of universal consciousness appears as the knowing subject owing to nescience when it is determined by egoism (ahamkāra). Ahamkāra is material; it can never be the knower, since it is unconscious. The jīva is the knower; and the jīva is the Ātman as conditioned by ahamkāra. Though ahamkāra is material and unconscious, it can be the knower when the Ātman is reflected in it owing to its proximity to the Ātman. The universal consciousness as reflected in ahamkāra is the jīva which is the knower and the doer. Neither ahamkāra in itself nor the Ātman in itself is the knower. But the Ātman as reflected in ahamkāra and conditioned by it is the knower. Owing to the reflection of the Ātman in ahamkāra there is an erroneous identification of it with ahamkāra. The Ātman which is above the distinction of ego and non-ego appears as the ego. In itself it is not the ego. In deep sleep the Ātman persists as the seer or witness, not as the knower because ahamkāra is resolved at that time.

The author of Pañcdāsaṭ holds that the Ātman is neither perceptible nor imperceptible. It is the subject (vīṣayin); so it can never be the object of perception (vīṣaya). But though it is not an object of sense-perception, it is apprehended by immediate intuition. Rāmakṛṣṇa holds that the Ātman is self-luminous without being an object of cognition like cognition, since it is realized by higher intuition. It cannot be subject and object at the same time. So it can never be an object (karma) of cognition. If it is argued that the Ātman, in its pure essence, is the subject (kṛtya), and as determined by a mental mode is the object (karma), it may as well be argued that a person in his

110 Pañcadasaṭ, panchakośavivekakaparakaṇanam, 27-8.  
111 Ātma svapakṣāṣa satvikārmaṇaṁ tattvantareṇaṇaparokṣaṇavat samvedanavat. Rāmakṛṣṇa's commentary on Pañcadasaṭ, iii, 28, p. 68 (Bombay, 1912).  
112
essential nature is the subject of going, and as determined by the act of going is the object of going, which is absurd. 109 So Rāmakṛṣṇa concludes that the Ātman can never be an object (karma) of cognition. 110 Citsukha also holds a similar view. The Ātman cannot be an object of cognition. If it were so, it would be subject and object of the same act of cognition, which is self-contradictory. It cannot be argued that the Ātman in itself is the subject and as determined by the mental modes of pleasure, pain, and the like is the object. In that case, the same person would be the subject as well as the object of going, which is absurd. 111 So Citsukha holds that the Ātman is self-luminous without being an object of cognition. 112

The Śaṅkarite position may be thus briefly summed up. The self cannot be an object of introspection (mānasapratyakṣa) or self-consciousness (aham-pratyaya), as Kumārila holds, for, in that case, it would become a not-self as unconscious as an external object; nor can it be perceived as the ego as opposed to the non-ego, or the subject of all knowledge of objects, as Prabhākara holds, because the ego is the phenomenal appearance of the self, being really a modification of the internal organ (antahkarana) which is an evolute of nescience. The self which is the one, undifferentiated, eternal light of consciousness, above the distinction of ego and non-ego—subject and object—can be known only by an immediate and intuitive consciousness. Though the knower (draṣṭṛ), the known (draśya), and knowledge or consciousness (draśi) are apprehended by all as undoubted, still the subject of consciousness or the knower (draṣṭṛ), and the object of consciousness or the known (draśya) depend upon consciousness (draśi) for their reality. Hence, consciousness alone has ultimate reality, and the knower and the known, the ego and the non-ego, have empirical reality only. 113 Consciousness, again, is of two kinds: unconditional (nirupādhika) and conditional (sopādhika). Unconditional consciousness is both subjectless (nirāśraya) and objectless (nirviṣaya): it is identical with Being (sonmātrarūpa): it does not depend upon anything else to realize its existence. It is called Brahman.

109 'To go' is a transitive verb in Sanskrit. The subject of going is an agent, and the object of going is the place to which he goes.
110 Ramakṛṣṇa's commentary on Pāṇcadasā, ch. iii, 28, p. 68.
111 Citsukhi, p. 25.
112 Akarmatvācātmanaḥ svaprakāśavatam. Ibid, p. 25.
113 R.B., i, 1, 1.
Conditional consciousness, on the other hand, has a subject (sāśraya) as well as an object (saviśaya), and depends on perception, inference, and the like. As it depends upon subject and object it has only an empirical reality. It is manifested by the antahkaraṇa (internal organ). It consists in the function (vrty) of the antahkaraṇa. Hence, subjecthood or egoity (jnātrtva) must belong to the antahkaraṇa, or the empirical self (jīva) which is conditioned by the antahkaraṇa. It cannot belong to the pure self (ātman), which is pure consciousness. It cannot be the knower, subject, or ego. Egoity belongs to ahamkāra, which is a modification of avidyā. Selfhood (ātmav) is falsely attributed to ahamkāra, which is entirely different from the self. So, unconditional consciousness, which is above the distinction of ego and non-ego, constitutes the essence of the self. It can be known only by an immediate intuition.

11. The Rāmānuja-Vedāntist

Rāmānuja holds with Śaṅkara that consciousness constitutes the essence of the self. But he differs from Śaṅkara in holding that the self is not mere consciousness but also the subject of consciousness: even as a lamp itself is of the nature of light, and still light is its property, so the self itself is of the nature of consciousness, and still consciousness is a property of the self. According to Rāmānuja, there can be no consciousness without a self, just as there can be no light without a lamp; just as the lamp is nothing but light, but still light is referred to the lamp, so the self is nothing but consciousness, but still consciousness is referred to the unity of the self.\textsuperscript{114} Thus, the self, according to Rāmānuja, is not mere consciousness, but the ego or subject of consciousness; the ego is not a phenomenal appearance of the self when it is determined by the limiting condition of ahamkāra (egoism), a modification of antahkaraṇa (internal organ) which is a particular form of nescience (avidyā); but it is identical with the self and constitutes its very essence.\textsuperscript{115}

Śaṅkara holds that just as the idea of silver is illusorily superimposed upon a nacre, so egoity is illusorily superimposed upon the self which is really beyond the distinction of ego and

\textsuperscript{114} R.B., i, 1, 1.
\textsuperscript{115} Tattvatraya, pp. 17-18.
non-ego. But if egoity were nothing but an illusory superimposition of nescience upon the self, then there would be a non-discrimination of the ego from pure consciousness or the self, and there would be such a consciousness as ‘I am consciousness’, and not as ‘I am conscious’. But, as a matter of fact, we always have such an experience as ‘I am conscious’; this undeniable fact of experience clearly shows that the self is the subject of consciousness. We cannot divide this single indivisible consciousness into two parts and hold that the element of ‘I’ is illusory and the element of consciousness is real—‘I’-ness or egoity is an illusory superimposition of nescience, and consciousness alone is a real ontological verity. Śaṅkara argues, that by the ego we mean the agent (kārtṛ) of cognition (jñāna), and that this agency of knowledge cannot be regarded as an attribute of the self which is changeless and eternal. Hence, egoity or the character of a knower which involves an action and consequently change, is not a property of the unchanging and eternal self, but of the unconscious antahkarana (internal organ) which is modified into egoism (ahamkāra). Rāmānuja contends that egoity or the character of a knower cannot be the property of an unconscious object, viz. the antahkarana (internal organ), but that it is the distinctive character of a conscious being, viz. the self. Moreover, the ego or knower does not involve any change; it is the subject of knowledge; a knower is not necessarily an active, energizing, and changing principle. According to Rāmānuja, the self is eternal, and the natural consciousness of the self is eternal; but though the consciousness of the self is eternal, it is subject to contraction and expansion, which are not natural properties of the self, but its mere accidents due to the karma of the person in the cycle of his mundane existence. The self, in its pure essence, is unchanging. But though changeless, it is a knower or ego. The agency of knowledge cannot belong to the unconscious organ of egoity (ahamkāra). How can the unconscious ahamkāra, which is a modification of the antahkarana, become a conscious knower? It may be argued that the unconscious organ of egoity (ahamkāra) may appear as a conscious knower (jñātṛ) because of the reflection of consciousness in it owing to its proximity to consciousness or the self. But this argument is quite unsound. What is the

\[116\] R.B., i, 1, 1.
\[117\] R.B., i, 1, 1.
\[118\] Cf. Sāṃkhya.
meaning of the 'reflection of consciousness'? Does it mean the reflection of ahaṁkāra on consciousness? Or, does it mean the reflection of consciousness on the unconscious ahaṁkāra? The first alternative is impossible, since Śaṅkara does not admit at all that consciousness in itself, or the self, is a knower. Nor can consciousness be reflected upon the unconscious ahaṁkāra, since that which is unconscious can never be a knower.

Śaṅkara holds that the self exists in deep sleep as the witness (Sākṣin) of the general non-particularized nescience (avidyā), when the organ of egoity (ahaṁkāra) is dissolved. But Rāmānuja asks: What is the meaning of a Sākṣin? By a Sākṣin we mean that which directly and immediately knows an object; and hence that which does not know an object cannot be called a Sākṣin; mere consciousness is never regarded as a Sākṣin; a Sākṣin is nothing but a knower or an ego. Egoity is not an adventitious property of the self, so that when this property is destroyed, the self may remain in its own essential condition as the pure light of consciousness which is above the distinction of ego and non-ego; but egoity constitutes the essence of the self; the ego is identical with the self and the self is identical with the ego. And this egoity of the self persists even in dreamless sleep, but there is no clear and distinct consciousness of the egoity at that time, since it is overpowered by tamas (ignorance), and there is no consciousness of external objects at that time. If it did not persist in deep sleep, we could never remember that we slept well or waking from sleep. And even when the self is released from the fetters of mundane existence, it does not realize itself as pure consciousness but as an ego. The self is always manifested as an ego, and never as mere consciousness above the distinction of ego and non-ego. Rāmānuja's conception of the self as an ego agrees, to a great extent, with Prabhākara's view of the self, the only difference being that according to the latter, consciousness does not constitute the essence of the self, as Rāmānuja holds with Śaṅkara, but it is a quality of the self which is its substrate. Veṅkaṭaṭātha holds that the self is an object of self-consciousness, but that the self, in its pure essence, is clearly apprehended by yogic intuition.

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119 R.B., i, 1, 1, and NSA., p. 59.
120 R.B., i, 1, 1.
121 NSA. pp. 60-1.
12. Comparison of the Different Views

The Cārvāka identifies the self either with the gross body, or with the sense-organs, or with the life-force, or with the mind (manas). His conception of the self is that of 'the material self' of James, since even mind is material, and thought is a function of matter. He cannot rise above 'the sensitive and appetitive self' of Ward. Sadānanda speaks of some Cārvāka philosophers who identify the self with the sons, i.e. near and dear ones. Their conception of the self is that of 'the social self' of James. The Buddhist idealist, like James, identifies the self with the stream of consciousness without any core of substantiability. He regards the self as a psychic continuum. He cannot rise above the psychological Me. His conception of the self is purely empirical. Like James, he does not recognize the transcendental or pure self. The Naiyāyika, however, recognizes the self as a permanent substance endowed with the qualities of cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and effort. Some older Naiyāyikas hold that the self is an object of inference. It is inferred from its qualities as their substratum. It cannot be perceived because it cannot be subject and object of the same act of knowledge. It cannot be the percipient and the perceived at the same time. The Naiyāyika rises above the psychological Me or the empirical self to the conception of the pure self or I. He conceives the pure self as the substratum of the empirical self or the stream of cognitions, affections, and conations. These psychoses are the qualities of the pure self, which inhere in it. They have no existence apart from it. There is an inseparable relation between the two. But they cannot be identified with each other. A substance cannot be identified with its qualities. "To identify I and Me," says Dr. Ward, "is logically impossible, for, ex vi terminorum, it is to identify subject and object."122 Again he says, "the I cannot be the Me nor the Me the I. At the same time the objective Me is impossible without the subjective I."122 Some earlier Naiyāyikas hold that the self cannot be perceived because the subject can never become the object. But this position is not satisfactory. We cannot be deprived all together of the perception of the self, which thinks, feels, and wills. Hence, the Vaiśeṣika holds that

129 Ibid., p. 379 n. (1920).
the self is not an object of ordinary perception, but it is an object of yogic perception or higher intuition. The Sāṁkhya also holds with some Naiyāyikas that the self is an object of inference. But, according to him, the self can be inferred from its reflection (pratibimba) in buddhi as its original (bimba). The Sāṁkhya dualism of Puruṣa and Prakṛti, Draśtr (the seer) and Drśya (seen), self and not-self makes the perception of the self impossible. The self is only the seer; it can never be seen; it can never turn back upon itself and perceive it. If it is ever perceived as the object, it will cease to be the subject. But the Pātañjala, like the Vaiśeṣika, holds that the self can be perceived by higher intuition (pratibha jñāna). But how can the same self be subject and object at the same time? The Pātañjala holds that the self in its essence, or the pure self, is the subject, and that the self as reflected in buddhi, or the empirical self, is the object. The pure self intuits itself through its reflection in buddhi, or the empirical self; it cannot make itself an object of direct intuition. Thus, the Pātañjala agrees with the Vaiśeṣika's view that the self can be perceived only by the yogis. But there is a difference between them. The Pātañjala holds that even in yogic intuition the pure self is the subject, while the empirical self, or the self as reflected in buddhi, is the object. The Vaiśeṣika, on the other hand, holds that the self in itself, or the pure self, apart from its cognitions, feelings, and conations, which constitute the empirical self, is the object of yogic intuition. For, unlike the Pātañjala, the Vaiśeṣika does not set up an antagonism between the pure self and the empirical self and consider the former as a conscious subject and the latter as an unconscious object. But if the self can be an object of yogic perception, why should it not be an object of ordinary perception? Can we not distinguish between the minimal perception of the self and the maximal perception of the self, and hold that we have the former in ordinary perception, and the latter in yogic perception? Can we not have even a glimpse of the self in ordinary perception? The Neo-Naiyāyika holds that the self is an object of ordinary perception. It is perceived only through the mind in relation to its qualities. The older Naiyāyika holds that the self is inferred from its qualities, while the Neo-Naiyāyika holds that the self is perceived together with its qualities. The Bhatta agrees with the Neo-Naiyāyika that the self is an object of introspection or internal perception (mānasapratyakṣa). He does not hold, with Prabhākara, that every act of cognition is
appropriated by the self and that all consciousness involves self-consciousness. There is a distinction between consciousness and self-consciousness. The Bhāṭṭa holds that only when an object is known and appropriated by the self, it is known as an object of internal perception or self-consciousness. Prabhākara, on the other hand, holds that every act of cognition apprehends itself, the cognizing subject and the cognized object. Self-consciousness is not a higher degree of consciousness. All consciousness is self-consciousness. Object-consciousness and self-consciousness always go together. There is no self-consciousness apart from object-consciousness. The self is always perceived as the subject of object-consciousness. Psychologically it is more reasonable to hold that the self is an object of self-consciousness than to hold that it is always the subject of object-consciousness. The Jaina agrees with Prabhākara in holding, that in every cognition of an object there is the cognition of the self, the object, and itself; that every cognition is appropriated by the self. But he differs from Prabhākara in holding that it is the self that perceives itself through itself together with the object and the cognition of the object, and also that the self is an object of internal perception such as 'I am happy', 'I am unhappy', etc. But how can the subject be perceived as an object? The Jaina replies that whatever is directly and immediately experienced is the object of perception. But still the difficulty remains. How can the subject become an object? How can the knower become the known? "The whole difficulty," says Kant, "lies in this, how a subject can internally intuit itself." Dr. Ward holds that the pure self is always immanent in experience in the sense that experience without an experient is unintelligible. But it is transcendent in the sense that it can never be a direct object of its own experience. So there is no difficulty in maintaining that the pure subject is immanent in experience and yet it is never a direct object of experience. In this sense, Prabhākara's view is right. Sāṅkara avoids all these difficulties by conceiving the self as pure consciousness above the distinction of subject and object. He puts pure consciousness above the distinction of subject and object, while the Buddhist idealist (Yogācāra) puts the distinction of subject and object within consciousness. Hence, both of them have not to face the difficulty how the subject can become an object. But

at least from the psychological point of view, this is cutting the Gordian knot. The pure self or Ātman of Śaṅkara is the Brahman or Absolute. The individual self (jīva) of Śaṅkara is the knower, the doer, and the enjoyer. Thus it is the subject from the individual point of view. The jīva is an object of self-consciousness (ahāṃpratyaya), but the Ātman is apprehended by immediate intuition. According to the Upaniṣads, the Ātman is beyond the grasp of the senses, the mind, and the intellect; it is known only by higher intuition (adhyātmayoga). According to Rāmānuja, the self is essentially an ego or subject; egoity is not an accidental quality of the self; it constitutes its very essence, and the self is always perceived as an ego or subject. It is an object of self-consciousness and is clearly apprehended by higher intuition.
BOOK VI

CHAPTER XIII

INDEFINITE PERCEPTIONS

1. Different Kinds of Indefinite Perceptions

We have dealt with the nature and conditions of various kinds of perception. But our treatment of Indian Psychology of Perception would be inadequate without reference to the analysis of the various kinds of erroneous perceptions. Praśastapāda divides knowledge into two kinds: (1) True knowledge (vidyā) and (2) erroneous knowledge (avidyā). He subdivides the former into four kinds: (1) Perception, (2) inference, (3) recollection, and (4) higher intuition of an ascetic. He subdivides the latter also into four kinds: (1) Doubt (samsāya), error (viparyaya), (3) indefinite and indeterminate perception due to lapse of memory (anadhyavasāya), and (4) dream (svapna).1 Śivāditya recognizes another kind of indefinite perception called Uha. In this chapter we shall discuss the nature of doubtful and indefinite perceptions. In subsequent chapters of this Book we shall deal with illusory perceptions, dreams, and abnormal perceptions. Three kinds of indefinite perceptions have been analysed in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika literature: (1) Samsāya or doubtful perception; (2) Uha or conjecture; and (3) Anadhyavasāya or indefinite and indeterminate perception due to lapse of memory. Let us consider the psychological nature of these indefinite perceptions apart from their epistemological value.

