no way of defining the co-operating conditions. Nor can a cause be
defined as that which being there the effect follows, and which
not being there there is no effect (sati bhāvo 'saty abhāva eva); for
such a maxim is invalidated by the plurality of causes (fire may
be produced by rubbing two pieces of wood, by striking hard
against a flint, or by a lens). It may be urged that there are
differences in each kind of fire produced by the different agencies:
to which it may be replied that, even if there were any such
difference, it is impossible to know it by observation. Even when
differences are noticeable, such differences do not necessarily imply
that the different effects belong to different classes; for the differ-
ences might well be due to various attendant circumstances. Again,
a cause cannot be defined as a collocation of things, since such a
collocation may well be one of irrelevant things. A cause cannot
be defined as a collocation of different causes, since it has not so
far been possible to define what is meant by "cause." The phrase
"collocation of causes" will therefore be meaningless. Moreover, it
may be asked whether a collocation of causes (sāmagri) be something
different from the causes, or identical with them. If the former
alternative be accepted, then effects would follow from individual
causes as well, and the supposition of a collocation of causes as
producing the effects would be uncalled-for. If the latter alternative
be accepted, then, since the individuals are the causes of the col-
location, the individuals being there, there is always the colloc-
tion and so always the effect, which is absurd. Again, what does
this collocation of causes mean? It cannot mean occurrence in the
same time or place; for, there being no sameness of time and place
for time and place respectively, they themselves would be without
any cause. Again, it cannot be said that, if the existence of cause be
not admitted, then things, being causeless, would be non-existent;
for the Nyāya holds that there are eternal substances such as atoms,
souls, etc., which have no cause.

Since cause cannot be defined, neither can effect (kārya) be
satisfactorily defined, as the conception of effect always depends
upon the notion of cause.

In refuting the conception of substance (dravya) Citsukha says
that a substance can be defined only as being that in which the
qualities inhere. But, since even qualities are seen to have qualities
and a substance is believed by the Naiyāyikas to be without any
quality at the moment of its origination, such a definition cannot
properly distinguish or define a substance. If a substance be
defined in a roundabout way as that in which there is no presence
of the absolute negation of possessing qualities (gunaavatvāty-
antābhāvānadhikaranatā), then also it may be objected that such
a definition would make us regard even negation (abhāva) as a
quality, since the absence of the negation of qualities, being itself
a negation, cannot exist in a negation\(^1\). It may again be asked
whether the absence of the negation of qualities refers to the
negation of a number of qualities or the negation of all qualities;
in either case it is wrong. For in the first case a substance, which
contains only some qualities and does not possess others, would
not be called a substance, and in the latter case it would be
difficult to find anything that cannot be called a substance; for
where is the substance which lacks all qualities? The fact also
remains that even such a roundabout definition cannot distin-
guish a substance from a quality; for even qualities have the
numerical qualities and the qualities of separateness\(^2\). If it is
argued that, if qualities are admitted to have further qualities,
there will be a vicious infinite, it may be said in reply that the
charge of vicious infinite cannot be made, since the qualities
of number and separateness cannot be said to have any
further qualities. Substances, again, have nothing in common
by virtue of which they could be regarded as coming under the
class-concept of substances\(^3\). Gold and mud and trees are all
regarded as substances, but there is nothing common in them
by virtue of which one can think that gold is the same as
mud or tree; therefore it cannot be admitted that in the sub-
stances one finds any characteristic which remains the same in
them all\(^4\).

Referring to qualities (guna), Citsukha deals with the definition
of guna in the Vaiśeṣika-bhāṣya of Praśastapāda. There Praśastapāda
defines guna as that which inheres in a substance, is associated
with the class-concept of substance, is itself without any quality

\(^1\) tatraivyāpyāyā; sopi hi gunavatvātyantābhāvas tasyādhi-

\(^2\) asmimnapi sakra-laksane gundāsi api samkhyā-prthivitva-gunayoh pratīte
kathām nātiivyāpī. Ibid. p. 177.

\(^3\) jātiṁ abhyupagacchātā tajjāti-vyamākām kimci-d-avafyam abhyupeyam na ca
tantarupanān rupakām. Ibid. p. 178.

\(^4\) dravyam dravyam iti anugata-pratyayah pramānaṁ iti cenna svanān-
upalabhya mrśtikām-upalabhyamānānāya lāukikāya tad evedam dravyam iti
pratyayah-bhāvāt parthākānām cânugata-pratyayo vipratipate. Ibid. p. 179.
and which has no motion (niṣkriya)\(^1\). But the definition of a quality cannot involve the phrase “without a quality”; for quality is still to be defined. Again, unless the guṇa is properly defined, its difference from motion is not known, and so the phrase “which has no motion” is meaningless. The class-concept of quality, again, can be determined only when the general character of qualities is known and the nature of class-concepts also is determined. Hence, from whatever point of view one may look at the question, it is impossible to define qualities.

It is needless now to multiply examples of such refutation by Citsukha. It will appear from what has been adduced that Citsukha enters into detail concerning most concepts of particular categories and tries to show their intrinsic impossibility. In some cases, however, he was not equal to the task and remained content with criticizing the definitions given by the Naiyāyikas. But it may be well to point out here that, though Śrīharṣa and Citsukha carried out an elaborate scheme of a critique of the different categories in order to show that the definitions of these categories, as given by the Nyāya, are impossible, yet neither of them can be regarded as the originator of the application of the dialectic method in the Vedānta. Śaṅkara himself had started it in his refutation of the Nyāya and other systems in his commentary on the Vedānta-sūtras, II. 11.

The Dialectic of Nāgārjuna and the Vedānta Dialectic.

The dialectic of Śrīharṣa was a protest against the realistic definitions of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, which supposed that all that was knowable was also definable. It aimed at refuting these definitions in order to prove that the natures of all things are indefinable, as their existence and nature are all involved in māyā. The only reality is Brahman. That it is easy to pick holes in all definitions was taught long ago by Nāgārjuna, and in that sense (except for a tendency to find faults of a purely verbal nature in Nyāya definitions) Śrīharṣa’s method was a continuation of Nāgārjuna’s, and an application of it to the actual definitions of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. But the most important part of Nāgārjuna’s method was deliberately ignored by Śrīharṣa and his followers, who made no attempt to refute Nāgārjuna’s conclusions. Nāgārjuna’s main thesis is that all things are relative and hence indefinable in

\(^1\) rūpādānāṁ guṇādānāṁ sarvesāṁ guṇatvābhāsāmbandhāḥ dravyāśrutātvāṁ nīśkriyātvāṁ. Praśastapāda-bhāṣya, p. 94. The Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, Benares, 1895.
themselves, and so there is no way of discovering their essences; and, since their essences are not only indefinable and indescribable, but incomprehensible as well, they cannot be said to possess any essences of their own. Nāgārjuna was followed by Āryadeva, a Ceylonese by birth, who wrote a separate work on the same subject in 400 verses. For about two centuries after this the doctrines of Nāgārjuna lay dormant, as is evidenced by the fact that Buddhaghoṣa of the fourth century A.D. does not refer to them. During the Guptā empire, in the fifth century A.D., Asaṅga and Vasubandhu flourished. In the sixth century A.D. the relativist philosophy of Nāgārjuna again flourished in the hands of Buddhapālita, of Valabhi in Surat, and of Bhāvyā, or Bhāvaviveka, of Orissa. The school of Bhāvyā was called Mādhyamika-Sautrāntika on account of his supplementing Nāgārjuna’s arguments with special arguments of his own. At this time the Yogācāra school of Mahāyāna monism developed in the north, and the aim of this school was to show that for the true knowledge of the one consciousness (vijñāna) all logical arguments were futile. All logical arguments showed only their own inconsistency. It seems very probable that Śrīharṣa was inspired by these Yogācāra authors, and their relativist allies from Nāgārjuna to Bhāvyā, and Candrakīrti, the master commentator on Nāgārjuna’s Mādhyamika-kārikā. Buddhapālita sought to prove that the apprehension and realization of the idealistic monism cannot be made by any logical argument, since all logic is futile and inconsistent, while Bhāvaviveka sought to establish his idealistic monism by logical arguments. Candrakīrti finally supported Buddhapālita’s scheme as against the scheme of Bhāvaviveka and tried to prove the futility of all logical arguments. It was this Mādhyamika scheme of Candrakīrti that finally was utilized in Tibet and Mongolia for the realization of idealistic monism.

In taking up his refutation of the various categories of being Nāgārjuna begins with the examination of causation. Causation in the non-Buddhistic systems of philosophy is regarded as being production from the inner changes of some permanent or abiding stuff or through the conglomeration (sāmagri) of several factors or through some factors operating upon an unchangeable and abiding stuff. But Nāgārjuna denies not only that anything is ever produced, but also that it is ever produced in any one of the above ways. Buddhapālita holds that things cannot arise

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1 The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa, pp. 66–67. Published by the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. Leningrad, 1927.
of themselves, since, if they are already existing, there is no meaning in their being produced; if things that are existing are regarded as capable of being produced again, then things would eternally continue to be produced. Bhāvaviveka, criticizing Buddhāpālita, says that the refutation of Buddhāpālita should have been supplemented with reasons and examples and that his refutation would imply the undesirable thesis that, if things are not produced of themselves, they must be produced by other factors. But Candrakīrti objects to this criticism of Bhāvaviveka and says that the burden of proof in establishing the identity of cause and effect lies with the opponents, the Sāṃkhyaists, who hold that view. There is no meaning in the production of what already exists, and, if that which is existent has to be produced again, and that again, there will be an infinite regress. It is unnecessary to give any new argument to refute the Sāṃkhya sat-kārya-vāda view; it is enough to point out the inconsistency of the Sāṃkhya view. Thus Āryadeva says that the Mādhyamika view has no thesis of its own which it seeks to establish, since it does not believe in the reality or unreality of anything or in the combination of reality and unreality. This was exactly the point of view that was taken by Śrīharṣa. Śrīharṣa says that the Vedāntists have no view of their own regarding the things of the world and the various categories involved in them. Therefore there was no way in which the Vedānta view could be attacked. The Vedānta, however, is free to find fault with other views, and, when once this is done and the inconsistencies of other positions are pointed out, its business is finished; for it has no view of its own to establish. Nāgarjuna writes in his Vīgraha-vyāvartani thus:

When I have these (of my own to prove),
I can commit mistakes just for the sake (of proving);
But I have none. I cannot be accused (of being inconsistent).
If I did (really) cognize some (separate) things,
I could then make an affirmation or a denial
Upon the basis of these things perceived or (inferred).
But these (separate) things do not exist for me.
Therefore I cannot be assailed on such a basis.

1  sad asat sad-asac ceti yasya pakṣo na vidyate
   upālambhaici rēṇūpi tasya vaktum na śākyate.
   Mādhyamika-vṛtti, p. 16.
2  anyat pratītya yadi nāma paro 'bhavisyat
   sāyeta tarhi bahulaḥ śikhino 'ndhakāraḥ
   sarvavya jāma ca bhavet khalu sarvataī ca
   tulyam paratvam akhile 'janake 'ptē yasmāt.
   Ibid. p. 36.
Candrakīrti thus emphasizes the fact that it is not possible for the Mādhyamikas to offer new arguments or new examples in criticizing any view, since they have no view of their own to support. They cannot even prove their own affirmations, and, if their affirmations contain any thesis, they quarrel with it also themselves. So the Mādhyamika scheme of criticism consists only in finding fault with all theses, whatever they may be, and in replying to the counter-charges so far as inconsistencies can be found in the opponents’ theses and methods, but not in adducing any new arguments or any new counter-theses, since the Mādhyamikas have no theses of their own. In an argument one can only follow the principles that one admits; no one can be defeated by arguments carried on on the basis of principles admitted only by his opponents.

Things are not produced by any conglomeration of foreign factors or causes; for, were it so, there would be no law of such production and anything might come from any other thing, e.g. darkness from light\(^1\). And, if a thing cannot be produced out of itself or out of others, it cannot be produced by a combination of them both. Again, the world could not have sprung into being without any cause (ahetutah).

The Buddhist logicians try to controvert this view by pointing out that, whatever a view may be, it must be established by proper proof. So, in order to prove the thesis that all existents are unproduced, the Mādhyamikas must give some proofs, and this would involve a further specification of the nature of such proofs and a specification of the number of valid proofs admitted by them. But, if the thesis that “all existents are unproved” is a mere assertion without any proof to support it, then any number of counter-assertions may be made for which no proof need be shown; and, if proofs are not required in one case, they cannot be required in the other. So one could with equal validity assert that all existents are real and are produced from causes. The Mādhyamika answer to such an objection, as formulated by Candrakīrti, is that the Mādhyamika has no thesis of his own and so the question whether his thesis is supported by valid proof or not is as meaningless as the question regarding the smallness or the greatness of a mule’s horn. Since there is no thesis, the Mādhyamika has nothing to

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\(^1\) Mādhyamika-vṛtti, p. 36. See also Stcherbatsky’s *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa*, to which the author is indebted for the translation and some of the materials of the last two paragraphs.
say regarding the nature of valid proofs (pramāṇa) or their number. But it may well be asked why, if the Mādhyamika has no thesis of his own, should he hold the proposition that all existents are unproduced (sarve bhāvā anutpannāḥ)? To this the Mādhyamika replies that such propositions appear as definite views only to ordinary people, not to the wise. The proper attitude for the wise is always to remain silent. They impart instruction only from a popular point of view to those who want to listen to them. Their arguments are not their own or those which they believe to be right, but only such as would appeal to their hearers.

It is not out of place here to mention that the Mādhyamika school wishes to keep the phenomenal and the real or the transcendental views wide apart. In the phenomenal view things are admitted to be as they are perceived, and their relations are also conceived as real. It is interesting to refer to the discussion of Candrakīrti with Diṅnāga regarding the nature of sense-perceptions. While Diṅnāga urges that a thing is what it is in itself (sva-lakṣaṇa), Candrakīrti holds that, since relations are also perceived to be true, things are relational as well. Phenomenally substances exist as well as their qualities. The "thing in itself" of Diṅnāga was as much a relative concept as the relational things that are popularly perceived as true; that being so, it is meaningless to define perception as being only the thing in itself. Candrakīrti thus does not think that any good can be done by criticizing the realistic logic of the Naiyāyikas, since, so far as popular perceptions or conceptions go, the Nyāya logic is quite competent to deal with them and give an account of them. There is a phenomenal reality and order which is true for the man in the street and on which all our linguistic and other usages are based. Diṅnāga, in defining perception, restricts it to the unique thing in itself (sva-lakṣaṇa) and thinks that all associations of quality and relations are extraneous to perceptions and should be included under imagination or inference. This however does violence to our ordinary experience and yet serves no better purpose; for the definition of perception as given by Diṅnāga is not from the transcendental point of view. If that is so, why not accept the realistic conceptions of the Nyāya school, which fit in with the popular experience? This reminds us of the attitude of the Vedāntists, who on the one hand accepted the viewpoint of popular experience and regarded all things as having a real objective existence, and on the other
hand considered them as false and unreal from the transcendental point of view of ultimate reality. The attitude of the Vedāntists on this point seems to have been directly inspired by that of the Mādhyamikas. The attempts of Śriharṣa to refute the realistic definitions of the Nyāya were intended to show that the definitions of the Nyāya could not be regarded as absolute and true, as the Naiyāyikas used to think. But, while the Mādhyamikas, who had no view-points of their own to support, could leave the field of experience absolutely undisturbed and allow the realistic definitions of the Nyāya to explain the popular experience in any way they liked, the Vedānta had a thesis of its own, namely, that the self-luminous Brahman was the only reality and that it was through it that everything else was manifested. The Vedānta therefore could not agree with Nyāya interpretations of experience and their definitions. But, as the Vedānta was unable to give the manifold world-appearance a footing in reality, it regarded it as somehow existing by itself and invented a theory of perception by which it could be considered as being manifested by coming in touch with Brahman and being illusorily imposed on it.

Continuing the discussion on the nature of causation, Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti hold that collocations of causal conditions which are different from the effect cannot produce the effect, as is held by the Hinayāna Buddhists; for, since the effect is not perceived in those causal conditions, it cannot be produced out of them, and, if it is already existent in them, its production becomes useless. Production of anything out of some foreign or extraneous causes implies that it is related to them, and this relation must mean that it was in some way existent in them. The main principle which Nāgārjuna employs in refuting the idea of causation or production in various ways is that, if a thing exists, it cannot be produced, and, if it does not exist, it cannot be produced at all. That which has no essence in itself cannot be caused by anything else, and, having no essence in itself, it cannot be the cause of anything else.

Nāgārjuna similarly examines the concepts of going and coming and says that the action of going is not to be found in the space traversed, nor is it to be found in that which is not traversed; and apart from the space traversed and not traversed there cannot be any action of going. If it is urged that going is neither in the space

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1 Mādhyamika-vṛtti, p. 90, l. 6.
traversed nor in the space untraversed, but in the person who continues to go, since going is in him in whom there is the effort of going, then this again cannot be right. For, if the action of going is to be associated with the person who goes, it cannot be associated with the space traversed. One action cannot be connected with both; and, unless some space is gone over, there cannot be a goer. If going is in the goer alone, then even without going one could be called a goer, which is impossible. If both the goer and the space traversed have to be associated with going, then there must be two actions and not one; and, if there are two actions, that implies that there are also two agents. It may be urged that the movement of going is associated with the goer and that therefore going belongs to the goer; but, if there is no going without the goer and if there is no goer without going, how can going be associated with the goer at all? Again, in the proposition “the goer goes” (gantā gacchati) there is only one action of going, and that is satisfied by the verb “goes”; what separate “going” is there by virtue of association with which a “goer” can be so called? and, since there are no two actions of going, there cannot be a goer. Again, the movement of going cannot even be begun; for, when there is the motion of going, there is no beginning and when there is no motion of going, there cannot be any beginning. Again, it cannot be urged that “going” must exist, since its opposite, “remaining at rest” (sthiti), exists; for who is at rest? The goer cannot be at rest, since no one can be a goer unless he goes; he who is not a goer, being already at rest, cannot be the agent of another action of being at rest. If the goer and going be regarded as identical, then there would be neither verb nor agent. So there is no reality in going. “Going” stands here for any kind of passage or becoming, and the refutation of “going” implies the refutation of all kinds of passage (niśkarṣaṇa) as well. If seeds passed into the state of shoots (āṅkura), then they would be seeds and not shoots; the shoots neither are seeds nor are different from them; yet, the seeds being there, there are the shoots. A pea is from another pea, yet no pea becomes another pea. A pea is neither in another pea nor different from it. It is as one may see in a mirror the beautiful face of a woman and feel attracted by it and run after her, though the face never passed into the mirror and there was no human face in the reflected image. Just as the essenceless reflected image of a woman’s face may rouse attachment in fools,
so are world-appearances the causes of our delusion and attachment.

It is needless to multiply examples and describe elaborately Nāgārjuna's method of applying his dialectic to the refutation of the various Buddhist and other categories. But from what has been said it may be possible to compare or contrast Nāgārjuna's dialectic with that of Śrīharṣa. Neither Nāgārjuna nor Śrīharṣa is interested to give any rational explanation of the world-process, nor are they interested to give a scientific reconstruction of our world-experience. They are agreed in discarding the validity of world-experience as such. But, while Nāgārjuna had no thesis of his own to uphold, Śrīharṣa sought to establish the validity and ultimate reality of Brahman. But, it does not appear that he ever properly tried to apply his own dialectic to his thesis and attempted to show that the definition of Brahman could stand the test of the criticism of his own dialectic. Both Nāgārjuna and Śrīharṣa were, however, agreed in the view that there was no theory of the reconstruction of world-appearance which could be supported as valid. But, while Śrīharṣa attacked only the definitions of the Nyāya, Nāgārjuna mainly attacked the accepted Buddhist categories and also some other relevant categories which were directly connected with them. But the entire efforts of Śrīharṣa were directed to showing that the definitions of the Nyāya were faulty and that there was no way in which the Nyāya could define its categories properly. From the fact that the Nyāya could not define its categories he rushed to the conclusion that they were intrinsically indefinable and that therefore the world-appearance which was measured and scanned in terms of those categories was also false. Nāgārjuna's methods differ considerably from those of Śrīharṣa in this, that the concepts which he criticized were shown by him to have been intrinsically based and constructed on notions which had no essential nature of their own, but were understood only in relation to others. No concept revealed any intrinsic nature of its own, and one could understand a concept only through another, and that again through the former or through another, and so on. The entire world-appearance would thus be based on relative conceptions and be false. Nāgārjuna's criticisms are, however, largely of an a priori nature, and do not treat the concepts in a concrete manner and are not based on the testimony of our psychological experience. The oppositions shown are therefore
very often of an abstract nature and occasionally degenerate into verbalism. But as a rule they are based on the fundamentally relative nature of our experience. They are never half so elaborate as the criticisms of Śriharṣa; but at the same time they are fundamentally more convincing and more direct than the elaborate roundabout logical subtleties of Śriharṣa’s dialectic. It cannot be denied that, based on the dialectical methods of Nāgārjuna, Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti, Śriharṣa’s criticisms, following an altogether different plan of approach, show wonderful powers of logical subtlety and finesse, though the total effect can hardly be regarded as an advance from the strictly philosophical point of view, while the frequent verbalism of many of his criticisms is a discredit to his whole venture.

Dialectical criticisms of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla (A.D. 760) as forerunners of Vedānta Dialectics.

(a) Criticisms of the Sāmkhyā Pariṇāma Doctrine.

