prophetic in character; they are either auspicious or inauspicious. Auspicious dreams betoken good and inauspicious dreams forebode evil. The former are due to a certain merit (dharma) of the person, and the latter, to a certain demerit (adharma). Some of these prophetic dreams are echoes of our past waking experiences, while others apprehend entirely novel objects never perceived before. The former are brought about by the subconscious traces of our past experience, in co-operation with merit or demerit, according as they augur good or evil, while the latter, by merit or demerit alone, since there are no subconscious traces of such absolutely unknown objects. But merit and demerit are supernatural agents; so this explanation of prophetic dreams seems to be unscientific. But we may interpret the agency of merit and demerit as "the force of character of clairvoyant dreamers" after Mr. Aung.

Praśastapāda and his followers recognized only three causes of dreams: (1) intensity of subconscious impressions, (2) intra-organic disorders, and (3) merit and demerit of the dreamer (adrṣṭa).

And besides the peripherally excited dreams, centrally excited dreams, and prophetic dreams, Ariyavansa-Adiccaransi, a Buddhist writer, has recognized another class of dreams which are due to spirit-influence, or "due to suggestions from spiritualistic agents" in the language of Mr. Aung; these may include "dream-coincidences". They may be called telepathic dreams.

Besides these dream-cognitions which we do not recognize as dreams during the dream-state, sometimes we have another kind of dream-cognitions which are recognized as dreams. Sometimes in the dream-state we dream, that we have been dreaming of some thing; this dream-within-dream is called svapnāntika-jñāna, which has been rendered by Dr. Gaṅgānātha Jhā as a 'dream-end cognition'; in this 'dream-end cognition' a dream is the object of another dream. Such a 'dream-end cognition' arises in the mind of a person whose sense-organs have ceased their operations; so it is apt to be confounded with a mere dream.

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58 Sāṃskārapāṭavāt dñātudṛṣṭa adṛṣṭa. PBh., p. 184.
60 E.T. of NK., p. 388.
61 Cf. Sully: "There is sometimes an undertone of critical reflection, which is sufficient to produce a feeling of uncertainty and bewilderment, and in very rare cases to amount to a vague consciousness that the mental experience is a dream." Illusions, p. 137 n.
cognition. But Praśastapāda, Śrīdhara and Śaṅkara Miśra rightly point out that our ‘dream-end cognitions’ essentially differ from mere dream-cognitions, since the former are representative, while the latter are representative in character. The ‘dream-end cognitions’ are recollections of dream-cognitions, while dream-cognitions resemble direct sense-perceptions. Dream-cognitions are representative in character, though they arise out of the subconscious traces left in the mind by the previous perceptions in the waking condition; and these representative dream-cognitions again leave traces in the mind which give rise to ‘dream-end cognitions’. Thus dreams-within-dreams are representative in character.\[62\]

Caraka and Suśruta describe various kinds of dreams which are the prognostics of impending diseases and death. Caraka suggests a physiological explanation of the morbid dreams which precede death. These horrible dreams are due to the currents in the manovāhā nādiś being filled with very strong flatulent, bilious, and phlegmatic humours before death.\[63\] From this we may infer, that dreams are due to the excitation of the manovāhā nāḍī which, in the language of Dr. B. N. Seal, is “a generic name for the channels along which centrally initiated presentations (as in dreaming or hallucination) come to the sixth lobe of the Manaśchakra”.\[64\] According to Śaṅkara Miśra, dreams are produced by the mind when it is in the svapnavahā nāḍī and disconnected with the external sense-organs except the tactual organ; when the mind loses its connection even with the tactual organ and retires into the purītat, there is deep dreamless sleep.\[65\] Thus, according to Caraka, the manovāhā nāḍī is the seat of dreams; and according to Śaṅkara Miśra, the svapnavahā nāḍī is the seat of dreams. What is the relation between the manovāhā nāḍī and the svapnavahā nāḍī? Dr. B. N. Seal says that according to the writers on Yoga and Tantras, “the Manovāhā Nāḍī is the channel of the communication of the Jīva (soul) with the Manaśchakra (sensorium) at the base of the brain. It has been stated that the sensory currents are brought to the sensory ganglia along different nerves of the special senses. But this is not sufficient for them to rise to the level of discriminative consciousness (savikalpaka

\[62\] PBh., p. 184; NK., 185-6; Upaskāra, ix, 2, 8.
\[63\] Caraka Saṁhitā, Indriyāsthaṇa, ch. v.
\[64\] PSAH., p. 221.
\[65\] Yadā svapnavahanāḍīmadhyavartī manah tādā vahirlindriyasambandha-virahāt svapnajñānānyeva jāyante. KR., p. 120.
A communication must now be established between the Jīva (in the Sahasrāra Chakra, upper cerebrum) and the sensory currents received at the sensorium, and this is done by means of the Manovahā Nādi. When sensations are centrally initiated, as in dreams and hallucinations, a special Nādi (Swapanavahā Nādi), which appears to be only a branch of the Manovahā Nādi, serves as the channel of communication from the Jīva (soul) to the sensorium.”

4. Theories of Dreams

Mr. Aung gives a lucid account of the four Buddhist theories of dreams: “The first of these is clearly the physiological theory, which recognizes a source of dreams in the pathological conditions of the body. . . . . The theory of the induction of dreams by peripheral nerve-stimulation, due either to the action of external objects on sense-organs, or to disturbances in the peripheral regions of the nerves, is but a branch of the physiological theory. The second may be called the psychological theory. It recognizes the induction of dreams by central stimulation due to the automatic activities of the mind.” The theory of the induction of dreams by the agency of spirits may be stigmatized in the West as “the superstitious theory”. “But as the devas, or mythical beings as they would be termed in the West, are, according to Buddhism, but different grades of sentient beings in the thirty-one stages of existence, the theory in question, merely recognizes the suggestive action of mind upon mind, and may therefore be aptly called the telepathic or telepsychic theory”. The theory of the induction of prophetic dreams by the agency of merit and demerit may be called ‘the clairvoyant theory’. The theory which explains dreams as the fulfilment of desires may also be called the psychological theory. The different kinds of dreams described by Indian thinkers may be explained by these four theories.

“What is this that men call a dream and who is it who dreams it? It is a suggestion coming across the path of the mind which is what is called a dream. And there are six kinds of people who see dreams—the man who is of a windy humour,

46 PSAH., p. 223.
47 CP., pp. 48-99.
or of a bilious one, or of a phlegmatic one, the man who dreams dreams by the influence of a god, the man who does so by the influence of his own habits, and the man who does so in the way of prognostication. And of these, only the last kind of dreams is true; all the rest are false." This is the view of Nāgasena, a Buddhist philosopher. The Buddhists ascribe dreams to extra-organic stimuli, intra-organic disorders, subconscious impressions of past experiences, old habits, clairvoyant character, and the suggestive action of a superior mind. There is always an element of suggestion in dream."

**The Questions of King Milinda, Part II, pp. 157-8. (B.B.E.).**
CHAPTER XVI

ABNORMAL PERCEPTIONS

1. The Śāmkhya and the Ancient Medical Science

Īśvarakṛṣṇa mentions eleven kinds of anaesthesia of the sense-organs (indriya-badha) corresponding to the eleven kinds of sense-organs—five sensory organs, five motor organs, and one central sensory as distinguished from the peripheral organs. And besides these eleven kinds of sense-disorders and their effects on the intellect, he mentions seventeen other kinds of the disorders of the intellect (buddhibadha). Māṭhara says that indriyabadha means the incapacity of the sense-organs for apprehending their objects; the sense-disorders cannot produce right apprehension.

Vācaspatimiśra explains the disorders of the five sense-organs as deafness (bādhirya) or anaesthesia of the auditory organ, cutaneous insensitivity (kuṣṭhītā) or anaesthesia of the tactual organ, blindness (anātha) or anaesthesia of the visual organ, numbness of the tongue and loss of the sense of taste (jaḍata) or anaesthesia of the gustatory organ, and insensitivity to smell (ajīghratā) or anaesthesia of the olfactory organ. He describes the abnormalities of the motor organs as dumbness (mūkatā) or paralysis of the vocal organ, paralysis of the hands or prehensory organ (kaunṣya), paralysis of the legs or the locomotive organ (pañgutva), paralysis of the excretory organ (udāvarta), and impotence or paralysis of the generative organ (klaibya). And he explains the anaesthesia of the mind as utter insensibility to pleasure, pain and the like (mādatā). Gauḍapāda regards insanity (unmāda) as the anaesthesia of the mind.

Corresponding to these eleven kinds of sense-disorders there are eleven kinds of intellectual disorders (buddhibadha) which consist in the non-production of psychoses corresponding to peripheral and central stimulations, or in the production of psychoses which are not in keeping with peripheral and central stimulations. And besides these eleven kinds of disorders of the

1 SK., 49.
2 SK., 49; STK., 49.
3 Māṭharaṇvṛtti, 49.
intellect corresponding to the eleven kinds of sense-disorders, there are seventeen kinds of abnormalities which are purely intellectual due to some defects of the intellect, and do not owe their origin to the stimulation of the peripheral organs or the central sensory affected by pathological disorders. These intellectual disorders consist in the production of such psychoses as are contradictory to the nine kinds of tuṣṭi or intellectual complacence and eight kinds of siddhi or fruition of the peripheral organs or the central sensory affected by pathological disorders. These intellectual disorders consist in the production of such psychoses as are contradictory to the nine kinds of tuṣṭi or intellectual complacence and eight kinds of siddhi or fruition of intellectual operations. Thus altogether there are twenty-eight kinds of disorders of the intellect.4

In the medical works of the ancient Hindus we find a description and explanation of various kinds of sense-disorders and consequent abnormalities in sense-perception. Our account of abnormal perceptions would be incomplete without a reference to this account in the medical works. First we shall give an account of the abnormalities of visual perception as described by Suśruta. But his account of the disorders of visual perception cannot be fully understood unless we understand his view of the mechanism of the visual organ. So we briefly refer to the mechanism of the eye described by him.

The eye-ball (nayana-budbuda) is almost round in shape and about an inch in diameter. It is made up of five elements. The muscles of the eye-ball are formed by the solid elements of earth (bhū); the blood in the veins and arteries of the eye-ball is formed by the element of heat (tejas); the black part of the eye-ball (iris, etc.) in which the pupil is situated is formed by the gaseous element (vāyu); the white part of the eye-ball (vitreous body) is made up of the fluid element (jala); and the lachrymal or other ducts or sacs (aṣrumārga) through which the secretions are discharged, are made up of the ethereal element (ākāśa). There are five maṇḍalas, or circles, and six paṭalas, or layers in the eye. The five maṇḍalas are the following, viz. (1) the drṣṭimandala (the pupil), (2) the kṛṣṇa-maṇḍala (the choroid), (3) the śveta-maṇḍala (the sclerotic and cornea), (4) the vartma-maṇḍala (the eye-lid).

*STK., 49, and Gauḍapādabhāṣya, 49.
and (5) the pakṣma-maṇḍala (the circle of the eye-lashes). Of the different parts of the eye-ball are held together by the blood-vessels, the muscles, the vitreous body, and the choroid. Beyond the choroid, the eye-ball is held (in the orbit) by a mass of Śleṣmā (viscid substance—capsule of Tenon) supported by a number of vessels. The deranged Doṣas which pass upward to the region of the eyes through the channels of the up-coursing veins and nerves give rise to a good many dreadful diseases in that region."

2. Abnormal Perceptions

According to the Hindu medical science, all diseases are due to the provocation of three humours of the body, flatulent, bilious, and phlegmatic. So the disorders of visual perception are brought about by the bodily humours (doṣas) attacking the different layers of the eye. (1) "All external objects appear dim and hazy to the sight when the deranged Doṣas of the locality passing through the veins (Sirā) of the eye, get into and are incarcerated within the first Paṭala (innermost coat) of the pupil (Driṣṭi)." (2) "False images of gnats, flies, hairs, nets or cobwebs, rings (circular patches), flags, ear-rings appear to the sight, and the external objects seem to be enveloped in mist or haze or as if laid under a sheet of water or as viewed in rain and on cloudy days, and meteors of different colours seem to be falling constantly in all directions in the event of the deranged Doṣas being similarly confined in the second Paṭala (coat) of the Driṣṭi. In such cases the near appearance of an actually remote object and the contrary (Miopia and Biopia) also should be ascribed to some deficiency in the range of vision (error of refraction in the crystalline lens) which incapacitates the patient from looking through the eye and hence from threading a needle." (3) "Objects situate high above are seen and these placed below remain unobserved when the deranged Doṣas are infiltrated in the third Paṭala (coat) of the Driṣṭi. The Doṣas affecting the Driṣṭi (crystalline lens), if highly enraged, impart their specific colours to the objects of vision. . . . . The deranged Doṣas situated at and obstructing the lower, upper, and lateral parts of the Driṣṭi (crystalline lens) respectively shut out the view of near, distant and laterally situate

1 Suśrutaśārṅhitā, Uttaratantra, E.T. by Kuñjalī Bhishagrātana, Ch. I.
2 Ibid, vol. iii, p. 4.
objects. A dim and confused view of the external world is all that can be had when the deranged Doṣas spread over and affect the whole of the Driṣṭi (crystalline lens). A thing appears to the sight as if cut into two (bifurcated) when the deranged Doṣas affect the middle part of the lens, and as triply divided and severed when the Doṣas are scattered in two parts; while a multifarious image of the same object is the result of the manifold distributions of movability of the Doṣas over the Driṣṭi.” (4) When the fourth pātala of the eye is attacked by the deranged humours, we have a loss of vision (timira). When the vision is completely obstructed by the deranged humours, it is called liṅganāśa (blindness). When liṅganāśa is not deep-seated but superficial, we have only a faint perception of the images of the sun, the moon and the stars, the heaven, a flash of lightning, and such other highly brilliant objects. The liṅganāśa (blindness) is also called nīlikā and kāca.⁴

There are various kinds of timira or loss of vision. In the type of timara due to the derangement of the flatulent humour (vāṭaja), external objects appear to the sight as cloudy, moving, crooked, and red. In the type of timira due to the derangement of the bilious humour (pittaja), external objects appear to be invested with the different colours of the spectrum, of the glow-worm, of the flash of lightning, of the feathers of a peacock, or coloured with a dark blue tint. In the type of timira due to the derangement of the phlegmatic humour (kopajja), all objects appear to the sight as covered with a thick white coat like that of a patch of white cloud, and look white, oily, and dull, and appear hazy and cloudy on a fine day, or as if laid under a sheet of water. In the type of timica due to deranged blood (raktaja), all objects appear red or enveloped in gloom, and they assume a greyish, blackish or variegated colour. In another type of timira (sāṇnipātika), external objects appear to the vision as doubled or trebled, variegated and confused, and abnormal images of stars and planets float about in the vision. In the type of timira due to deranged bile in concert with deranged blood, which is called parimlāyi, the quarters of the heaven look yellow and appear to the sight as if brilliant with the light of the rising

⁴Ibid., vol. iii, ch. vii.
sun, and trees appear as if sparkling with the flashes of glow-worms.

Besides these six types of liṅgaṅaśa, there are six other kinds peculiar to the drṣṭi (pupil), which are called pīta-vidagdha-drṣṭi, slesma-vidagdha-drṣṭi, dhūma-drṣṭi, hrasva-jātya, nakulāndhya and gambhirika. (1) In pīta-vidagdha-drṣṭi, all external objects appear yellow to the sight, and nothing can be seen in the day, but things can be seen only at night. It is due to an accumulation of the deranged bile in the third pātala or coat of the eye. (2) In slesma-vidagdha-drṣṭi all external objects appear white to the sight, and they can be seen only in the day, but not at night; this is called nocturnal blindness. It is due to an accumulation of the deranged phlegm in all the three pātulas or coats of the eye. (3) In dhūma-drṣṭi the external objects appear smoky. It is due to grief, high fever, excessive physical exercise, or injury to head, etc. (4) In hrasva-jātya small objects can be seen with the greatest difficulty even in the day-time, but they can be seen easily and distinctly at night. (5) In nakulāndhya the external objects appear multi-coloured in the day-time, and nothing can be seen at night. (6) In gambhirika the pupil is contracted and deformed and sinks into the socket, attended with an extreme pain in the affected parts.⁹

Caraka says that when the cerebrum is injured the eye-sight is affected and we have disorders in visual perception.¹⁰ And he attributes blindness (timira) to the excessive provocation of the flatulent humour.¹¹

Suṣruta describes three kinds of disorders in sound-perception, viz. praṇāda or karna-nāda, karna-kṣveḍa, and bādhirya. In praṇāda or karna-nāda, ringing and various other sounds are heard in the ear. In karna-kṣveḍa, only a peculiar type of sound is heard in the ear. It differs from karna-nāda in that in this disease only a sound of a special kind, viz. that of a wind-pipe, is heard in the ear, while in the latter various kinds of sounds are produced in the ear. In deafness (bādhirya) there is a complete loss of hearing.¹² According to Caraka complete deafness (bādhirya) is due to the provocation of the flatulent humour. He mentions two other kinds of disorders in auditory perception,

viz. asabda-śravaṇa and uccaśīrūti, which also are due to the
provocation of the flatulent humour. The former is that kind
of deafness in which a person can hear words uttered very softly
or in whispers only. The latter is that form of deafness in which
a person hears only such words as are uttered very loudly.  

Suśruta describes many disorders of the olfactory organ, of
which one may be regarded as a cause of the loss of the sense of
smell. In apināsa (obstruction in the nostrils) there is a choking
and burning sensation in the nostrils with a deposit of filthy slimy
mucus in their passages, which deaden the sense of smell and
taste for the time being. In a malignant type of catarrh
(pratisyāya), too, there is an insensibility to smell.  

Caraka also refers to ghrāṇa-nāsa which consists in the loss
of the sensation of smell, and is due to the provocation of the
flatulent humour.  

Caraka mentions arasajñātā as a disease of the tongue in
which there is a complete loss of the sensation of taste; it is due
to the provocation of the flatulent humour. He also describes
the different kinds of tastes owing to the provocation of different
kinds of humours. Owing to the provocation of the flatulent
humour a person has an astringent taste in the mouth, and
sometimes does not feel any taste at all. Owing to the provoca-
tion of the bilious humour a person feels in his tongue the
presence of an acrid or sour taste. Owing to the provocation
of the phlegmatic humour a person feels in his mouth the presence
of a sweet taste. And owing to the simultaneous provocation of
all the three humours, a person feels the presence of many tastes
in his mouth. Caraka also refers to the disease of tiktāsyatā or
a constant bitter taste in the mouth owing to the provocation of
bilious humour. He also refers to mukhamādhurya or a constant
sweet taste in the mouth, and kaśāyāsyatā or a constant astringent
taste in the mouth.  

Caraka and Suśruta describe cutaneous affections as kuṣṭhas,
which are of various kinds and which give rise to various kinds
of disordered cutaneous sensations. According to Suśruta, when
the cutaneous affection is confined only to the serous fluid of the

13 Caraka Saṁhitā, Sūtra-sthāna, lesson xx, 12.
14 Suśruta Saṁhitā, Uttar Tantra, ch. xxii.
15 Caraka Saṁhitā, Sūtra-sthāna, lesson xx, 12.
16 Caraka Saṁhitā, Sūtra-sthāna, lesson x.
skin, there are the following symptoms, viz. loss of the perception of touch, itching sensation, etc.; when it is confined to the blood, it brings about complete anaesthesia; when it affects only the flesh, there are various symptoms such as excruciating pricking pain in the affected part and its numbness; and when it affects the fat, the body seems to be covered with a plaster. In the various kinds of cutaneous affections described by Caraka and Suśruta there is partial or complete anaesthesia together with various kinds of disorders in cutaneous, organic, and muscular sensations.

