'DISCOURSE V.'

Sources of Evil

SECTION (1)

What shortens Life?

VERSE (1)

The sages, having heard the duties of the Accomplished Student as just described, said this to the high-souled Bhṛgu, who sprang from fire.—(1)

Bhāṣya

‘Having heard the duties of the Student and the Householder as expounded in the foregoing three Discourses, the great Sages, Marichi and others, ‘said to’—asked the following question of—Bhṛgu, their teacher.

“In the text we find the expression of the Accomplished Student—‘snātakasya’; why then do you bring in the Student?”

Our answer to this is that the present verse is meant to be descriptive of what has gone before; and as a matter of fact, the duties of the Student also have been described.

‘High-souled’ and ‘who sprang from the fire’ are the epithets of Bhṛgu;—‘He whose origination was from the fire.’

“But in discourse I, verse 34, Bhṛgu has been spoken of as the son of Manu”.

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True'; but what was stated there was an imaginary commendation, while what is said here is in accordance with the account found in the Vedas of Bhṛgu having been born out of fire. The name 'Bhṛgu' has been thus explained—'What rose out first out of the fallen semen was the Sun, and what rose as the second was Bhṛgu'. Or, what is asserted here may be only figurative; the origin of Bhṛgu being described as 'Fire', on the basis of similarity, as regards effulgence.

In any case, it is not necessary to lay stress upon either of the two explanations as being the more reasonable of the two; because this is not what forms the main subject-matter of the treatise.

The whole of the text, describing the question and the answer, is meant to indicate the importance of the subject of the evils attaching to food; the meaning being that the evils attaching to the food itself are more serious than those attaching to the nature of its gift and acceptance; and this on the ground that the defects attaching to the thing itself are more intimate, and hence more serious, than those arising from contact.

"In connection with the defects of contact, the Expiatory Rite that is laid down is a three days' fast; while that in connection with the thing itself, is a single day's fast (5. 20). How then can this latter be said to be more serious?"

Our answer is as follows:—The greater seriousness here spoken of refers to garlic and such things, in connection with which it is stated that—'by eating these intentionally the man becomes an outcast' (5. 19); so that the expiation necessary would be that which has been prescribed for outcasts (which is very serious).—(1)

VERSE (2)

"How is it, O Lord, that Death overpowers the Brāhmaṇas, who are learned in the Vedic lore, and who perform their duty exactly as it has been thus described?" —(2)

Bṛāśya

The Text now shows what the great Sages asked.
"Thus"—refers to the manner in which the Treatise has propounded the subject; and "exactly as described"—refers to the subject-matter of the Treatise.

Those Twice-born men who perform the duty exactly in the form in which it has been described in the present Treatise;—that all twice-born men are indicated by the terms 'vipra' 'brahmana,' in the Text will be clear from what is going to be said in verse 26 below, where 'twice-born' is the term used;—'how is it that death overpowers them'—while still in the state of the 'Student,' or in that of the 'Accomplished Student'? How is this, when, in reality, they should live the full span of human life? The span of a man's life is a hundred years; so that the death of Brahmaanas before that is not proper; specially as it has been declared that 'from right conduct one attains longevity' (4.156), and 'no calamity befalls persons who recite the Veda and offer oblations' (4.146). (2).

VERSES (3.4).

Bhrgu, the righteous son of Manu, said to the great sages—
"Listen, by what fault death seeks to destroy the Brahmaanas."—(3).

Death seeks to destroy the Brahmaanas on account of their omitting the study of the Vedas, on account of neglect of right conduct, on account of slothfulness and on account of the defects of food.—(4).

Bhasya.

Objection—"When the question has been put forward in regard to Brahmaanas who perform their duties. it is not right to answer it by indicating the 'fault'; nor can there be any connection with what follows (in verse 4) [as omission of Vedic Study &c. is not possible for those who perform their duties]."

The answer to the above is as follows:—'Omission of Vedic Study' and the rest have been put forward only by way of illustration; the sense being—'just as the omission of Vedic Study
stroke of the foot) that the prohibition (of 'kavaka') is not applicable to those vegetable growths that shoot out of the trunks of trees.

In medicinal treatises the kukunda has been described as 'kavaka'; but this explanation (of the name on a purely conventional basis) cannot be accepted in the same manner as that in regard to the term 'go' and the rest. Further, as a matter of fact, in ordinary parlance the term 'kavaka' is always applied to a vegetable. Hence it is on the basis of usage that the exact signification of the term, wherever it occurs in a medical or other scientific treatise, should be ascertained, and we have already shown what that signification is.

Other things also, which resemble garlic and such things mentioned here, which resemble these latter in colour and smell, have been forbidden by Visnu. In the Smriti of Parashara however the prohibition is by name, and this for the purpose of prescribing the special Expiatory Rite of 'Chandrayana' in connection with it. From this it follows that 'lavataka', 'karnikara' and such other things are forbidden.