In tracing the history of the dialectical ways of thinking in the Vedānta it has been pointed out in the previous sections that the influence of Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti on Śaṅkara and some of his followers, such as Śriharṣa, Citsukha and others, was very great. It has also been pointed out that not only Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti, but many other Buddhist writers, had taken to critical and dialectical ways of discussion. The criticism of the different schools of Indian thought, as contained in Śāntarakṣita’s Tattva-samgraha with Kamalaśīla’s commentary Pañjikā, is a remarkable instance of this. Śāntarakṣita lived in the first half of the eighth century A.D., and Kamalaśīla was probably his junior contemporary. They refuted the views of Kambalāśvatara, a follower of the Lokāyata school, the Buddhist Vāsumatra (A.D. 100), Dharmatāta (A.D. 100), Ghoṣaka (A.D. 150), Buddhadeva (A.D. 200), the Naiyāyika Vātsyāyana (A.D. 300), the Mīmāṃsik Śabarasvāmin (A.D. 300), the Śāmkhyist Vindhvāvāmin (A.D. 300), the Buddhist Saṅghabhadra (A.D. 350), Vasubandhu (A.D. 350), the Śāmkhyist Iśvarakṛṣṇa (A.D. 390), the Buddhist Diṅnāga (A.D. 400), the Jaina Ācāryasūri (A.D. 478), the Śāmkhyist Māṭhara Ācārya (A.D. 500), the Naiyāyika Uddotakara (A.D. 600), the rhetorician Bhāmaha (A.D. 640), the Buddhist Dharmakīrti (A.D. 650), the grammarian-philosopher Bhartṛhari (A.D. 650), the Mīmāṃsik Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (A.D. 680),
the Jaina Śubhagupta (A.D. 700), the Buddhist Yugasena (A.D. 700),
the Naiyāyika Āviddhakarṇa (A.D. 700), Śaṅkarasvāmin (A.D. 700),
Prašastamati (A.D. 700), Bhāviviktā (A.D. 700), the Jaina Pātrasvāmin
(A.D. 700), Āhrika (A.D. 700), Sumati (A.D. 700), and the Mīmāṃśist
Uveyaka (A.D. 700). It is not possible here, of course, to enter into
a complete analysis of all the criticisms of the different philosophers
by Śantaraksita and Kamalaśīla; yet some of the important points
of these criticisms may be noted in order to show the nature
and importance of this work, which also reveals the nature of
the critical thinking that prevailed among the Buddhists before
Śaṅkara and by which Śaṅkara and his followers, like Śrīharṣa,
Citsukha or Ānandajñāna, were in all probability greatly in-
fluenced.

In criticizing the Śaṁkhya views they say that, if the effects,
the evolutes, be identical with the cause, the pradhāna, why should
they be produced from the pradhāna? If they are identical, then
the evolutes themselves might be regarded as cause or the pradhāna
as effect. The ordinary way of determining causality is invariable
antecedence, and that is avowedly not available here. The idea of
parināma, which means identity in diversity, the causal scheme
of the Śaṁkhya, is also inadmissible; for, if it is urged that any
entity changes into diverse forms, it may be asked whether the
nature of the causal entity also changes or does not change. If
it does not change, then the causal and the effect states should
abide together in the later product, which is impossible; if it
changes, then there is nothing that remains as a permanent
cause; for this would only mean that a previous state is arrested
and a new state is produced. If it is urged that causal trans-
formation means the assumption of new qualities, it may be
asked whether such qualities are different from the causal sub-
stance or not; if they are, then the occurrence of new qualities
cannot entitle one to hold the view that the causal substance is
undergoing transformations (parināma). If the changing qualities
and the causal substance are identical, then the first part of the
argument would reappear. Again, the very arguments that are
given in favour of the sat-kārya-vāda (existence of the effect in the
cause) could be turned against it. Thus, if curds, etc. already exist

1 These dates are collected from Dr B. Bhattacharya’s foreword to the Tattvac-
samgraha. The present author, though he thinks that many of these dates are
generally approximately correct, yet, since he cannot spare the room for proper
discussions, does not take responsibility for them.
in the nature of the milk, then what is the meaning of their being produced from it? If there is no idea of production, there is no idea of causality. If it is urged that the effects are potentially existent in the cause, and causal operations only actualize them, then it is admitted that the effects are actually non-existent in the cause, and we have to admit in the cause some specific characteristic, brought about by the causal operation, on account of the absence of which the effects remained in the potential state in the cause, and that the causal operations which actualize the effects produce some specific determinations in the cause, in consequence of which the effect, which was non-existent before, is actualized; this would mean that what was non-existent could be produced, which would be against the sat-kārya-vāda theory. In the light of the above criticisms, since according to the sat-kārya-vāda theory causal productions are impossible, the arguments of Śāmkhya in favour of sat-kārya-vāda, that only particular kinds of effects are produced from particular kinds of causes, are also inadmissible.

Again, according to Śāmkhya, nothing ought to be capable of being definitely asserted, since according to the sat-kārya-vāda theory doubts and errors are always existent as a modification of either buddhi, manas or caitanya. Again, the application of all Śāmkhya arguments might be regarded as futile, since all arguments are intended to arrive at decisive conclusions; but decisive conclusions, being effects, are already existent. If, however, it is contended that decisive conclusions were not existent before, but were produced by the application of arguments, then there is production of what was non-existent, and thus the sat-kārya-vāda theory fails. If it is urged that, though the decisive conclusion (niścaya) is already existent before the application of the argumentative premises, yet it may be regarded as being manifested by the application of those premises, the Śāmkhyist may be asked to define what he means by such manifestation (abhivyakti). This manifestation may mean either some new characteristic or some knowledge or the withdrawal of some obscuration to the comprehension. In the first alternative, it may again be asked whether this new character (svabhāvatāsaya) that is generated by the application of the premises is different from the decisive conclusion itself or identical with it. If it is identical, there is no meaning in its introduction; if it is different, no relation is admissible between these two, since any attempt to introduce a relation between
two unrelated entities would launch us into a vicious infinite (anavasthā). It cannot mean the rise of the knowledge about that particular object for the manifestation of which the premises are applied; for, according to the sat-kārya-vāda theory, that knowledge is already there. Again, it cannot mean the removal of the obscurcation of knowledge; for, if there is obscurcation, that also must be ever-existent. As a matter of fact, the whole of the teachings of Sāṃkhya philosophy directed to the rise of true knowledge ought to be false, for true knowledge is ever-existent, and therefore there ought to be no bondage, and therefore all persons should always remain emancipated. Again, if there is any false knowledge, it could not be destroyed, and therefore there could be no emancipation.

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla then urge that, though the above refutation of the sat-kārya-vāda ought naturally to prove the a-sat-kārya-vāda (the production of that which did not exist before) doctrine, yet a few words may be said in reply to the Sāṃkhya refutation of a-sat-kārya-vāda. Thus the argument that that which is non-existent has no form (nairūpya) and therefore cannot be produced is false; for the operation of production represents itself the character of the thing that is being produced. As the Satkāryavādins think that out of the same three guṇas different kinds of effects may be produced according to causal collocations, so here also, according to the law of different kinds of causal forces (karaṇa-ṣakti-pratiniyamāti), different kinds of non-existing effects come into being. It is meaningless to hold that the limitation of causal forces is to be found in the pre-existence of effects; for, in reality, it is on account of the varying capacities of the causal forces that the various effects of the causes are produced. The production of various effects is thus solely due to the diverse nature of the causal forces that produce them. The law of causal forces is thus ultimately fundamental. The name a-sat-kārya-vāda, however, is a misnomer; for certainly there is no such non-existent entity which comes into being\(^1\). Production in reality means nothing more than the characteristic of the moment only, divested from all associations of a previous and a succeeding point of time\(^2\). The meaning of a-sat-kārya-vāda is that an entity called the effect is seen immediately

\(^1\) na hy asan-nāma kīcchid asti yad utpattim āvijet, kintu kālpamiko 'yaṁ vyava-hāra yad asad utpadyata iti yāvat. Tattva-saṃgraha-parjñāka, p. 33.

\(^2\) vastūnāṃ pūrvāpara-kośi-tānya-kṣaṇa-matrāvasthāyī svabhāva eva utpādaḥ ity ucyate. Ibid.
after a particular causal operation; and it certainly did not exist before this second moment, since, if it did exist at the first moment of the causal operation, it would have been perceived; it is therefore said that the effect did not exist before; but this should not be interpreted to mean that the Buddhists believed in the non-existing existence of the effect, which suddenly came into being after the causal operation.

Refuting the other Sāmkhya doctrines, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla point out that, if an effect (e.g. curd) is said to exist in the cause (e.g. milk), it cannot do so in the actual form of the effect, since then milk would have tasted as curd. If it is said to exist in the form of a special capacity or potency (śakti), then the existence of the effect in the cause is naturally denied; for it is the potency of the effect that exists in the cause and not the effect itself. Again, the Sāmkhyists believe that all sensible things are of the nature of pleasure and pain; this, however, is obviously impossible, since only conscious states can be regarded as pleasurable or painful. There is no sense at all in describing material things as of the nature of pleasure or pain. Again, if objective material things were themselves pleasurable or painful, then the fact that the same objects may appear pleasurable to some and painful to others would be unexplainable. If, however, it is held that even pleasurable objects may appear painful to someone, on account of his particular state of mind or bad destiny, then the objects themselves cannot be pleasurable or painful. Again, if objects are regarded as being made up of three guṇas, there is no reason for admitting one eternal prakṛti as the source of them all. If causes are similar to effects, then from the fact that the world of objects is many and limited and non-eternal one ought to suppose that the cause of the objects also should be many, limited and non-eternal. It is sometimes held that, as all earthen things are produced from one earth, so all objects are produced from one prakṛti; but this also is a fallacious argument, since all earthen things are produced not out of one lump of earth, but from different lumps. Thus, though it may be inferred that the world of effects must have its causes, this cannot lead us to infer that there is one such cause as the prakṛti of the Sāmkhyists.
(b) Criticism of Isvara.

One of the chief arguments of the Naiyāyika theists in favour of the existence of God is based on the fact that the specific forms and shapes of the different objects in the world cannot be explained except on the supposition of an intelligent organizer or shaper. To this Śāntarakṣita and Kamalāśīla reply that we perceive only the different kinds of visual and tactile sensibles and that there are no further shaped wholes or so-called objects, which men fancy themselves to be perceiving. It is meaningless to think that the visual sensibles and tactile sensibles go together to form one whole object. When people say that it is the same coloured object, seen in the day, that we touched in the night when we did not see it, they are wrong; for colour sensibles or sense-data are entirely different kinds of entities from tactile sense-data, and it is meaningless to say that it is the same object or whole which has both the colour and tactile characteristics. If two colour sensibles, say yellow and blue, are different, then still more different are the colour sensibles and the tactile ones. What exist therefore are not wholes having colour and tactile characters, but only discrete elements of colour and tactile sense-data; the combining of them into wholes is due only to false imagination. There are no objects which can be perceived by the two senses; there is no proof that it is one identical object that is perceived by the eye as well as touched. There exist therefore only loose and discrete sense-data. There being thus no shaped wholes, the supposition of the existence of God as shaper and organizer is inadmissible. The mere fact that there are the effects cannot lead to the inference that there is one intelligent creator and organizer, since a causal inference cannot be made from mere similarity of any description; there must be a law of unconditional and invariable connection (pratibandha). The argument that, since jugs, etc. are made by an intelligent potter, so trees, etc. must also have been made by an intelligent creator, is faulty; for trees, etc., are so different in nature from jugs, etc., that it is wrong to make any assertion from the former to the latter. The general Buddhist arguments against the existence of any eternal entity will also apply against the existence of any eternal God. The argument that, since a state of arrest breaks up into a state of motion or production in all natural phenomena, there must be an intelligent creator, is wrong;
for there is no state of arrest in nature; all things in the world are momentary. Again, if things are happening in succession, at intervals, through the operation of a causal agent, then God also must be operating at intervals and, by the arguments of the opponents themselves, He must have another being to guide His operations, and that another, and that another, and there would thus be a vicious infinite. If God had been the creator, then everything would have sprung into being all at once. He ought not to depend on accessory assistance; for, He being the creator of all such accessory circumstances, they could not render Him any assistance in His creation. Again, if it is urged that the above argument does not hold, because God only creates when He wishes, then it may be replied that, since God’s will is regarded as eternal and one, the old objection of simultaneous production holds good. Moreover, since God is eternal and since His will depends only on Him and Him alone, His will cannot be transitory. Now, if He and His will be always present, and yet at the moment of the production of any particular phenomenon all other phenomena are not produced, then those phenomena cannot be regarded as being caused by God or by His will. Again, even if for argument’s sake it may be granted that all natural objects, such as trees, hills, etc., presuppose intelligent creators, there is no argument for supposing that one intelligent creator is the cause of all diverse natural objects and phenomena. Therefore there is no argument in favour of the existence of one omniscient creator.

The arguments urged in refutation of prakṛti and Iśvara would also apply against the Pātañjala-Sāṃkhya, which admits the joint causality of Iśvara and prakṛti; for here also, prakṛti and Iśvara being eternal causes, one would expect to have simultaneous production of all effects. If it is urged that the three guṇas behave as accessory causes with reference to God’s operation, then also it may be asked whether at the time of productive activity (sarga) the activity of dissolution or of maintenance (sthiti) may also be expected to be operated, or whether at the time of dissolution, there might be productive operation as well. If it is urged that, though all kinds of forces are existent in prakṛti, yet it is only those that become operative that take effect, it may be objected that some other kind of cause has to be admitted for making some powers of prakṛti operative, while others are inoperative, and this would introduce a third factor; thus the joint causality of puruṣa
and prakṛti is also easily refuted. Again, the view that God produces the world through kindness is also false; for, had it been so, the world would not have been so full of misery. Again, there being before creation no beings, God could not feel kindness to non-existent beings. He would not have destroyed the world had He been so kind; if He created and destroyed the world in accordance with the good or bad deeds, then He would not be independent. Had He been independent, He would not have allowed Himself to be influenced by the consequences of bad deeds in producing misery in the world. If He created the world out of mere playful instincts, then these playful instincts would be superior to Him. If He derived much enjoyment from His productive and destructive play, then, if He were able, He would have created and destroyed the world simultaneously. If He is not capable of creating and destroying the world simultaneously, then there is no reason to suppose that He would be able to do it at intervals. If it is urged that the world was produced naturally by His own existence, then there would be simultaneous production. If it is objected that, just as spiders, though they naturally go on producing webs, yet do not produce them all at once, so God also may be producing the world gradually and not all at once, it may then be pointed out that the analogy of spider's webs is false, since the spider does not naturally produce webs, but only through greed for eating insects, and its activities are determined by such motives. God, however, is One who can have only one uniform motive. If it is urged that creation flows from God unconsciously, as it were, it may readily be objected that a being who creates such a great universe without any intelligent purpose would indeed be very unintelligent.

(c) Refutation of the Soul Theory.

The Nyāya view of the soul, that our thoughts must have a knower and that our desires and feelings must have some entity in which they may inhere and that this entity is soul and that it is the existence of this one soul that explains the fact of the unity of all our conscious states as the experience of one individual, is objected to by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. They hold that no thought or knowledge requires any further knower for its illumination; if it had been so, there would be a vicious infinite. Again, desires, feelings, etc., are not like material objects, which would
require a receptacle in which they might be placed. The so-called unity of consciousness is due to a false unifying imagination of the momentary ones as one. It is also well known that different entities may be regarded as combined on account of their fulfilling the same kinds of functions. It is knowledge in its aspect of ego that is often described as the self, though there is no objective entity corresponding to it. It is sometimes argued that the existence of the soul is proved by the fact that a man is living only so long as his vital currents are connected with the soul, and that he dies when they are disconnected from it; but this is false, since, unless the existence of soul be proved, the supposition of its connection with vital currents as determining life is untenable. Some, however, say that the self is directly perceived in experience; if it had not been, there would not have been such diversity of opinion about its existence. The sense of ego cannot be said to refer to the self; for the sense of ego is not eternal, as it is supposed to be. On the other hand, it refers sometimes to our body (as when I say, "I am white"), sometimes to the senses (as when I say, "I am deaf"), and sometimes to intellectual states. It cannot be said that its reference to body or to senses is only indirect; for no other permanent and direct realization of its nature is found in experience. Feelings, desires, etc., also often arise in succession and cannot therefore be regarded as inhering in a permanent self. The conclusion is that, as all material objects are soulless, so also are human beings. The supposed eternal soul is so different from the body that it cannot be conceived how one can help the other or even be related to it. Thus there is hardly any argument in favour of the soul theory of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika.

(d) Refutation of the Mīmāṃsā Theory of the Self.

Kumārila believed that, though the nature of the self as pure consciousness was eternal and unchangeable, yet it passed through various changing phases of other feeling and volitional states. That the self was of the nature of pure consciousness was proved by the fact that it perceives itself to be knower in the past and in the present. So the existence of the self is proved by the fact of self-consciousness. To this Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla reply that, if the self is regarded as one eternal consciousness, then knowledge or the knowing faculty (buddha) ought also to be regarded as similarly one and eternal; but seemingly Kumārila does not
consider buddhi to be such. If the knowing faculty be regarded as eternal and one, how are the varying states of cognition, such as colour-cognition, taste-cognition, etc., to be explained? If it is urged that, though the knowing faculty is one, yet (just as a fire, though it has always a capacity of burning, yet burns only when combustible substances are put in it) it only passes through various kinds of perception according as various kinds of objects are presented to it; or, just as a mirror, though it has always the power of reflecting, yet only reflects when the objects are presented to it, so the selves are eternally conscious and yet operate only in connection with their specific bodies and grasp the various kinds of sense-data, and all cognitions are forged from them(selves). If the change of cognitions is due to the changing operations of the senses and the sense-objects, then such a cognizing faculty cannot be regarded as eternal and one. If the knowing faculty is to be regarded as eternal owing to an experience of continuity of consciousness, then how can one explain the variety of cognitions? If it is urged that the variety of cognitions is due to the assumption by the cognizing faculty of various forms of objects, then how can one explain the experience of the variety of cognitions in hallucinations, when there are no objects? Moreover the Mīmāṃsist does not think that the cognizing faculty assumes the forms of the objects cognized, but believes that cognition reveals the objects in the objective world and the cognizing faculty has itself no forms (nirākāra buddhiḥ). The fact that there may be cognitions without a corresponding real objective presentation proves that our cognitions are subjective and self-revealed and that they do not reveal objective entities. If it is urged that the knowing faculty has always the power of revealing all things, then sound-cognition would be the same as colour-cognition. The analogy of fire is also false, since there is not one fire that is constant; the analogy of the reflecting mirror is also false, since there is really no reflection in the mirror itself; one can see a reflection in a mirror at a particular angle, the mirror therefore is only an apparatus for producing an illusory cognition. Again, the buddhi cannot be compared to a mirror as an apparatus for producing illusory images; for then some other buddhi would be necessary for perceiving illusory images. Again, if the self is regarded as one and eternal, then it cannot pass through the varying feeling and volitional states. If these states are not entirely different from the self, then their changes would imply the change of the self; and again, if they are entirely different from
the self, how should their change affect the self? Again, if these states all belong to the self and it is urged that it is when the pleasurable state is submerged in the nature of the common self, that the painful state may arise, it may be pointed out in objection that, if the pleasurable states could be submerged in the nature of the self in identity with itself, then they would be identical with the nature of the self. It is also wrong to suppose that the sense of self-consciousness refers to a really existing entity corresponding to it. It has in reality no specific object to refer to as the self. It may therefore be safely asserted that the existence of the self is not proved by the evidence of self-consciousness.

(e) Refutation of the Śāmkhya View of the Self.

Against the Śāmkhya view of the self it is pointed out that the Śāmkhya regards the self as pure consciousness, one and eternal, and that, as such, it ought not to be able to enjoy diverse kinds of experiences. If it is held that enjoyment, etc., all belong to buddhi and the puruṣa only enjoys the reflections in the buddhi, it may well be objected that if the reflections in the buddhi are identical with puruṣa, then with their change the puruṣa also undergoes a change; and if they are different, the puruṣa cannot be considered to be their enjoyer. Again, if the prakṛti concentrates all its activities for the enjoyment of the puruṣa, how can it be regarded as unconscious? Again, if all actions and deeds belong to buddhi, and if buddhi be different from puruṣa, why should the puruṣa suffer for what is done by the buddhi? If, again, the nature of puruṣa cannot be affected by the varying states of pleasure and pain, then it cannot be regarded as an enjoyer; and, if it could be affected, it would itself be changeable.

(f) The Refutation of the Upaniṣad View of the Self.

The Upaniṣadic thinkers hold that it is one eternal consciousness that illusorily appears as all objects, and that there is in reality no perceiver and perceived, but only one eternal consciousness. Against this view it is urged by Śantarakṣita and Kamalaśīla that, apart from the individual cognitions of colour, taste, etc., no eternal, unchangeable consciousness is experienced. If one eternal consciousness is the one reality, then there cannot be a distinction of false knowledge and right knowledge, bondage and emancipation. There being only one reality, there is no right knowledge which need be attained.
(g) Refutation of the Theory of the Persistence of Existing Entities.

Sāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla point out that the Naiyāyikas divide existing entities into two classes, as produced (kṛtaka) and unproduced (a-kṛtaka), and they hold that those which are produced are destructible. The Vātsiputriyas also similarly divide existing entities into momentary (e.g. ideas, sound, flame, etc.) and non-momentary (e.g. earth, sky, etc.). On this point Sāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla urge that whatever is produced is momentary, since the destructibility of momentary things does not depend on any cause excepting the fact that they are produced; for, had the destructibility of such entities depended on conditions or causes other than the fact of their being produced, then the premise that whatever is produced is necessarily destructible would be false. The Naiyāyika view, therefore, that produced entities depend for their destruction on other conditions, is false. If produced entities do not depend for their destruction on any other condition or cause than the fact of their being produced, then they must be destroyed the moment they are produced, or in other words they are momentary. Moreover, destruction, being negation, is not a positive entity and is absolutely contentless, and only positive entities depend on other conditions or causes for their production. Destruction, being negation, is not produced by any conditions or causes like a positive entity. Destruction therefore is not generated by any separate causal apparatus, but the very causes that lead to the production of an entity lead also to its destruction the next moment. Destructibility being a necessary characteristic of productibility, destruction cannot need the interference of any causes. It has also been stated above that destruction is pure negation and has therefore no characteristics which have to be generated by any positive set of causes or conditions.¹

¹ The word kṣanika, which is translated as “momentary,” is, according to Sāntarakṣita, a technical term. The character in an entity of dving immediately after production, is technically called kṣana, and whatever has this quality is called kṣanika (utpādānāntara-vimāsi-svabhāvo vastunah kṣana ucyate, sa yasyāstī sa kṣanika iti. Tattva-samgraha, p. 142); kṣana therefore does not mean time-moment. It means the character of dving immediately after being produced. The objection of Uddyotakara that what only stays for a moment of time (kṣana) cannot be called kṣanika, because at the expiry of the moment nothing remains which can be characterized as momentary, is therefore inadmissible. There is, however, no entity separate from the momentary character, and the use of the term kṣanika, which grammatically distinguishes the possessor of the momentary character from the momentary character itself, is due only to verbal license.
Kumalasila and Śāntarakṣita urge that existence (sattva) can be affirmed only of those entities which are capable of serving a purpose (artha-kriyā-samartha). They urge that entities can only serve a purpose, if they are momentary. Entities that persist cannot serve any purpose and therefore cannot have any existence. In order to prove their thesis they enter into the following argument. If any purpose is to be served, then that can be either in succession or simultaneously, and no middle alternative is possible. If an existing entity persists in time, then all its effects ought to come about simultaneously; for, the complete cause being there, the effects must also be there, and there is no reason why the effects should happen in succession; but it is well known in experience that effects happen only in succession and not simultaneously. If, however, it is objected that even a persisting entity can perform actions in succession owing to its association with successive accessories (kraminah sahakārinah), then one may well enquire as to the nature of the assistance given by the successive accessories to the persisting entity in the production of the effect; is it by producing a special modification (atīsayādhāna) of the persisting cause or by independent working in consonance with the productive action of the persisting entity? In the first alternative, the special modification may be either identical with or different from the nature of the persisting entity, and both these alternatives are impossible; for, if it is identical, then, since the effect follows in consequence of the special modification of the accessories, it is the element of this special modification that is to be regarded as the cause of the effect, and not the persisting entity. If it is again urged that the effect is due to the association of the special modification with the persisting entity, then it would be impossible to define the nature of such association; for an association may be either of identity or of productivity (tādātmya and tad-utpatti), and neither of them is possible in the present case, since the special modification is recognized as being different from the persisting entity and is acknowledged by assumption to be produced by the accessories. Again, such association cannot be regarded as being of the nature of samavāya; for this special modification, being of the nature of an additional assistance (upakāra), cannot be regarded as being of the nature of inseparable inherence (samavāya). If this special modification be regarded as being neither of the nature of an additional assistance (upakāra) nor of the nature of an essence
identical with the persisting entity, and if it is still regarded as being associated with the persisting entity in a relation of *samavāya*, then anything in the world could be regarded as being in the *samavāya* relation with anything else. In the other alternative, in which it is maintained that the persisting entity awaits only the independent working of the accessories, it may well be asked whether the causal nature of the persisting entity is the same together with the totality of the accessories as it is without them? In the former case, the accessories would also be persistent. In the latter case, the persisting entity can no longer be regarded as persisting.

Regarding the objection of Bhadanta Yogasena, that the same difficulties would arise in the assumption of entities as momentary, Śántaraksita and Kamalaśīla reply that in their view the accessories behave in two ways, firstly, as independent co-operation (*ekārtha-kriyā-kārita*) and, secondly, as mutual help (*parasparopakārita*). Thus in the first moment the different accessory-units are only independently co-operant, since, in one moment, their mutual actions cannot help one another; but in the second moment, the effects may be regarded as being of a joint nature, and therefore mutually determining one another, in the production of the effect of the third moment. In this view, though each entity operates independently, yet none of their operations are irrelevant. They are all being produced and determined by the respective causes and conditions in a beginningless series.

The objection against the momentariness of all things on the ground that things are perceived and recognized to be the same, and as persisting, is not a valid one. For the fact of persistence cannot be perceived by the senses and must be regarded as due to false imagination. All recognition is due to the operation of memory, which is almost universally recognized as invalid for purposes of right knowledge. On this point it may be argued that in recognition, if the entity now perceived be the same as the entity perceived at a previous time, then how can a cognition in the past comprehend an entity of the present time? If they are held to be different, then it is acknowledged that the entities perceived as the same in recognition are not really the same. The objector's argument that, since things pass by the same name, they must be persistent is invalid; for it is well known that even in ordinary perception, where a flame is known to be destroyed every moment, and produced anew, it is still said in common verbal usage to be
the same flame. Thus all existing things must be regarded as momentary.

(h) Refutation of Criticisms of the Non-permanency of Entities.

It is objected by the Naiyāyikas and others that, if things are momentary, then the theory of karma would fail; for how can it be understood that the deeds be performed by one, and the fruits reaped by another? How, again, can it be understood that a momentary cause which does not abide till the rise of the effect should produce the same? Again, if objects are momentary, how can they be perceived by the eye? The phenomena of recognition would also be inexplicable, as there would be no permanent perceiver who would identify the present and the past as being one. How, again, would the phenomenon of bondage and of emancipation apply to a non-permanent being? In reply to this Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla say that, just as a seed by means of its invariable power produces the shoots, without being superintended by any conscious agent, so the inner states of a man may generate other states, without being superintended by any permanent conscious agent; the formula (dharma-samketa) for all production is, “this happening, that happens”; “this being produced, that is produced.” It is through ignorance that a man cannot discern that all subsequent states are determined by the natural forces of the preceding ones and thinks of himself as performing this or that action or as striving for emancipation. The true nature of things cannot be determined by the illusory experience of ignorant people. It is sometimes objected that the parts of a seed attain a due constitution by assimilating nutritive elements at the second stage, and then again at the third stage attain a new constitution by further accretion of new nutritive elements, and that therefore it cannot be held that the parts of the seed are entirely destroyed at the second stage. To this the reply of Śāntarakṣita is that in the second moment the effect is produced in dependence on the undestroyed causal efficiency of the first causal moment; so that the effect is produced by the causal efficiency of the first moment, when the cause is not destroyed. The cause however perishes in the second moment; for, once the cause has produced the effect, it cannot be producing it again and again; if it did, there would be a vicious infinite. It must therefore be admitted that the causal
efficiency of the cause ceases immediately after production. The view that the effect is produced simultaneously with the cause (saha-bhūtam kāryam) is unreasonable, since the cause cannot produce the effect before it is itself produced; again, it cannot produce after it is itself produced; for then the effect also has to be acknowledged to be of the same nature as the cause; but at the same moment it can have no scope for its efficiency. Thus the cause and effect cannot be produced simultaneously. There is no necessity also for admitting a causal operation (vyāpāra), as separate and distinct from the cause. Invariable antecedence is the only qualification of cause. If a causal operation has to be admitted for connecting the cause with the effect, then that would require another operation, and that another, and there would be a vicious infinite. If the causal operation is admitted to be able to generate the effect independently by itself, so can the cause be also admitted to be able to produce the effect. The objection that, if antecedence be admitted to be alone the determinant of causality, then the fact, that a thing is smelted after it is seen may also lead one to infer that colour is the cause of smell, is invalid, for the Buddhists have no objection to regarding colour as an accessory cause of smell. It must also be remembered that the Buddhists do not regard mere antecedence as the definition of cause, but invariable and necessary antecedence. Again, no difficulty need be experienced in perception, if the objects are admitted to be momentary; for ideas may be considered to have forms akin to the objects, or to be formless, but revealing the objects. In either case the ideas are produced by their causes, and the momentariness or permanence of objects has nothing to do with their determination. There are in reality no agent and no enjoyer, but only the series of passing mental phenomena. Causality consists in the determination of the succeeding states by the previous ones. The objection of Uddyotakara, that, if the mind is momentary, it cannot be modified (vāsanā) by deeds (karma), is invalid; for, in the Buddhist view, this modification

1 The Vaibhāṣikas are spoken of by Śantarakṣita as holding the view that the effect is produced at the third moment. In this view the effect is produced by the destroyed cause.

2 idam eva hi kāryasya kārāṇāpekṣā yat tad-anantara-bhāvitvam. Tattva-saṅgrahā, p. 177.

3 na hi vyayam ṁnantaryā-mātraṁ kārya-kāraṇa-bhāvādhigati-nibandhanam ... yasyāvāntaram yad bhavati tat tasya kāraṇam isyate. Ibid. p. 180.

4 Śantarakṣita and Kamalaśīla are Buddhists who style themselves nirākāra-vijñāna-vādin.
(vāsanā) means nothing more than the production of a new mental state of a modified nature. There is again no permanent perceiver who remembers and recognizes; it is only when in a particular series of conscious states, on account of the strength of a particular perception, such particularly modified mental states are generated as may be said to contain seeds of memory, that memory is possible. The Buddhists also do not consider that there is one person who suffers bondage and is liberated; they think that bondage means nothing more than the production of painful states due to ignorance (avidyā) and other mental causes, and that liberation also means nothing more than purity of the mental states due to cessation of ignorance through right knowledge.

(i) Refutation of the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika Categories.

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśila attempt to refute the categories of substance (dravya) with its subdivisions, quality (guna), action (karma), generality, or class concepts (sāmānitya), specific peculiarities (viśesa), relation of inherence (samaśāya), and the connotation and denotation of words (sabdārtha). This refutation may briefly be set out here.

Speaking against the eternity of atoms, they hold that, since no special excellence can be produced in eternal entities, no conditions or collocations of any kind can produce any change in the nature of the atoms; thus, the atoms being always the same in nature, all objects should be produced from them either at once, or not at all. The mere fact that no cause of atoms is known is no ground for thinking that they are causeless. Again, substance, as different from characters and qualities, is never perceived. The refutation of wholes (avayāvai), which has already been effected, also goes against the acceptance of substantive wholes, and so the four substances earth, water, air and fire, which are ordinarily regarded as substantive—wholes made up of atoms—also stand refuted. Again, it is not easy to prove the existence of separate and independent time and space entities; for spatial and temporal determinations may well be explained as mental modifications due, like other facts of experience, to their specific causes. The Buddhists of course accept the existence of manas as an instrument separate from the sense-organs, but they do not admit its existence as an eternal and single entity.

The refutation of substances implies the refutation of gunas,
which are supposed to be dependent on substances. If the substances do not exist, there can also be no relation of inherence, in which relation the gunas are supposed to exist in substances. There is, again, no meaning in acknowledging colours, etc., as different from the atoms in which they are supposed to exist. The perception of numbers also ought to be regarded as due to mental modifications associated with particular cognitions. There is no reason for holding that numbers should stand as separate qualities. In a similar manner Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśila proceed with the refutation of the other Nyāya qualities.

Proceeding with the refutation of action (karma), they hold that, if all things are admitted to be momentary, then action cannot be attributed to them; for action, involving as it does successive separation of parts and association of contact-points, implies many moments for its execution. If things are admitted to be persistent or eternal, then also movement cannot be explained. If things are admitted to be always moving, then they will be in motion while they are perceived to be at rest, which is impossible. If things are at rest by nature, there cannot be any vibratory movement in them. The main principle involved in the refutation of gunas and karmas consists in the fact that the gunas and karmas are regarded by the Buddhists as being identical with the particular sense-data cognized. It is wrong, in their view, to analyse the sense-data as substances having qualities and motion as different categories inhering in them. Whatever may be the substance, that is also the quality which is supposed to be inhering in it, as also the motion which it is supposed to execute.

Regarding the refutation of class-concepts the main drift of Buddhist argument is that, though the perception of class-natures may be supposed to be due to some cause, yet it is wrong to assume the existence of eternal class-nature existing constantly in all the changing and diverse individual members of a class. For, howsoever we may try to explain it, it is difficult to see how one thing can remain constantly the same, though all the individual members in which it is supposed to exist are constantly changing. If class-natures are said to inhere owing to specific qualities, e.g. cooking in the cook, then also it may be objected that, since the operation of cooking is different in each case, there is no one character “cooking” by virtue of which the class-nature of cook is admissible. Moreover, a cook is called a cook even when
he is not cooking. Considerations like these should lead any thinking person to deny the existence of eternal class-natures.

Regarding the refutation of specific qualities (višeśa) it is held that, if yogins can perceive the ultimate specific qualities as different from one another, they might equally perceive the atoms to be different from one another; if the atoms cannot be perceived as different except through some other properties, then the same may be required of the specific properties themselves.

Regarding the refutation of samavāya, or relation of inherence, the Buddhist objects mainly to the admission of a permanent samavāya relation, though all the individuals in which this relation may be supposed to exist should be changing or perishing. It is a false supposition that the relation of inherence, such as that of the cloth in the thread, is ever felt to be, as if the one (e.g. the cloth) was existing in the other (threads), as the Naiyāyikas suppose.

Dialectic of Šaṅkara and Ānandajñāna.

It is well known that Šaṅkarācārya in his commentary on the Brahma-sūtra, II. ii 11–17, criticizes the atomic theory of the Vaiśeṣikas. His first thesis is that the production of an effect different in nature from the cause, as in the case of the production of the impure world from pure Brahman, can be justified on the analogy of even the critics of the Vedānta, the Vaiśeṣikas. The Vaiśeṣikas hold that in the production of the ṅaṭika (containing two atoms) from the paramāṇu (single atom) and of the catur-āṅuka (containing four atoms) from the ṅaṭika, all other qualities of the paramāṇu and the ṅaṭika are transferred to the ṅaṭika and catur-āṅuka respectively, excepting the specific measures of pārimāṇḍalya (specific atomic measure) and anu-hrasva (specific measure of the dyads), which are peculiar to paramāṇu and ṅaṭika respectively. Thus, though all other qualities of paramāṇus pass over to ṅaṭikas produced by their combination, yet the specific pārimāṇḍalya measure of the paramāṇus does not pass to the ṅaṭikas, which are of the anu-hrasva parimāṇa. So also, though all the qualities of ṅaṭikas would pass on to the catur-āṅukas made out of their combination, yet their own specific anu-hrasva parimāṇa would not pass on to the catur-āṅukas, which are possessed of their own measure, viz. the mahat parimāṇa, uncaused by the parimāṇa of the ṅaṭikas. This shows that the
Vaiśeṣikas believe that the pārimāndalāya measure (parimāṇa) of the paramāṇus may produce an altogether different measure in their product, the dvy-anukas, and so the anu-hrasva measure of the dvy-anukas may produce an altogether different measure in their product, the catur-anukas, viz. the mahat parimāṇa. On this analogy it may be contended that the Vaiśeṣikas have nothing to object to in the production of an altogether different effect (viz. the impure world) from an altogether different cause, the pure Brahman. If it is urged that the measure of the paramāṇu cannot pass on to the dvy-anuka only because its passage is rendered impossible by the taking possession of it by an opposite quality (the anu-hrasva parimāṇa), then a similar reply may be given in the case of the difference between the world and Brahman. Moreover, since, according to the Vaiśeṣika theory, all products remain for a moment without qualities, there is no reason why, when the dvy-anuka was produced, the pārimāndalāya measure should not pass on to it. At that moment, since the pārimāndalāya measure did not pass on to it as did the other qualities, it follows, not that the passing of the pārimāndalāya measure is opposed by the other parimāṇa, but that it naturally did not pass on to it. Again, it cannot be objected that the analogy of dissimilarity of qualities (guna) cannot be cited in support of the dissimilarity of substances.

Śaṅkara’s second thesis is that the Vaiśeṣika view that atoms combine is wrong, because, since the atoms are partless, and since combination implies contact and contact implies parts which come in contact, there cannot be any combination of atoms. Moreover, since before creation there is no one who can make an effort, and since the contact of atoms cannot be effected without effort, and since the selves, being unconscious at that time, cannot themselves make any effort, it is impossible to account for the activity without which the contact of the atoms would also be impossible. So the atoms cannot combine, for want of the effort needed for such a contact. Śaṅkara’s third point is that the relation of samavāya upheld by the Vaiśeṣikas cannot be admitted; for, if to unite two different objects the relation of samavāya is needed, then samavāya, being itself different from them, would require another samavāya to connect itself with them, and that another, and that another, and so on ad infinitum. If the relation of contact requires a further relation of samavāya to connect it with the objects in contact, there is no reason why samavāya should not require some other relation
in its turn. Again, if the atoms are regarded as always operative and combining, then there can be no dissolution (pralaya), and, if they are always disintegrating, then creation would be impossible. Again, since the atoms possess the qualities of colour, etc., they must be the product of some simpler causes, just as other objects having qualities are made up of simpler entities. Moreover, it is not right to suppose that, since we have the idea of non-eternality, this must imply eternality and that therefore the atoms must be eternal; for, even though it implies the existence of eternality, it does not imply that the atoms should be eternal, since there is such an eternal thing as Brahman. Again, the fact that the cause of the destruction of the atoms is not known does not imply that they are eternal; for mere ignorance of the ways of destruction does not imply eternality. Again, the Vaiśeṣikas are wrong in speaking of six different categories and yet hold that all the five other categories depend on substance for their existence or manifestation. A substance and its quality do not appear to be as different as two substances. A substance appears black or white, and this implies that the qualities are at bottom identical with the substance (dravyātmakatā guṇasya). It cannot, moreover, be urged that the dependence of other categories on substance consists in their inseparableness (ayuta-siddhatva) from it. This inseparableness cannot be inseparableness of space; for, when threads constitute as their product a piece of cloth, then the threads and the cloth cannot be regarded as having the same space, yet, being cause and effect, they are to be regarded as ayuta-siddha, or inseparable; and yet the whiteness of the cloth is not regarded as abiding in the threads. If inseparableness means inseparableness of time, then the two horns of a bull, which exist at the same time, should also be regarded as inseparable; and, if inseparableness means inseparableness of character or sameness of character, then quality cannot be regarded as being different from substance. Again, since the cause exists prior to the effect, it cannot be regarded as inseparable from the cause, and yet it is asserted by the Vaiśeṣikas that their relation is one of samavāya, since they are inseparable in their nature.

Śaṅkara, however, seldom indulges in logical dialectic like the above, and there are only a few rare instances in which he attacks his opponents from a purely logical point of view. But even here he does not so much criticize the definitions of the Vaiśeṣikas as point out the general logical and metaphysical confusions that
result from some of the important Vaiśeṣika theories. It is easy to note the difference of a criticism like this from the criticism of Śrīharṣa in his Khandana-khanda-khādyā, where he uses all the power of his dialectical subtleties to demolish the cherished principles of pure logic as formulated by the Nyāya logicians. It is not a criticism of certain doctrines in support of others, but it is a criticism which aims at destroying the possibility of logical or perceptual knowledge as a whole. It does not touch any specific metaphysical views, but it denies the power of perception and inference to give us right knowledge, and it supposes that it achieves its purpose by proving that the Nyāya modes of definition of perception and inference are faulty and self-contradictory. Citsukha’s attempts are more positive; for he criticizes not only the Nyāya categories of logic, but also the categories of Vaiśeṣika metaphysics, and makes some positive and important statements, too, about the Vedānta doctrine itself. Ānandajñāna’s Tarka-samgraha is another important work of negative criticism of the Vaiśeṣika categories and in that sense a continuation on a more elaborate scale of Citsukha’s criticisms of the Vaiśeṣika categories. The importance of the Vaiśeṣika was gradually increasing, as it was gradually more and more adopted by Vaiṣṇava realistic writers, such as Madhva and his followers, and it was supposed that a refutation of the Vaiśeṣika would also imply a refutation of the dualistic writers who draw their chief support from Vaiśeṣika physics and metaphysics.

Ānandajñāna, also called Ānandagiri, was probably a native of Gujarat and lived in the middle of the thirteenth century. Mr Tripathi points out in his introduction to Ānandajñāna’s Tarka-samgraha that Ānandajñāna was a spiritual head of the Dvārakā monastery of Śaṅkara, of which Suresvarācārya was the first teacher. He was a pupil of two teachers, Anubhūtisvarūpācārya and Śuddhānanda. Anubhūtisvarūpācārya wrote five works, viz. (1) a grammatical work called Sārasvata-prakriyā, (2) a commentary on Śaṅkara’s commentary on Gaṇḍapāda’s Māṇḍūkya-kārikā, (3) a commentary on Ānandabodha Yati’s Nyāya-makaranda, called Nyāya-makaranda-samgraha, (4) a commentary, called Candrikā, on Ānandabodha’s Nyāya-dipāvali, and (5) another commentary, called Nibandha, on Ānandabodha’s Pramāṇa-mālā. Nothing is known about his other teacher, Śuddhānanda, who is different from the other Śuddhānanda, the teacher of Svayamprakāśa of the
seventeenth century, author of the \textit{Advaita-makaranda-ṭikā}. One of the most distinguished of Ānandagiri's pupils was Akhaṇḍānanda, author of the \textit{Tattva-dīpana}, a commentary on Prakāśātman's \textit{Pañca-pādiṃka-vivarana}, as he refers to him as \textit{sāmād-ānandaśailāva-paṅcāsyam satataṃ bhaje} in the fourth verse of his \textit{Tattva-dīpana}. Ānandagiri wrote a large number of works, which are mostly commentaries. Of these his \textit{Īsāvāsa-bhāsyaa-ṭippaṇa}, \textit{Kenoapaniśad-bhāsyaa-ṭippaṇa}, \textit{Vākya-vivarana-vyākhyā}, \textit{Kathopaniśad-bhāsyaa-ṭikā}, \textit{Mundaka-bhāsyaa-vyākhyāna}, \textit{Māṇḍūkya-Gauḍapādīya-bhāsyaa-vyākhyā}, \textit{Tatttiriya-bhāsyaa-ṭippaṇa}, \textit{Chāndogya-bhāsyaa-ṭikā}, \textit{Taittiriya-bhāsyaa-vārttika-ṭikā}, \textit{Śāstra-prakāśikā}, \textit{Bṛhad-āranyakaa-bhāsyaa-vārttika-ṭikā}, \textit{Bṛhad-āranyakaa-bhāsyaa-ṭikā}, \textit{Śāriraka-bhāsyaa-ṭikā} (called also \textit{Nyāya-nirṇaya}), \textit{Gītā-bhāsyaa-viveca}, \textit{Pañcikaraṇa-vivarana}, with a commentary called \textit{Tattva-candrikā} by Rāma Tīrtha, a pupil of Jagannāthāśrama (latter part of the fifteenth century), and \textit{Tarka-samgraha} have already been printed. But some of his other works, such as \textit{Upadeśa-sāhasrī-vivṛti}, \textit{Vākya-vṛtti-ṭikā}, \textit{Ātma-jñānopadeśa-ṭikā}, \textit{Svarūpa-nirṇaya-ṭikā}, \textit{Tripūri-prakaraṇa-ṭikā}, \textit{Padārtha-tattva-nirṇaya-vivarana} and \textit{Tattvāloka}, still remain to be printed. It will thus be seen that almost all his works are but commentaries on Śaṅkara's commentaries and other works. The \textit{Tarka-samgraha} and \textit{Tattvāloka} (attributed to "Janārdana," which was probably the name of Ānandagiri when he was a householder) seem to be his only two independent works\footnote{1 See Mr Tripathi's introduction to his edition of the \textit{Tarka-samgraha}, Baroda, 1917.}. Of these the manuscript of the second work, in which he refutes the doctrines of many other philosophers, including Bhāskara's \textit{parināma} doctrines, has, unfortunately, not been available to the present writer. The \textit{Tarka-samgraha} is devoted almost wholly to a detailed refutation of the Vaiṣeṣika philosophy. The book is divided into three chapters. In the first chapter, dealing with the criticism of substances (\textit{dravya}), he starts with a refutation of the concepts of duality, reality (\textit{tattva}), existence (\textit{sattva}), non-existence, positivity (\textit{bhāva}) and negativity (\textit{abhāva}). Ānandojiṇāna then passes on to a refutation of the definition of substance and its division into nine kinds (according to the Vaiṣeṣika philosophy). He then criticizes the first substance, earth, and its diverse forms, as atoms (\textit{paramāṇu}) and molecules (\textit{dvyaānuka}), and its grosser forms and their modified states,
as bodies, senses and sense-objects, and continues to criticize the other substances such as water, fire, air, and the theory of creation and dissolution, ākāśa, time, space, self (ātman) and manas. In the second chapter he goes on to the criticism of qualities (guna), such as colour (rūpa), taste (rasa), smell (gandha), touch (sparśa), the effects of heat on the transformations of objects through molecular or atomic changes (piṭu-pāka and piṭhara-pāka), number (saṅkhya), measure (parimāṇa), separateness (prthaktva), contact (saṃyoga), separation (viḥāga), the nature of knowledge, illusion and dreams, the nature of right knowledge and its means (pramāṇa and pramā), perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), concomitance (vyāpti), reason (hetu), fallacies (hetvābhasa), examples (drṣṭānta), discussions, disputations and wranglings, testimony of the scriptures (āgama), analogy (upamāna), memory, pleasure, pain, will, antipathy (deśa), effort (prayatna), heaviness, liquidity (dravatvā), virtue, vice, etc. In the third chapter he refutes the notion of action, class-concept or universality (jāti), the relation of inference (samatvāya) and different kinds of negation. The thesis designed to be proved in all these refutations is the same as that of Śrīharṣa or Citsukha, viz. that in whatsoever manner the Vaiśeṅkas have attempted to divide, classify or define the world of appearances they have failed.