2. (a) Samsāya (Doubtful Perception)

We may have doubt with regard to perceptible objects or with regard to inferable objects. But here we are concerned only with doubtful perception. Bhāsarvajña defines doubt as uncertain knowledge (anavadhāraṇa-jñāna).2 But this definition is too wide. It includes two other kinds of indefinite perception, e.g. Uha and Anadhyavasāya. Praśastapāda defines doubt as uncertain knowledge

1 PBh., p. 172.
2 NSār., p. 1.
of the mind wavering between two alternatives, which arises from the perception of the common qualities of two objects, the peculiar qualities of which were perceived in the past, the recollection of the peculiar qualities of both the objects, and demerit (adharma). Sūraidhara explains it in the following manner. When we perceive a tall object from a distance but do not perceive the peculiar qualities of the object, we have a doubtful perception such as 'Is it a post or a man?' Here, we perceive the tallness of the object, which is common to a post and a man, but we do not perceive their distinctive features such as crookedness and cavities which are the peculiar characteristics of a post, and hands and feet which are the peculiar features of a man; but the perception of the common quality (e.g. tallness) simultaneously revives in memory the subconscious impressions of the peculiar characters of both the objects (e.g. a post and a man) left by previous perceptions; and our minds oscillate between these two objects revived in memory, and cannot come to a definite decision whether the object of perception is a post or man, because when we are inclined to think that the object is a post we are met by the opposite characters of a man revived in memory by the perception of the common quality; and thus our minds are drawn from the one to the other by conflicting trains of ideas, and consequently come to have a doubtful perception such as 'Is it a post or a man?' Thus, the perception of the common quality of two objects in the same substance is the cause of a doubtful perception. But how can it be so? Is it not destroyed when there is a reproduction of the peculiar qualities of the two objects? Sūraidhara contends, that the perception of the common quality simultaneously revives the subconscious impressions of the peculiar qualities of both objects with which it was associated in our past experience, but that it does not vanish after reinstating the ideas of the peculiar features of both objects; that it lingers in the mind, and together with the conflicting trains of ideas constitutes a complex psychosis called doubtful perception. Udayana points out that a doubtful perception arises from the perception of an object, endowed with the common qualities of two objects along with the non-perception of their peculiar qualities, which brings about the recollection of their peculiar qualities. Thus, a doubtful

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3 PBh., p. 174.  
4 NK., p. 175-6.  
5 Kir., p. 261.
perception is a complex presentative-representative process in which there is the perception of the common quality of two objects in the same substance together with two conflicting trains of ideas revived by the perceptions. But these conflicting trains of ideas are not integrated with the percept, but hover round it; sometimes the one train of ideas suggested by the percept gives rise to the apprehension of the one object, and sometimes the other train of ideas suggested by the percept gives rise to the apprehension of the other object. Thus, the mind oscillates between two alternatives in a doubtful perception. Udayana points out that the state of doubt has always an unpleasant feeling tone, and we always try to avoid it. Otherwise, it would never bring about the desire to know the object of doubtful cognition more definitely. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa says that a doubtful cognition arrests all activity for the time being.

Śaṅkara Miśra defines a doubtful cognition as the knowledge of many contrary qualities in one and the same object. Annam Bhaṭṭa also defines it in the same way. Thus doubt has three characteristics: (1) There must be knowledge of several qualities; (2) the qualities must be contrary to one another; and (3) they must be apprehended in one and the same object. The definition, however, is not quite satisfactory, since it is difficult to define what is meant by contrary (viruddha) qualities. "There is no certain test," says Mr. Athalye, "to determine what properties are contrary to one another and what not. Roughly we may say that those which are never observed together as existing in one object are irreconcilable." Laugāksi Bhāskara defines a doubtful cognition more precisely as knowledge consisting in an alternation between various contrary qualities with regard to one and the same object. Śrī Vādi Devasūri also defines it as uncertain knowledge consisting in an alternation between various extremes owing to the absence of proof or disproof. According to all these definitions, in the state of doubt the mind oscillates between more than two alternatives, while according to Praśastapāda, Śrīdhara, Udayana, and others, the mind oscillates between two alternatives only in the state of doubt. Viśvānātha distinguishes between definite knowledge and doubtful knowledge.

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4 Kir., p. 261.  
5 NM., p. 166.  
6 KR., p. 121; TS., p. 56.  
7 Ibid., p. 361.  
8 TK., p. 6.  
9 PNT., i, 11.
Definite knowledge (*niścaya*) consists in knowledge of the presence of an attribute in an object, which it possesses, and of the absence of an attribute in an object, which it does not possess. Doubtful knowledge (*saṁśaya*) consists in knowledge which has for its characteristic the presence or absence of contrary qualities in one and the same object. When we have a doubtful perception such as 'Is this a post or a man?' we have four alternatives (*kōti*): (1) 'This is a post'; (2) 'This is not a post'; (3) 'This is a man'; and (4) 'This is not a man'. Thus the doubtful perception has four alternatives.¹²

In the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika literature the various kinds of doubt and the various causes of doubt have been discussed elaborately. But these are not so much concerned with the psychological nature of doubtful perception. So we cannot consider them here.¹³

3. (b) Ŭha (Conjecture)

Generally in a doubtful perception (*saṁśaya*) we have a distinct consciousness of two alternatives reproduced in memory by the perception of the common quality of two objects. But sometimes one of these alternatives is suppressed and the other is manifest, and sometimes both the alternatives are indistinct and unmanifested. So we have two other kinds of indefinite perceptions: Ŭha and Anadhyavasāya. Ŭha or conjecture is an indefinite perception in which the mind does not oscillate between two equally distinct alternatives as in doubtful perception (*saṁśaya*) described above. In it the mind is conscious of one of the alternatives, the other being suppressed. Śivādirya defines Ŭha as a doubtful or indefinite perception in which only one of the suggested alternatives is manifest to consciousness (the other being suppressed).¹⁴ When we perceive a tall object from a distance, in a field of corn in which posts are not generally found, but only men, we have an indefinite perception such as 'That may be a tall man in the field'.¹⁵ Here, we perceive only the tallness of an object, but do not perceive its peculiar features; the perception of tallness which is common to a post and a man tends

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¹² SM., Ślokas 129-130, pp. 440-1.  
¹³ HIP., i, pp. 550-3.  
¹⁴ Utkataiikakotikah *saṁśaya* Ŭhā. SP., p. 69.  
¹⁵ MB., p. 25; NSār., p. 2; NTD., p. 65.
to reinstate in memory the two conflicting trains of ideas, e.g.
those of the peculiar qualities of a post and a man. But one of
these conflicting trains of ideas is suppressed by the other owing
to the greater strength of its associative connection. Generally
we do not find posts in fields of corn, but very often meet with
men working in fields. So when we perceive a tall object in a
field from a distance, though the perception of tallness tends to
revive the ideas of a post and a man both, it actually revives the
idea of a man owing to the greater strength of its associative con-
nection which suppresses the idea of a post suggested by the
perception of tallness. One alternative is suppressed by the
strength of the other. But though the idea of a post is suppressed
by the idea of a man, it tends to come to the margin of conscious-
ness, and colours the whole mental process and invests it with
indefiniteness. Herein lies the difference between conjecture (ūha)
and definite perception. Thus the suppressed alternative also has
a function in such an indefinite perception. Veṇkaṭaḥaṇātha gives
a similar account of Ūha. It is a kind of perception in which
only one alternative is distinctly present to consciousness owing
to repeated perception of this object in the past, the other being
suppressed. In it the mind does not oscillate between two alter-
natives because they are not equally distinct to consciousness.
Only one of them is manifest to consciousness and the other is
unmanifest so that the mind tentatively accepts the former alter-
native.16 Śrīnīvāsa urges that Ūha should not be regarded as
having only one alternative. It has two alternatives, one of which
comes up to the level of consciousness, and the other still remains
below the threshold of consciousness so that one is manifest and
the other is unmanifested.17 Ūha is not quite an indefinite cog-
nition. It is almost definite.18

Sāmśaya may be compared with Ūha. In Sāmśaya both the
alternatives suggested by the perception of their common quality
are manifest to consciousness; both of them are above the thresh-
hold of consciousness; but the mind oscillates between these two
alternatives, since it cannot perceive the peculiar qualities of the
object present to a sense-organ. But in Ūha only one alternative

16 NP., p. 68.
17 Utkāṭaḥaṇāthaḥ ārya eva na tvekākoṭiḥaḥ. Nyāyasāra on
NP., p. 68.
18 Adhyayasāyaṃmakā eva sa āhaḥ. Ibid., p. 68.
suggested by the perception of the common quality is manifest to consciousness, which is above the threshold of consciousness, being revived by the perception of the common quality owing to its stronger association with the object and suppressing the other alternative. This alternative was very often perceived together with the object in the past; so a strong bond of association has been established between their subconscious impressions; hence, this alternative is revived in memory, which suppresses the other alternative, because it was seldom perceived together with the object in the past. Thus, in Saṁsāya both the alternatives are manifest to consciousness, while in Uha only one alternative is manifest to consciousness, and the other is suppressed. This distinction is brought out by Veṅkaṭanātha. Thus, though Uha is an indefinite perception like Saṁsāya, it is more definite than the latter as here the mind tentatively accepts one alternative which is manifest to consciousness, the other being suppressed, while in Saṁsāya the mind wavers between two alternatives equally manifest to consciousness and cannot accept one and reject the other.

4. (c) Anadhyavasāya (Indefinite and Indeterminate Perception)

Sometimes an indefinite perception takes the form of Anadhyavasāya, which is defined by Śivāditya as an indefinite perception of an object in which both the alternatives are unmanifested to consciousness. It is an indefinite and indeterminate perception due to lapse of memory. For example, when we perceive a tree but do not remember its name, we have an indefinite perception of the tree in the form: 'What may be the name of the tree?' According to Śivāditya, in this perception also there are two conflicting trains of ideas suggested by the perception of a common quality, but these trains of ideas are not distinct and manifest to consciousness, as in the doubtful perception: 'Is it a post or a man?' but they are indistinct or unmanifested (anālingita, aspasta), occupying only the margin of consciousness, or the level of the subconscious; and when these marginal or subconscious ideas are 'brought back to the field of distinct consciousness by an effort of the mind afterwards, the mind oscillates between the

19 NP., p. 68.
20 Anālingitobhayakotyanavadhāraṇajñānamanadhyavasāyaḥ. SP., p. 69.
21 MB., p. 25; NTD., p. 66.
two distinct trains of ideas and comes to have a doubtful perception: 'Is it a mango-tree or a jack-fruit tree?' But when the conflicting trains of ideas suggested by the perception of a common quality occupy the margin of consciousness or the subconscious region, the mind is in an aching void, groping in the dark, as it were, for one of these marginal or subconscious ideas. This kind of indefinite perception is different from a doubtful perception in which both the alternatives are manifested to consciousness.

But Praśastapāda and his exponents, Śrīdhara and Udayana, give us a slightly different account of the nature of Anadhyavasāya. Praśastapāda defines Anadhyavasāya as an indefinite perception of an object, either familiar or unfamiliar, due to absent-mindedness or desire for further knowledge. For instance, when a well-known king has passed by a road, one who has not been able to observe him through inattention or absent-mindedness, has only an indefinite perception that 'somebody has passed by the road' without definitely recognizing the object of perception.

As regards unfamiliar objects an indefinite perception appears on account of ignorance. For instance, a Bāhīka, an inhabitant of the Dakṣa country, has an indefinite perception of a jack-fruit tree, which is unfamiliar to him. Śrīdhara explains it in the following manner. When a Bāhīka perceives a jack-fruit tree, he has many definite perceptions with regard to it, such as (1) 'this exists', (2) 'this is a substance', (3) 'this is a modification of earth', (4) 'this is a tree', (5) 'this has a colour', and (6) 'this has branches'. He has also an indistinct perception of the generic character of the jack-fruit tree, which is common to all jack-fruit trees, and which distinguishes these from other kinds of trees. What he does not know is the only fact that this tree bears the particular name, viz. 'jack-fruit tree', since he has not yet heard this name from any other person; but he has an idea that it must have a name. And such an indefinite perception devoid of the definite idea of the particular name is called Anadhyavasāya. Venkata-nātha's account of Anadhyavasāya is similar to those of Praśastapāda and Śrīdhara. He holds that it is the apprehension of an object, the name of which is forgotten. In it the mind has a definite perception of an object but has no definite recollection.

23 PBh., p. 182.
24 Ibid., pp. 182-3; E.T., p. 385.
25 NK., p. 182.
of its name, though it feels that it must have a name. After
definitely perceiving a tree, for instance, we are in doubt whether
its name is ‘mango-tree’, or ‘jack-fruit tree’, and want to know its
name definitely. So in Anadhyavasāya there is a doubt as to the
name of an object due to lapse of memory.26

Udayana differs from Praśastapāda and Śrīdhara in his con-
ception of Anadhyavasāya. According to him, Anadhyavasāya is
an indefinite perception due to the perception of a common quality
of two alternatives both of which are not distinctly apprehended.
There is a distinct apprehension of one alternative, but no
apprehension of the other. So Anadhyavasāya is different from
Saṁśaya. Saṁśaya or doubt arises from the perception of the
common quality of two alternatives, both of which are distinctly
apprehended. In it the mind oscillates between two alternatives,
both of which are distinctly present to consciousness. But in
Anadhyavasāya there is no oscillation of the mind, since the two
alternatives are not distinctly present to consciousness.27 Udayana’s
conception of Anadhyavasāya resembles Śivāditya’s conception of
Ūha.