'Things proceeding from impure substances';—those that grow of impure things or are in contact with them.

Others have declared that it is not right to forbid those things that grow only out of impure things, these standing on the same footing as 'mula' (radish) 'vastuka' (a kind of grass) and such other things (known to grow out of impure things);—so that the prohibition does not apply to those grains and vegetables growing in fields specially manured for the purpose of enriching the harvest.

This however is not right. Because from what the text says it is clear that all these things are equally unfit to be eaten. Further, what has been suggested might have been accepted, if it were absolutely impossible for anything to grow without the use of impure substances. There are some things however that grow directly out of impure substances, while there are some
VERSE VI : OBJECTIONABLE FOOD

that grow out of mere connection with them; the right view to take therefore is that, the prohibition applies to the former only, and not to the latter.

As regards meat, even though it grows out of semen and blood (both impure substances), yet the present prohibition does not apply to it; because it has been dealt with in a totally different context.—(5)

VERSE (6)

HE SHALL CAREFULLY AVOID THE RED EXUDATION FROM TREES, AS ALSO THOSE FLOWING FROM INCISIONS, THE SHÉLU BERRIES, AND 'CURDLED MILK' OF THE COW.—(6)

Bhāṣya

'Exudation from trees';—anything, apart from the constituent parts of the tree itself,—such as, the root, the trunk, the branches, the leaves, the fruits and the flowers,—which proceeds from the tree, either in the form of some liquid flowing from the cavity in the tree, or in some other form. The epithet 'red' excludes, from prohibition, such exudations as the camphor and the like.

Those that have their origin, source, in 'incisions'; those that flow from the bark and such parts of the tree. These things, if not red, are not forbidden.

'Shélù'—the shlesmātaka fruit, to be known from medical and other treatises. It should not be taken to mean the cream of fresh milk; as it is never known to have that meaning. It has been argued that—"it is better to take the word as standing for cream, on account of its proximity to the term, 'curdled milk'." But proximity becomes a means of deciding in favour of one of the two possible meanings of a term, only when the term is actually found in usage to be used in both senses; but it can never be the authority for attributing an unheard of meaning to a word.

'Of the cow';—this shows that that of the buffalo etc. is not forbidden. The milk is unfit to be eaten if, by mere contact with
fire, it becomes *curdled*,—i.e. thickened without adhesion; the term *piyusa* is used in the sense of the milk of the newly-calved cow.

"The text is going to declare, as *unfit to be eaten*, the milk, along with all its preparations, of the cow for the first ten days of its calving; and it is only during three or four days that the milk is of the nature described above (i.e. curdled by mere contact with fire) [so that no separate prohibition appears to be called for.]

- True; the thing is mentioned in the present verse with a view to those cases where the milk continues to be so 'curdled' even after the first ten days.

The two words—'carefully' and 'avoid'—are added only for filling up the metre; since *unfit to be eaten* (of verse 5) continues to be connected with all that is mentioned in the text.—(6)

**VERSE (7)**

Needlessly cooked Rice-sesamum and Butter-sugar-sesamum, milk-rice and flour-cakes, unconsecrated meat, food of the gods and sacrificial viands;—(7)

*Bhāṣya*

*Kṛsarasamyava* is an aggregative copulative compound. Rice cooked with Sesamum is called *kṛsara*;—*samyava* is a particular article of food, made up of butter, sugar, sesameum and such things, well-known in cities.

Some people, on the strength of the root *yu* (from which the term *samyava* is derived) signifying the act of mixing, explain the term *samyava* as standing for all those articles of food that are prepared by mixing together different kinds of grains,—such as the mudga, the *kusthaka* and the rest.

For these persons the separate mention of *kṛsara* would be superfluous; as this would be included under *samyava*, as just explained.

*The term 'needlessly cooked' is to be construed with all the terms. It stands for what the householder cooks for himself, and not for the sake of Gods, Pitrs or guests.*
This however does not appear to be right. Because the ordinary cooking that the Householder does is not always for any such set purpose as that of making offerings out of it. What happens is that the cooking having been done, without reference to any particular purpose, and only in a general way, the Five Sacrifices have been laid down, as to be offered out of the food thus cooked. So that if the man eats the food without having made the offering to the Vishvedevas out of it, he transgresses a direct injunction; but no prohibition enters into the case. According to the present text however, as just explained, such eating would necessitate two expiatory rites,—one due to transgressing an injunction (by not making the offering to the Vishvedevas), and another due to the doing of a prohibited act (of cooking the Rice-sesamum needlessly). If however such articles of food as ‘Rice-sesamum’ and the rest, are cooked without reference to a particular God, or to a particular sacrificial rite,—this involves a transgression of the rules pertaining to one’s daily duties also.