The conclusion at which he arrives after this long series of criticisms and refutations reminds us of Ānandabodha’s conclusions in his Nyāya-makaranda, on which a commentary was written by his teacher Anubhūtisvarūpa Ācārya, to which reference has already been made when Ānandabodha’s views were under discussion. Thus Ānandaśānāṇa says that an illusory imposition cannot be regarded as existent (sat); for, since it is non-existent in the sub-stratum (adhīṣṭhāna) of its appearance, it cannot be existent anywhere else. Neither can it be regarded as absolutely non-existent (atyaṃtāsat); for, had it been so, it would not have appeared as immediately perceived (aparokṣa-pratiti-virodhat); nor can it be regarded as existent and non-existent in the same object. The only alternative left is that the illusory imposition is indescribable in its nature1. This indescribability (anirvācyatva) means that, in whichever way one may try to describe it, it is found that none of those ways can be affirmed of it or, in other words, that it is indescribable

in each and every one of those ways\(^1\). Now, since all appearances must have something for their cause and since that which is not a real thing cannot have a real thing as its material cause (na ca avastuno vastu upādānam upapadyate), and, since they are all indescribable in their nature, their cause must also be of that nature, the nescience of the substratum\(^2\).

He then asserts that this nescience (ajñāna), which is the material out of which all appearances take their form, is associated with Brahman; for Brahman could not be regarded as omniscient or the knower of all (sarva-jñā) without its association with ajñāna, which is the material stuff of the all (the knower, the means of knowledge, the objects and their relations)\(^3\). Everything else that appears except the one reality, the self, the Brahman, is the product of this ajñāna. This one ajñāna then can explain the infinite kinds of appearances, and there is not the slightest necessity of admitting a number of ajñānas in order to explain the diversity or the plurality of appearances. The many selves are thus but appearances produced by this one ajñāna in association with Brahman\(^4\). It is the one ajñāna that is responsible for appearances of the dream state as well as of the waking state. It is the one ajñāna which produces all kinds of diversity by its diversity of functions or modes of operation. If there is only one reality, which through one ajñāna appears in all diverse forms of appearances, how is the phenomenon of self-consciousness or self-recognition to be explained? To this difficulty Ānandajñāna’s reply is that both the perceiving and the perceived self are but false appearances in the antahkarana (an ajñāna product), and that it does not in any way infect the one true self with any kind of activity. Thus there is the one Brahman and there is one beginningless, indescribable ajñāna in connection with it, which is the cause of all the infinitely diverse appearances through which the former appears impure and suffers bondage, as it were, and again appears liberated, as it were, through the

\(^{1}\) yena yena prakāreṇa para nirvaktum icchati

\(^{2}\) tasmād rūpyādi-kāryasyāmirvācyatvāt tad-upādānam api adhiṣṭhānajñānam upādeyam. Ibid. p. 137.

\(^{3}\) pramāṇataḥ sarvajñatvāte ‘pi pramāṇa-prameyasya pramāṇa-prameyasya-sambandhasya
cājñāna-sambandham antarāṇāsiddheḥ tasmin ajñānavattvam avaiśyam ā śrayita-

\(^{4}\) ekas tāvad atrimā dvayaḥ api dvayoḥ sampratipanno 'sti, tasya svājñānād eva
avividā-siddhād ekasmat atīrīktaṁ sarvarṇa pratibhātāḥ; . . . samastasyaiva bheda-
bhānasya-pramaṇārthikaśayikajñāna-sāmarthyād eva sambhavān nājñāna-bhede
hetur asti. Ibid. pp. 138, 139.
realization of the Vedantic truth of the real nature of the self. In fact there is neither bondage nor emancipation.

In view of the above it may be suggested that Ānandajñāna is following the same line of interpretation of the relation of ajñāna to Brahman which was upheld by Vācaspati and Ānandabodha. Ānandajñāna’s position as an interpreter of Śaṅkara’s philosophy is evident from the number of able commentaries which he wrote on the commentaries of Śaṅkara and also from the references made to him by later writers. Mr Tripathi collects the names of some of these writers, as Prajñānānanda, Śeṣa Śārigadharga, Vādivāgīśvara, Vādindra, Rāmānanda Sarasvatī, Śādananda Kaśmīraka (A.D. 1547), Kṛṣṇānanda (A.D. 1650), Maheśvara Tīrtha (A.D. 1650) and others.

Philosophy of the Prakāṭārtha-vivaraṇa (A.D. 1200).

The Prakāṭārtha-vivaraṇa (as the writer himself calls it in the colophon of the work—prārabhyate vivaranam prakāṭārtham etat) is an important commentary still in manuscript on Śaṅkara’s commentary on the Brahma-sūtra, which the present writer had an opportunity of going through from a copy in the Adyar Library, Madras, through the kind courtesy of the Librarian, Mr T. R. Chintamani, who is intending to bring out an edition. The author, however, does not anywhere in the work reveal his own name and the references which can be found in other works are all to its name as Prakāṭar or to the author of the Prakāṭārtha (prakāṭārtha-kāra), and not to the author’s personal name. This work has been referred to by Ānandajñāna, of the thirteenth century (Mundaka, p. 32; Kena, p. 23; Ānanda-śrama editions A.D. 1918 and 1917), and it may well be supposed that the author of the work lived in the latter half of the twelfth


2 The colophon of the work runs as follows: jñāntāpī yasya bahu-kālām acintanena vyākhyātam akṣamātva pariṣṭhtī ca tathā taryopadāpā-haraṇāya maye ha bhāhya prārabhyate vivaranam prakāṭārtham etat.

MS. No. 1, 38. 27, Govt. MSS. Library, Madras.
century. He certainly preceded Rāmādvaya, the author of the *Vedānta-kaumudi*, who not only refers to the *Prakāśārtha*, but has been largely influenced in many of his conceptions by the argument of this work. The author of the latter holds that the indefinable māyā in association with pure consciousness (cimātra-sambandhinī) is the mother of all existence (bhūta-prakṛti). Through the reflection of pure consciousness in māyā is produced Īśvara (God), and by a transformation of Him there arises the creator Brahmā, and it is by the reflection of the pure consciousness in the infinite parts of this Brahmā that there arise the infinite number of individual souls through the veiling and creating functions of the māyā. Māyā or ajñāna is not negation, but a positive material cause, just as the earth is of the jug (ajñānam nābhāva upādānati vā mṛdayat). But, being of the nature of veiling (āvaranatvat) and being destructible through right knowledge (prakāśa-heyatvat), it cannot be known as it is: still it may well be regarded as the positive cause of all illusions. The well-known Vedantic term svaprakāśa is defined in the *Prakāśārtha* as illumination without the cognition of its own idea (sva-samvīn-nairapekṣeṇa sphūraṇam). The self is to be regarded as self-revealing; for without such a supposition the revelation of the self would be inexplicable. The author of the *Prakāśārtha* then criticizes the Kumārila view of cognition as being a subjective act, inferable from the fact of a particular awareness, as also the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Prabhakara views of knowledge as an illumination of the object inhering in the subject (ātma-samavāyī viśaya-prakāśo jñānam), and the Bhāskara view of knowledge as merely a particular kind of activity of the self; and he ultimately holds the view that the mind or manas is a substance with a preponderance of sattva, which has an illuminating nature, and that it is this manas which, being helped by the moral destiny (adṛṣṭād-sahakrītam), arrives at the place where the objects stand like a long ray of light and comes in contact with it, and then as a result thereof pure consciousness is reflected upon the object, and this leads to its cognition. Perceptual cognition, thus defined, would be a mental transformation which can excite the

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3 ātma sva-prakāśas tato 'nyathā'nupapadyamānatva sati prakāśamānatvān na ya evām na sa evām yathā kumbhaḥ. *Prakāśārtha* MS.
The Śaṅkara School of Vedānta

revelation of an object (manah-parināmah samvid-vyañjako jñānam)\(^1\). In the case of inference, however, the transformation of manas takes place without any actual touch with the objects; and there is therefore no direct excitation revealing the object; for the manas there, being in direct touch with the reason or the linga, is prevented from being in contact with the object that is inferred. There is here not an operation by which the knowledge of the object can be directly revealed, but only such a transformation of the manas that a rise of the idea about the object may not be obstructed\(^2\).

The author of the Prakāśārtha accepted the distinction between māyā and ajñāna as conditioning Iśvara and jīva.

Vimukttātman (A.D. 1200).

Vimukttātman, a disciple of Avyayātman Bhagavat Pūjyapādā, wrote his Iṣṭa-siddhi probably not later than the early years of the thirteenth century. He is quoted and referred to by Madhusūdana in his Advaita-siddhi and by Rāmādvaya in his Vedānta-kaumudi of the fourteenth century. It was commented upon by Jñānottama, the teacher of Citsukha, and this commentary is called Iṣṭa-siddhi-vyākhyā or Iṣṭa-siddhi-vivarāṇa. For reasons stated elsewhere Jñānottama could not have flourished later than the latter half of the thirteenth century. Vimukttātman wrote also another work, called Pramāṇa-vṛtti-nirṇaya, to which he refers in his Iṣṭa-siddhi (MS. p. 72). The work has not yet been published, and the manuscript from the Adyar Library, which is a transcript copy of a manuscript of the Nāduvil Maṭham, Cochin State, and which has been available to the present writer, is very fragmentary in many parts; so much so, that it is often extremely difficult to follow properly the meaning of the discussions. The work is divided into eight chapters, and is devoted in a very large part to discussions relating to the analysis of illusions in the Vedānta school and in the other schools of philosophy. This work is to be regarded as one of the four traditional Siddhis, such as the Brahma-siddhi by Maṇḍana, the Naiṣkarmya-siddhi by Sureśvara,

\(^1\) MS. p. 54.
\(^2\) upaladha-sambandhārthā kāreṇa parinatam mano
'nāvabhāsa-vyāvṛtti-mātraphalam, na tu samvid-vyañjakam
lingādi-samvid-vyavadhāna-pratibandhāt.

It is easy to see how Dharmarājādīvarindra elaborated his Vedāntic theory of perception and inference with these and other data worked out by his predecessors.
the *Iṣṭa-siddhi* by Vimuktātman and the *Advaita-siddhi* by Madhusūdana. Hitherto only the *Naśkarmya-siddhi* and the *Advaita-siddhi* have been published. The *Brahma-siddhi* is expected to be published soon in Madras; but as yet the present writer is not aware of any venture regarding this important work.

The work begins with the interpretation of a salutation made by the author, in which he offers his adoration to that birthless, incognizable, infinite intuitive consciousness of the nature of self-joy which is the canvas on which the illusory world-appearance has been painted. Thus he starts the discussion regarding the nature of the ultimate reality as pure intuitive consciousness (*anubhūti*). Nothing can be beginningless and eternal, except pure consciousness. The atoms are often regarded as beginningless; but, since they have colours and other sense-properties, they are like other objects of nature, and they have parts also, as without them no combination of atoms would be possible. Only that can be indivisible which is partless and beginningless, and it is only the intuitive consciousness that can be said to be so. The difference between consciousness and other objects is this, that, while the latter can be described as the "this" or the object, the former is clearly not such. But, though this difference is generally accepted, dialectical reasoning shows that the two are not intrinsically different. There cannot logically be any difference between the perceiving principle (*dṛk*) and the perceived (*dṛṣya*); for the former is unperceived (*adrṣyatvat*). No difference can be realized between a perceived and an unperceived entity; for all difference relates two cognized entities. But it may be argued that, though the perceiver may not be cognized, yet he is self-luminous, and therefore the notion of difference ought to be manifested. A reply to this objection involves a consideration regarding the nature of difference. If difference were of the nature of the entities that differed, then difference should not be dependent on a reference to another (*nāśavāpa-dṛṣṭih prati-yogy-apekṣā*). The difference has thus to be regarded as a characteristic (*dharma*) different from the nature of the differing entities and cognized by a distinct knowing process like colours, tastes, etc. But this view also is not correct, since it is difficult to admit "difference" as an entity different from the

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1 *tasmāt kathaṇcit bhino jñānāntara-gamyo rūpa-rasādivad bhṛdo 'bhuyapeyah. Adyār Iṣṭa-siddhi MS. p. 5.*
differing entities; for such a difference would involve another difference by which it is known, and that another and that another, we should have an infinite regress; and the same objection applies to the admission of mutual negation as a separate entity. This being so, it is difficult to imagine how "difference" or mutual negation between the perceiver and the perceived can be cognized; for it is impossible that there should be any other cognition by which this "difference," or mutual negation which has the perceiver as one of its alternating poles, could be perceived. Moreover, the self-luminous perceiving power is always present, and it is impossible that it could be negated—a condition without which neither difference nor negation could be possible. Moreover, if it is admitted that such a difference is cognized, then that very fact proves that it is not a characteristic of the perceiving self. If this difference is admitted to be self-luminous, then it would not await a reference to another, which is a condition for all notions of difference or mutual negation. Therefore, "difference" or "mutual negation" cannot be established, either as the essence of the perceiving self or as its characteristics; and as there is no other way in which this difference can be conceived, it is clear that there is no difference between the perceiving self and its characteristics.

Again, negation is defined as the non-perception of a perceivable thing; but the perceiving self is of the very nature of perception, and its non-perception would be impossible. Admitting for the sake of argument that the perceiving self could be negated, how could there be any knowledge of such a negation? for without the self there could be no perception, as it is itself of the nature of perception. So the notion of the negation of the perceiving self cannot be anything but illusion. Thus the perceiving self and the perceived (drk and dṛiya) cannot be differentiated from each other. The difficulty, however, arises that, if the perceiving self and the perceived were identical, then the infinite limitations and differences that are characteristic of the perceived would also be characteristic of the perceiver; and there are the further objections to such a supposition that it is against all ordinary usage and experience. It may be argued that the two are identical, since they are both

\[
\text{evam ca sati na dṛg-dṛṣṭayor bheda draṣṭum iacyah}
\]

\[
\text{nāpy anyonyābhāvah na hi dṛṣṭah svayaṁ dṛṣṭeh}
\]

\[
\text{pratī-yogy-aṅkṣa-dṛṣṭy-antara-dṛṣṭyam rūpāntaram svāṁ}
\]

\[
\text{samastī svayaṁ dṛṣṭīvā-hāndāḥ}
\]
experienced simultaneously (sahopalambha-niyamāt); but the reply is that, as two are experienced and not one, they cannot be regarded as identical, for in the very experience of the two their difference is also manifested. In spite of such obvious contradiction of experience one could not venture to affirm the identity of the perceiver and the perceived. The maxim of identity of the perceiver and the perceived because of simultaneous perception cannot be regarded as true; for, firstly, the perceiver is never a cognized object, and the perceived is never self-luminous, secondly, the perceiver is always self-revealing, but not so the perceived, and, thirdly, though the "perceived" cannot be revealed without the perceiver, the latter is always self-revealed. There is thus plainly no simultaneity of the perceiver and the perceived. When a perceived object $A$ is illuminated in consciousness, the other objects $B, C, D,$ etc. are not illuminated, and, when the perceived object $B$ is illuminated, $A$ is not illuminated, but the consciousness (samvid) is always self-illuminated; so no consciousness can be regarded as being always qualified by a particular objective content; for, had it been so, that particular content would always have stood self-revealed. Moreover, each particular cognition (e.g. awareness of blue) is momentary and self-revealed and, as such, cannot be the object of any other cognition; and, if any particular awareness could be the object of any other awareness, then it would not be awareness, but a mere object, like a jug or a book. There is thus an intrinsic difference between the awareness and the object, and so the perceiver, as pure awareness, cannot be identified with its object. It has already been pointed out that the perceiver and the perceived cannot be regarded as different, and now it is shown that they cannot be regarded as identical. There is another alternative, viz. that they may be both identical and different (which is the bhedābheda view of Bhāskara and Rāmānuja and others), and Vimuktatman tries to show that this alternative is also impossible and that the perceiver and the

1 abhede saha-bhāṇḍayogād dvayor hi suha-bhānam na ekasyaiva na hi drśaiva drk suha bhāttī bhavatāpy ucyate, nāpi drśyaiva drśyaṁ saha bhāttī kintu drg-dṛśyaṁ saha bhānam ucyate atas tayor bheda bhāty eva. MS. p. 23.
2 tasmāt surva-vyavahāra-lopa-prasangān na bheda drg-dṛśyaṁ. Ibid.
3 kim vidyud-viśeṣātā nāma samvidāh svarūpaṁ uta samvedyaṁ, yadi samvidāh sāpi bhāty eva samvid-bhānāt samvedya-svarūpaṁ cet tadda bhānān na samvidha bhānam. Ibid. p. 27.
4 asamvedyaṁ samātī samvedyaṁ cāsamātī eva, atah samvedyaṁ ghaṭa-sukhādeḥ samvidai cābheda-gandho 'pi na pramāṇāvān. Ibid. p. 31.
perceived cannot be regarded as being both identical and different. The upholder of the bhedabheda view is supposed to say that, though the perceiver and the perceived cannot, as such, be regarded as identical, yet they may be regarded as one in their nature as Brahman. But in reply to this it may be urged that, if they are both one and identical with Brahman, there would be no difference between them. If it is argued that their identity with Brahman is in another form, then also the question arises whether their forms as perceiver and perceived are identical with the form in which they are identical with Brahman; and no one is aware of any form of the perceiver and the perceived other than their forms as such, and therefore it cannot be admitted that in spite of their difference they have any form in which they are one and identical. If again it is objected that it is quite possible that an identical entity should have two different forms, then also the question arises whether these forms are one, different or both identical with that entity and different. In the first alternative the forms would not be different; in the second they would not be one with the entity. Moreover, if any part of the entity be identical with any particular form, it cannot also be identical with other forms; for then these different forms would not be different from one another; and, if again the forms are identical with the entity, how can one distinguish the entity (rupin) from the forms (rupa)? In the third alternative the question arises whether the entity is identical with one particular form of it and different from other forms, or whether it is both identical with the same form and different. In the first case each form would have two forms, and these again other two forms in which they are identical and different, and these other two forms, and so on, and we should have infinite regress: and the same kind of infinite regress would appear in the relation between the entity and its forms. For these and similar reasons it is impossible to hold that the perceiver and the perceived are different as such and yet one and identical as Brahman.

If the manifold world is neither different nor identical nor both different and identical with the perceiver, what then is its status? The perceiver is indeed the same as pure perception and pure bliss, and, if it is neither identical nor different nor both identical with the manifold world and different, the manifold world must necessarily be unsubstantial (avastu); for, if it had any substantiality, it might have been related in one of the above three
ways of relation. But, if it is unsubstantial, then none of the above objections would apply. But it may again be objected that, if the world were unsubstantial, then both our common experience and our practical dealing with this world would be contradicted. To this Vimuktatman's reply is that, since the world is admitted to be made up of māyā (māyā-nirmatvābhhyupagamāt), and since the effects of māyā cannot be regarded either as substantial or as unsubstantial, none of the above objections would be applicable to this view. Since the manifold world is not a substance, its admission cannot disturb the monistic view, and, since it is not unsubstantial, the facts of experience may also be justified. As an instance of such an appearance which is neither vastu (substance) nor avastu, one may refer to dream-appearances, which are not regarded as unreal because of their nature as neither substance nor not-substance, but because they are contradicted in experience. Just as a canvas is neither the material of the picture painted on it nor a constituent of the picture, and just as the picture cannot be regarded as being the modification of the canvas in the same way as a jug is a modification of clay, or as a change of quality, like the redness in ripe mangoes, and just as the canvas was there before the painting, and just as it would remain even if the painting were washed away, whereas the painting would not be there without the canvas, so the pure consciousness also is related to this world-appearance, which is but a painting of māyā on it.