Saṁkara Miśra defines anadhyavasāya as the apprehension of
an object as something.28 When a person who has never seen a
camel sees it suddenly for the first time he apprehends it as some-
thing. He perceives the distinctive qualities of the camel, e.g. a
long neck, wide lips, etc., and so distinguishes it from a horse or an
elephant. But he cannot refer it to the class of camels nor does
he know its name. So anadhyavasāya is different from saṁśaya.
In saṁśaya the mind wavers between two conflicting alternatives
such as ‘Is it a post or a man?’ But in anadhyavasāya the mind
does not waver between two alternatives, since they are not present
to consciousness. It does not arise from the perception of the
common quality of two objects, and the recollection of their distinc-
tive qualities. It apprehends the distinctive qualities of an object.
Saṁśaya and anadhyavasāya both are indefinite knowledge. They
give rise to a desire for further knowledge. In saṁśaya the alter-
natives are distinct, while in anadhyavasāya they are unmanifested.
Thus, anadhyavasāya differs from saṁśaya for three reasons. First,
they are different kinds of indefinite knowledge. Secondly, they

26 NP., pp. 67-8.
27 Anupalabdhāhasapakṣasāmparāsya dharmasya darśanāt višeṣata
upalabdhnupalabdhaṅkārṇī jñānamanadhyavasāyāh. Kār., p. 269.
28 Anadhyavasāyo’pi kim svid idamiti jñānam. KR., p. 121.
apprehend different objects. Thirdly, they are produced by different causes.\textsuperscript{29}

Vallabhācārya gives us a slightly different account of Anadhya-
vasāya. According to him, Anadhavasāya is the indefinite per-
ception of an object as something in a general way, the particular
features of which are not perceived. In it there is a bare apprehe-
nsion of an object as something, but no apprehension of its
distinctive character. Still there is a desire to know its nature.\textsuperscript{30}
Śrī Vādi Devasūri, a Jaina philosopher, gives us a similar account
of anadhavyasāya. He defines it as an indefinite perception of an
object in the form ‘What is it?’ He gives an example. When a
passer-by treads on grass with an inattentive mind he has an
indefinite perception of something in the form of anadhya-
vasāya.\textsuperscript{31} Ratnaprabhācārya further explains the nature of
anadhavyasāya as defined by Śrī Vādi Devasūri. He defines
anadhavyasāya as the bare apprehension of an object in the
form ‘What is it?’ In it the particular features of the object
are not distinctly presented to consciousness. For instance, when
a person with his mind engaged in some other thing treads on
grass he has an indefinite perception that he has touched some-
thing, but owing to inattention he cannot recognize what class it
belongs to and what its name is. Such a bare apprehension of
an object with no knowledge of its particular features is called
Anadhavyasāya.\textsuperscript{32} Thus, it is an indistinct impression in the field
of inattention surrounding the focal point of clear and distinct
consciousness.

Samśaya may be compared with Anadhavyasāya. Śrīdhara
points out that anadhavyasāya must not be identified with
samśaya, because it differs from the latter both in its origin and
nature. Firstly, samśaya arises from the recollection of the
peculiar features of two objects; while in anadhavyasāya there is
no such recollection of the peculiar features of two objects,
which often arises from mere absence of a distinct cognition of
peculiarities. Secondly, in samśaya the mind wavers between two
distinct alternatives, sometimes touching the one and sometimes
touching the other, while in anadhavyasāya the mind does
not oscillate between two alternatives.\textsuperscript{33} Udayana distinguishes

\textsuperscript{29} K.R., pp. 121-2.
\textsuperscript{30} P.N.T., i, 13-14.
\textsuperscript{31} Ratnākaravatārika (on above), i, 13-14.
\textsuperscript{32} N.K., p. 183; E.T., pp. 385-6.
\textsuperscript{33} Nyāyaśālāvatī (Bombay), p. 46.
samśaya from anadhyavasāya in the following manner: Samśaya arises from the perception of the common quality of two extremes which are revived in memory; in it the mind oscillates between two alternatives which are distinctly present to consciousness. Anadhyavasāya, on the other hand, arises from the perception of the common quality of two extremes both of which are not distinctly revived in memory; it is indefinite knowledge consisting in an alternation between two extremes one of which is distinctly present to consciousness, while the other is suppressed. Here, evidently, Udayana means by Anadhyavasāya what has already been explained as Čha.\footnote{Kir., p. 269.}
CHAPTER XIV

ILLUSIONS

1. Introduction

In this chapter we shall confine our attention to illusory perceptions. The treatment of Indian philosophers is more psychological than physiological. And their psychological analysis of illusory perception is closely allied with the determination of its epistemological value and ontological basis. Indian philosophers treat psychology always as the basis of epistemology and ontology; and their psychological analysis is sometimes coloured by their metaphysical presuppositions. They do not give an exhaustive classification of the different kinds of illusions with reference to all the sense-organs. But still they give a psychological classification of the principal types of illusions. Their enumeration of the different sources of illusions is almost complete. The different schools of Indian philosophers have tackled the problem of illusion in different ways. They give us slightly different accounts about its psychological nature. There is a hot controversy among them about its ontological basis. Different schools of Indian philosophers have advanced different theories of illusion, and their polemics against one another exhibit their wonderful power of psychological analysis and rare metaphysical acumen. Western psychologists are more concerned with the physiological conditions of illusions than with their psychological nature. Their treatment is more physiological than psychological, and their treatment of illusions from the epistemological and ontological points of view is extremely meagre in comparison with the Indian treatment.

2. Different kinds of Illusions

(i) Anubhūyamānāropa viparyaya and smaryamānāropa viparyaya.

Śaṅkara Miśra divides illusions into two kinds: (1) those which consist in false ascription of an actually perceived object to another object present to a sense-organ (anubhūyamānāropa); and
(2) those which consist in false ascription of an object revived in memory to another object present to a sense-organ (smarayamānārropa).¹ The illusory perceptions of bitter molasses and a yellow conch-shell are examples of the first kind. And the illusory perception of silver in a nacre is an example of the second kind. In the illusory perceptions of bitter molasses and a yellow conch-shell, bitterness of the bile in the gustatory organ and yellowness of the bile in the visual organ, which are actually perceived, are falsely ascribed to molasses and conch-shell respectively. These illusions are not due to subconscious impressions. In them both the object which is superimposed and the object on which the former is superimposed are actually perceived. The illusions of the second kind are produced by the sense-organs in co-operation with subconscious impressions, like recognition. They cannot be produced by the sense-organs alone; nor can they be produced by subconscious impressions alone; but they are produced by both taken together. For instance, the illusory perception of silver in a nacre is produced by the visual organ in contact with the nacre, in co-operation with the subconscious impression of silver revived by the perception of brightness of the nacre, which it has in common with silver.² Jayasimhasūri also divides illusions into the above two kinds.³ He illustrates the first kind of illusion by the illusory perception of the double moon. He explains it in the following manner. When we press the eye-ball with a finger, the moon appears to be double; but before the eye-ball was pressed the moon appeared to be single, and after the pressing has ceased the moon appears to be single. And sometimes the illusion of the double moon is due to the excess of darkness (timira) within the eye-ball, which bifurcates the ray of light issuing out of the eye-ball. In this illusion an object revived in memory is not falsely ascribed to an object present to a sense-organ. He illustrates the second kind of illusion by the illusory perception of elephants, etc., during sleep. In dreams the objects which were perceived in the past are revived in memory and appear to be actually perceived here and now. Thus centrally initiated illusions or hallucinations fall within the second category.⁴

¹ Kapādarahasya, pp. 119-120. ² NTD., p. 66. ³ Ibid., p. 120. ⁴ Ibid., pp. 66-7.
(ii) *Indriyāṇāhṛanti* (Illusion) and *Mānasi hṛanti* (Hallucination)

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa divides illusory perceptions into two kinds: (1) those which are produced by the peripheral organs (*indriyaja*), and (2) those which are produced by the central organ or mind (*mānasa*). The former are peripherally excited, while the latter are centrally excited. The former are produced by some defects in the external stimuli, or by some defects in the peripheral organs. The latter are produced by some defects in the central organ or mind. The former are never without objective substrates; they are always produced by external stimuli (*sālambana*). But the latter are always without objective substrates; they are never produced by external stimuli (*nirālambana*). The former are called illusions and the latter hallucinations in Western psychology. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa illustrates these different kinds of illusory perceptions. The illusory perceptions of silver in a nacre, and of a sheet of water in the rays of the sun reflected on sands in a desert are illusions due to defects in the external stimuli (*viṣaya-dōṣa*). The illusory perceptions of bitter sugar, double moon, and a mass of hair are illusions due to defects in the peripheral organs (*indriya-dōṣa*). All these are illusions. Hallucinations have no external stimuli, and are independent of the peripheral organ; they are solely of mental origin, and due to some defects in the mind (*manodōṣa, antahkaranadōṣa*). For example, when a lover is overpowered by stormy passion awakened by pangs of separation, he perceives the semblance of his beloved lady near him, though she is far away. Hallucinations are due to the recollection of objects distant in time and space owing to the revival of their subconscious impressions. Dreams also are hallucinations due to revival of subconscious impressions left by previous perceptions; they are excited by the mind overcome by drowsiness. Thus, in hallucinations the forms which appear in consciousness are mostly memory-images owing to the revival of their subconscious impressions. But what is the cause of the resuscitation of these subconscious impressions? Sometimes they are awakened by similar cognitions (*sādṛśa vijnāna*), sometimes by strong passions, e.g. lust, grief, etc. (*kāmasokādi*), sometimes by the habitual perception of these objects (*taddārśanābhyaśa*), sometimes by drowsiness (*nītrā*), sometimes by constant thinking (*cintā*), sometimes

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*NM., pp. 89, 185, and 545.
* Ibid, pp. 185 and 545.
by perversion of the bodily humours (dhātunām vikṛti), and sometimes by adṛṣṭa (i.e. merit or demerit) where there are no other causes.\(^7\)

Śrīdhara also divides illusory perceptions into peripherally excited illusions and centrally excited illusions or hallucinations. He divides the former again into indeterminate (nirvikalpaka) illusions and determinate (savikalpaka) illusions. Indeterminate illusions contain only presentative elements; they are due to pathological disorders of the peripheral organs alone. For example, when we perceive a white conch-shell as yellow, the illusion is purely presentative in character, and is produced by the visual organ perverted by preponderance of the bilious humour. Determinate illusions contain both presentative and representative elements; they are produced by the peripheral organs in cooperation with subconscious impressions. For example, when we mistake a nacre for a piece of silver, the illusion is produced by the perverted visual organ in contact with the nacre in co-operation with the subconscious impression of silver. Here, the illusory perception contains both presentative and representative elements; the presentative element (idam) is produced by the perverted visual organ, and the representative element (rahatām), by the subconscious impression. But the illusion is perceptual in character, though it contains presentative and representative elements; hence it is produced by the perverted visual organ in co-operation with the subconscious impression of silver. These illusions are produced by external stimuli which have certain features in common with those objects which are manifested in illusory perceptions; this similarity between the real objects or external stimuli (e.g. nacre) and the illusory objects (e.g. silver) appearing in consciousness is the cause of these illusions. But hallucinations are not peripherally excited; they arise solely from some derangement of the mind. Hallucinations never arise out of the perception of similarity which is not possible in these cases, since there are no external stimuli to excite them. For instance, when a man is infatuated with love for a woman, he perceives the semblance of his beloved, here, there, and everywhere, though there is no objective stimulus. Hallucinations are illusory perceptions because in them absent objects appear in consciousness as present.\(^8\)

\(^7\) *Ibid.*, p. 89.  
\(^8\) *NK.*, pp. 178 ff.
According to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa also, in the illusory perception of silver in a nacre we perceive only the common feature of the nacre (e.g. brightness); the perception of this similarity between the nacre and silver reminds us of the peculiar features of silver, and so we have an illusory perception of silver in a nacre.* But this is possible only in peripherally excited illusions. In centrally excited illusions or hallucinations there are no external stimuli; so they cannot be produced by the perception of the common features of two objects and the recollection of the peculiar features of one of them. In hallucinations there is no perception of external objects, but only a perception of those objects which are reproduced in memory and projected into the external world. Recollection alone is the cause of hallucinations, while perception and recollection both are the causes of those peripherally excited illusions which contain representative elements. Thus, both these kinds of illusions consist in false ascription of memory-images (smaryamāṇāropā). The former consist in the projection of memory-images into the external world, while the latter consist in the superimposition of memory-images on external objects actually perceived. Thus, the two divisions of illusions are not mutually exclusive. But they are based on two different principles.

3. Different Causes of Illusions

Illusory perceptions are due to some defects (doṣa) in the conditions of perception, or to wrong operation of the sense-organs with regard to their objects (asamprayoga), or to subconscious impressions (saṃskāra).

In the first place, illusory perceptions are produced by defects in any condition of perception. Ordinarily, sense-perception is produced by several conditions taken together. It requires an external object of perception and sometimes an external medium of perception, e.g. light in the case of visual perception. Then it requires an external sense-organ through which the object is perceived, and also the central organ or mind without the help of which the peripheral organs cannot operate on their objects. And in internal perception the mind alone is the channel of perception. Besides these, the self is involved in every act of perception; it is the self which perceives an object through the

* NM., p. 181.
senses. These are the conditions of sense-perception. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa holds that if any of these conditions is vitiated by defects it gives rise to illusory perceptions.¹⁰ (i) Some illusions are due to defects in the external stimuli or objects (viṣaya-ḍoṣa), e.g. similarity, movement, distance, etc. For instance, we perceive a nacre as a piece of silver, a rope as a snake, a cow as a horse, and clouds coloured by fading light as a town of ethereal beings owing to similarity between the two in each case. Again, the rapid movement of a fire-brand in a circle produces the illusion of a circle. But when it is moved slowly it cannot produce the illusion of a circle. Then, again, the moon appears to be small because it is at a great distance from us.¹¹ (ii) Some illusions are due to the movement of the conveyance (bāhyāśraya-ḍoṣa) in which we travel. For instance, when we sail in a boat, it moves and we also move along with it, but the trees and other objects around us appear to be moving. This illusion is known as "parallax" in Western psychology.¹² (iii) Some illusions are due to defects in the external medium of perception. For instance, when the light is dim or dirty, we sometimes mistake one object for another.¹³ (iv) Some illusions are due to pathological disorders of the peripheral organs (bāhyendriya-ḍoṣa). For instance, when the visual organ is affected by jaundice or preponderance of bile, we perceive a white conch-shell as yellow. When the gustatory organ is affected by provocation of bile, we taste molasses or sugar as bitter. When the rays of light issuing out of the visual organ are bifurcated by darkness (timira), we perceive the moon as double.¹⁴ Or, when the eye-ball is pressed with a finger, the moon appears to be double. The illusion of a mass of hair also is due to some defect in the visual organ. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa explains it in the following manner. There are particles of darkness within the cavities of the eye-ball here and there; the rays of light issuing out of the visual organ are intercepted by these particles of darkness so that they become thinly distributed; these thinly distributed fine rays of light issuing out of the eye-ball are obstructed by the rays of the sun and appear as a mass of hair. Before sunrise or after sunset we do not get this illusory perception.¹⁵ All these illusions are due to some defects in the peripheral

organs. Thus when they are overpowered by predominance of flatulent, bilious, and phlegmatic humours, we have illusory perceptions. (v) Some illusions are due to pathological disorders of the bodily humours (adhyātmagatadosa), e.g. the flatulent humour, the bilious humour, and the phlegmatic humour. For instance, pillars of fire are seen owing to provocation of the bodily humours. (vi) Some illusions are due to defects in the mind (antahkarana-dosā, mano-dosā). For instance, when it is overpowered by the predominance ofrajasa or tamas, we have illusory perceptions. When it is overpowered by strong emotions or passions we have illusory perceptions. A man infatuated with love for a woman, sees the semblance of his beloved here, there, and everywhere. When the mind is overpowered by drowsiness, we have illusory perceptions in the form of dreams. All these illusions which are due to some disorder of the mind only are called hallucinations.16 (vii) Some illusions are due to defects in the self (pramātrodosā). For instance, when the self is affected by strong desire, aversion, hunger, rage etc., it has illusory perceptions.17 Dharmottara describes four sources of illusions, e.g. disorders of the peripheral organs, disturbances in the external stimuli, movement of the conveyance in which we travel, and disorders of the bodily humours. According to him, all these different causes of illusions must involve a derangement of the sense-organs. There can be no ‘sense-illusions’ unless there are ‘sense-disorders’.18 Thus, some illusions are due to defects in the various conditions of perception. This condition of illusions is emphasized by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

In the second place, illusory perceptions are produced by a wrong function of the sense-organs with regard to their objects (asamprayoga). This condition of illusions is mentioned by the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas. Right perception depends upon the right intercourse between the sense-organs and their objects (satsamprayoga). It requires a real object (sat), and the right intercourse between the object and the proper sense-organ (samprayoga). If there is no real object and still we have perceptual experience, the perception is illusory. In dreams there are no real objects or external stimuli, but still we have illusory perceptions of various objects. So dreams should be regarded as hallucinations. If, in

