INTRODUCTION

BY DR. A. A. BRILL

PSYCHOANALYSIS was unknown in this country until I introduced it in 1908. Ever since then, I have been translating, lecturing and writing on this subject both for physicians and laymen; and I am happy to say that today psychoanalysis, which has encountered so much opposition here, as it did abroad, is firmly established not only in medicine, but also in psychology, sociology, pedagogy and anthropology. It has not only permeated and transvalued the mental sciences, but indirectly also belles lettres and the cultural trends of the last generation.

At the beginning of the psychoanalytic movement in this country, its opponents and some of its lukewarm friends predicted that, like so many other discoveries in mental therapy, psychoanalysis was destined to be short-lived. They were poor prophets. The falsity of their prognosis can be seen in the fact that the psychoanalytic terminology, some of which I was the first to coin into English expressions, can now be found in all standard English dictionaries. Words like abreaction, transference, repression, displacement, unconscious, which I introduced as Freudian concepts, have been adopted and are used to give new meanings, new values to our knowledge of normal and abnormal behavior.

How did Freud come to discover psychoanalysis? Every contribution to the sum total of our knowledge has been consciously or unconsciously motivated by the wish to ameliorate the lot of mankind. Discoveries of this sort never come out of the clear sky; there is always a vis a tergo, which forms some definite nucleus in the mind of some genius, and this slowly grows until it attains sufficient proportions to make itself felt despite all obstacles. Freud has said that a human being is a resultant of constitution and fate, or heredity and environment. The constitution is brought along from all the past centuries and millenniums, but once here cannot be changed. A living being either comes into the world with a normal body and mind, and survives in the struggle for existence, or he is born defective and falls by the wayside. But, given an average being, his
further development, his future character or personality, depends on fate or environment. The same holds true for any scientific discovery.

The discoverer begins with some nucleus, some kernel of material, which for some unconscious reason takes possession of him. He then compulsively elaborates upon it through a long labor of trial and error until it is accepted by others—one might say, until he forces its acceptance by others. For no matter how true a thing may be, the world-at-large at first refuses to believe it. The world-at-large is the conservative old sage, who regularly objects to anything new and accepts it only after experience has demonstrated the truth of the discovery, and thus forces conviction upon him. I am presumptuous enough to feel that psychoanalysis is one of the greatest discoveries of our age. Freud has repeatedly been compared to Darwin, Spinoza, Newton, Einstein, and other great geniuses, whose works were at first combated and repudiated, but finally accepted. To give here even a short survey of the resistances and obstacles which Freud’s teachings encountered would take too much space; I must refer the reader to the master’s own history at the end of this volume.

Sigmund Freud was born in 1856 in Freiberg, Moravia, formerly Austria, now Czechoslovakia. He was brought up in Vienna, having lived there since the age of four. In his autobiography, he states: “My parents were Jews and I remained a Jew.”

One of the arguments that has been hurled at psychoanalysis on a few occasions is that its originator was a Jew, implying thereby that the theories expressed by Freud do not apply to the rest of mankind. Such an argument, which, if accepted, would also invalidate Christianity, is too stupid to require refutation. Freud’s works had the honor of forming part of the sacred pyre on Hitler’s accession to power. The fact that the bulk of this pyre was composed of works of non-Jewish thinkers plainly shows that truth knows no creed or race. I feel, however, that Freud’s Jewish descent—constitution—as well as the environment to which he was subjected because of it—fate—exerted considerable influence on his personality. One might say that only a Jewish genius, forged in the crucible of centuries of persecution, could have offered himself so willingly on the altar of public opprobrium for the sake of demonstrating the truths of psychoanalysis.

Freud tells us that in college he always stood first, and was hardly ever examined. Despite the very straitened financial condition of his family, his father wanted him to follow his own inclination in the selection of a vocation. He had no special love for medicine at that age, nor did he acquire it later, but rather he was stimulated by a sort of inquisitiveness directed to human relations and objects of nature. He was very much attracted to Darwin’s theories because they offered the prospect of an extraordinary advance of human knowledge, and he finally decided to
INTRODUCTION

enter the medical school after he had read Goethe's beautiful essay, *Die Natur*.

In a number of his works Freud exposes his innermost feelings, so that he who reads will find there his real autobiography, and in some, notably, *The Interpretation of Dreams*, he touches on the Jewish problem. But his first encounter of this problem is described in his autobiography, where he states that he came face to face with it when he entered the university in 1873. It struck him as unreasonable that he was supposed to feel inferior and extra-national because he was a Jew. "I rejected the first," he states, "with all resoluteness. I could never grasp why I should be ashamed of my origin, or, as they began to say, of my 'race.' As to the nationality which was denied me, I gave this up without much regret." He felt that there would surely always be a bit of room for a zealous fellow worker within the sphere of mankind without the necessity of any enrollment. "But these first university impressions produced one very important result for the future. I became familiar early with my destiny—to belong to the opposition and to be proscribed from the 'compact majority.' A certain independence of judgment was in this way developed." 1

While still in the university, he worked for a number of years in the physiological laboratory of the famous Ernst Brücke, who was his teacher and gave him as his first task the histology of the nervous system. With only a short interruption Freud worked in the Institute from 1876 until 1882. Then, he discovered, that with the exception of psychiatry, the other medical specialties did not attract him. He graduated from the medical school in 1881, and in 1882 he entered Vienna's well known *Allgemeine Krankenhaus* (general hospital). There, he went through the usual routine services, but continued his studies on the anatomy of the brain, in which he became very proficient. It is not generally known that in his early days Freud wrote a number of works on diseases of the nervous system, which were very highly regarded by his contemporaries. 2

In 1885 he was attracted by the fame of Charcot, who was applying hypnotism to the study and treatment of hysteria and other functional nervous diseases. He remained for a year in Paris as a pupil and translator of this master's works. In 1886 he returned to his native Vienna and "married the girl who waited for me in a far-off city longer than four years." He then entered private practice, but continued as an instructor in the university.

What Freud saw in Charcot's Clinic made a very deep impression on him. While still a student, he also witnessed a performance of the "magnetiser," Hansen, in which a test person became deadly pale when she
INTRODUCTION

merged into a cataleptic rigidity, and remained so during the whole duration of the catalepsy. This convinced Freud of the genuineness of hypnotic phenomena, a conviction which remained in him despite the fact that the contemporary professors of psychiatry considered hypnosis fraudulent and dangerous. From Charcot he learned that hypnosis could produce hysterical symptoms as well as remove them, and that hysteria could also occur in men; and from Lièbault and Bernheim of the Nancy School he learned that suggestion alone, without hypnotism, was as efficacious as suggestion employed in hypnosis.

When Freud returned to Vienna and demonstrated what he had learned from Charcot, he met with considerable opposition. It was the age of physical therapy, when physicians knew nothing about the psychic factors in disease, when everything was judged by the formula, *Mens sana in corpore sano* (a healthy mind in a healthy body). Every symptom was explained on the basis of some organic lesion, and if nothing physical was discovered, it was assumed that there must be something in the brain to account for the disturbance. The treatment was based on this same deficient understanding; drugs, hydrotherapy, and electrotherapy were the only agents that physicians could use. When the patient was excited, he received some sedative; if he was depressed and felt fatigue, he was given a tonic; and when drugs failed, electricity or cold baths were recommended. All these remedies gave only temporary alleviation, mainly through suggestion. Most of the thoughtful physicians were fully cognizant of this helpless state, but there was nothing else to be done.

During the first few years of his private practice Freud relied mostly on hypnotism and electrotherapy, but he soon realized that the latter failed to benefit the patient, and that the whole idea of electric treatment for functional nervous diseases was fantastic. He had some good results, however, from hypnotic therapy; but he soon found that not every patient could be hypnotized, and that even those who could be, did not remain permanently cured. Attributing such failures to a deficiency in his technique, to an inability on his part to put every patient into a state of somnambulism with its consequent amnesia, he spent some weeks in Nancy with Lièbault and Bernheim, to whom he took a recalcitrant patient for treatment. Bernheim made a number of efforts to produce a deep hypnotic state in the patient, but finally had to admit failure. Freud, though disappointed with the technique of hypnotism, learned a great deal from the experiments witnessed there concerning the forceful psychic forces which were still to be investigated. Very soon thereafter, he gradually gave up hypnotism and developed what he called "psychoanalysis."

In this connection he makes the following interesting statement: "The importance of hypnotism for the history of the development of psychoanalysis must not be too lightly estimated. Both in theoretic as well as in
therapeutic aspects, psychoanalysis is the administrator of the estate left by hypnotism.\(^1\)

In order to give a full account of the development of psychoanalysis, it will be necessary to go back a few years. While Freud still worked in Brücke’s laboratory, he made the acquaintance of Dr. Josef Breuer, a prominent general practitioner of high scientific standing. Although Breuer was 14 years older than Freud, they soon became friends and frequently discussed their scientific views and experiences. Knowing Freud’s interest in neurology and psychiatry, Breuer gave him an account of a very interesting case of hysteria which he had studied and cured by hypnosis from 1880 to 1882.\(^2\) As this unique case was of the greatest importance to the development of psychoanalysis, it will be worth while to give a few details.

The patient concerned was a young girl of unusual education and talent, who had become ill while nursing her father to whom she was very much attached. Dr. Breuer states that when he took her as a patient she presented a variegated picture of paralyses with contractures, inhibitions and states of psychic confusion. Through an accidental observation Breuer discovered that the patient could be freed from such disturbances of consciousness if she could be enabled to give verbal expression to the affective phantasies which dominated her. Breuer elaborated this experience into a method of treatment. He hypnotized her and urged her to tell him what oppressed her at the time, and by this simple method he freed her from all her symptoms. The significance of the case lay in this fact, that in her waking state the patient knew nothing about the origin of her symptoms, but once hypnotized, she immediately knew the connection between her symptoms and some of her past experiences. All her symptoms were traceable to experiences during the time when she had nursed her sick father. Moreover, the symptoms were not arbitrary and senseless, but could be traced to definite experiences and forgotten reminiscences of that emotional situation.

A common feature of all the symptoms consisted in the fact that they had come into existence in situations in which an impulse to do something had to be foregone because other motives suppressed it. The symptom appeared as a substitute for the unperformed act. As a rule, the symptom was not the result of one single “traumatic” scene, but of a sum of many similar situations. If the patient in a state of hypnosis recalled hallucinatorily the act which she had suppressed in the past, and if she now brought it to conclusion under the stress of a freely generated affect, the symptom was wiped away never to return again. It was remarked that

\(^1\) *Psychoanalysis: Exploring the Hidden Recesses of the Mind*, translated by A. A. Brill, Encyclopaedia Britannica.

the causes which had given origin to the symptom resembled the traumatic factors described by Charcot in his experimental cases. What was still more remarkable was that these traumatic causes with their concomitant psychic feelings had been entirely lost to the patient’s memory, as if they had never happened, while their results—that is, the symptoms, had continued unchanged, as if unaffected by the wear and tear of time, until attacked by Breuer through hypnosis.

Although Breuer, as was mentioned above, told Freud about this wonderful discovery, he did not publish his findings. Freud could not understand why. The discovery seemed to him of inestimable value. But following his return from Nancy in 1889 with the cognition of hypnotic suggestive therapy, Freud decided to test Breuer’s method in his own cases, and found ample corroboration of its efficacy during a period of many years. He then urged Breuer to report with him the results of his method, and in 1893 they jointly issued a preliminary communication, *On the Psychic Mechanisms of Hysterical Phenomena*.¹

As can be seen, Breuer was the spiritual creator of this method of treatment and Freud always gave him full credit for it, although they differed from the very beginning in their basic interpretation of the symptoms. They called their treatment the “cathartic method” because they concluded that the efficacy of it rested on the mental and emotional purging, catharsis, which the patient went through during the treatment. The other conclusion drawn by the authors was that hysteria was a disease of the past, and that, as Freud put it later, the symptom was, as it were, a monument to some disagreeable and forgotten (repressed) episode from the patient’s life. The patient, however, did not know the meaning of the monument any more than the average German would know the meaning of the Bunker Hill monument. This concept for the first time showed the importance of distinguishing between conscious and unconscious states, which was later amplified and developed by Freud as the psychology of the unconscious. New meaning was given to the affective or emotional factors of life, their fluctuations and dynamism. The symptom was the result of a dammed-up or strangulated affect. The patient could not give vent to the affect because the situation in question made this impossible, so that the idea was intentionally repressed from consciousness and excluded from associative elaboration. As a result of this repression, the sum of energy which could not be discharged took a wrong path to bodily innervation, and thus produced the symptom. In other words, the symptom was the result of a conversion of psychic energy into a physical manifestation, such as pain or paralysis. Thus, a pain in the face, diagnosed as neuralgia, might be due to an insult which would ordinarily evoke the thought, “I feel as if he had slapped me in the face.” As this insult could

¹ L. C. D. 1.
not be retaliated against, the strangulated energy remained in a state of repression and gave rise to "neuralgia." The cure or the discharge was effected through what the authors called the process of *abreaction*. The hypnotized patient was led back to the repressed episodes and allowed to give free vent in speech and action to the feelings which were originally kept out of consciousness.¹

Breuer’s and Freud’s discoveries were not received as sympathetically as the authors expected. Their psychogenetic views of hysteria were interesting, but too revolutionary to be accepted by their older colleagues. On the other hand, in spite of much discussion, there was as yet, no real antagonism. That did not arise until later, when Freud began to stress the sexual factor in the neuroses. In his report of Anna O., Breuer stated: "The sexual element in her make-up was astonishingly undeveloped."² Throughout their book the sexual elements, of which there were many in every case, were treated no differently than the other factors in the patients’ lives. How Freud happened to become interested in sex and then stress its importance in the etiology of the neuroses he tells us later.³

Very soon after the appearance of the *Studies in Hysteria*, Breuer withdrew from the field. He was, after all, unprepared for this specialty, and as much as he enjoyed a stable and lucrative practice and a high reputation as a family physician, the storm which began to gather as his collaborator advanced deeper into the etiology of the neuroses more or less frightened him. Freud, therefore, continued alone to elaborate and perfect the instrument left by his erstwhile friend and collaborator; and as a result, the cathartic method underwent numerous modifications, the most important of which was the giving-up of hypnotism in favor of *free association*. As pointed out above, not everybody could be hypnotized, and since hypnotism was absolutely indispensable to the cathartic treatment at that time, many a worthy patient had had to be given up just because he or she could not be hypnotized. Freud was also dissatisfied with the therapeutic results of catharsis based on hypnotism. Although cures were often very striking, they were often of very short duration and depended mainly on the personal relation between the patient and physician. Moreover, Freud always entertained a feeling of antipathy to the application of hypnotism and suggestion to patients. Speaking of his visit to Bernheim in 1889, he states: "But I can remember even then a feeling of gloomy antagonism against this tyranny of suggestion. When a patient who did not prove to be yielding was shouted at: ‘What are you doing? Vous vous

¹ To *ab-react* literally means to re-act or work off something repressed, thereby unburdening oneself of unconscious, strangulated feelings.
² *I. c.*, p. 144.
³ *Cf. The History of the Psychoanalytic Movement*. 
INTRODUCTION

"contresuggestionnez!", I said to myself that this was an evident injustice and violence." ¹

Yet his visit to Bernheim later helped him out of the dilemma of not being able to hypnotize some patients. He recalled the following experiment which he had witnessed there, the object of which was to overcome the post-hypnotic amnesia: On being awakened, the patient could not remember anything that had transpired during hypnosis, but when he was urged to make an effort to recall what had been said to him, he eventually remembered everything. Freud applied the same method to those patients whom he could not hypnotize. He urged them to tell him everything that came to their minds, to leave out nothing, regardless of whether they considered it relevant or not. He persuaded them to give up all conscious reflection, abandon themselves to calm concentration, follow their spontaneous mental occurrences, and impart everything to him. In this way he finally obtained those free associations which lead to the origin of the symptoms. As he developed this method, he found that it was not as simple as he had thought, that these so-called free associations were really not free, but were determined by unconscious material which had to be analyzed and interpreted. He therefore designated this new technique psychoanalysis. The cathartic method, however, was ever preserved as a sort of nucleus of psychoanalysis despite the expansions and modifications which Freud gradually made as he proceeded with the new technique.

In the course of working with free associations, Freud gained a tremendous amount of insight into the play of forces of the human mind which he could not have obtained through the former therapeutic procedure. The question as to how the patient could have forgotten so many outer and inner experiences, which could be recalled only in a state of hypnosis and which were difficult to bring to consciousness by means of free association, soon became revealed to him. The forgotten material represented something painful, something disagreeable, or something frightful, obnoxious to the ego of the patient, which he did not like to think of consciously. In order to make it conscious, the physician had to exert himself mightily to overcome the patient's resistance, which kept these experiences in a state of repression and away from consciousness. The neurosis proved to be the result of a psychic conflict between two dynamic forces, impulse and resistance, in the course of which struggle the ego withdrew from the disagreeable impulse. As a result of this withdrawal, the obnoxious impulse was kept from access to consciousness as well as from direct motor discharge, but it retained its impulsive energy.

This unconscious process actually is a primary defense mechanism, comparable to an effort to fly away from something. But in order to keep

the disagreeable idea from consciousness, the ego has to contend against
the constant thrust of the repressed impulse which is ever searching for
expression. But despite constant exertion by the ego, the repressed, ob-
noxious impulse often finds an outlet through some by-path, and thus
invalidates the intention of the repression. The repressed impulsive energy
then settles by this indirect course on some organ or part of the body, and
this innervation constitutes the symptom. Once this is established, the
patient struggles against the symptom in the same way as he did against
the originally repressed impulses.

To illustrate these mechanisms let us consider the case of an hysterical
young woman. For some months she was courted by a young man pro-
claiming his ardent love for her. Suddenly one day he made an unsucces-
sful sexual assault upon her, and then disappeared, leaving her in a state of
deep depression. She could not confide in her mother, because from the
very beginning of the affair the mother had forbidden her to see the young
man. Three years later I found her suffering from numerous hysterical con-
version symptoms, and attacks of an epileptic character which had existed
for some two and a half years. Analysis showed that the attacks repre-
sented symbolically what had taken place at the time of the abortive sex-
ual assault. Every detail of the so-called epileptiform attack—every ges-
ture, every movement—was a stereotyped repetition of the sexual attack
which the patient was reproducing unconsciously. The other symptoms,
too, were directly traceable to the love affair.

The whole process of this disease can readily be understood if we bear
in mind the various steps of this love situation. The young woman was
healthy and, biontically speaking, ready for mating; her primitive instinct
of sex was striving for fulfillment. Consciously, she could think of love
only in the modern sense of the term, in which the physical elements are
deliberately kept out of sight. Her middle-class, religious environment
precluded any illicit sexual activity as far as she was consciously
concerned. But, behind it all, the sexual impulses were actively reaching
out for maternity. She was sincerely in love with the man, but naturally
thought of love as marriage, with everything that goes with it. The sudden
shock of coming face to face with the physical elements of sex left a ter-
rific impression on her mind: on the one hand, consciously, she rejected
vehemently the lover’s physical approaches, and on the other hand, un-
consciously, she really craved them. For weeks afterwards she vividly
lived over in her mind everything that had happened to her, and, now and
then, even fancied herself as having yielded—a thought which was im-
mediately rejected and replaced by feelings of reproach and disgust. Last,
but not least, she actually missed the love-making, which she had enjoyed
for months prior to the attempted assault. As she could not unburden her-
INTRODUCTION

self to anyone, she tried very hard to forget everything, and finally seemingly succeeded. But a few weeks later she began to show the symptoms which finally developed into the pathogenic picture which was diagnosed as epilepsy or hystero-epilepsy. These symptoms were the symbolization, or, if you will, a dramatization of the conflict between her primitive self and her ethical self, between what Freud now calls the Id and the Ego.

To make ourselves more explicit, it will be necessary to say something about the elements of the psychic apparatus. According to Freud's formulation the child brings into the world an unorganized chaotic mentality called the Id, the sole aim of which is the gratification of all needs, the alleviation of hunger, self-preservation, and love, the preservation of the species. However, as the child grows older, that part of the id which comes in contact with the environment through the senses learns to know the inexorable reality of the outer world and becomes modified into what Freud calls the ego. This ego, possessing awareness of the environment, henceforth strives to curb the lawless id tendencies whenever they attempt to assert themselves incompatibly. The neurosis, as we see it here, was, therefore, a conflict between the ego and the id. The ego, aware of the forces of civilization, religion and ethics, refused to allow motor discharge to the powerful sexual impulses emanating from the lawless id, and thus blocked them from attainment of the object towards which they aimed. The ego then defended itself against these impulses by repressing them. The young lady in question seemingly forgot this whole episode. Had the repression continued unabated, she would have remained healthy. But the repressed material struggled against this fate, finally broke through as a substitutive formation on paths over which the ego had no control, and obtruded itself on the ego as symptoms. As a result of this process, the ego found itself more or less impoverished, its integrity was threatened and hurt, and hence it continued to combat the symptom in the same way as it had defended itself against the original id impulses.