Māyā is unspeakable and indescribable (anirvacanīyā), not as different from both being and non-being, but as involving the characters of both being and non-being. It is thus regarded as a power of ignorance (avidyā-sakti) which is the material cause of all objects of perception otherwise called matter (sarva-jaḍopādāna-bhūtā). But, just as fire springing from bamboos may burn up the same bamboos even to their very roots, so Brahma-knowledge, which is itself a product of ignorance and its processes, destroys the self-same ignorance from which it was produced and its processes and at last itself subsides and leaves the Brahman to

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1 prapañcasya vastutvaabhavān nādevaita-hānīh avastutvaabhavāc ca pratyakṣa-dyaprāmāṇyam' api-ukta-dosābhāvāt. MS. p. 64.
2 yatha citrasya bhītīh sākṣat nopādānam nāpi sahajam citram tasyāh nāpya-vasthāntaram yūryaiva ghaṭādih nāpi guṇāntarāgamah āṃrasyevam raktaτādhih na caryāh janmādī hiti citrā prāg ārdham ca bhūvāt, yady api bhītīm vinā citram na bhūti tathāpi na sā citram vinā bhūti ity evam-ādy-anubhūtī bhīti-jagac-citrarū yojyam. Ibid. p. 73.
shine in its own radiance\(^1\). The functions of the *pramāṇas*, which are all mere processes of ignorance, *ajñāna* or *avidyā*, consist only in the removal of obstructions veiling the illumination of the self-luminous consciousness, just as the digging of a well means the removal of all earth that was obstructing the omnipresent *ākāśa* or space; the *pramāṇas* have thus no function of manifesting the self-luminous consciousness, and only remove the veiling *ajñāna*\(^2\). So Brahma-knowledge also means the removal of the last remnants of *ajñāna*, after which Brahma-knowledge as conceptual knowledge, being the last vestige of *ajñāna*, also ceases of itself. This cessation of *ajñāna* is as unspeakable as *ajñāna* itself. Unlike Mandana, Vimuktātman does not consider *avidyā* to be merely subjective, but regards it as being both subjective and objective, involving within it not only all phenomena, but all their mutual relations and also the relation with which it is supposed to be related to the pure consciousness, which is in reality beyond all relations. Vimuktātman devotes a large part of his work to the criticism of the different kinds of theories of illusion (*khyāti*), and more particularly to the criticism of *anyathākhyāti*. These contain many new and important points; but, as the essential features of these theories of illusion and their criticisms have already been dealt with in the tenth chapter of the first volume, it is not desirable to enter into these fresh criticisms of Vimuktātman, which do not involve any new point of view in Vedāntic interpretation. He also deals with some of the principal Vedāntic topics of discussion, such as the nature of bondage, emancipation, and the reconciliation of the pluralistic experience of practical life with the monistic doctrine of the Vedānta; but, as there are not here any strikingly new modes of approach, these may be left out in the present work.

Rāmādvaya (A.D 1300).

Rāmādvaya, a pupil of Advayāśrama, wrote an important work, called *Vedānta-kaumudi*, in four chapters, in which he discussed in a polemical way many Vedāntic problems while dealing with the subject matter of Śaṅkara’s commentary on the first four topics of the *Brahma-sūtra*. The work has not yet been published; but at least one manuscript of it is available in the Government

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\(^1\) MS. p. 137. 
\(^2\) Ibid. p. 143.
Oriental Manuscript Library, Madras: this through the kindness of the Curator the present author had the opportunity of utilizing. Rāmādvaya also wrote a commentary on his *Vedānta-kaumudi*, called *Vedānta-kaumudi-vyākhyāna*, a manuscript of the first chapter of which has been available to the present writer in the library of the Calcutta Asiatic Society. These are probably the only manuscripts of this work known till now. The date of the writing of the copy of the *Vedānta-kaumudi-vyākhyāna* is given by the copyist Śeṣaṇṛṣiṇha as A.D. 1512. It is therefore certain that the work cannot have been written later than the fifteenth century. Rāmādvaya in the course of his discussions refers to many noted authors on Nyāya and Vedānta, none of whom are later than the thirteenth century. Vimuktātman, author of the *Iṣṭa-siddhi*, has been placed by the present author in the early half of the thirteenth century; but Rāmādvaya always refers to him approvingly, as if his views were largely guided by his; he also in his *Vedānta-kaumudi-vyākhyāna* (MS. p. 14) refers to Janārdana, which is Ānandajñāna’s name as a householder; but Janārdana lived in the middle of the thirteenth century; it seems therefore probable that Rāmādvaya lived in the first half of the fourteenth century.

In the enunciation of the Vedāntic theory of perception and inference Rāmādvaya seems to have been very much under the influence of the views of the author of the *Prakāṭārtha*; for, though he does not refer to his name in this connection, he repeats his very phrases with a slight elaboration. Just as the cloudless sky covers itself with clouds and assumes various forms, so the pure consciousness veils itself with the indefinable avidyā and appears in diverse limited forms. It is this consciousness that forms the real ground of all that is known. Just as a spark of fire cannot manifest itself as fire if there are no fuels as its condition, so the pure consciousness, which is the underlying reality of all objects, cannot illuminate them if there are not the proper conditions to help it in its work. Such a conditioning factor is found in

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1 See *Vedānta-kaumudi*, MS. transcript copy, pp. 36 and 47.
2 Rāmādvaya refers here to the *daharādhikaraya* of Śaṅkara’s commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, presumably to 1. 3. 19, where Śaṅkara refers to the supposed distinction between the individual soul (*jīva*) and Brahman. Here Śaṅkara says that his commentary is directed towards the regulation of those views, both outside and inside the circle of Upaṇiṣadic interpreters, which regard individual souls as real (*apare tu vādinaḥ pāramārthikam eva jāivam rūpam iti manyante asmudyāi ca ketc*). Such a view militates against the correct understanding of
manas, which is of the stuff of pure sattva: on the occasion of sense-object contact this manas, being propelled by the moral destiny (adṛśādi-ksubdham), transforms itself into the form of a long ray reaching to the object itself\(^1\). The pure consciousness, as conditioned or limited by the antahkarana (antahkarana-caitanyakam caitanyam), does by such a process remove its veil of avidyā, (though in its limited condition as individual soul this avidyā formed its own body), and the object also being in contact with it is manifested by the same process. The two manifestations of the subject and the object, having taken place in the same process (vṛtti) there, are joined together in the same cognition as “this object is known by me” (vṛttir ubhayasmālagnatvāc ca tad-abhivyakta-caitanyasyāpi tathātvena mayedam viditam iti saṁśīṣa-pratyayaḥ); and, as its other effect, the consciousness limited by the antahkarana, transformed into the form of the process (vṛtti) of right knowledge (pramā), appears as the cognizer (vṛtti-lakṣaṇa-pramāśrayāntahkaraṇāvacchinnam tat-pramātetyapi vyapadiśyate)\(^2\). The object also attains a new status in being manifested and is thus known as the object (karma-kārakābhivyaktam ca tat prakāśatmanā phala-vyapadesa-bhāk). In reality it is the underlying consciousness that manifests the vṛtti transformation of the antahkarana; but, as it is illusorily identified with the antahkarana (antahkarana-caitanyakyor aikyādhisat), like fire and iron in the heated iron, it is also identified with the vṛtti transformation of the antahkarana, and, as the vṛtti becomes superimposed on the object, by manifesting the vṛtti it also manifests the object, and thus apart from the subjective illumination as awareness, there is also the objective fact of an illumination of the object (evam vṛtti-vyaṇjakam api taptāyah-piṇḍa-nyāyena tad-ekatām ivāptam vṛttivad-viṣaya-prākatyātmanā sampadyate)\(^3\). The moments in the cognitive process in perception according to Rāmādvaya may thus be described. The

the self as the only reality which through avidyā manifests itself as individual souls and with its removal reveals itself in its real nature in right knowledge as parameśvara, just as an illusory snake shows itself as a piece of rope. Paramesvāra, the eternal unchangeable and upholding consciousness, is the one reality which, like a magician, appears as many through avidyā. There is no consciousness other than this (eka eva parameśvarah kāśṭha-nityo vijnāna-dhātuv āvidyāyāmāyā māyāvad anekadā nibhāvyate nānyo vijnāna-dhātuv ati).

\(^1\) This passage seems to be borrowed directly from the Prakāśārtha, as may be inferred from their verbal agreement. But it may well be that both the Vedānta-kaumudi and the Prakāśārtha borrowed it from the Pañca-pādikā-tvāraṇa.

\(^2\) Vedānta-kaumudi, MS. transcript copy, p. 36.

\(^3\) Ibid. p. 37.
sense-object contact offers an occasion for the moral destiny (adrṣṭa) to stir up the antahkarana, and, as a result thereof, the antahkarana or mind is transformed into a particular state called vṛtti. The pure consciousness underlying the antahkarana was lying dormant and veiled, as it were, and, as soon as there is a transformation of the antahkarana into a vṛtti, the consciousness brightens up and overcomes for the moment the veil that was covering it. The vṛtti thus no longer veils the underlying consciousness, but serves as a transparent transmitter of the light of consciousness to the object on which the vṛtti is superimposed, and, as a result thereof, the object has an objective manifestation, separate from the brightening up of consciousness at the first moment of the vṛtti transformation. Now, since the vṛtti joins up the subjective brightening up of consciousness and the objective illumination of the object, these two are joined up (saṃślesa-pratyaya) and this results in the cognition “this object is known by me”; and out of this cognition it is possible to differentiate the knower as the underlying consciousness, as limited by the antahkarana as transformed into the vṛtti, and the known as that which has been objectively illuminated. In the Vedānta-paribhāṣā we hear of three consciousnesses (caitanya), the pramāṭr-caitanya (the consciousness conditioned by the antahkarana), the pramāṇa-caitanya (the same consciousness conditioned by the vṛtti of the antahkarana), and the viṣaya-caitanya (the same consciousness conditioned by the object). According to this perception (pratyakṣa) can be characterized either from the point of view of cognition (jñāna-gata-pratyakṣatva) or from the point of view of the object, both being regarded as two distinct phases, cognitional and objective, of the same perceptual revelation. From the point of view of cognition it is defined as the non-distinction (abheda) of the pramāṇa-caitanya from the viṣaya-caitanya through spatial superimposition of the vṛtti on the object. Perception from the point of view of the object (viṣaya-gata-pratyakṣatva) is defined as the non-distinction of the object from the pramāṭr-caitanya or the perceiver, which is consciousness conditioned by the antahkarana. This latter view, viz. the definition of perception from the point of view of the object as the non-distinction of the object from the consciousness as limited by antahkarana (ghatāder antahkaranāvaca-chinna-caitanyābhedaḥ), is open to the serious objection that really the non-distinction of the object (or the consciousness conditioned
by the antāhkarana—antāhkarana-vacchinna-caitanya) but with the
cognition (pramāṇa-caitanya or vṛtti-caitanya); for the cognition
or the vṛtti intervenes between the object and the perceiver, and
the object is in immediate contact with the vṛtti and not with the
perceiver (antāhkarana-vacchinna-caitanya). That this is so is also
admitted by Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra, son of Rāmakṛṣṇa Adhvarin,
in his Śikhā-mani commentary on the Vedānta-paribhāṣā¹. But he
tries to justify Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra by pointing out that he was
forced to define visaya-gata-pratyakṣa as non-distinction of the
object from the subject, since this view was taken in Prakāśātmā’s
Vivaraṇa and also in other traditional works on Vedānta². This
however seems to be an error. For the passage of the Vivaraṇa to
which reference is made here expounds an entirely different view³.
It says there that the perceptibility of the object consists in
its directly and immediately qualifying the cognitive state or
sense-knowledge (samvid)⁴. That other traditional Vedāntic inter-
preters entirely disagreed with the view of Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra
is also evident from the account of the analysis of the perceptual
process given by Rāmādvaya. Rāmādvaya says, as has just been
pointed out, that it is the illuminated cognitive process, or the
vṛtti, that has the subject and the object at its two poles and
thus unites the subject and the object in the complex subject-
predicate form “this is known by me.” The object is thus
illuminated by the vṛtti, and it is not directly with the subject, but
with the vṛtti, that the object is united. Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra
himself raises an objection against his interpretation, that it might
be urged, if in perception there was non-distinction of the
object from the subject, then in perceiving an object, e.g. a book,
one should feel “I am the book,” and not “I perceive the book”;
in reply to such an objection he says that in the perceptual process

¹ Yad vā yogatve sati visaya-caitanyābhinnā-pramāṇa-caitanya-visayatvam
ghatāder visayasya prayyakṣatvaṁ tathāpi visayasya-parokṣatvaṁ samvid-
bhedat iti vivaranē tatra tatra ca sāmpradāyikāḥ pramāṇartha-bhedasyaiva visay-
-pratyakṣa-lakṣaṇatvenābhīdhanād evam uktam. Śikhā-mani on Vedānta-pari-
bhāṣā, p. 75, Bombay, 1911, Venkatesvara Press.
² Ibid.
³ Tasmād avyavahānena samvid-upādhitayāparokṣatā visayahāya. Pañca-
pādikā-vivaraṇa, p. 50, Benares, 1892.
⁴ It should be noted here that samvid means cognitive idea or sense-
knowledge and not the perceiver (antahkaranavacchinna-caitanya), as the author
of the Śikhāmāni says. Thus Akhandananda in his Tattva-dīpana commentary
explains the word samvid as samavic-chabdena indriyārthā-samprayoga-ja-jñānasya
vivekṣitavat. Tattva-dīpana, p. 194, Benares, 1902.
there is only a non-distinction between the consciousness underlying the
object and the consciousness underlying the perceiver, and this
non-distinction, being non-relational, does not imply the assertion
of a relation of identity resulting in the notion "I am the book".1
This is undoubtedly so, but it is hardly an answer to the objection
that has been raised. It is true that the object and the subject are
both but impositions of avidyā on one distinctionless pure con-
sciousness; but that fact can hardly be taken as an explanation of
the various modes of experiences of the complex world of subject-
object experience. The difference of the Vedāntic view of perception,
as expounded in the Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa, from the Buddhist
idealism (vijñāna-vāda) consists in this, that, while the Buddhists
did not accord any independent status to objects as outside the
ideas or percepts, the Vedānta accepted the independent mani-
festation of the objects in perception in the external world2. There
is thus a distinction between visional percept and the object; but
there is also a direct and immediate connection between them, and
it is this immediate relationship of the object to its awareness
that constitutes the perceptivity of the object (avyāvadhānena
samvid-upādhitā aparokṣatā viṣayasya—Vivaraṇa, p. 50). The
object is revealed in perception only as an object of awareness,
whereas the awareness and the subject reveal themselves directly
and immediately and not as an object of any further intuition or
inference (prameyam karmatvena aparokṣam pramār-pramiti punar
aparokṣe eva kevalam na karmatayā)3.

The views of the Vedānta-kaumudi, however, cannot be regarded
as original in any sense, since they are only a reflection of the ex-
position of the subject in Padmapāda’s Pañca-pādikā and Prakā-
śātman’s Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa. The development of the whole
theory of perception may be attributed to the Pañca-pādikā-
vivaraṇa, since all the essential points of the perceptual theory can
be traced in that work. Thus it holds that all the world objects
are veiled by avidyā; that, as the antahkarana is transformed into
states by superimposition on objects, it is illuminated by the
underlying consciousness; and that through the spatial contact with
the objects the veil of the objects is removed by these antah-
karaṇa transformations; there are thus two illuminations, namely

1 Vedānta-paribhāṣā, pp. 76, 77.
2 na ca vijñānabhedād eva aparokṣyam avabhāsate bahiṣṭvasyāpi rajatāder
aparokṣyāt. Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa, p. 50.
3 Pañca-pādikā, p. 17, Benares, 1891.
of the antahkarana transformations (called vṛtti in the Vedānta-kaumudī, and Vedānta-paribhāṣā and pure consciousness); to the question that, if there were unity of the consciousness underlying the object and the consciousness underlying the antahkarana (i.e. the subject) and the consciousness underlying the antahkarana modification (or vṛtti), there would be nothing to explain the duality in perception (e.g. “I perceive the book,” and not “I am the book,” and it is only the latter form that could be expected from the unity of the three consciousnesses), Prakāśātman’s reply is that, since the unity of the object-consciousness with the antahkarana-consciousness (subject) is effected through the modification or the vṛtti of the antahkarana and, since the antahkarana is one with its vṛtti, the vṛtti operation is rightly attributed to the antahkarana as its agent, and this is illuminated by the consciousness underlying the antahkarana resulting in the perception of the knower as distinguished from the illumination of object to which the operation of the vṛtti is directed in spatial superimposition—the difference between the subject and the object in perception is thus due to the difference in the mode or the condition of the vṛtti with reference to the subject and the object\(^1\). This is exactly the interpretation of the Vedānta-kaumudī, and it has been pointed out above that the explanations of the Vedānta-paribhāṣā are largely different therefrom and are in all probability inexact. As this unity is effected between individual subjects (consciousness limited by specific antahkaranas) and individual objects (consciousness limited by specific avidyā materials constituting the objects) through the vṛtti, it can result only in revelation of a particular subject and a particular object and not in the revelation of all subjects and all objects\(^2\). This has been elaborated into the view that there is an infinite number of ajñāna-veils, and that each cognitive illumination removes only one ajñāna corresponding to the illumination of one object\(^3\). But this also is not an original contribution of Rāmādvaṇya, since it was also propounded by his predecessor Ānandajñāna in his Tarka-

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\(^1\) See Pañca-pādiḥkā-vivaraṇa, p. 70, and Tatvā-dipana, pp. 256–259, Benares, 1902.


\(^3\) yēvanī śānānī tāvanī śva-tantrāṇi para-tantrāṇi vā ajñānāni tato na doṣah. Vedānta-kaumudī, MS. copy, p. 43.
sangraha and by others\(^1\). The upshot of the whole discussion is that on the occasion of a cognitive operation of the mind both the mind and the cognitive operation become enlivened and illuminated by the indwelling pure consciousness as subject-consciousness and awareness, and through contact with this cognitive operation the object also becomes revealed not as a mere content of awareness, but as an objective fact shining forth in the external world. Cognition of objects is thus not a mere quality of the self as knower, as the Nyāya holds, nor is there any immediate contact of the self with the object (the contact being only through the cognitive operation); the cognition is also not to be regarded as unperceived movement, modification or transformation of the self which may be inferred from the fact of the enlightenment of the object (jñātatā), as Kumārila held, nor is the illumination of the object to be regarded mere form of awareness without there being a corresponding as an objective entity (viśayābhivyaktir nāma vijnāne tad-ākārollekhamātrām na bahir-āngra-rūpasya vijnānābhivyayāptih), as is held by the Buddhist subjective idealists. The cognitive operation before its contact with the object is a mere undifferentiated awareness, having only an objective reference and devoid of all specifications of sense characters, which later on assumes the sense characteristics in accordance with the object with which it comes in contact. It must be noted, however, that the cognitive operation is not an abstract idea, but an active transformation of a real sattva stuff, the mind (antahkarana)\(^2\). Since in the continuous perception of the same object we have only a rapid succession of cognitive acts, each

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\(^1\) The theory is that there is an infinite number of the ašīna-veils; as soon as there is the vṛtti-object contact, the veil is removed and the object is illuminated; the next moment there is again an ašīna-veil covering the object, and again there is the vṛtti-object contact, and again illumination of the object, and thus there is very quick succession of veils and their removals, as the perception of the object continues in time. On account of the rapidity of this succession it is not possible to notice it (vṛtti-aśīnaaya sāavyayatvāc ca hrāsa-dālāyāṁ dīpa-jvalāyā iva tamo 'ntaram mohāntaram āvartum viṣayām pravartate tato 'pī kramamānaṁ kṣaṇāntare sāmaygy-anusāreṇa vijnānāntaram viṣayājāvartanhaṅgenaiva sva-kāryam karoti, tathā sarvāny api atiśaṅghreyātu tā jñāna-bhedavād āvāraṇāntaram na lakṣyate. Vedānta-kumudī, MS. copy, p. 46). This view of the Vedānta-kumudī is different from the view of the Vedānta-paribhāṣā, which holds that in the case of continuous perception of the same object there are not different successive awarenesses, but there is one unchanged continuous vṛtti and not different vṛttis removing different aśīnas (kiṁ ca siddhante dhrāvāhikā-buddhi-sthale na jñāna-bhedah kiṁtā vāvād ghāta-sphūram tāvād ghaṭākārdāntahkarana-vṛttir ekaiva na tu nānā vṛttih sva-virodhī-vṛttya-utpattiparyantaman vēdānta-vāhikā-yupagamāt. Vedānta-paribhāṣā, pp. 26, 27, Bombay, 1911).

\(^2\) atāh sāavyaya-sattvātmakah antahkarānam eka anubhūta-rūpa-sparśi adhīyam asprāyaṃ ca viṣayākāreṇa parinamate. Vedānta-kumudī, MS. copy, p. 42.
dispelling an intellectual darkness enfold ing the object before its illumination, there is no separate perception of time as an entity standing apart from the objects; perception of time is but the perception of the succession of cognitive acts, and what is regarded as the present time is that in which the successive time-moments have been fused together into one concrete duration: it is this concrete duration, which is in reality but a fusion of momentary cognitive acts and awarenesses, that is designated as the present time. According to Rāmādvaya the definition of perception would not therefore include the present time as a separate element over and above the object as a separate datum of perception; for his view denies time as an objective entity and regards it only as a mode of cognitive process.