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16 NM., p. 545.
17 Ibid., p. 173.
spite of the presence of a real object, there is a wrong intercourse between it and the proper sense-organ, we have illusory perception. For instance, when we mistake a nacre for a piece of silver, there is a wrong intercourse between the visual organ and the nacre. Right perception depends upon the intercourse of that object with the proper sense-organ, which is manifested in consciousness. When one object is in contact with a sense-organ, but another object appears in consciousness, the perception is illusory. For instance, when a nacre is in contact with a visual organ, but a piece of silver appears in consciousness, the perception is illusory. Thus, right perception depends upon the right operation of the sense-organs with regard to their objects, and illusory perception depends upon a wrong operation of the sense-organs with regard to their objects. This condition of illusions, viz. asamprayoga, emphasized by the Mīmāṁsakas, is included in viṣaya-dosā and indriya-dosā mentioned by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.¹⁹

In the third place, illusory perceptions are produced by subconscious impressions (sanskāra). We have already found that subconscious impressions are the causes of those peripherally excited illusions which contain representative elements. For example, when a nacre is in contact with the visual organ, we sometimes perceive only its brightness which is common to both nacre and silver, and the perception of this brightness revives the subconscious impression of silver, and the visual organ in cooperation with this subconscious impression produces the illusory perception of silver. Thus, subconscious impressions in cooperation with the peripheral organs produce those peripherally excited illusions which contain representative elements.²⁰ We have also found that centrally excited illusions or hallucinations are due to subconscious impressions alone. For example, a lover infatuated with love for a woman sees his beloved near him, though she is far away. Here, the subconscious impression of the woman is revived by the strong passion of love and invades the field of consciousness; the memory-image of the woman distant in time and space appears like a woman actually perceived here and now. Thus subconscious impressions alone are the causes of hallucinations.²¹

¹⁹ ŚV. and Nyāyaratnākāra, Sūtra 4, 15 ff.
²⁰ KR., p. 120.
²¹ NK., p. 179; NM., p. 545.
Praśastapāda asserts, that an illusory perception consists in the misapprehension of one object as another, both of which were perceived in the past with their peculiar characters, and that it is due to three causes: (1) wrong apprehension by a peripheral organ perverted by provocation of the bilious, phlegmatic, and flatulent humours; (2) the mind-soul-contact depending upon the subconscious impression left by the previous cognition of an absent object; and (3) demerit (adharma); e.g. the illusory perception of a horse in a cow. Here Praśastapāda refers to peripherally excited illusions which contain representative elements. Srīdhara explains the functions of the peripheral organs and subconscious impressions in producing these kinds of illusions. When we mistake a cow for a horse, what is the cause of the non-apprehension of the distinctive character of a cow; and what is the cause of the apprehension of the distinctive character of a horse which is not present to the visual organ? The visual organ, he argues, cannot apprehend the distinctive character of a cow, though it is in contact with a cow, because it is perverted by the disorders of the bilious, phlegmatic, and flatulent humours. But how can the perverted sense-organ produce the apprehension of the distinctive character of a horse which is not present to the visual organ? Can it produce the apprehension of absent objects? If so, then it can produce the apprehension of any absent object whatsoever at any time, and thus there will be nothing to determine the appearance of particular objects in consciousness in illusory perceptions. Srīdhara points out that the perverted sense-organ brings about the apprehension of an absent object only in cooperation with the mind-soul-contact, which depends upon the subconscious impression of an absent object. Though the visual organ is in contact with a cow, it cannot apprehend the object as a cow because it is perverted by disorders of the bodily humours. But still it apprehends the individual as endowed with those features which are common to cows and horses. The perception of similarity revives the subconscious impression of a horse; and this subconscious impression being revived brings about the recollection of a horse; and this recollection of a horse, owing to some perversion of the mind, produces the perceptual experience of a horse, in contact with the visual organ because of the similarity between a cow and a horse. Thus, any absent object

**FBh., p. 177.**
cannot appear in consciousness or appear in the presence of any object in contact with a perverted sense-organ. Similarity between a present object and an absent object, and the subconscious impression of the latter revived by the perception of similarity determine the appearance of a particular absent object in an illusory perception. Hence, the perverted sense-organs in co-operation with subconscious impressions produce certain illusory perceptions.\(^{28}\)

4. Psychological Analysis of an Illusion

A centrally excited illusion or hallucination is solely due to revival of subconscious impressions. A peripherally excited illusion which contains only presentative elements is due to pathological disorders of the peripheral organs. So these two kinds of illusions are simple psychoses. But a peripherally excited illusion which contains both presentative and representative elements is complex in character. It is due to the peripheral organs and subconscious impressions. This kind of illusion has been analysed by different schools of Indian thinkers in slightly different ways. Let us consider the illusory perception of silver in a nacre. Is it a single psychosis? Or, is it a combination of two psychoses? If it is a single psychosis, what is its nature? Prabhākara holds that an illusion is a complex psychosis, made up of a presentative element or perception (anubhava) and a representative element or recollection (smarana), and as long as the illusion lasts we do not discriminate these two factors from each other. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Vedāntist hold that an illusion is a single psychosis of a presentative or perceptual character.

According to Prabhākara, in an illusion there are two elements, an element of perception or presentation and an element of recollection or representation. When we perceive a nacre as silver, we perceive only the common qualities of nacre and silver, viz. brightness and the like, which revive the idea of silver in memory by association. Thus, in the illusion of silver in a nacre there are the perception of brightness and the like, and the recollection of silver. But so long as the illusion lasts we do not distinguish the presentative element from the representative element. Thus, an illusion is made up of a presentative element and a representative

\(^{28}\) NK., pp. 178-9.
element, in which there is no discrimination of the two factors from each other. This non-discrimination (vivekākhyāti) of the presentative element from the representative element is the cause of exertion for the appropriation or avoidance of the object of illusion. A sublating cognition (bādhaka-jñāna) does not contradict an illusion, but simply recognizes the distinction between the presentative element and the representative element. But why are not the two elements discriminated from each other before the so-called sublative cognition? Prabhākara holds that we cannot discriminate the representative element from the presentative element, because the former does not appear in consciousness as representation or memory owing to obscuration of memory (smṛtipramoṣa).24

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, an illusion is a single psychosis of a presentative or perceptual character. In the illusion of silver in a nacre at first we perceive those qualities of the nacre which are common to both silver and nacre, e.g. brightness, etc., but we do not perceive the peculiar qualities of the nacre owing to the perversion of the visual organ; then the perception of these common qualities reminds us of the peculiar qualities of silver by association. So far the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika agrees with Prabhākara. But according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the recollection of silver, owing to some perversion of the mind, produces the perception of silver, in contact with the visual organ; the illusion of silver is perceptual in character; it is experienced as a direct perception, and not as a recollection. If we regard an illusion as a mere reproduction of past experience, then we miss its distinctive psychological character.25

According to the Neo-Naiyāyika, the visual perception of silver in a nacre depends upon the extraordinary intercourse through the idea of silver revived in memory by association as we have already seen.26 Here there is no contact of the visual organ with actual silver; there is no ordinary intercourse (laukika sannikarṣa) between the sense-organ and its object. But there is an extraordinary intercourse (alaukika sannikarṣa), by means of which the idea of silver reproduced in memory by association produces the visual perception of silver. This is called the

1 PP., p. 43; also NM., pp. 179-180.
26 NM., pp. 180-1, and NK., p. 178.
28 Chapter IV.
extraordinary intercorse whose character is knowledge (jñāna-lakṣaṇa-sannikāraṣa).

According to the Advaitā Vedānti, an illusion is a presentative process. He explains the illusion of silver in a nacre in the following manner. At first, the visual organ perverted by certain pathological disorders comes into contact with the nacre which is present to the sense-organ, and brings about a mental mode in the form of 'this' or 'brightness'. Then the object-consciousness determined by 'this' is reflected in the mental mode, so that the mental mode streaming out of the sense-orifice, the object-consciousness (viṣaya-caitanya) determined by 'this' the mental consciousness or consciousness determined by the mental mode in the form of 'this' (vṛtti-caitanya), and the logical subject-consciousness (pramāṇa-caitanya) are identified with one another. Then nescience (avidya) in the form of nacre is produced, this avidyā exists in the object-consciousness which has been identified with the subject-consciousness. In co-operation with the subconscious impression of silver revived by the perception of the common features, (e.g. brightness) and the peripheral disorders, it is transformed into illusory silver (pratibhāsika rajata), on the one hand, and the illusory perception of silver (rajata-jñānābhāsa), on the other.27 Stripped of all epistemological and metaphysical implications, the Sāṁkarite's analysis of an illusion is exactly the same as that of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika from the psychological point of view. According to both, an illusion is a simple psychosis of a presentative character; it is produced by a sense-organ vitiated by a certain derangement in co-operation with a subconscious impression revived by the perception of similarity. They do not differ in their psychological analysis of an illusion, though they differ in their epistemological and metaphysical doctrines of illusion, which we shall consider later on.

An illusion may be compared with a doubtful perception. According to Udayana, both an illusion (viparyaya) and a doubtful perception (sahāsaya) are not produced by the corresponding objects (anarthaja); but the former is definite (niṣcayātmaka), while the latter is indefinite (aniscayātmaka). An illusion is a false perception of a definite character in the waking condition.28 According to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, an illusion differs from a doubtful perception both

27 VP., pp. 136-7.
28 Kir., p. 263.
in its nature and in its origin. First, in an illusion one object is
definitely perceived as another, e.g. a post as a man, or a man as a
post; while in a doubtful perception the mind wavers between two
alternatives, sometimes touching the one, and sometimes touching
the other. Thus, an illusion is a definite, false perception, while
a doubtful perception is an indefinite or uncertain false perception.
Secondly, an illusion springs from the recollection of the peculiar
qualities of one object (e.g. silver, or water) which is suggested by
the perception of the common quality in another object (e.g. nacre,
or the rays of the sun); while a doubtful perception springs from
the recollection of the peculiar qualities of two objects (e.g. a post
and a man) which are suggested by the perception of their common
quality (e.g. tallness).**

5. Different Theories of Illusions

Different schools of Indian philosophers have advanced different
theories of illusions. These theories are not only based on the
purely psychological analysis of illusions, but also on their episte-
mological significance and ontological basis. Prabhācandra refers
to seven different theories of illusions viz. Akhyāti (non-apprehen-
sion), Asākhyāti (apprehension of a non-existent object), Prasid-
dhārthakhyāti (apprehension of a real object established by knowl-
dge), Ātmakhyāti (apprehension of a subjective cognition pro-
jected into the external world), Anirvacaniyārthakhyāti (apprehen-
sion of an undefinable object), Anyathākhyāti (apprehension of an
object as otherwise, i.e. as a different object), and Smṛtipramoṣa
(oblusion of memory) or Vivekākhyāti (non-apprehension of
discrimination or non-discrimination). It is not known who is the
advocate of the first doctrine. The second doctrine is held by the
Mādhyamika. It is not known who is the advocate of the third
document. The fourth doctrine is held by the Yogācāra; the fifth, by
the Advaita Vedāntists; the sixth, by the Naiyāyika, the Vaiśeṣika,
the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakā, Patañjali, and the Jaina; and the
seventh, by the Prabhākara Mīmāṃsaka. Jayasimhasūri mentions
eight different theories of illusions, adding to the above list Alauki-
kakhyāti (apprehension of an extraordinary object, different from
the ordinary objects of experience). Jayanta Bhaṭṭa also discusses
the theory of Alaukikakhyāti and attributes it to a certain

** NM., p. 181.
Mīmāṁsāka. The Sāṁkhya advocates the doctrine of Sadasat-khyāti. Rāmānuja advocates the doctrine of Satkhyāti (apprehension of a real object).

(i) The Doctrine of Akhyāti.—According to this doctrine, an illusion has no objective substratum; it is objectless (nirālambana); it does not apprehend any object at all; it is a pure hallucination. Let us consider the illusion of a mirage, or the illusory perception of water in the rays of the sun. What is the object of this illusion? Is it water, absence of water, or the rays of the sun, or something else? Water cannot be the object of the illusory cognition, for, in that case, the cognition would be valid and not illusory. The absence of water cannot be the object of the illusion, because it is the cognition of water that induces the person under illusion to exert himself to get water. The rays of the sun, too, cannot be the object of the illusion, for, in that case, the cognition would not be illusory but valid, representing the real nature of the external stimulus. It cannot be argued that the rays of the sun are perceived as water, inasmuch as one thing (e.g., a cloth) cannot be perceived as something different (e.g. a jar). Hence, an illusion is objectless or without any objective substratum. Prabhācandra, a Jaina philosopher, gives this account of the doctrine of Akhyāti.

Prabhācandra criticizes the doctrine of Akhyāti. If illusions have no objective substrates (ālambana), and are not excited by external stimuli, we cannot distinguish one illusion from another. For instance, we cannot distinguish the illusory cognition of water (in the rays of the sun) from the illusory cognition of silver (in a nacre). If, again, illusions are not produced by external objects, there can be no difference between an illusion and dreamless sleep. It may be urged, there is no difference between the two, except that in an illusion there is consciousness, while in dreamless sleep there is no consciousness at all; they agree in having no external stimulus. But Prabhācandra contends that at least the object that appears in consciousness in an illusion must be regarded as the object of that illusion. Thus, an illusion can never be held to be a non-apprehension of an object.

(ii) The Doctrine of Asatkhyāti.—The Mādhyamika holds that in the illusory cognition of silver, there is a cognition of

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80 Nirālambanaṁ viprayaya-jñānam, PKM., p. 13.
81 PKM., p. 13.
silver as real, though really there is no silver at all. Hence, he concludes that in an illusion something non-existent is cognized as existent. This is the doctrine of Asatkhyāti.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa criticizes Asatkhyāti on behalf of Prabhākara. What is the meaning of Asatkhyāti or apprehension of a non-existent object? What is the object of an illusion according to this doctrine? Is it an absolutely non-existent object like a sky-flower? Or, is it an object existing in some other time and place? If it is the latter, then Asatkhyāti is nothing but Viparītakhyāti, according to which, silver existing in some other time and place appears in the illusory cognition of silver, but not existing in that time and place. If it is the former, then there will be a cognition of a sky-flower also; but because such an absolutely non-existent object never appears in consciousness, it cannot be the object of an illusion. It may be argued that a non-existent thing appears in consciousness through the intensity of a subconscious impression. But it is not possible without a real object; it is nothing but a vestige left by the previous perception of an object. Why should such a residuum be the cause of the cognition of an absolutely non-existent object? If we admit that some other kind of impression (vāsanā) produces the cognition of a non-existent object, why should it produce the cognition of silver and not that of a sky-flower? What regulates the operation of such an impression? An absolutely non-existent object can never appear in consciousness, nor can it induce a person to exert himself to get hold of it.\textsuperscript{22} So the doctrine of Asatkhyāti is untenable.

Prabhācandra criticizes it thus: According to the Mādhya- mika, there is neither an external reality, nor a subjective cognition; so there is neither any variety in external objects nor any variety in cognitions. Hence, there cannot be a variety of illusions.\textsuperscript{23} Thus the doctrine of Asatkhyāti cannot be maintained.