Caraka also mentions various other abnormalities in tactile sensations (including organic and muscular sensations) such as ekāṅgaroga (partial or local paralysis), paksabadha (side paralysis), sarvāṅgaroga (complete paralysis), danḍaka (stiffness of the whole body like a log of wood), oṣa (the disease in which the patient feels the sensation of fire being always placed very near his body), ploṣa (the disease in which the patient has the sensation of his body being slightly scorched by fire), dāha (a sensation of burning experienced in every part of the body), davaṭhu (a sensation of every part of the body having been subject to painful inflammation), antardāha (a burning sensation within the body, generally within the thorax), aṁsadāha (a burning sensation in the shoulders), uṣmādhiṅkya (excess of internal heat in the body), māṁsandāha (a sensation of burning in the flesh), etc.

Caraka refers to the abnormalities of the vocal organ such as vāksaṅga (temporary dumbness or difficulty in speaking, e.g. stammering), gadgadatva (slowness of speech), and mūkatava (complete dumbness). When the cerebrum is injured, there are slowness of speech, loss of voice, and complete dumbness. Temporary dumbness (vāksaṅga) and complete dumbness (mūkatava) are due to the provocation of the flatulent humour.

Caraka asserts that when the cerebrum is injured there is a loss of motor effort (ceṣṭānāśa). According to him, the heart is the seat of the mind, the intellect, and consciousness. But the cerebrum is the seat of sensory and motor centres. Just as the rays of the sun have their seat in the sun, so the sensory and

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17 Suśruta Saṁhitā, Nidāna-sthāna, ch. v.
18 Ibid., ch. v; Caraka Saṁhitā, Sūtra-sthāna, ch. xx.
19 Caraka Saṁhitā, Sūtra-sthāna, lesson x.
20 Caraka Saṁhitā, Siddhāsthāna, ix, 9.
21 Ibid., Sūtra-sthāna, xx, 12.
22 Ibid., Siddhāsthāna, ch. ix, 9.
motor organs and the vital currents of the sense-organs have their seat in the cerebrum.23

According to Caraka, the heart is the seat of consciousness. So when the heart is injured, we have epilepsy (apasmāra), insanity (unnāda), delirium (pralāpa), and loss of the mind (cittanāśa). This paralysis of the mind (cittanāśa) may be called 'mental blindness' in the language of William James. "When mental blindness is more complete," says James, "neither sight, touch, nor sound avails to steer the patient, and a sort of dementia which has been called asymbolia or apraxia is the result."24

According to Caraka, the prāna and the udāna, which are biomorphic forces, the mind (manas), the intellect (budhāṇi), and consciousness (cetanā) have their seat in the heart.25 So when the heart is overpowered by the provocation of the phlegmatic humour, consciousness is benumbed, and lapses into semi-unconsciousness (tandrā).26 And when the heart is overpowered by the provocation of the flatulent humour, consciousness is suspended and lapses into torpor or unconsciousness (moha).

3. Causes of Sense-disorders and Mental Disorders

According to Caraka, there are four kinds of correlation or contact of the sense-organs with their objects, viz. atiyoga, or excess of contact, ayoga or total absence of contact, hinayoga or sparing or partial contact, and mithyāyoga or contact of sense-organs with disagreeable objects. Atiyoga corresponds to overuse of a sense-organ, ayoga, to its non-use, hinayoga, to its under-use, and mithyāyoga, to its misuse. This account of Caraka has a strangely modern ring. There is no doubt that sense-disorders are, to a great extent, due to the abnormal functioning of the sense-organs. So Caraka’s explanation is very significant. He accounts for the disorders of the sense-organs and consequent abnormalities of sense-perceptions by the excess of correlation, absence of correlation, insufficient correlation, and injudicious correlation of the sense-organs with their respective objects. Yathāyoga or judicious correlation of a sense-organ with its objects preserves the normal condition of the organ, and also keeps the

23 Ibid., Siddhisthāna, ch. ix, 5.
25 Caraka Sarthātā, Siddhisthāna, ix. 4.
26 Ibid., ix, 28.
perceptions produced by that organ unimpaired. But excessive exercise, absence of judicious exercise, insufficient exercise, and injudicious exercise impair the sense-organs, and consequently impair the perceptions produced by them. Caraka gives us some examples to illustrate the different kinds of correlation of the sense-organs with their objects. A continuous gaze at very bright objects is an example of excessive correlation of the visual organ. Total abstention from exercising the eye is the absence of correlation. The sight of objects that are very minute or very distant, or that are hateful, terrible, amazing, repulsive, or extremely ugly is an example of injudicious correlation. All these impair the sense of vision. Excessive correlation of the auditory organ arises from constantly exposing the ear to the stunning report of thunder or beat of a drum or loud cries. Total abstention from hearing by closing the ears is the absence of correlation. Injudicious correlation arises from hearing sounds that are rough, harsh, dreadful, uncongenial, disagreeable, and indicative of danger. These impair the sense of hearing. Excessive correlation of the olfactory organ arises from constantly smelling very keen and powerful scents which call forth tears, excite nausea, produce stupefaction, etc. Total abstention from all scents is the absence of correlation. Injudicious correlation arises from smelling odours emitted by putrid objects, or objects that are poisonous, disagreeable, or repulsive. These impair the sense of smell. Excessive correlation of the gustatory organ arises when the objects producing any of the six kinds of taste are taken in an excessive degree. Total abstention from tasting is the absence of correlation. Injudicious correlation arises from tasting things which are made up of incompatible ingredients, or which are not suitable to the organism. These impair the sense of taste. Excessive correlation of the tactual organ arises from exposure to excessive heat and cold, excessive indulgence in bathing and rubbing the skin with oil, etc., and indulgence in sudden change of temperature. Total abstention from enjoying the sense of touch, or from allowing the body to be touched, is the absence of correlation. Contact of the body with poisonous objects, or with untimely heat and cold is injudicious correlation. These impair the sense of touch.\footnote{Caraka Saṁhitā, Sūstrastra, ch. xi, 27-32. E.T. (Abinash Chandra Kaviratna).}
BOOK VII

CHAPTER XVII

SUPER-NORMAL PERCEPTIONS

1. Introduction

In the last Book we have dealt with indefinite perceptions, illusions and hallucinations, dreams, and abnormal perceptions. In this Book we shall deal with super-normal perceptions, divine perception, the perception of the individual witness (Jīva-Sākṣīn), and the perception of the divine witness (Īsvara-Sākṣīn).

The Indian treatment of super-normal perceptions is more descriptive than explanatory. The Indian philosophers have distinguished between abnormal perceptions and super-normal perceptions, inasmuch as the former are disorders and aberrations of perception, while the latter are the higher grades of perception. Super-normal perceptions are above the general laws and conditions of normal perceptions. They transcend the categories of time, space, and causality, and apprehend the real nature of things divested of all their accidental associations of names, concepts, and so forth. So we cannot understand their nature by appealing to the facts of our ordinary perceptions. We must have a conception of these higher grades of super-normal perception on the basis of speculation, unless we ourselves attain the stage of higher intuitions. And Indian philosophers have tried to arrive at a conception of these super-normal perceptions by using speculative arguments and appealing to their own higher intuitions. Almost all schools of Indian philosophers believe in supernormal perceptions. Only the materialist Cārvāka does not believe in any other source of knowledge than sense-perception. And the Mīmāṁsaka also denies the possibility of super-normal perceptions, because, according to him, the past, the future, the distant, and the subtle can be known only through the injunctions of the Vedas. But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the Sāmkhya-Pātañjala, the Vedāntist, the Buddhist, and the Jaina believe in super-normal perceptions, though they give different accounts of them.
The modern science of hypnotism and other occult and esoteric sciences will find sufficient material for research and investigation in the Indian account of super-normal perceptions. They will find in it evidences of auto-suggestion, clairvoyance, clairaudience, hyperæsthesia of vision, hearing, touch, etc., hypermnesia, thought-reading, thought-transference or telepathy, and different kinds of trance or ecstasy.

2. The Mimāmsaka Denial of Yogi-Pratyakṣa

Yāmunācārya gives us a lucid account of the Mimāmsaka argument against the possibility of yogic or ecstatic intuition. Is yogic perception sensuous or non-sensuous? Is it produced by the sense-organs or not? If it is sensuous, is it produced by the external sense-organs or by the internal organ or mind? The external sense-organs produce cognitions of their appropriate objects only when they come in contact with their objects. But as the external sense-organs can never come in contact with distant, past, and future objects, they can never produce cognitions of these objects. Hence yogic perception can never be produced by the external sense-organs. Nor can it be produced by the mind. For the mind can produce the perception of only mental states, independently of the external sense-organs. But it cannot produce the perception of external objects independently of the external sense-organs. If the mind did not depend upon the external sense-organs to produce the perception of external objects, then there would be no need of the external organs at all in the perception of external objects, and no one would be blind or deaf. Hence the Māṁśaka concludes that external objects cannot be perceived through the mind independently of the peripheral organs. Nor can it be said that the external organs can apprehend objects even without coming in contact with them, when they attain the highest degree of excellence through the powers of occult medicines, incantations, and the practice of austerities and intense meditation; for all that these can do is to bring about a manifestation of only the natural capacities of the sense-organs, which are not unlimited, but strictly limited within their proper sphere. The ear can never produce the perception of colour or taste, even if it is extremely refined by the application of medicines. A sense-organ can never transcend its
natural limitations, even when it attains the highest degree of perfection by intense meditation; the function of a sense-organ is always restricted within a limited sphere; so a sense-organ, even in its highest degree of excellence, cannot transcend its natural limits. Hence sensuous knowledge can never apprehend past, distant, and future objects.

The perception of the Yōgin is said to be the result of intense meditation. But though the cognition produced by constant meditation is manifested as a distinct presentation, does it cognize a thing as apprehended in the past or more than that? If it apprehends exactly the same thing as was apprehended in the past, then the cognition produced by intense meditation is nothing but memory or reproduction of the past experience. And if it apprehends more than what was perceived in the past, then it is illusory as it apprehends something which has no real existence. Therefore, either the intuition of the Yōgin is not of the nature of perception, or, if it is perceptual, it is illusory. If it is regarded as perceptual in character, then it cannot transgress the general condition of perception, that it must be produced by the contact of a sense-organ with its proper object. Hence the Mīmāṃsaka concludes that there can be no yogic perception of past, distant, and future objects and that these can be known only through the injunction of the Vedas.¹

3. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika View of Yogi-pratyakṣa

Śrīdhara proves the possibility of yogic perception by the following arguments: In the first place, just as by constant practice we learn new things in different sciences and arts, so by the collective force of constant meditation upon the self, ākāśa, and other super-sensible objects we acquire true knowledge of these objects. In the second place, the varying grades of the intellect must reach the highest limit beyond which it cannot go, because they are varying grades, like the varying grades of magnitude.² Jayanta Bhaṭṭa also offers the same argument. Just as there are various degrees of whiteness and other qualities, so there are various degrees of the faculty of perception; and the highest degree of perfection is reached by man in yogic perception

¹ Siddhātraya, pp. 70-2. HIP., 1, p. 805.
² NK., p. 196; Gangānātha Jha, E.T., p. 413.
which apprehends all objects, subtle, hidden, remote, past, future, and the like; and there is nothing improbable in this. We see only proximate objects with the help of light. But cats can see objects even in utter darkness, and vultures can see objects from a very great distance. So we can legitimately suppose, that we can acquire super-sensuous vision by constant practice in meditation.\(^1\)

But it has been objected that the mere presence of the varying degrees of an object does not necessarily imply that it should reach the highest limit. For instance, there are varying degrees of heat when water is heated; but we never find it reaching the highest limit of heat and turning into fire itself; nor do we ever perceive the highest limit of jumping as there is no man who can jump over all the three worlds. Śrīdhara replies that this objection does not apply to yogic practices. That property which has a permanent substratum, and which produces a peculiarity in it gradually reaches the highest limit of excellence through constant practice. For instance, when gold is repeatedly heated and treated by the method of 'putapāka' its purity gradually reaches the highest limit and acquires the character of the rakṣasāra. As for the heating of water, it has no permanent substratum; so repetition cannot bring it up to the highest limit of perfection. That water has no permanent substratum is proved by the fact that it entirely disappears on the application of intense heat. Then as for the practice of jumping it does not produce any peculiarity in its substratum; because the first act of jumping is totally destroyed and leaves no such trace behind, so that the second and subsequent acts of jumping may be helped by the effect of the first act of jumping; all these acts of jumping are effects of different forces and efforts, and hence any subsequent excellence of jumping may not be due to the previous jumping. It is for this reason that when a man is tired by three or four jumps his limit of jumping begins to decline, owing to the decrease of strength. As for the intellect (buddhi), on the other hand, it has a permanent substratum and produces a peculiarity in it; since we find that though something is quite unintelligible to us at first, it becomes thoroughly intelligible when we repeatedly apply intelligence to it. Thus the more we practise meditation upon an object, the greater peculiarity is produced in it at

\(^{1}\)NM., p. 103.
each step of the practice, and when the practice is kept up continuously for a long time, the intellect acquires a fresh force due to the peculiar powers or merit (dharma) born of yoga and must reach its highest limit of excellence. And there is nothing unreasonable in this.⁴

Then, again, it has been objected that Yogis cannot perceive super-sensuous objects because they are living beings like ourselves. Śrīdhara criticizes this argument. The Yogis are, no doubt, living beings but they may be omniscient, too. The character of living beings is not inconsistent with omniscience; they are not mutually exclusive of each other. No inconsistency has ever been found between omniscience and the character of living beings. But since we cannot definitely ascertain whether our want of omniscience is due to our character of living beings, or due to the absence of the peculiar power of dharma born of yoga which is regarded as the cause of omniscience, there is a doubtful concomitance of omniscience with the character of living beings. And because there is a doubtful concomitance between the character of living beings and omniscience, the former can never prove the inference that Yogis cannot have super-sensuous knowledge because they are living beings. But the fact that the dharma, or a peculiar power born of yoga, is the cause of super-sensuous knowledge is well-known to us. So Śrīdhara concludes that our want of omniscience is due to the absence of the peculiar power of dharma produced by constant meditation.⁵

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa describes the nature of yogic perception. The Yogis can perceive all objects past, distant, and future, hidden, subtle, and remote, and even dharma which is absolutely super-sensible to us. But do the Yogis perceive all objects by one cognition or by many cognitions? Not by one cognition, since contradictory qualities like heat and cold cannot be apprehended by a single cognition. Nor by many cognitions, since they cannot arise simultaneously owing to the atomic nature of manas; and if they are produced successively, then Yogis will require infinite time to perceive all the objects of the world. Hence Yogis cannot be omniscient. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa refutes this objection. Yogis perceive all objects of the world simultaneously by one cognition,

⁴ NK., pp. 196-7; E.T., pp. 413-14.
and there is nothing unreasonable in it. It is found in actual experience that contradictory qualities like blue, yellow, etc., do appear in a single psychosis (citrapratyaya), and heat and cold are perceived simultaneously by a person with the lower part of his body plunged in water and the upper part of his body in the scorching rays of the sun. Thus Jayanta Bhaṭṭa concludes that Yogis perceive all objects of the world simultaneously by a single intuition.⁴

Bhāsarvajña divides perception into two kinds, yogic perception (yogipratyakṣa), and non-yogic perception (ayogipratyakṣa). He defines ordinary or non-yogic perception as direct and immediate apprehension of gross objects, produced by a particular relation between sense-organs and their objects with the help of light, time ('now'), space ('here'), merit or demerit of the person. And he defines yogic perception as direct and immediate apprehension of distant, past, future, and subtle objects.⁷

If Yogis can perceive all objects of the world, past, present, future, hidden, subtle, and remote, and supersensible objects like dharma, etc., how do they differ from omniscient God? How does the perception of Yogis differ from divine perception? Jayanta Bhaṭṭa replies that the difference lies in that the omniscience of Yogis is produced by constant meditation, while divine omniscience is eternal. Moreover, the divine perception of dharma (Moral Law) is natural to God; dharma constitutes the essential nature of God, which is the cause of the Vedic injunctions of dharma. But Yogis at first learn the real nature of dharma from the Vedic injunctions and then by unceasing practice in meditation they come to perceive it; and when they acquire an intuition of it, the conception that the Vedic injunction is the ultimate standard of duty or moral obligation loses its hold upon their minds.⁸

Praśastapāda divides yogic perception into two kinds, viz. (i) yuktrapratyakṣa or the perception of those who are in ecstasy, and (ii) viyuktrapratyakṣa or the perception of those who have fallen off from ecstasy. Those who are in a state of ecstasy can perceive their own selves, the selves of others, ākāśa, space, time,

⁴ Yogapad ekayaiva buddhyā sarvatra sarvān arthān draksyanti yogināḥ. NM., pp. 107-8.
⁷ NSār., p. 3, and NTD., p. 82.
⁸ Iśvarasya nityam eva jānām yoginām tu yogabhāvanābhyaśa-prabhavam. NM., p. 106. NP., p. 72.
atoms, air, manas, and the qualities, actions generalities, and particularities inhering in these, and inherence itself through the manas aided by the peculiar powers (dharma) produced by meditation. And those who have fallen off from ecstasy perceive subtle, hidden, and remote things, owing to the fourfold contact of the self, manas, sense-organs and objects, and by virtue of the peculiar powers produced by meditation.9

Bhāsarvajña also follows Praśastapāda in dividing yogic perception into two kinds: (1) ecstatic intuition or intuition in the state of ecstasy, and (2) non-ecstatic intuition or intuition out of the state of ecstasy. In the ecstatic condition there is no peripheral stimulation or intercourse of the external sense-organs with outward objects; but the perception of all the objects follows from the conjunction of the self with the internal organ (manas), aided by a certain dharma brought about by intense meditation and the grace of God. Thus in the state of ecstasy the internal organ alone is operative, the external organs being entirely inoperative at the time. But in the non-ecstatic condition the yogic perception of supersensible objects follows from the four-fold, three-fold or two-fold contact as required in different cases.10 When objects are perceived through the olfactory organ, the gustatory organ, or the tactual organ, perception is brought about by the four-fold contact of the self with the manas, of the manas with the external sense-organs, and of these external sense-organs with their proper objects. In the perception of sound there is the three-fold contact of the self with the manas; and of the manas with the auditory organ. And in the perception of pleasure, pain, etc., there is the two-fold contact of the self with the manas.11

Similarly the Neo-Naiyāyikas divide yogic perception into two kinds: (1) the perception of a Yogan who has attained union with the supreme Being (yukta), and (2) the perception of a yogin who is endeavouring to attain such a union (yujñāna). The first yogin enjoys a constant perception of all the objects of the world, ether, atoms, etc., through his mind aided by a certain dharma born of meditation, while the second Yogan can acquire perception of all the objects with a little effort of attention or meditation.12

9 PBh., p. 187; NP., pp. 72-75.
10 NSār., p. 3.
11 NTD., p. 83.
12 BhP., 63; SM., pp. 284-5. HIP., i, pp. 472-3.
Is yogic perception determinate (sāvikālpa) or indeterminate (nirvikālpa)? Jayasimhasūri holds that the yogic perception in the state of ecstasy is indeterminate, since the complete focussing of attention in ecstasy cannot be brought about by a determinate perception. There is no element of discrimination in the yogic intuition in the state of ecstasy. But it must not be supposed, that the yogic intuition in ecstasy is the same as our indeterminate perception which apprehends the mere forms of objects, and not their mutual relations. Our indeterminate perception marks the lowest stage of immediacy, while the yogic intuition in ecstasy marks the highest limit of immediacy. Our indeterminate perception is below determinate perception, while the indeterminate perception of the Yogin in a state of ecstasy is above determinate perception and, indeed, above all determinate cognitions, presentative and representative, perceptual and conceptual. Our indeterminate perception is immediate 'sense-perception', while that of the Yogin in ecstasy is immediate 'intellectual intuition'. Our indeterminate perception apprehends the mere form of an object through an external sense-organ, while that of the Yogin in ecstasy apprehends all objects of the world simultaneously. Therein lies the speciality of the indeterminate perception of the Yogin in a state of ecstasy. But the perception of a Yogin out of the condition of ecstasy can be both indeterminate and determinate.¹³ Dharmottara also holds that the perception of a Yogin in the highest stage is indeterminate.