This whole process constitutes the picture of the neuroses, or rather of the transference neuroses, which comprise hysteria, anxiety hysteria, and the compulsion neuroses, in contradistinction to the so-called narcissistic neuroses, melancholic depressions, and to the psychoses, schizophrenia, paranoid conditions and paranoia proper, in which the underlying mechanisms are somewhat different. In a psychosis, as will be shown later, the illness results from a conflict between the ego and the outer world, and in the narcissistic neurosis from a conflict between the ego and the super-ego. For just as the ego is a modified portion of the id as a result of contact with the outer world, the super-ego represents a modified part of the ego, formed through experiences absorbed from the parents, especially from the father. The super-ego is the highest mental evolution attainable by man, and consists of a precipitate of all prohibitions and inhibitions, all
the rules of conduct which are impressed on the child by his parents and by parental substitutes. The feeling of conscience depends altogether on the development of the super-ego.¹

From the description given here of the mechanism of the neurosis, scant as it is, one can already see the great rôle attributed by Freud to the unconscious factor of the mind. Psychoanalysis has been justly called the “psychology of depths” because it has emphasized the rôle of the unconscious mental processes. Unlike those psychologists and philosophers who use such terms as conscious, co-conscious, and sub-conscious in a very loose and confused manner, Freud conceives consciousness simply as an organ of perception. One is conscious or aware of those mental processes which occupy one at any given time. In contrast to this, the unconscious is utterly unknown and cannot be voluntarily recalled. No person can bring to light anything from his unconscious unless he is made to recall it by hypnosis, or unless it is interpreted for him by psychoanalysis. Midway between conscious and unconscious there is a fore-conscious or pre-conscious, which contains memories of which one is unaware, but which one can eventually recall with some effort.

This structure of a conscious fore-conscious, and an actual unconscious, is based on the attempt which Freud made to conceive the psychic apparatus as a composition of a number of forces or systems. It is a theoretical classification, which seems, however, to work well in practice. Bearing in mind these spatial divisions, we can state that whereas the dream is the royal road to the unconscious, most of the mechanisms discussed in the Psychopathology of Everyday Life belong to the fore-conscious system. This work was written after Freud became convinced that there is nothing arbitrary or accidental in psychic life, be it normal or abnormal. For the very unconscious forces which he found in the neuroses he also found in the common faulty actions of everyday life, like ordinary forgetting of familiar names, slips of the tongue, mistakes in reading or writing, which had hitherto been considered accidental and unworthy of explanation. Freud shows in the Psychopathology of Everyday Life that a rapid reflection or a short analysis always demonstrates the disturbing influence behind such slips, and conclusively proves that the same disturbances, differing only in degree, are found in every person, and that the gap between the neurotic and the so-called normal is, therefore, very narrow.

The dream, according to Freud, represents the hidden fulfillment of an unconscious wish. But the wishes which it represents as fulfilled are the very same unconscious wishes which are repressed in neuroses. Dreaming is a normal function of the mind; it is the guardian of sleep insofar as it strives to release tensions generated by unattainable wishes—tensions which, if not removed, might keep the person from sleeping. The dream is

not always successful in its efforts; sometimes it oversteps the limits of propriety; it goes too far; and then the dreamer is awakened by the super-ego.

Without going further into the psychology of the dream, enough has been said to show that these twin discoveries—that non-conscious psychic processes are active in every normal person, expressing themselves in inhibitions and other modifications of intentional acts, and that the dreams of mentally healthy persons are not differently constructed from neurotic or psychotic symptoms—gave rise not only to a New Psychology, but to fruitful investigations in many other fields of human knowledge. The ability to interpret the dreams of today made it possible also to interpret the dreams of yesterday. Freudian literature, therefore, abounds in studies throwing new light on mythology, folklore, fairy tales, and ethnology; and psychoanalysis has become as important to the non-medical sciences as to the therapy of the neuroses.

Returning now to the case of the virtuous young lady, we can understand better that her attacks should prove on analysis to be a detailed reproduction of the coitus which her lover had tried to force upon her. Employing the same distortions one finds in dreams, the patient reënacted everything that had happened at the last rendezvous with her lover. In fact, she went further; in her attacks she actually attained, or better, completed, what had been omitted in reality; she actually simulated coitus in all its physical manifestations. Despite distortion, the attack thus served as an unconscious compensation for the traumatic event. In the attack, the patient possessed her lost lover by playing both the masculine and the feminine rôle. Consciously, however, she knew nothing about it, and objected most vehemently when the meaning of her symptoms was made known to her. The treatment followed the same path as the analysis of a dream. That the numerous implications of such a case are as important to psychology, sociology and pedagogy, as to mental medicine, is quite obvious.

I have always found it hard to understand why Freud’s views on sex roused so much opposition. Freud did not enter that realm voluntarily, but was forced by a natural course of events into taking account of the sexual factor in neuroses. Following the discovery of the psychogenesis of hysterical symptoms, first through Breuer’s cathartic method and later through the technique of “free association,” Freud was led, step by step, to discover and explore the realm of infantile sexuality. This discovery was based entirely on empiric material. In probing for the origin of hysterical symptoms, in tracing them back as far as possible, even into childhood, Freud found physical and psychical activities of a definitely sexual nature in the earliest ages of childhood. The necessary conclusion was that the traumas underlying the symptoms were invariably of a sex-
ual nature, since all his cases produced similar findings. Finally, therefore, he concluded that sexual activities in childhood could not be considered abnormal, but were on the contrary normal phenomena of the sexual instinct.

In following up these discoveries it was natural that he should also investigate the rôle of sexuality in the extensive syndrome of neurasthenia. To his surprise Freud found that all his so-called neurasthenics exhibited some sexual abuses such as coitus interruptus, frustrated excitement, sexual abstinence, excessive masturbation, etc. In the course of these investigations he was able to bring order into the field of neurasthenia—that "garbage can of medicine," as Forel aptly called it—by separating from others those cases which were mainly characterized by anxiety. The results he embodied in his classic paper, On the Right to Separate from Neurasthenia a Definite Symptom-Complex as "Anxiety Neurosis," in which he called attention for the first time to the relation between anxiety and sex. The pursuit of studies in this direction brought him at length to the conviction that all neuroses represent a general disturbance of the sexual functions; that the actual neuroses (neurasthenia and anxiety neuroses) result from a direct chemical or toxic disturbance, while the psychoneuroses (hysteria and compulsion neuroses) represent the psychic expression of these disturbances. This conclusion, based at first on explorations in the sexual life of adults, but reënforced and confirmed since 1908 through analyses of children, was finally compressed into the famous dictum that "In a normal sex life no neurosis is possible."

Freud was not the first to discover sexual difficulties in man. One need only think of literature throughout the ages to realize that there was abundant material on the subject long before the appearance of Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex. Freud's special merit lies in the fact that before him sex had been treated as an isolated phenomenon, or as (more or less) an abnormality, whereas he paid it the respect of considering it as a component of the normal personality. In the words of Dr. James J. Putnam, former professor of neurology at Harvard University, "Freud has made considerable addition to this stock of knowledge, but he has done also something of greater consequence than this. He has worked out, with incredible penetration, the part which the instinct plays in every phase of human life and in the development of human character, and has been able to establish on a firm footing the remarkable thesis that psychoneurotic illnesses never occur with a perfectly normal sexual life."
INTRODUCTION

Dr. Putnam wrote those words in his introduction to my first translation (1910) of Freud's three essays on sex, and I can think of no finer estimate of Freud's contribution to sexology.

In his study of sex, Freud kept steadily in mind the total human personality. His formulation of infantile sexuality has opened new fields of interest in the realm of child study and education which already are yielding good results. Another concept which has been enormously helpful to physicians and educators is Freud's libido theory. In psychoanalysis libido signifies that quantitatively changeable and not at present measurable energy of the sexual instinct which is usually directed to an outside object. It comprises all those impulses which deal with love in the broad sense. Its main component is sexual love; and sexual union is its aim; but it also includes self-love, love for parents and children, friendship, attachments to concrete objects, and even devotion to abstract

For those who are unacquainted with Freud's theories of the neuroses, it will not be amiss to add a few remarks on the paths taken by the libido in neurotic states. The homestead of the libido is the ego; in the child the whole libido is centered in the ego, and we designate it as ego libido. The child may be said to be purely egoistic at first; but as he grows older and reaches the narcissistic stage of development, we speak of narcissistic libido, because the former ego libido has now become erotically tinged. Still later, when the child has successfully passed through the early phases of development and can transfer his libido to objects outside himself, that is, when he is genitally pubescent, we speak of object libido. Libido thus can be directed to outside objects or can be withdrawn back to the ego. A great many normal and pathological states depend on the resulting interchanges between these two forces. The transference neuroses, hysteria and compulsion neuroses, are determined by some disturbance in the give-and-take of object libido, and hence are curable by psychoanalytic therapy, whereas the narcissistic neuroses, or the psychoses which are mainly controlled by narcissistic libido, can be studied and helped, but cannot as yet be cured by analysis. The psychotic is, as a rule, inaccessible to this treatment because he is unable to transfer sufficient libido to the analyst. The psychotic is either too suspicious or too interested in his own inner world to pay any attention to the physician.

But leaving this problem to the psychoanalytic therapist, one must agree with Freud that by broadening the term sex into love or libido, much is gained for the understanding of the sexual activity of the normal person, of the child, and of the pervert. As will be shown later, the activities of all three spring from the same source, but the manifestations of each depend on the accidental factors to which they have been subjected by their early environments. Moreover, the libido concept loosens sexual-
ity from its close connection with the genitals and establishes it as a more comprehensive physical function, which strives for pleasure in general, and only secondarily enters into the service of propagation. It also adds to the sexual sphere those affectionate and friendly feelings to which we ordinarily apply the term love. To illustrate the application of the libido concept clinically, let us take the case of a nervous child, keeping in mind Freud’s dictum that no neurosis is possible in a wholly normal sexual life—a teaching which has aroused more resistances against psychoanalysis than any other utterance of Freud.

An apparently normal girl of about four became very nervous, refused most of her food, had frequent crying spells and tantrums, with consequent loss of weight, malaise, and insomnia, so that her condition became quite alarming. After the ordinary medical measures had been found of no avail, I was consulted. The case was so simple that I could not understand why no one had thought of the cure before I came on the scene. The child had begun to show the symptoms enumerated above, about two months after her mother was separated from her, and she was cured soon after her mother returned to her. I cannot go into the many details of this interesting case, but one can readily see that it differed materially from the case of the young woman mentioned earlier. There we dealt with a disturbance of adult sexuality, here with an emotional disturbance based on a deprivation of mother love in a very sensitive or neurotic child. Nevertheless, it was a disturbance in the child’s love life. For infantile sexuality consists of a gratification of partial impulses which are widely disseminated and not yet subservient to the primacy of the genitals. Here it was really a disturbance in the child’s distribution of libido. When the mother was forced to leave her home, the libido which the child ordinarily transferred to the mother became detached and remained, as it were, floating in the air. She was unable to establish any new transference with the mother-substitutes which were offered to her, and was cured as soon as her love object was restored. In our hysterical young woman the situation was the same as far as the disposition of her libido was concerned. Here, too, there was a floating libido, detached from the lost love object, but it was object libido in the adult sense, in which the genitals participated. In the child genitality played no part because she was still depending on disseminated partial impulses and components, in which the mother played the leading part. We shall later hear that the child’s relation to the mother is anaclitic. Nevertheless, we feel justified in saying that in both cases there was a disturbance in the sexual life of the patient; in the child it was in the infantile, in the young woman it was in the adult sexual life.

The disseminated sexual activity of the child resembles in many ways

1 Cf. Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex.
INTRODUCTION

that of adult perverts, in that the latter, like children, can obtain sexual gratification from partial impulses apart from the genitals. The difference between them, however, is very marked. The child can obtain pleasure from the impulses of looking, touching, exhibitionism, etc., because these impulses have not yet undergone the normal evolution of partial repression, sublimation, and then subjection to the primacy of the genitals. In the pervert some partial impulses, so to say, withdraw from the primacy of the genitals and obtain pleasure independently as in the earliest period of the development of the libido. The sadist, the masochist, the voyeur, the toucheur, the exhibitionist, etc., gets his sexual pleasure from aggression, passivity, showing off, looking, or touching, with or without any direct genital participation.

The most frequent perversion, homosexuality, which is usually designated as an inversion, is very widespread in all strata of society. It has been estimated that from 1% to 3% of the male population suffers from this perversion. The prevailing idea that all perverts are mental degenerates is not borne out by investigation. Nor is it true, as some claim, that most homosexuals are intellectual giants.¹

Concerning the relation of perversions to the neuroses, Freud claims that the neurotic symptom is the negative of the perversion. For reasons that the reader will find in the body of this volume, some people, instead of resorting to perverse looking, etc., suffer instead from neurotic disturbances of their eyesight. I have in mind a patient who was treated by numerous ophthalmologists for years. He complained of pains and blurred vision which could only temporarily be alleviated through medication or changing his eyeglasses. When he was analyzed, it was found that for many years he had alternated between scopophilia, which got him in conflict with the law on two occasions, and neurotic eye symptoms. During the summer months, when he endeavored to look through a telescope at bathing resorts, hoping to see some naked women, his eyesight was excellent, but as soon as this activity had to cease, his eyes began to disturb him. For over nine years this man struggled with a perversion for looking; he was a voyeur with conflicts which alternately afforded him perverse pleasure and made him suffer from neurotic symptoms, which were the negative of the perversion. In the negative periods, instead of experiencing pleasure, he suffered displeasure or pain. It is interesting to note that when this man was cured, he changed his former occupation and became a dealer in optical instruments. And through his new vocation he was able to sublimate the tendency for perverse looking. For sublimation, another term coined by Freud, is a process of deflecting libido or sexual-

¹ Those interested are referred to my paper, Homosexual and Paranoia, American Journal of Psychiatry, March, 1934.
motive activity from human objects to new objects of a non-sexual, socially valuable nature.

Sublimation, too, gives justification for broadening the concept of sex; for investigation of cases of the type mentioned conclusively show that most of our so-called feelings of tenderness and affection, which color so many of our activities and relations in life, originally form part of pure sexuality, and are later inhibited and deflected to higher aims. Thus, I have in mind a number of benevolent people who contributed much of their time and money to the protection and conservation of animals, who were extremely aggressive in childhood and ruthless Nimrods as adults. Their accentuated aggression originally formed a part of their childhood sexuality; then, as a result of training, it was first inhibited and directed to animals, and later altogether repressed and changed into sympathy. Now and then, we encounter cases in which repression and sublimation do not follow each other in regular succession, owing to some weakness or fixation which obstructs the process of development. This may lead to paradoxical situations. For example, a man, who was notorious as a great lover of animals, suffered while riding his favorite pony from sudden attacks during which he beat the animal mercilessly until he was exhausted, and then felt extreme remorse and pity for the beast. He would then dismount, pat the horse, appeasing him with lumps of sugar, and walk him home—sometimes a distance of three or four miles. We cannot here go into any analysis of this interesting case; all we can say is that the horse represented a mother symbol, and that the attacks, in which cruelty alternated with compassion, represented the ambivalent feeling of love and hatred which the patient unconsciously felt for his mother.

This patient was entirely changed by analysis, and although he has not given up his interest in animals and still contributes much to their comfort, he is no longer known to the neighborhood boys as “the man who pays a dollar for a sick cat or sick dog.” Psychoanalytic literature is rich in clinical material which demonstrates the great benefits accrued from Freud’s amplification of the sex concept. It not only gives us an understanding of the broad ramifications of sexual energy hitherto undreamed of, but it has also furnished us with an instrument for treatment and adjustment of many unfortunates who are no more responsible for their perversions than is the victim of infantile paralysis for his malady.

In his effort to understand the mechanism of the expressions observable in those erroneous actions illustrated in the Psychopathology of Everyday Life, as well as the distortions in dreams, Freud discerned a remarkable resemblance between these distortions and those found in wit. The following slip of the tongue shows that a slight substitution of one letter not only uncovers the real truth, but also provokes mirth. It was related to
me many years ago by one of my patients. She was present at an evening
dance of a wealthy, but not too generous, host, which continued until about
midnight, when everybody expected a more or less substantial supper.
Instead, just sandwiches and lemonade were served. Theodore Roosevelt
was then running for President for the second time, under the slogan,
"He gave us a square deal." While they were disappointedly consuming
this modest repast, the guests were discussing the coming election with
the host, and one of them remarked, "There is one fine thing about
Teddy; he always gives you a square meal."

This lapsus linguae not only disclosed unwittingly what the speaker
thought of the supper, discharging his hidden disappointment, but it also
provoked an outburst of laughter among the guests, for they, through
identification with the speaker, found outlet for their own disappoint-
ment. But unlike the speaker and the host, who were embarrassed by the
mistake, the others experienced a sudden relaxation of the tension gener-
ated by disappointment and resentment, which expressed itself in laugh-
ter. This slight distortion changed the whole atmosphere of the party.
Instead of resentful tension, the majority of the guests now felt relaxed
and pleased. There is no doubt that there is a definite connection between
faulty actions, dreams and wit. In all of them, the unconscious underly-
ing thoughts are brought to consciousness in some sort of disguise, as if
to say, "The truth cannot always be told openly, but somehow it does
come out." Other authors have made valuable contributions to the sub-
ject of wit; yet most of them fail to grasp its basic function as emo-
tional discharge. I am tempted to speak here of certain criticisms of
Freud's theories of wit, made by persons who have written on the subject
since my translation of his Wit and Its Relation to the Unconscious ap-
peared in 1916; but, after rereading these superficial statements, I am
content to advise the authors thereof to read Freud's works.

Freud's interest in wit was a logical consequence of his free associ-
ation technique. Once he became convinced that nothing must be ignored
—that whatever the patient expressed, be it in mimicry or in sounds,
formed part of an effort to release something indirectly because circum-
cstances prevented direct expression—once this fact dawned upon him, it
was simply a question of classifying the various forms of distortion and
showing in what function of the psychic apparatus they were manifested.
The mechanisms of condensation, displacement, substitution, illogical
thinking, absurdity, indirect expressions, elisions, and representation
through the opposite, are all present in everyday conversation, but such
conventional inaccuracies glide by without any evident impediments.
When the thought in question meets with inner resistances, however, a
lapse of some kind occurs, which the speaker recognizes and at once ex-
cuses by some such expression as "I mean . . ." or "Oh, I made a mis-
take." The average person readily accepts such excuses, not realizing that by the slip of the tongue the speaker has unconsciously betrayed his resistance to something in the present situation. The disguises seen in the simple lapses of everyday life are even more evident in dreams because *censorship* is more or less abolished during sleep; but fundamentally they are the same. In wit these mental disguises are especially evident, but here they are utilized to produce pleasure. They, too, are products of the unconscious, and show that no matter how much restriction civilization imposes on the individual, he nevertheless finds some way to circumvent it. Wit is the best safety valve modern man has evolved; the more civilization, the more repression, the more need there is for wit. Only relatively civilized people have a sense of humor. The child and the true primitive show no such mechanisms. The child like the savage is still natural and frank. When the child begins to dream, which shows that repressive forces are already at work, he also shows the beginnings of a sense of humor.

The most pronounced psychopathological expressions which point to a deep-seated disturbance are *hallucinations* and *delusions*, which occur in adult psychotics and show a somewhat different kind of disguise. The hallucination as a verbal expression is neither witty nor in any other way distorted. The only thing peculiar about it is that the patient hears, sees, or feels something which is not perceived by anyone else. To be sure, the patient's statements do not concur with the objective facts; yet he is not lying; subjectively speaking, he actually perceives everything he says he does. But we know from Freud that hallucinations represent outward projections of inner feelings. Thus, a woman who has seemingly been living quite contentedly with her husband for five years, hears people say that she is a "bad woman," that her husband is divorcing her, and that she has had illicit relations with a well known movie star. At the same time she complains of peculiar feelings like pin-pricks and electricity in certain parts of her body. These statements could be true, but they are not. We, therefore, call them hallucinatory.