As regards the text ‘one shall not cook for himself’,—this cannot be regarded as a prohibition; because it being absolutely necessary to do the cooking, all that the sentence does is simply to make a reference to the act of eating done by one who has disobeyed the rules (regarding the daily ‘sacrifices’). For, as already pointed out above, if it were a prohibition, there would be a twofold expiatory rite involved. Then again, even when the cooking is done for some other purpose, it cannot be absolutely denied that it has been done by the man ‘for himself’ also. ‘Cooking’ means the act of cooking food, and the fact of its being done for one’s own self cannot be denied by means of the same word; as the man is directed to live upon the same food (i.e. what is left after the feeding of the guests &c). The eating of the remnant of food, after the guests and others have been fed, (which has been laid down for the Householder) is not meant to be a mere ‘embellishment’ of the Remnant (and not an act necessary for the maintenance of the man himself). Nor has it been laid down anywhere that at the time of cooking the Householder is to make use of any such formula of determination as ‘cook food for me’,
which would be regarded as forbidden (by the sentence ‘one shall not cook for himself’) In fact the cooking is said to be ‘for himself’ only in consideration of what happens subsequently. That is to say, if the food were cooked with the determination to make an offering to the Gods, and then subsequently the man were to eat it all himself, this would involve the wrong of being false to one’s own resolve also. From all this it is clear that the sentence in question is a mere reiterative reference, the sense being—‘what one cooks, he should not use for himself, until he has made the offering to the Vishvēdevas’.

It is in view of all this that this same rule has been held to be applicable also to the case of the man eating uncooked food; in accordance with the assertion—‘the Gods of a man have the same food as the man himself’ (Vālmikiya Rāmāyana.)

Further, cooking is not to be done only by the hungry householder; in fact, the act of cooking every day forms an integral factor of Householdership itself. So that even on the day on which the man himself does not eat, if he omits the act of cooking, he incurs sin.

The upshot of the whole is this:—The man may cook for himself, or for others; the words ‘shall not cook for himself’ can only mean that people should not undertake the act, if they do not intend to make the offering to the Vishvēdevas. So that this only reiterates the obligatory character of the offering. Similarly also the text that—‘For the removal of the sin of the Five Slaughters, the Vishvēdeva-offering shall be made in the ordinary fire, in the Vedic sacrificial fire, in the fire in which oblations have been already poured and the deity dismissed, in water or on the ground,’—only reiterates the obligatory character of the offering to the Vishvēdevas. Because the said offering cannot be made into the Vedic sacrificial fire; specially as there is no authority attaching to a Smṛti text (as against a Shruti text) [so that the text just quoted cannot be taken in its literal sense].
VERSE VII:—OBLIGATIONAL FOOD

Milk-rice and flour-cakes.—'lāyasa', 'Milk-rice, stands for rice cooked in milk, and not for preparations of milk.—'Puroḍāsha' is flour-cake.

'Food of the Goods';—what these are can only be ascertained from usage.

'Sacrificial viands',—the materials laid down in the Shruti as to be offered into the Fire.

These are 'unfit to be eaten' only before the Grahahomas; as the text is going to lay down the necessity of eating the remnants of the offerings.

The meat of an animal that has not been 'consecrated',—i.e. which has not been killed at a sacrifice. 'Consecration' is a peculiar form of purification of the animal, prescribed in connection with the 'Animal-Sacrifice.' The mention of this indicates that one should eat the remnant of the meat that has been offered at a sacrifice.

Though the Text has already used the qualification 'needlessly prepared', yet the epithet 'unconsecrated' has been added with a view to forbid the meat of the cow, the sheep and the goat that may have been left by the guest and other persons to whom they may have been offered. Or, the term unconsecrated may be taken as referring specially to the meat of the cow, the sheep and the goat; since it is the killing of these animals only that has been enjoined in connection with sacrifices; the other animals being described as already 'proksita', 'washed clean' (suit for eating).

VERSE (8)


Bhāṣya.

If we read the opening words as 'anirdashāham goh kṣīram,' then the prohibition regarding the milk of the camel and other ani-
mals also would be understood as limited to the ten days from calving; so that the qualification 'that has not passed its ten days' being taken with every one of the animals, it would become necessary to depend entirely upon usage in support of the absolute prohibition of the milk of the camel and other animals. If however we read 'anirdashāyāḥ' in the feminine form, then there would be no possibility of the above misunderstanding. Because it would not be possible to interpret the nominal affixes (attached to the names of the other animals) as, in any way, connecting these animals with the epithet 'anirdashāyāḥ'.

In as much as the word 'milk' is repeated in the second half of the verse, this implies that what are forbidden by the former half are the milk of the camel, of the one-hoofed animals, of the sheep, of the goat and of the cow within ten days of its calving,—along with all its preparations; while in the case of the 'irregular' cow and the cow 'deprived of its calf', it is the milk only that is forbidden. Such is the usage also.

That cow is called 'anirdashāiha,' 'not passed its ten days', in whose case ten days have not passed since her calving.