Rāmādvaya’s definition of right knowledge is also different from that of Dharmarāja Adhvarindra. Rāmādvaya defines right knowledge (pramāṇa) as experience which does not wrongly represent its object (yathārthānubhavah pramāṇa), and he defines the instrument of right knowledge as that which leads to it. Verbally this definition is entirely different from that of Dharmarāja Adhvarindra, with whom the two conditions of pramāṇa or right knowledge are that it should not be acquaintance with what was already known (anadhigata) and that it should be uncontradicted. The latter condition, however, seems to point only to a verbal difference from Rāmādvaya’s definition; but it may really mean very much more than a verbal difference. For, though want of contradiction (Dharmarāja Adhvarindra’s condition) and want of wrong representation (Rāmādvaya’s condition) may mean the same thing, yet in the former case the definition of truth becomes more subjective than in the latter case; for want of wrong representation refers to an objective correspondence and objective certainty. An awareness may wrongly represent an object, but yet may not be found contradicted in the personal history of one or even many observers. Such a definition of truth becomes very relative, since its limits are not fixed by correspondence with its object. Considering the fact


2 Ibid. p. 16.

that the Vedānta speaks of a real spatial superimposition of the modification of the antahkarana (which is its cognitive operation) on the object, a Vedānta definition of truth might well be expected to be realistic and not subjectivistic or relativistic. The idealism of the Vedānta rests content in the view that, however realistic these cognitive relations to objects may be, they are impositions and appearances which have as their ultimate ground one changeless consciousness. The definition of pramā by Rāmādvaya as an awareness which does not give a wrong representation (yathārthānubhava) of objects could not be found faulty because of the fact that according to the Vedānta all dual experience of the world was false; for, though it was ultimately so, for all practical purposes it had a real existence, and Rāmādvaya refers to the Iṣṭa-siddhi to justify his view on this point.

As to the other point, viz. that a pramā must always be that which acquaints us with what is unknown before (anadhigata), Rāmādvaya certainly repudiates such a suggestion¹. He says that it often happens that we perceive things that we perceived before, and this makes recognition possible, and, if we deny that these are cases of right knowledge, we shall have to exclude much that is universally acknowledged as right knowledge. Also it cannot be conceived how in the case of the continuous perception of an object there can be new qualities accruing to the object, so as to justify the validity of the consciousness as right knowledge at every moment; nor can it be said that the sense-organs after producing the right knowledge of an object (which lasts for some time and is not momentary) may cease to operate until a new awareness is produced. There is therefore no justification for introducing anadhigatatva as a condition of perception. Turning to the difference between perception and inference, Rāmādvaya says that in inference the inferred object does not form a datum and there is no direct and immediate contact of the antahkarana with the inferred object (e.g. fire). In inference the antahkarana is in touch only with the reason or the linga (e.g. smoke), and through this there arises (lingādibala-labdhākārrolekha-mātreṇa) an idea in the mind (e.g. regarding the existence of fire) which is called inference².

¹ ajñāta-jñāpanam pramānam iti tad asāram. Vedānta-kaumūḍt. MS. copy, p. 18.
² Ibid. p. 47. One of the earliest explanations of the Vedāntic view of inference occurs in the Prakārārtha-vivaraṇa, to which the Vedānta-kaumūḍt is in all probability indebted.
On the subject of the self-validity of knowledge (svatah-prāmāṇya) Rāmādvaya does not, like Dharmarājādharvarindra, include the absence of defects (doṣābhāva) in the definition of svatah-prāmāṇya. It may well be remembered that Dharmarāja Adhvarindra defines validity (prāmāṇya) of knowledge as an awareness that characterizes an object as it is (tadvati tat-prakāraka-jñānatvam), while self-validity (svatah-prāmāṇya) is defined as the acceptance by the underlying sākṣi consciousness of this validity in accordance with the exact modes of the awareness (of which the validity is affirmed), and in accordance with the exact objective conditions of the awareness, in absence of any defects\(^1\). Rāmādvaya, however, closely follows Kumārila’s view of the self-validity of knowledge and defines it as that which, being produced by the actual data of that cognition, does not contain any element which is derived from other sources\(^2\). Later knowledge of the presence of any defects or distorting elements may invalidate any cognition; but, so long as such defects are not known, each cognition is valid of itself for reasons similar to those held by Kumārila and already discussed\(^3\). In this connection Rāmādvaya points out that our cognitions are entirely internal phenomena and are not in touch with objects, and that, though the objects are revealed outside, yet it is through our own internal conditions, merit and demerit, that they may be perceived by us\(^4\).

Vidyāraṇya (A.D. 1350).

In addition to the Sarva-dārsana-saṃgraha Mādhava wrote two works on the Śaṅkara Vedānta system, viz. Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṃgraha and Pañcadaśī; and also Jīvan-muktī-viveka. Of these the former is an independent study of Prakāśātman’s Pañca-pādikā-vivarana, in which Mādhava elaborates the latter’s arguments in his own way. His other work, Pañcadaśī, is a popular compendium in verse. Both these works attained great celebrity on account of


\(^3\) jñāntādvi jñāna-jñāpaka-sāmagnit-mātra-jñāpayatvaṁ svastastvam. Ibid. p. 61.


\(^4\) prākatyaṇa yuktaśyāpi tasya na sarvair viditātvaṁ svā-grāhikam api prākattyam kavyācid evāddṛśa-yogāt sāphraṇi na gunatva jñānasya kathaṇcīr artha-yogāḥ samastīti. Vedānta-kaumudi, MS. copy, pp. 67, 68.
their clear and forcible style and diction. Vidyārānya is reputed to be the same as Mādhava, brother of Sāyana, the great Vedic commentator. He was a pupil of Śaṅkarānanda, who had written some works of minor importance on the Upaniṣads\textsuperscript{1}.

Vidyārānya in his Pañcadasī repeats the Vivarana view of the Vedānta, that, whether in our awakened state or in our dreams or in our dreamless condition, there is no moment when there is no consciousness; for even in dreamless sleep there must be some consciousness, as is evident from the later remembrance of the experience of the dreamless state. The light of consciousness is thus itself ever present without any change or flickering of any kind. It should therefore be regarded as ultimately real. It is self-luminous and neither rises nor sets\textsuperscript{2}. This self is pure bliss, because nothing is so much loved by us as our own selves. If the nature of self had been unobscured, we could not have found any enjoyment in sense-objects. It is only because the self is largely obscured to us that we do not rest content with self-realization and crave for other pleasures from sense-objects. Māyā is the cause of this obscuration, and it is described as that power by which can be produced the manifold world-appearance. This power (sakti), cannot be regarded either as absolutely real or as unreal. It is, however, associated only with a part of Brahman and not with the whole of it, and it is only in association with a part of Brahman that it transforms itself into the various elements and their modifications. All objects of the world are thus but a complex of Brahman and māyā. The existence or being of all things is the Brahman, and all that appears identified with being is the māyā part. Māyā as the power of Brahman regulates all relation and order of the universe. In association with the intelligence of Brahman this behaves as an intelligent power which is responsible for the orderliness of all qualities of things, their inter-relations and interactions\textsuperscript{3}. He compares the world-appearance to a painting, where the white paste for the inner controller (antaryāmin), the dark colour for the dispenser of the crude elements (sūtrātman) and the coloration for

\textsuperscript{1} Bhāratītīrtha and his teacher Vidyātīrtha also were teachers of Vidyārānya. Vidyārānya thus seems to have had three teachers, Bhāratī Tīrtha, Vidyā Tīrtha and Śaṅkarānanda.

\textsuperscript{2} nodeti nāstamety ekā samvid ēṣā svayam-prabhā. Pañcadasī, 1. 7, Basumati edition, Calcutta, 1907.

\textsuperscript{3} śaktir astī aśīvarī kācit sarva-vastu-niyāmikā. 38. . . .cica-chāyāveśataḥ śaktiḥ cetaneva vibhāti sā. 40. Ibid. III.
the dispenser of the concrete elemental world (vīrāt), and all the figures that are manifested thereon are the living beings and other objects of the world. It is Brahman that, being reflected through the māyā, assumes the diverse forms and characters. The false appearance of individual selves is due to the false identification of subjectivity—a product of māyā—with the underlying pure consciousness—Brahman. Vidyāranya then goes on to describe the usual topics of the Vedānta, which have already been dealt with. The chief and important feature of Vidyāranya's Pañcadaśī is the continual repetition of the well-established Vedāntic principles in a clear, popular and attractive way, which is very helpful to those who wish to initiate their minds into the Vedāntic ways of self-realization. His Vivaraṇa-prameya-samgraha is a more scholarly work; but, as it is of the nature of an elaboration of the ideas contained in Pañca-pādikā-vivaraṇa, which has generally been followed as the main guide in the account of Vedānta given in this and the preceding chapter, and there being but few ideas which can be considered as an original contribution of Vidyāranya to the development of Vedāntic thought, no separate account of its contents need be given here. The jivan-mukti-viveka, the substance of which has already been utilized in section 17 of chapter x, volume 1 of the present work, is an ethical treatise, covering more or less the same ground as the Naiṣkarmya-siddhi of Sureśvara.

Nṛśimhāśrama Muni (A.D. 1500).

Nṛśimhāśrama Muni (A.D. 1500) was a pupil of Gīrvānendrab Sarasvatī and Jagannāthāśrama and teacher of Nārāyanāśrama, who wrote a commentary on his Bheda-dhikkāra. He wrote many works, such as Advaita-dipikā, Advaita-paṇca-ratna, Advaita-bodha-dipikā, Advaita-vāda, Bheda-dhikkāra, Vācārambhāna, Vedānta-tattva-viveka, and commentaries on the Saṃkṣepa-śārīraka and Pañca-

1 There are four commentaries on the Pañcadaśī:—Tattva-bodhīnt, Vṛtti-prabhākara by Niścaladāsa Svāmin, Tātparya-bodhīnt by Rāmakṛṣṇa and another commentary by Sadānanda. It is traditionally believed that the Pañcadaśī was written jointly by Vidyāranya and Bhāratī Tirtha. Niścaladāsa Svāmin points out in his Vṛtti-prabhākara that Vidyāranya was author of the first ten chapters of the Pañcadaśī and Bhāratī Tirtha of the other five. Rāmakṛṣṇa, however, in the beginning of his commentary on the seventh chapter, attributes that chapter to Bhāratī Tirtha, and this fits in with the other tradition that the first six chapters were written by Vidyāranya and the other nine by Bhāratītirtha.

2 He also wrote another work on the Vivaraṇa, called Vivaraṇopanyāsa, which is referred to by Appaya Dīkṣita in his Siddhānta-leśa, p. 68—Vivaraṇopanyāsa Bhāratītṛtha-vacanam.
Nṛśīṁhasrama Muni

pādikā-vivarana, called Tattva-bodhīnt and Pañca-pādikā-vivarana-prakāśikā. Nṛśīṁhasrama was very well reputed among his contemporaries, but it does not seem that he introduced any new ideas into the Vedānta. He is more interested in emphasizing the fact of the identity of Brahman with the self and the illusory character of the world-appearance than in investigating the nature and constitution of māyā and the way in which it can be regarded as the material stuff of world-appearance. He defines the falsehood of world-appearance as its non-existence in the locus in which it appears (pratipannopādhāv abhāva-pratīyogitva)\(^1\). When a piece of conch-shell appears to be silver, the silver appears to be existent and real (sat), but silver cannot be the same as being or existence (na tāvad rajata-svarūpam sat). So also, when we take the world-appearance as existent, the world-appearance cannot be identical with being or existence; its apparent identification with these is thus necessarily false\(^2\). So also the appearance of subjectivity or egoistic characters in the self-luminous self is false, because the two are entirely different and cannot be identified. Nṛśīṁhasrama, however, cannot show by logical arguments or by a reference to experience that subjectivity or egoism (ahaṁkāra, which he also calls antahkarana or mind) is different from self, and he relies on the texts of the Upaniṣads to prove this point, which is of fundamental importance for the Vedānta thesis. In explaining the nature of the perceptual process he gives us the same sort of account as is given by his pupil Dharmarāja Adhvarindra in his Vedānta-paribhāṣā, as described in the tenth chapter in the first volume of this work\(^3\). He considers the self to be bliss itself (sukha-rūpa) and does not admit that there is any difference between the self and bliss (sa cātmā sukhān na bhidyate)\(^4\). His definition of ajñāna is the same as that of Citsukha, viz. that it is a beginningless constitutive cause, which is removable by true knowledge\(^5\). There is thus practically

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\(^1\) Vedānta-tattva-viveka, p. 12. The Pandit, vol. xxv, May 1903. This work has two important commentaries, viz. Tattva-viveka-dīpana, and one called Tattva-viveka-dīpana-tyākhyā by Bhaṭṭoṣī.

\(^2\) Vedānta-tattva-viveka, p. 15.

\(^3\) yadā antahkarana-vṛttīyā gḥatāvacchinnaṁ caityanyām upadhyāye tada antahkarana-vacchinna-gḥatāvacchinna-caityanyayor vastuta ekatve 'py upādhi-bhedād bhimayaḥ abhedopādhi-sambandhena aikyād bhavaty abheda ity antahkarana-vacchinna-caityanyasya viśayābhinna tad-adhiṣṭhāṇa-caityanyasyābheda-siddhi-artham vṛttīr nirguṇanam vācyam. Ibid. p. 22.

\(^4\) Ibid. p. 29.

\(^5\) anādy upādānata sati jñāno-nivartyaṁ ajñānam, nikhila-praṇānapādaṇa-brahma-gocaram eva ajñānam. Ibid. p. 43.
no new line of argument in his presentation of the Vedānta. On the side of dialectical arguments, in his attempts to refute “difference” (bheda) in his Bheda-dhikāra he was anticipated by his great predecessors Śriharṣa and Citsukha.

Appaya Dīkṣita1 (A.D. 1550).

Appaya Dīkṣita lived probably in the middle of the sixteenth century, as he refers to Nṛsimhāśrama Muni, who lived early in that century. He was a great scholar, well-read in many branches of Sanskrit learning, and wrote a large number of works on many subjects. His grandfather was Ācārya Dīkṣita, who is said to have been famous for his scholarship from the Himalayas to the south point of India: the name of his father was Raṅgarāja Makhindra (or simply Rāja Makhindra). There is, however, nothing very noteworthy in his Vedāntic doctrines. For, in spite of his scholarship, he was only a good compiler and not an original thinker, and on many occasions where he had opportunities of giving original views he contents himself with the views of others. It is sometimes said that he had two different religious views at two different periods of his life, Śaiva and the Vedānta. But of this one cannot be certain; for he was such an all-round scholar that the fact that he wrote a Śaiva commentary and a Vedāntic commentary need not lead to the supposition that he changed his faith. In the beginning of his commentary Śivārka-mani-dipikā on Śrikanṭha’s Śaiva commentary to the Brahma-sūtra he says that, though the right interpretation of the Brahma-sūtra is the monistic interpretation, as attempted by Śaṅkara and others, yet the desire for attaining this right wisdom of oneness (advaita-vāsanā) arises only through the grace of Śiva, and it is for this reason that Vyāsa in his Brahma-sūtra tried to establish the superiority of the qualified Brahman Śiva as interpreted by Śrikanṭhācārya. This shows that even while writing his commentary on Śrikanṭha’s Śaiva-bhāṣya he had not lost respect for the monistic interpretations of Śaṅkara, and he was somehow able to reconcile in his mind the Śaiva doctrine of qualified Brahman (saguna-brahma) as Śiva with the Śaṅkara doctrine of unqualified pure Brahman. It is possible,

1 He was also called Appayya Dīkṣita and Avadhāni Yajvā, and he studied Logic (tarka) with Yajñeśvara Makhindra. See colophon to Appaya Dīkṣita’s commentary on the Nyāya-siddhānta-maṇjari of Jānakinātha, called Nyāya-siddhānta-maṇjari-vyākhyaṇa (MS.).
however, that his sympathies with the monistic Vedānta, which
at the beginning were only lukewarm, deepened with age. He
says in his Śivārka-manī-dīpikā that he lived in the reign of King
Cinnabomma (whose land-grant inscriptions date from Sadāśiva,
mahārāja of Vijayanagara, A.D. 1566 to 1575; vide Hultsch, S.I.
Inscriptions, vol. 1), under whose orders he wrote the Śivārka-
manī-dīpikā commentary on Śrīkaṇṭha’s commentary. His grandson
Nilakaṇṭha Dikṣita says in his Śiva-lilārṇava that Appaya Dikṣita
lived to the good old age of seventy-two. In the Oriental Historical
Manuscripts catalogued by Taylor, vol. ii, it is related that at
the request of the Pāṇḍya king Tirumalai Nayaka he came to the
Pāṇḍya country in A.D. 1626 to settle certain disputes between the
Śaivas and the Vaiṣṇavas. Kālahasti-śaraṇa-Śivānanda Yogindra,
in his commentary on the Ātmārpaṇa-stava, gives the date of
Appaya Dikṣita’s birth as Kali age 4654, or A.D. 1554, as pointed
out by Mahāmahopādhyāya Kuppusvami Sastri in his Sanskrit
introduction to the Śiva-lilārṇava. Since he lived seventy-two
years, he must have died some time in 1626, the very year when
he came to the Pāṇḍya country. He had for his pupil Bhaṭṭọji
Dikṣita, as is indicated by his own statement in the Tantra-
siddhānta-dīpikā by the latter author. Bhaṭṭọji Dikṣita must there-
fore have been a junior contemporary of Appaya Dikṣita, as
is also evidenced by his other statement in his Tattva-kaustubha
that he wrote this work at the request of King Keladi- Veṅkaṭendra,
who reigned from 1604 to 1626 (vide Hultsch’s second volume of
Reports on Sanskrit Manuscripts).¹

It is said that Appaya Dikṣita wrote about four hundred
works. Some of them may be mentioned here: Advaita-nirṇaya,
Catur-mata-sāra-saṃgraha (containing in the first chapter, called
Nyāya-muktāvalī, a brief summary of the doctrines of Madhva,
in the second chapter, called Naya-maṭhakā-mālikā, the doctrines
of Rāmānuja, in the third chapter the decisive conclusions from
the point of view of Śrīkaṇṭha’s commentary called Naya-maṇi-
mālā and in the fourth chapter, called Naya-maṇjarī, decisive
conclusions in accordance with the views of Saṅkarācārya); Tattva-
muktāvalī, a work on Vedānta; Vyākaraṇa-vāda-nakṣatra-mālā,
a work on grammar; Pūrvottara-mimāṃsā-vāda-nakṣatra-mālā
(containing various separate topics of discussion in Mimāṃsā and

¹ See Mahāmahopādhyāya Kuppusvami Sastri’s introduction to the Śiva-
lilārṇava, Srirangam, 1911.
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Vedānta); Nyāya-rāksa-manī, a commentary on the Brahma-sūtra following the monistic lines of Śaṅkara; Vedānta-kalpa-taru-parimala, a commentary on Amalānanda’s Vedānta-kalpa-taru, a commentary on Vācaspati’s Bhāmati commentary; Siddhānta-leśa-samgraha, a collection of the views of different philosophers of the monistic school of Śaṅkara on some of the most important points of the Vedānta, without any attempt at harmonizing them or showing his own preference by reasoned arguments, and comprising a number of commentaries by Acyutakṛṣṇānanda Tīrtha (Krṣṇālamkāra), Gaṅgādharendra Sarasvātī (Siddhānta-bindu-śikṣā), Rāmacandra Yajvan (Gūḍhārtha-prakāśa), Viśvanātha Tīrtha, Dharmaya Dikṣita and others; Śīrka-manī-dipikā, a commentary on Śrikanṭha’s Śaiva-bhāṣya on the Brahma-sūtra; Śīva-karnāmṛta; Śīva-tattva-viveka; Śīva-purāṇa-tāmasatvā-khaṇḍana; Śīvādevaita-nirṇaya; Śīvānanda-lahari-candrikā, a commentary on Śaṅkara’s Śīvānanda-lahari; Śīvārccana-candrikā; Śīvotkara-candrikā; Śīvotkara-maṇijari; Śaiva-kalpa-druma; Siddhānta-ratnākara; Madhva-mukha-bhaṅga, an attempt to show that Madhva’s interpretation of the Brahma-sūtra is not in accordance with the meaning of the texts of the Upaniṣads; Rāmānuja-muta-khaṇḍana; Rāmāyaṇa-tātparya-nirṇaya; Rāmāyaṇa-tātparya-samgraha; Rāmāyaṇa-bhārata-sāra-samgraha; Rāmāyaṇa-sāra; Rāmāyaṇa-sāra-samgraha; Rāmāyaṇa-sāra-stava; Mīmāṃsādikaraṇā-mālā Upākrama-parākrama, a short Mīnāṁsa work; Dharma-mīmāṁsā-paribhāṣā; Nāma-samgraha-mālikā; Vidhi-rasāyana; Vidhi-rasāyanopajīvani; Vyṛti-vārttika, a short work on the threefold meanings of words; Kuvalayānanda, a work on rhetoric on which no less than ten commentaries have been written; Citra-mīmāṁsā, a work on rhetoric; Jayollāsa-nidhi, a commentary on the Bhāgavata-purāṇa; Yādavābhuyadaya-tīkā, a commentary on Veṇkaṭa’s Yādavābhuyadaya; a commentary on the Prabodha-candrodaya nāṭaka, etc.

Prakāsānanda (A.D. 1550–1600).

It has been pointed out that the Vedānta doctrine of monism as preached by Śaṅkara could not shake off its apparent duality in association with māyā, which in the hands of the later followers of Śaṅkara gradually thickened into a positive stuff through the evolution or transformation of which all the phenomena of world-appearance could be explained. The Vedāntists held that this māyā,
though it adhered to Brahman and spread its magical creations thereon, was unspeakable, indescribable, indefinable, changeable and unthinkable and was thus entirely different from the self-revealing, unchangeable Brahman. The charge of dualism against such a system of philosophy could be dodged by the teachers of Vedānta only by holding that, since Brahman was the ultimate reality, māyā was unreal and illusory, and hence the charge of duality would be false. But when one considers that māyā is regarded as positive and as the stuff of the transformations of world-appearance, it is hardly intelligible how it can be kept out of consideration as having no kind of existence at all. The positive character of māyā as being the stuff of all world-appearance has to be given up, if the strictly monistic doctrine is to be consistently kept. Almost all the followers of Śaṅkara had, however, been interpreting their master’s views in such a way that the positive existence of an objective world with its infinite varieties as the ground of perceptual presentation was never denied. The whole course of the development of Vedānta doctrine in the hands of these Vedānta teachers began to crystallize compactly in the view that, since the variety and multiplicity of world-appearance cannot be explained by the pure changeless Brahman, an indefinable stuff, the māyā, has necessarily to be admitted as the ground of this world. Prakāśānanda was probably the first who tried to explain Vedānta from a purely sensationalistic view-point of idealism and denied the objective existence of any stuff. The existence of objects is nothing more than their perception (drṣṭi). The central doctrine of Prakāśānanda has already been briefly described in chapter x, section 15, of volume i of the present work, and his analysis of the nature of perceptual cognition has already been referred to in a preceding section of the present chapter.