Śrīdhara explains the meaning of yoga as ecstasy (sāmādhi), which is of two kinds, conscious (asamprajñāta) and supra-conscious (asamprajñāta). The word asamprajñāta has been translated by Dr. Gaṅgānatha Jha as unconscious. And it has been translated by Professor Krishna Chandra Bhattacharya as supra-conscious, and by Dr. S. N. Das Gupta as ultra-cognitive. The latter seems to be the better version. In the highest stage of ecstasy there is the most clear, most distinct, most vivid, and most concentrated consciousness of the self. It is supra-conscious rather than unconscious. The conscious ecstasy consists in the union of the manas, which has been controlled and concentrated on an aspect of the self, with the self in which there is a desire for true knowledge. And the supra-conscious ecstasy consists in the union of the controlled manas with an aspect of the self in which there

¹³ NTD., p. 86.
is no desire owing to its unruffled condition. The supra-conscious ecstasy is fully developed in the highest stage of the spiritual life of a person who has thoroughly conquered all desires and cravings and seeks only deliverance; it does not produce any merit (dharma) as there is no desire in the self to acquire merit and avoid demerit; nor does it tend towards any external object as the manas is concentrated on the self alone. The conscious ecstasy, on the other hand, is always aided by a certain desire, and as such brings about a true knowledge of the object for which there is a desire in the self.\textsuperscript{14}

Praśastapāda describes the nature of sagic intuition (ārṣajñāna) which is kindred to yogic perception. The sages who are the authors of the śāstras have a true intuitive cognition of all objects, past, present, and future, and also of Dharma (Moral Law) and other supersensible objects, owing to the contact of the manas with the self and a peculiar dharma or power born of austerities; such an intuitive cognition is called ārṣa-jñāna. This cognition is perceptual in character, since it is not produced by inferential marks and so forth; but it differs from ordinary perception in that it is not produced by the external organs, but by the manas with the help of certain powers acquired by learning, austerities, and meditation. This intuition is also called prātibhā-jñāna, since it is a distinct and vivid perception which is not produced by the sense-organs, inferential marks, and so forth. It is a valid cognition as it is free from doubts and illusions. It is not a doubtful cognition because it does not oscillate between two alternatives. It is not an illusion as it is actually found to agree with facts.\textsuperscript{15}

Jayasimhasūri asserts that essentially there is no difference between sagic intuition (ārṣajñāna) and yogic intuition (yogipratyakṣa), since both of them are produced by a peculiar dharma or merit. The only difference between them lies in the fact, that the former is produced by the practice of austerities (tapojañita), while the latter is produced by meditation (yoga). Both of them are non-sensuous. The organ of both these kinds of higher intuition is the manas. Veṅkaṭanātha includes sagic intuition in yogic intuition.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{14} NK., pp. 195-6; E.T., pp. 411-12.
\textsuperscript{15} Pbh. and NK., p. 258. HIP., i, pp. 289, 805.
\textsuperscript{16} NTD., p. 84; NP., pp. 75-6.
Besides the intuitions of Yogis and sages Praśastapāda describes the perceptions of occultists who cannot perceive supersensible objects like Yogis and sages, but can perceive only those sensible things which are too subtle or too remote for our gross sense-organs, and as such are hidden from our view. They can perceive these subtle, remote, and hidden objects not through the manas by meditation or austerities like yogis and sages, but through the external sense-organs refined by the application of certain unguents and the like which produce certain occult powers. And such an occult perception is purely sensuous, since it is produced by the external sense-organs with the help of certain occult medicines. Thus the difference between ordinary perception and occult perception lies in that the former is produced by the sense-organs unaided by any external applications, while the latter is produced by the sense-organs strengthened and refined by the application of occult medicines. But both of them are sensuous. Praśastapāda and his commentators, Śrīdhara, Udayana and others, do not explain how occult powers are generated in the sense-organs by the application of occult medicines. They have simply recorded occult perception as a fact of experience.

According to Praśastapāda, higher intuition (prātibhajñāna) generally belongs to sages; but on rare occasions it belongs to ordinary persons also, as when a girl has a flash of intuitive perception that her brother will come to-morrow. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa also asserts that though Yogis can perceive all objects, past, present, and future, ordinary persons like us are not entirely devoid of the power of perceiving the future. On rare occasions we also have a flash of intuition; for instance, when a girl perceives in her heart of hearts that her brother will come to-morrow.

This flash of intuition must be regarded as a kind of valid perception on the following grounds: (1) It is produced by an object; (2) it is not doubtful; (3) it is not contradicted; (4) its causes are not vitiated by any defect. (1) It may be objected that the cognition is not produced by an object, since the object of the cognition does not exist at that time. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa replies that this objection would be valid, if such a cognition were held to apprehend an object existing at that time; that, in fact, this intuitive cognition apprehends its object not as existing at that

\[17\] PBh. and NK., pp. 258-9.
\[18\] PBh., p. 258. HMP., i, p. 289.
time but as existing in the future. So it cannot be said that the
cognition is not produced by an object. (2) But how can there
be a perception of the future? Futurity is nothing but prior non-
existence which will be destroyed; but how can there be a rela-
tion between this prior non-existence and the existent object (e.g.
brother)? It is self-contradictory to say that existence is related
to non-existence. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa replies that this objection is
not sound. The object of the intuition (e.g. brother) is not non-
extistent, but its relation to that place is non-existent. There is
a prior non-existence not of the object itself, but of its relation to
that place. The brother does exist, though not in that place.
The girl is reminded of her brother for some reason or other,
and when the ‘brother’ flashes in her memory he is perceived as
coming to-morrow. Thus the object of intuitive perception is
reproduced in memory owing to a certain cause, and the repro-
duction of the object in memory is the cause of its presentation
to consciousness. The intuition of the object, therefore, is the
effect of its reproduction in memory. Thus it is a valid cogni-
tion, since it is produced by an object that has a real existence.
(3) But how can it be regarded as perception, since it is not pro-
duced by peripheral stimulation? Jayanta Bhaṭṭa replies that it
is not of the nature of sensuous perception, but of the nature of
‘intuition’ produced by the internal organ (manas). It is not an
inference, since it is not produced by the knowledge of a mark
of inference (liṅga). It is not an analogy, since it is not produced
by the knowledge of similarity. It is not a verbal cognition,
since it is not produced by a word. It is a perceptual cognition
produced directly by the manas, independently of the peripheral
organs; it is an intuitive perception of a future object brought
to consciousness by memory owing to a certain cause.18

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa discusses the question of the yogic perception
of Dharma or moral law. Can the Yogis perceive Dharma which
is regarded by all as supersensuous? Kumārila denies it on certain
grounds which are criticized by Jayanta. Kumārila argues,
a sense-organ can never apprehend anything but its proper object;
the eye can see only visible objects; it can never see odour or
taste when it attains the highest degree of excellence by constant
meditation; it can at best see subtle and remote objects, but it
can never see Dharma which is absolutely supersensible. Jayanta

18 NM., pp. 106-7.
Bhaṭṭa contends that it is not impossible for the Yogis to acquire a vision of Dharma which is supersensible to us. If those things which are too remote for our vision, and which are hidden from our view by other things or concealed by utter darkness can be seen by other animals like vultures, cats, flies, etc., it is quite reasonable to suppose that Dharma which is not an object of our vision can be an object of the vision of Yogis. Secondly, Kumārila argues, if Dharma which is supersensible could be an object of the vision of Yogis, then their eyes would perceive smell, taste, etc., which are not their proper objects. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa replies that this is an unwarrantable assumption, since the other sense-organs of the Yogis, too, attain perfection and apprehend their proper objects. But similarly it cannot be argued that Dharma cannot be an object of yogic vision, since it is not the proper object of vision like smell, taste, etc. For we cannot know that Dharma is not a proper object of the vision of the Yogis. We know that an object is not the proper object of a sense-organ, if we cannot perceive it in the presence of that sense-organ. For instance, we cannot perceive sound even in the presence of the eyes; so we conclude that sound is not the proper object of the eyes. But we cannot know that a Yogin cannot perceive Dharma even in the presence of his visual organ. Thirdly, Kumārila argues, Dharma is above all temporal limits; it is not determined by the past, the present, or the future; so it is absurd to suppose that it is an object of sense-perception. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa replies that certainly it is absurd in the case of ordinary human beings whose perception is confined to 'here and now', but not in the case of Yogis who have transcended the limitations of time and space. Fourthly, if the Mīmāṁsaka insists that Dharma can never be an object of external sense-perception, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa argues that it may be an object of internal perception. The Yogis can perceive even supersensible dharma through their minds by constant practice in meditation. The mind can apprehend all objects; there is nothing which is not an object of mental apprehension. Even those objects which are beyond the range of external sense-organs are found to be clearly perceived by the mind by constant practice in meditation. For instance, the lover mad in love for a woman perceives his beloved as present before his eyes, though not really present. But is it not a false analogy? Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, asserts though the perception of the lover is
illusory and that of the Yogin is perfectly valid, they agree in being clear and distinct presentations. Hence even super-sensible objects like Dharma can be perceived by Yogis through the mind, if not through the peripheral organs. Lastly, just as we have flashes of intuition of future objects in prātibhajñāna, so Yogis can perceive all objects past, distant, future, hidden, subtle, and remote, and even Dharma which is absolutely supersensible to us. The divine perception of the Moral Law is natural, which is the cause of the Vedas.\textsuperscript{20}

4. The Sāṁkhya

According to Sāṁkhya, everything exists at the present moment; nothing goes out of existence and nothing comes into existence. The various qualities of things are only modes of energy acting in different collocations of the original guṇas or reals, mass (tamas) energy (rajas) and essence (sattva). “And these various Energies are sometimes actual (kinetic), sometimes potential, rising to actuality, and sometimes sublatent, subsiding from actuality into sub-latency.”\textsuperscript{21} Thus the so-called future objects are present as latent or potential, and the so-called past objects are present as sublatent; and only those things which are supposed to be present are actual. So the mind of the Yogin can come in contact with past and future objects which are not non-existent at present, but exist only as sublatent and potential respectively by virtue of certain peculiar powers produced by meditation. Certainly the Sāṁkhya explanation of the yogic perception of past and future objects is more convincing than that of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. If the past and the future exist at present in some form or other, it is easier to conceive that the mind of the Yogin can come in contact with them and produce a perception of the past and the future.

Vijñānabhiṣṣu points out that the mind of the Yogin can come into contact with distant and hidden objects by virtue of the peculiar power (atiśaya) acquired by meditation, which consists in its all-pervasiveness, or its power of acting on all objects, owing to the complete suppression of the inertia (tamas) of the mind which prevents it from acting on them. The inertia

\textsuperscript{20} Yāvarajñānam śārṣṭiddhikam eva dharmaviṣayat vedaśya kāraṇa-bhūtam. NM., p. 108. Ibid., pp. 102-8.

\textsuperscript{21} PŚAII., p. 17.
(tamas) of the mind is removed sometimes by the intercourse of the sense-organs with their objects as in ordinary sense-perception, and sometimes by the dharma born of meditation as in yogic perception. According to Aniruddha, the perception of a Yogan is produced by the mind and not by the external organs, and, consequently, it is not like the perception of an ordinary person. The Yogan alone, who has acquired peculiar powers through the favourable influence of the dharma born of yoga, can perceive objects in all times and places through the connection of his mind with Prakṛti, the ultimate ground of all existence.

5. The Yoga

Patañjali holds that ordinarily the mind is a continuous stream of mental functions. Vyāsa describes its five stages: wandering (ksipta), forgetful (mudha), occasionally steady (viksipta), one-pointed (ekāgra), and restrained (niruddha). In the first stage, the mind being overpowered by energy (rajas), becomes extremely unsteady and constantly flits from one object to another. In the second stage, the mind is overpowered by inertia (tamas) and sinks into listlessness, drowsiness, and deep sleep. In the third stage, the mind, though unsteady for the most part, becomes occasionally steady when it avoids painful things and is temporarily absorbed in pleasurable objects. In the fourth stage, the mind is withdrawn from all other objects and concentrated on one object, either material or mental, and assumes an unflickering and unwavering attitude with regard to that object owing to the predominance of essence or purity (sattva). In the last stage, all the mental functions are arrested and the mind retains only the potencies of its functions. In the fourth stage, the mind falls into conscious ecstasy (samprajñāta samādhi). In the last stage, the mind reaches the highest stage of supra-conscious ecstasy (asamprajñāta samādhi).

The mental functions can be arrested by constant practice of abstraction and concentration and extirpation of passion for objects of enjoyment. Trance (samādhi) is the ultimate result of the long and arduous processes of the inhibition of the bodily
activities or perfect posture of the body (āsana), regulation of breathing (prānāyāma), withdrawal of the mind from distracting influences (pratyāhāra), fixation of the mind on certain parts of body (dharana), and constant meditation on the same object (dhyāna). When the mind by deep concentration on an object is transformed into it and feels at one with it, that condition of the mind is called trance or ecstasy (samādhi).

Patañjali recognizes two kinds of ecstasy: (i) conscious ecstasy (samprajñāta samādhi), and (ii) supra-conscious ecstasy (asamprajñāta samādhi). Rāmānanda Yati and Vācaspatimīśra divide conscious ecstasy (samprajñāta samādhi) into eight kinds, which may be represented as follows:

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<td>Ānandānugata</td>
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<td>Sānanda Anandamātra or Nirānanda</td>
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Just as an archer at first tries to pierce a large object and then points his arrow at a small object, so a Yogin at first concentrates his mind on gross (sthūla) objects and then on subtle (sūkṣma) objects. Thus he rises to higher and higher stages of ecstasy according as he identifies his mind with subtler and subtler objects and at last reaches the highest stage of purely objectless and supra-conscious ecstasy. Let us explain the nature of the different kinds of conscious ecstasy in their ascending order. (1) Savitarka samādhi is the condition of the mind when by deep concentration it becomes one with a gross (sthūla) object (artha) together with its name (śabda) and concept (jñāna). This is the lowest stage of samādhi. In this stage, the object of contemplation does not appear to consciousness in its pure form but associated and identified with its name and concept, though, as a matter of fact, the object, the name, and the concept are quite distinct from one another. Thus savitarka samādhi cannot give us true knowledge of the real nature of an object; it erroneously identifies the object of contemplation with its name and concept.18

18 YPR., p. 150; The Study of Patañjali, p. 156.
(2) *Nirvātarka samādhi* is the condition of the mind when by deep concentration it becomes identified with a gross (*sthūla*) object divested of all associations of name and concept. This is a higher stage than *savitarka samādhi*, because it gives us true knowledge of the real nature of its object free from all kinds of association, which serve to conceal its real nature. "The thing in this state does not appear to be an object of my consciousness, but my consciousness becoming divested of all 'I' or 'mine', becomes one with the object itself; so that there is no notion here as 'I know this', but the mind becomes one with the thing, so that the notion of subject and object drops off and the result is the one steady transformation of the mind into the object of its contemplation."24 The objects of the above two kinds of *samādhi* are gross material objects according to Rāmānanda Yati and Vācaspatimiśra. But according to Bhojarāja, Nāgęśa, and Vijñānabhinīkṣu, gross material objects (*sthūlabhūta*) and gross sense-organs (*sthūla indriya*) are the objects of contemplation in *savitarka samādhi* and *nirvātarka samādhi* which are comprehended under one name as *vitarkānugata*. But Rāmānanda Yati and Vācaspatimiśra regard the sense-organs as the objects of contemplation in *sānanda samādhi*. (3) *Savīcāra samādhi* is the condition of the mind when by deep contemplation it becomes one with subtle objects such as atoms, *tanmātras*, etc., associated with the notions of time, space, and causality, qualified by many other qualifications and erroneously identified with their names and concepts. (4) *Nirvīcāra samādhi* is the condition of the mind when by deep concentration it becomes identified with subtle objects such as atoms, *tanmātras*, etc., in their pure state, divested of all the notions of time, space, and causality, and devoid of all qualifications and associations. *Savīcāra samādhi* and *nirvīcāra samādhi* may have for their objects, atoms, *tanmātras*, Ahamkāra, Buddhī, and Prakṛti. They are comprehended under one name as *vitarkānugata*. (5) *Sānanda samādhi* is the determinate state of mind when by deep concentration it becomes identified with the gross sense-organs, the essence of which is *sattva* owing to their power of manifesting objects. This is the view of Rāmānanda Yati and Vācaspatimiśra. But Bhojarāja, Nāgęśa, and Vijñānabhinīkṣu hold that the sense-organs are the objects of *savitarka samādhi*. According to them, the object of *sānanda samādhi*

24 YPR., p. 151.
is extreme bliss arising from the predominance of sattva (essence),
though rajas (energy) and tamas (inertia) are not entirely sup-
pressed. (6) Nirānanda samādhi is the indeterminate state of the
mind when by deep concentration it becomes identified with gross
sense-organs. But Vijñānabhikṣu holds that ānanda samādhi does
not admit of two forms, viz., sānanda and nirānanda. (7) Sāsmita
samādhi is the determinate state of the mind when by deep con-
centration it becomes one with Buddha (the cause of the sense-
organs) which is identified with the self. This is the view of
Rāmānanda Yati and Vācaspatimiśra. According to Vijñānabhikṣu,
the object of asmița is the consciousness transformed into the
form of the pure self. This kind of samādhi may have for
its object either the finite self (jīvātman) or the infinite self
(paramātman). According to Bhojarāja, in this stage Buddha
which is endowed with pure sattva—rajas and tamas being
entirely suppressed, becomes the object of contemplation. (8) Nirā-
nanda samādhi is the indeterminate state of the mind when it be-
comes one with Buddha which is identified with the pure self.

Rāmānanda Yati and Vācaspatimiśra recognize these eight
kinds of samprajñāta samādhi. But Vijñānabhikṣu does not
recognize two forms of samādhi each under ānandānugata and
asmītanugata. He recognizes only six kinds of samādhi. Vāca-
spatimiśra comprehends all the different kinds of samprajñāta
samādhi under three classes: (1) grāhya-samādhi or concentra-
tion on external objects, (2) grahaṇa-samādhi or concentration on
the sense-organs, and (3) grahitṛ-samādhi or concentration on the
ego. In the different stages of samprajñāta samādhi the Yogin
attains certain miraculous powers (siddhi) which strengthen his
faith in the process of yoga. Different miraculous powers are
achieved as the result of concentration on different objects. No
reason is given why these powers are attained and why particular
powers are attained as the result of concentration on particular
objects. These are the facts of actual experience of the Yogin,
and they have been recorded as such. Some of these miraculous
powers are clairvoyance, clairaudience, thought-reading, inter-
pretation of veridical dreams, understanding the language of
animals, memory of past lives, knowledge of the past and the
future, the distant and the subtle, and knowledge of the self
(puruṣa).
The different kinds of samprajñāta samādhi (conscious ecstasy) are called sabīja samādhi because they contain the seed of bondage inasmuch as they do not bring about true knowledge of the distinction between Puruṣa and Prakṛti. Asamprajñāta samādhi (supra-conscious ecstasy) is produced by constant practice of extreme passionlessness which is the cause of the complete cessation of the mental functions. In this stage all the mental functions are arrested, leaving behind only their potencies in the mind. Extreme passionlessness destroys even its own traces, and thus brings about the highest stage of asamprajñāta samādhi, which is called nirbīja samādhi because it is absolutely objectless and does not contain the seed of bondage.27

6. The Samkara-Vedāntist

Sadānanda Yati has accepted Patañjali's classification of samādhi in its entirety. He divides samādhi mainly into two kinds, viz. samprajñāta samādhi and asamprajñāta samādhi. And like Vijñānabhinīkṣu he divides the former, again, into six kinds: (1) savitarka samādhi, (2) nirvitarka samādhi, (3) savicāra samādhi, (4) nirvicāra samādhi, (5) sāṇanda samādhi, and (6) sāsmīta samādhi. From another standpoint, he divides samprajñāta samādhi into three kinds: (1) grāhyasamādhi, (2) grahamasamādhi, and (3) grahamasamādhi. Here he agrees with Vācaspati-miśra. Thus Sadānanda Yati has incorporated the Patañjala system of yoga-practice into the Vedāntic culture.