'Irregular cow';—the cow that is expected to give milk both morning and evening, but gives it only at one time; giving milk in the evening only if not milked in the morning; and on account of the supply of milk being scanty, she is milked once only.

Some people explain 'Sandhini' as standing for that cow which, on having lost her own calf, is made to yield milk by bringing to her the calf of another cow; and in this case the cow 'without her calf' would be one whose calf is alive, but is separated from it, and is milked, independently of the calf, through presenting before her such special articles of food as the husks of barley, rice etc., so that the cow would be called 'without her calf' by the calf being held aside; just as people say—'bring the cow without her calf'.

The 'cow' having been already mentioned in the first half, the term is repeated in the second half, with a view to show that similar milk of the goat and the buffalo is not forbidden. The same does not hold good regarding the epithet 'anirdashāyāḥ,' 'that has not passed its ten days,' so that in this connection the 'cow' in-
VERSE VII:—OBJECTIONABLE FOOD

cludes the goat and the buffalo also. So says Gautama (17.22-23)—‘The milk of the cow that has not passed its ten days, during the period of impurity; also of the goat and the buffalo.’

The term 'payah' 'milk,' has been added because it is not easy to construe the term 'goh,' 'of the cow,' with the term 'kṣīram,' 'milk' as contained in the compound 'sandhinikṣīram.'—(8)

VERSE (9)

That of all wild animals, except the buffalo; the milk of females (women) and all soured substances should be avoided.—(9)

Bhāṣya

'Wild animals'—cows, elephants, monkeys and so forth.

There can be no milk of males; hence the masculine gender used in connection with the words 'sarrīṣam mrgāṇam' is to be taken as standing for the genus, and the connection is with the female members of that genus; the term 'mrgāksīram' thus being similar to 'kukkuṭandam'. This has been made clear by the author of the Mahābhāṣya in connection with the rules relating to the change of the feminine form into the masculine, (when occurring within a compound).

'Māhiṣam vinā' ;—the neuter form has been used, in view of the neuter form 'payah' 'milk'.

Females,'—human females, women. Though in such passages as 'strī gauḥ somakrayinī', 'the female cow is the price of the soma',—the term 'strī', 'female', is found to be used in connection with the animal with the dewlap also,—yet it is to be understood here in the sense of the 'woman', in as much as in the present context the term cannot apply to any other species of animals, and as it is better known as standing for the 'human female' only. In all such assertions as—‘females desire sweets’, ‘females are the best jewels’—the word is understood as standing for the woman.
The term 'eva' in the text has been explained as indicating the prohibition of applying the woman's milk to the eye and such other uses of it; the meaning being that 'the milk of the woman is to be avoided, not only in eating, but also in all similar uses. The word can be taken as indicative of all this only on the strength of usage and other Smriti texts; and it cannot be regarded as directly expressive of it.—(9).

VERSE (10.)

AMONG SOURED SUBSTANCES, THE CURD IS FIT TO BE EATEN, AND ALL THAT IS PREPARED OUT OF IT; AS ALSO ALL THAT IS DISTILLED FROM PURE FLOWERS, ROOTS AND FRUITS;—(10)

Bhasya

All 'soured substances' having been forbidden in the foregoing verse, the present text makes an exception in favour of a few of them.

'Shukta', 'soured substance', is the name of those substances which, being juicy in their constitution and having a distinct taste of their own, become soured either by the flux of time, or by the contact of some other substance. For instance, the Amrataka, which is sweet and full of juice, becomes 'soured' after the lapse of some time; cane-juice becomes 'soured' after sometime. Things that are sour by their very nature—e.g., the Pomegranate, the Amalaka, the Lemon &c.—are not called 'soured substances'; nor those that are still unripe. Because the term 'shukta', 'soured', is not synonymous with 'sour'. What are directly forbidden here are only those soured substances that have become sour by fermentation; and those that turn sour by the contact of flowers and roots &c. are only indirectly indicated; according to what Gautama has said (17·14)—'All soured substances except Curd only'.

'Distilled.'—Distillation consists in allowing the thing to remain soaked in water over-night.

"In that case the sourness would be due to the length of time (so that all these would be included among 'Soured Substances')."
True; these also are ‘soured substances’; and the Instrumental ending may signify either instrumentality or association. The meaning thus is —‘what are distilled—e.g. made out of—flowers etc. along with water’.

Some people offer the following explanation:—“The roots of trees are directly productive of sourness. Such ‘sour substances’ as the Pomegranate, the Āmalaka and the rest are ‘fit to be eaten’, while those that are distilled from grapes and other sweet things are not eaten. ‘Distillation’ means producing acidity; hence ‘distilled from flowers’ means soured by flowers and such things. Grapes and such other things however are not themselves productive of acidity; in their case it is time alone that is the acidulating agent.”

This however i not right; simply because such is not the meaning of the term (‘distillation’). When one says —‘he is distilling Soma’—this is not understood to mean that he is making it sour; what is understood is as we have explained above.