(iii) The Doctrine of Ātmakhyāti.—Vidyārāṇya Muni, a Saṁkarite, gives the following exposition of the doctrine of Ātmakhyāti held by the Yogācāra. According to the Buddhists, mind (citta) and mental states (caitā) are produced by four different causes: (1) co-operating cause (sahākāri-pratyaya), (2) dominant cause (adhipati-pratyaya), (3) immediate cause (sama- nantara-pratyaya), and (4) objective datum or external cause

\textsuperscript{22} NM., pp. 177-8.
\textsuperscript{23} PKM., p. 13.
(ālambana-pratyaya). Now, in the first place, the illusion of silver cannot be produced by the co-operating cause which, in the present case, is light; for light is the cause of the distinctness of the perception. In the second place, it cannot be produced by the dominant cause which, in the present case, is the visual organ, for it is the cause only of the visual character of the perception, but it cannot account for the particular nature of the visual perception, viz. that of silver. In the third place, it cannot be produced by the immediate cause which is the immediately preceding cognition; for the illusory cognition of silver may arise immediately after a cognition of an entirely different kind, e.g. that of a jar. In the fourth place, it cannot be produced by an external cause, for according to the Buddhist idealist there is no external reality at all. How, then, can he account for the illusory cognition of silver? The Yogācāra holds that it is produced by a subconscious impression (vāsanā) of silver which, at some time or other, arose in the beginningless series of nescience (avidyā), which, again, had been produced by a yet earlier idea of silver, and so on. Thus the idea of silver is the result of a beginningless series of subconscious impressions, and owing to error this subjective idea appears to consciousness as something external. An illusion, therefore, is not produced by an external object in contact with a sense-organ; but it is simply an eccentric projection of a subjective idea into the external world; it is a purely subjective hallucination.\(^4\)

Prabhācandra gives the following gist of the doctrine of Ātmakhyāti. In the illusory perception of silver, the object of consciousness (e.g. silver) is a subjective form of consciousness itself; it appears as an extra-mental object owing to the potency of erroneous cognitions arising out of beginningless nescience. The beginningless series of various subconscious impressions are gradually awakened in persons; on account of this, various cognitions (e.g. pots, cloths, etc.) arise, which cognize their own forms. There are no external objects corresponding to these cognitions. This is the doctrine of Ātmakhyāti.\(^5\)

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa criticizes Ātmakhyāti, on behalf of Prabhākara. According to this doctrine, a mere idea appears as the cognizer, the cognized object, and the cognition; there is neither a subject

\(^{44}\text{VPS.}, \text{p. 34.}\)
\(^{55}\text{PKM.}, \text{p. 13.}\)
nor an object apart from ideas; there is simply a series of ideas. Thus, if in an illusion a mere idea were manifested in consciousness, and not an external object, then we should have such a cognition as 'I am silver', and not as 'this is silver'. Moreover, this doctrine implies Vipařītakhyāti, inasmuch as, according to this view, a subjective idea is cognized as something different, viz. an objective reality. And this doctrine implies Āsatkhīyāti too, since the cognition of externality has no real objective basis, there being no extra-mental reality according to the Yogācāra.  

Prabhācandra criticizes the doctrine of Ātmakhyāti. If all cognitions apprehended only their own forms, and not those of external objects, as the Yogācāra holds, there would be no distinction between an illusory cognition and a valid cognition, and consequently, there would be neither any sublating cognition nor any sublated cognition. If, again, the forms of illusory cognitions such as silver and the like were not those of external objects, but mere forms of consciousness, then they would be apprehended as such, like the forms of pleasure and pain, and not as something external; and, also, a person under illusion would exert himself to get the object of illusion, as if it were a subjective momentary cognition, and not an extra-mental reality. If it be urged that an internal momentary cognition is mistaken for an external permanent object owing to the potency of nescience (avidyā), then the doctrine of Ātmakhyāti leads to Vipařītakhyāti, since the internal form of a momentary cognition appears as an external permanent object. Thus the doctrine of Ātmakhyāti is untenable.  

Vidyārānya, a Śāṅkara-Vedāntist, criticizes the doctrine of Ātmakhyāti. In the illusion of silver, the illusory silver is either devoid of origination, on account of its extraordinary nature; or it originates like an ordinary silver. On the first alternative, it will not be of the nature of an emergent cognition as it really is; it comes into being, and so it cannot be without an origin. On the second alternative, it must be produced either by a cognition or by an object. It cannot be produced by an object, as the Yogācāra does not admit the existence of an extra-mental object. If it is produced by a cognition, it is produced by a pure cognition or a cognition which is due to a vitiated cause. It cannot be produced by a pure (visuddha) cognition, as a pure cognition

**NM., p. 178.**

**PKM., p. 13.**
constitutes liberation. If it is produced by a cognition which is due to a vitiated cause, it is the same originating cognition which apprehends the silver, or it is some other cognition. The first alternative is not possible, because the originating cognition and the originated cognition both being momentary, and hence occupying different points of time, there will be no presentation of silver at all. The second alternative also is impossible. If it is another cognition that apprehends the silver, it cannot be a cognition produced by a non-vitiating cause, for in that case there will be no reason why such a cognition should specially apprehend silver. If, on the other hand, the cognition apprehending the illusory silver is produced by a vitiated cause, then that cause is either silver or it is not silver. It cannot be silver, for, in that case, silver will have causal efficiency, and, consequently, a real existence, which is not admitted by the Yogācāra. If silver is not the cause, then it cannot be manifested in the illusory cognition. Thus, on the doctrine of Ātmakhyāti, the illusory cognition of silver will never come into being.38

(iv) The Doctrine of Alaukikakhyāti.—Jayanta Bhaṭṭa gives the following exposition of the doctrine of Alaukikakhyāti and ascribes it to a certain Mīmāṃśaka. According to this doctrine, in the illusory cognition of silver it is not a nacre that is the object of the illusion, but it is silver; but this silver is different from ordinary (laukika) silver; it is extraordinary (alaukika) silver. Just as the valid cognition of silver has for its object ordinary (laukika) silver, so the illusory cognition of silver has for its object extraordinary (alaukika) silver. What is the difference between laukika silver and alaukika silver? Whatever is manifested to consciousness as silver must be regarded as silver; but some silver known as an object of consciousness serves our practical purposes (vyavahāra-pravartaka), while some other silver does not; the former is called ordinary (laukika) silver, while the latter is called extraordinary (alaukika) silver. In the illusory cognition of silver it is an extraordinary (alaukika) silver that is the object of the illusion; it is silver because there is a cognition of silver; and it is extraordinary (alaukika) silver because it does not serve any practical purpose.39

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa criticizes the doctrine of Alaukikakhyāti. We

39 NM., p. 187.
cannot know that there is extraordinary \textit{(alaukika)} silver corresponding to the illusory cognition of silver. It is an absolutely new and unperceived object. The contradicting perception ‘this is not silver’ clearly establishes the extraordinariness \textit{(alaukikatva)} of the silver which existed at the time of the illusory cognition. Hence there is neither silver corresponding to the illusion of silver, nor is it extraordinary \textit{(alaukika)}. So it is not right to hold that whatever is manifested to consciousness as silver must be silver; silver is manifested to consciousness in the illusory cognition of silver, though really there is no silver at all at that time and place. Real silver can be known only through the cognition of silver which is not contradicted by any other cognition. Moreover, what differentiates an ordinary \textit{(laukika)} object from an extraordinary \textit{(alaukika)} object? On what does the distinction depend? Does it depend upon the distinction of our cognitions \textit{(pratibhāsa-nibandhana)}. Or, does it depend upon the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of our practical purposes \textit{(vyavahāra-sadasadbhāva-nibandhana)}? The first alternative is not tenable; for sometimes we are conscious of the existence of silver, and sometimes of the non-existence of silver; but we are never conscious of the ordinari-ness \textit{(laukikatva)} and extraordinariness \textit{(alaukikatva)} of silver. The second alternative also cannot be maintained, for what is the meaning of practical use \textit{(vyavahāra)}? Does it mean the capacity of being an object of thought and speech \textit{(jñānabhidhāna-svabhāva)}? Or, does it mean the capacity of producing an effect or action \textit{(arthakriyā-nirvartana)}? The first view is untenable, because there is no consciousness of ordinari-ness \textit{(laukikatva)} or extraordinariness \textit{(alaukikatva)} of an object. The second view also is not tenable, for, in that case, a woman embraced in a dream will be ordinary, and a jar which is destroyed as soon as it pro-duced, and as such cannot serve any practical purpose, will be extraordinary. Further, he who does not make an effort to pick up silver at the sight of a nacre does so, not because he recognizes the extraordinariness of the existing silver, but because he under-stands that there is no silver in reality. If there is \textit{alaukika} silver as the object of the illusion of silver, why should a person under illusion make an effort to pick it up? If it is urged that he perceived the \textit{alaukika} silver as \textit{laukika}, then at last the advocate of the doctrine of Alaukikakhyāti comes to adopt the view of
Anyathākhyāti, according to which, one object appears as a
different one in an illusion.\textsuperscript{40}

(v) The Doctrine of Anirvacanīyakhyāti.—The Advaita Vedāntist holds that the object of an illusion is neither real, nor unreal, nor both, but undefinable (anirvacaniya). This is called
the doctrine of Anirvacanīyakhyāti. According to this doctrine, whatever is manifested in a cognition is the object of that cognition. In the illusory perception of silver, it is silver that appears in consciousness; so silver must be the object of this illusion. If something else is regarded as the object of this illusion, as the doctrine of Anyathākhyāti holds, then we cannot call this illusion an illusion of silver, but of something else. So it is silver that is the object of the illusion of silver. But this silver is neither real (sat), nor unreal (asat), nor both real and unreal (sadasat), but is undefinable (anirvacaniya). It cannot be real, for, then, the cognition of silver will be valid, and not illusory, and as such will not be contradicted by any sublating cognition. Nor can it be unreal, for then, it will not produce the cognition of silver, and, consequently, it will not lead the person under illusion to exert himself to get hold of silver. Nor can it be both real and unreal, as this supposition will involve both the above difficulties, and further, two contradictory qualities like reality and unreality cannot inhere in one and the same object. Hence, the silver which is the object of the illusory cognition of silver must be regarded as undefinable (anirvacaniya).\textsuperscript{41} The Śaṅkarite, therefore, holds that undefinable silver is produced at that time and place and continues as long as the illusion of silver persists. This kind of existence is called by him apparent existence (prātibhāsika-sattā), which is different from empirical existence (vyāvahārika-sattā).

But what is the use of admitting an undefinable reality to account for an illusion? An illusory cognition may very well be explained by the doctrine of Anyathākhyāti, according to which, an illusion is the misapprehension of one thing as a different thing; for example, the illusion of silver is the misapprehension of a nacre as silver which exists in some other time and place. The Śaṅkarite urges that silver existing in some other time and place cannot be an object of perception, since it is not not present to the sense-organ and there can be no presentation without a present object.

\textsuperscript{40} NM., pp. 187-8.
\textsuperscript{41} The Jaina account of the śaṅkarite doctrine. PKM., pp. 13-14.
The Neo-Naiyāyika argues that the silver existing in some other time and place is brought to consciousness by association, and produces the perception of silver by means of an extraordinary intercourse whose character is knowledge (jñānalakṣaṇa-sannikāraṇa). The Śamkarite urges that in that case, in the inference of fire from smoke, fire which is not present to the sense-organ may be brought to consciousness by association, and produce the perception of fire by means of an extraordinary intercourse whose character is knowledge (jñāna-lakṣaṇa-sannikāraṇa), and thus there will be no inference at all. Besides, what is the meaning of Anyathākhyāti? If it means a cognition of one thing as otherwise, to what does the otherwiseness actually belong? Does it belong to the cognitive activity, or to the resulting cognition, or to the object of cognition? The first alternative is impossible. If the act of cognizing the shell is in the form of silver, then the shell cannot be called the objective substrate of the illusory cognition of silver; because an object can impart its own form to that cognition by which it is apprehended, and hence the shell cannot impart its own form to a cognition which apprehends silver. The second alternative also is not tenable. The otherwiseness (anyathātva) cannot belong to the result of cognitive activity or the cognition itself, for the cognition does not essentially differ, whether it is true or illusory; the cognition does not appear as something different or otherwise. Nor can the third alternative be maintained. In what sense, can the otherwiseness belong to the object, viz. the shell? Does it mean that the shell identifies itself with silver? Or, does it mean that the shell transforms itself into the form of silver? In the first alternative, is the shell absolutely different from silver? Or, are they different and non-different at the same time? The first view is untenable, since things absolutely different from each other can never identify themselves with each other. The second view also is untenable, for, in that case, such judgments as 'the cow is short-horned' will be illusory. In the second alternative, if the shell actually transforms itself into the form of silver, then the cognition of silver cannot be sublated as it is the cognition of a real change. If it be urged that the shell actually transforms itself into silver so long as the illusion lasts, then silver will be perceived in the shell also by those who do not suffer from any defect of the sense-organs and the like. Hence, the doctrine of Anyathākhyāti cannot be stated in an intelligible
form. It does not offer a better explanation of an illusion than the doctrine of Anirvacanīyakhyāti, according to which an undefinable object is produced at the time of an illusory cognition. But it may be urged that the object of the illusory cognition of silver (e.g. its different parts) is absent at the time. The Sāmkarite replies that it is produced by avidyā in co-operation with the subconscious impression of silver perceived in the past, and revived by the perception of its similarity with a nacre which is in contact with the visual organ impaired by a certain derangement. So it cannot be said that illusory silver (prātibhāsika rajata) cannot be produced at the time, which is the object of the illusory cognition of silver.

According to the Sāmkarite, an illusion is a presentative cognition, and as such it must be produced by a present object; and the object of a cognition must be that which appears in consciousness; it cannot be some other object which does not appear in consciousness. In the illusory cognition of silver, it is silver that is the object of the cognition as it appears in consciousness; and that silver must be present at that time and place, when and where the illusion is produced; otherwise the illusion would not be a presentative cognition. So the illusion of silver has silver for its object which is produced then and there and continues as long as the illusion lasts. But this silver cannot be real, for, in that case, the cognition of silver will not be illusory. It cannot be unreal, for, in that case, there will be no cognition of silver and consequently no activity for the appropriation of silver. Nor can it be real and unreal both, as it involves self-contradiction. Hence it must be undefinable.

Rāmānuja contends that even the doctrine of Anirvacanīyakhyāti cannot avoid Anyathākhyāti, which it seeks to refute. The very assumption of an undefinable existence to account for an illusion implies that one thing appears as another, since an undefinable object appears to consciousness as real. If an undefinable object were apprehended as undefinable at the time of the illusory cognition, then the cognition would not be illusory, and hence it would not be contradicted by a subsequent cognition. If it be urged that the undefinable object of an illusion does not appear as undefinable so long as the illusion lasts, but subsequently it is known to be undefinable by rational reflection, then also the

**VPS., pp. 33-4.**

**VP., pp. 136-7.**

**HIP., ii, pp. 560-4.**
doctrine of Anirvacanīyakhyāti leads to Anyathākhyāti, since an undefinable object appears to consciousness as real. Moreover, the doctrine of Anyathākhyāti can adequately explain all the facts connected with an illusion, viz. illusory cognition, activity consequent upon an illusion, and the subsequent sublating cognition. Hence, it is needless to assume an undefinable object, which is absolutely unperceived and groundless. Even if we admit that an undefinable object is produced at the time of the corresponding illusion, what is its cause? In the illusory cognition of silver what is the cause of the undefinable silver which is the object of the illusion? The cognition of silver cannot originate the undefinable silver, for there cannot be the cognition of silver before origination of the silver. It is absurd to argue that at first a cognition arises without any object, and then this objectless cognition produces the undefinable silver and makes it an object of apprehension. Nor can it be argued that a certain defect in the sense-organs is the cause of the illusory silver; for a defect abiding in the knowing person cannot produce an effect in an outward object. Nor can the sense-organs unvitiated by defects, give rise to the illusory silver, for the sense-organs are the causes of cognitions only, and not of their objects. Nor can the sense-organs deranged by a certain defect originate the illusory silver; for they also can produce peculiar modifications only in the cognitions produced by them, but not in their objects. Nor can a beginningless nescience (avidyā) be the cause of the illusory silver, for the doctrine of nescience does not stand to reason. Rāmānuja has brought seven charges against the Śaṅkarite doctrine of nescience (avidyā).44

(vi) THE DOCTRINE OF SATKYĀTI.—Rāmānuja holds that an illusory perception has a real object (sat) for its objective substrate. In the illusory perception of silver in a nacre the silver that is manifested to consciousness is a real object, for an unreal object can never be apprehended. Otherwise, why is it that only silver is apprehended in a nacre, and not a jar, or a cloth, or some other thing? It cannot be argued that silver is apprehended owing to its similarity with the nacre, inasmuch as the similarity of the nacre with silver will revive the subconscious impression of silver, and thus produce the recollection of silver, but will never produce the perception of silver. It is real silver that is the object