And indeed, the whole picture of the disease in this case showed that the woman suffered from hallucinations of hearing, sight, and sensation. Their meaning became plain when her mother informed me that her son-in-law had been impotent all these years, but that her daughter nevertheless loved him and would not consider leaving him. The hallucinations depicted the wish to be divorced and be married to a real man as a recompense for her drab existence. The annoyance and displeasure caused by "all that talk" and by the peculiar prickling sensations, represented the pangs of conscience, or the feeling of guilt which accompanied her erotic phantasies. The distortion in this whole picture consisted of a fusion of feelings and ideas which had played a part in the conflict in the mind of
this sensitive patient. She could not decide one way or the other, so she tore herself entirely away from reality and behaved, as we say,  

deris- 

tically. She abandoned all logic and objectified her phantasies in disguised fashion.

However, no human being who has been brought up under the system of logic and morality which prevails in our civilization can disengage himself entirely from his or her past. The words and thoughts of hallucinations are not as distorted as the verbal expressions in wit or in slips of all kinds, but the fundamental disturbance is the same. The person who makes a mistake or laughs at a joke, or expresses a wish in a dream is still in contact with reality. No matter how bizarre the dream appears, one knows that it is only a dream; an injury inflicted by a joke is usually excused by “Can’t you take a joke?”—and lapses are immediately recognized as mistakes by both the speaker and the hearer. Hallucinations and delusions are the only psychopathological expressions which are always taken seriously by the patient and sometimes even by others, because they represent an absolute schizoidism or splitting of the psychic apparatus. Unlike wit, dreams, and lapses, which are products of difficulties encountered in the effort to stick to reality at all cost, the hallucination represents an escape from reality.

The hallucinating patient would like to have nothing to do with reality; yet, as a matter of fact, this is hardly possible. Investigation shows that the patient can do this only imperfectly. In the case mentioned above, the deep struggle between the id tendencies and the forces of the ego were readily discernible. In the beginning of the psychosis she was very irritable and agitated; her hallucinations were very active and vivid, and in her effort to harmonize them with her past life, she frequently showed acute outbursts of violence. After a few months she became calmer; she paid little attention to anything; she just smiled and sometimes talked to herself inaudibly. When an effort was made to arouse her interest, she usually reacted to it with some irritation. The patient evidently refused to be affected by impressions from the outer world, and also ignored or depreciated everything that she remembered from her past, namely, her inner world.

As time went on, the patient developed the diagnostic characteristic of schizophrenia, namely, a marked apathy. She became indifferent to everything around her. Her relatives at first looked upon this behavior as an improvement in her general condition; but as a matter of fact, this was really a form of adjustment to the disease. What was actually happening was that the ego was gradually constructing for itself a new world in terms of the patient’s infantile wish tendencies, in much the same way as kindred wishes are expressed in dreams, the turning away from reality being conditioned by the state of sleep.

1 De (away from) reor—ratio (reason)—hence, away from reason; unrealistically.
INTRODUCTION

It is now over six years since the first symptoms made their appearance. The patient has to be kept in a sanatorium because she is absolutely unable to care for herself. For the last few years she has given little trouble to her environment. She is usually calm and manageable, but behaves in every way like a little child. She talks in an embellished childish way, plays with toys, laughs and cries like a little girl of three or four years. There is no doubt that she is now living through her insuperable infantile wishes, to which she regressed because life did not grant her what her id tendencies craved. In terms of the psychic apparatus, it can be said that at first the ego strove to curb the id tendencies; the patient's hallucinations plainly demonstrated this; but as time went on, the ego weakened and was carried away from reality, from the outer world, by the id. In discussing the various forces of the mental apparatus, Freud compares the ego and the id to a rider and his horse. As a rule, the rider can curb the horse and force it to follow his will, but it sometimes happens that the horse runs away with the rider. To repeat what we said above, the psychosis in this case represented a conflict between the ego and the outer world.

It is quite clear that the distortions manifested in the psychoses are shown by the whole behavior of the person rather than through verbal expressions. Verbal distortions as seen in lapses, errors, blunders in speech and action, are immediate responses to a struggle between the ego and the id. No matter how anxious we are to hide our true nature in adjusting ourselves to the repressive forces of civilization, repression sometimes fails and our real desires come to the surface. The dream is a hidden fulfillment of a repressed wish, or a direct attempt to obtain in phantasy what is denied us in reality. Wit is a direct effort to make use of distortions in order to obtain pleasure from otherwise forbidden sources. Both lapses and dreams are momentary illusions which render a very quick and very brief service to the organism. Wit, on the other hand, is a conscious mechanism for the production of pleasure, the highest or latest development of civilization in this direction. We like to tell jokes and listen to them because for the moment we not only forget inexorable reality, but also obtain pleasure at the expense of our hardships.

But in all these phenomena we remain in touch with reality; the mistake, the dream and the joke amply demonstrate this. The psychosis exhibits alone no compromise with reality, turns its back on reality, as it were. Yet, even in a psychosis, symptoms show that there is a constant struggle between fancy and reality. A chronic schizophrenic may remain in a hospital for years in a state of indifference, but now and then he may suddenly act like a rational being. Sometimes a severe shock, such as an accident or illness which threatens his self-preservative instinct, brings the schizophrenic back to reality for a time. The latest form of
therapy for schizophrenics is based on this very idea. I am referring to
the insulin or, as it is called, the shock therapy, because the patient re-
ceives such a shock through the hypoglycemia that for a time at least he
gives up his phantasy world.¹ But it matters little whether hypoglycemia
cures or only produces a transient change; the fact that schizophrenics
occasionally return to normality spontaneously and then relapse, and the
fact that an accidental or experimental shock can drive them back to
reality at least for a time, clearly shows that the psychotic, too, is not
altogether detached from reality.

From what has been said thus far, Freud's great contribution to the
understanding of the psychoses can be fully realized; nevertheless, it
seems worthwhile to dwell on this phase of psychiatry a bit longer. To
show the influence of psychoanalysis on psychiatry I can do no better than
enumerate my own experiences in this field. For it is during the period of
my own psychiatric activity that this science has made the greatest pro-
gress, especially in this country.

When I entered the New York State Hospital service in 1903, psy-
chiatry was on the threshold of a new epoch. Dr. Adolf Meyer had re-
cently become director of what is now the New York Psychiatric Insti-
tute, and it was through his indomitable labor and perseverance that the
old New York insane asylums were eventually transformed into mental
hospitals. I was fortunate in being one among Dr. Meyer's first group of
students at the Psychiatric Institute, where he gave us a thorough ground-
ing in neuropathology and modern psychiatry in the form of lectures,
clinics, and abstracts of the teachings of prominent psychiatrists of the
German School.

After two years of neuropathology I turned to clinical psychiatry, and
I am presumptuous enough to feel that I made good use of the enormous
material at my disposal. I had charge of the so-called acute reception serv-
ice at the Central Islip State Hospital, where I received and examined all
the new admissions from Manhattan and The Bronx. And yet, although I
enjoyed my work for a year or two, I then began to lose interest. Looking
back now, I can see that this was not due to a flagging of effort on my
part, but to the nature of the work itself. I followed the methods I had
learned from Dr. Meyer and from the original works of Kraepelin, Ziehen,
Wernicke, and other eminent psychiatrists. Upon receiving a patient, I
gave him the usual routine examination, the stenographic records of

¹ Notwithstanding many opinions to the contrary, that is all we can say at present
about this promising therapy. Professor Eugen Bleuler, the greatest authority on
schizophrenia, states in his last (6th) German edition of The Textbook of Psychiatry:
"This method, which has aroused great interest, is still in the experimental stage.
But, even now, it seems that it is possible thereby to calm and socialize many pa-
tients. But it has often failed, and it is a question whether it really exerts a curative
effect on the fundamental symptoms of the disease."
which covered on an average from 10 to 16 typewritten pages; the patient was thus classified and diagnosed. Once this was accomplished his future psychic condition depended mostly on himself, for there was nothing specific that we could do for him. We classified him symptomatically; we knew that if he was a manic-depressive, he would recover from the attack, and if he was a schizophrenic, he might improve to some degree or he might not. Everything was quite hopeless, and hence uninteresting.

It was at that time that my interest in psychotherapy awoke. Hypnotism was still in vogue, though only a few people practiced it here. I was much impressed by the works of Charcot, Forel, Loewenfeld, and others, and by our own Morton Prince and Boris Sidis, who both used hypnotism in treatment and experimentation and wrote on psychopathology. I began to employ hypnotism and suggestion, and obtained encouraging enough results. In 1906, Drs. Smith Ely Jelliffe and William A. White published an English translation of Dr. Dubois’ The Psychic Treatment of Mental Disorders, which I read with alacrity and benefit; but the results of my psychotherapeutic procedures left much to be desired.

In my quest for new knowledge I took a two months’ vacation in 1905, visiting some of the French, Austrian, and German clinics; and in the spring of 1907 I obtained a leave of absence from the hospital and went to Paris, where I imagined I could obtain all the psychotherapeutic knowledge that I wished as a preparation for private practice. I expected perhaps too much from Paris. I soon found that psychiatrically the French hospitals were below our standards in equipment and everything else. After looking around, I decided to work with Pierre Marie and entered his service in the Hospice de Bicêtre. He assigned me to study and then confer with him on a case of acromegaly. This was interesting enough, but this kind of work did not appeal to me. I had come to Paris to learn how to treat the borderline cases of mental disease, the psychoneuroses, and what I saw there was quite disappointing. It was then that the same man who had originally introduced me to the New York State Hospitals advised me to go to the Clinic of Psychiatry at Zurich, the Director of which was Professor Eugen Bleuler. In giving this advice to me, Dr. Frederick Peterson assured me that I would find the work there very interesting. He casually mentioned that he had spent a few months there and that they were applying Freud’s theories in their work with the patients. Dr. Peterson was a great admirer of Freud at that time, and he was certainly right in prophesying that I would find the work at the Burghölzli Clinic interesting.

I was fortunate enough to arrive there at the beginning of a new era in psychiatry shortly after Professor Bleuler had recognized the value of Freud’s theories and urged his assistants to learn and test them in the hospital. Professor Bleuler was the first orthodox psychiatrist to open
his clinic to psychoanalysis. The first staff meeting at the hospital was an inspiring experience and it decided me to remain. The physicians who were there at the time have all played a great part in the history of the psychoanalytic movement. Besides Jung, who was the first assistant, there were also Riklin, Abraham and Meier. All of them worked for hours daily with the association technique which was especially designed to test Freud's theories experimentally. Within a month or so of my arrival Dr. Karl Abraham resigned to go into private practice in Berlin, and I was very happy when Professor Bleuler appointed me as his third assistant in the hospital to fill the vacancy. It would be impossible to describe now how I felt when I entered the ranks of this enthusiastic group. I repeat what I have often stated in the past—namely, that no such group of psychiatric workers ever existed before or since. Under the benevolent but penetrating eye of our "Herr Direktor" all of us worked zealously and assiduously to produce what the late Dr. George H. Kirby, former director of the New York Psychiatric Institute, later designated as "Interpretative Psychiatry."

Psychiatry as I had known it before had been barren of interest and hopeless in outlook despite my great interest in mental processes, an interest which I seemed to have displayed throughout my college and university years. To be sure, there had been plenty to do in the state hospital, neuropathologically and psychiatically, but it had all come down to a few formulae, this or that form of dementia praecox, or this or that form of manic-depressive insanity, etc. In Burghölzli it was quite different: Instead of diagnosing this or that form of dementia praecox, which could be done at sight after a little experience, we focussed our interest on the particular expressions of the patient. Instead of simply saying that the patient had hallucinations of hearing, we wished to know why he heard these particular voices, for following Freud, we invariably found that these particular hallucinations could be perceived only by this particular patient. They told the struggles of his wrecked individual mental life.

Jung was at that time the most ardent Freudian. Had I been better acquainted with the Freudian mechanisms, I could have foretold what was to happen a few years later. But now Jung brooked no disagreement with Freud's views; impulsive and bright, he refused to see the other side. Anyone who dared doubt what was certainly then new and revolutionary immediately aroused his anger. Nevertheless, psychoanalysis owes him much, his enthusiasm and brilliance soon placed him at the forefront of the battle line. He was my first, and, I might say, my most vehement teacher. I read the Traumdeutung under his guidance. The first analysis of one of my dreams was done by Jung and was extremely impressive. I still have a transcript of the dream with the analysis as we
INTRODUCTION

did it one morning in the laboratory after we had finished an association experiment with the galvanometer.

Jung’s *Psychology of Dementia Praecox*¹ had appeared a few months before and I decided to put it into English. This book established Jung as the pioneer psychoanalyst in psychiatry. To be sure, Professor Bleuler was the man who had started everything and supervised and guided us all, but the appearance of Jung’s book started the younger psychiatrists thinking and the older ones scolding.

In the hospital the spirit of Freud hovered over everything. Our conversation at meals was frequently punctuated with the word “complex,” the special meaning of which was created at that time. No one could make a slip of any kind without immediately being called on to evoke free associations to explain it. It did not matter that women were present—wives and female voluntary internes—who might have curbed the frankness usually produced by free associations. The women were just as keen to discover the concealed mechanisms as their husbands. There was also a Psychoanalytic Circle, which met every month. Some of those who attended were far from agreeing with our views; but despite Jung’s occasional impulsive intolerance, the meetings were very fruitful and successful in disseminating Freud’s theories.

Meanwhile, I had been in active correspondence with Professor Freud, and when we met in the beginning of 1908, we both felt that we knew each other quite well. To make a long story, stretching over thirty years, short, I am happy to say that this friendship has continued ever since and has been the greatest experience of my life. It was during our first meeting that we agreed on the sequence in which I was to translate his works into English. I continued as his sole English translator until after the World War, when I voluntarily gave up the task. All the works that I undertook in 1908 to translate are included in the present volume; but in addition, not included here, I translated some of his *Selected Papers on Hysteria and Psychoneuroses, Reflections on War and Death, Leonardo da Vinci, Psychoanalysis: Exploring the Hidden Recesses of the Mind* (which appeared in the Encyclopaedia Britannica), and the *Studies in Hysteria* which Freud had first published with Breuer. It was also during my first visit to Freud that I attended the first meeting of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. There I made the acquaintance of Freud’s first disciples, some of whom, like the late Dr. Adler and Dr. Stekel, later chose to follow different paths. The reader will find a full account of these secessionists in Freud’s own history of the psychoanalytic movement. It was also at that meeting that I met Dr. Fritz Wittels who came here in 1928 at the

¹ Translated by A. A. Brill, Monograph Series, Nervous and Mental Disease Publishing Co.
INTRODUCTION

invitation of the New School for Social Research and has been practicing psychoanalysis in New York City ever since, and in Burghölzli I learned to know Dr. Herman Nunberg, then a medical student, who was invited to start a group in Philadelphia and has been practicing analysis in New York City for about six years.

I returned to New York in the spring of 1908 with my translation of Jung's book complete and some analytic material which I had collected during my sojourn in Burghölzli. I was full of enthusiasm about the prospects of psychoanalysis in the mental sciences, and I started at once to inform and convince others of the value of this new science. It was no easy task. At first I was listened to with interest; then opposition arose and became increasingly strong as time went on. During the first few years I was the only psychiatrist employing psychoanalysis in the United States, though in Toronto I had an ardent collaborator and friend in Dr. Ernest Jones of London. He and I had first met when he was visiting the Clinic of Psychiatry at Zurich. Being both of us enthusiastic students of psychoanalysis, we had soon become friends. Dr. Jones had joined the psychiatric department of the University of Toronto at the same time that I was beginning my work at the Vanderbilt Clinic at Columbia University, and we have worked together ever since. After a few years in Toronto, Dr. Jones returned to London, and has ever since been an active contributor to psychoanalytic thought and a most helpful leader of the movement.

In 1909 Professor Stanley Hall, President of Clark University, invited Professor Freud and Jung to attend the celebration of the 20th anniversary of Clark University. A full account of this most important event is given by Freud elsewhere in this volume; but I should like to mention a few facts that in my opinion had a decisive influence upon the course of psychoanalysis in this country. First, the academic psychologists heard for the first time the master himself, and whether they agreed with him or not, they were impressed by him. Second, the five lectures which Freud delivered at this conference were translated by a Fellow in Psychology at Clark University, no less a person than Harry W. Chase, the present Chancellor of New York University. Third, that conference marked the beginning of a friendship between Freud and James J. Putnam, then professor of neurology at Harvard, which lasted until Dr. Putnam died. Up to the time of this meeting Dr. Putnam had been rather critical of analysis, but he later changed into a great admirer of Freud and was very active on behalf of psychoanalysis. Although Freud was not himself satisfied with his visit here, the impressions he made were very helpful to those of us who lived here. Both his and Jung's lectures were well re-

ceived by the conference, which was mainly composed of psychologists.

Jung later gave his impression of "America" before the Second Psychoanalytic Congress at Nürnberg (March 30–31, 1910), which I believe is of interest in the light of his later attitude toward Freud's views on sex. In his *auto-referat* he states: "The psychological peculiarities of the Americans evince features which are accessible to psychoanalytic investigation. These features point to energetic sexual repressions. The causes for the repression can be found in the specific American Complex, namely, in the living together with lower races, especially with Negroes. Living together with barbaric races exerts a suggestive effect on the laboriously tamed instinct of the white race and tends to pull it down. Hence, the need for strongly developed defensive measures, which precisely show themselves in those specific features of American culture."  

It was only natural that I should have directed my first psychoanalytic expositions to the medical profession, and especially to psychiatrists. I have always felt that psychoanalysis as a therapy belonged to the medical profession, to psychiatry, and what I have learned during all these years has not changed my opinion. In holding this view, I am not forgetting that the principles of psychoanalysis are applicable to many non-medical sciences, that many lay analysts have made valuable contributions to analysis, and last but not least, that a psychiatrist without psychoanalytic training is not a psychoanalyst, and has no moral right to practice psychoanalysis.  

Soon after I began to present papers on psychoanalysis and published my first translation, a number of psychiatrists became interested and showed an eagerness for more knowledge of the subject. Some of them visited me regularly, and we spent hours together arguing and discussing the new views. After a number of such informal meetings, I founded the New York Psychoanalytic Society on February 11, 1911. I was naturally chosen as its first president, an office which I held on and off until 1936, when I retired to an honorary post in the Society. Looking over the list of those who were present at the first meeting and constituted the charter members, I find that some of them, like M. J. Karpas, George H. Kirby and others, have passed away; some resigned after they had assimilated as many as they could of Freud's views and could go no further; still others gradually lost their enthusiasm, but remained in the group as kindly onlookers. Only one of the original members, Dr. C. P. Oberndorf, has continued as an active, steadfast and reliable co-worker throughout all these years. As it is not my intention to give at this time a history of the psychoanalytic movement in the United States, I will merely add a

---

1 *Jahrbuch f. Psychoan. u. Psychopathol. Bd. II.*

2 It may be of interest to state that the requisites for the specialty of psychoanalysis as stipulated by the New York Psychoanalytic Institute are higher than those demanded for other medical specialties.
few facts to supplement Freud's general history, which he published in February, 1914.

Very soon after the New York Psychoanalytic Society was formed, we organized the American Psychoanalytic Association, with Dr. James J. Putnam as President and Dr. Ernest Jones as Secretary. The membership of this organization was made up of those who, living in various parts of the country, had no opportunity to belong to the New York Society. Among the charter members of the American Psychoanalytic Association one notes the following distinguished psychiatrists: Dr. Ross McC. Chapman, Dr. Isador Coriat, Dr. August Hoch, Dr. Richard H. Hutchings, Dr. Smith Ely Jelliffe, Dr. Adolf Meyer, Dr. William A. White and others. Most of the members of the New York Society were also members of the American Psychoanalytic Association. This association met annually in different cities until its complexion changed in 1932, because new groups had meanwhile been formed in Baltimore-Washington, Chicago, and Boston. The American Psychoanalytic Association is now made up of the membership of these American groups and no longer functions as an independent organization.