‘Prepared out of curd’—e.g. Vīṣṭasvita, Maṣṭa (whey), Kilāṭa (Coagulated milk), Kūrpikara (Inspissated milk) and so forth.—(10)

VERSE (11)

He shall avoid all carnivorous birds, and also those living in villages, the one-hoofed animals not specified, and also the Tīṭṭibha. —(11)

Bhāṣya

‘Carnivorous’;—those that eat raw flesh; such as the Heron, the Vulture &c. What are meant are those that eat raw flesh only; and not those that eat both (raw and cooked flesh), such as the Peacock and the rest.

‘Living in villages’—even though they be not carnivorous.

‘One-hoofed animals’—e.g., the Horse, the Mule, the Ass and so forth.
'Not specified';—i.e. those that have not been specified as fit to be eaten should not be eaten; those that have been so specified are fit to be eaten. For instance, it has been declared that 'one who desires to obtain offspring shall eat the meat of the camel, the horse, the bear and the white ass'. [and here the one-hoofed animals, horse and white ass, are specified as fit to be eaten].

"The eatability of these animals is known only from this Shruti passage. And the presence of the term 'specified' in the verse would be understood to mean that the animals thus specified in the Vedic passage may be eaten even elsewhere (apart from Vedic sacrifices also); the meaning of the text being 'one shall avoid those not specified, but not those specified.' As a matter of fact however, nowhere in the Smṛti have any one-hoofed animals been specified as fit to be eaten, with reference to which the term 'not specified' (of the text) could be explained. Hence it comes to this that 'those not specified in the Shruti are unfit to be eaten'."

Our answer to the above is that such a sense of the Smṛti would be contrary to all usage. The term 'not specified' is a mere re-iterative reference.

'Ṭṭṭibha'—is a bird which is always screaming 'ṭṭ', 'ṭṭ'. In most cases the names of birds are in imitation of their sounds; as says the Nirukta—'The name Kāka is in imitation of the sound; such is the case with most bird-names.'—(11).

VERSE (12).


Bhāṣya.

'Sparrow', 'Kalabiṅka', is the name of a village-bird described in the scriptures. Its prohibition being already got at by the general prohibition of all 'village-birds', the separate mention of
the sparrow implies the eatability of the *female* sparrow; the term *kalabinka* being a masculine just like the term 'bull.'

Others have explained that this name has been added for the purpose of excluding (from the prohibition) the *wild* sparrow, which retires to the forest during the rains. They are called 'village-birds' because of their living in the villages during the greater part of the year; just as is the case with the 'wild buffalo.'

The prohibition of the *plava, the hamsa,* and the *chakravëka* being already got at from the general prohibition of all 'web-footed birds,' the separate mention of these is for the purpose of emphasising the obligatory character of their exclusion,—the eating of the *Hamsa* and other 'web-footed' birds being regarded as *optional.*

*Village-cock*—the specification of the 'village-cock' permits the eating of the wild cock.

"But why should there have been any suspicion regarding the non-eatability of the *wild* cock at all?"

Because another *Śruti* text says simply—'Among birds, the cock,' which indicates that all kinds of cock are equally 'unfit to be eaten'; it is for this reason that this general statement has been sought by the present text to be limited in its scope.

"But why cannot this be regarded as a case of option, since the present text permits the eating of the *wild* cock, which the other text forbids?"

This cannot be a case of option; it is a case of option only when there are two contradictory texts of equal authority bearing upon the same subject; in the present case however, there is no contradiction; there is no difference in the actual teaching of the two *Śruti*-texts concerned; because it is quite reasonable to regard the general statement as restricted in its scope; specially as a third independent text has already been quoted above.

"If this be so, then the general prohibition regarding the web-footed birds may be taken as restricted in its scope to the *Hamsa* and other specified birds; so that the prohibition does not extend to all crows and web-footed birds."
This would have been the case if the Smṛti-treatises were not the work of a human author. In the case of works of non-human origin, if they proceed from different sources, there would be no useful purpose by making the general statement restricted to the particular case of the Humsu and other birds; while in the case of the work of human authors, if they proceed from different persons, it is quite possible that the person who knows the truth in its general form is ignorant of it in the restricted form, or the person who know it in the limited form is ignorant of it in the wider form; so that when we come to consider the source of the two statements, we assume the existence (in the Veda) of a general statement as the source of one, and a particular statement as the source of the other; and these two Vedic statements occurring in two different recensional texts, the only reasonable course is to construe them together, unless there are distinct injunctions bearing upon the two statements. Specially as no such complaint can be raised against the Vedas as—‘What is the use of the general statement if it is to be taken in its restricted sense?’ There is no room for such a complaint, because there is no author in the case against whom such a complaint could be raised. Specially as in the case of a Vedic statement, the only idea that is obtained is from the actual words of the text, only that which can be derived from the words themselves; and there can be no justification for the assuming of any other meaning, for any purpose whatsoever.