But Vedāntists generally recognize only two kinds of samādhi, viz. samaprajñāta samādhi or savikalpa samādhi and asamprajñāta samādhi or nirvikalpa samādhi. Mahādeva Sarasvatī Muni divides samādhi into these two kinds. He defines samprajñāta samādhi as an unbroken stream of mental functions having for their object the pure consciousness (Brahman) without the distinction of subject and object. In this stage the mental modes are not entirely destroyed; they have for their object Brahman or pure consciousness and are transformed into it. In it the consciousness of subject and object drops off altogether, but the mental modes remain concentrated on and transformed into pure consciousness; it is the result of the utmost perfection of the practice of concentration. Mahādeva Sarasvatī Muni defines

27 Hipp., ii, pp. 161-6; YPR., ch. xiii.
asamprajñāta samādhi as the complete suppression of all mental functions (sarvadhiśinrodha) on the suppression of the effects of samprajñāta samādhi. He explains it as the transformation of the mind into the form of Brahman or pure consciousness without the medium of mental modes which are entirely destroyed.  

Sadānanda recognizes two kinds of samādhi, viz. savikalpa samādhi and nirvikalpa samādhi. He defines the former as the mental mode which has for its object Brahman or pure consciousness into which it is transformed, and in which the distinction of the knower, the known, and the knowledge is not destroyed. In this stage there is the consciousness of Identity (the pure self) through the medium of mental modes in spite of the consciousness of duality of subject and object. He defines the latter as the mental mode which has for its object Brahman or pure consciousness into which it is transformed, and with which it is more completely identified; in this stage, though there is a mental mode which is transformed into Brahman or pure consciousness, there is no consciousness of the mental mode, but only the consciousness of pure Brahman. But, then, what is the difference between nirvikalpa samādhi and dreamless sleep? According to Sadānanda, though in both the states there is no consciousness of any mental mode, yet in the former there is a mental mode (vrtti) which is transformed into the form of Brahman, while in the latter there is no mental mode at all because the mind is dissolved into avidyā in deep sleep.

Nṛśimha Sarasvāti describes two stages of savikalpa samādhi. In the first stage, there is the consciousness of Brahman through the medium of a mental mode (vrtti) which is interpenetrated by the authoritative knowledge that 'I am Brahman'. So, in this stage, there is a mental mode; its object is Brahman; there is the consciousness of Brahman through the mental mode; and there is the consciousness of the injunction of the śāstras, 'Thou art that.' In the second stage, there is the continuous consciousness of Brahman through the medium of a mental mode which is not interpenetrated by the authoritative knowledge that 'I am Brahman'. So, in this stage, there is a mental mode; its object is Brahman: there is continuous consciousness of Brahman through the mental mode; but there is no authoritative knowledge that 'I am Brahman'. In both there is the consciousness

**ACK., pp. 398-9.**

**VSR., pp. 457.**
of the distinction between the knower, the known, and the knowledge. But though there is this consciousness of distinction or duality, yet there is a consciousness of Identity. In both these stages there is a consciousness of Identity with the consciousness of duality. The only difference between them lies in that in the first stage there is the consciousness of the authoritative injunction 'Thou art that', while in the second stage there is no such consciousness.30

Nṛśimha Sarasvatī describes two stages of nirvikalpa samādhi also. In the first stage, there is the consciousness of Brahman through the medium of a mental mode (vṛtti) which is transformed into and identified with Brahman with the aid of the subconscious impressions of the mental modes in the state of determinate ecstasy (savikalpa samādhi) devoid of the consciousness of the knower, the known, and the knowledge. In this stage, therefore, there are the following factors: (1) there is a mental mode having for its object Brahman; (2) there are subconscious impressions of the mental modes in the state of determinate ecstasy, which colour and modify the present mode in the state of indeterminate ecstasy; (3) there is no consciousness of the knower, the known, and the knowledge. In the second stage, there is the existence of Brahman (pure consciousness and bliss) without the medium of any mental mode modified into the form of Brahman and thus manifesting it, in which there is no consciousness of the distinction among the knower, the known, and the knowledge, and in which there is no trace of subconscious impressions of mental modes, which are being completely destroyed by the constant practice of indeterminate ecstasy. In this state, therefore, there are neither any mental modes (vṛtti) nor any subconscious impressions (samskāra) of past psychoses, nor any consciousness of duality of subject and object; there is the existence of pure absolute consciousness and bliss (Brahman). This is the highest stage of samādhi.31

According to Sadānanda, there are mental modes in both determinate and indeterminate ecstasy. But in indeterminate ecstasy though there are mental modes, there is no consciousness of them. According to him, in determinate ecstasy there is the consciousness of Identity (Brahman) together with the consciousness of duality of subject and object, while in indeterminate

30 Subodhī on VSR., p. 45 (Jacob's edition).
ecstasy there is the pure consciousness of Identity (Brahman) without the consciousness of duality of subject and object. According to Nṛsimha Sarasvatī also, in determinate ecstasy there is the consciousness of Identity together with the consciousness of duality, while in indeterminate ecstasy there is the pure consciousness of Identity (Brahman) divested of all consciousness of relativity of subject and object. But, according to him, in the highest stage of indeterminate ecstasy all mental modes and their subconscious impressions are destroyed and there remain only the pure absolute consciousness and bliss. It is the pure, absolute, transcendental consciousness free from all empirical modes and determinations and devoid of all consciousness of relativity. This state of ecstasy alone should properly be called indeterminate ecstasy. All the other kinds of ecstasy in which there is empirical consciousness revealed through mental modes should be called savikalpa samādhi. Mahādeva Sarasvatī also holds that in the highest stage of ecstasy (asamprajñāta samādhi) all mental modes and their subconscious impressions are totally destroyed and the mind is transformed into Brahman or pure consciousness and bliss, though devoid of all mental modes. But, according to him, in samprajñāta samādhi only there are mental modes which are transformed into Brahman or pure consciousness, but there is no consciousness of relativity of subject and object. But this is nirvikalpa samādhi, according to Sadānanda. The author of Ratnāvalī also describes asamprajñāta samādhi as the condition of the mind in which all mental functions are completely arrested. Rāmatīrtha Yati identifies conscious ecstasy (samprajñāta samādhi) with determinate ecstasy (savikalpa samādhi) and supra-conscious ecstasy (asamprajñāta samādhi) with indeterminate ecstasy (nirvikalpa samādhi).  

7. The Buddhist

According to Dharmakīrti, the intuitive perception of a Yogan is produced by constant contemplation of the ultimate truths when it reaches the highest limit of perfection. Dharmottara clearly explains the nature of yogic intuition. There are four ultimate truths according to the Buddhists: (1) all is momentary, (2) all is void, (3) all is pain, and (4) everything is like itself. By

**Vidvanmanoraṇjani on VSR., p. 129 (Jacob's edition).**
constant contemplation of these four truths the Yogin gradually attains a more and more distinct vision of them; and when he attains the highest stage of contemplation, he acquires the most distinct vision or intuition of the ultimate truths. Until he reaches the highest limit of distinct vision born of constant contemplation, he perceives the objects of contemplation as slightly indistinct, as if hidden behind mica. But when he reaches the highest limit of distinct vision by constant contemplation of the ultimate truths, he perceives the objects of contemplation most distinctly, as if they were within his own grasp. And because he has the most distinct vision of the ultimate truths at the highest stage of contemplation, his intuitive perception is indeterminate. According to the Buddhists, indeterminate perception alone is distinct and vivid; and the so-called determinate perception is not in itself distinct and vivid, but it acquires distinctness and vividness from its contact with indeterminate perception which is its immediate antecedent.\(^{33}\)

Anuruddha describes the different levels of consciousness. He divides consciousness into two orders, viz subliminal consciousness or subconsciousness below the threshold of consciousness (manodvāra), and supra-liminal consciousness or consciousness above the threshold of consciousness. He divides supra-liminal consciousness, again, into two orders, viz. normal consciousness and super-normal consciousness. Normal consciousness is called kāma-citta as it is generally confined to the kāma-loka or the plane of existence in which desire prevails. Super-normal consciousness is called Mahaggata-citta or sublime or exalted consciousness. And this super-normal consciousness, again, is subdivided into Rūpa-citta, which is generally found in the Rūpa-loka or the sphere of visible forms which are not altogether immaterial, and Arūpa-citta, which is concerned with Arūpa-loka or the sphere of the invisible or formless, and Lokuttara-citta or transcendent consciousness which is above the three worlds, viz. Kāma-loka, Rūpa-loka, and Arūpa-loka.\(^{34}\)

In order to pass from the Kāma-citta or normal consciousness to the Rūpa-citta or the lowest order of super-normal consciousness a severe discipline and concentration of the mind are

\(^{33}\) Bhūtārthaḥbāhāvanāprakārṣaptaryantajām yogijāṇānam ceti. NB., p. 20. NBT., pp. 20-1.

\(^{34}\) Cf., Introduction, pp. 10 and 12.
necessary. A monk must inhibit all physical and mental activity and concentrate his mind on a single selected object or sensation without changing the object of thought. After some time the sensuous mark or symbol is replaced by the corresponding image. This concentration of the mind on a bare sensation or its image is called 'preliminary concentration' (parikamma-samādhi). Then by more intense concentration of the mind the image is divested of its concrete, sensuous, or imaginal form, and is converted into an abstract conceptualized image, though not completely de-individualized. The concentration of the mind on this conceptualized image during the period of transition from normal consciousness to super-normal consciousness is still known as 'access concentration' (uṣpacāra-samādhi). At this stage there intervenes the lowest order of super-normal consciousness known as the first Rūpa-jhāna.

The Pali word jhāna corresponds to the Sanskrit word dhyāna, which means 'concentrative meditation', or 'ecstatic musing'. There are five Rūpa-jhānas, which consist in the gradual elimination of the factors of consciousness and attainment of an 'intensified inward vision' and an absolute equanimity or hedonic indifference. (1) The first jhānic consciousness of the Rūpa-loka has five factors: (i) Vitakka or initial attention by which sloth-and-torpor (thina-middha) is inhibited; (ii) Vicāra or sustained attention by which doubt (vicicicchā) is inhibited; (iii) Pīti or pleasurable interest or zest by which aversion (bhāpāda) is inhibited; (iv) Sukha or pleasure or happiness by which distraction and worry (uddhacca-kukkucca) are inhibited; (v) Ekaggatā or one-pointedness of consciousness or individualization which develops into ecstatic concentration (appanā-samādhi) and inhibits all sensuous desire (kāma-chanda). (2) In the second Rūpa-jhāna, initial attention (vitakka) is eliminated; and it occurs together with sustained attention (vicāra), pleasurable interest or zest (pīti), pleasure (sukha), and individualization (ekaggatā). (3) In the third Rūpa-jhāna, both initial attention (vitakka) and sustained attention (vicāra) are got rid of; and it occurs together with pleasurable interest or zest (pīti), pleasure (sukha), and individualization (ekaggatā). (4) In the fourth Rūpa-jhāna, pleasurable interest (pīti) also is eliminated; and it occurs together with

**BP., p. 109.**

**CP., Introduction, p. 56.**
pleasure *(sukha)* and individualization *(ekaggatat)*. (5) In the fifth Rūpa-jhāna, pleasure or happiness *(sukha)* is eliminated; and it occurs together with neutral feeling or hedonic indifference *(upekkhā)* and individualization *(ekaggatat)*. Sometimes the fourth Jhāna and the fifth Jhāna are combined into one and only four Rūpa-jhānas are spoken of."

The higher stages of *samādhi* in the Yoga system are attained by concentrating the mind on subtler and subtler objects. But the higher stages of Jhāna in the Buddhist system are attained by eliminating the factors of consciousness gradually. "Here we have," says Mrs. Rhys Davids, "a gradual composure and collectedness of consciousness gradually brought about by the deliberate elimination of: (1) the restless, discursive work of intellect, seeking likenesses and differences, establishing relations, forming conclusions; (2) the expansive suffusion of zest, keen interest, creative joy; (3) all hedonistic consciousness. The residual content of consciousness is admitted to be (a) a sort of sublimated or clarified *sati*, an intensified inward vision or intuition, such as a god or spirit might conceivably be capable of; (b) indifference or equanimity, also god-like."** Above the level of the Rūpa-citta there is the Arūpa-citta which is concerned with Arūpa-loka or the world of the invisible or formless. The Arūpa-loka is entirely non-spatial. And the experience of this world can never be sensuous. In the highest stage of the Rūpa-citta, which is attained by the gradual elimination of the factors of consciousness, there is the abnormal clarity of inward vision or intuition together with hedonic indifference or equanimity. Above this stage there is no longer any elimination of factors of consciousness, but of all consciousness of distinctions or limitations. Just as there are four stages of Rūpa-jhāna, so there are four stages of Arūpa-jhāna. (1) At the first stage of Arūpa-jhāna, the mind transcends the consciousness of matter and form, distinctions and limitations, and being concentrated on the concept of infinite space, acquires "the blissful consciousness, subtle yet actual, of an infinite sensation of space".** This may be compared to Kant's pure intuition of space as distinguished from his empirical intuition of space. (2) At the second stage of Arūpa-jhāna, the mind


**BP., p. 111.

**Ibid., pp. 117-8.
transcends the sensation of infinite space, and being concentrated on the concept of infinite consciousness "becomes conscious only of a concept subtle yet actual, of consciousness as infinite". At the third stage of Arūpa-jhāna, the mind wholly transcends the conceptual sphere of consciousness as infinite, and being concentrated on the concept of nothingness "becomes conscious only of a concept, subtle yet actual, of infinite nothingness". At the fourth stage of Arūpa-jhāna, the mind wholly transcends the sphere of nothingness and attains the stage of an all but complete hypnosis or quasi-unconsciousness which may be described as "neither percipience or non-percipience". When the mind transcends all these different stages of super-normal consciousness concerned with the Rūpa-loka and the Arūpa-loka, it attains the highest stage of super-normal consciousness which is called transcendent or supra-mundane consciousness (Lokuttara-citta).

Jhāna-consciousness is mystic consciousness. It is brought about by auto-suggestion. It consists in concentrating consciousness on a single object. The object is first of all a percept, then an image, then a concept. So far the mind is in the preparatory stage. Then gradually the contents of consciousness are eliminated in the different stages of Rūpa-jhāna till the mind at last acquires super-normal clarity of vision and hedonic indifference. So long the mind is in the plane of visible forms (Rūpa-loka). It is conscious of the ethereal but not of the immaterial or non-spatial. Then the mind comes in touch with the entirely immaterial world of the invisible or formless by gradually eliminating all consciousness of distinctions and limitations. The mind is, at first, concentrated on infinite space, then on infinite consciousness, then on infinite nothingness, and last of all attains the stage of complete trance or quasi-unconsciousness which may be described as neither consciousness nor unconsciousness. This is the highest stage of Jhāna-consciousness, but not the highest plane of consciousness. When the mind completely transcends even the plane of the invisible or formless (Arūpa-loka), it attains the stage of transcendent or supramundane consciousness (Lokuttara-citta).

40 Ibid., p. 118.
41 Ibid., p. 118.
42 Ibid., p. 118.
According to William James, ineffability, noetic quality, transiency, and passivity are the characteristics of mystical consciousness. As to transiency and ineffability, Mrs. Rhys Davids says, "the former is markedly true concerning the momentary ecstasy of attainment or appanā, as also concerning the realization of great spiritual elevation generally. Touching the 'Fruit' of each 'Path' of spiritual progress appears to have been a momentary flash of insight. As to the latter, ineffability, it is also true that we find no attempts by brethren who were expert at Jhāna to enter in detail into their abnormal experiences. . . . Language is everywhere too much the creature and product of our five-fold world of sense, with a varying coefficient of motor consciousness, to be of much use in describing consciousness that has apparently got beyond the range of sense and local movement." As to the noetic quality, Jhāna-consciousness is strongly characterized by it. It gives us insight into depths of truth unfathomed by the discursive intellect; it brings the mind into touch with higher and higher planes of existence. The chief intellectual result of the different stages of Jhāna-consciousness is a super-normal clarity of inward vision or intuition "untroubled by either discursive intellection or hedonistic affection". The Jhāna-process gives us the following powers: (1) Hyperæsthesia of vision or clairvoyance, e.g. the super-normal vision of the past and the future history of a particular individual; (2) hyperæsthesia of hearing or clairaudience, e.g. super-normal hearing of sounds and voices, both human and celestial,—the distant becoming near; (3) thought-reading and thought-transference or telepathy; (4) hypermnnesia, or reminiscence of the past history of former lives. According to William James, mystical consciousness has got another characteristic, viz. passivity. "When mystical consciousness has once set in," says James, "the mystic feels as if his own will were in abeyance, and indeed sometimes as if he were grasped and held by a superior power." This characteristic of passivity, however, is lacking in Jhāna-consciousness and differentiates it from other kinds of mystical consciousness. It differentiates it from the eucharistic consciousness or the mystic sense of union with the divine one, and also from the Vedântic sense of identity of the

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"BPα., pp. 115-16.
"The Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 381.
individual soul with the world-soul. "There was, of course, this deep cleavage," says Mrs. Rhys Davids, "between it and the eucharistic consciousness, that the self was banished, and no sense of union with the divine One, or any One, aimed at or felt. Herein, too, the Buddhist differs from the Vedântist, who sought to realize identity with Âtman—that is, the identity of the world-soul and his own self or ātman—'Tat tvam asi' (That art thou)."

But why is Jhâna-consciousness wanting in passivity? Mrs. Rhys Davids offers a reason for it. She says, "it has the essential noëtic quality too strongly to permit of passivity as a constant. Intellect and volition, for Buddhist thought, are hardly distinguishable, and the jhâyin seems to be always master of himself and self-possessed, even in ecstasy, even to the deliberate falling into and emerging from trance. There is a synergy about this Jhâna, combined with an absence of any reference whatever to a merging or melting into something greater, that for many may reveal defect, but which is certainly a most interesting and significant difference."