The American Psychiatric Association, which is the largest psychiatric organization in the world, has always been fair-minded and kindly disposed toward psychoanalysis; although some of the members were naturally critical, I always found there a sympathetic forum. Since 1926 I had worked hard to establish a Section on Psychoanalysis in this organization, and with the help of the late William A. White, Ross McC. Chapman, C. C. Cheney, Richard H. Hutchings, George H. Kirby, and others, the council of this association finally recommended that a Section on Psychoanalysis be formed in the American Psychiatric Association. In my inaugural address at the first official meeting of this Section, I expressed my feelings in the following words: "You have listened for well-nigh a generation to papers and discussions on the subject of psychoanalysis. You have been more than kind for these many years in offering us hospitality, dispassionate consideration of our information, and the encouragement and very great assistance of your discussions and criticisms based on clinical experience. While the outside world was in doubt of our respectability and intentions, you invited us to come to your meetings and, so to speak, display our wares. You disregarded the cant and vituperations hurled against us by our unthinking, unfair, or actually stupid detractors. When you gave criticism, it was the criticism of sincere seekers for the truth, and as such it was generous encouragement." ¹ This Section has been actively functioning since
INTRODUCTION

With the help of generous friends I succeeded in raising a fund of about $50,000 for a New York Psychoanalytic Institute, which was founded in 1931. Dr. Sandor Rado, formerly of the Berlin Institute has been its educational director ever since. A year later a similar institute was opened in Chicago under the leadership of Dr. Franz Alexander, and another in Boston, headed by Dr. Hanns Sachs. Other groups and institutes are in the process of formation on the Pacific coast by Drs. Ernest Simmel and Siegfried Bernfeld. Other European analysts, who were invited to come as teachers and have settled here, are Drs. Felix and Helene Deutsch, Karen Horney, and J. H. W. Van Ophuijsen.

These groups and institutes are devoted mainly to the training of physicians in the psychoanalytic technique; I mean Freudian psychoanalytic technique. We have nothing to do with the so-called analysts of the other schools. Besides therapeutic analysis these institutes also offer courses in psychoanalytic anthropology, sociology and in other allied disciplines. One must not imagine, however, that the progress made by psychoanalysis in this country proceeded smoothly and peacefully. One could write an interesting chapter on the adjustment of psychoanalysts to the American environment, but this will have to be reserved for future consideration. Suffice it to say that we had to overcome great, and almost insurmountable vicissitudes, but I am happy to say that psychoanalysis is here to stay.

I could continue and give you an elaborate description of Freud's works and struggles since the publication of his history of the psychoanalytic movement in 1914. Basically, nothing of importance has happened within the movement besides the defection of Otto Rank, who, like Adler and Jung, left Professor Freud after having devoted many years of valuable work to psychoanalysis. Reflecting on the works of the Freudian secessionists, I feel that none of them has contributed anything of real value to mental science since they separated themselves from the master. All of them, however, have made contributions of a special kind to the literature of psychology. The master himself has actively continued his life's work despite the bad handicap of a severe illness for over fourteen years. Reading his productions which have appeared within the last few months, one is impressed with the same fluency, alertness and brilliancy that have always characterized his works. His disciples, of whom there are many the world over, have made impressive contributions to the mental sciences, but a deep study of these productions will show nothing that is so novel as not to have been anticipated or implied by the master himself. We who follow him realize this full well, and most of us feel that this state of affairs will continue until his thoughts shall have been better assimilated and more fully developed.

That the world which at first turned its back on him has now recognized his great services to science and culture is shown by the many honors that
INTRODUCTION

have been showered upon him within the last few years. To mention only one of many: His eightieth birthday was an international event. It was celebrated in Vienna at the Wiener Konzerthaus and was attended by distinguished scientists from Vienna and abroad. The birthday oration, which was delivered by Thomas Mann, is a masterpiece which has been translated into many languages.¹

It was not my intention to present here a complete outline of Freud’s theories of the neuroses as he has developed them up to the present time. I merely strove to introduce the reader to the works contained in this volume, because they are all, as it were, by-products of his original studies and treatment of neurotic disturbances. I am fully aware that what is here presented is a very fragmentary description of the neurotic mechanisms as they are related to the works of this volume, works that are more psychological than psychopathological. I feel, however, that my presentation will suffice to show the intimate connection of neurotic and psychotic symptoms to ordinary mistakes and errors, to dreams and wit. The essays on sex show that there is no absolute gap between the sexual life of the normal person and that of the neurotic, the pervert, and the child. These relations are all correlated in Freud’s Totem and Taboo, in which he shows the resemblance between the ceremonials of the compulsion neurotic and the taboos of savages, thus throwing new light on the origin of most of our cultural institutions. I purposely have omitted to speak of Freud’s later metapsychological works, which are of special interest to the psychoanalytic therapist, but are not in any way necessary for the understanding of dreams or wit.

New York,
March, 1938.

¹ Alas! As these pages are going to the printer we have been startled by the terrible news that the Nazi holocaust has suddenly encircled Vienna and that Professor Freud and his family are virtual prisoners in the hands of civilization’s greatest scourge.
ONE

PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF EVERYDAY LIFE
FORGETTING OF PROPER NAMES

DURING the year 1898, I published a short essay, On the Psychic Mechanism of Forgetfulness.¹ I shall now repeat its contents and take it as a starting-point for further discussion. I have there undertaken a psychologic analysis of a common case of temporary forgetfulness of proper names, and from a pregnant example of my own observation, I have reached the conclusion that this frequent and practically unimportant occurrence of a failure of a psychic function—of memory—admits an explanation which goes beyond the customary utilization of this phenomenon.

If an average psychologist should be asked to explain how it happens that we often fail to recall a name which we are sure we know, he would probably content himself with the answer that proper names are more apt to be forgotten than any other content of memory. He might give plausible reasons for this "forgetting preference" for proper names, but he would not assume any deep determinant for the process.

I was led to examine exhaustively the phenomenon of temporary forgetfulness through the observation of certain peculiarities, which, although not general, can, nevertheless, be seen clearly in some cases. In these, there is not only forgetfulness, but also false recollection; he who strives for the escaped name brings to consciousness others—substitutive names—which, although immediately recognized as false, nevertheless obtrude themselves with great tenacity. The process which should lead to the reproduction of the lost name is, as it were, displaced, and thus brings one to an incorrect substitute.

Now it is my assumption that the displacement is not left to psychic arbitrariness, but that it follows lawful and rational paths. In other words, I assume that the substitutive name (or names) stands in direct relation to the lost name, and I hope, if I succeed in demonstrating this connection, to throw light on the origin of the forgetting of names.

In the example which I selected for analysis in 1898, I vainly strove to

¹ Monatschrift f. Psychiatrie.
recall the name of the master who made the imposing frescoes of the "Last Judgment" in the dome of Orvieto. Instead of the lost name—Signorelli—two other names of artists—Botticelli and Boltraffio—obtruded themselves, names which my judgment immediately and definitely rejected as being incorrect. When the correct name was imparted to me by an outsider, I recognized it at once without any hesitation. The examination of the influence and association paths which caused the displacement from Signorelli to Botticelli and Boltraffio led to the following results:

(a) The reason for the escape of the name Signorelli is neither to be sought in the strangeness in itself of this name nor in the psychologic character of the connection in which it was inserted. The forgotten name was just as familiar to me as one of the substitutive names—Botticelli—and somewhat more familiar than the other substitute—Boltraffio—of the possessor of which I could hardly say more than that he belonged to the Milanese School. The connection, too, in which the forgetting of the name took place appeared to me harmless, and led to no further explanation. I journeyed by carriage with a stranger from Ragusa, Dalmatia, to a station in Herzegovina. Our conversation drifted to travelling in Italy, and I asked my companion whether he had been in Orvieto and had seen there the famous frescoes of ———.

(b) The forgetting of the name could not be explained until after I had recalled the theme discussed immediately before this conversation. This forgetting then made itself known as a disturbance of the newly emerging theme caused by the theme preceding it. In brief, before I asked my travelling companion if he had been in Orvieto, we had been discussing the customs of the Turks living in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I had related what I heard from a colleague who was practising medicine among them, namely, that they show full confidence in the physician and complete submission to fate. When one is compelled to inform them that there is no help for the patient, they answer: "Sir (Herr), what can I say? I know that if he could be saved, you would save him." In these sentences alone we can find the words and names: Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Herr (Sir), which may be inserted in an association series between Signorelli, Botticelli and Boltraffio.

(c) I assume that the stream of thoughts concerning the customs of the Turks in Bosnia, etc., was able to disturb the next thought, because I withdrew my attention from it before it came to an end. For I recalled that I wished to relate a second anecdote which was next to the first in my memory. These Turks value sexual pleasure above all else, and at sexual disturbances merge into an utter despair which strangely contrasts with their resignation at the peril of losing their lives. One of my colleague's patients once told him: "For you know, Sir (Herr), if that ceases, life no longer has any charm."
FORGETTING OF PROPER NAMES

I refrained from imparting this characteristic feature because I did not wish to touch upon such a delicate theme in conversation with a stranger. But I went still further; I also deflected my attention from the continuation of the thought which might have associated itself in me with the theme “Death and Sexuality.” I was at that time under the after-effects of a message which I had received a few weeks before, during a brief sojourn in Trafoi. A patient on whom I had spent much effort had ended his life on account of an incurable sexual disturbance. I know positively that this sad event, and everything connected with it, did not come to my conscious recollection on that trip in Herzegovina. However, the agreement between Trafoi and Boltraffio forces me to assume that this reminiscence was at that time brought into activity despite all the intentional deviation of my attention.

(d) I can no longer conceive the forgetting of the name Signorelli as an accidental occurrence. I must recognize in this process the influence of a motive. There were motives which actuated the interruption in the communication of my thoughts (concerning the customs of the Turks, etc.), which later influenced me to exclude from my consciousness the thoughts connected with them, and which might have led to the message concerning the incident in Trafoi—that is, I wanted to forget something, I repressed something. To be sure, I wished to forget something other than the name of the master of Orvieto; but this other thought brought about an associative connection between itself and this name, so that my act of volition missed the aim, and I forgot the one against my will, while I intentionally wished to forget the other. The disinclination to recall directed itself against the one content; the inability to remember appeared in another. The case would have been obviously simpler if this disinclination and the inability to remember had concerned the same content. The substitutive names no longer seem so thoroughly unjustified as they seemed before this explanation. They remind me (after the form of a compromise) as much of what I wished to forget as of what I wished to remember, and show me that my object to forget something was neither a perfect success nor a failure.

(e) The nature of the association formed between the lost name and the repressed theme (death and sexuality, etc.), containing the names of Bosnia, Herzegovina and Trafoi, is also very strange. In the scheme inserted here, which originally appeared in 1898, an attempt is made to graphically represent these associations.

The name Signorelli was thus divided into two parts. One pair of syllables (elli) returned unchanged in one of the substitutions, while the other had gained, through the translation of signor (Sir, Herr), many and diverse relations to the name contained in the repressed theme, but was lost through it in the reproduction. Its substitution was formed in a
way to suggest that a displacement took place along the same associations—"Herzegovina and Bosnia"—regardless of the sense and acoustic demarcation. The names were therefore treated in this process like the written pictures of a sentence which is to be transformed into a picture-puzzle (rebus). No information was given to consciousness concerning the whole process, which, instead of the name Signorelli, was thus changed to the substitutive names. At first sight, no relation is apparent between the theme that contained the name Signorelli and the repressed one which immediately preceded it.
Perhaps it is not superfluous to remark that the given explanation does not contradict the conditions of memory reproduction and forgetting assumed by other psychologists, which they seek in certain relations and dispositions. Only in certain cases have we added another motive to the factors long recognized as causative in forgetting names, and have thus laid bare the mechanism of faulty memory. The assumed dispositions are indispensable also in our case, in order to make it possible for the repressed element to associatively gain control over the desired name and take it along into the repression. Perhaps this would not have occurred in another name having more favorable conditions of reproduction. For it is quite probable that a suppressed element continually strives to assert itself in some other way, but attains this success only where it meets with suitable conditions. At other times, the suppression succeeds without disturbance of function, or, as we may justly say, without symptoms.

When we recapitulate the conditions for forgetting a name with faulty recollection we find: (1) a certain disposition to forget the name; (2) a process of suppression which has taken place shortly before; and (3) the possibility of establishing an outer association between the concerned name and the element previously suppressed. The last condition will probably not have to be much overrated, for the slightest claim on the association is apt in most cases to bring it about. But it is a different and farther-reaching question whether such outer association can really furnish the proper condition to enable the suppressed element to disturb the reproduction of the desired name, or whether after all a more intimate connection between the two themes is not necessarily required. On superficial consideration, one may be willing to reject the latter requirement and consider the temporal meeting in perfectly dissimilar contents as sufficient. But on more thorough examination, one finds more and more frequently that the two elements (the repressed and the new one) connected by an outer association, possess besides a connection in content, and this can also be demonstrated in the example, Signorelli.

The value of the understanding gained through the analysis of the example Signorelli naturally depends on whether we must explain this case as a typical or as an isolated process. I must now maintain that the forgetting of a name associated with faulty recollection not uncommonly follows the same process as was demonstrated in the case of Signorelli. Almost every time that I observed this phenomenon in myself, I was able to explain it in the manner indicated above as being motivated by repression.

I must mention still another viewpoint in favor of the typical nature of our analysis. I believe that one is not justified in separating the cases of name-forgetting with faulty recollection from those in which incorrect substitutive names have not obstructed themselves. These substitutive
names occur spontaneously in a number of cases; in other cases, where they do not come spontaneously, they can be brought to the surface by concentration of attention, and they then show the same relation to the repressed element and the lost name as those that come spontaneously. Two factors seem to play a part in bringing to consciousness the substitutive names: first, the effort of attention, and second, an inner determinant which adheres to the psychic material. I could find the latter in the greater or lesser facility which forms the required outer associations between the two elements. A great many of the cases of name-forgetting without faulty recollection therefore belong to the cases with substitutive name formation, the mechanism of which corresponds to the one in the example Signorelli. But I surely shall not venture to assert that all cases of name-forgetting belong to the same group. There is no doubt that there are cases of name-forgetting that proceed in a much simpler way. We shall represent this state of affairs carefully enough if we assert that besides the simple forgetting of proper names, there is another forgetting which is motivated by repression.
FORGETTING OF FOREIGN WORDS

The ordinary vocabulary of our own language seems to be protected against forgetting within the limits of normal function, but it is quite different with words from a foreign language. The tendency to forget such words extends to all parts of speech. In fact, depending on our own general state and the degree of fatigue, the first manifestation of functional disturbance evinces itself in the irregularity of our control over foreign vocabulary. In a series of cases, this forgetting follows the same mechanism as the one revealed in the example Signorelli. As a demonstration of this, I shall report a single analysis, characterized, however, by valuable features concerning the forgetting of a word, not a noun, from a Latin quotation. Before proceeding, allow me to give a full and clear account of this little episode.

Last summer, while journeying on my vacation, I renewed the acquaintance of a young man of academic education, who, as I soon noticed, was conversant with some of my works. In our conversation we drifted—I no longer remember how—to the social position of the race to which we both belonged. He, being ambitious, bemoaned the fact that his generation, as he expressed it, was destined to become stunted, that it was prevented from developing its talents and from gratifying its desires. He concluded his passionately felt speech with the familiar verse from Virgil: Exoriar ... in which the unhappy Dido leaves her vengeance upon Aeneas to posterity. Instead of "concluded," I should have said "wished to conclude," for he could not bring the quotation to an end, and attempted to conceal the open gap in his memory by transposing the words: "Exoriar(e) ex nostris ossibus ultor!" He finally became piqued and said: "Please don't make such a mocking face, as if you were gloating over my embarrassment, but help me. There is something missing in this verse. How does it read in its complete form?"

"With pleasure," I answered, and cited it correctly: "Exoriar(e) aliquis nostris ex ossibus ultor!"

"It was too stupid to forget such a word," he said. "By the way, I un-
I understand you claim that forgetting is not without its reasons; I should be very curious to find out how I came to forget this indefinite pronoun "aliquis."

I gladly accepted the challenge, as I hoped to get an addition to my collection, and said, "We can easily do this, but I must ask you to tell me frankly and without any criticism everything that occurs to your mind after you focus your attention, without any particular intention, on the forgotten word." ¹

"Very well, the ridiculous idea comes to me to divide the word in the following way: a and liquis."

"What does that mean?"

"I don't know."

"What else does that recall to you?"

"The thought goes on to reliques—liquidation—liquidity—fluid."

"Does that mean anything to you now?"

"No, not by a long shot."

"Just go ahead."

"I now think," he said, laughing sarcastically, "of Simon of Trent, whose relics I saw two years ago in a church in Trent. I think of the old accusation which has been brought against the Jews again, and of the work of Kleinpaal, who sees in these supposed sacrifices reincarnations or revivals, so to speak, of the Saviour."

"This stream of thoughts has some connection with the theme which we discussed before the Latin word escaped you."

"You are right. I now think of an article in an Italian journal which I have recently read. I believe it was entitled: 'What St. Augustine said Concerning Women.' What can you do with this?"

I waited.

"Now I think of something which surely has no connection with the theme."

"Oh, please abstain from all criticism, and—"

"Oh, I know! I recall a handsome old gentleman whom I met on my journey last week. He was really an original type. He looked like a big bird of prey. His name, if you care to know, is Benedict."

"Well, at least you give a grouping of saints and church fathers: St. Simon, St. Augustine and St. Benedict. I believe that there was a Church father named Origines. Three of these, moreover, are Christian names, like Paul in the name of Kleinpaal."

"Now I think of St. Januarius and his blood miracle—I find that the thoughts are running mechanically."

"Just stop a moment; both St. Januarius and St. Augustine have something to do with the calendar. Will you recall to me the blood miracle?"

"Don’t you know about it? The blood of St. Januarius is preserved in a phial in a church in Naples, and on a certain holiday, a miracle takes place causing it to liquefy. The people think a great deal of this miracle, and become very excited if the liquefying process is retarded, as happened once during the French occupation. The General in command—or Garibaldi, if I am not mistaken—then took the priest aside, and with a very significant gesture pointed out to him the soldiers arrayed without, and expressed his hope that the miracle would soon take place. And it actually took place. . . ."

"Well, what else comes to your mind? Why do you hesitate?"

"Something really occurred to me . . . but it is too intimate a matter to impart . . . besides, I see no connection and no necessity for telling it."

"I will take care of the connection. Of course I cannot compel you to reveal what is disagreeable to you, but then you should not have demanded that I tell you why you forgot the word ‘aliquis’."

"Really? Do you think so? Well, I suddenly thought of a woman from whom I could easily get a message that would be very annoying to us both."

"That she missed her courses?"

"How could you guess such a thing?"

"That was not very difficult. You prepared me for it long enough. Just think of the saints of the calendar, the liquefying of the blood on a certain day, the excitement if the event does not take place, and the distinct threat that the miracle must take place. . . . Indeed, you have elaborated the miracle of St. Januarius into a clever allusion to the courses of the woman."

"It was surely without my knowledge. And do you really believe that my inability to reproduce the word ‘aliquis’ was due to this anxious expectation?"

"That appears to me absolutely certain. Don’t you recall dividing it into a-liquis and the associations: reliques, liquidation, fluid? Shall I also add to this connection the fact that St. Simon, to whom you got by way of reliques, was sacrificed as a child?"

"Please stop. I hope you do not take these thoughts—if I really entertained them—seriously. I will, however, confess to you that the lady is Italian, and that I visited Naples in her company. But may not all this be coincidental?"

"I must leave to your own judgment whether you can explain all these connections through the assumption of coincidence. I will tell you, how-
ever, that every similar case that you analyze will lead you to just such remarkable ‘coincidences’!”

I have more than one reason for valuing this little analysis, for which I am indebted to my travelling companion. First, because in this case, I was able to make use of a source which is otherwise inaccessible to me. Most of the examples of psychic disturbances of daily life that I have here compiled, I was obliged to take from observation of myself. I endeavored to evade the far richer material furnished me by my neurotic patients because I had to preclude the objection that the phenomena in question were only the result and manifestation of the neurosis. It was therefore of special value for my purpose to have a stranger free from a neurosis offer himself as a subject for such examination. This analysis is also important in other respects, inasmuch as it elucidates a case of word-forgetting without substitutive recollection, and thus confirms the principle formulated above, namely, that the appearance or nonappearance of incorrect substitutive recollections does not constitute an essential distinction.