What the ‘Rajjutāla’ and other birds are is to be learnt from persons versed in the science of birds.—(12)

VERSE (13)

Those birds that feed by striking with their beaks, those that are web-footed, the Koyasti, those that scratch with their nails, those that dive and eat fish, slaughter-house meat, and dried meat.—(13)

Bhāṣya.

Those that feed by ‘striking’—piercing—‘with their beaks. Such is the nature of these birds. The Shatapairā and other birds belong to this class.
VERSE XIII:—OBJECTIONABLE FOOD

'Web-footed'.—The Atri and the rest. That there is an option in regard to this has already been pointed out above (Bhāṣya on 12.)

"Wherever there is an option, it depends upon the man's wish which of the two options he will adopt; and as a matter of fact, it is only an unforbidden course that can be so adopted. The act of eating is an ordinary temporal act, possible only when there is a desire on the part of the man (to do it); it is not a spiritual act, which would have to be done in any case. So that we do not see any useful purpose that could be secured by an optional prohibition."

Our answer to this is that this has already been answered.

"But what has been said may be all right in regard to cases where (as in the Veda) the comprehension of the meaning depends entirely upon the words of the text, and there is no intention (of any author) behind them (to indicate their true purport). The present treatise however is the work of a human author, having been composed by him with great care and labour, for the purpose of supplying in brief all the information that was contained in another voluminous work containing a hundred thousand verses; so that no needless word can be used in it. In fact it is for this reason (of his not using a single superfluous word) that the author comes to be regarded as a 'Teacher'. It is not that there is no prohibition of all web-footed birds in general, in which case alone the prohibition of a particular web-footed bird, the Hamsa, could be justified. Since the present verse also is a Smṛti-text (and it forbids all web-footed birds in general). Some people have held that the term 'jālapida' (web-footed bird) in the present verse is a wrong reading'.

. . We have already explained that the intention of the Teacher is understood with the help of gestures, actions and the spinning out of long explanations; and in the present case particular details are also inferred. What was meant to be said was that 'one shall not eat web-footed birds in normal times'; but the author has propounded the prohibition
in the wider form, with a view to justifying both prohibitions (of web-footed birds in general, and of the Hamsa in particular).

'Sūnā' 'Slaughter house', is that place where animals are killed for the purpose of selling their flesh. Others explain it as 'meat-market'.

'Dried meat', 'Vallūra', is flesh dried and kept for several days.

'Nakhaviśkira' are those birds that scratch with their nails;—e.g. the Peacock, the Cock &c.

These birds are partly 'fit to be eaten' also, in view of the assertion that these may be eaten 'in abnormal times,' specially in view of what another Smṛti-writer has said regarding 'the Cock among birds' (being eatable). But the present text of Manu cannot be regarded as referring to the Cock; as in that case the separate mention of the 'Cock' would be useless.—(13)

VERSE (14)


Bhasya

The prohibition of the 'Baka, Balākā and Kākola' being already included under that of 'fish-eaters', these have been mentioned separately in order to indicate that the eating of the other fish-eating birds is optional.

'Fish-eaters'.—Animals other than birds also, which eat fish, are to be regarded as 'unfit to be eaten'; such animals, for instance, as the alligator and the like; that this is what is meant is clear from the fact that the name 'fish-eater' is to be applied in its literal sense.

'Kākola is the same as 'the Kite, such' being its name in foreign lands; for instance, it is known by this name in the Bāhlika country.'
The prohibition of the ‘village-pig’ implies the permission to eat the wild pig. The prohibition of those ‘living in villages’ in the preceding verse (11) should be taken, on the strength of the context, as referring to birds only. It is only thus that there would be any point in the mention of the ‘village-pig’ in the present verse. The pig that lives in villages is called ‘vidvarāha’, ‘village-pig’.

“If in verse 11, ‘those living in villages’ are to be taken, on the strength of the context, as birds only, then the term ‘fish-eaters’ in the present verse also should be taken as referring to birds only.”

Not so; because the present context is not restricted to birds only; since it mentions also non-birds, such as the ‘village pig’ and ‘fish’.

‘Sarvashah,—always.

This is a general rule; its exceptions we shall explain later on.—(14).

VERSE (15).

He who eats the flesh of an animal, is called the ‘eater of its flesh’; he who eats fish is the ‘eater of all kinds of flesh’; hence one shall avoid fish.—(15).

Bhasya.

This is a commendatory supplement to the foregoing prohibition of fish.

When one eats the flesh of an animal, he comes to be described as connected with the act of eating that animal; e.g. the mongoose is called ‘serpent-eater’, the cat ‘rat-eater’ and so forth. He who eats fish eats all kinds of flesh; it would be right to speak of him as a ‘beef-eater’ also.

Hence, by reason of the possibility of this calumny, one should avoid fish.—(15).
VERSE (16).