Speaking on the subject of the causality of Brahman, he says that the attribution of causality to Brahman cannot be regarded as strictly correct; for ordinarily causality implies the dual relation of cause and effect; since there is nothing else but Brahman, it cannot, under the circumstances, be called a cause. Nescience (avidyā), again, cannot be called a cause of the world; for causality is based upon the false notion of duality, which is itself the outcome of nescience. The theory of cause and effect thus lies outside the scope of the Vedānta (kārya-kāraṇa-vādasya vedānta-bahir-bhūtatvāt). When in reply to the question, “what is the cause of
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the world?” it is said that nescience (ajñāna—literally, want of knowledge) is the cause, the respondent simply wants to obviate the awkward silence. The nature of this nescience cannot, however, be proved by any of the pramāṇas; for it is like darkness and the pramāṇas or the valid ways of cognition are like light, and it is impossible to perceive darkness by light. Nescience is that which cannot be known except through something else, by its relation to something else, and it is inexplicable in itself, yet beginningless and positive. It will be futile for any one to try to understand it as it is in itself. Nescience is proved by one’s own consciousness: so it is useless to ask how nescience is proved. Yet it is destroyed when the identity of the self with the immediately presented Brahman is realized. The destruction of nescience cannot mean its cessation together with its products, as Prakāśātman holds in the Vivarāna; for such a definition would not apply, whether taken simply or jointly. Prakāśānanda, therefore, defines it as the conviction, following the realization of the underlying ground, that the appearance which was illusorily imposed on it did not exist. This view is different from the anyathā-khyāti view, that the surmised appearance was elsewhere and not on the ground on which it was imposed; for here, when the underlying ground is immediately intuited, the false appearance absolutely vanishes, and it is felt that it was not there, it is not anywhere, and it will not be anywhere; and it is this conviction that is technically called bādha.

The indefinability of nescience is its negation on the ground on which it appears (pratipannopādhau niṣedha-pratiyogitvam). This negation of all else excepting Brahman has thus two forms; in one form it is negation and in another form this negation, being included within “all else except Brahman,” is itself an illusory imposition, and this latter form thus is itself contradicted and negated by its former form. Thus it would be wrong to argue that, since this negation remains after the realization of Brahman, it would not itself be negated, and hence it would be a dual principle existing side by side with Brahman.

True knowledge is opposed to false knowledge in such a way

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1 Brahmany adhyāsyamānaṁ sarvaṁ kālātrye nāśttinīcayasya asti rūpadvāyam ekam bādhātmakam aparām adhyāsyamānattvam; tatra adhyāsyamānattvena rūpeṇa vva-viṣayatvatam; bādhatvaṁ viṣayitvam iti nātmāraṇya ity arthaḥ tathā ca nādvaite-ksāth. Compare also Bhāmatt on Adhyāsa-bhārya. Nānā Dīkṣita seems to have borrowed his whole argument from the Bhāmatt. See his commentary on the Siddhānta-muktavati. The Pandūt, 1890, p. 108.

This idea, however, is not by any means a new contribution of Prakāśānanda. Thus Citsukha writes the same thing in his Tatva-dīpikā (also called Pratyak-tatt-
that, when the former dawns, the latter is dispelled altogether. An objection is sometimes raised that, if this be so, then the person who has realized Brahma knowledge will cease to have a bodily existence; for bodily existence is based on illusion and all illusion must vanish when true knowledge dawns. And, if this is so, there will be no competent Vedānta teacher. To this Prakāśānanda replies that, even though the Vedānta teacher may be himself an illusory production, he may all the same lead any one to the true path, just as the Vedas, which are themselves but illusory products, may lead any one to the right path.¹

On the subject of the nature of the self as pure bliss (ānanda) he differs from Sarvajñātma Muni’s view that what is meant by the statement that the self is of the nature of pure bliss is that there is entire absence of all sorrows or negation of bliss in the self. Bliss, according to Sarvajñātma Muni, thus means the absence of the negation of bliss (an-ānanda-vyavrīti-mātram ānandatvam)². He differs also from the view of Prakāśātman that ānanda, or bliss, means the substance which appears as blissful, since it is the object that we really desire. Prakāśātman holds that it is the self on which the character of blissfulness is imposed. The self is called blissful, because it is the ground of the appearance of blissfulness. What people consider of value and desire is not the blissfulness, but that which is blissful. Prakāśānanda holds that this view is not correct, since the self appears not only as blissful, but also as painful, and it would therefore be as right to call the self blissful as to call it painful. Moreover, not the object of blissfulness, which in itself is dissociated from blissfulness, is called blissful, but that which is endowed with bliss is called blissful (viśīṣtyaiva ānandapadārthatvāt)³. If blissfulness is not a natural character of the self, it cannot be called blissful because it happens to be the ground on which blissfulness is illusorily imposed. So Prakāśānanda holds that the self is naturally of a blissful character.

Prakāśānanda raises the question regarding the holder of the

¹ Samkhṣepa-īśāvatara, i. 1. 174.
³ The Pandit, 1890, p. 160.
experienced duality and says that it is Brahman who has this experience of duality; but, though Brahman alone exists, yet there is no actual modification or transformation (parināma) of Brahman into all its experiences, since such a view would be open to the objections brought against the alternative assumptions of the whole of Brahman or a part of it, and both of them would land us in impossible consequences. The vivarta view holds that the effect has no reality apart from the underlying ground or substance. So vivarta really means oneness with the substance, and it virtually denies all else that may appear to be growing out of this one substance. The false perception of world-appearance thus consists in the appearance of all kinds of characters in Brahman, which is absolutely characterless (nisprakārikāyāh saprakārakatvena bhāvah). Since the self and its cognition are identical and since there is nothing else but this self, there is no meaning in saying that the Vedānta admits the vivarta view of causation; for, strictly speaking, there is no causation at all (vivartasya bāla-vyutpatti-prayojana-tayā)\(^1\). If anything existed apart from self, then the Vedāntic monism would be disturbed. If one looks at māyā in accordance with the texts of the Vedas, māyā will appear to be an absolutely fictitious non-entity (tuccha), like the hare’s horn; if an attempt is made to interpret it logically, it is indefinable (anivratam), though common people would always think of it as being real (vāstavā)\(^2\). Prakāśānanda thus preaches the extreme view of the Vedānta, that there is no kind of objectivity that can be attributed to the world, that māyā is absolutely non-existent, that our ideas have no objective substratum to which they correspond, that the self is the one and only ultimate reality, and that there is no causation or creation of the world. In this view he has often to fight with Sarvajñātma Muni, Prakāśatman, and with others who developed a more realistic conception of māyā transformation; but it was he who, developing probably on the lines of Maṇḍana, tried for the first time to give a consistent presentation of the Vedānta from the most thorough-going idealistic point of view. In the colophon of his work he says that the essence of the Vedānta as

\[^{1}\text{bālān prati vivartā t'jām brahmanah sakalam jagat}
\text{avivartitaṁ ānandam āṣṭhitāṁ karinah sadā.}
\text{\textit{The Pandit}, 1890, p. 326.}

\[^{2}\text{tucchaṁivratam ca vāstavā cety asau tridhā}
\text{jñeyā māyā tribhir bodhaiḥ śrāuta-yāuktika-laukikāiḥ.}
\text{\textit{Ibid.} p. 420.}\]
preached by him is unknown to his contemporaries and that it was he who first thoroughly expounded this doctrine of philosophy\(^1\). Prakāśānanda wrote many other works in addition to his Siddhānta-muktāvalī, such as Tārā-bhakti-taraṅgini, Manorāmā tantra-rāja-ṭikā, Mahā-lakṣmi-paddhati and Śrī-vidyā-paddhati, and this shows that, though a thoroughgoing Vedāntist, he was religiously attached to tantra forms of worship. Nānā Dīkṣita wrote a commentary on the Muktāvalī, called Siddhānta-pradīpikā, at a time when different countries of India had become pervaded by the disciples and disciples of the disciples of Prakāśānanda\(^2\).

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (A.D. 1500)\(^3\).

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, who was a pupil of Viśveśvara Sarasvatī and teacher of Puruṣottama Sarasvatī, in all probability flourished in the first half of the sixteenth century. His chief works are Vedānta-kalpa-latikā, Advaita-siddhi, Advaita-mañjari, Advaita-ratna-raksana, Ātma-bodha-ṭikā, Ānanda-mandakini, Kṛṣṇa-kutūhala-nāṭaka, Prasthāna-bhedā, Bhakti-sāmānya-nirūpaṇa, Bhagavat-gitā-gūḍhārtha-dīpikā, Bhagavat-bhakti-rasāyana, Bhāgavata-purāṇa-prathama-śloka-vyākhya, Veda-stuti-ṭikā, Śāntīlya-sūtra-ṭikā, Śāstra-siddhānta-leśa-ṭikā, Sāmkṣepa-śārīraka-sara-samgraha, Siddhānta-tattva-bindu, Hari-lilā-vyākhya. His most important work, however, is his Advaita-siddhi, in which he tries to refute the objections raised in Vyāsatirtha's Nyāyāmṛta\(^4\).

\(^1\) vedānta-sāra-saratvam ajñeyam adhunātanaīh
aśeṇa mayoktām tat puruṣottama-yatnatah.

\(^2\) The Pandit, 1890, p. 428.

\(^3\) yacchīṣya-śīṣya-sandoha-vyāptā bhārata-bhūmayāḥ
tam yatībhir vandyaṃ Prākāśānandaṃ tivaram.

\(^4\) Ibid. p. 488.

\(^5\) Rāmājñā Pāṇḍeya in his edition of Madhusūdana's Vedānta-kalpa-latikā suggests that he was a Bengali by birth. His pupil Puruṣottama Sarasvatī in his commentary on the Siddhānta-bindu-ṭikā refers to Balabhadra Bhaṭṭacārya as a favourite pupil of his, and Pāṇḍeya argues that, since Bhaṭṭacārya is a Bengali surname and since his favourite pupil was a Bengali, he also must have been a Bengali. It is also pointed out that in a family genealogy (Kula-paṇijikā) of Kotalipara of Faridpur, Bengal, Madhusūdana’s father is said to have been Pramodapurandara Ācārya, who had four sons—Śrīnātha Cūḍāmāni, Yādavānanda Nyāyācārya, Kamalajanaayana and Vāgīṣa Gosvāmin. Some of the important details of Madhusūdana’s philosophical dialectics will be taken up in the treatment of the philosophy of Madhva and his followers in the third volume of the present work in connection with Madhusūdana’s discussions with Vyāsatirtha.

\(^6\) The Advaita-siddhi has three commentaries, Advaita-siddhy-upanyāsa, Brhat-ṭikā, and Laghu-candrikā, by Brahmānanda Sarasvatī.
against the monistic Vedānta of Śaṅkara and his followers. Materials from this book have already been utilized in sections 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the tenth chapter of the present work. More will be utilized in the third volume in connection with the controversy between Vyāsatirtha and Madhusūdana, which is the subject-matter of Advaita-siddhi. Madhusūdana’s Siddhānta-bindu does not contain anything of importance, excepting that he gives a connected account of the perceptual process, already dealt with in the tenth chapter and also in the section “Vedāntic Cosmology” of the present volume. His Advaita-ratna-rakṣana deals with such subjects as the validity of the Upaniṣads: the Upaniṣads do not admit duality; perception does not prove the reality of duality; the duality involved in mutual negation is false; indeterminate knowledge does not admit duality; duality cannot be proved by any valid means of proof, and so forth. There is practically nothing new in the work, as it only repeats some of the important arguments of the bigger work Advaita-siddhi and tries to refute the view of dualists like the followers of Madhva, with whom Madhusūdana was in constant controversy. It is unnecessary, therefore, for our present purposes to enter into any of the details of this work. It is, however, interesting to note that, though he was such a confirmed monist in his philosophy, he was a theist in his religion and followed the path of bhakti, or devotion, as is evidenced by his numerous works promulgating the bhakti creed. These works, however, have nothing to do with the philosophy of the Vedānta, with which we are concerned in the present chapter. Madhusūdana’s Vedānta-kalpa-latikā was written earlier than his Advaita-siddhi and his commentary on the Mahimnāh stotra. Rāmajñā Pāṇḍeya points out in his introduction to the Vedānta-kalpa-latikā that the Advaita-siddhi contains a reference to his Gitā-nibandhana; the Gitā-nibandhana and the Śrimad-bhāgavata-tīkā contain references to his Bhakti-rasāyana, and the Bhakti-rasāyana refers to the Vedānta-kalpa-latikā; and this shows that the Vedānta-kalpa-latikā was written prior to all these works. The Advaita-ratna-rakṣana refers to the Advaita-siddhi and may therefore be regarded as a much later work. There is nothing particularly new in the Vedānta-kalpa-latikā that deserves special mention as a contribution to Vedāntic thought. The special feature of the work consists in the frequent

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1 He refers to the Vedānta-kalpa-latikā and Siddhānta-bindu in his Advaita-siddhi, p. 537 (Nirṇaya-Sāgara edition). See also Mahimnāh-stotra-tīkā, p. 5.
brief summaries of doctrines of other systems of Indian philosophy and contrasts them with important Vedānta views. The first problem discussed is the nature of emancipation (mokṣa) and the ways of realizing it: Madhusūdana attempts to prove that it is only the Vedantic concept of salvation that can appeal to men, all other views being unsatisfactory and invalid. But it does not seem that he does proper justice to other views. Thus, for example, in refuting the Sāmkhya view of salvation he says that, since the Sāmkhya thinks that what is existent cannot be destroyed, sorrow, being an existent entity, cannot be destroyed, so there cannot be any emancipation from sorrow. This is an evident misrepresentation of the Sāmkhya; for with the Sāmkhya the destruction of sorrow in emancipation means that the buddhi, a product of prakṛti which is the source of all sorrow, ceases in emancipation to have any contact with puruṣa, and hence, even though sorrow may not be destroyed, there is no inconsistency in having emancipation from sorrow. It is unnecessary for our present purposes, however, to multiply examples of misrepresentation by Madhusūdana of the views of other systems of thought in regard to the same problem. In the course of the discussions he describes negation (abhāva) also as being made up of the stuff of nescience, which, like other things, makes its appearance in connection with pure consciousness. He next introduces a discussion of the nature of self-knowledge, and then, since Brahma knowledge can be attained only through the Upaniṣadic propositions of identity, he passes over to the discussion of import of propositions and the doctrines of abhihitān-vaya-vāda, anvītabhidhāna-vāda and the like. He then treats of the destruction of nescience. He concludes the work with a discussion of the substantial nature of the senses. Thus the mind-organ is said to be made up of five elements, whereas other senses are regarded as being constituted of one element only. Manas is said to pervade the whole of the body and not to be atomic, as the Naiyāyikas hold. Finally, Madhusūdana returns again to the problem of emancipation, and holds that it is the self freed from nescience that should be regarded as the real nature of emancipation.
CHAPTER XII

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE YOGA-VĀSIŚṬHA

The philosophical elements in the various Purāṇas will be taken in a later volume. The Yoga-vāsiśṭha-Rāmāyaṇa may be included among the purāṇas, but it is devoid of the general characteristics of the purāṇas and is throughout occupied with discussions of Vedāntic problems of a radically monistic type, resembling the Vedāntic doctrines as interpreted by Śaṅkara. This extensive philosophical poem, which contains twenty-three thousand seven hundred and thirty-four verses (ignoring possible differences in different manuscripts or editions) and is thus very much larger than the Śrimad-bhagavad-gītā, is a unique work. The philosophical view with which it is concerned, and which it is never tired of reiterating, is so much like the view of Śaṅkara and of Vijñānavāda Buddhism, that its claim to treatment immediately after Śaṅkara seems to me to be particularly strong. Moreover, the various interpretations of the Vedānta-sūtra which will follow are so much opposed to Śaṅkara's views as to make it hard to find a suitable place for a treatment like that of the Yoga-vāsiśṭha unless it is taken up immediately after the chapter dealing with Śaṅkara.

The work begins with a story. A certain Brahmin went to the hermitage of the sage Agastya and asked him whether knowledge or work was the direct cause of salvation (mokṣa-sādhana). Agastya replied that, as a bird flies with its two wings, so a man can attain the highest (paramam padam) only through knowledge and work. To illustrate this idea he narrates a story in which Kāruṇya, the son of Agnivesya, having returned from the teacher's house after the completion of his studies, remained silent and did no work. When he was asked for the reason of this attitude of his, he said that he was perplexed over the question as to whether the action of a man in accordance with scriptural injunction was or was not more fitted for the attainment of his highest than following a course of self-abnegation and desirelessness (tyāga-mātra). On hearing this question of Kāruṇya Agnivesya told him that he could answer his question only by narrating a story, after hearing which he might decide as he chose. A heavenly damsel (apsarāh), Suruci by name, sitting on one of the peaks of the
Himalayas, once saw a messenger of Indra flying through the sky. She asked him where he was going. In reply he said that a certain king, Arisṭanemi by name, having given his kingdom to his son and having become free from all passions, was performing a course of asceticism (tapas), and that he had had to go to him on duty and was returning from him. The damsel wanted to know in detail what happened there between the messenger and the king. The messenger replied that he was asked by Indra to take a well-decorated chariot and bring the king in it to heaven, but while doing so he was asked by the king to describe the advantages and defects of heaven, on hearing which he would make up his mind whether he would like to go there or not. In heaven, he was answered, people enjoyed superior, medium and inferior pleasures according as their merits were superior, medium or inferior: when they had exhausted their merits by enjoyment, they were reborn again on earth, and during their stay there they were subject to mutual jealousy on account of the inequality of their enjoyments. On hearing this the king had refused to go to heaven, and, when this was reported to Indra, he was very much surprised and he asked the messenger to carry the king to Vālmiki’s hermitage and make Vālmiki acquainted with the king’s refusal to enjoy the fruits of heaven and request him to give him proper instructions for the attainment of right knowledge, leading to emancipation (mokṣa). When this was done, the king asked Vālmiki how he might attain mokṣa, and Vālmiki in reply wished to narrate the dialogue of Vasiṣṭha and Rāma (Vasiṣṭha-rāma-samvāda) on the subject.

Vālmiki said that, when he had finished the story of Rāma—the work properly known as Rāmāyana—and taught it to Bharadvāja, Bharadvāja recited it once to Brahmā (the god), and he, being pleased, wished to confer a boon on him. Bharadvāja in reply said that he would like to receive such instructions as would enable people to escape from sorrow. Brahmā told him to apply to Vālmiki and went himself to him (Vālmiki), accompanied by Bharadvāja, and asked him not to cease working until he finished describing the entire character of Rāma, by listening to which people will be saved from the dangers of the world. When Brahmā disappeared from the hermitage after giving this instruction, Bharadvāja also asked Vālmiki to describe how Rāma and his wife, brother and followers behaved in this sorrowful and dangerous world and lived in sorrowless tranquillity.
In answer to the above question Vālmīki replied that Rāma, after finishing his studies, went out on his travels to see the various places of pilgrimage and hermitages. On his return, however, he looked very sad every day and would not tell anyone the cause of his sorrow. King Daśaratha, Rāma’s father, became very much concerned about Rāma’s sadness and asked Vaśiṣṭha if he knew what might be the cause of it. At this time the sage Viśvāmitra also visited the city of Ayodhyā to invite Rāma to kill the demons. Rāma’s dejected mental state at this time created much anxiety, and Viśvāmitra asked him the cause of his dejection.

Rāma said in reply that a new enquiry had come into his mind and had made him averse from all enjoyments. There is no happiness in this world, people are born to die and they die to be born again. Everything is impermanent (asthira) in this world. All existent things are unconnected (bhāvah...parasparam asaṅginah). They are collected and associated together only by our mental imagination (manah-kalpanayā). The world of enjoyment is created by the mind (manah), and this mind itself appears to be non-existent. Everything is like a mirage.

Vaśiṣṭha then explained the nature of the world-appearance, and it is this answer which forms the content of the book. When Vālmiki narrated this dialogue of Vaśiṣṭha and Rāma, king Ariṣṭanemi found himself enlightened, and the damsel was also pleased and dismissed the heavenly messenger. Kārunya, on hearing all this from his father Agnivesya, felt as if he realized the ultimate truth and thought that, since he realized the philosophical truth, and since work and passivity mean the same, it was his clear duty to follow the customary duties of life. When Agastya finished narrating the story, the Brāhmaṇ Sutikṣṇa felt himself enlightened.

There is at least one point which may be considered as a very clear indication of later date, much later than would be implied by the claim that the work was written by the author of the Rāmāyaṇa. It contains a śloka which may be noted as almost identical with a verse of Kālidāsa’s Kumāra-sambhava. It may, in my opinion, be almost unhesitatingly assumed that the author borrowed it from Kālidāsa, and it is true, as is generally supposed, that Kālidāsa

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1 Yoga-vāsiṣṭha, iii. 16. 50:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{atha tām atimātra-vihvalāṁ} \\
\text{sakrākāabhaṁ varasvatt} \\
\text{jaśharṁ hrada-loṣa-vihvalāṁ} \\
\text{prathamā vyāśīr ivāmvakampata.}
\end{align*}
\]
The Yoga-vāsiṣṭha Literature

lived in the fifth century A.D. The author of the Yoga-vāsiṣṭha, whoever he may have been, flourished at least some time after Kālidāsa. It may also be assumed that the interval between Kālidāsa's time and that of the author of the Yoga-vāsiṣṭha had been long enough to establish Kālidāsa's reputation as a poet. There is another fact which deserves consideration in this connection. In spite of the fact that the views of the Yoga-vāsiṣṭha and Śaṅkara's interpretation of Vedānta have important points of agreement neither of them refers to the other. Again, the views of the Yoga-vāsiṣṭha so much resemble those of the idealistic school of Buddhists, that the whole work seems to be a Brahmanic modification of idealistic Buddhism. One other important instance can be given of such a tendency to assimilate Buddhistic idealism and modify it on Brahmanic lines, viz. the writings of Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara. I am therefore inclined to think that the author of the Yoga-vāsiṣṭha was probably a contemporary of Gauḍapāda or Śaṅkara, about A.D. 800 or a century anterior to them.