But the principal value of the example aliquis lies in another of its distinctions from the case Signorelli. In the latter example, the reproduction of the name becomes disturbed through the after-effects of a stream

---

1 This small analysis has aroused much attention and evoked lively discussions in the literature. Through it, Bleuler attempted to prove mathematically the authenticity of psychoanalytic interpretation. He states: “It contains more probability value than thousands of unassailed medical ‘cognitions,’ and its peculiar position is only due to the fact that we are not yet in the habit of dealing in science with psychological probabilities.”—Bleuler: “Austistik-Undiszipliniertes Denken,” p. 142. Springer, Berlin, 1921.

2 Finer observation reduces somewhat the contrast between the analyses of Signorelli and aliquis as far as the substitutive recollections are concerned. Here, too, the forgetting seems to be accompanied by substitutive formations. When I later asked my companion whether in his effort to recall the forgotten word, he did not think of some substitution, he informed me that he was at first tempted to put an *ab* into the verse: *nostis ab ossibus* (perhaps the disjointed part of *a-ligious*) and that later the word *exoriare* obtruded itself with particular distinctness and persistency. Being skeptical, he added that it was apparently due to the fact that it was the first word of the verse. But when I asked him to focus his attention on the associations to *exoriare*, he gave me the word *exorcism*. This makes me think that the reinforcement of *exoriare* in the reproduction has really the value of such substitution. It probably came through the association *exorcism* from the names of the saints. However, those are refinements upon which no value need be laid. It seems now quite possible that the appearance of any kind of substitutive recollection is a constant sign—perhaps only characteristic and misleading—of the purposive forgetting motivated by repression. This substitution might also exist in the reinforcement of an element akin to the thing forgotten, even where incorrect substitutive names fail to appear. Thus, in the example Signorelli, as long as the name of the painter remained inaccessible to me, I had more than a clear visual memory of the cycle of his frescoes, and of the picture of himself in the corner; at least it was more intensive than any of my other visual memory traces. In another case, also reported in my essay of 1898, I had hopelessly forgotten the street name and address connected with a disagreeable visit in a strange city, but—as if to mock me—the house number appeared especially vivid, whereas the memory of numbers usually causes me the greatest difficulty.
of thought which began shortly before and was interrupted, but whose content had no distinct relation to the new theme which contained the name Signorelli. Between the repression and the theme of the forgotten name, there existed only the relation of temporal contiguity, which reached the other in order that the two should be able to form a connection through an outer association.\(^1\) On the other hand, in the example *aliquis*, one can note no trace of such an independent repressed theme which could occupy conscious thought immediately before and then re-echo as a disturbance. The disturbance of the reproduction proceeded here from the inner part of the theme touched upon, and was brought about by the fact that unconsciously a contradiction arose against the wish-idea represented in the quotation.

The origin must be construed in the following manner: The speaker deplored the fact that the present generation of his people was being deprived of its rights, and like Dido, he presaged that a new generation would take upon itself vengeance against the oppressors. He therefore expressed the wish for posterity. In this moment, he was interrupted by the contradictory thought: “Do you really wish so much for posterity? That is not true. Just think in what a predicament you would be if you should now receive the information that you must expect posterity from the quarter you have in mind! No, you want no posterity—as much as you need it for your vengeance.” This contradiction asserts itself, just as in the example *Signorelli*, by forming an outer association between one of his ideation elements and an element of the repressed wish, but here it is brought about in a most strained manner through what seems an artificial detour of associations. Another important agreement with the example *Signorelli* results from the fact that the contradiction originates from repressed sources and emanates from thoughts which would cause a deviation of attention.

So much for the diversity and the inner relationship of both paradigms of the forgetting of names. We have learned to know a second mechanism of forgetting, namely, the disturbance of thought through an inner contradiction emanating from the repression. In the course of this discussion, we shall repeatedly meet with this process, which seems to me to be the more easily understood.

\(^1\) I am not fully convinced of the lack of an inner connection between the two streams of thought in the case of *Signorelli*. In carefully following the repressed thought concerning the theme of death and sexual life, one does strike an idea which shows a near relation to the theme of the frescoes of Orvieto.
III

FORGETTING OF NAMES AND ORDER OF WORDS

EXPERIENCES like those mentioned concerning the process of forgetting a part of the order of words from a foreign language may cause one to wonder whether the forgetting of the order of words in one's own language requires an essentially different explanation. To be sure, one is not wont to be surprised if after a while a formula or poem learned by heart can only be reproduced imperfectly, with variations and gaps. Still, as this forgetting does not affect equally all the things learned together, but seems to pick out therefrom definite parts, it may be worth our effort to investigate analytically some examples of such faulty reproductions.

Brill reports the following example:

"While conversing one day with a very brilliant young woman, she had occasion to quote from Keats. The poem was entitled 'Ode to Apollo,' and she recited the following lines:

"'In thy western house of gold
    Where thou livest in thy state,
    Bards, that once sublimely told
    Prosaic truths that came too late.'

She hesitated many times during the recitation, being sure that there was something wrong with the last line. To her great surprise, on referring to the book, she found that not only was the last line misquoted, but that there were many other mistakes. The correct lines read as follows:

ODE TO APOLLO

"'In thy western halls of gold
    When thou sittest in thy state,
    Bards, that erst sublimely told
    Heroic deeds and sang of fate.'

The words italicized are those that have been forgotten and replaced by others during the recitation."
"She was astonished at her many mistakes, and attributed them to a failure of memory. I could readily convince her, however, that there was no qualitative or quantitative disturbance of memory in her case; and recalled to her our conversation immediately before quoting these lines.

"We were discussing the over-estimation of personality among lovers, and she thought it was Victor Hugo who said that love is the greatest thing in the world because it makes an angel or a god out of a grocery clerk. She continued: 'Only when we are in love have we blind faith in humanity; everything is perfect, everything is beautiful, and... everything is so poetically unreal. Still, it is a wonderful experience; worth going through, notwithstanding the terrible disappointments that usually follow. It puts us on a level with the gods and incites us to all sorts of artistic activities. We become real poets; we not only memorize and quote poetry, but we often become Apollos ourselves.' She then quoted the lines given above.

"When I asked on what occasion she memorized the lines, she could not recall. As a teacher of elocution, she was wont to memorize so much and so often that it was difficult to tell just when she had memorized these lines. 'Judging by the conversation,' I suggested, 'it would seem that this poem is intimately associated with the idea of over-estimation of personality of one in love. Have you perhaps memorized this poem when you were in such a state?' She became thoughtful for a while and soon recalled the following facts: Twelve years before, when she was eighteen years old, she fell in love. She met the young man while participating in an amateur theatrical performance. He was, at the time, studying for the stage, and it was predicted that some day he would be a matinée idol. He was endowed with all the attributes needed for such a calling. He was well built, fascinating, impulsive, very clever and... very fickle-minded. She was warned against him, but she paid no heed, attributing it all to the envy of her counsellors. Everything went well for a few months, when she suddenly received word that her Apollo, for whom she had memorized these lines, had eloped with and married a very wealthy young woman. A few years later, she heard that he was living in a Western city, where he was taking care of his father-in-law's interests.

"The misquoted lines are now quite plain. The discussion about the over-estimation of personality among lovers unconsciously recalled to her a disagreeable experience, when she herself over-estimated the personality of the man she loved. She thought he was a god, but he turned out to be even worse than the average mortal. The episode could not come to the surface because it was determined by very disagreeable and painful thoughts, but the unconscious variations in the poem plainly showed her present mental state. The poetic expressions were not only changed to prosaic ones, but they clearly alluded to the whole episode."
Another example of forgetting the order of words of a poem well known to the person, I shall cite from Dr. C. G. Jung, quoting the words of the author:

"A man wished to recite the familiar poem, 'A Pine Tree Stands Alone,' etc. In the line 'He felt drowsy' he became hopelessly stuck at the words 'with the white sheet.' This forgetting of such a well-known verse seemed to me rather peculiar, and I therefore asked him to reproduce what came to his mind when he thought of the words 'with the white sheet.' He gave the following series of associations: 'The white sheet makes one think of a white sheet on a corpse—a linen sheet with which one covers a dead body—(pause)—now I think of a near friend—his brother died quite recently—he is supposed to have died of heart disease—he was also very corpulent—my friend is corpulent, too, and I thought that he might meet the same fate—probably he doesn't exercise enough—when I heard of this death, I suddenly became frightened: the same thing might happen to me, as my own family is predisposed to obesity—my grandfather died of heart disease—I, also, am somewhat too corpulent, and for that reason, I began an obesity cure a few days ago.'"

Jung remarks: "The man had unconsciously identified himself with the pine tree which was covered with a white sheet."

For the following example of forgetting the order of words, I am indebted to my friend, Dr. Ferenczi, of Budapest. Unlike the former examples, it does not refer to a verse taken from poetry, but to a self-coined saying. It may also demonstrate to us the rather unusual case where the forgetting places itself at the disposal of discretion when the latter is in danger of yielding to a momentary desire. The mistake thus advances to a useful function. After we have sobered down, we justify that inner striving which at first could manifest itself only in some default, as in forgetting or psychic impotence.

"At a social gathering, some one quoted 'Tout comprendre c'est tout pardonner,' to which I remarked that the first part of the sentence should suffice, as 'pardoning' is an exemption which must be left to God and the priest. One of the guests thought this observation very good, which in turn emboldened me to remark—probably to ensure myself of the good opinion of the well-disposed critic—that some time ago, I thought of something still better. But when I was about to repeat this clever idea, I was unable to recall it. Thereupon I immediately withdrew from the company and wrote my latent thoughts. I first recalled the name of the friend who had witnessed the birth of this (desired) thought, and of the street in Budapest where it took place, and then the name of another friend, whose name was Max, whom we usually called Maxie. That led me to the word 'maxim,' and to the thought that at that time, as in the present case, 1The Psychology of Dementia Praecox, translated by A. A. Brill.
it was a question of varying a well-known maxim. Strangely enough, I did not recall any maxim but the following sentence: ‘God created man in His own image,’ and its changed conception, ‘Man created God in his own image.’ Immediately I recalled the sought-for recollection.

“My friend said to me at that time in Andrássy Street, ‘Nothing human is foreign to me.’ To which I remarked, basing it on psychoanalytic experience, ‘You should go further and acknowledge that nothing animal is foreign to you.’

“But after I had finally found the desired recollection, I was even then prevented from telling it in this social gathering. The young wife of the friend whom I had reminded of the animality of the unconscious, was also among those present, and I was perforce reminded that she was not at all prepared for the reception of such unsympathetic views. The forgetting spared me a number of unpleasant questions from her and a hopeless discussion, and just that must have been the motive of the ‘temporary amnesia.’

“It is interesting to note that as a concealing thought there emerged a sentence in which the deity is degraded to a human invention, while in the sought-for sentence, there was an allusion to the animal in the man. The capitis diminutio is therefore common to both. The whole matter was apparently only a continuation of the stream of thought concerning understanding and forgiving which was stimulated by the discussion.

“That the desired thought so rapidly appeared may also be due to the fact that I withdrew into a vacant room, away from the society in which it was censored.”

I have since then analyzed a large number of cases of forgetting or faulty reproduction of the order of words, and the consistent result of these investigations led me to assume that the mechanisms of forgetting, as demonstrated in the examples aliquis and Ode to Apollo, are almost universally true. It is not always very convenient to report such analyses, for, just as those cited, they usually lead to intimate and painful things in the person analyzed; I shall therefore add no more to the number of such examples. What is common to all these cases, regardless of the material, is the fact that the forgotten or distorted material becomes connected through some associative path with an unconscious stream of thought which gives rise to the influence that comes to light as forgetting.

I am now returning to the forgetting of names, concerning which we have so far considered exhaustively neither the casuistic elements nor the motives. As this form of faulty acts can at times be abundantly observed in myself, I am not at a loss for examples. The slight attacks of migraine, from which I am still suffering, are wont to announce themselves hours before through the forgetting of names, and at the height of the attack,
during which I am not forced, however, to give up my work, I am often unable to recall all proper names.

Still, just such cases as mine may furnish the cause for a strong objection to our analytic efforts. Should not one be forced to conclude from such observations that the causation of forgetfulness, especially forgetting of names, is to be sought in circulatory or functional disturbances of the brain, and spare himself the trouble of searching for psychologic explanations for these phenomena? Not at all; that would mean to substitute the mechanism of a process, which is the same in all cases, by a variable. But instead of an analysis, I shall cite a comparison which will settle the argument.

Let us assume that I was so reckless as to take a walk at night in an uninhabited neighborhood of a big city, and was attacked and robbed of my watch and purse. At the nearest police station I report the matter in the following words: "I was in this or that street, and was there robbed of my watch and purse by lonesomeness and darkness." Although these words would not express anything that is incorrect, I would, nevertheless, run the danger of being considered—judging from the wording of this report—as not quite right in the head. To be correct, the state of affairs could only be described by saying that, favored by the lonesomeness of the place and under cover of darkness, I was robbed of my valuables by unknown malefactors.

Now, then, the state of affairs in forgetting names need not be different. Favored by exhaustion, circulatory disturbances and intoxication, I am robbed by an unknown psychic force of the control over the proper names belonging to my memory; it is the same force which in other cases may bring about the same failure of memory during perfect health and mental capacity.

When I analyze those cases of name-forgetting in myself, I find almost regularly that the name withheld shows some relation to a theme which concerns my own person, and is apt to provoke in me strong and often painful emotions. Following the convenient and commendable practice of the Zürich School (Bleuler, Jung, Riklin), I might express the same thing in the following form: The name withheld has touched a "personal complex" in me. The relation of the name to my person is an unexpected one, and is mostly brought about through superficial associations (words of double meaning and of similar sounds); it may generally be designated as a side association. A few single examples will best illustrate the nature of the same:

(a) A patient requested me to recommend to him a sanatorium in the Riviera. I knew of such a place very near Genoa; I also recalled the name of the German colleague who was in charge of the place, but the place itself I could not name, well as I believed I knew it. There was nothing
FORGETTING OF NAMES AND ORDER OF WORDS

left to do but ask the patient to wait, and to appeal quickly to the women of the family.

"Just what is the name of the place near Genoa where Dr. X has his small institution in which Mrs. So-and-So remained so long under treatment?"

"Of course you would forget a name of that sort. The name is Nervi."

To be sure, I have enough to do with nerves.

(b) Another patient spoke about a neighboring summer resort, and maintained that besides the two familiar inns, there was a third. I disputed the existence of any third inn, and referred to the fact that I had spent seven summers in the vicinity and therefore knew more about the place than he. Instigated by my contradiction, he recalled the name. The name of the third inn was "The Hochwartner." Of course, I had to admit it; indeed, I was forced to confess that for seven summers I had lived near this very inn, whose existence I had so strenuously denied. But why should I have forgotten the name and the object? I believe because the name sounded very much like that of a Vienna colleague who practised the same specialty as my own. It touched my "professional complex."

(c) On another occasion, when about to buy a railroad ticket on the Reichenhall station, I could not recall the very familiar name of the next big railroad station which I had so often passed. I was forced to look it up in the time-table. The name was Rosehome (Rosenheim). I soon discovered through what associations I lost it. An hour earlier, I had visited my sister in her home near Reichenhall; my sister's name is Rose, hence also a Rosehome. This name was taken away by my "family complex."

(d) This predatory influence of the "family complex," I can demonstrate in a whole series of complexes.

One day, I was consulted by a young man, a younger brother of one of my female patients, whom I saw any number of times, and whom I used to call by his first name. Later, while wishing to talk about his visit, I forgot his first name, in no way an unusual one, and could not recall it in any way. I walked into the street to read the business signs and recognized the name as soon as it met my eyes.

The analysis showed that I had formed a parallel between the visitor and my own brother which centered in the question: "Would my brother, in a similar case, have behaved like him or even more contrarily?" The outer connection between the thoughts concerning the stranger and my own family was rendered possible through the accident that the name of the mothers in each case was the same, Amelia. Subsequently, I also understood the substitutive names, Daniel and Frank, which intruded themselves without any explanation. These names, as well as Amelia, belong to Schiller's play The Robbers; they are all connected with a joke of the Vienna pedestrian, Daniel Spitzer.
(e) On another occasion, I was unable to recall a patient's name which had a certain reference to my early life. The analysis had to be followed over a long devious road before the desired name was discovered. The patient expressed his apprehension lest he should lose his eyesight; this recalled a young man who became blind from a gunshot, and this again led to a picture of another youth who shot himself, and the latter bore the same name as my first patient, though not at all related to him. The name became known to me, however, only after the anxious apprehension from these two juvenile cases was transferred to a person of my own family.

Thus an incessant stream of "self-reference" flows through my thoughts concerning which I usually have no inkling, but which betrays itself through such name-forgetting. It seems as if I were forced to compare with my own person all that I hear about strangers, as if my personal complexes became stirred up by associations from without. It seems impossible that this should be an individual peculiarity of my own person; it must, on the contrary, point to the way we grasp outside matters in general. I have reasons to assume that other individuals meet with experiences quite similar to mine.

The best example of this kind was reported to me by a gentleman named Lederer as a personal experience. While on his wedding trip in Venice, he came across a man with whom he was but slightly acquainted, and whom he was obliged to introduce to his wife. As he forgot the name of the stranger, he got himself out of the embarrassment the first time by mumbling the name unintelligibly. But when he met the man a second time, as is inevitable in Venice, he took him aside and begged him to help him out of the difficulty by telling him his name, which he unfortunately had forgotten. The answer of the stranger pointed to a superior knowledge of human nature: "I readily believe that you did not grasp my name. My name is like yours—Lederer!"

One cannot suppress a slight feeling of unpleasantness on discovering his own name in a stranger. I had recently felt it very plainly when I was consulted during my office hours by a man named S. Freud. However, I am assured by one of my own critics that in this respect, he behaves in quite the opposite manner.

(f) The effect of personal relation can be recognized also in the following examples reported by Jung.¹

"Mr. Y. falls in love with a lady who soon thereafter marries Mr. X. In spite of the fact that Mr. Y. was an old acquaintance of Mr. X., and had business relations with him, he repeatedly forgot the name, and on a number of occasions, when wishing to correspond with X., he was obliged to ask other people for his name."

However, the motivation for the forgetting is more evident in this case.

¹ The Psychology of Dementia Praecox, p. 45.
than in the preceding ones, which were under the constellation of the personal reference. Here the forgetting is manifestly a direct result of the dislike of Y. for the happy rival; he does not wish to know anything about him.

(g) The following case, reported by Ferenczi, the analysis of which is especially instructive through the explanation of the substitutive thoughts (like Botticelli-Boltraffio to Signorelli), shows in a somewhat different way how self-reference leads to the forgetting of a name:

“A lady who heard something about psychoanalysis could not recall the name of the psychiatrist, Young (Jung).

“Instead, the following names occurred to her: Kl. (a name)—Wilde—Nietzsche—Hauptmann.

“I did not tell her the name and requested her to repeat her free associations to every thought.

“To Kl. she at once thought of Mrs. Kl., that she was an embellished and affected person who looked very well for her age. ‘She does not age.’ As a general and principal conception of Wilde and Nietzsche, she gave the association ‘mental disease.’ She continued: ‘I cannot bear Wilde and Nietzsche. I do not understand them. I hear that they were both homosexual. Wilde has occupied himself with young people’ (although she uttered in this sentence the correct name, she still could not remember it).

“To Hauptmann she associated the words half and youth, and only after I called her attention to the word youth did she become aware that she was looking for the name Young (Jung).”

It is clear that this lady, who had lost her husband at the age of thirty-nine, and had no prospect of marrying a second time, had cause enough to avoid reminiscences recalling youth or old age. The remarkable thing is that the concealing thoughts of the desired name came to the surface as simple associations of content without any sound-associations.

(h) Still different and very finely motivated is an example of name-forgetting which the person concerned has himself explained.

“While taking an examination in philosophy as a minor subject, I was questioned by the examiner about the teachings of Epicurus, and was asked whether I knew who took up his teachings centuries later. I answered that it was Pierre Gassendi, whom two days before, while in a café, I had happened to hear spoken of as a follower of Epicurus. To the question how I knew this, I boldly replied that I had taken an interest in Gassendi for a long time. This resulted in a certificate with a magna cum laude, but later, unfortunately, also in a persistent tendency to forget the name Gassendi. I believe that it is due to my guilty conscience that even now I cannot retain this name despite all efforts. I had no business knowing it at that time.”

To have a proper appreciation of the intense repugnance entertained
by our narrator against the recollection of this examination episode, one
must have realized how highly he prizest his doctor’s degree, and for how
many other things this substitute must stand.