44 R.B., 1, 1, 1. HIP., ii, pp. 680-7.
of the illusory perception of silver. But how is it real? All objects of the world are produced by triplication or quintuplication (pañcikaraṇa) of the five elements of earth, water, fire, air, and ether, so that everything exists everywhere in the form of its elements. Hence, silver in which the element of fire predominates exists in part in the nacre in which the element of earth predominates. Moreover, there is a law that an object is similar to that object which contains the parts of the latter. According to this law, a nacre which is similar to silver must contain the parts of silver. Thus, in the illusory perception of silver in a nacre, silver must exist in part in the nacre. But, then, why is the perception of silver in a nacre called illusory? It is called illusory, not because silver does not exist even in part in the nacre, but because in the nacre the parts of silver are much less than those of the nacre, and they do not serve our practical purposes. Hence, every illusory perception has a real object for its objective substrate. This is the doctrine of Satkhyāti.45

A Śaṅkarite offers the following criticism of the doctrine of Satkhyāti in Advaitāmoda. According to Rāmānuja, all cognitions are real; even an illusory cognition has a real object for its objective substrate. So the illusory perception of silver has real silver for its object. The Śaṅkarite also holds that the illusory perception of silver has real silver for its object. But, according to the Śaṅkarite, the silver which is the object of the illusory cognition of silver has only apparent or illusory existence (prāti-bhāṣīka-sattā), while according to Rāmānuja, it has real or ontological existence (pāramārthika-sattā). But if the object of an illusion has real existence, how can we perceive water in a desert? It is true that a part of water does exist in earth on account of triplication or quintuplication of the subtle elements. But the distinctive character of water does not exist in a particular earthy substance produced by triplication or quintuplication of the elements. Even if the distinctive character of water exists in the part of water which constitutes a part of that subsance, it is not capable of being perceived. Triplication or quintuplication is such a combination of the elements that they cannot be separated. Before triplication or quintuplication the elements are subtle and imperceptible; after combination also the part of water alone cannot be perceived in the earthy substance. Moreover, it does not stand to reason that

45 NP., p. 37; YMD., pp. 4-5.
the elements of water in the earthy substance, though subtle, are perceived from a distance, but they cannot be perceived by those who are near it. Rāmānuja asserts, that fire and earth are not perceived owing to a certain defect of the peripheral organ, and that water is perceived owing to demerit (adrṣṭa). But this is no argument. For the same reason it is wrong to hold that we have an illusory perception of silver in a nacre because silver really exists in the nacre in the form of the elements of fire, which enter into three-fold or five-fold combination to constitute the nacre. Moreover, why are the elements of fire in the nacre perceived as silver alone? They may as well be perceived as lightning, the sun, and other fiery objects, because the elements of fire are common to all these objects before combination. It cannot be said that certain particles of the fire (tejas) which, by tripllication or quintuplication, are transformed into silver, are combined and are perceived in the nacre, for there is no proof of their existence. It cannot be said that the cognition of silver is the proof of their existence, for it will involve a vicious circle. The existence of silver in the nacre will depend upon the cognition of silver being an apprehension of a real object; and the cognition of silver being an apprehension of a real object will depend upon the existence of a part of silver in the nacre. It cannot be said that the existence of a part of silver in the nacre is proved by the perception of similarity of the nacre with silver. The nacre is similar to silver because it is endowed with those qualities which are common to itself and silver, viz. brightness and the like, and not because it contains a part of silver; there is no law of nature that an object must contain a part of another object with which it has similarity. If the clothes and ornaments of Caitra are similar to those of Devadatta, Devadatta may mistake the clothes and ornaments of Caitra for his own. But the parts of the clothes and ornaments of Devadatta do not interpenetrate into those of Caitra. Hence the doctrine of Satkhyāti is groundless.

(vii) The Doctrine of Sadasatkhyāti.—This doctrine is held by the Sāṃkhya. Kapila criticizes all the rival doctrines of illusion and establishes his own doctrine.46 And Aniruddha explains his arguments. The Mādhyamika holds that something non-existent, e.g. the identity of a nacre with a piece of silver, appears in consciousness in the illusory perception ‘this is silver’. This is wrong.

**Sadasatkhyātibādbādbhāt.** SS., v, 56.
for a non-existent object (e.g. the horns of a man) can neither lead to action nor produce a cognition. Prabhākara maintains, that in the illusory perception 'this is silver' there are two cognitions: (1) the perception of 'this' present to the visual organ, and (2) the recollection of 'silver'; and that non-discrimination of these two cognitions from each other leads to action. This also is wrong, for apprehension of non-difference or identity is found to lead to action, and the illusory perception 'this is silver' is contradicted by the sublating cognition 'this is not silver', while a valid cognition can never be contradicted. According to the Śāmkarite, the objective substrate of the illusory perception 'this is silver' is neither real nor unreal nor both; if it were unreal, there would be no immediate or presentative cognition; if it were real, there would be no sublating cognition; and it cannot be both, because it is self-contradictory; hence the object of the illusion is neither real nor unreal nor both, but it is undefinable. This also is wrong, for the illusory perception, in the present case, is defined as 'this is silver'. The Naiyāyika holds that in the illusory perception 'this is silver' it is a nacre that appears in consciousness as a piece of silver. This also is wrong, because it is against experience that one object should appear in consciousness as another object.

Hence, the Śāmkhya concludes that in the illusory perception 'this is silver' the cognition of 'this' is real (sat) and the cognition of 'silver' is unreal (asat). The cognition of 'this' has for its object an object present to the visual organ; so it is real. The cognition of 'silver' has for its object 'silver' which is not present to the visual organ; and it is contradicted by a sublating cognition; so it is unreal. So an illusion apprehends both a real object (sat) and an unreal object (asat). This is Aniruddha's interpretation of the doctrine of Sadasatkhya. Vijñānabhikṣu asserts, that in the illusory perception 'this is silver' the silver that appears in consciousness is real (sat), since it exists in the shop of a silver-merchant, and that it is unreal (asat), since it is falsely ascribed to a nacre.

(viii) The Doctrine of Prasiddhārthakhyāti.—According to this doctrine, a non-existent thing is not the object of an illusory cognition, but a really existent object established by knowledge; for example, water is the object of the illusion of water, and when

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47 SSV., v, 52.  
48 SSV., v, 53.  
49 Ibid, v, 55.  
50 Ibid, v, 56.  
51 Ibid, v, 54.  
the illusory cognition is contradicted by the cognition of the rays of the sun, the latter cognition has for its object the rays of the sun.

This theory, too, is untenable. If all cognitions were true representations of their objects, then there would be no difference between a valid cognition and an illusion, and all cognitions would be equally valid; and a person having an illusory cognition of water and acting upon it would feel the wetness of the ground, etc., which are the effects of water though water itself may be absent, because the effect of water is not momentary like the flash of lightning. And if all cognitions are equally valid, no cognition can be contradicted by another cognition. But it is a fact of experience that some cognitions are contradicted by other cognitions. Hence the doctrine of Prasiddhārthakhyaṭī is untenable.62

(ix) The Doctrine of Vivekākhyaṭī or Smṛtipramoṣa.—Prabhākara's doctrine of Vivekākhyaṭī (non-discrimination) is sometimes called Akhyāṭī (non-apprehension). But in order to distinguish this doctrine from that of Akhyāṭī described above we prefer to call it by the name of Vivekākhyaṭī. According to Prabhākara, whatever is manifested to consciousness must be the object of that consciousness; and hence there can be no apprehension of an object as a different thing; there can be no Anyathākhyaṭī or misapprehension. What is the object of the illusion of silver, according to the doctrine of Anyathākhyaṭī? Is it silver existing in some other time and place? Or, is it a nacre which conceals its own form and assumes the form of silver? Or, is it the nacre itself in its own true form? The first alternative implies Asatkhyāṭī. If silver existing in some other time and place is the object of the illusion of silver, then silver which does not exist at present becomes the object of the illusory cognition, and thus something non-existent is apprehended as existent. Hence Anyathākhyaṭī implies Asatkhyāṭī. The second alternative is unintelligible. If a nacre, which conceals its own form and assumes the form of silver, is the objective substrate of the illusion of silver, then is there an apprehension of a nacre or an apprehension of silver? If the former, then there is no illusion, as a nacre is perceived as a nacre. If the latter, then there is no proof for the existence of the nacre there, which is manifested as silver in consciousness. It cannot be said that the nacre is known by the sublating cognition 'this is not silver'; because the object of

62 PKM., p. 13.
the illusion of silver cannot be established by some other cognition. A sublating cognition merely establishes the non-existence of the object of the sublated illusion; it does not ascertain the object of the illusory cognition. The third alternative also cannot be maintained. It cannot be held that a nacre is the object of the illusion of silver. For, in that case, everything present at the time of the cognition, e.g. the proximate piece of land, etc., would be regarded as the object of the illusory cognition. Hence Prabhākara concludes that whatever is manifested in a cognition must be regarded as its object. In the illusory cognition of silver, it is silver that is manifested in consciousness; so silver must be regarded as its object. It is foolish to regard a nacre as the object of the illusion of silver.

We have already found that, according to Prabhākara, there are two elements in an illusory cognition. It is made up of a presentative element and a representative element which are not discriminated from each other as long as the illusion lasts. This lack of discrimination between the two elements is the cause of exertion for the appropriation or avoidance of the object of illusion. A sublating cognition does not contradict an illusion, but simply recognizes the distinction between the presentative element and the representative element involved in an illusion. In the illusory cognition 'this is silver', 'this' is not identical with 'silver', as the doctrine of Anyathākhyāti holds; 'this' is nothing but 'this' which is perceived, and 'silver' is nothing but 'silver' which is remembered; 'this' is one thing (e.g. brightness, etc.), and 'silver' is quite a different thing. The distinction between these two is recognized when there is the so-called sublative cognition 'this is not silver'. But why are not the two elements discriminated from each other before the so-called sublative cognition? Prabhākara holds that the representative element does not appear in consciousness as representation owing to obscurational of memory (smṛtipramoṣa).

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa offers the following criticism of the doctrine of Vivekākhyaṭi: Prabhākara holds that an illusion is a complex psychosis made up of presentative and representative elements which cannot be discriminated from each other owing to obscurational of memory. But when the illusion is contradicted by a sublative cognition, the presentative element is discriminated
from the representative element. In the illusory perception of silver in a nacre in the form ‘this is silver’, there is a presentation of ‘this’ and there is a representation of silver in memory, which are not distinguished from each other. But the Naiyāyika urges that in the illusion of silver there is an actual perception or presentation of silver, in which we do actually feel that we are perceiving silver. But Prabhākara tries to explain away this fact of experience. He cannot account for the fact that as long as the illusion of silver lasts, there is an actual presentation or perception of silver, and not a mere representation of silver. He cannot give a satisfactory account of the so-called non-discrimination of the presentative element from the representative element in an illusion. He cannot also explain the nature of the so-called obscuration of memory (smṛtipramaṇa).

Let us consider these in detail. In the first place, according to Prabhākara, when we have the illusion of silver in a nacre the sense-organ does not come into contact with real silver; so there is no presentation of silver, but only a representation of silver. In the illusion ‘this is silver’ there are two elements, a presentation of ‘this’ and a representation of ‘silver’, which are not discriminated from each other at the time. But the Naiyāyika and the Advaita Vedāntist contend that we are conscious of silver as something presented to consciousness ‘here and now’, and not as something perceived in the past and remembered now.²⁵ Nor can it be said that there is only a presentation of ‘this’ and not of ‘silver’, for we have a direct and immediate knowledge of both ‘this’ and ‘silver’ at the same time; so both of them are directly presented to consciousness or perceived at present. Gangeśa and his followers hold that in the illusion ‘this is silver’ both the elements ‘this’ and ‘silver’ are perceived, the first through the ordinary intercourse between the visual organ and its object and the second through the extraordinary intercourse whose character is knowledge (jñāna-lakṣaṇa-sannikāraṇa). In the second place, what does Prabhākara mean by non-discrimination? So long as an illusion lasts there is no apprehension of non-discrimination of its presentative factor from its representative factor. It is apprehended, if at all, when it is sublated. But, as a matter of fact, the subsequent sublative cognition testifies to the immediate consciousness of ‘this is silver’ at the time of the illusory

²⁵ Indian Thought, vol. 1, p. 177.
perception, rather than non-discrimination of the presentative element from the representative element. Moreover, non-discrimination at the time of an illusion cannot induce exertion in the person under illusion to appropriate or avoid the illusory object. In the illusion 'this is silver' what moves a person to action? Is it the actual perception and the recollection together or either of the two? If the former, then do the two psychoses operate together or in succession? The first of these latter alternatives is inadmissible, since presentation and representation being distinct psychoses cannot occur at the same time. If the two cognitions are successive, the former can have no casual efficiency with regard to the person's action, since the latter intervenes between the two. Nor can either psychosis by itself move the person to action; for the particular action follows neither from the perception of 'this' nor from the recollection of 'silver', but from the direct and immediate apprehension of 'this is silver'. Thus mere non-discrimination cannot account for exertion induced by an illusion. In the third place, what is the meaning of obscuration of memory (smtipramoṣa)? If it means the absence of memory, then there cannot be a reproduction of silver perceived in the past, and it cannot differ from swoon in which there is no memory. If it means the consciousness of memory not as memory, but as something opposed to it, viz., perception, then the doctrine of smtiṣipramoṣa implies Anyathākhyāti. If it means the apprehension of a past object as present, then also it implies Anyathākhyāti. If it means the blending of perception with recollection in such a way that the two psychoses cannot be distinguished from each other, then what is the meaning of blending? Does it mean the apprehension of the two different psychoses as non-different or identical? Or, does it mean the actual blending of the two different psychoses? The first alternative leads to Anyathākhyāti. The second alternative is impossible, for two physical things can blend with each other as milk and water, but two psychoses cannot blend with each other. Hence the doctrine of smtiṣipramoṣa is unintelligible.

(X) THE DOCTRINE OF ANYATHĀKHYĀTI.—According to the doctrine of Anyathākhyāti, an object is apprehended as a different object in an illusion which is not a sum of two psychical processes—perception and recollection—but a single psychosis of a perceptual character. When we perceive silver in a nacre, we perceive
in the nacre only the common qualities of nacre and silver, and
not the peculiar qualities of the nacre; the perception of similarity
revives the idea of the peculiar qualities of silver in memory;
and the reproduction of silver in memory produces the perception
of silver, and so we have an illusory perception 'this is silver'.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa refutes Prabhākara's objections to the doctrine
of Anyathākhyāti in the following manner: First, Prabhākara
has asked: What is the objective substrate of the illusion of silver?
Is it silver existing in some other time and place? Or, is it a
nacre that conceals its own form and assumes the form of silver?
Or, is it a nacre in itself? He has urged that the first alternative
implies Asatkhyāti or apprehension of a non-existent object as
existent. The Naiyāyika replies that silver is not non-existent;
but that it does exist in some other time and place. There is
a difference between an absolutely non-existent thing (e.g. a sky-
flower, etc.) and an object not existing here and now, but in some
other time and place. The former is never an object of conscious-
ness, while the latter is an object of consciousness. Secondly,
Prabhākara has urged that the second alternative is absurd and
unintelligible. The Naiyāyika replies that the nacre is said to
conceal its own form, since we do not perceive its peculiar features
(e.g. triangularity, etc.), and that it is said to assume the form of
silver, since we remember the distinctive features of silver.
Thirdly, Prabhākara has urged that the third alternative also is
unreasonable. One object can never be apprehended as a different
one; for, in that case, whatever is present to the sense-organ at
the time of the illusory perception of silver would be regarded
as the substrate of that illusion. The Naiyāyika replies that he
does not mean that whatever is present to the sense-organ is the
object of consciousness, so that the piece of land before the eyes
may be regarded as the object of consciousness. What he means
is that the nacre is the cause of the illusion of silver; that it is
not an object of the illusory perception of silver. So all the
charges of Prabhākara against Anyathākhyāti are groundless.\textsuperscript{54}

6. Different Theories of Illusions compared

According to the doctrine of Akhyāti, an illusion consists in
non-apprehension of an object (akhyaṭi). An illusion has no