8. The Jaina

The Jaina divides perception into two kinds: (1) empirical perception (sâṁvyavahârika pratyakṣa), and (2) transcendental perception (pâramârthika pratyakṣa). Empirical perception is what we have in everyday life. It is of two kinds: (1) sensuous perception (indriya-nibandhana) or perception derived from the sense-organs (i.e. external sense-organs) and (2) non-sensuous perception (anindriya-nibandhana) or perception derived from the mind which is not a sense-organ according to the Jaina. Transcendental perception owes its origin to the self alone; it is neither derived from the sense-organs nor from the mind. It is directly derived from the self owing to the destruction of the impediments to perfect knowledge. It is of two kinds, viz. imperfect or deficient (vikala) and perfect or complete (sakala). The former, again, is of two kinds, viz. clairvoyant perception of objects at a distance of time and space (avâdhi) and direct perception of the thoughts of others, as in telepathic knowledge of the thoughts of other minds (manahparyaya). The latter is omniscience (kevalajñâna) or the perfect knowledge of all the objects of the universe due to

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46 BPa, p. 114.
47 BPa, pp. 114-15.
the complete destruction of the \textit{karma}-matter which is an obstacle to knowledge. Thus the highest stage of transcendental perception, according to the Jaina, is omniscience (\textit{kevala-jñāna}). The Jaina does not believe in the existence of God and consequently in divine omniscience. But he holds that the \textit{jīva} or the individual self can attain perfection and omniscience by completely destroying the \textit{karma}-matter which is an obstacle to perfect knowledge. The knowledge of all objects exists in the self. But it is veiled by \textit{karma}-matter. When the veil of \textit{karma}-matter encrusting the self is completely destroyed, the self realizes its omniscience.\footnote{PNT\textsubscript{c}, ch. ii, 4, 5, 18-23; PMS\textsubscript{c}, ii, 11; HIP\textsubscript{a}, ii, pp. 189-90.} This perfect intuition of the whole universe is not produced by the external sense-organs, or by the internal organ of mind, as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds. So before we discuss the nature of omniscience, let us briefly refer to the Jaina criticism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of yogic intuition.

According to some, the external sense-organs aided by the merit born of meditation can apprehend past, future, distant, and subtle objects. But the sense-organs can never be freed from their inherent imperfections, Prabhācandra argues, and so even the sense-organs of Yogis can never enter into direct relation with supersensible objects (e.g. atoms), like ours because they are, after all, sense-organs. What is the nature of the aid rendered by the peculiar power (dharma) born of meditation to the sense-organs? Does the dharma born of meditation increase the capacity of the sense-organs when they function with regard to their objects (e.g. atoms)? Or does it merely assist the sense-organs when they operate on their own objects? The first alternative is untenable, because the sense-organs by themselves can never operate on atoms, etc. If they operate on atoms, etc., they do not stand in need of the aid of the dharma born of yoga; and if they operate on atoms, etc., only when they are aided by the dharma, then there is a circular reasoning. The dharma born of yoga increases the capacity of the sense-organs, when they operate on their objects, e.g. atoms, etc.; and the sense-organs operate on atoms, etc., when they are aided by the dharma born of yoga. The second alternative also is impossible. If the dharma born of yoga cannot increase the capacity of the sense-organs, but merely assists them in operating on supersensible objects like atoms, etc., the aid
of dharma rendered to the sense-organs in their apprehension of supersensible objects is needless.

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the internal organ (manas) with the aid of the dharma born of yoga can simultaneously produce a knowledge of all the objects of the world, past, future, remote, and subtle. But Prabhācandra contends that the manas which is regarded as atomic by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika can never enter into direct relation with all the objects of the world simultaneously, and therefore, cannot produce a knowledge of them at the same time; that otherwise there would be a simultaneous perception of all the qualities of a cake, e.g. its taste, colour, odour, etc., at the time of eating it, which is not admitted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. In fact, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika does not admit the possibility of simultaneous cognitions owing to the atomic nature of the mind. So it cannot produce a knowledge of all the objects of the world at the same time, even when it is aided by the dharma born of yoga. The atomic mind cannot enter into relation with many objects at the same time by contradicting its very nature. It is more reasonable to maintain that it is the self which apprehends all the objects of the world independently of the mind by virtue of the specific powers born of meditation. It is useless to suppose that the self knows an infinite number of objects through the atomic mind at the same time. If it be urged that the mind of a Yogin enters into relation with all objects of the world not simultaneously but successively, then there is no difference between the perception of a Yogin and that of an ordinary person. Hence Prabhācandra concludes that the atomic mind can never enter into direct relation with all the objects of the world at the same time. But it may be urged that the mind of a Yogin enters into relation with all the objects of the world, through its union with God who is ubiquitous and consequently related to everything in the world. Prabhācandra contends that the mind of the Yogin can enter into relation with the present objects only through its union with God, but never with past and future objects, since they are non-existent at the time when the mind enters into union with Him. Hence the Jaina concludes that omniscience can never be produced either by the external organs or by the so-called internal organ of mind, though they are aided by the peculiar powers born of meditation.49

49 PKM., p. 5.
According to the Jaina, there is no eternal and omniscient God, but the finite self can attain omniscience when all the karma-matter is totally destroyed, which is an impediment to right knowledge. And this omniscience is not derived through the channel of the external sense-organs or the internal organ of mind. And further, the Jaina holds that constant meditation cannot produce omniscience, until and unless the karma-matter, which is an impediment to right knowledge, is wholly destroyed. Herein lies the difference between the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Jaina view. Just as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika proves the existence of yogic intuition by inference, so the Jaina also proves the existence of omniscience by the ontological argument. Just as heat is subject to varying grades and consequently reaches the highest limit, so right knowledge which is subject to varying grades owing to the various degrees of the karma-matter impeding it, reaches the highest limit of omniscience when the hindrance of the four kinds of karma-matter is completely destroyed. Omniscience is not derived from authority or scripture, because it can never give us a direct and distinct presentative knowledge which characterizes omniscience. Nor can it be derived from inference for the same reason. Nor can it be derived from the peripheral organs or the central organ of mind, as we have found already. Hence it is neither verbal, nor inferential, nor sensuous. It is a transcendental perception of the whole world, produced by the complete decay and destruction of the karma-matter. It is a distinct perception of all supersensible objects of the world on the complete destruction of Karma or infra-sensible particles of matter which encrust the self.\textsuperscript{50}

The Mīmāṃsaka, however, does not advocate this view of omniscience. He asks: What is the meaning of omniscience? Does it mean the knowledge of all objects of the world? Or does it mean the knowledge of certain principal objects? In the first alternative, does it mean the knowledge of all objects of the world in succession or at the same time? If the former, then there can be no omniscience. The objects of the world, past, present, and future can never be exhausted, and so their knowledge also can never be complete. And since there can be no knowledge of all objects of the world, there can be no omniscience. If the latter, then also there can be no omniscience. All objects of the world

\textsuperscript{50} PKM., p. 65.
cannot be known simultaneously, because contradictory things like heat and cold cannot be apprehended at the same time by a single cognition. Moreover, if all objects were known at one moment by the omniscient self, then in the next moment it would become unconscious having nothing to know. Further, the omniscient self would be tainted by the desires and aversions of others in knowing them, and would thus cease to be omniscient, since these are impediments to right knowledge. Thus, omniscience cannot mean the knowledge of all objects of the world either at the same time or in succession. Nor, in the second place, can it be held that omniscience means the knowledge of certain principal objects or archetypal forms, because only when all the objects of the world are known can there be a discrimination of principal objects from subordinate objects. Moreover, there cannot be a knowledge of the past and the future, which are really non-existent. If the past and the future are known by the omniscient self, though they are non-existent, then its knowledge is illusory. And if the past and the future are known as real and existent, then they are converted into the present; and if the past and the future are known by the omniscient self as present, then its knowledge is illusory. Thus the Jaina doctrine of omniscience is untenable.

Prabhācandra severely criticizes all these objections of the Mīmāṃsaka. First, it has been asked whether omniscience is made up of a single cognition, or many cognitions. Prabhācandra replies that it is a single intuition of the whole world. It does not depend upon the external sense-organs or the mind; so it need not be diversified by many cognitions. Our perception is produced by the external organs or the internal organ; so it cannot apprehend past, distant, future, and subtle objects. But the perception of the omniscient self is not produced by the external sense-organs or the mind; hence it can apprehend all supersensible objects. The pure intuition of the omniscient self is not produced successively; it knows all objects of the universe simultaneously by a single stroke of intuition since it transcends the limits of time and space which are the necessary conditions of all sense-perception owing to the complete destruction of karma. Secondly, it has been urged that contradictory things like heat and cold cannot be apprehended by a single cognition. Prabhācandra asks whether they cannot be perceived by a single cognition, because they cannot be present at the same
time, or because they cannot be apprehended by a single cognition, though they are simultaneously present. The first view is untenable because contradictory things like heat and cold can exist at the same time; for instance, when incense is burnt in a pot, the upper part of it is hot and the lower part is cold. The second view also cannot be maintained; because when there is a flash of lightning in the midst of darkness, we have a simultaneous perception of contradictory things like darkness and light. Thirdly, the Mīmāṃsaka has urged that if the omniscient self knows all objects of the world at one moment, in the next moment it will become unconscious having nothing to know. Prabhācandra replies that the objection would hold good, if both the omniscient cognition and the whole world were destroyed in the next moment; but that both of these are never-ending; and that the omniscient self knows all objects of the world by a single unending intuition. Fourthly, the Mīmāṃsaka has urged that if the omniscient self knows the desires and aversions of the non-liberated souls, then it becomes tainted with these desires and aversions which hinder omniscience. Prabhācandra replies that desires and aversions are produced by modifications (parināma); which do not affect the omniscient self, so that it cannot be tainted by desires and aversions of others by merely knowing them; that desires and aversions are of sensuous origin; but that the knowledge of the omniscient self is non-sensuous, which cannot therefore be tainted by the imperfections of ordinary men. Fifthly, the Mīmāṃsaka has urged that the omniscient self cannot perceive the past and the future, since they are non-existent; and that if it knows them as existent, then the knowledge of the omniscient self is illusory. Prabhācandra replies that the past and the future are perceived by the omniscient self not as present, but as past and future respectively; and that the knowledge of the omniscient self is not therefore illusory.

But how can the past be perceived? The past is not present; it is non-existent. Prabhācandra asks: Are past objects non-existent in relation to the past time? Or, are they non-existent in relation to the time when they are perceived by the omniscient self? The first alternative is untenable. The past objects are as much existent in relation to their own time, as the present objects which exist at their own time. The past objects as much exist in the past, as the present objects exist at present. The second
alternative is true. The Jaina admits that the past objects are non-existent in relation to the present time when they are perceived by the omniscient self. It knows the past as existing in the past; and it knows the future as existing in the future. In other words, the omniscient self knows the past as produced in the past; and it knows the future as to be produced in the future. Hence the knowledge of the omniscient self is not illusory.

But how can the past and the future be perceived by the omniscient self as past and future respectively, though they are not existent at the time of perception? The Jaina replies that the omniscient self is absolutely free from the bondage of physical existence; that its knowledge is not produced by the external sense-organs or the mind; and that therefore there is nothing to obstruct its knowledge of the past and the future. The Mimamsaka himself admits that recognition, which is a kind of perception according to him, can apprehend the past as well as the present, and that a flash of intuition in ordinary life (pratibhajana) can apprehend the future as future. Similarly, the Jaina argues, it is not impossible for the omniscient self who is entirely free from the fetters of karma and mundane existence to have a supersensuous vision of the whole world, past, present, and future. It directly and immediately knows all objects of the world, past, present, and future, subtle and remote, by a single unending intuition without the medium of the external sense-organs or the so-called internal organ of the mind.61

The Jaina believes in the supernormal telepathic perception of the mental processes of other persons owing to the destruction of a particular kind of karma-matter obscuring the knowledge. It is called manahparyayajñana. It is direct or immediate knowledge (saksatkarnijñana), or perception.62 Patañjali also recognizes the supernormal perception of other persons' mental processes consequent on the concentration of the mind on their external behaviour. This telepathic perception directly apprehends others' psychoses, but not their objects.63

61 PKM., pp. 67-73.
62 PNT., RK., ii, 18-23; HIP., ii, pp. 189-90; SS., viii, 6, pp. 224-5.
63 YS., iii, 19-20; YBh., iii, 19-20.
CHAPTER XVIII

DIVINE PERCEPTION

(Isvara-Pratyakṣa)

1. Patañjali’s Proof of Divine Omniscience

We have discussed the different orders of human perception, normal, abnormal, and super-normal. Now we shall briefly refer to the nature of Divine Perception as conceived by the Indian philosophers, apart from its value and validity. Just as the possibility of yogic intuition has been proved by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, and the possibility of the omniscience of the individual self or Jīva has been proved by the Jaina by an appeal to something like the ontological argument, so the omniscience of God is proved by Patañjali by the ontological argument such as we find in Anselm in the West. Gradation in degrees of worth gradually leads to and implies as the terminus of the series ens realissimum or the greatest reality which is omniscient, omnipotent, and all-perfect. Patañjali describes God as the Supreme Person untouched by all taint of imperfection, above the law of Karma, and above the processes of fulfilling and fulfilment.¹

We infer the existence of omniscient God from our knowledge of the supersensuous, whether in the past or future or present, whether separately or collectively, whether small or great. Our supersensuous knowledge is the germ of omniscience; so from this we infer the existence of omniscient God. When this supersensuous knowledge, which is the germ of omniscience, gradually increases and reaches the acme of perfection in a person, he is called omniscient. It is possible for the germ of omniscience to reach its highest limit of perfection, for it admits of degrees of excellence, as in the case of an ascending scale of magnitude. Whatever admits of degrees of excellence is capable of reaching the highest limit of excellence. We actually find that knowledge admits of degrees of excellence; it gradually increases in

¹ Kleśakarmavipākādaiḥ aparāmarṣtah puruṣaviveśa Isvaraḥ. YS., i, 24.
proportion to the degree to which matter-stuff, (tamas), which covers pure essence (sattva), of the mind is removed; therefore it must reach the highest excellence of omniscience. But here we are not concerned with the proofs of the existence of God. We are concerned only with the nature of Divine Knowledge.²

2. The Naiyāyika View of the Nature of Divine Knowledge

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa has discussed the nature of divine knowledge. First, God is free from all taint of imperfection, and so He is omniscient. But we are corrupted by the impurities of cravings, aversions, etc., and so we cannot perceive all objects of the world, and have fragmentary knowledge. Secondly, divine knowledge, which is all-embracing, is eternal; it is without a beginning and without an end. If there were a break in divine consciousness even for a moment, there would be a collapse of the whole universe, since it is created and sustained by the divine will which is inseparable from divine knowledge. Even at the time of the dissolution of the universe divine knowledge is not suspended, since there is no cause of its destruction at that time. And at the time of the creation of the universe, divine knowledge is not created, since there is no cause of its creation at that time. Hence divine knowledge is eternal. Herein lies the difference between the human omniscience and the divine omniscience; the former is produced, while the latter is eternal; the former is acquired, while the latter is natural and essential. Thirdly, divine knowledge is not diversified by many cognitions; it grasps all objects of the universe, past, present, and future, subtle and remote, by a single all-embracing intuition. Were it not so, God would have many cognitions either successively or simultaneously. But He cannot have them in succession, for, in that case, He would have discrete, discontinuous cognitions, and consequently, He would be unconscious at intervals, and thus would bring about a collapse of the universe at intervals, which would make all human activities impossible. God cannot have many cognitions simultaneously, for, in that case, there would be no cause of the difference of divine cognitions.⁴ Fourthly, divine knowledge is perceptual in character as it satisfies the essential conditions of perception. Viśvanātha defines perception as a cognition which is not derived


⁴ NM., pp. 200-1.
through the instrumentality of any other cognition. Inference is derived through the medium of the knowledge, of invariable concomitance. Analogy is derived through the medium of the knowledge of similarity. Verbal knowledge is derived through the medium of the knowledge of the import of a term or a proposition. Thus perception alone is direct, immediate, and presentative knowledge. And divine knowledge is perceptual in character as it consists in direct and immediate apprehension of the whole universe. Divine perception is not produced by the intercourse of the sense-organs with their objects, as God has no sense-organs at all. In fact, divine perception is not produced at all; it is beginningless and endless; it is eternal. Divine perception, therefore, is not of the nature of sensuous perception, but of the nature of ‘creative intuition’. God evolves the materials of His consciousness by the divine will, and perceives them all by a single all-embracing intuition, even as the sun illuminates all objects of the universe, though it is not produced by them. Thus the knowledge of God is not determined by its objects; but the objects are determined by the knowledge of God. Fifthly, because divine perception is eternal, God has no subconscious impression (samskāra). He is never subconscious or unconscious. And because He has no subconscious impression, He has no memory. And because He has no memory, He has no inferential knowledge which depends on memory. He has no need of inference as it is a mark of limitation or finitude. God does not know things in a fragmentary and piecemeal fashion; He knows all objects of the universe, past, present, and future in one intuitive glance; He is above the limitations of time and space; so He has no need of inferential or discursive knowledge. For the same reason He has no analogical or verbal knowledge.

First, human knowledge is finite and limited, while divine knowledge is infinite and unlimited. Human knowledge is produced by many causes, while divine knowledge is eternal. Human knowledge is tainted by errors and illusions, while divine knowledge is free from errors and imperfections. Human knowledge is conditioned while divine knowledge is unconditioned. Human knowledge admits of degrees of excellence, while divine

5 SM., pp. 237-40.
4 NV., and NVTT., iv, 1, 21. HIP., i, pp. 665-70.
knowledge is unequalled and unexcelled. Secondly, human knowledge is derived from perception, inference, analogy, and authority, while divine knowledge is neither inferential, nor analogical, nor verbal, but only perceptual in character. In human knowledge there is memory produced by subconscious impressions, while in divine knowledge there is no subconscious impression at all, and, therefore, no memory. There are breaks in human knowledge, while divine knowledge is unbroken and continuous. Man is sometimes subconscious or unconscious; but God is never subconscious or unconscious. Thirdly, human perception is sensuous, while divine perception is non-sensuous. Human perception is determined by its objects, while divine perception is not determined by its objects, but it determines its own objects. Human perception is limited by space and time, while divine perception is above the limitations of space and time. Human perception is confined to here and now, while divine perception grasps the past, the present, the future, and the remote in an Eternal Now. Man has sometimes a flash of intuition of the future, and can attain omniscience by constant meditation, practice of austerities, and so on, but divine omniscience is natural and eternal. This higher intuition of man is acquired through the internal organ or mind. But divine intuition depends neither upon the external organs nor upon the internal organ.

This interesting question has been raised by Udayana in connection with the validity of divine knowledge. God is omniscient. There is nothing in the universe which is unknown to God; so there is nothing in human experience which escapes divine knowledge. And since there are illusory cognitions in human experience, these, too, must be objects of divine knowledge. And if God knows human illusions, He must know also the objects of these illusions, since there cannot be a cognition of another cognition without apprehending the object of that cognition. Just as there cannot be a cognition without apprehending an object, so there cannot be a cognition of another cognition without apprehending the object of the latter cognition. So, if human illusions are objects of divine knowledge, the objects of these illusions, too, must necessarily be objects of divine knowledge. In other words, God being omniscient, must perceive certain objects as different things, and thus, He must be subject to illusions like human beings.
It cannot be said that God does not know the errors and illusions of human experience, for God is omniscient. But God cannot be subject to illusions as a penalty for His omniscience. His knowledge of human illusions is not itself illusory. When we perceive silver in a nacre, our perception is illusory; but when God perceives our illusory perception of silver, He does not perceive silver in a nacre, but He perceives silver as the real object of the cognition of silver, and so His cognition is not illusory. When we perceive that we have a perception of silver, though we do not know that it is illusory, this second perception, viz., the perception of the perception of silver, is not illusory. A cognition of silver in a nacre is illusory; but when it is appropriated by the self, the cognition of this illusory cognition is not illusory. Likewise, God never perceives silver in a nacre; He perceives everything as it really is; but when we perceive silver in a nacre God perceives that we have an illusory perception of silver in a nacre. Hence, God can never be subject to the illusions and imperfections of human experience. Divine knowledge is absolutely free from limitations and imperfections, illusions and hallucinations. It is the supreme norm and ultimate criterion of the validity of human knowledge.  