(i) I add here another example of forgetting the name of a city, an
instance which is perhaps not as simple as those given before, but which
will appear credible and valuable to those more familiar with such investi-
gations. The name of an Italian city withdrew itself from memory on ac-
count of its far-reaching sound-similarity to a woman’s first name, which
was in turn connected with various emotional reminiscences which were
surely not exhaustively treated in this report. Dr. S. Ferenczi, who ob-
served this case of forgetting in himself, treated it—quite justly—as an
analysis of a dream or a neurotic idea.

“Today I visited some old friends, and the conversation turned to cities
of Northern Italy. Someone remarked that they still showed the Austrian
influence. A few of these cities were cited. I, too, wished to mention one,
but the name did not come to me, although I knew that I had spent two
very pleasant days there; this, of course, does not quite concur with
Freud’s theory of forgetting. Instead of the desired name of the city, there
obtruded themselves the following thoughts: ‘Capua—Brescia—the lion
of Brescia.’ This lion I saw objectively before me in the form of a marble
statue, but I soon noticed that he resembled less the lion of the statue of
liberty in Brescia (which I saw only in a picture) than the other marble
lion which I saw in Lucerne on the monument in honor of the Swiss Guard
fallen in the Tuileries. I finally thought of the desired name: it was
Verona.

“I knew at once the cause of this amnesia. No other than a former
servant of the family whom I visited at the time. Her name was Veronica;
in Hungarian Verona. I felt a great antipathy for her on account of her
repulsive physiognomy, as well as her hoarse, shrill voice and her unbear-
able self-assertion (to which she thought herself entitled on account of
her long service). Also the tyrannical way in which she treated the chil-
dren of the family was insufferable to me. Now I knew the significance of
the substitutive thoughts.

“‘To Capua I immediately associated caput mortuum. I had often com-
pared Veronica’s head to a skull. The Hungarian word kapsoi (greed after
money) surely furnished a determinant for the displacement. Naturally
I also found those more direct associations which connected Capua and
Verona as geographical ideas and as Italian words of the same rhythm.

“The same held true for Brescia; here, too, I found concealed side-
tracks of associations of ideas.

“My antipathy at that time was so violent that I thought Veronica very
ugly, and have often expressed my astonishment at the fact that anyone
should love her: ‘Why, to kiss her,’ I said, ‘must provoke nausea.’
"Brescia, at least in Hungary, is very often mentioned not in connection with the lion, but with another wild beast. The most hated name in this country, as well as in North Italy, is that of General Haynau, who is briefly referred to as the hyena of Brescia. From the hated tyrant Haynau, one stream of thought leads over Brescia to the city of Verona, and the other over the idea of the grave-digging animal with the hoarse voice (which corresponds to the thought of a monument to the dead), to the skull, and to the disagreeable organ of Veronica, which was so cruelly insulted in my unconscious mind. Veronica, in her time, ruled as tyrannically as did the Austrian General after the Hungarian and Italian struggles for liberty.

"Lucerne is associated with the idea of the summer which Veronica spent with her employers in a place near Lucerne. The Swiss Guard again recalls that she tyrannized not only the children, but also the adult members of the family, and thus played the part of the 'Garde-Dame.'

"I expressly observe that this antipathy of mine against Veronica consciously belongs to things long overcome. Since that time, she has changed in her appearance and manner, very much to her advantage, so that I am able to meet her with sincere regard (to be sure, I hardly find such occasion). As usual, however, my unconscious sticks more tenaciously to those impressions; it is old in its resentment.

"The Tuileries represent an allusion to a second personality, an old French lady who actually 'guarded' the women of the house, and who was in high regard and somewhat feared by everybody. For a long time, I was her élève in French conversation. The word élève recalls that when I visited the brother-in-law of my present host in northern Bohemia, I had to laugh a great deal because the rural population referred to the élèves (pupils) of the school of forestry as löwen (lions). Also this jocose recollection might have taken part in the displacement of the hyena by the lion."

(j) The following example can also show how a personal complex swaying the person at the time being, may, by devious ways, bring about the forgetting of a name.¹

Two men, an elder and a younger, who had travelled together in Sicily six months before, exchanged reminiscences of those pleasant and interesting days.

"Let's see, what was the name of that place," asked the younger, "where we passed the night before taking the trip to Selinunt? Calatafimi, was it not?"

The elder rejected this by saying: "Certainly not; but I have forgotten the name, too, although I can recall perfectly all the details of the place. Whenever I hear someone forget a name, it immediately produces forget- ¹Zentralb. f. Psychoanalyse, I. 9, 1911.
fulness in me. Let us look for the name. I cannot think of any other name except Caltanisetta, which is surely not correct."

"No," said the younger, "the name begins with, or contains, a w."

"But the Italian language contains no w," retorted the elder.

"I really meant a v, and I said w because I am accustomed to interchange them in my mother-tongue."

The elder, however, objected to the v. He added: "I believe that I have already forgotten many of the Sicilian names. Suppose we try to find out. For example, what is the name of the place situated on a height which was called Enna in antiquity?"

"Oh, I know that: Castrogiovanni." In the next moment, the younger man discovered the lost name. He cried out "Castelvetrano," and was pleased to be able to demonstrate the supposed v.

For a moment, the elder still lacked the feeling of recognition, but after he accepted the name, he was able to state why it had escaped him. He thought: "Obviously because the second half, vetrano, suggests veteran. I am aware that I am not quite anxious to think of ageing, and react peculiarly when I am reminded of it. Thus, e.g., I had recently reminded a very esteemed friend in most unmistakable terms that he had ‘long ago passed the years of youth,’ because before this, he once remarked in the most flattering manner, ‘I am no longer a young man.’ That my resistance was directed against the second half of the name Castelvetrano is shown by the fact that the initial sound of the same returned in the substitutive name Caltanisetta."

"What about the name Caltanisetta itself?" asked the younger.

"That always seemed to me like a pet name of a young woman," admitted the elder.

Somewhat later he added: "The name for Enna was also only a substitutive name. And now it occurs to me that the name Castrogiovanni, which obturated itself with the aid of a rationalization, alludes as expressly to giovane, young, as the last name, Castelvetrano, to veteran."

The older man believed that he had thus accounted for his forgetting the name. What the motive was that led the young man to this memory failure was not investigated.

In some cases, one must have recourse to all the fineness of psychoanalytic technique in order to explain the forgetting of a name. Those who wish to read an example of such work, I refer to a communication by Professor Ernest Jones.¹

Brill reports the following interesting example:

"Soon after I became an assistant in the Clinic of Psychiatry at Zürich,

¹ "Analyse eines Falles von Namenvergessen," Zentralb. f. Psychoanalyse, Jahrg. 11, Heft 2, 1911."
I had an interesting experience in forgetting a name, which I may say, finally converted me to Freud's teachings. At that time, I was not fully convinced of his theories, and my attitude was skeptical, though by no means unsympathetic. I approached the whole subject in the spirit of an investigator and student who made every effort to discover and understand all the data before passing final judgment on his psychology. Spurred on by Professor Bleuler, all the physicians in the hospital were firm and ardent workers with the new theories. In fact, we were in the only hospital or clinic where the Freudian principles were applied in the study and treatment of patients. Those were the pioneer days of Freud among psychiatrists, and we observed and studied and noted whatever was done or said about us with unfailing patience and untiring interest and zeal. We made no scruples, for instance, of asking a man at table why he did not use his spoon in the proper way, or why he did such and such a thing in such and such a manner. It was impossible for one to show any degree of hesitation or make some abrupt pause in speaking without being at once called to account. We had to keep ourselves well in hand, ever ready and alert, for there was no telling when and where there would be a new attack. We had to explain why we whistled or hummed some particular tune or why we made some slip in talking or some mistake in writing. But we were glad to do this if for no other reason than to learn to face the truth.

"One afternoon, when I was off duty, I was reading about a certain case which recalled to my mind a similar one I had when I was in a hospital in New York. I am in the habit of making marginal notes and so I took up my pencil to write down the case, but when I came to note the name of the patient whom I had known for a number of months and in whom I had taken an unusual amount of interest, I found that I could not recall it. I tried very hard to bring it back to my mind, but without success. It was strange and puzzling; but as I knew definitely whom I meant, I finished the note. Now, according to Freud, I thought at once to myself, the name must be connected with something painful and unpleasant. I decided right there and then to find it by the Freudian free association method.

"Now, the patient whose name I could not recall, was the same man who, some years ago, attempted to set fire to the St. Patrick's Cathedral in New York; he gathered together some odds and ends before the entrance of the church and set fire to it. He was, of course, arrested, brought to the psychopathic pavilion in Bellevue and later to the State Hospital where he became my patient. I diagnosed him as a psychic epileptic. I decided that he suffered from a form of epilepsy which does not manifest itself in fits, as the general cases do, but rather in peculiar psychic actions which may last for a few minutes, hours, or perhaps for weeks, months
or years. Nobody agreed with me in the diagnosis; my senior doctor held
that the patient suffered from dementia praecox.

"Within a week or so, the patient recovered and was entirely normal,
thus corroborating my diagnosis in every respect. The patient told us that
this was his fifth attack and that in some of his previous ones, he had
burned a railroad station, a church and several barns. He would run away
from home, his wife and children, and wander off, scot-free, when one
of these fits came upon him. He was an editor of a journal and newspaper
in Canada, a man of considerable intelligence and refinement. On one of
his attacks during the Boer War, he ran away from Canada and came to
London, where, seeing calls for volunteers, he enlisted and was sent to
South Africa. He fought bravely and was promoted to sergeant in a few
weeks. When he came to himself, he was quite surprised to find himself a
soldier and did not have the least idea how he got to South Africa. Previ-
oun experience told him, however, what his condition meant and upon
reporting it to the physicians, he was honorably discharged. He sent a
cable to his wife and returned home. He gave us various details about
himself, the hospital where he found himself last, his former doctor, all
of which we were soon able to corroborate. He had what we called a
"fugue" or "poriomania." Cases like this have been reported where the
person disappeared for as many as three years. Indeed, they are not as
rare as you may suppose.

"Everybody congratulated me on my clever diagnosis, and I myself
was greatly elated. The superintendent assured me that I had all good
reason to be proud of myself and he went on to state, to my profound
disappointment and displeasure, that he would report the case to a med-
cal society. I had spent a tremendous amount of time and effort on it and
desired to publish it as my first contribution to medical literature.

"A few days before the meeting, the superintendent changed his mind
and asked me to read it. I was very much pleased at this and felt quite
relieved. But the programs were already printed, and when I went before
the society, everybody thought it was the superintendent's paper and that
he sent me merely to read it for him. You may realize how deeply I felt
about the whole affair.

"Now, I am dwelling quite at length on the phase of the situation be-
cause I would like you to note carefully that there was enough of the dis-
agreeable and unpleasant associated with the whole experience to account
for my forgetting the name of the patient.

"For hours on end, I sat there writing down the associations, but I was
not a whit nearer to knowing the name than when I began. Various details
and incidents came swarming into my mind and I had to write mighty
rapidly to keep pace with them. I could see clearly how this New York
patient looked, the color of his hair, the peculiar expression on his face.
I became discouraged and thought to myself, 'If that is the way to find a thing through the Freudian method, I shall never be a Freudian.' It was now evening and one of my colleagues, surprised to find me indoors, asked me to make his rounds for him inasmuch as I was not going out. I consented gladly, for I was tired of these Freudian labors. But when I was done, I felt refreshed and returned to the associations with renewed interest. At eleven o'clock, I was still in as much darkness about the name as before. I went to bed disheartened and thoroughly disgusted with the whole affair. At about four o'clock in the morning, I awoke and made a supreme effort to dismiss it from my mind, but in vain. Nolens volens, I soon began to associate in bed, and finally, at about a little after five, the long-sought name suddenly came to me. My joy and elation was not at all free from a sense of relief; it was as if I had solved a long vexing problem. I have no doubt now that had I not been able to find it, I probably would never have continued to take the slightest interest in Freud. I spent so much time and effort in trying to ferret it out that I felt quite out of humor with myself; but I was well compensated no less by the sense of pleasure and satisfaction that went with the discovery, than by the fresh conviction it gave me in Freudian psychology.

"Now, what was the situation? Let me say first that when you begin to associate freely, you will soon be surprised to find that thousands of associations begin pouring in upon consciousness. Sometimes, three or four of these associations come at the same moment and you pause and wonder which one to write down first. You soon make some selection and continue. In my own case, I observed that a few very definite associations kept on recurring continually. Every time I asked myself the name of this New York patient, there would invariably come to my mind the case of a real epileptic I then had in the Zürich hospital. His name was Appenzeller; he was just a Swiss peasant, and I explained the association on the ground that they were both epileptics, the New York patient, as you remember, being a psychic epileptic. Another continually recurring association was this: When I thought of the hospital on Long Island and all that happened there during the five years I was connected with it, one particular scene would stand out very clearly and prominently; my mind would revert to it all the time. There were very often forest fires near the hospital and on many occasions, we had to go out and check them lest they reached our buildings. The particular scene was on a Friday; there was a big fire raging near the hospital and we had to send out as many doctors and nurses as we could possibly spare to help control it. I was there to see that there was no confusion, that things were carried out properly; I was chatting with a physician who was with me in the same capacity. The fire was consuming a good deal of scrub pine; and now and then, an attendant would succeed in shooting one of the rabbits that
were fleeing from the brush wood. As I was standing there, the superintendent came up to us, passed some remark or other, and then, spying a rabbit some distance away, asked one of the attendants for his shotgun to try his skill, saying: 'Let's see if I can get that rabbit.' We all looked on knowingly, for we never had very much faith in the superintendent's marksmanship, and no mistake, he missed his aim and the rabbit escaped. He turned to me and declared somewhat uneasily, and by way of explanation, that his fingers slipped, for it was beginning to rain. I seemingly concurred in the observation, but in my heart I smiled at his discomfiture. I could see him very plainly as he stood there, saying, 'Let's see if I can get that rabbit,' and he would then aim, shoot and miss it. Finally I saw the scene again in the morning, and with the words, 'Let's see if I can get that rabbit,' the name came to me. It was Lapin, the French word for rabbit. Later on, when I actually counted my associations, I found that this particular association came up twenty-eight times more than any of the others.

"This may seem strange to you, but that is exactly the way the mind works unconsciously. The name was symbolically represented by the scene; the whole situation was under repression and that is the manner in which the unconscious elaborated it. The repressed emotion attached itself to an actual occurrence: the superintendent fails to shoot the rabbit, i.e., he fails to deprive me of the case. You can easily see also why I thought of Appenzeller. There was the sound association of the first part of Appenzeller, Appen, Lapin; and what is just as important, both patients were epileptics. You may thus see, first, that there was something distinctly disagreeable and painful associated with the name, and secondly, that there was a definite symbolic expression of it in the form of a repressed emotion."

I could multiply the examples of name-forgetting and prolong the discussion very much further if I did not wish to avoid elucidating here almost all the viewpoints which will be considered in later themes. I shall, however, take the liberty of comprehending in a few sentences the results of the analyses reported here.

The mechanism of forgetting, or rather of losing or temporary forgetting of a name, consists in the disturbance of the intended reproduction of the name through a strange stream of thought unconscious at the time. Between the disturbed name and the disturbing complex, there exists a connection either from the beginning or such a connection has been formed—perhaps by artificial means—through superficial (outer) associations.

The self-reference complex (personal, family or professional) proves to be the most effective of the disturbing complexes.
A name which, by virtue of its many meanings, belongs to a number of thought associations (complexes) is frequently disturbed in its connection to one series of thoughts through a stronger complex belonging to the other associations.

To avoid the awakening of pain through memory is one of the objects among the motives of these disturbances.

In general, one may distinguish two principal cases of name-forgetting; when the name itself touches something unpleasant, or when it is brought into connection with other associations which are influenced by such effects. Thus, names can be disturbed on their own account or on account of their nearer or more remote associative relations in the reproduction.

A review of these general principles readily convinces us that the temporary forgetting of a name is observed as the most frequent faulty action of our mental functions.

However, we are far from having described all the peculiarities of this phenomenon. I also wish to call attention to the fact that name-forgetting is extremely contagious. In a conversation between two persons, the mere mention of having forgotten this or that name by one often suffices to induce the same memory slip in the other. But wherever the forgetting is induced, the sought-for name easily comes to the surface.

There is also a continuous forgetting of names in which whole chains of names are withdrawn from memory. If, in the course of endeavoring to discover an escaped name, one finds others with which the latter is intimately connected, it often happens that these new names also escape. The forgetting thus jumps from one name to another, as if to demonstrate the existence of a hindrance not to be easily removed.
CHILDHOOD AND CONCEALING MEMORIES

In a second essay, I was able to demonstrate the purposive nature of our memories in an unexpected field. I started with the remarkable fact that the earliest recollections of a person often seemed to preserve the unimportant and accidental, whereas (frequently though not universally!) not a trace is found in the adult memory of the weighty and affective impressions of this period. As it is known that the memory exercises a certain selection among the impressions at its disposal, it would seem logical to suppose that this selection follows entirely different principles in childhood than at the time of intellectual maturity. However, close investigation points to the fact that such an assumption is superfluous. The indifferent childhood memories owe their existence to a process of displacement. It may be shown by psychoanalysis that in the reproduction they represent the substitute for other really significant impressions, whose direct reproduction is hindered by some resistance. As they do not owe their existence to their own contents, but to an associative relation of their contents to another repressed thought, they deserve the title of "concealing memories," by which I have designated them.

In the aforementioned essay I only touched upon, but in no way exhausted, the varicities in the relations and meanings of concealed memories. In the given example fully analyzed, I particularly emphasized a peculiarity in the temporal relation between the concealing memory and the contents of the memory concealed by it. The content of the concealing memory in that example belonged to one of the first years of childhood, while the thoughts represented by it, which remained practically unconscious, belonged to a later period of the individual in question. I called this form of displacement a retro-active or regressive one. Perhaps more often, one finds the reversed relation—that is, an indifferent impression of the most remote period becomes a concealing memory in consciousness, which simply owes its existence to an association with an earlier experience, against whose direct reproduction there are resistances. We would

1 Published in the Monatschrift für Psychiatrie u. Neurologie, 1899.
CHILDHOOD AND CONCEALING MEMORIES

call these *encroaching* or *interposing* concealing memories. What most concerns the memory lies here chronologically beyond the concealing memory. Finally, there may be a third possible case, namely, the concealing memory may be connected with the impression it conceals, not only through its contents, but also through contiguity of time; this is the *contemporaneous* or *contiguous* concealing memory.

How large a portion of the sum total of our memory belongs to the category of concealing memories, and what part it plays in various neurotic hidden processes, these are problems into the value of which I have neither inquired, nor shall I enter here. I am concerned only with emphasizing the sameness between the forgetting of proper names with faulty recollection and the formation of concealing memories.

At first sight, it would seem that the diversities of both phenomena are far more striking than their exact analogies. There we deal with proper names, here with complete impressions experienced either in reality or in thought; there we deal with a manifest failure of the memory function, here with a memory act which appears strange to us. Again, there we are concerned with a momentary disturbance—for the name just forgotten could have been reproduced correctly a hundred times before, and will be so again from tomorrow on; here we deal with lasting possession without a failure, for the indifferent childhood memories seem to be able to accompany us through a great part of life. In both these cases, the riddle seems to be solved in an entirely different way. There it is the forgetting, while here it is the remembering which excites our scientific curiosity.

After deeper reflection, one realizes that, although there is a diversity in the psychic material and in the duration of time of the two phenomena, yet these are by far outweighed by the conformities between the two. In both cases we deal with the failure of remembering; what should be correctly reproduced by the memory fails to appear, and instead something else comes as a substitute. In the case of forgetting a name, there is no lack of memory function in the form of name substitution. The formation of a concealing memory depends on the forgetting of other important impressions. In both cases, we are reminded by an intellectual feeling of the intervention of a disturbance, which in each case takes a different form. In the case of forgetting of names, we are aware that the substitutive names are incorrect, while in concealing memories, we are surprised that we have them at all. Hence, if psychologic analysis demonstrates that the substitutive formation in each case is brought about in the same manner—that is, through displacement along a superficial association—we are justified in saying that the diversities in material, in duration of time, and in the centering of both phenomena serve to enhance our expectation, that we have discovered something that is important and of general value. This generality purports that the stopping and straying of the reproduc-
ing function indicates more often than we suppose that there is an intervention of a prejudicial factor, a tendency which favors one memory and, at the same time, works against another.