The 'Pāṭhīna' and the 'Rohita' are fit to be eaten when used as offerings to gods or Pitṛs; the 'Rājīva', the 'Simhatuṇḍa' and the 'Sashalka,' (one may eat) on all occasions—(16)

Bhāṣya.

'Pāṭhīna' and 'Rohita'—two particulars kinds of fish—having been mentioned as fit to be offered to Gods and to Pitṛs, the eating of these is permitted on the occasion of the performance of Shrāddha and other rites; and not in the course of ordinary daily food. As for the Rājīva, the 'Simhatuṇḍa' and the 'Sashalka' fish on the other hand, these are to be eaten 'on all occasions'; i.e. they may be eaten also on occasions other than the offerings to Gods and to Pitṛs.

'Rājīva'—some people regard this as standing for lotus-coloured fish. Others explain it as standing for those fish that are marked by lines.

'Simhatuṇḍa,'—those having a lion-like face.

'Sashalka'—is the same as the fish called 'Shakalin.'—(16).

VERSE (17).

He shall not eat solitary animals, nor unknown beasts and birds, even though indicated among those fit to be eaten; nor any five-nailed animals.—(17).

Bhāṣya.

'Solitary'—those animals that move about singly (not in herds); such as serpents, owls and the like.

'Unknown'—as regards name and kind.

'Beasts and birds';—neither beasts nor birds are fit to be taken.
VERSE XVIII:—OBJECTIONABLE FOOD

‘Even though indicated among those fit to be eaten’—Those that are not actually forbidden are, to that extent, regarded as fit to be eaten; and hence indirectly ‘indicated’ as such. In reality, there is no direct indication of those fit to be eaten. Those that are not specially recognised as to be avoided come to be regarded as fit to be eaten; and these are spoken of as ‘indicated as fit to be eaten’.

‘Five-nailed animals’—e.g. the Monkey, the Jackal and the like.

Any’—has been added for filling up the metre.—(17)

VERSE (18)

Among five-nailed animals they declare the Porcupine, the Hedge-hog, the Alligator, the Rhinoceros, the Tortoise and the Hare, as fit to be eaten; as also all animals having one line of teeth, except the Camel.—(18)

Bhāṣya.

Among five-nailed animals, the Porcupine and the rest are fit to be eaten.

In another Smṛti, there is option regarding the Rhinoceros. Says Vashisṭha (14-47)—‘They dispute about the rhinoceros.’

With the exception of the camel, all those animals are fit to be eaten which have only one line of teeth; for instance, the cow, the goat and the deer.

‘In as much as the present verse specifies the porcupine &c. as alone fit to be eaten, among five-nailed animals,—it follows that all the other five-nailed animals are unfit to be eaten; so that the prohibition of ‘all five-nailed animals’ becomes entirely superfluous.’.
There is nothing wrong in this. "When the prohibition is stated in so many words, our comprehension of it is direct; if on the other hand, we were to derive our knowledge of what should not be eaten from the specification of what should be eaten, our comprehension of the prohibition would be only inferential, indirect; and this would be a complicated process. —(18)."
SECTION (3).

Penalty for eating Forbidden Food.

VERSE (19.)

The mushroom, the village-pig, garlic, the village-cock, onions and leeks,—the twice-born man eating these intentionally would become an outcast.—(19).

Bhāsyā.

'Chhatraka' is the same as kavaka, the mushroom.

'Vidvārāhā' is the village-pig, which wanders about unchecked.

By eating these the man becomes an outcast. That is, he should perform the Expiatory Rites prescribed for outcasts. It will be asserted later on (11:56) —'The eating of forbidden food is like the drinking of wine.'—(19.)

VERSE (20.)

Having eaten these unintentionally, he should perform the 'Kirchhira Sāntapana', or the 'Yati-Chāndrāyaṇa'; and in the case of the rest one should fast for a day.—(20)

Bhāsyā.

'Unintentionally'—unwillingly,—'having eaten these'—any one of the six just mentioned;—that it is any one that is meant, and not all together, is indicated by the fact that the act of eating in this case is not what is actually enjoined.

In the case of the rest'—i.e. in the case of eating the other things—'red exudations from trees' and other things forbidden above,—one should desist from eating 'for a day';—the term 'day' is used as including the night also; e.g. in such passages as 'the day is dark, the day is bright'—(Rgveda 6.9.1.)

In connection with the eating of some of the things here forbidden, the text is going to prescribe in the section on Expiatory
Rites (Discourse 11) distinct expiatory rites;—e.g. in connection with 'carnivorous animals, pig etc.' (11:156); and in this case those are the Rites to be performed; since they have been directly enjoined in so man words; specially as the single 'day's fast' here prescribed will have its application only in cases other than those especially provided for.—(20)

VERSE (21)

Once a year the Brāhmaṇa shall perform the 'Krucchhra' penance, in order to atone for unintentional eating; but for intentional eating, special ones.—(21).