CHAPTER XIX

JIVA-SAKŚI-PRATYAKṢA AND ISVARA-SAKŚI-PRATYAKṢA

1. The Śaṅkara-Vedāntist: The Jīva and the Jīva-Sākṣī
The author of Vedānta-Paribhāṣā not only distinguishes between the Jīva (finite self) and Īśvara (God), but also between the Jīva-Sākṣī and the Īśvara-Sākṣī, and consequently he distinguishes between the perception of the Jīva-Sākṣī and the perception of the Īśvara-Sākṣī. This view is peculiar to the Śaṅkara-Vedānta.

According to the Śaṅkaraite, there is one, undifferentiated, eternal universal consciousness (caitanya). And this universal consciousness is particularized by certain determinants. There are two classes of determinants, namely, qualifying adjuncts or qualifications (viṣeṣaṇa) and limiting adjuncts or conditions (upādhi). A qualification (viṣeṣaṇa) is intimately connected with and inseparable from the qualified object, and as such distinguishes it from other objects. For instance, the particular colour of a jar qualifies it in such a way that it cannot be separated from the jar, and as such it distinguishes the jar from all other objects. A limiting adjunct or condition (upādhi), on the other hand, does not qualify an object in such a way that it cannot be separated from it, but simply limits the object to a particular time and space. For instance, the ear-drum is the limiting adjunct or condition of ether (ākāśa), because it is not inseparable from ākāśa, but simply limits it to a particular time and space, and can be separated from it.1 Thus there are two kinds of determinants which particularize the one eternal consciousness.

According to the Śaṅkaraite, the internal organ (antaḥkaraṇa) is the principle of individuation; it particularizes the eternal consciousness in two different ways. When the universal consciousness is determined by antaḥkaraṇa as a qualifying adjunct or qualification (viṣeṣaṇa), it is called the Jīva or the individual

1 Viṣeṣaṇam ca kāryānvayi vyāvartakam. Upādhiśca kāryānvanvayi vyāvartako vartamānaścā. VP, p. 103.
self, and when it is determined by antahkarana as merely a limiting adjunct or condition (upadhi), it is called the Jiva-Saksin or the Witness Self. Antahkarana is not separable from the individual self (Jiva) because it enters as a constituent element into the individual self; but it is separable from the Witness Self (Jiva-Saksin), because it limits it merely as an adventitious condition. In both the individual self (Jiva) and the Witness Self (Jiva-Saksin) the presence of antahkarana is necessary as a determining condition. But in the case of the individual self it is a qualification (viseyna) of the universal consciousness (caitanya), while in the case of the Witness Self it is merely a limiting adjunct or condition (upadhi) of the universal consciousness. Thus antahkarana is a constituent factor of the individual self, but it is merely an adventitious condition of the Witness Self.

It is the Jiva or the individual self that is the knower (jnata) doer (karta), and enjoyer (bhokta), but that in the individual self through which there is the manifestation of consciousness is the Jiva-Saksin or the Witness Self. Antahkarana or the internal organ is material and unconscious, and hence it cannot manifest consciousness in the individual self. It is the Jiva-Saksin or the Witness Self which manifests consciousness and all objects of individual experience. It is not one; but it differs in each individual self, for otherwise there would be no compartmental division of individual experiences.

But what is the use of the distinction between the Jiva and the Jiva-Saksin? The empirical ego is the object of consciousness. But who is the cognizer of the empirical ego? There must be a Saksin (Seer or Witness) of the empirical ego, otherwise there would be no unity of apperception in our knowledge of external objects and that of the empirical ego. But the Jiva-Saksin is not known as an object of knowledge; it is the presupposition of all knowledge, the knowledge of objects and the knowledge of the empirical ego or the subject. It is the Transcendental Ego as distinguished from the Empirical Ego. Thus the Jiva is the Empirical Ego, and the Jiva-Saksin is the Transcendental Ego.

The Jiva which is manifested either as a knower (jnata) or a doer (karta), or an enjoyer (bhokta), is a psycho-physical organism;

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3 Jiva namantahkarana vacchinacaitanyan tataksita tu antahkaranopahita-cai tanyan. VP., p. 102.
4 Ayah jivasaksit pratyayam ad na. VP., p. 104.
it is intimately connected with the material antahkarana which enters into it as a constituent factor. But the Jiva-Sakshin is the universal consciousness only limited by antahkarana to a particular individual and thus individualized by it; it is not qualified by antahkarana as a constituent factor, and hence it is not a psycho-physical organism. But it is not altogether free from connection with organism (e.g. the internal organ); it is limited and individualized by the internal organ. The Jiva-Sakshin may be regarded as the super-organic self, but limited by antahkarana to a particular individual, while Jiva is the psycho-physical organism of which antahkarana is a constituent factor. The Jiva is the Empirical Ego which is the centre of all feelings of 'me' and 'mine' intimately connected with the organism, while the Jiva-Sakshin is the Transcendental Ego which lights up all the experience of the individual self, the experience of the known objects and the knowing subject.4

2. Isvara and Isvara-Sakshin

According to the Sankara-Vedantist, just as the universal consciousness is particularized by antahkarana in two different ways, so it is determined by Maya or cosmic nescience in two different ways. When it is determined by Maya as a qualifying adjunct (visesa) it is called Isvara or God; and when it is determined by Maya as a limiting condition (upadhi), it is called Isvara-Sakshin or the Divine Witness. In other words, when Maya enters as a constituent factor into relation with the universal consciousness, it is called Isvara; and when Maya enters into relation with the universal consciousness merely as an adventitious condition, it is called Isvara-Sakshin.

Isvara-Sakshin is the connoisseur before whom the cosmic panorama unfolds itself. Though there is a difference between the character of Isvara and the character of Isvara-Sakshin, according as the determinant Maya enters into relation with the universal consciousness either as a constituent factor (visesa) or as an adventitious or limiting condition (upadhi), yet there is no difference whatsoever in the substrata of these two characters, namely, Isvara and Isvara-Sakshin. Just as one and the same person, viz. Devadatta, may be a cook as well as a reader, so one

* Sikkhamani on VP., pp. 102-5.
and the same universal consciousness may be Iśvara and Iśvara-Sākṣin. Just as there is a difference between the two functions of Devadatta, viz. cooking and reading, but there is no difference in their substrata, viz. the cook and the reader, they being one and the same person, viz. Devadatta, so there is a difference between the two characters of the universal consciousness, viz. those of Iśvara (Iśvara-tva) and Iśvara-Sākṣin (Iśvara-Sākṣitva), but there is no difference in their substrata, viz. Iśvara and Iśvara-Sākṣin, they being one and the same universal consciousness.

Though there is a plurality of Jīva-Sākṣins owing to the plurality of the limiting conditions, viz. antahkaraṇas or internal organs, there is only one Iśvara-Sākṣin owing to the oneness of its limiting condition, viz. Māyā or cosmic nescience; and this Iśvara-Sākṣin is eternal because its limiting condition, Māyā, is eternal. Thus according to the Saṅkarite, there is not only a difference between human perception (Jīva-pratyakṣa) and divine perception (Iśvara-pratyakṣa), but there is also a difference between the perception of the Jīva-Sākṣin or the Witness Self and that of Iśvara-Sākṣin or the Divine Witness. The author or Vedāntaparibhāṣā does not specify the distinctive characters of these different kinds of perception, viz. Jīva-pratyakṣa, Jīva-Sākṣi-pratyakṣa Iśvara-pratyakṣa, and Iśvara-Sākṣi-pratyakṣa.

1 Iśvaraśākṣī tu māyopahita-caitanyāḥ, taccakāraḥ tadupādhibhūta-māyāyā ekatvāt. VP., p. 105.
CHAPTER XX

MEMORY AND IMAGINATION

1. The Nature of Recollection: Its Kinds

Gautama maintains that the self which is a permanent substance endowed with knowledge can recall an object of its past experience.¹ Vātsyāyana states that it is the self that recalls, and that a stream of cognitions can never recall.² These statements are directed against the Buddhist account of memory. The Questions of King Milinda expounds the Buddhist view. "The King said, 'By what, Nāgasena, does one recollect what is past and done long ago?' 'By memory'. 'But is it not by the mind, not by the memory, that we recollect?' 'Do you recollect any business. O king, that you have done and forgotten?' 'Yes.' What then? Were you then without a mind?' 'No. But my memory failed me'. 'Then why do you say that it is by the mind, not by the memory, that we recollect?' 'Very good, Nāgasena".³ The Buddhist regards the self as a stream of momentary ideas, feelings and volitions. It is not a permanent principle. The permanent self cannot recall a past object or action. But a later idea recalls a past object perceived by a past idea. Memory does not presuppose the existence of a permanent self. This is the Buddhist view.

But Vātsyāyana gives the Nyāya definition of recollection which contradicts the Buddhist view. He defines recollection as recalling and recognizing an object perceived in the past by the same self. One and the same self perceived it in the past, remembers it at present, and recognizes it as an object of its past experience. Recollection appears in the form 'I have known it before'.⁴ The definition implies the following characteristics of recollection. (1) Recollection presupposes a past apprehension of an object by the self. (2) It presupposes an impression (sankśāra) produced by the past apprehension in the same self. (3) It pre-

¹Smaranantvātmano jñāsvābhāvyāt. NS., iii, 2, 43.
²Ātmana eva maraṇah, na buddhi-santatimātrasya. NBh., iii, 2, 43.
⁴NBh., iii, 2, 42.
supposes the awakening \textit{(ubodha)} of the impression by excitants \textit{(ubodhaka)}, e.g., the perception of a similar object and the like. 
(4) It implies recognition of the recalled object as perceived in the past by the same self. A complete recollection involves an element of recognition. 
(5) Recollection implies temporal localization in the past. The object recalled and recognized is referred to a particular time in the past. 
(6) Recollection presupposes the identity of the self. The self that recalls an object is the same as perceived it in the past. If there were no identity of the self, there would be no recollection. 
Udayana asserts that the past perception, its impression, and its recollection must subsist in the same self; that otherwise one’s impression would produce another’s recollection. 
Hence, recollection implies the identity of the self which is endowed with the essential nature of knowing the past, the present, and the future. 
It implies retention \textit{(dharma)} and recall \textit{(smrti)}. It presupposes original apprehension, retention of its impression \textit{(samkara)}, and recall and recognition of the object apprehended in the past by the same self. This is the \textit{Nyaya} view of recollection. 

Māṇikyanandi, a Jaina philosopher, defines recollection as a cognition in the form of ‘that’ which is produced by the revival of an impression. For example, Devadatta was perceived in the past, and that Devadatta is remembered at present. Vidyānanda Svāmī asserts that recollection is a cognition that assumes the form of ‘that’; and that it cognizes an object which was perceived in the past. 
Prabhācandra defines recollection as a cognition in the form of ‘that’ due to the revival of an impression generated by the perception of an object on a previous occasion,—the revival being due to the perception or thought of a cue. It is a representative cognition as distinguished from a presentative cognition. 
If the past perception of Devadatta, Bhaṭṭa Akalaṇka observes, did not cognize itself, then the present recollection would be a novel knowledge, and consequently cease to be recollection. But it is an already acquired knowledge devoid of novelty, and therefore a reproduction of a past perception which cognized itself. 

This is the Jaina view of recollection.

\textsuperscript{4}Kir., p. 149; KVB., pp. 154, 160. 
\textsuperscript{5}Trikaḷavāppini jñānasaktireva jñāsavābhāvyam. NVTT., p. 403. 
\textsuperscript{6}Sahākārodbhāvanibandhanā tadityākārā smṛthā. PMS., iii, 3. 
\textsuperscript{7}Tadityākārāsuḥśūtarthavājayā smṛthā. PRP., p. 69. 
\textsuperscript{8}FKM., p. 96. 
\textsuperscript{9}TRV., i, 5, 5, p. 36.
The Sāṁkhya defines recollection as the cognition of a past object, or a cognition produced by an impression. It is the representative cognition of an object perceived in the past due to the resuscitation of an impression (sāṁskāra).

The Yoga gives a similar account of recollection. Patañjali defines it as mental mode which cognizes an object which was apprehended in the past. It does not cognize anything in excess of the object of a past apprehension. Vyāsa raises an interesting question whether the mind remembers a cognition or whether it remembers an object, and replies that recollection cognizes both a cognition and an object, since a cognition is coloured by its object. Consciousness is common to all cognitions, which are distinguished from one another by their objects which colour them. A cognition coloured by an object which is cognized by it, produces an impression of a similar nature. When it is revived by a proper excitant, it produces a recollection of the past cognition and its object. Both apprehension and recollection cognize a cognition and an object. But the manifestation of a cognition is predominant in apprehension, while the manifestation of an object is predominant in recollection. Apprehension cognizes an object which was not known already so that the manifestation of a cognition is predominant in it; whereas recollection cognizes an object that was known already so that the manifestation of an object is predominant in it. All recollections are produced by the apprehension of valid knowledge, illusion, imagination, sleep and recollection. These mental modes were apprehended in the past, and are remembered on a future occasion. Apprehension is an immediate knowledge of an object, which prompts a fruitful action leading to its attainment, whereas recollection is a reproduction of that apprehension.

Pārthaśārathi Miśra, a Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsaka, defines recollection as a cognition that cognizes an object apprehended before,—that

11 Sāṁskṛta jñānam. SSV., ii, 33.
12 Sāṁskṛta jñānam. SPB., ii, 33.
13 SSV., iv, 21.
14 Anubhūtaviśayāṁ pramoṣuḥ sāṁskṛtiḥ. YS., i, 1, 11.
15 Grāhya-pravṛttiḥ pratyayā grāhya-grahaṇa-bhavat-kāra-nirbhāsaḥ grāhya-grahaṇa-bhavat-dharmikāṁ sāṁskṛtiḥ janayati. YBh., i, 1, 11.
16 Tatra grahaṇākāra-pūrvā buddhiḥ, grāhya-kāra-pūrvā sāṁskṛtiḥ. YBh., i, 1, 11.
17 Sarvāḥ sāṁskṛtyāḥ pramāṇa-viśayāḥ vikalpa-nidrā-sāṁskṛtnāṁ anubhavat prabhavanti. YBh., i, 1, 11.
18 TV., i, 1, 11.
never cognizes an unapprehended object.\

Sālikānātha Miśra, a Prābhākara Mīmāṁsaka, defines it as a representative cognition which is produced by the impression of a past cognition only.\textsuperscript{10} They do not differ from the Naiyāyika in their views of recollection. They regard perception, impression and recollection as qualities of the self.

Vācaspati Miśra defines recollection as a cognition which is produced by an impression only. It is different from apprehension consisting of perception, inference, testimony, comparison, presumption and non-apprehension.\textsuperscript{21} Śaṅkara regards dreams as recollections.\textsuperscript{22} In a sleeping person's mind only impressions persist, which produce dreams. They are false because they are tainted by sleep.\textsuperscript{23} Mahādevānanda Sarasvatī gives the same definition of recollection as Vācaspati Miśra does.\textsuperscript{24} Prakāśānanda observes, the past cognition which produced an impression, which is the cause of recollection, cognized an object only, but not itself; so that recollection produced by the impression of the cognition of a mere object cognizes an object only, but not the past cognition.\textsuperscript{25} He rejects the view of Vyāsa who maintains that recollection cognizes both a past cognition and its object. Mādhavācārya Vidyārānya regards recollection as a reproduction of an object exactly as it was apprehended in the past, which depends upon the mere revival of the impression of the past apprehension. It cannot transcend the limits of the past apprehension. It cannot be created, destroyed or altered at will.\textsuperscript{26}

Veṅkaṭānātha, a Rāmānujist, gives the same definition of recollection as Prabhākara, Vācaspati Miśra and others give. He observes that a recollection cognises that particular object, the apprehension of which produces it. The perception of an object produces a recollection, which cognizes that object which was known by the perception in the past. The perception of a jar produces the recollection of it. It can never produce the

\textsuperscript{10} NR., iv, 30, p. 142.
\textsuperscript{11} Smṛtiḥ punaḥ pūrvavijñāna-saṁskāramātāram jñānam. PP., p. 42.
\textsuperscript{12} TR., p. 20.
\textsuperscript{13} Saṁskāramātraṃ hi vijñānaḥ smṛtiḥ. Bhāmatī, S. B., ii, 2, 29.
\textsuperscript{14} TK., p. 6; TSD., p. 35; TSC., p. 29.
\textsuperscript{15} Smṛtir eṣā yat svapnadarśanam. S.B., ii, 2, 29.
\textsuperscript{16} Bhāmatī, S.B., ii, 2, 29.
\textsuperscript{17} ACK., p. 258.
\textsuperscript{18} Arthamātraviñayājñānajanyā smṛtir arthamātram eva viśayikarod.
PPV., p. 24.
\textsuperscript{19} Kartum akartum anyathā vā kartum asayā yathānubhūtanā vastu avilanghayati tamaśkarododbhūtiḥ viśayāvṛddhāṁ smṛtiḥ. VPS., p. 253.
recollection of a cloth.²⁷ Puruṣottamājī Mahārāja, a Vallabhite, defines recollection as a cognition produced by an impression only, and not by the external sense-organs, and not during sleep; or as a cognition produced by an impression as impression; or as a cognition which is different from an apprehension.²⁸

Some regard recollection as non-sensuous perception, since it is vivid like the experience of pleasure and pain. Vidyānanda Śvāmī refutes this view. Recollection is not vivid (viṣada) like perception. Sometimes by repeated representation it acquires vividness, but still it is invalid like a dream-cognition. A representation can never be perception.²⁹ The later cognitions of a serial perception (dhārāvāhikabuddhi) are not recollections, since they are perceptions, being produced by the stimulation of the sense-organs by external objects.³⁰

The Jainas regard recollection as mediate knowledge (parokṣa jñāna), like inference and testimony, because an object which was perceived in the past and is remembered at present can never be vivid, like an object which is perceived at present. Every recollection cognizes its object as 'that.'³¹ A memory-image is a faint copy of the original percept.

But recollection is not inference, since it is produced without the knowledge of a mark (liṅga). If the recollection of invariable concomitance be inference, then the uniform relation is the probans, and so its relation to the recollection must be admitted. The recollection of this being an inference, it will depend upon the recollection of another invariable concomitance, and so on to infinity. Hence recollection is different from inference.³²

Recollection is different from recognition. (1) The former cognizes a past object, whereas the latter cognizes an object qualified by the past time and the present time.³³ (2) The former is produced by impressions as its specific cause, whereas the latter is produced by the sense-object-intercourse as its specific cause, which is aided by impressions.³⁴

²⁷ Smṛter anubhūtavyaktiyataviṣayatvatam. SAS or TMK., p. 579. PKM., p. 131; YMD., p. 4.
²⁹ PP., p. 42.
³⁰ Pratyakṣam viṣadam jñānam. Pūrvānubhūte'tte'rthe vaiśādyā sambhavāt smṛthi parokṣameva. PRP., p. 69.
³¹ TSV., i, 22-3, p. 189.
³² NM., 459-60.
Some maintain that recognition is not produced by impressions but by recollection. Prabhacandra also maintains that recognition is produced by perception and recollection. But recognition cannot be produced by perception and recollection, since there is no distinct recollection of the object of past perception in it. A memory-image is not disengaged from a percept, but there is a fusion of a nascent memory-image with a percept in it. Recognition is an effect of peripheral stimulation aided by an impression, and not of distinct recollection. It is a kind of perception qualified by an impression of past experience.

Recollection cognizes its past object, even as perception cognizes its present object. If recollection cannot cognize its past object because of its indistinctness, then inference also should not cognize its object for the same reason. But inference cognizes past, future and remote objects, and prompts actions which lead to their attainment. So recollection also cognizes its past object.