The subject of childhood memories appears to me so important and interesting that I would like to devote to it a few additional remarks which go beyond the views expressed so far.

How far back into childhood do our memories reach? I am familiar with some investigations on this question by V. and C. Henri2 and Potwin.2 They assert that such examinations show wide individual variations, inasmuch as some trace their first reminiscences to the sixth month of life, while others can recall nothing of their lives before the end of the sixth or even the eighth year. But what connection is there between these variations in the behavior of childhood reminiscences, and what significance may be ascribed to them? It seems that it is not enough to procure the material for this question by simple inquiry, but it must later be subjected to a study in which the person furnishing the information must participate.

I believe we accept too indifferently the fact of infantile amnesia—that is, the failure of memory for the first years of our lives—and fail to find in it a strange riddle. We forget of what great intellectual accomplishments and of what complicated emotions a child of four years is capable. We really ought to wonder why the memory of later years has, as a rule, retained so little of these psychic processes, especially as we have every reason for assuming that these same forgotten childhood activities have not glided off without leaving a trace in the development of the person, but that they have left a definite influence for all future time. Yet, in spite of this unparalleled effectiveness they were forgotten! This would suggest that there are particularly formed conditions of memory (in the sense of conscious reproduction) which have thus far eluded our knowledge. It is quite possible that the forgetting of childhood may give us the key to the understanding of those amnesias which, according to our newer studies, lie at the basis of the formation of all neurotic symptoms.

Of these retained childhood reminiscences, some appear to us readily comprehensible, while others seem strange or unintelligible. It is not difficult to correct certain errors in regard to both kinds. If the retained reminiscences of a person are subjected to an analytic test, it can be readily ascertained that a guarantee for their correctness does not exist. Some of the memory pictures are surely falsified and incomplete, or displaced in point of time and place. The assertions of persons examined, that their

1 "Enquête sur les premiers souvenirs de l'enfance," L'Année psychologique, iii., 1897.
first memories reach back perhaps to their second year, are evidently unreliable. Motives can soon be discovered which explain the disfigurement and the displacement of these experiences, but they also demonstrate that these memory lapses are not the result of a mere unreliable memory. Powerful forces from a later period have moulded the memory capacity of our infantile experiences, and it is probably due to these same forces that the understanding of our childhood is generally so very strange to us.

The recollection of adults, as is known, proceeds through different psychic material. Some recall by means of visual pictures—their memories are of a visual character; other individuals can scarcely reproduce in memory the most paltry sketch of an experience; we call such persons "auditifs" and "moteurs" in contrast to the "visuels," terms proposed by Charcot. These differences vanish in dreams; all our dreams are preponderantly visual. But this development is also found in the childhood memories; the latter are plastic and visual, even in those people whose later memory lacks the visual element. The visual memory, therefore, preserves the type of the infantile recollections. Only my earliest childhood memories are of a visual character; they represent plastically depicted scenes, comparable only to stage settings.

In these scenes of childhood, whether they prove true or false, one usually sees his own childish person both in contour and dress. This circumstance must excite our wonder, for adults do not see their own persons in their recollections of later experiences. It is, moreover, against our experiences to assume that the child's attention during his experiences is centered on himself rather than exclusively on outside impressions. Various sources force us to assume that the so-called earliest childhood recollections are not true memory traces but later elaborations of the same, elaborations which might have been subjected to the influences of many later psychic forces. Thus, the "childhood reminiscences" of individuals altogether advance to the signification of "concealing memories," and thereby form a noteworthy analogy to the childhood reminiscences as laid down in the legends and myths of nations.

Whoever has examined mentally a number of persons by the method of psychoanalysis must have gathered in this work numerous examples of concealing memories of every description. However, owing to the previously discussed nature of the relations of the childhood reminiscences to later life, it becomes extraordinarily difficult to report such examples. For, in order to attach the value of the concealing memory to an infantile reminiscence, it would be often necessary to present the entire life-history of the person concerned. Only seldom is it possible, as in the following

---

1 I assert this as a result of certain investigations made by myself.
good example, to take out from its context and report a single childhood memory.

A twenty-four-year-old man preserved the following picture from the fifth year of his life: In the garden of a summer-house, he sat on a stool next to his aunt, who was engaged in teaching him the alphabet. He found difficulty in distinguishing the letter m from n, and he begged his aunt to tell him how to tell one from the other. His aunt called his attention to the fact that the letter m had one whole portion (a stroke) more than the letter n. There was no reason to dispute the reliability of this childhood recollection; its meaning, however, was discovered only later, when it showed itself to be the symbolic representation of another boyish inquisitiveness. For just as he wanted to know the difference between m and n at that time, so he concerned himself later about the difference between boy and girl, and he would have been willing that just this aunt should be his teacher. He also discovered that the difference was a similar one; that the boy again had one whole portion more than the girl, and at the time of this recognition, his memory awoke to the corresponding childish inquisitiveness.

The following interesting example is given by Brill:

"One of my patients informed me once that his memory went back to the time of his baptism, when he was about a week old. He maintained that he distinctly remembered the house and the stairway leading up to the first floor where he was supposed to have been baptized. He particularly recalled a lamp standing at the foot of the stairs and the minister who performed the baptism, a tall man in a black frock coat. He remembered vividly how his head was totally submerged in a basin of water. I was naturally skeptical and explained to him that I thought it was a concealing memory which probably hid something else of a much later date. He then informed me that he had entertained this memory for many years, but that when he imparted it to his mother, a few years ago, she laughed, declaring that there was no truth in it, that in the first place, he was not born in this particular house, but that he had merely lived there from the age of four to six, that she could not recall this particular lamp, that the minister who really baptized him was not tall, and what was more, that the baby's head is not submerged in a basin of water during baptism. Notwithstanding his mother's absolute denial, the patient continued to entertain this memory; he strongly felt that it was true despite all facts to the contrary.

"We then proceeded to analyze it. He stated that the most vivid element in the memory was the lamp, and so I asked him to concentrate his attention on it and give me his associations. He could see the lamp at the foot of the stairs, the stairway, and the room on the first floor. He then recalled that at the age of about five years, he was standing one
afternoon in that room watching a Swedish servant who was either on a high chair or a step-ladder cleaning the chandelier. He became very inquisitive sexually and made a great effort to look under her clothes. She noticed it and gave him a very strong rebuke. He then recalled that a few years later, he watched through a keyhole to see his mother dress, and somehow she caught him and punished him very severely for it. He was very much humiliated, for she took him downstairs to the dining room and told his father and brother what he had done. At about the same age, probably a little before this episode with his mother, he was on the roof one evening and spied a woman undressing in a house across the street. In his great excitement, he ran down to call his brother, but when he returned, the woman had already slipped a nightgown on and was now pulling down the shades. He told me that for years he regretted that he went to call his brother. He kept on reproducing more scenes, all of which dealt with frustrated sexual looking.

"The lamp, therefore, represented a contrast association of darkness which stood in the way of his sexual inquisitiveness. That is why the lamp element was so accentuated in his memory.

"The question now presents itself, 'Why did he remember the fact of his baptism so vividly?' This young man is a good Christian; his parents are Christians, but his paternal grandfather was a Jew. He himself shows no traces of Semitism; the only thing he retains from his grandfather is the name. It is a German name which is often mistaken for a Jewish one, and for this reason, it has given him considerable trouble. He was refused, for instance, admission to a certain school because of his name. At college it was suspected that he was Jewish, and on that account he failed to be elected to a fraternity that admitted only Gentiles. The concealing memory of his baptism is thus a compensation for his suspected Judaism and that is why it retained its vividness, his mother's denial to the contrary. He had to be assured that he was baptized and, therefore, was a Christian. On the whole, the memory represents a religious scene in order to hide an immoral scene of marked affective content."

I would like to show by one more example the sense that may be gained by a childhood reminiscence through analytic work, although it may seem to contain no sense before. In my forty-third year, when I began to interest myself in what remained in my memory of my own childhood, a scene struck me which for a long time, as I afterwards believed, had repeatedly come to consciousness, and which through reliable identification could be traced to a period before the completion of my third year. I saw myself in front of a chest, the door of which was held open by my half-brother, twenty years my senior. I stood there demanding something and screaming; my mother, pretty and slender, then suddenly entered the room, as if returning from the street.
In these words I formulated this scene so vividly seen, which, however, furnished no other clue. Whether my brother wished to open or lock the chest (in the first explanation it was a “cupboard”), why I cried, and what bearing the arrival of my mother had, all these questions were dim to me; I was tempted to explain to myself that it dealt with the memory of a hoax by my older brother, which was interrupted by my mother. Such misunderstandings of childhood scenes retained in memory are not uncommon; we recall a situation, but it is not centralized; we do not know on which of the elements to place the psychic accent. Analytic effort led me to an entirely unexpected solution of the picture. I missed my mother and began to suspect that she was locked in this cupboard or chest, and therefore demanded that my brother should unlock it. As he obliged me and I became convinced that she was not in the chest, I began to cry; this is the moment firmly retained in the memory, which was directly followed by the appearance of my mother, who appeased my worry and anxiety.

But how did the child get the idea of looking for the absent mother in the chest? Dreams which occurred at the same time pointed dimly to a nurse, concerning whom other reminiscences were retained; as, for example, that she conscientiously urged me to deliver to her the small coins which I received as gifts, a detail which in itself may lay claim to the value of a concealing memory for later things. I then concluded to facilitate for myself this time the task of interpretation, and asked my now aged mother about that nurse. I found out all sorts of things, among others the fact that this shrewd but dishonest person had committed extensive robberies during the confinement of my mother, and that my half-brother was instrumental in bringing her to justice.

This information gave me the key to the scene from childhood, as through a sort of inspiration. The sudden disappearance of the nurse was not a matter of indifference to me; I had just asked this brother where she was, probably because I had noticed that he had played a part in her disappearance, and he, evasive and witty as he is to this day, answered that she was “boxed in.” I understood this answer in the childish way, but asked no more, as there was nothing else to be discovered. When my mother left me shortly thereafter, I suspected that the naughty brother had treated her in the same way as he did the nurse, and therefore pressed him to open the chest.

I also understand now why in the translation of the visual childhood scene, my mother’s slenderness was accentuated; she must have struck me as being newly restored. I am two-and-a-half years older than the sister born at that time, and when I was three years of age, I was separated from my half-brother.
V

MISTAKES IN SPEECH

Although the ordinary material of speech of our mother-tongue seems to be guarded against forgetting, its application, however, more often succumbs to another disturbance which is familiar to us as "slips of the tongue." What we observe in normal persons as slips of the tongue gives the same impression as the first step of the so-called "paraphasias" which manifest themselves under pathologic conditions.

I am in the exceptional position of being about to refer to a previous work on the subject. In the year 1895, Meringer and C. Mayer published a study on *Mistakes in Speech and Reading*, with whose viewpoints I do not agree. One of the authors, who is the spokesman in the text, is a philologist actuated by a linguistic interest to examine the rules governing those slips. He hoped to deduce from these rules the existence "of a definite psychic mechanism," "whereby the sounds of a word, of a sentence, and even the words themselves, would be associated and connected with one another in a quite peculiar manner" (p. 10).

The authors grouped the examples of speech-mistakes collected by them first, according to purely descriptive viewpoints, such as interchangings (*e.g.*, the Milo of Venus instead of the Venus of Milo), as anticipations (*e.g.*, the shoes made her sorft . . . the shoes made her feet sore), as echoes and post positions, as contaminations (*e.g.*, "I will soon him home," instead of "I will soon go home and I will see him"), and substitutions (*e.g.*, "he entrusted his money to a savings crank," instead of "a savings bank").¹ Besides these principal categories, there are some others of lesser importance (or of lesser significance for our purpose). In this grouping it makes no difference whether the transposition, disfigurement, fusion, etc., affects single sounds of the word or syllables, or whole words of the concerned sentence.

To explain the various forms of mistakes in speech, Meringer assumes a varied psychic value of phonetics. As soon as the innervation affects the first syllable of a word, or the first word of a sentence, the stimulating

¹ The examples are given by the editor.
process immediately strikes the succeeding sounds, and the following words, and in so far as these innervations are synchronous, they may effect some changes in one another. The stimulus of the psychically more intensive sound "rings" before or continues echoing, and thus disturbs the less important process of innervation. It is necessary therefore to determine which are the most important sounds of a word. Meringer states: "If one wishes to know which sound of a word possesses the greatest intensity, he should examine himself while searching for a forgotten word, for example, a name. That which first returns to consciousness invariably had the greatest intensity prior to the forgetting (p. 160). Thus the most important sounds are the initial sound of the root-syllable and the initial sound of the word itself, as well as one or another of the accented vowels" (p. 162).

Here, I cannot help voicing a contradiction. Whether or not the initial sound of the name belongs to the most important elements of the word, it is surely not true that in the case of the forgetting of the word it first returns to consciousness; the above rule is therefore of no use. When we observe ourselves during the search for a forgotten name, we are comparatively often forced to express the opinion that it begins with a certain letter. This conviction proves to be as often unfounded as founded. Indeed, I would even go so far as to assert that in the majority of cases, one reproduces a false initial sound. Also, in our example Signorcelli, the substitutive name lacked the initial sound, and the principal syllables were lost; on the other hand, the less important pair of syllables elli returned to consciousness in the substitutive name Botticelli.

How little substitutive names respect the initial sound of the lost names may be learned from the following case. One day, I found it impossible to recall the name of the small country whose capital is Monte Carlo. The substitutive names were as follows: Piedmont, Albania, Montevideo, Colico. In place of Albania, Montenegro soon appeared, and then it struck me that the syllable Mont (pronounced Mon) occurred in all but the last of the substitutive names. It thus became easy for me to find from the name of Prince Albert the forgotten name Monaco. Colico practically imitates the syllabic sequence and rhythm of the forgotten name.

If we admit the conjecture that a mechanism similar to that pointed out in the forgetting of names may also play a part in the phenomena of speech-blunders, we are then led to a better-founded judgment of cases of speech-blunders. The speech disturbance which manifests itself as a speech-blunder may, in the first place, be caused by the influence of another component of the same speech; that is, through a fore-sound or an echo, or through another meaning within the sentence or context which differs from that which the speaker wishes to utter. In the second place, however, the disturbance could be brought about analogously to the proc-
MISTAKES IN SPEECH

ess in the case Signorelli, through influences outside this word, sentence or context, from elements which we did not intend to express, and of whose incitement we became conscious only through the disturbance. In both modes of origin of the mistake in speech, the common element lies in the simultaneity of the stimulus, while the differentiating elements lie in the arrangement within or without the same sentence or context.

The difference does not at first appear as wide as when it is taken into consideration in certain conclusions drawn from the symptomatology of speech-mistakes. It is clear, however, that only in the first case, is there a prospect of drawing conclusions from the manifestations of speech-blunders concerning a mechanism which connects together sounds and words for the reciprocal influence of their articulation; that is, conclusions such as the philologist hopes to gain from the study of speech-blunders. In the case of disturbance through influence outside of the same sentence or context, it would before all be a question of becoming acquainted with the disturbing elements, and then the question would arise whether the mechanism of this disturbance cannot also suggest the probable laws of the formation of speech.

We cannot maintain that Meringer and Mayer have overlooked the possibility of speech disturbance through "complicated psychic influences," that is, through elements outside of the same word or sentence or the same sequence of words. Indeed, they must have observed that the theory of the psychic variation of sound applies, strictly speaking, only to the explanation of sound disturbances as well as to fore-sounds and after-sounds. Where the word disturbances cannot be reduced to sound disturbances, as, for example, in the substitutions and contaminations of words, they, too, have without hesitation sought the cause of the mistake in speech outside of the intended context, and proved this state of affairs by means of fitting examples.\(^1\) According to the authors' own understanding, it is some similarity between a certain word in the intended sentence and some other not intended, which allows the latter to assert itself in consciousness by causing a disfigurement, a composition or a compromise formation (contamination).

Now, in my Interpretation of Dreams, I have shown the part played by the process of condensation in the origin of the so-called manifest contents of the dream from the latent thoughts of the dream. Any similarity of objects or of word-presentsations between two elements of the unconscious material is taken as a cause for the formation of a third, which is a composite or compromise formation. This element represents both components in the dream content, and in view of this origin, it is frequently endowed with numerous contradictory individual determinants. The formation of substitutions and contaminations in speech-mistakes is, there

\(^1\) Those who are interested are referred to pp. 62, 73 and 97 of these authors' work.
fore, the beginning of that work of condensation, which we find taking a most active part in the construction of the dream.

In a small essay destined for the general reader, Meringer advanced a theory of very practical significance for certain cases of interchanging of words, especially for such cases where one word is substituted by another of opposite meaning. He says: "We may still recall the manner in which the President of the Austrian House of Deputies opened the session some time ago: 'Honored Sirs! I announce the presence of so and so many gentlemen, and therefore declare the session as "closed"!" The general merriment first attracted his attention and he corrected his mistake. In the present case, the probable explanation is that the President wished himself in a position to close this session, from which he had little good to expect, and the thought broke through at least partially—a frequent manifestation—resulting in his use of "closed" in place of "opened," that is, the opposite of the statement intended. Numerous observations have taught me, however, that we frequently interchange contrasting words; they are already associated in our speech consciousness; they lie very close together and are easily incorrectly evoked.

Still, not in all cases of contrast substitution is it so simple as in the example of the President as to appear plausible that the speech-mistake occurs merely as a contradiction which arises in the inner thought of the speaker opposing the sentence uttered. We have found the analogous mechanism in the analysis of the example aliquid; there the inner contradiction asserts itself in the form of forgetting a word instead of a substitution through its opposite. But in order to adjust the difference, we may remark that the little word aliquid is incapable of a contrast similar to "closing" and "opening," and that the word "opening" cannot be subject to forgetting on account of its being a common component of speech.

Having been shown by the last examples of Meringer and Mayer that speech disturbance may be caused through the influence of fore-sounds, after-sounds, words from the same sentence that were intended for expression, as well as through the effect of words outside the sentence intended, the stimulus of which would otherwise not have been suspected, we shall next wish to discover two classes of mistakes in speech, and how we can distinguish the example of the one from a case of the other class.

But at this stage of the discussion, we must also think of the assertions of Wundt, who deals with the manifestations of speech-mistakes in his recent work on the development of language. Psychic influences, according to Wundt, never lack in these as well as in other phenomena related to them. "The uninhibited stream of sound and word associations stimulated by spoken sounds belongs here, in the first place, as a positive

---

1 *Neue Freie Presse*, August 23, 1900: "Wie man sich versprechen kann."

2 *Völkerpsychologie*, vol. i., pt. i., p. 371, etc., 1900.
determinant. This is supported as a negative factor by the relaxation or suppression of the influences of the will which inhibit this stream, and by the active attention which is here a function of volition. Whether that play of associations manifests itself in the fact that a coming sound is anticipated or a preceding sound reproduced, or whether a familiar practised sound becomes intercalated between others, or finally, whether it manifests itself in the fact that altogether different sounds associatively related to the spoken sounds act upon these—all these questions designate only differences in the direction, and at most in the play of the occurring associations but not in the general nature of the same. In some cases, it may be also doubtful to which form a certain disturbance may be attributed, or whether it would not be more correct to refer such disturbance to a concurrence of many motives, *following the principle of the complication of causes*¹ (cf. pp. 380-81).

I consider these observations of Wundt as absolutely justified and very instructive. Perhaps we could emphasize with even greater firmness than Wundt that the positive factor favoring mistakes in speech (the un inhibited stream of associations, and its negative, the relaxation of the inhibiting attention) regularly attain synchronous action, so that both factors become only different determinants of the same process. With the relaxation or, more unequivocally expressed, *through* this relaxation, of the inhibiting attention, the uninhibited stream of associations becomes active.

Among the examples of the mistakes in speech collected by me, I can scarcely find one in which I would be obliged to attribute the speech disturbance simply and solely to what Wundt calls "contact effect of sound." Almost invariably I discover besides this a disturbing influence of something *outside* of the intended speech. The disturbing element is either a single unconscious thought, which comes to light through the speech-blunder and can only be brought to consciousness through a searching analysis, or it is a more general psychic motive, which directs itself against the entire speech.

*Example (a)* Seeing my daughter make an unpleasant face while biting into an apple, I wished to quote the following couplet:

"The ape he is a funny sight,  
When in the apple he takes a bite."