\textsuperscript{54} NM., pp. 184-5. HIP., i, pp. 478-83 ; ii, pp. 134-5.
external stimulus at all; it is objectless (*mirūlambana*). This doctrine is right in so far as the object that is manifested in consciousness in an illusory cognition does not exist at that time and place. For example, silver does not exist at that time and place when and where there is the illusory cognition of silver. But it is wrong for two reasons. In the first place, an illusory perception is not mere non-apprehension of an object; it is apprehension of something; in the illusory perception of silver there is apprehension of silver, though the object does not exist at that time and place; there is not mere non-apprehension of a nacre. In the second place, an illusory perception is not always objectless; in most cases it has an external stimulus (*ālambana*). But sometimes an illusion is not produced by an external stimulus; it is produced directly by the mind affected by a certain derangement. It is called a hallucination. But all illusions are not hallucinations. The Mādhyamika holds that an illusion consists in the apprehension of a non-existent object (*asatkhyātī*). He agrees with the view that an illusion has no external stimulus at all. But, according to the former, an illusory cognition consists in non-apprehension of an object (*akhyātī*), while, according to the latter, it consists in apprehension of a non-existent object (*asatkhyātī*). The doctrine of Asatkhyātī is right in so far as the object of an illusion does not exist then and there. But it is wrong in so far as the object of an illusion is not absolutely non-existent, but exists in some other time and place. But this doctrine is in keeping with the spirit of nihilism of the Mādhyamika. According to him, the ultimate reality is Void (*śūnya*); neither the external world nor the inner world of ideas is real. The Yogācāra holds that an illusion consists in apprehension of a subjective cognition (*ātmakhyātī*). He agrees with the two views mentioned above that an illusion has no external stimulus at all: it is absolutely objectless. But, according to him, an illusory cognition consists neither in non-apprehension of an object nor in apprehension of a non-existent object, but in apprehension of a purely subjective cognition as an external object; an illusion consists in projection of an idea into the external world. But only hallucinations are illusions of this kind. Other illusions are produced by external stimuli, which are not pure creations of fancy. They cannot be explained by the doctrine of Ātmakhyātī. But this doctrine is in keeping with the spirit of subjective idealism of the Yogācāra.
According to him, there is no external world at all; there is only the inner world of ideas which appear to us as external objects. The Śaṅkarite holds that an illusion consists in apprehension of an undefinable object (anirvacanīyakhyāti). According to him, an illusion has an objective basis; it has an external stimulus; it has an illusory object corresponding to it. The Śaṅkarite believes in three degrees of reality: (1) ontological reality (pāramārthikasattā); (2) empirical reality (vyāvahārikasattā); and (3) illusory reality (prātibhāsikasattā). Brahman has ontological reality; the world of external objects conditioned by space, time, and causality has empirical reality; and objects falsely ascribed to empirical objects, like silver ascribed to a nacre, have illusory reality: these also have an extra-mental existence. The illusory perception of silver has for its object extra-mental illusory silver which is neither real, nor unreal, nor both, but undefinable. The doctrine of Alaukikakhyāti is substantially the same as that of Anirvacaniyakhyāti. According to the Alaukikakhyāti, the illusory perception of silver has extraordinary silver for its object, which has no practical efficiency. These doctrines go beyond the province of psychology and seek to define the ontological nature of the object of an illusion. They recognize the distinctive character of an illusory cognition. According to them, it is presentative or perceptual in character. But a presentative cognition always requires a present object which is an illusory reality (prātibhāsika) according to Anirvacaniyakhyāti, and an extraordinary (alaukika) reality, according to Alaukikakhyāti. Rāmānuja holds that an illusion consists in apprehension of a real object (satkhyāti). The illusory perception of silver in a nacre has real silver for its object. The Śaṅkarite believes in the illusory existence (prātibhāsika-sattā) of silver at the time of the illusory perception. But Rāmānuja believes in its ontological existence (pāramārthikasattā) at the time of the illusory perception. According to him, silver really exists in the nacre in the form of its elements; and the nacre is similar to silver only because silver does exist in part in the nacre. But this is going too far. Similarity means similarity in qualities. It does not necessarily mean partial co-existence of two things in each other. The doctrine of Satkhyāti is based on the cosmological doctrine of triplication or quintuplication of the elements. The Śāṅkhya holds that an illusion consists in apprehension of a real object and an unreal
object both (*sadasatkhya*). In the illusory cognition of silver in the form ‘this is silver’ the cognition of ‘this’ is the apprehension of an object present to the sense-organ, and the cognition of ‘silver’ is the apprehension of silver which is not present to the sense-organ. Prabhākara makes it more clear. According to him, an illusory cognition is a complex psychosis made up of a presentative element and a representative element. The illusory cognition in the form ‘this is silver’ is made up of the perception of ‘this’ and the recollection of ‘silver,’ which are not discriminated from each other until the illusion is contradicted. But Prabhākara misses the distinctive psychological character of an illusory cognition; it is a perceptual process, though it depends upon perception and recollection both. Prabhākara contends that the representative process in an illusory cognition appears to be a presentative process owing to lapse of memory (*smitipramoṣa*). But he should not explain away a fact of experience by an unintelligible theory. An illusory cognition is experienced as a direct and immediate perception. The Naiyāyika holds that an illusion consists in misapprehension of one object as another or apprehension of an object in that in which it does not exist. According to him, an illusory cognition is a single psychosis of a perceptual character which is produced by a sense-organ impaired by a certain defect in contact with an external object in co-operation with the subconscious impression of another object with which it has similarity. In the illusory perception of silver in a nacre, the nacre is wrongly perceived as silver owing to the perversion of the sense-organ and the subconscious impression of another object awakened by the perception of similarity. This theory is not based on metaphysical grounds. It is based on the evidence of our experience. There is an extraordinary intercourse (*alaukika sannikarṣa*) whose character is knowledge (*jñanalakṣaṇasannikarṣa*), according to Gangeśa, in an illusion. There is visual perception of silver, though its idea (*jñāna*) is revived in memory, on account of this extraordinary intercourse through knowledge. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view is more faithful to our experience than the other views.
CHAPTER XV

DREAMS

1. The Psychological Character of Dream-consciousness
   (i) The Presentative Theory of Dreams

Kaṇāda defines a dream-cognition as the consciousness produced by a particular conjunction of the self with the mind (manas) in co-operation with the subconscious impressions of past experience, like recollection.¹ Praśastapāda defines it as an internal perception through the mind, when all the functions of the external sense-organs have ceased and the mind has retired within a trans-organic region of the organism.² When the internal organ (manas) retires within itself, the peripheral organs cease to operate and consequently cannot apprehend their objects as they are no longer guided by the mind. During this retired state of the mind, when the automatic vital functions of in-breathings and out-breathings profusely go on in the organism, dream-cognitions arise through the mind from such causes as sleep, which is the name of a particular conjunction of the self with the mind, and subconscious impressions of past experience; these dreams are internal perceptions of unreal objects.³ Udayana asserts, that in the dream-state, though the external sense-organs cease to operate, we distinctly feel that we see objects with our very eyes, hear sounds with our very ears, and so on.⁴ Śaṅkara Miśra also holds that though a dream-cognition is produced by the mind when it has retired, and the external sense-organs have ceased to operate, it is apprehended as if it were produced by the external sense-organs.⁵ Śrīdhara also regards dreams as presentative in character. Dream-cognitions are independent of previous cognitions, and as such are not mere reproductions of past experience; they are produced through the retired central sensory or mind when the functions of all the peripheral organs have ceased; they are direct and immediate presentations of a definite and determinate

¹ VS., ix, 2, 6-7.
² PBh., p. 183.
³ VSU., ix, 2, 7.
⁴ Kir., p. 273.
⁵ Ibid., p. 183.
character. These dream-cognitions arising from sleep and subconscious impressions are direct and immediate presentations (āparokṣasamjñvedana) of objects which have no real existence at that time and place. They are presentative in character, and not mere reproductions of past experience. But dream-perceptions are not produced by the external organs which cease to function at that time, but they are produced entirely by the mind (manomātra-prabhava). And these dream-perceptions are not indefinite and indeterminate in nature; but they are definite and determinate in character (paricchedasvabhāva). They are not valid but illusory, since they do not represent real objects present to the sense-organs. Sīvāditya defines a dream as a cognition produced by the mind perverted by sleep. Mādhava Sarasvatī mentions the following distinctive marks of dream-cognitions as defined by Sīvāditya. First, they are produced by the mind, and as such are different from the waking perceptions of jars and the like, which are produced by the external sense-organs. Secondly, they are produced by the perverted mind, and as such are different from the waking perceptions of pleasure and the like, which are produced by the unperverted mind. Thirdly, they are produced by the mind perverted by sleep, and as such are different from waking hallucinations which are produced by the perverted mind in the waking condition.

Praśastapāda, Śrīdhara, Saṁkara Miśra, Sīvāditya and others recognize the central origin of dreams. Though they hold that certain dreams are produced by organic disorders within the body, they do not recognize the origin of dreams from the external sense-organs. But Udayana admits that in the dream-state the peripheral organs—at least the tactual organ which pervades the organism—do not altogether cease to operate; external stimuli, if not sufficiently intense to awaken the person, may act upon the peripheral organs and produce dream-cognitions. Thus Udayana recognizes both peripherally excited and centrally excited dreams, or in the language of Sully, dream-illusions and dream hallucinations. Udayana also holds that though dream-cognitions are generally perceptual in character being produced by the mind, sometimes, though very rarely, they assume the form of inference,
when, for instance, a person dreams that he sees smoke in a particular place and from the sight of the smoke infers that there must be fire behind it. Thus the Vaiśeṣikas generally advocate the presentative theory of dreams.

The ancient Naiyāyikas also consider dreams as presentative in character. Gautama does not include dream-cognition in recollection. Vātsyāyana regards dream as distinct from recollection. Uddyotakara and Vācaspati also agree with Gautama and Vātsyāyana. Thus the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas generally recognize the perceptual character of dreams. But there are some Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers who regard dreams as recollections of past experience due to the revival of subconscious impressions. We may designate this doctrine as the representative theory of dreams as contrasted with the presentative theory.

(ii) The Representative Theory of Dreams

Among the Naiyāyikas Bhāsarvajña started the view that dream-consciousness is a kind of false recollection (smṛti). We have already seen that Jayasimhasūri distinguishes between anubhūtyamanāropa illusions and smaryamāṇāropa illusions. The former consist in the false ascription of a percept to another percept. The latter consist in the false ascription of an idea of memory to a percept. Jayasimhasūri includes dreams in the latter. So he regards them as representative in character. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa seems to regard dream-cognitions as recollections of past experience. Kesāvamīśra regards all dream-cognitions as false recollections. Jagadīśa holds that dream-cognitions are produced by recollections of objects perceived in the past, merit and demerit, and intra-organic disorders. Thus the ancient Naiyāyikas regard dreams as presentative in character, while the majority of medieval and modern Naiyāyikas regard them as representative in character.

The Mīmāṃsakas also recognize the representative character of dreams. According to Kumārila, dreams have an objective

11 Kir., p. 273.
13 Princess of Wales Sarswatibhavan Studies, *Benares*, vol. iii, p. 82 n.
14 NTD., p. 67.
15 NM., pp. 182-3, 545.
16 TBh., p. 30.
17 TA., p. 11.
18 The Allahabad University Studies, vol. v, p. 278.
basis; they are produced by external objects which are not present to the sense-organs but were perceived elsewhere in the past and are now revived through their subconscious impressions. Pārthaśārathimśa says, "It is definitely known that dream-cognitions are of the nature of recollection." External objects perceived in some other time and place are remembered owing to the revival of their impressions through the agency of merit or demerit; but they appear to consciousness as objects existing here and now owing to the perversion of the mind by sleep.

Prabhākara also regards dream-cognitions as recollections of past experience. But he slightly modifies the doctrine of Kumārila. He advances his theory of obscuration of memory (smṛtipramoṣa) to account for the apparently presentative character of dreams. His theory will be considered in the next section.

Śaṅkara also is an advocate of the representative theory of dreams. He says, "Dream-consciousness is of the nature of recollection (smṛti)." Dreams are reproductions of past waking perceptions owing to the revival of their subconscious impressions; so they have the semblance of waking perceptions. Though Śaṅkara advocates the representative theory of dreams, his follower, Dharmarājādharvarindra, advocates the presentative theory.

According to Prabhākara, dream-cognitions are really reproductions of past waking experience; but they appear to consciousness as direct and immediate sense-presentations owing to lapse of memory (smṛtipramoṣa). In dream-consciousness memory-images of past experience appear to consciousness as percepts. It is due to lapse of memory which makes the distinctive character of the memory-images, viz., their representative character, drop out of consciousness; and thus the memory-images of past experience deprived of their representative character appear to consciousness as percepts in dream. The process may be represented as follows: Memory-image—memory = percept; or, representation—memory = presentation. Recollection is the apprehension of the previously apprehended; and if the element of 'the apprehended' sinks below the threshold of consciousness,
then recollection appears as a direct apprehension or perception, or, the re-presentation appears as a direct and immediate presentation. Thus, according to Prabhākara, dream-cognitions are representative in character, but they appear to consciousness as direct presentations owing to lapse of memory. Prabhākara explains both waking illusions and dream-illusions by the same theory of obscuration of memory (smṛtipramoṣa).  

Udayana discusses the nature of dream-cognitions and criticizes Prabhākara’s theory of dreams. In the dream-state, though the external sense-organs cease to function, yet we have direct and immediate presentations of objects not present at that time and place. This dream-consciousness cannot be of the nature of memory, inasmuch as during the state of dream we do not recognize dream-cognitions as reproductions of our past experience in such a form as ‘I remember this’; nor, on waking from sleep, do we remember our dream cognitions in such a form as ‘I remembered this’. But, on the contrary, during the state of dream we apprehend our dream-cognitions as actual perceptions, and not as mere echoes of our past experience; and on waking from sleep we remember our dream-cognitions as actual perceptions in the dream-state. So dream-cognitions are not representative, but perceptual in character.

But how can they be perceptual in nature, since the things that are presented to consciousness in dream are not present at that time and place, and the peripheral organs are not quite operative at that time, which are the channels of all perceptions, and the mind (manas) too cannot apprehend external objects without the help of the peripheral organs? Are dream-cognitions, then, illusions of memory (smṛti-viparyāsa)? Do dream-cognitions appear as percepts, though, as a matter of fact, they are nothing but memory-images? Do memory-images appear to consciousness as percepts in dream-cognitions? Are dream-cognitions the illusions of memory, as Prabhākara holds? If by illusions of memory he means the illusory cognitions of the objects of memory, Udayana has no objection. But if by these he means the illusory appearance of memory as perception, then it cannot be maintained that dream-cognitions are the illusions of memory. For if dream-cognitions were nothing but illusory appearances of memory-images as percepts, the perceptual character of dream-
cognitions would be contradicted at some time or other recognized as representative. But, in fact, in the dream-state we never recognize dream-cognitions as reproductions of our past experience. Besides, in the dream-state we have cognitions of many things which have never been perceived before, e.g. the lopping off of our own heads. Moreover, it is not possible for one form of consciousness to appear as another, though an object may appear to consciousness as quite a different thing. If in dream-consciousness memory-images were illusorily cognized as percepts, we should never have a direct presentative consciousness in the form 'I perceive this pot', but we should have a presentative consciousness in the form 'I perceive that pot' (i.e. perceived in the past and reproduced in memory). As a matter of fact, in dream-cognitions we have a direct and immediate presentation in the form 'I perceive this pot'. Thisness is the special characteristic of perception alone, while thatness is, of memory. Hence, dream-cognitions must be admitted to be presentative or perceptual in character.\(^2\)

Dharmarājādhwārindra criticizes Prabhākara's theory of dream. According to the Śaṅkarite, in an illusory perception of waking life we do not perceive an object as another, as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds, but we perceive an illusory reality which is produced at that time and place; this reality is illusory (pratibhāsika) and undefinable (anirvacaniya) as distinguished from the empirical (vyāvahārika) reality which is the object of right perception. Likewise, according to him, dream-cognitions too are illusory perceptions, during sleep, of illusory realities produced at that time and place, like the illusory perceptions of our waking life. But Prabhākara contends that dream-cognitions cannot be direct and immediate sense-presentations, because the peripheral organs cease to function during sleep and the mind (manas) cannot apprehend external objects without the help of the peripheral organs; and because dream-cognitions are not presentations at all, it is quite useless to assume that they apprehend illusory realities produced at that time and place. In fact, Prabhākara urges that dream-cognitions are nothing but representations of our previous waking perceptions; and that because we cannot discriminate the dream-representations from their originals in waking perceptions we mistake them for actual sense-presentations. To this the