Memory consists in retention and recollection. Recall depends upon retention. If there is no retention of an impression of a previous perception, there can be no recollection. The Jaina regards retention (dhāranā) as the last element in the process of perception. An impression is retained in the self. Retention is non-oblivion of an object that was known in the past. An impression is produced by an apprehension or a recollection. It is different from merit and demerit. The former is a residuum of a cognition, while the latter are potencies of moral and immoral actions.

In the Alankāra literature the nature of recollection is described. It is a representative cognition that cognizes an object perceived in the past. It is a representation of the causes of pleasure and pain. It is the remembrance of emotions due to pleasure and pain. It is the reproduction of objects forgotten.
for a long time, which gave pleasure or pain in the past at a particular time, in a particular place, appropriate to the occasion.\footnote{43}

The act of recalling is expressed by shaking the head, raising or lowering eye-brows, turning the head upward, looking at the sky, gazing, inhibiting the movements of the body and the like.\footnote{44}

There are two kinds of memory, \textit{viz.}, passive memory and active memory. Mādhavācārya Vidyāraṇya describes the former as spontaneous recall which depends entirely upon the energizing of the impressions of the past cognitions of objects, and not upon a person’s will.\footnote{45} It often appears in spite of his desire not to remember it. It does not appear even when he intently desires to remember it. An undesired object is recalled owing to the revival of an impression on the perception of a similar object or under influence of an unseen agency (\textit{adṛśta}). But sometimes there is active memory when a recollection depends upon the volition of a person; a series of thoughts produces concentration of mind which revives an impression.\footnote{46}

Vyāsa describes two kinds of recollection: recollection of an imagined object, and recollection of unimagined object.\footnote{47} Dream is the recollection of an imagined object. Waking recall is the recollection of an unimagined object. Vyāsa gives these examples. Dream involves imagination, whereas recollection involves memory. This is Vācaspati’s interpretation. But Vijnānabhinīku gives a different interpretation. He mentions two kinds of recollection: (1) recollection of forecast objects (\textit{e.g.}, dreams), and (2) recollection of unforecast-objects (\textit{e.g.}, waking recollection). Some dreams foreshadow future events, though they are recollections. Waking recollections do not forecast future events. They merely faithfully reproduce past objects or events perceived before. Vācaspati’s interpretation seems to be right because it is natural. But it may be contended, that dreams are not recollections because they are not produced by impressions only, and because they do not represent objects perceived in the past. Vijnānabhinīku

\footnote{43} Bhāva-prakāśana (G.O.S.), p. 19.
\footnote{45} Smṛṭijñānām saṃskārodadbhādhīnām na puruṣa-prayatnādīhindīnam. VPS, p. 251.
\footnote{46} VPS, p. 251.
\footnote{47} Sā ca dvayi bhāvīta-smartavyā ca abhāvīta-smartavyā ca. YBh., i, 1, 11.
rejects this contention, and replies that sometimes they are recollections of objects perceived in the past,—being produced by impressions only.\textsuperscript{50}

Mahādevānanda Sarasvatī divides recollection into (1) valid recollection and (2) invalid recollection, and subdivides the former into (1) recollection of the self and (2) recollection of the not-self. Keśavamīśra, Jagadīśā, Mahādeva Paṇḍita and others also recognize valid recollection and invalid recollection. If the past apprehension is valid, the recollection is valid; and if it is invalid, the recall is invalid. Keśavamīśra regards dreams as invalid recollections.\textsuperscript{51}

2. Memory and Identity of the Self

The Cārvāka denies the existence of the self, and cannot account for memory. All other schools of Indian philosophy except Buddhism maintain, that memory presupposes the existence and identity of the self. Gautama, Vātsyāyana, and Vācaspāti Miśra’s views have already been given. It is the permanent self that perceived an object in the past, retained its impression, remembers it at present, and will remember it in future. It is the self that remembers because it is endowed with the character of being a knower. A mere series of cognitions cannot remember an object of past experience, because it is devoid of substantivity (nirātmaka). Memory presupposes the identity of the self as related to past, present and future cognitions.\textsuperscript{52}

The Buddhist idealist regards the self as a series of discrete and momentary psychoses.\textsuperscript{52a} Vātsyāyana urges that this conception of this self makes recollection impossible. If the self were a mere series of fleeting cognitions, then one momentary past cognition would perceive an object and another momentary future cognition would remember it—there being no connection whatever between them—which is absurd! What was perceived by one cognition cannot be remembered by another unconnected with it. Further, recollection involves recognition. Both presuppose the identity of the permanent self which knows the past, the present, and the future.\textsuperscript{53}

\textsuperscript{50} YV, i, 1, 11; TV, i, 1, 11.
\textsuperscript{51} ACK, pp. 258-9; TA, p. 11; TBh, p. 30; Nyāyasāra, p. 116; Bhāskarodayā, p. 168.
\textsuperscript{52} NBh., NVTT, iii, 2, 43.
\textsuperscript{52a} Cp. David Hume, J. S. Mill and W. James.
\textsuperscript{53} NBh., iii, 2, 42.
The Advaita Vedāntist also urges that the Buddhist idealist, who advocates the doctrine of momentary ideas, cannot account for recollection, since the original apprehension, its impression, and its recollection, which are momentary, do not abide in a common permanent substrate; and that if they abide in different substrates which are momentary, then the same person cannot remember an object apprehended by him in the past. The Buddhist idealist argues that these discrete momentary cognitions can produce recollection because they belong to the same psychical series (vijñānasatāna). The Advaita Vedāntist rejects this argument as invalid, since the so-called series is unreal. When one member of a series is produced, its preceding member is destroyed, and its succeeding member has not yet come into existence. Even if a series is real, there can be no recollection, inasmuch as impressions were destroyed long ago. An entity which is destroyed cannot produce an effect. If impressions are assumed to continue, then they cease to be momentary and contradict the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness. Hence, the Yogācāra cannot account for recollection. The Śūnyavādin also cannot account for personal identity involved in memory. If all are non-existent in their real nature, then all empirical life is destroyed.

The Advaita Vedāntist criticizes the Naiyāyika view. The Naiyāyika who regards the self as omnipresent can account for personal identity in memory, because apprehension, impression and recollection abide in the same self. But there being no relation of a self and its cognition to an object, recollection cannot have the form of it. The Naiyāyika regards cognitions as formless. If a cognition does not cognize the form of its object, it cannot have its form. If the cognition has no form of its object, then its impression cannot have the form of the cognition, and consequently the recollection produced by the impression cannot have the form of the object perceived in the past. Moreover, if a cognition is absolutely destroyed, a recollection cannot be like a previous cognition, since an impression which is not a particular condition of a cognition, but assumes another independent quality, is not a residuum (vāsanā) of the previous cognition, and so cannot produce a similar recollection.

The Advaita Vedānta regards the empirical self limited by the adjunct of the internal organ (antahkaraṇa) in which pure
consciousness is reflected, as the apprehender, the substrate of the impression, and the recollector, so that the original apprehension, its impression, and its recollection abide in the same substrate. The empirical self is directly related to an object through a mental mode in which pure consciousness is reflected, and which assumes the form of the object. The mental mode produces a residuum (vāsanā) in the nescience (avidyā) which is the cause of the internal organ; it is called an impression (samskāra). When the impression is revived by an excitant, a similar recollection is produced. Hence, a recollection is similar to the original apprehension which is its ultimate cause, and the apprehension, the impression, and the recollection have the form of the object which was apprehended in the past.54

3. The Nature, Causes and Effects of Impressions

The Buddhist idealists regard impressions (samskāra) as residua (vāsanā) of momentary cognitions modifying the succeeding cognitions, which do not abide in a permanent self. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika regards an impression as a quality of the self produced by a cognition and subsisting in it. The Saṃkhya-Yoga and the Vedāntists regard it as a modification of the mind (antahkarana), which is retained in it.

Vātsyāyana asserts that an impression is a quality of the self produced by a cognition of an object, which is a cause of recollection.55 Praśastapāda says, “An impression is a quality of the self produced by objects seen, heard or otherwise apprehended on a previous occasion, which is a cause of recollection and recognition.”56 Saṃkara Miśra describes an impression as the effect of a cognition and the cause of a cognition.57 It is produced by perception or presentative cognition. It produces recollection and recognition or representative cognitions.58 Jagadīśa opines that an impression is produced by a determinate cognition.59 Śrīdhara observes, that even wrong cognitions leave impressions in the self, since we have recollections of even those objects which we

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54 ATP., pp. 109-10.
55 NBh., iii, 2, 44.
57 Jñāna-jānitenā saṃskāreṇa jñāna-jānanaṁ. KR., p. 131.
58 KR., p. 132.
perceived wrongly in the past.\textsuperscript{60} Illusions are definite and determinate cognitions. Viśvanātha also opines that impressions are produced by definite and determinate cognitions, and not by doubtful cognitions. They are imperceptible and abide in the self.\textsuperscript{61} The Navya Nyāya maintains that recollections also produce impressions.\textsuperscript{62} Thus both presentative and representative cognitions produce impressions (sāṁskāra) in the self.

Impressions are imperceptible. We infer their existence as the causes of recollection and recognition. We cannot account for them without impressions. Past cognitions cannot produce recollections without the operation (vyāpāra) of impressions since nothing can be a cause of an effect, if it does not exist itself or its operation. If recollection is the effect of a past cognition, then it must be due to its operation (vyāpāra), because it does not exist when recollection is produced.\textsuperscript{63} A cause or its operation must exist at the moment immediately before the production of its effect. An impression is the operation of a perception, which produces recollection.\textsuperscript{64} The destruction of a perception, it may be argued, is the operation which produces recollection. This argument is invalid, because an absence and its counter-entity together cannot produce an effect. Further, if an impression be not admitted, then what was perceived on a previous occasion will always be remembered, because the operation in the form of the destruction of a perception always exists. Therefore the destruction of a perception is not its causal operation (vyāpāra) which may produce recollection.\textsuperscript{65}

Varadarāja observes, that an impression, which is the effect of a perceptual cognition and the cause of a representative cognition, is not a cognition.\textsuperscript{66} It is dissimilar to a cognition. Puruṣottamājī Mahārāja describes an impression as the subtle condition of an apprehension.\textsuperscript{67}

Veṅkaṭanātha regards an impression as a peculiar adventitious property produced by a past perception. Any impression cannot produce the recollection of any object. That particular

\textsuperscript{60} NK., p. 268. \textsuperscript{61} Bhop., 160; SM., pp. 495-6.
\textsuperscript{62} Skruter api sāṁskāra-janakatvam navinair uktam. TSD., p. 91.
\textsuperscript{63} SM., pp. 496-7. TK., p. 6.
\textsuperscript{64} Sāṁskāraḥ pūrvanubhava-vyāpāraḥ. KR., p. 133.
\textsuperscript{65} SMD., pp. 496-7.
\textsuperscript{66} Sāṁskāraḥ anubhava-jñāna-janyāḥ smṛti-jñāna-hetuḥ syayah na jñānajñātiyāḥ. TR., p. 147. NBh., iii, 2, 45.
impression produces the recollection of an object, which was produced by the perception of it. The past perception is not the adventitious property which produces recollection, because it is destroyed when recollection is produced. The perception of a similar object or the like is not a present impression which produces recollection, for, in that case, an imperceptible object would be remembered. Further, it cannot produce recollection without the aid of an impression of a past perception. Hence, the hypothesis of an impression is not unwarranted.  

Venketanātha, unlike the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, thinks that an impression abides in the intellect (buddhi), and not in the self, and regards it as a modification of buddhi produced by frequent previous perceptions. He does not regard it as a modification of the self which is unmodifiable. An attributive cognition (dharma-bhūta-jñāna) is subject to modifications. So an impression produced by a previous perception subsists in buddhi which is a substance. This is the view of Viśiṣṭadvaitavāda.

Mahādevānanda Sarasvatī also regards the mind (antaḥkaraṇa) as the receptacle of an impression. The Nyāya regards the self as its substrate. What is called ahamkāra by the Advaita Vedānta is called Ātman by the Nyāya. Or, the empirical self limited by the adjunct of the mind (antaḥkaraṇa) in which pure consciousness is reflected, is the receptacle of an impression.

The Śāṅkhyā also regards the mind (manas) as the receptacle of impressions, since persons whose sense-organs are destroyed still remember objects perceived in the past. It does not regard the self as the substrate of impressions, because it is unmodifiable and devoid of sattva, rajas and tamas.

The Advaita Vedānta severely criticizes the Buddhist view of impressions (vāsanā). Impressions are produced, according to Śāṅkara, by perceptions. The variety of impressions is due to the variety of perceptions. The variety of recollections is due to the variety of impressions. They abide in the permanent empirical self. They cannot abide in the Alayavijñāna, because it is a series of momentary self-cognitions. Both are momentary and produced at the same moment, and consequently cannot be

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68 TMK., p. 689 ; SAS., p. 689.
69 Sāṁskāraḥ antaḥkaraṇa-niṣṭhaḥ.
70 TMK., p. 690 ; SAS., p. 690.
71 Ibid., p. 259.
72 Tattvānusandhāna on ACK., p. 259.
73 ATP., p. 110.
74 S.B., ii, 2, 30-1.
75 SPS., SSV., ii, 42-4.
related to each other as the substrate and the content, like the two horns of a cow springing up simultaneously.76 A cause is the invariable antecedent of its effect. If the *Alayavijñāna* is prior to the impression, then it cannot be its substrate because it is non-existent when the latter comes into existence.77 If the Buddhist regards the *Alayavijñāna* as permanent, he contradicts the doctrine of momentariness.78

Kumārila and Pārthaśārathi Miśra also severely criticize the Buddhist doctrine of impression (*vāsanā*). A preceding cognition that is entirely destroyed cannot modify the succeeding cognition. Even if they are produced simultaneously, they cannot modify each other because they are not related to each other. An impression is due to the operation of conjunction, inheritance and the like, which are not possible if the preceding cognition is entirely destroyed before the succeeding cognition is generated. A composite substance (e.g. a campakā flower) can perfume another composite substance (e.g. oil), because it can transfer its fine parts into the latter. But a prior momentary cognition cannot transfer its parts to the succeeding momentary cognition and modify it, because both are partless. Further, all residua (*vāsanā*) abide in momentary cognitions. When they are destroyed, the residua are destroyed, and cannot produce recollections in a definite order. If they are supposed to persist as potencies (*sakti*) after the destruction of the cognitions in which they resided, then they undermine the doctrine of momentariness. If a series of residua were supposed to exist like a series of cognitions, then a residuum would produce a residuum only, and a cognition would produce a cognition only, because a like cause produces a like effect only. But a like cause, it may be argued, produces an unlike effect in co-operation with a dissimilar auxiliary condition. Similarly, a cognition produces a residuum, and a residuum produces a cognition. This argument is baseless, since there are no dissimilar auxiliary conditions as there is nothing else than cognitions. The Mīmāṃsakas obviate these difficulties in that they regard the permanent self as the receptacle of impressions.79

Impressions produce recollections. They are auxiliary causes of recognition, because they render an aid to the sense-object-
intercourse which is its principal cause. They are auxiliary causes of determinate perception which involves recollection of similar and dissimilar objects. They are auxiliary causes of acquired perception which is complicated by the recollection of an object perceived on a previous occasion. They are auxiliary causes of illusions in which an object (e.g. a shell) is misperceived as another (e.g. silver) perceived at another time, in another place, and remembered at present, but appearing as an object perceived (Nyāya); or in which there is non-discrimination between the perceived element and the remembered element owing to obscuration of memory (smṛti-pramōṣa, Prabhākara). Inference depends upon the recollection of invariable concomitance of a probans with a probandum, which is produced by an impression. Comparison and testimony also involve recollection which depends upon an impression. Generally a single impression produced by a single perception produces a single recollection. But sometimes it produces the recollection of a collection of objects in co-operation with other impressions. 79 'Bring a jar'. In this example, the impressions of the constituent letters in co-operation with one another produce the recollection of a word; and the impressions of the constituent words jointly produce the recollection of a sentence. 80 An impression is intensified by repeated recollection of a similar nature. It produces a recollection which produces a stronger impression, which, in its turn, produces another recollection which produces a still stronger impression, and so on. The same impression is not intensified by repeated recollection. Impressions are non-eternal. They are produced and destroyed. They are destroyed by similar recollections, diseases and the lapse of a long time. 81

4. The Conditions of Retention (Causes of Impressions)

Retentive knowledge is the cause of not forgetting the objects which were learnt or perceived in the past. It is a condition of recollection. 82 It depends upon the following conditions:

(1) The healthy and vigorous condition of the body is the physiological condition of retention. It is indicated by a passage

80 Ibid., p. 134.
81 Śāstrārthasarhgraḥ, p. 379.
82 PRP., p. 68; SS., i, 15.
in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad: "When the food is pure, the mind is pure; when the mind is pure, memory becomes firm." Memory depends upon the health of the mind (sattva), which, in its turn, depends upon the health of the body. The healthy condition of the psycho-physical organism is a preconditional of memory.

Praśastapāda mentions three causes of impressions: (1) intense cognitions, (2) repeated cognitions, and (3) interesting cognitions.

(2) The contact of the self with the mind (manas) depending upon the intense perception of a wonderful object produces a deep and excessive impression in the self. The attentive intense perception of wonderful objects produces deep impressions. For instance, when an inhabitant of the Deccan, who has never seen a camel before, sees it for the first time, his intense perception of the wonderful animal produces a deep impression in his self, which enables him to recall it ever afterwards. Śrīdhara suggests that paṭupratyāya not only means an intense cognition, but also a very distinct cognition (sphuṭata-ra-pratyāya). For instance, when we walk on grass barefooted, sometimes we have intense tactual perception of the grass; but it cannot produce a deep impression in the self, because it is not very distinct. Such indistinct perceptions cannot produce deep impressions. Distinct perceptions alone can generate such deep impressions as may produce recollections in future.

(3) Repetition or frequency is another condition of retention inasmuch as it produces a deep impression. In acquiring learning frequent reading is an important condition of retention. Sometimes a single perception, though distinct and intense, cannot produce a deep impression. But when it is repeated several times, it produces a lasting impression. When a chapter of the Veda is read for the first time, it does not produce any distinct impression. But when it is read over and over again, its distinct perception is repeated, produces a deep impression, and fixes the matter in memory.

88 Ahāraśuddhau sattvaśuddhiḥ, sattvaśuddhau dhruvā smṛtiḥ, vii, 26, 2.
91 Paṭuprātayāḥ sphuṭata-ra-pratyayajaḥ. NK., p. 257.
92 NK., p. 257.
invaluable service. In acquiring skill in physical exercise, swimming, dancing and the like repeated practice is of great help. When study, art, physical exercise and the like are repeatedly practised, deep impressions are produced by the mind-soul-contact and the perceptions aided by the preceding impressions. A single cognition does not produce a lasting impression, because there is no distinct recollection after the first cognition. The last cognition also cannot be regarded as the cause of the deep impression. If it were so, there would be no need of repeated practice. Therefore, Śrīdhara concludes, the preceding impressions facilitate the succeeding cognitions, which, in their turn, strengthen the preceding impressions. When the practice is continued for a very long time with regard to the same object, the impression becomes very deep, and brings about a distinct recollection of it. This impression is produced by the last cognition, which depends upon the last but one impression. This is how impressions are strengthened by repeated practice.

(4) Interest is another condition of retention. The perception of an object which evokes great interest and compels attention produces a deep impression in the self. When a person puts forth special efforts and fixes his eyes on an interesting object with an attentive mind, which he has never seen before, his perception of it is as vivid as that of a flash of lightning. A deep impression (saṁskāreṇaḥ) is produced by the mind-soul-contact under the influence of the vivid perception. For instance, a deep impression is produced by the vivid perception of lotuses made of gold and silver in the Deva lake at midnight on the full-moon day in the month of Caitra, when the moon is in the asterism of Citrā. Though the lotuses appear for a single moment, they produce so vivid perceptions that they leave lasting impressions, and can be recalled ever afterwards. Nobody can vouch for the truth of the statement. But the fact remains, that a rare object evokes great interest, attracts attention, and calls forth a special effort of the self to perceive it; and that it produces a lasting impression in it. Sometimes when we perceive a very strange or marvellous object only once in our life, we have such a vivid perception of it that we remember it ever afterwards.