But I began: "*The ape...*" This seems to be a contamination of "ape" and "apple" (compromise formation), or it may be also conceived as an anticipation of the prepared "apple." The true state of affairs, however, was this: I began the quotation once before, and made no mistake

¹ Italics are mine.
the first time. I made the mistake only during the repetition, which was necessary because my daughter, having been distracted from another side, did not listen to me. This repetition with the added impatience to disburden myself of the sentence I must include in the motivation of the speech-blunder, which represented itself as a function of condensation.

(b) My daughter said, "I wrote to Mrs. Schresinger." The woman's name was Schlesinger. This speech-blunder may depend on the tendency to facilitate articulation. I must state, however, that this mistake was made by my daughter a few moments after I had said "apel" instead of "ape." Mistakes in speech are in a great measure contagious; a similar peculiarity was noticed by Meringer and Mayer in the forgetting of names. I know of no reason for this psychic contagiousness.

(c) "I cut up like a pocket knife," said a patient in the beginning of treatment, instead of "I shut up." This suggests a difficulty of articulation which may serve as an excuse for the interchanging of sounds. When her attention was called to the speech-blunder, she promptly replied, "Yes, that happened because you said 'eannesht' instead of 'earnest'!" As a matter of fact, I received her with the remark, "Today we shall be in earnest" (because it was the last hour before her discharge from treatment), and I jokingly changed the word into "eannesht." In the course of the hour, she repeated mistakes in speech, and I finally observed that it was not only because she imitated me but because she had a special reason in her unconscious to linger at the word earnest (Ernst) as a name.¹

(d) A woman, speaking about a game invented by her children and called by them "the man in the box," said "the manx in the box." I could readily understand her mistake. It was while analyzing her dream, in which her husband is depicted as very generous in money matters—just the reverse of reality—that she made this speech-blunder. The day before she had asked for a new set of furs, which her husband denied her, claiming that he could not afford to spend so much money. She upbraided him for his stinginess, "for putting away so much into the strongbox," and mentioned a friend whose husband has not nearly his income, and yet he presented his wife with a mink coat for her birthday. The mistake is now comprehensible. The word manx (manks) reduces itself to the "minks" which she longs for, and the box refers to her husband's stinginess.²

(e) A similar mechanism is shown in the mistake of another patient

¹ It turned out that she was under the influence of unconscious thoughts concerning pregnancy and prevention of conception. With the words "shut up like a pocket knife," which she uttered consciously as a complaint, she meant to describe the position of the child in the womb. The word "earnest" in my remark recalled to her the name (S. Ernst) of the well-known Vienna business firm in Kärthner Strasse, which used to advertise the sale of articles for the prevention of conception.
² Given by Editor.
MISTAKES IN SPEECH

whose memory deserted her in the midst of a long-forgotten childish reminiscence. Her memory failed to inform her on what part of the body the prying and lustful hand of another had touched her. Soon thereafter she visited one of her friends, with whom she discussed summer homes. Asked where her cottage in M. was located, she answered, "Near the mountain loin" instead of "mountain lane."

(f) Another patient, whom I asked at the end of her visit how her uncle was, answered: "I don't know, I only see him now in flagranti."

The following day she said: "I am really ashamed of myself for having given you such a stupid answer yesterday. Naturally, you must have thought me a very uneducated person who always mistakes the meaning of foreign words. I wished to say en passant." We did not know at the time where she got the incorrectly used foreign words, but during the same session, she reproduced a reminiscence as a continuation of the theme from the previous day, in which being caught in flagranti played the principal part. The mistake of the previous day had therefore anticipated the recollection, which, at that time, had not yet become conscious.

(g) "In discussing her summer plans, a patient said, 'I shall remain most of the summer in Elberlon.' She noted her mistake, and asked me to analyze it. The associations to Elberlon elicited: seashore on the Jersey coast—summer resort—vacation travelling. This recalled travelling in Europe with her cousin, a topic which we had discussed the day before during the analysis of a dream. The dream dealt with her dislike for this cousin, and she admitted that it was mainly due to the fact that the latter was the favorite of the man whom they met together while travelling abroad. During the dream analysis, she could not recall the name of the city in which they met this man, and I did not make any effort at the time to bring it to her consciousness, as we were engrossed in a totally different problem. When asked to focus her attention again on Elberlon and reproduce her associations, she said, 'It brings to mind Elberlawn—lawn—field—and Elberfield.' Elberfield was the lost name of the city in Germany. Here the mistake served to bring to consciousness in a concealed manner a memory which was connected with a painful feeling.

(h) "The following lapsus linguae was reported by the New York Times (October 7th, 1937):

"'Delegates to the convention of the Georgia division of the United Daughters of the Confederacy listened appreciatively, while Mrs. Walter D. Lamar eulogized Jefferson Davis last night.

"'The State Historian General concluded with warm enthusiasm: "Let the world know the wisdom, the kindness, the justice of the great and only President of the Confederate States of America—Abraham Lincoln!"
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF EVERYDAY LIFE

"Only after she had resumed her seat did a subdued gasp from her listeners make her realize her lapse.

"...It was just one of those slips that may happen at moments of enthusiasm," Mrs. Lamar said."

"Yes! The speaker is right, but we must know that the process of enthusiasm is nothing but a heightened emotional state in which conscious attention is almost completely suspended. In such a state, one unwittingly displays his true feelings and as under the influence of alcohol, the truth comes out."  

(i) Before calling on me, a patient telephoned for an appointment and also wished to be informed about my consultation fee. He was told that the first consultation was ten dollars; after the examination was over, he again asked what he was to pay and added: "I don't like to owe money to anyone, especially to doctors; I prefer to pay right away." Instead of pay he said play. His last voluntary remarks and his mistake put me on my guard, but after a few more uncalled-for remarks, he set me at ease by taking money from his pocket. He counted four paper dollars and was very chagrined and surprised because he had no more money with him and promised to send me a cheque for the balance. I was sure that his mistake betrayed him, that he was only playing with me, but there was nothing to be done. At the end of a few weeks, I sent him a bill for the balance, and the letter was returned to me by the post office authorities marked "Not found."

(j) Miss X. spoke very warmly of Mr. Y., which was rather strange, as before this, she had always expressed her indifference, not to say her contempt, for him. On being asked about this sudden change of heart, she said: "I really never had anything against him; he was always nice to me, but I never gave him the chance to cultivate my acquaintance." She said "cuptivate." This neologism was a contamination of cultivate and captivate, and foretold the coming betrothal.

(k) An illustration of the mechanisms of contamination and condensation will be found in the following lapsus linguæ. Speaking of Miss Z., Miss W. depicted her as a very "straitlaced" person who was not given to levity, etc. Miss X. thereupon remarked: "Yes, that is a very characteristic description, she always appealed to me as very straitet-brazed." Here the mistake resolved itself into straitlaced and brazenfaced, which corresponded to Miss W.'s opinion of Miss Z.

(1) I was to give a lecture to a woman. Her husband, upon whose request this was done, stood behind the door listening. At the end of my sermonizing, which had made a visible impression, I said: "Goodbye, Sir!" To the experienced person, I thus betrayed the fact that the words were directed towards the husband, that I had spoken to oblige him.

1 Given by Editor.
(m) Two women stopped in front of a drugstore, and one said to her companion, "If you will wait a few moments, I'll soon be back," but she said movements instead. She was on her way to buy some castoria for her child.

(n) Mr. L., who is fonder of being called on than of calling, spoke to me through the telephone from a nearby summer resort. He wanted to know when I would pay him a visit. I reminded him that it was his turn to visit me, and called his attention to the fact that, as he was the happy possessor of an automobile, it would be easier for him to call on me. (We were at different summer resorts, separated by about one half-hour's railway trip.) He gladly promised to call and asked: "How about Labor Day (September 1st), will it be convenient for you?" When I answered in the affirmative, he said, "Very well, then, put me down for Election Day" (November). His mistake was quite plain. He likes to visit me, but it was inconvenient to travel so far. In November, we would both be in the city. My analysis proved correct.

(o) A friend described to me a nervous patient and wished to know whether I could benefit him. I remarked: "I believe that in time I can remove all his symptoms by psychoanalysis, because it is a durable case," wishing to say "curable"!

(p) I repeatedly addressed my patient as "Mrs. Smith," her married daughter's name, when her real name is "Mrs. James." My attention having been called to it, I soon discovered that I had another patient of the same name who refused to pay for the treatment. Mrs. Smith was also my patient and paid her bills promptly.

(q) A lapsus linguae sometimes stands for a particular characteristic. A young woman, who is the dominating spirit in her home, said of her ailing husband, that he had consulted the doctor about a wholesome diet for himself, and then added: "The doctor said that diet has nothing to do with his ailments, and that he can eat and drink what I want."

(r) I cannot omit this excellent and instructive example, although, according to my authority, it is about twenty years old. A lady once expressed herself in society—the very words show that they were uttered with fervor and under the pressure of a great many secret emotions: "Yes, a woman must be pretty if she is to please the men. A man is much better off. As long as he has five straight limbs, he needs no more!"

This example affords us a good insight into the intimate mechanisms of a mistake in speech by means of condensation and contamination. It is quite obvious that we have here a fusion of two similar modes of expression:

"As long as he has his four straight limbs."

"As long as he has all his five senses."
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF EVERYDAY LIFE

Or the term "straight" may be the common element of the two intended expressions:

"As long as he has his straight limbs."

"All five should be straight."

It may also be assumed that both modes of expression—viz., those of the five senses and those of the straight five—have coöperated to introduce into the sentence about the straight limbs first a number and then the mysterious five instead of the simple four. But this fusion surely would not have succeeded if it had not expressed good sense in the form resulting from the mistake; if it had not expressed a cynical truth which, naturally, could not be uttered unconcealed, coming as it did from a woman.

Finally, we shall not hesitate to call attention to the fact that the woman's saying, following its wording, would just as well be an excellent witticism as a jocose speech-blunder. It is simply a question whether she uttered these words with conscious or unconscious intention. The behavior of the speaker in this case certainly speaks against the conscious intention, and thus excludes wit.

(s) Owing to similarity of material, I add here another case of speech-blunder, the interpretation of which requires less skill. A professor of anatomy strove to explain the nostril, which, as is known, is a very difficult anatomical structure. To his question whether his audience grasped his ideas, he received an affirmative reply. The professor, known for his self-esteem, thereupon remarked: "I can hardly believe this, for the number of people who understand the nostril, even in a city of millions like Vienna, can be counted on a finger—pardon me, I meant to say on the fingers of a hand."

In the psychotherapeutic procedure which I employ in the solution and removal of neurotic symptoms, I am often confronted with the task of discovering from the accidental utterances and fancies of the patient the thought contents, which, though striving for concealment, nevertheless unintentionally betray themselves. In doing this, the mistakes often perform the most valuable service, as I can show through most convincing and still most singular examples.

For example, patients speak of an aunt and later, without noting the mistake, call her "my mother," or designate a husband as a "brother." In this way, they attract my attention to the fact that they have "identified" these persons with each other, that they have placed them in the same category, which for their emotional life signifies the recurrence of the same type. Or, a young man of twenty years presents himself during my office hours with these words: "I am the father of N. N., whom you have treated—pardon me, I mean the brother; why, he is four years older than I." I understand through this mistake that he wishes to ex-
press that, like the brother, he, too, is ill through the fault of the father; like his brother he wishes to be cured, but that the father is the one most in need of treatment. At other times, an unusual arrangement of words, or a forced expression, is sufficient to disclose in the speech of a patient the participation of a repressed thought having a different motive.

Hence, in coarse as well as in finer speech disturbances, which may, nevertheless, be subsumed as "speech-blunders," I find that it is not the contact effects of the sound, but the thoughts outside the intended speech, which determine the origin of the speech-blunder, and also suffice to explain the newly formed mistakes in speech. I do not doubt the laws whereby the sounds produce changes upon one another; but they alone do not appear to me sufficiently forcible to mar the correct execution of speech. In those cases which I have studied and investigated more closely, they merely represent the preformed mechanism, which is conveniently utilized by a more remote psychic motive. The latter does not, however, form a part of the sphere of influence of these sound relations. In a large number of substitutions caused by mistakes in talking, there is an entire absence of such phonetic laws. In this respect, I am in full accord with Wundt, who likewise assumes that the conditions underlying speech-blunders are complex and go far beyond the contact effect of the sounds.

If I accept as certain "these more remote psychic influences," following Wundt's expression, there is still nothing to detain me from conceding also that in accelerated speech, with a certain amount of diverted attention, the causes of speech-blunder may be easily limited to the definite law of Meringer and Mayer. However, in a number of examples gathered by these authors, a more complicated solution is quite apparent.

In some forms of speech-blunders we may assume that the disturbing factor is the result of striking against obscene words and meanings. The purposive disfigurement and distortion of words and phrases, which is so popular with vulgar persons, aims at nothing else but the employing of a harmless motive as a reminder of the obscene, and this sport is so frequent that it would not be at all remarkable if it appeared unintentionally and contrary to the will.

I trust that the readers will not depreciate the value of these interpretations, for which there is no proof, and of these examples which I have myself collected and explained by means of analysis. But, if secretly I still cherish the expectation that even the apparently simple cases of speech-blunder will be traced to a disturbance caused by a half-repressed idea outside of the intended context, I am tempted to it by a noteworthy observation of Meringer. This author asserts that it is remarkable that nobody wishes to admit having made a mistake in speaking. There are many intelligent and honest people who are offended if we tell them that they made a mistake in speaking. I would not risk making this assertion as general as
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF EVERYDAY LIFE

does Meringer, using the term "nobody." But the emotional trace which clings to the demonstration of the mistake, which manifestly belongs to the nature of shame, has its significance. It may be classed with the anger displayed at the inability to recall a forgotten name, and with the surprise at the tenaciousness of an apparently indifferent memory, and it invariably points to the participation of a motive in the formation of the disturbance.

The distorting of names amounts to an insult when done intentionally, and could have the same significance in a whole series of cases where it appears as unintentional speech-blunders. The person who, according to Mayer's report, once said "Freuder" instead of "Freud," because shortly before he pronounced the name "Breuer," and what at another time, spoke of the "Freuer-Breudian" method, was certainly not particularly enthusiastic over this method. Later, under the mistakes in writing, I shall report a case of name disfigurement which certainly admits of no other explanation.¹

As a disturbing element in these cases, there is an Intermingling of a criticism which must be omitted, because at the time being, it does not correspond to the intention of the speaker.

¹ It may be observed that aristocrats in particular very frequently distort the names of the physicians they consult, from which we may conclude that inwardly they slight them, in spite of the politeness with which they are wont to greet them. I shall cite here some excellent observations concerning the forgetting of names from the works of Dr. Ernest Jones: *Papers on Psychoanalysis*, Chap. iii., p. 49:

"Few people can avoid feeling a twinge of resentment when they find that their name has been forgotten, particularly if it is by someone with whom they had hoped or expected it would be remembered. They instinctively realize that if they had made a greater impression on the person's mind, he would certainly have remembered them again, for the name is an integral part of the personality. Similar, few things are more flattering to most people than to find themselves addressed by name by a great personage where they could hardly have anticipated it. Napoleon, like most leaders of men, was a master of this art. In the midst of the disastrous campaign of France in 1814, he gave an amazing proof of his memory in this direction. When in a town near Craonne, he recollected that he had met the mayor, De Bussy, over twenty years ago in the La Fère Regiment. The delighted De Bussy at once threw himself into his service with extraordinary zeal. Conversely, there is no surer way of affronting someone than by pretending to forget his name; the insinuation is thus conveyed that the person is so unimportant in our eyes that we cannot be bothered to remember his name. This device is often exploited in literature. In Turgenev's *Smoke* (p. 255) the following passage occurs: "So you still find Baden entertaining, M'sieur—Litvinov." Ratmiryov always uttered Litvinov's surname with hesitation, every time, as though he had forgotten it, and could not at once recall it. In this way, as well as by the lofty flourish of his hat in saluting him, he meant to insult his pride. The same author, in his *Fathers and Children* (p. 107), writes: 'The Governor invited Kirsanov and Bazarov to his ball, and within a few minutes invited them a second time, regarding them as brothers, and calling them Kirsov.' Here the forgetting that he had spoken to them, the mistake in the names and the inability to distinguish between the two young men, constitute a culmination of disparagement. Falsification of a name has the same signification as forgetting it; it is only a step towards complete amnesia."
A similar identification was reported to me concerning a young physician who timidly and reverently introduced himself to the celebrated Virchow with the following words: "I am Dr. Virchow." The surprised professor turned to him and asked, "Is your name also Virchow?" I do not know how the ambitious young man justified his speech-blunder, whether he thought of the charming excuse that he imagined himself so insignificant next to this big man that his own name slipped from him, or whether he had the courage to admit that he hoped that he, too, would some day be as great a man as Virchow, and that the professor should therefore not treat him in too disparaging a manner. One or both of these thoughts may have put this young man in an embarrassing position during the introduction.

Owing to very personal motives, I must leave it undecided whether a similar interpretation may also apply in the case to be cited. At the International Congress in Amsterdam, in 1907, my theories of hysteria were the subject of a lively discussion. One of my most violent opponents, in his diatribe against me, repeatedly made mistakes in speech in such a manner that he put himself in my place and spoke in my name. He said, for example, "Breuer and I, as is well known, have demonstrated," etc., when he wished to say "Breuer and Freud." The name of this opponent does not show the slightest sound similarity to my own. From this example, as well as from other cases of interchanging names in speech-blunders, we are reminded of the fact that the speech-blunder can fully forego the facility afforded to it through similar sounds, and can achieve its purpose if only supported in content by concealed relations.

In other and more significant cases, it is a self-criticism, an internal contradiction against one's own utterance, which causes the speech-blunder, and even forces a contrasting substitution for the one intended. We then observe with surprise how the wording of an assertion removes the purpose of the same, and how the error in speech lays bare the inner dishonesty. Here the lapsus linguae becomes a mimicking form of expression, often, indeed, for the expression of what one does not wish to say. It is thus a means of self-betrayal.

Brill relates: "I had recently been consulted by a woman who showed many paranoid trends, and as she had no relatives who could cooperate with me, I urged her to enter a State hospital as a voluntary patient. She was quite willing to do so, but on the following day, she told me that her friends, with whom she had leased an apartment, objected to her going to a hospital, as it would interfere with their plans, and so on. I lost patience and said: 'There is no use listening to your friends, who know nothing about your mental condition; you are quite incompetent to take care of your own affairs.' I meant to say 'competent.' Here, the lapsus linguae expressed my true opinion."
Favored by chance, the speech material often gives origin to examples of speech-blunders which serve to bring about an overwhelming revelation or a full comic effect, as shown by the following examples reported by Brill:

"A wealthy but not very generous host invited his friends for an evening dance. Everything went well until about 11:30 p.m., when there was an intermission, presumably for supper. To the great disappointment of most of the guests, there was no supper; instead, they were regaled with thin sandwiches and lemonade. As it was close to Election Day, the conversation centered on the different candidates; and as the discussion grew warmer, one of the guests, an ardent admirer of the Progressive Party candidate, remarked to the host: 'You may say what you please about Teddy, but there is one thing—he can always be relied upon, he always gives you a square meal,' wishing to say square deal. The assembled guests burst into a roar of laughter, to the great embarrassment of the speaker and the host, who fully understood each other."

"While writing a prescription for a woman who was especially weighed down by the financial burden of the treatment, I was interested to hear her say suddenly: 'Please do not give me big bills, because I cannot swallow them.' Of course, she meant to say pills."

The following example illustrates a rather serious case of self-betrayal through a mistake in talking. Some accessory details justify full reproduction as first printed by Dr. A. A. Brill.¹

"While walking one night with Dr. Frink, we accidentally met a colleague, Dr. P., whom I had not seen for years, and of whose private life I knew nothing. We were naturally very pleased to meet again, and on my invitation, he accompanied us to a café, where we spent about two hours in pleasant conversation. To my question as to whether he was married, he gave a negative answer, and added, 'Why should a man like me marry?'

"On leaving the café, he suddenly turned to me and said: 'I should like to know what you would do in a case like this: I know a nurse who was named as co-respondent in a divorce case. The wife sued the husband for divorce and named her as co-respondent, and he got the divorce.' I interrupted him, saying, 'You mean she got the divorce.' He immediately corrected himself, saying, 'Yes, she got the divorce,' and continued to tell how the excitement of the trial had affected this nurse to such an extent that she became nervous and took to drink. He wanted me to advise him how to treat her.

"As soon as I had corrected his mistake, I asked him to explain it, but,