\(^2\) NKS., v, pp. 146-7.
Saṁkarite replies that dream-cognitions cannot be representative in character because in dream we are conscious that ‘we see a chariot’, and on waking from dream we are conscious that ‘we saw a chariot in dream’. This introspection clearly shows that dreams are perceptual in character, and this fact of experience cannot be explained away by a dogmatic assumption. Moreover, dream-cognitions cannot be mere recollections of our previous waking perceptions, for the objects of dream-cognitions (e.g. chariots, elephants, etc.) were never perceived in our waking life exactly in that place; hence dream-cognitions must be regarded as immediate presentations or perceptions.27

Dharmarājādhvarindra criticizes the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of dream. Though the Saṁkarite agrees with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika in regarding dream-cognitions as presentative in character, and in refuting Prabhākara’s doctrine of the representative character of dreams, yet he differs from the latter in bringing out the metaphysical implication of dreams. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, in an illusory perception we erroneously ascribe unreal silver to a nacre which is real in the illusory perception of the nacre as silver. But, according to the Saṁkarite, illusory silver is produced at that time and place and continue as long as dream-cognitions last. The objects of dream-cognitions (e.g. chariots, elephants, etc.) cannot be erroneously ascribed to any real object (e.g. ground) present to the sense-organs, since the ground is not in contact with the peripheral organs. Nor can they be erroneously ascribed to an object such as ground reproduced in memory, since the ground is not reproduced in memory in dream but is an object of actual perception. Moreover, the objects of dream-cognitions cannot be perceived through the peripheral organs, since they do not really exist in that place, and consequently cannot come into contact with the sense-organs. Nor can these objects of dream-cognitions be brought to consciousness in dream through association (jñānalakṣaṇasannikāra) with the ideas of other objects which are not present to the sense-organs at that time. Nor can they be perceived by the mind, since it cannot apprehend external objects which are not in contact with the external organs. Nor can they be cognized by inference, since they are distinctly felt as objects of direct perception. Moreover, the objects of dream-cognitions are perceived in the absence of recollection of any

27 VP. and Sīktāmamii, pp. 159-161.
mark of inference. According to the Śaṅkarite, therefore, the illusory objects of dream-cognitions are produced at that time and place and continue as long as dream-cognitions last. Herein lies the difference between the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Advaita Vedānta in their explanation of dream-cognitions.²⁸

2. Dreams, Illusions, Indefinite Perceptions and Hallucinations

Udayana distinguishes dream-cognitions from illusory perceptions of waking life and doubtful and indefinite perceptions. Though dream-cognitions are illusory perceptions, since they apprehend objects which are not present at that time and place, and as such resemble illusory perceptions of waking life, they differ from the latter in that they are produced when the peripheral organs are not quite operative, while the latter are produced by the peripheral organs. Then, again, dream-cognitions are not to be identified with doubtful and indefinite perceptions. For dream-cognitions are definite and determinate in character, in which the mind does not oscillate between alternate possibilities, while doubtful and indefinite perceptions are uncertain, because in them the mind is not fixed on a definite object but wavers between two objects without any definite decision.²⁹ Bhaṭṭa Vāḍindra also describes a dream-cognition as an illusory, definite perception (niyatakoṭīka) which does not waver between alternate possibilities and which is produced when all the peripheral organs cease to operate. Puruṣottamaḷi Mahārāja also regards dreams as determinate cognitions.³⁰ Śrīdhara also regards dream-cognitions as definite and determinate perceptions as distinguished from indefinite and indeterminate perceptions. Dream-cognitions, arising either from the intensity of subconscious traces, or from intra-organic disorders, or from unseen agencies, are purely illusory, since they consist in the false imposition of an external form upon something that is wholly internal, and as such are not essentially different from the illusions of our waking life, the only difference lying in the fact that the former are illusory perceptions in the condition of sleep, while the latter are illusory perceptions.

²⁸ VP. with Śikhāmaṇi and Maṇiprabhā, p. 162.
²⁹ Kīr., p. 271.
³⁰ Rasasāra, pp. 101-2. PR., p. 28.
in the waking condition. According to Jayasimhasūri also, dreams are illusions in the condition of sleep. They are illusions because in them things which were perceived in the past and in some other place are perceived here and now. Thus, in the language of James Sully, "Dreams are clearly illusory, and, unlike the illusions of waking life, are complete and persistent."

Hallucinations are pure creations of the mind (manas). And some dreams also are pure creations of the mind (manomātra-prabhava). Both are centrally initiated presentations. Both are definite and determinate in character. And both are invalid. So there is a great resemblance between dreams and hallucinations. The only difference between them lies in the fact that the former are hallucinations in sleep, while the latter are hallucinations in the waking condition. This distinction has been pointed out by Mādhava Sarasvatī.

Frank Padmore says: "A dream is a hallucination in sleep, and a hallucination is only a waking dream; though it is probable that the waking impression, seeing that it can contend on equal terms with the impressions derived from external objects, is more vivid than the common run of dream." Wundt also regards dreams as hallucinations. They are as vivid as sensory experience and are projected into the external world as are sensations.

3. Classification of Dreams: Kinds of Dreams: Their Physiological Basis

We find a crude classification of dreams in Caraka-sāṃhitā. Caraka says that a person sees various dreams through the mind which is the guide of the external sense-organs when he is not in profound sleep. Some of these dreams are significant; others are not. These dreams are of seven kinds, viz. dreams of those objects which have been seen, heard, and felt, dreams of those objects which are desired, dreams awakened by imagination, dreams that are premonitions of future events, and pathological or morbid dreams. Caraka seems to suggest here the following psychological facts. Some dreams are mere reproductions of past experience (anubhūta), though they are apprehended as immediate

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31 NK., p. 185.  
32 Illusions, p. 137.  
33 NTD., p. 67.  
34 MB., p. 68.  
35 Apparitions and Thought Transference, p. 186.
36 Caraka Sāṃhitā, Indrīyaasthāna, ch. v.
perceptions. Some dreams involve constructive imagination (kalpita), though the material is supplied by memory. Some dreams are fulfilment of desires (prārthiśa). Some dreams are stimulated by pathological disorders within the organism (doṣaja). And some dreams are prophetic in character (bhāvika), and forecast shadow future events. This fact is called dream-coincidence in modern western psychology. According to Caraka, dreams are experienced only in light sleep; they are produced by the mind.37

The Vaiśeṣikas, Praśastapāda, Śrīdhara, Udayana, Saṁkara Miśra and others, describe four kinds of dreams: (1) dreams due to intra-organic pathological disorders (dhātudoṣa); (2) dreams due to the intensity of subconscious impressions (saṁskārapātava); (3) dreams due to the unseen agency (adrśta), i.e. merit and demerit (dharma); and (4) “dream-end cognitions” or dreams-within-dreams (svapnāntiša jñāna).38

Dreams are due to phlegm, bile and flatulence, the influence of a god, the influence of a person’s own habits, and his power of prognostication according to Nāgasena. Ariyavansa-Ādīccharanāi attempted a systematic explanation of dream-phenomena from the Buddhist standpoint. He recognized four kinds of dreams: (1) dreams due to organic and muscular disturbances, e.g. the flatulent, phlegmatic, and bilious humours; (2) recurrent dreams consisting in recurrence of the previous dreams, due to previous experiences; (3) telepathic dreams due to suggestions from spiritualistic agents; and (4) prophetic dreams due to the force of character of clairvoyant dreamers. “The first category includes the dreams of a fall over a precipice, flying into the sky, etc., and what is called ‘nightmare’; the second consists of the ‘echoes of past waking experiences’; the third may include dream coincidences; and the fourth is of a clairvoyant character.”39

Thus the Buddhists add to the Vaiśeṣika list dreams due to spirit-influence, or telepathic dreams. In addition to these various kinds of dreams, Caraka recognizes dreams which are wish-fulfillments. Madhusūdana and Saṁkara also recognize the

37 Caraka Śaṁhitā, Indriyastraśa, ch. v. Nāgasena also holds that dreams are dreams when the mind is active in light sleep, in which a person still guards his scattered thoughts. In deep sleep the mind enters into the life stream and becomes inactive. The Questions of King Miiśinda, Vol. II, pp. 159-61, S.B.E.
38 PBh., p. 184.
influence of desires on dreams. These different kinds of dreams will be considered in the next section.

We have seen that, according to most Indian thinkers, dream-cognitions are presentative in character. They are felt as perceptions, and are aroused by external and internal stimuli. They are sometimes produced by extra-organic stimuli, and sometimes by intra-organic stimuli in the shape of periphera! disturbances and other organic disorders. These dreams may be called dream-illusions. And there are some dream-cognitions which are produced by the strength of subconscious impressions of a recent experience coloured by an intense emotion. These dreams are centrally excited and hence may be called dream-hallucinations. Among the Western psychologists, Spitta, first of all, drew a distinction between these two kinds of dreams, and called, the former *Nervenreizträume*, and the latter *psychische Träume*. Miss Calkins calls the former *presentation*-dreams, and the latter *representation*-dreams.\(^{40}\) Jastrow calls the former *presentative* dreams and the latter *representative* dreams.\(^{41}\) Sully calls the former *dream-illusions* and the latter *dream-hallucinations*.\(^{42}\) And besides these two kinds of dreams, the Indian thinkers recognize prophetic or veridical dreams and telepathic dreams. The former are due to the merit and demerit of the dreamer, forecasting the future and so on; and the latter are due to the suggestive force of spiritualistic agents. In addition to these, there are dreams-within-dreams or ‘dream-end’ cognitions. Let us consider the nature of these different kinds of dreams.

Dream-illusions are those dreams which are excited by peripheral stimulation either internal or external. Udayana has discussed the question of the extra-organic and intra-organic origin of dreams. How can dream-cognitions arise in sleep? What is the origin of dreams? Dream-illusions are produced by the reproduction of those objects, the subconscious traces of which are resuscitated owing to certain causes. But how can the subconscious traces be revived without the suggestive force of similar experience? What is the suggestive force here that revives the subconscious traces of past experience? According to Udayana,

\(^{40}\) Edmund Parish, *Hallucinations and Illusions*, p. 50; Marie De Menacene, *Sleep*, p. 255.

\(^{41}\) Joseph Jastrow, *The Subconscious*, p. 188.

\(^{42}\) Sully, *Illusions*, p. 139.
peripheral stimulation is not altogether absent from dream-cognitions. Dreams are not altogether without external stimuli; they are excited by certain external stimuli in the environment, and certain intra-organic stimuli. In the state of dream we do not altogether cease to perceive external objects, since the external sense-organs are not entirely inoperative. For instance, we perceive external sounds in dream, when they are not sufficiently loud to rouse us from sleep; and the faint external sounds perceived through the ears even during light sleep easily incorporate themselves into dreams. Even if all other external sense-organs cease to function in dream, at least the organ of touch is not inoperative, as the mind (manas) does not lose its connection with the tactual organ even in dream, which is not confined to the external skin but pervades the whole organism according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. This is the peculiar doctrine of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. In dream we can perceive at least the heat of our organism which serves to revive the subconscious traces of past experience. Hence certain extra-organic or intra-organic stimuli serve as the exciting cause of the revival of subconscious traces in dream. Udayana does not recognize the purely hallucinatory character of dreams. According to him, all dreams are of the nature of illusions because they are initiated by extra-organic or intro-organic stimuli. Thus he anticipates the more recent account of dreams in Western psychology.

"Dream-appearances," says Mr. A. E. Taylor, "which Volkmann classes as hallucinations are more accurately regarded by Wundt as generally, if not always, based on illusion; i.e. they are misinterpretations of actual minimal sense-impressions such as those due to slight noises, to the positions of the sleeper’s limbs, to trifling pains, slight difficulties in breathing, palpitations, and the like." Sully says, "Dreams are commonly classified with hallucinations, and this rightly, since, as their common appellation of ‘vision’ suggests, they are for the most part the semblance of percepts in the absence of external impressions. At the same time, recent research goes to show that in many dreams something answering to the ‘external impression’ in waking perception is starting point”. Bergson says, "When we are sleeping naturally,

45 Illusions, p. 139.
it is not necessary to believe, as has often been supposed, that our senses are closed to external sensations. Our senses continue to be active.” “Our senses continue to act during sleep—they provide us with the outline, or at least the point of departure, of most of our dreams.”

Praśastapāda also describes the intra-organic stimulation of dream-illusions, which has been explained and illustrated by Udayana, Śridhara, Saṅkara Miśra, Jayanārāyaṇa Tarka-Paṅcānana and others. There are some dreams which are due to intra-organic disturbances such as the disorders of the flatulent, bilious, and phlegmatic humours of the organism, which are thought by the Hindu medical science to be the causes of all organic diseases (dhatudosā). Those who suffer from disorder of flatulence dream, that they are flying in the sky, wandering about on the earth, fleeing with fear from tigers, etc. These are kinesthetic dreams of levitation. And those who suffer from an inordinate secretion of bile dream, that they are entering into fire, embracing flames of fire, seeing golden mountains, flashes of lightning, meteor-falls, a huge conflagration, the scorching rays of the midday sun, etc. And those who suffer from phlegmatic disorder dream, that they are crossing the sea, bathing in rivers, being sprinkled with showers of rain, and seeing mountains of silver and the like.

There are many dreams which are not excited by peripheral nerve-stimulation but by the intensity of the subconscious impressions left by a recent experience (saṃskārapāta). On the physical side, these dreams are due to central stimulation, and hence may be called dream-hallucinations. These dreams are generally excited by intense passions. For instance, when a man, infatuated with love for a woman, or highly enraged at his enemy, constantly thinks of his beloved or enemy, and while thus thinking falls asleep, the series of thoughts produces a series of memory-images, which are manifested in consciousness as immediate sense-presentations owing to the strength of subconscious impressions. These dreams are purely hallucinatory in character.

We find a similar Buddhist account of dreams in Mr. Aung’s Introduction to Compendium of Philosophy in which he has

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"Dreams", p. 31, and p. 48.  
"P Bh., p. 184.  
"VSU., ix, 2, 7.  
"P Bh., p. 184.  
"NK., p. 185.
summarized Ariyavansa-Adiccaransi’s explanation of dreams. “When scenes are reproduced automatically in a dream with our eyes closed the obvious inference is that we see them by way of the door of the mind. Even in the case of peripheral stimulations, as when a light, brought near a sleeping man’s eye, is mistaken for a bonfire, it is this exaggerated light that is perceived in a dream by the mind-door. . . . . If these presentations do not come from without, they must come from within, from the ‘inner’ activities of mind. That is to say, if peripheral stimulations are absent, we must look to the automatic activity of mind itself for the source of these presentations; or, to speak in terms of physiology, we must look to the central activity of the cerebrum, which is now generally admitted to be the physical counterpart of the mind-door, the sensory nerves being the physical counterpart of the five-doors in an ‘organized sentient existence.’”

But even these centrally excited dreams due to the revival of subconscious traces are suggested by extra-organic or intra-organic stimuli according to Udayana.53

Caraka says that some dreams are about those objects which are desired (prārthita). Madhusūdana defines dream as the perception of objects due to the desires (vāsanā) in the mind (antahkarana) when the external sense-organs are inoperative.55 Sarīkara also recognizes the influence of desires (vāsanā) on dreams.56 Dr. M. N. Sircar truly observes: “Here the word ‘desire’ is significant, it introduces a volitional element in dream. It seems to hold that desires get freedom, in a state of passivity and acquire strength, finally appearing in the form of dream construction.”57 This reminds us of the Freudian theory according to which, dreams arise out of the repressed, unconscious desires. These dreams also should be regarded as dream-hallucinations, because they are not excited by peripheral stimulation; they are centrally initiated presentations or hallucinations.

But all dreams cannot be explained by peripheral stimulation, due to the action either of external stimuli or internal stimuli, and by central stimulation. There are certain dreams which are

54 NKS., ch. iii, p. 9.
55 Caraka Sarīkara, Indriyasādhaṇa, ch. v.
56 Siddhāntabindu, p. 189.
57 S.B., iii, 2, 6.
58 Vedantic Thought and Culture, p. 172.