The work contains six books, or prakaranas, namely, Vairāgya, Mumukṣu-vyavahāra, Utpatti, Sthiti, Upāsana and Nirvāṇa. It is known also by the names of Ārṣa-Rāmāyaṇa, Jñāna-vāsiṣṭha, Mahā-Rāmāyaṇa, Vāsiṣṭha-Rāmāyaṇa or Vāsiṣṭha. Several commentaries have been written on it. Of these commentaries I am particularly indebted to the Tatparya-prakāśa of Ānandabodhendra.

The Yoga-vāsiṣṭha is throughout a philosophical work, in the form of popular lectures, and the same idea is often repeated again and again in various kinds of expressions and poetical imagery. But the writer seems to have been endowed with extraordinary poetical gifts. Almost every verse is full of the finest poetical imagery; the choice of words is exceedingly pleasing to the ear, and they often produce the effect of interesting us more by their poetical value than by the extremely idealistic thought which they are intended to convey.

The Yoga-vāsiṣṭha had a number of commentaries, and it was also summarized in verse by some writers whose works also had commentaries written upon them. Thus Advayāranya, son of Narahari, wrote a commentary on it, called Vāsiṣṭha-Rāmāyaṇa-candrikā. Ānandabodhendra Sarasvatī, pupil of Gaṅgādharendra Sarasvatī of the nineteenth century, wrote the Tatparya-prakāśa. Gaṅgādharendra also is said to have written a commentary of the same name. Rāmadeva and Sadānanda also wrote two commentaries on
the work, and in addition to these there is another commentary, called Yoga-vāsiṣṭha-tātparya-samgraha, and another commentary, the Pada-candrikā, was written by Mādhava Sarasvatī. The names of some of its summaries are Brhad-yoga-vāsiṣṭha, Laghu-jñāna-vāsiṣṭha, Yoga-vāsiṣṭha-ślokāḥ and Yoga-vāsiṣṭha-samkṣepa by Gauḍa Abhinanda of the ninth century, Yoga-vāsiṣṭha-sāra or Jñāna-sāra, Yoga-vāsiṣṭha-sāra-samgraha and Vāsiṣṭha-sāra or Vāsiṣṭha-sāra-guḍhārtha by Ramānanda Tirtha, pupil of Advaitānanda. The Yoga-vāsiṣṭha-samkṣepa of Gauḍa Abhinanda had a commentary by Ātmasukha, called Candrikā, and another called Saṃsāra-tarani, by Mummaḍideva. The Yoga-vāsiṣṭha-sāra also had two commentaries by Pūrṇānanda and Mahīdhara. Mr Sivaprasad Bhattacarya in an article on the Yoga-vāsiṣṭha-Rāmāyaṇa in the Proceedings of the Madras Oriental Conference of 1924 says that the Mokṣopāya-sāra, which is another name for the Yoga-vāsiṣṭha-sāra, was written by an Abhinanda who is not to be confused with Gauḍa Abhinanda. But he misses the fact that Gauḍa Abhinanda had also written another summary of it, called Yoga-vāsiṣṭha-samkṣepa. Incidentally this also refutes his view that the Yoga-vāsiṣṭha is to be placed between the tenth and the twelfth centuries. For, if a summary of it was written by Gauḍa Abhinanda of the ninth century, the Yoga-vāsiṣṭha must have been written at least in the eighth century. The date of the Yoga-vāsiṣṭha may thus be regarded as being the seventh or the eighth century.

The Ultimate Entity.

The third book of the Yoga-vāsiṣṭha deals with origination (upatti). All bondage (bandha) is due to the existence of the perceptible universe (dṛṣṭya), and it is the main thesis of this work that it does not exist. At the time of each dissolution the entire universe of appearance is destroyed, like dreams in deep sleep (suṣupti). What is left is deep and static (stīmita-gambhira), neither light nor darkness, indescribable and unmanifested (anākhyam anabhivyaktam), but a somehow existent entity. This entity manifests itself as another (svayam anya ivollasan); and through this dynamic aspect it appears as the ever-active mind (manas)—like moving ripples from the motionless ocean. But in reality whatever appears as the diversified universe is altogether non-existent; for, if it was existent,
it could not cease under any circumstances\(^1\). It does not exist at all. The ultimate indefinite and indescribable entity, which is pure extinction (nirvāṇa-mātra), or pure intelligence (paro bodhak), remains always in itself and does not really suffer any transformations or modifications. Out of the first movement of this entity arises ego (svatā), which, in spite of its appearance, is in reality nothing but the ultimate entity. Gradually, by a series of movements (spanda) like waves in the air, there springs forth the entire world-appearance. The ultimate entity is a mere entity of pure conceiving or imagining (samkalpa-purusa)\(^2\). The Muni held that what appears before us is due to the imagination of manas, like dreamland or fairyland (yathā samkalpa-nagaram yathā gandharva-pattanam). There is nothing in essence except that ultimate entity, and whatever else appears does not exist at all—it is all mere mental creations, proceeding out of the substanceless, essenceless mental creations of the ultimate entity. It is only by the realization that this world-appearance has no possibility of existence that the false notion of ourselves as knowers ceases, and, though the false appearance may continue as such, there is emancipation (mokṣa).

This manas, however, by whose mental creations everything springs forth in appearance, has no proper form, it is merely a name, mere nothingness\(^3\). It does not exist outside or subjectively inside us; it is like the vacuity surrounding us everywhere. That anything has come out of it is merely like the production of a mirage stream. All characteristics of forms and existence are like momentary imaginations. Whatever appears and seems to have existence is nothing but manas, though this manas itself is merely a hypothetical starting-point, having no actual reality. For the manas is not different from the dreams of appearance and cannot be separated from them, just as one cannot separate liquidity from water or movement from air. Manas is thus nothing but the hypothetical entity from which all the dreams of appearance proceed, though these dreams and manas are merely the same and

\(^1\) Yoga-vādiṣṭha, iii. 3.

\(^2\) sarveṣṇāṁ bhūtā-jātānāṁ samsāra-vyavahārānāṁ prathamo ’sau pratispandai citta-dehaḥ svatodayah asmāt pūrvarūpān ānanyaitat-svarūpāṁ iyāṁ pravīrtriṣā syātiḥ spanda-sṛṣṭir ivaṁ nilat.

\(^3\) rāmārya manaso rūpam na kime ca api dhṛyate nāma-mātrād ṛte vyomamo yathā śunya-jādākṛteh.

iii. 3. 14, 15.

iii. 4. 38.
The Philosophy of the Yoga-vāsiṣṭha

It is impossible to distinguish between them\(^1\). *Avidyā, samsṛti, citta, manas, bandha, mala, tama* are thus but synonyms for the same concept\(^2\). It is the perceiver that appears as the perceived, and it is but the perceptions that appear as the perceiver and the perceived. The state of emancipation is the cessation of this world-appearance. There is in reality no perceiver, perceived or perceptions, no vacuity (*śūnya*), no matter, no spirit or consciousness, but pure cessation or pure negation, and this is what we mean by Brahman\(^3\). Its nature is that of pure cessation (*śānta*), and it is this that the Sāmkhyists call *puruṣa*, the Vedāntins call “Brahman,” the idealistic Buddhists call “pure idea” (*vijñāna-mātra*) and the nihilists “pure essencelessness” (*śūnya*)\(^4\). It is of the nature of pure annihilation and cessation, pervading the inner and the outer world\(^5\). It is described as that essencelessness (*śūnya*) which does not appear to be so, and in which lies the ground and being of the essenceless world-appearance (*yasmin śūnyam jagat sthitam*), and which, in spite of all creations, is essenceless\(^6\). The illusory world-appearance has to be considered as absolutely non-existent, like the water of the mirage or the son of a barren woman. The ultimate entity is thus neither existent nor non-existent and is both statical and dynamical (*spandāspandātmaka*)\(^7\); it is indescribable and un-nameable (*kimapy avyapadesātmā*) and neither being nor non-being nor being-non-being, neither statical being nor becoming (*na bhāvo bhavam na ca*). The similarity of the philosophy of the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* to the idealistic philosophy of the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* is so definite and deep that the subject does not require any elaborate discussion and the readers are referred to the philosophy of the *Laṅkāvatāra* in the first volume of the present work. On Vedānta lines it is very similar to Prakāśānanda’s interpretation of the Vedānta in later times, called *drṣṭi-sṛṣṭi-vāda*, which can probably be traced at least as far back as Gauḍapāda or Maṇḍana. Prakāśātman refers to the *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* as one of his main authorities.

\(^1\) *pūrṇe pūrṇam prasarati śānte śāntam vyavasthitam vyomany evodhitaṃ vyoma brahmaḥ brahma tiṣṭhata na drṣṭyam asti sud-rūpaṃ na draṣṭā na ca darśanam na śūnyam na jādam no eci chāntam evedam ātataṃ.*

\(^2\) III. 4. 46.

\(^3\) III. 4. 69, 70.

\(^4\) III. 5. 6–7.

\(^5\) III. 7. 22.

\(^6\) III. 5. 16.

\(^7\) III. 9. 59.

\(^8\) III. 5. 59.
Origination.

The world as such never existed in the past, nor exists now, nor will exist hereafter; so it has no production or destruction in any real sense\(^1\). But yet there is the appearance, and its genesis has somehow to be accounted for. The ultimate entity is, of course, of the nature of pure cessation (śānta), as described above. The order of moments leading to the manifestation of the world-appearance can be described in this way: At first there is something like a self-reflecting thought in the ultimate entity, producing some indescribable objectivity which gives rise to an egohood. Thus, on a further movement, which is akin to thought, is produced a state which can be described as a self-thinking entity, which is clear pure intelligence, in which everything may be reflected. It is only this entity that can be called conscious intelligence (cit). As the thought-activity becomes more and more concrete (ghan-śamvedana), other conditions of soul (jīva) arise out of it. At this stage it forgets, as it were, its subject-objectless ultimate state, and desires to flow out of itself as a pure essence of creative movement (bhāvanā-mātra-sāra). The first objectivity is ākāśa, manifested as pure vacuity. At this moment arise the ego (ahāmtā) and time (kāla). This creation is, however, in no sense real, and is nothing but the seeming appearances of the self-conscious movement (sva-śamvedana-mātrakam) of the ultimate being. All the network of being is non-existent, and has only an appearance of existing. Thought (sama-vit), which at this moment is like the ākāśa and the ego and which is the seed (bijā) of all the conceivings of thought (bhāvanā), formulates by its movement air\(^2\). Again,

\[\text{bandhyā-putra-vyoma-bane yathā na stah kadācana}
\text{jagad-ādy akhilaṃ dhiyaṃ tathā nāsti kadācana}
\text{na ceto manma na ca dhravma yat kilādau na vidyate}
\text{upattih kāḍīś tasya nāśa-sabdasya kā kathā.}
\]

\[\text{III. 11. 4, 5.}
\]

\[\text{manah samapadyate lolaṃ kalanā-kalanomukham;}
\text{kalyannti manah saktr ādaü bhāvayati kṣanāt.}
\text{ākāśa-bhāvanāmacchām sābdā-bija-rasonmukhātm;}
\text{tatas tām ghanatām jātān ghanā-spanda-kramān manāh.}
\]

\[\text{IV. 44. 16, 17.}
\]

A comparison of numerous passages like these shows that each mental creation is the result of a creative thought-movement called bhāvanā, and each successive movement in the chain of a succession of developing creative movements is said to be ghanā, or concrete. Ghanā has been paraphrased in the Tātparya-prakāśa as accretion (upacaya). Bhāvāna is the same as spanda; as the result of each thought-movement, there was thought-accretion (ghanā), and corresponding to each ghanā there was a semi-statical creation, and following each ghanā there was a spanda (ghanā-spanda-kramāt).
following the ākāśa moment and from it as a more concrete state (ghanibhūya), comes forth the sound-potential (kha-tan-mātra). This sound-potential is the root of the production of all the Vedas, with their words, sentences and valid means of proof. Gradually the conceivings of the other tan-mātras of sparśa, tejas, rasa and gandha follow, and from them the entire objective world, which has no other reality than the fact that they are conceptions of the self-conscious thought\(^1\). The stages then are, that in the state of equilibrium (sama) of the ultimate indescribable entity called the Brahman, which, though pure consciousness in essence, is in an unmanifested state, there first arises an objectivity (cetyatva) through its self-directed self-consciousness of the objectivity inherent in it (sataś cetyāṃśa-cetanāt); next arises the soul, where there is objective consciousness only through the touch or connection of objectivity (cetya-samyoga-cetanāt) instead of the self-directed consciousness of objectivity inherent in itself. Then comes the illusory notion of subjectivity, through which the soul thinks that it is only the conscious subject and as such is different from the object (cetyaika-paratā-vasāt). This moment naturally leads to the state of the subjective ego, which conceives actively (buddhitvākalanam), and it is this conceiving activity which leads to the objective conceptions of the different tan-mātras and the world-appearance. These are all, however, ideal creations, and as such have no reality apart from their being as mere appearance. Since their nature is purely conceptual (vikalpa), they cannot be real at any time. All that appears as existent does so only as a result of the conceptual activity of thought. Through its desire, “I shall see,” there comes the appearance of the two hollows of the eye, and similarly in the case of touch, smell, hearing and taste. There is no single soul, far less an infinite number of them. It is by the all-powerful conceptual activity of Brahman that there arises the appearance of so many centres of subjective thought, as the souls (jivas). In reality, however, the jivas have no other existence than the conceptualizing activity which produces their appearance. There is no materiality or form: these are nothing but the self-flashings of thought (citta-camatkāra).

\(^{1}\) III. 12.

\(Manas\), according to this theory, is nothing but that function of pure consciousness through which it posits out of itself an object of itself. Here the pure conscious part may be called the spiritual
part and its objectivity aspect the material part. In its objectivity also the cit perceives nothing but itself, though it appears to perceive something other than itself (svam evānyatayā dṛṣṭvā), and this objectivity takes its first start with the rise of egohood (ahaṃtā).

But to the most important question, namely, how the original equilibrium is disturbed and how the present development of the conceptual creation has come about, the answer given in the Yoga-vāsiṣṭha is that it is by pure accident (kākatāliya-yogena) that such a course of events took place. It is indeed disappointing that such a wonderful creation of world-appearance should have ultimately to depend on accident for its origin. It is considered irrelevant to enquire into the possibility of some other cause of the ultimate cause, the Brahman.

Karma, Manas and the Categories.

Karma in this view is nothing but the activity of the manas. The active states of manas are again determined by their preceding moments and may in their turn be considered as determining the succeeding moments. When any particular state determines any succeeding state, it may be considered as an agent, or kartā; but, as this state is determined by the activity of the previous state, otherwise called the karma, it may be said that the karma generates the kartā, the kartā by its activity again produces karma, so that karma and kartā are mutually determinative. As in the case of the seed coming from the tree and the tree coming from the seed, the cycle proceeds on from kartā to karma and from karma to kartā, and no ultimate priority can be affirmed of any one of them. But, if this is so, then the responsibility of karma ceases; the root desire (vāsanā) through which a man is born also makes him suffer or enjoy in accordance with it; but, if kartā and karma spring forth together, then a particular birth ought not to be determined by the karma of previous birth, and this would mean

\begin{align*}
\text{cito yac cetya-kalanam tan-manastvam udāḥytam} & \quad \text{III. 91. 37.} \\
\text{cid-bhāgo 'trājaśo bhāgo jádyam atra hi cetyatā} & \\
\text{\textsuperscript{2}} & \\
\text{\textsuperscript{3} III. 96. 15, IV. 54. 7.} \\
\text{\textsuperscript{4} Brahmanam kāramam kim syād iti vaktum na yuyjate} & \quad \text{IV. 18. 22.} \\
\text{svabhāvo niruśāvatvāt paro vaktum na yuyjate.} & \\
\text{yathā karma ca kartā ca paryāyeneha samgatau} & \\
\text{karanā hriyate kartā kartā kartā karma pranāyate} & \quad \text{III. 95. 19, 20.} \\
\text{bhitarkurādivan-nyāyo loka-vedokta eva sah.} &
\end{align*}
that man's enjoyment and sorrow did not depend on his *karma*. In answer to such a question, raised by Rāmacandra, Vaśiśṭha says that *karma* is due not to *ātman*, but to *manas*. It is the mental movement which constitutes *karma*. When first the category of *manas* rises into being from Brahman, *karma* also begins from that moment, and, as a result thereof, the soul and the body associated with it are supposed to be manifested. *Karma* and *manas* are in one sense the same. In this world the movement generated by action (*kriyā-spanda*) is called *karma*, and, as it is by the movement of *manas* that all effects take place, and the bodies with all their associated sufferings or enjoyments are produced, so even the body, which is associated with physical, external *karma*, is in reality nothing but the *manas* and its activity. *Manas* is essentially of the nature of *karma*, or activity, and the cessation of activity means the destruction of *manas* (*karma-nāse mano-nāśah*). As heat cannot be separated from fire or blackness from collyrium, so movement and activity cannot be separated from *manas*. If one ceases, the other also necessarily ceases. *Manas* means that activity which subsists between being and non-being and induces being through non-being: it is essentially dynamic in its nature and passes by the name of *manas*. It is by the activity of *manas* that the subject-objectless pure consciousness assumes the form of a self-conscious ego. *Manas* thus consists of this constantly positing activity (*ekānta-kalanāh*). The seed of *karma* is to be sought in the activity of *manas* (*karma-bijam manah-spanda*), and the actions (*kriyā*) which follow are indeed very diverse. It is the synthetic function (*tad-anusandhatte*) of *manas* that is called the functioning of the conative senses, by which all actions are performed, and it is for this reason that *karma* is nothing but *manas*. *Manas*, *buddhi*, *ahamkāra*, *citta*, *karma*, *kalpanā*, *samsṛti*, *vāsanā*, *vidyā*, *prayatna*, *smṛti*, *indriya*, *prakṛti*, *māyā* and *kriyā* are different only in name, and they create confusion by these varied names; in reality, however, they signify the same concept, namely, the active functioning of *manas* or *citta*. These different names are current only because they lay stress on the different aspects of the same active functioning. They do not mean different entities, but only different moments, stages or aspects. Thus the first moment of self-conscious activity leading in different directions is called *manas*. When, after such oscillating movement, there is

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1 III. 95.
the position of either of the alternatives, as "the thus," it is called buddhi. When by the false notions of associations of body and soul there is the feeling of a concrete individual as "I," it is called ahamkāra. When there is reflective thought associated with the memory of the past and the anticipations of the future, it is called citta. When the activity is taken in its actual form as motion or action towards any point, it is called karma. When, leaving its self-contained state, it desires anything, we have kalpanā. When the citta turns itself to anything previously seen or unseen, as being previously experienced, we have what is called memory (smṛti). When certain impressions are produced in a very subtle, subdued form, dominating all other inclinations, as if certain attractions or repulsions to certain things were really experienced, we have the root inclinations (vāsanā). In the realization that there is such a thing as self-knowledge, and that there is also such a thing as the false and illusory world-appearance, we have what is called right knowledge (vidyā). When the true knowledge is forgotten and the impressions of the false world-appearance gain ground, we have what are called the impure states (mala). The functions of the five kinds of cognition please us and are called the senses (indriya). As all world-appearance has its origin and ground in the highest self, it is called the origin (prakṛti). As the true state can neither be called existent nor non-existent, and as it gives rise to all kinds of appearance, it is called illusion (māyā)\textsuperscript{1}. Thus it is the same appearance which goes by the various names of jīva, manas, citta and buddhi\textsuperscript{2}.

One of the peculiarities of this work is that it is not a philosophical treatise of the ordinary type, but its main purpose lies in the attempt to create a firm conviction on the part of its readers, by repeating the same idea in various ways by means of stories and elaborate descriptions often abounding in the richest poetical imagery of undeniably high aesthetic value, hardly inferior to that of the greatest Sanskrit poet, Kālidāsa.

\textsuperscript{1} III. 96. 17–31.
\textsuperscript{2} 
\begin{center}
\textit{Jīva ity ucycate loke mana ity api kathyate }
\textit{cittam ity ucycate saiva buddhir ity ucycate tathā.}
\end{center}

III. 96. 34.
The World-Appearance.

The Yoga-vāsiṣṭha is never tired of repeating that this world is like a hare’s horn, a forest in the sky, or a lotus in the sky. The state of Brahman is higher than the state of manas. It is by becoming manas that Brahman transforms itself into thought-activity and thus produces the seeming changeful appearances. But Brahman in itself cannot have anything else (brahma-tattve ‘nyatā nāsti). But, though there is this change into manas, and through it the production of the world-appearance, yet such a change is not real, but illusory; for during all the time when this change makes its appearance and seems to stay, Brahman remains shut up within itself, changeless and unchangeable. All objective appearance is thus nothing but identically the same as the Brahman, and all that appears has simply no existence. The seer never transforms himself into objectivity, but remains simply identical with himself in all appearances of objectivity. But the question arises, how, if the world-appearance is nothing but the illusory creative conception of manas, can the order of the world-appearance be explained? The natural answer to such a question in this system is that the seeming correspondence and agreement depend upon the similarity of the imaginary products in certain spheres, and also upon accident. It is by accident that certain dream series correspond with certain other dream series. But in reality they are all empty dream constructions of one manas. It is by the dream desires that physical objects gradually come to be considered as persistent objects existing outside of us. But, though during the continuance of the dreams they appear to be real, they are all the while nothing but mere dream conceptions. The self-alienation by which the pure consciousness constructs the dream conception is such that, though it always remains identical with itself, yet it seems to posit itself as its other, and as diversified by space, time, action and substance (deśa-kāla-kriyā-dravyaiḥ).

The difference between the ordinary waking state and the dream state consists in this, that the former is considered by us as associated with permanent convictions (sthira-pratīyā), whereas the latter is generally thought to have no permanent basis. Any experience which persists, whether it be dream or not,

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1 melanam api svakhyā-parakhyā-svapnānām daivat kvacit samuḍdavat svantāh-kalpanādākham eva. Yoga-vāsiṣṭha-tātparya-parākhyā, iv. 18. 46.