"NK., p. 257.
"NK., p. 257.
'NK., p. 271.
5. The Conditions of Recall

The Buddhist account is found in *Milindapañha* which mentions sixteen conditions of recall in an unscientific and unsystematic manner. (1) An extraordinary effort reminds an adept (e.g. Ananda) of his previous births. A superhuman effort of the mind is necessary for the revival of the deep-lying impressions of previous births. (2) Outward aid reminds a person of his past experiences. A person, forgetful by nature, is continually reminded by others of things which he cannot recall by unaided efforts. (3) Massive experience which moves a whole personality is a condition of recall. A deep impression left by the vivid perception of an interesting event can easily be recalled. Kings remember their coronation day, and persons remember their days of conversion on account of their deep impressions. This condition of memory corresponds to *ādarapratyaya* mentioned by Praśastapāda. An intense experience which afforded pleasure or joy to a person on a previous occasion reminds him of it. (4) An intense experience which afforded pain or sorrow to a person on a previous occasion reminds him of it. Thus the influence of feelings and emotions on memory was recognized. (5) Similarity of appearance is a condition of recall. The sight of a person resembling the father, the mother, the brother, or the sister reminds us of the latter. The sight of a camel, an ox, or an ass reminds us of some other member of the species like it. These are examples of the law of similarity which is adumbrated here. (6) Difference of appearance is a condition of recall. When we perceive an object, we perceive all its qualities. Hence we remember that a particular colour, a particular smell, a particular taste, and a particular touch belong to a particular object. The law of contiguity is adumbrated here. (7) The knowledge of speech is a condition of memory. A person who is by nature forgetful is reminded by others of an object, and then he remembers it. This condition is akin to the second condition, viz., outward aid. (8) A sign reminds us of an object signified by it. We recognise a draught bullock by a brand mark or some other sign. (9) An effort to recall on the prompting of others is a condition of memory. A person by nature forgetful is urged again and again by others to try his utmost to remember his past experience, and succeeds in doing so. (10) Calculation is a condition
of recall. A person knows by the training he has received in writing that such and such a letter follows another letter. This is a mechanical condition of memory. (11) Arithmetic is a condition of memory. Accountants do big sums by their knowledge of figures. This is a mechanical condition of memory. (12) Learning by heart is a condition of memory. Those who recite the scriptures again and again can recall them easily. This also is a mechanical condition of memory. Calculation, arithmetic and learning by heart correspond to abhyāsapratyāya mentioned by Praśastapāda. They remind us of past experiences on account of the mere frequency of the same experience. They are causes of rote memory or cramming. (13) Meditation is a condition of active memory. A monk remembers his days of temporal life by meditation. This condition is mentioned by Gautama. (14) Reference to a book is a condition of memory. Kings are reminded of regulations by referring to the book of laws. This condition is akin to an external aid to memory. (15) Pledge is a condition of memory. A pledged ornament reminds a person of the circumstances under which it was pledged. (16) Past experience is a condition of memory. Recollection is a reproduction of past experience. A person remembers what he has actually seen, heard, tasted, smelt, or touched. Memory cannot transcend the bounds of experience. In Milindapañha there is simply an empirical enumeration of the conditions of memory, but no attempt at a classification and explanation of them.  

The conditions of recall are discussed in the Vaiśeṣika literature. Kaṇḍāda mentions a particular conjunction of the self with the mind (manas) and an impression as the conditions of recollection. A particular mind-soul-contact, Śaṅkara Miśra observes, called attention (prāṇidhāna) is the non-material cause (asamavāyi-kāraṇa), the self is the material cause (samavāyi-kāraṇa), and an impression is the efficient cause (nimitta-kāraṇa) of recollection. Attention is the concentration of mind. Past perceptions are the causes of impressions, and consequently the ultimate causes of recollections. There is not always remembrance of an object, because it depends upon the revival of impressions by suggestive forces. Jaya Nārāyaṇa mentions the mind-soul-contact, a desire  

82 Ātmamanasoḥ sāmyoga-viśeṣāt sāṁskārāc ca smṛtiḥ. V.S., ix, 2, 6. VSU., ix, 2, 6. KVB., p. 154.
to recall (sūsmūrṣā), a similar impression, and excitants or cues as the conditions of recollection. He regards a determinate cognition which is not neutral in character as the principal cause (kāraṇa), an impression as the casual operation (vyāpāra), excitants or cues as the auxiliary cause (saṅhāri-kāraṇa), the mind-soul-contact as the non-material cause, and a desire to recall, attention and the like as the efficient cause of recollection. There must be a definite, distinct and determinate cognition of an object which is either pleasant or painful. An indefinite, indistinct and indeterminate cognition cannot produce an impression. Further, a cognition with a pleasant or unpleasant feeling-tone can produce an impression. It can be revived by the cognition of suggestive signs. Its revival depends upon the intention to remember the particular object perceived in the past, the mind-soul-contact, and attention. These are the conditions of active memory.

Praśastapāda mentions the following conditions of recall. The recollection of objects seen, heard, or otherwise perceived in the past is produced by a particular mind-soul-contact aided by the cognition of suggestive signs (liṅgadarśana), the desire (icchā) to recall, the thinking of associated ideas (anuśmaraṇa), and impressions produced by intense, repeated, and interesting or vivid cognitions. A particular mind-soul-contact, Śrīdhara observes, cannot bring about recollection unless it is aided by the perception of a suggestive sign which revives the impression. Hence the impression and the perception of a cue are the efficient causes of recollection.

Gautama mentions attention, context, repetition, signs, distinctive features, similarity, ownership, relation of the supporter and the supported, relationship, immediate sequence, separation, identity of function, excess, attainment, antagonism, concealment, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, fear, need, action, attachment, merit, and demerit as the conditions of recollection. (1) Attention (prāṇidhāna) is the fixation of the mind on the object by a person who intends to remember it. It consists in preventing the mind from wandering away to other objects. Intently thinking of the suggestive signs which have the power of reviving the impression

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44 VSV., ix, 2, 6. 45 PBh., p. 256.
46 Liṅgadarśanavat saṃskāro'pi smṛtār nīmittakāraṇam. NK., p. 257.
47 NS., iii, 2, 44.
48 Susmūrṣayā manaso dhāraṇāṃ prāṇidhānam. NBh., iii, 2, 44.
49 Prāṇidhānāṃ manaso viṣayāntara-saṅcāra-vāraṇam. NSV., iii, 2, 44.
of the object sought to be remembered is a cause of recollection.\textsuperscript{108} Constant thought of the signs (liṅga) which suggest the thing to be remembered directly leads to its recollection. Fixation of the mind on the signs which indicate these suggestive signs also indirectly leads to recollection.\textsuperscript{101} The associative tendencies are controlled and brought to a focus by concentration of mind so that their cumulative strength may easily rouse the dormant impression and produce its recollection. Attention is a subjective condition of recall. It throws the mind into an attitude which is favourable to recollection. (2) Context (nibandha) is a condition of recall. When many topics are discussed in the same work and repeatedly read together, an association is established among their ideas; so that they remind us of one another in the same order or in a different order. A person thinks of the means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa), and then remembers the object of valid knowledge (prameya), because he learnt them repeatedly in the same work on the Nyāya in the past. Here recollection of the contents of past experience follows the same order in which they were learnt in the past. When a person thinks of the grounds of defeat (nigrahasthāna), and then remembers the means of valid knowledge, his recollection follows a different order.\textsuperscript{102} Here continuous association under the influence of the context is responsible for recollection. Vātsyāyana gives another meaning of nibandha. It consists in establishing associations between well-known things and new things to be remembered—the familiar and the unfamiliar—with the help of the art of concentration of mind.\textsuperscript{103} It contains a significant suggestion. The things to be remembered must be associated with those already known and incorporated in the system of knowledge. Well-assimilated matter can be easily remembered. Undigested material of knowledge cannot be easily recalled. Hence, apperception is a subjective condition of memory. (3) Repetition (abhyāsa) is a condition of recollection. Vātsyāyana means by it an intense impression (samskāra) produced by the repetition of cognitions with regard to the same object. Vācaspati includes keen interest and vivid cognition (ādara-pratyaya) in repetition, since they also produce an impression through which they

\textsuperscript{108} Susmūrṣīta-liṅga-cintanam artha-smṛti-kāraṇam. NBh., iii, 2, 44.

\textsuperscript{101} NVTT., p. 404.

\textsuperscript{102} NVTT., p. 404. NSV., iii, 2, 44.

\textsuperscript{103} Dhāraṇā-stātra-kṛto vā prajñāteṣu vastuṣu smartavyānām upanikṣepo nibandhaḥ. NBh., iii, 2, 44.
bring about recollection. Repetition of the same experience produces many impressions of the same kind, which intensify and strengthen the last impression and fix it in memory. Though such an intense impression is not an excitant (*udbodhaka*) of recollection, yet it facilitates quick recall. Others maintain, that an intense impression produced by the repetition of the same experience is an excitant of recall.\(^{104}\) (4) Suggestive signs (*liṅga*) remind us of the object with which they were associated in our past experience. They are of four kinds: conjunct (*samyogī*), inherent (*samavāyī*), coinherent in the same substrate (*ekārtha-samavāyī*), and contradictory (*virodhi*). (i) An object reminds us of something with which it was invariably found to be in contact in our past experience. Smoke was invariably perceived in the past in conjunction with fire. So smoke reminds us of fire. (ii) An object reminds us of something in which it was always perceived to inhere in our past experience. Horns were always perceived to inhere in a cow. So they remind us of a cow. (iii) An object reminds us of another, both of which were always perceived to coinherit in the same substrate. Hands were always perceived in the past along with feet to coinherit in the same body. So hands remind us of feet. Colour and touch were always perceived in the past to coinherit in one and the same substance. So the colour of the object reminds us of its touch. These examples illustrate the law of contiguity. (iv) Two objects, which were always perceived to be antagonistic to each other, remind us of each other. The non-existent remind us of the existent because they are opposed to each other. This is an example of the law of contrast. (5) Distinguishing features (*laksana*) remind us of the objects which are distinguished by them. The sight of a flag with a distinctive mark reminds one of the nation to which it belongs. The sight of the distinctive features of an animal leads to the recollection of the species to which it belongs. The distinctive marks on the body of a person remind one of the race to which he belongs. (6) Similarity (*sādṛśya*).—An object reminds us of another on account of its similarity with it. The picture of Devadatta reminds us of him. This is an example of the law of similarity. (7) Ownership (*parigraha*).—When two entities are related to each other as the owner and the owned, either of them reminds us of the other. A property reminds one of its owner.

\(^{104}\) NBh., NVTT., NSV., iii, 2, 44.
and the owner reminds one of his property. (8) The supporter (āśraya) reminds one of the supported. A master reminds one of the servant supported by him. A king reminds us of his attendants. (9) The supported (āśrita) remind one of their supporters. A servant reminds one of his master who supports him. The attendants remind one of their king. If two objects are related to each other as the supporter and the supported, they remind us of each other. (10) If two objects are related to each other, one reminds us of the other. A pupil reminds one of his teacher. A priest reminds one of the person for whom he performs a sacrifice. Vācaspati Miśra observes, that some sort of relationship is involved in all the conditions of recall mentioned here. The special mention of relationship as a condition of recall means all relations other than those specially mentioned here.¹⁰⁵

(11) Immediate sequence (ānantarya) is a condition of recall. In performing a complex act the performance of one item reminds us of the item that follows it. The preceding item reminds us of the succeeding item. The sprinkling of water on rice reminds us of pounding it in a wooden mortar. Vācaspati gives an example of a series of acts which are habitually performed every day. They form a connected chain of acts; the preceding act reminds us of the succeeding act. We awake early in the morning, then get up from bed, then wash our faces, then satisfy the calls of nature, then clean our teeth. We perform these acts almost automatically owing to habit. Here the preceding act reminds us of the succeeding act, and then the act is performed. (12) Separation (viyoga).—When two lovers are separated from each other, one is reminded of the other. Separation implies sorrow which reminds one of the object of sorrow. (13) The identity of effect or function (ekakārya).—When C¹, C² and C³ co-operate and produce the same effect E, the perception of C¹ reminds one of C² or C³. Those who are engaged in the same profession or do the same kind of work remind us of one another. The fellow-students who are engaged in the same task remind us of one another. (14) Antagonism (virodha).—Of two rivals antagonistic to each other, the sight of the one reminds us of the other. A serpent and a mongoose remind one of each other, because they are naturally hostile to each other. (15) Excess (atiśaya) reminds one of what brings it about. The sacred thread ceremony

¹⁰⁵ NVTE, p. 404.
reminds a Brahmin boy of the priest who performed it. He attains a certain superiority in the shape of education, modesty, purity of conduct and the like after he is invested with sacred thread. Hence the superiority reminds him of his preceptor who is its indirect cause. (16) Attainment (prāpti).—One who received gifts from a charitable person often remembers him. A beggar often remembers the person from whom he received gifts or will receive them. (17) Concealment (vyavadāna).—A sheath reminds one of a sword which is concealed in it. (18) Pleasure and pain (sukha-duḥkha).—Pleasure reminds a person of the object that gave him pleasure in the past. Similarly, pain reminds him of the object that caused his pain in the past. Pleasure and pain not only remind us of their causes, but also of each other. Pleasure reminds us of pain, and pain reminds us of pleasure. Present joy reminds us of past sorrow; present sorrow reminds us of past joy. The law of contrast governs these recollections. (19) Desire and aversion (icchā-dveṣa).—Desire reminds a person of the object or person that he likes. Aversion reminds him of the object or person that he dislikes. Desire and aversion remind one of the objects that excite them. Vācaspati Miśra means by desire and aversion affection and hatred respectively. Affection for brothers reminds a person of his brothers. Hatred for a hostile wife reminds him of his wife. Conative tendencies determine recall. (20) Fear (bhaya).—Fear reminds one of its cause (e.g. death). (21) Affection (rāga).—Love often reminds a lover of his beloved woman. Affection reminds a father of his son. Thus emotions determine recall. (22) Need (arthitva).—It reminds a needy person of what he needs in the shape of food or clothing, or of a charitable person who will remove it. (23) Action (kriyā).—It reminds one of the agent who performs it. A chariot reminds one of the carpenter who made it. The movement of the branches of a tree reminds one of the wind that causes it. (24) Merit (dharma) acquired by the habitual performance of duties enjoyed by the Vedas leads to the recollection of past lives. It is the cause of extraordinary power of retention and recollection in this life. (25) Demerit (adharma) acquired by the habitual commission of sins reminds one of the cause of pain and misery experienced in the past. Merit and demerit remind one of the causes of pleasure and pain experienced on previous occasions in

106 Mahābhārata, Sāntiparva, Ch. 16, 15.
this life and previous births. A new-born baby sucks the breast of his mother because he remembers that it gave him pleasure in the previous birth.\textsuperscript{107}

The list of conditions of recall mentioned by Gautama is not an exhaustive enumeration of all possible conditions. It is purely suggestive.\textsuperscript{108} Sometimes in abnormal conditions of the mind the impressions of past experiences in the inmost recesses of the mind are revived, which were almost beyond the reach of recollection under normal conditions. "It is well-known," Vācaspati asserts, "that insanity and the like also are conditions of recollection."\textsuperscript{109}

The causes of the revival of impressions are conditions of recall. Three excitants (\textit{udbodhaka}) are mentioned in the Śāṅkhya, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, and the Vedānta literature. The perception of a similar object, an unseen force (\textit{adṛśta}), and reflection are the revivers of impressions which are the seeds of recollections.\textsuperscript{110} (1) Sometimes the excitant is the perception of an object similar to what was perceived in the past. The sight of Devadatta excites the recollection of Yajñadatta who resembles him. Devadatta reminds one of Yajñadatta because of his similarity with him. This is an example of the law of similarity. (2) Sometimes the excitant is an unseen force (\textit{adṛśta}). An impression of the past life is revived by an unseen agency (\textit{adṛśta}).\textsuperscript{111} An object perceived in the past, e.g. the holy place Śrīraṅgam, suddenly flashes into memory owing to an unseen force (\textit{adṛśta}). Here the dormant impression of the place is roused by \textit{adṛśta} and thrust into the focus of consciousness. This is an example of spontaneous memory. (3) Sometimes reflection (\textit{cintā}) resuscitates an impression and brings about recollection of an object. For instance, one can voluntarily call up the divine image of Veṅkaṭeśa by thinking of all the associated ideas of its beauty, holiness, auspiciousness and the like. This is an example of active memory. By reflection we can bring to a focus all the forces of suggestion, the cumulative effect of which brings about

\textsuperscript{107} NBh., NSV., iii, 2, 44; NVTT., pp. 404-5.
\textsuperscript{108} Nidarsaṁcedam śrīhetūnāṁ, na parisaṅkhyaṁ na. NBh., iii, 2, 44.
\textsuperscript{109} Unmādādayo'pi śrīhetatavo lokaprasiddhāḥ. NVTT., p. 405.
\textsuperscript{110} Sadrśṛṣṭaṁcintāyaṁ śrīhitijasya bodhakāḥ. Tbh., p. 28; SSV., iv, 21; Vps., p. 251; SāS., on TMK., p. 688; YMD., p. 4; KR., p. 133.
\textsuperscript{111} Adṛśṭāj, janmāntare sanśkārodvāya. KR., p. 133.
recolletion which is due to convergent association. (4) Śrīnivāsa mentions contiguity (sāhacarya) also as a condition of recollection. Devadatta and Yajñadatta were always perceived together in the past. So the sight of the one reminds a person of the other. This is an example of the law of contiguity. Veṅkaṭanātha also recognizes the law of similarity and the law of contiguity as the laws of association. Vātsyāyana recognizes the law of contrast and the law of causation also as the laws of association.

The causes of recollection do not operate at the same time. Therefore there cannot be simultaneous recollection of all our past experiences. Just as the mind-soul-contact and impressions are the causes of recollection, so are attention, perception of suggestive signs and the rest, which do not appear simultaneously. There is no simultaneous recollection of all past experiences, because these auxiliary conditions do not appear simultaneously. The succession of the causes of recollection accounts for the succession of recollections.

In the Alankāra literature the following conditions of recollection are mentioned: the perception of similar objects, impression, attention, reflection (cintā), meditation (dhyāna), vividness of previous perception, repetition of similar experience, and health of the organism (svāsthya).

Individual impressions are revived in isolation from one another. Many connected impressions are revived together in a single file. When they are revived singly, they produce recollection of single objects. When they are revived together, they produce recollection of many objects at the same time (samūhālambanā smṛti). Though a particular impression is produced by a particular perception, it is revived along with many other connected impressions and brings about recollection of all their objects together. Discrete impressions do not always produce discrete recollections, but a cumulative recollection of all the objects perceived together in the past. For instance, we hear the following words in succession: “Bring the horse”. Here the perception of every letter produces an impression. The impressions of the letters are revived together and produce recollection of the words

112 YMD., p. 4.
113 TMK., p. 576.
114 NS., NBh., NSV., iii, 2, 34 ; NVTT., pp. 398, 429.
115 Nāṭyadārpaṇa, p. 180, (G.O.S.); Rasagāṅgādhara, p. 123 ; Bhāva-prakāśana, p. 844, (G.O.S.); Rasārpaṇaudhākara, p. 126.