Bhisya.

This refers to the Brāhmaṇa who is in the habit of eating at the house of those Shūdra whose food he is permitted to eat.

It is possible that at the house of a Shūdra, there may be some articles of food that are not fit to be eaten by the Brāhmaṇa, which can not always be avoided; if the Brāhmaṇa eats at the house of such a Shūdra, there is always a fear of his having partaken of some forbidden food; hence for him it is laid down that he should perform the 'Prajāpatya krucchhra.' In all cases where the precise form of the 'krucchhra' is not laid down, it should be understood to be the 'Prajāpatya krucchhra, as we shall explain later on.

'In order to atone for unintentional eating':—i.e. in the event of there being suspicion of his having unwillingly partaken of forbidden food; that is, for the expiating of the sin incurred, in the event of his having eaten forbidden food.

"But the expiation for this is going to be prescribed" later on, under 5:127."

What that means and refers to we shall explain in connection with that verse.

For the act committed intentionally, special rites should be performed; i.e. that expiatory rite which has been prescribed in so many words in connection with a particular case—(21).
SECTION (4)

Killing of Animals for Food.

VERSE (22).

The animals and birds may be killed by Brāhmaṇas for the purpose of feeding their dependents; as Agastya did this of old.—(22).

Bhāṣya

In connection with food fit to be eaten, the Text proceeds to sanction the act of killing.

If one's dependents are very much pressed by hunger, and no other food can be found, then one may kill such birds and beasts as are fit to be eaten. The exact meaning of the term 'dependent' has been explained before (as standing for parents, wife etc.)

The mention of Agastya—that Agastya did the act—is only by way of recommendation.

The first half of the verse is purely commendatory; because the act of killing in connection with sacrifices is directly enjoined by the Vedic injunctions themselves (and as such does not stand in need of any sanction from the present text).

'Commended'—i. e. permitted as fit to be eaten.

This same thing is stated in the next verse in greater detail, as bearing upon the recommendation of certain acts.—(22).

VERSE (23)

In ancient times, at sacrifices performed by the sages, as also at sacrifices performed by Brāhmaṇas and Kṣatrexyas, the sacrificial cakes were made of eatable beasts and birds.—(23)

Bhāṣya

The killing of beasts and birds has been prescribed in connection with the sacrifice named 'Śadvimśat-samvatsara' (Twenty-
six Years). This is what is referred to in the present verse. The Brāhmaṇa-passage bearing upon the subject is as follows:—

‘At the end of the day the master of the house goes out hunting, and out of the flesh of the animals that he kills sacrificial cakes are made’.

In as much as the present verse is purely commenodatory, no significance is meant to be attached to the past tense in the term ‘babhūva’, ‘were made’; hence the same thing is done now-a-days also.

The same holds good regarding the term ‘purāṇeṣu’, ‘in ancient times’. This also means that people should not consider that the said sacrificial practice has come into force in recent times only.—Or, the term may be taken to mean that ‘it should not be understood that there is nothing to sanction the practice of killing animals at sacrifices’.—Or, the term may be regarded as added for the benefit of those persons who are incapable of comprehending the meaning of the scriptures themselves, and who regulate their conduct entirely in accordance with the practices of other people, on the principle that ‘the right path is that whereby great men have gone’. The meaning is that ‘this practice is not of recent origin, it is without beginning’.

The ‘ancient sages’ are certain Brāhmaṇas, well-known for their austerities. Or, it may stand for a distinct species of beings; as described in the Mahābhārata and other works. In this connection it is not necessary to press the objection that—‘If these sages belong to a distinct species of beings, they are like Gandharvas and others, and as such, not entitled to the performance of sacrifices’;—since the passage is a purely commenodatory one, and as such, may be understood in any way one chooses.

‘Brahmakṣattriyasava’,—sacrifices performed by Brāhmaṇas and Kṣattriyas.
SECTION (5)

Stale Food

Such food and eatables as are mixed with oils may be eaten though stale, if unspoilt; so also what may be the remnant of a sacrificial offering.—(24)

Bhasya

'Whatever food is mixed with oils.'—'Food' stands fro Rice etc. Though the roots to 'eat' and to 'feed' are synonymous, yet the two terms 'food' and 'eatables' have been used with a view to the various articles of food.

'Unspoilt'—here stands for what has not become sour by keeping.

Such food 'may be eaten though stale'. That is called 'stale' which has been kept over night. What is cooked on one day also becomes 'stale' the next day.

'Mixed with oils.'—In regard to this the following question is raised:

"Does this mean that whatever in the shape of vegetable juice etc. has been cooked with oils should be eaten even when stale?—Or, that 'oils are to be mixed up with dry articles of food, at the time that they are going to be eaten stale? According to the latter view stale cakes and sweets also would have to be eaten only after having been mixed with oils."

'There is, it is argued, no room for any such doubt; since what is asserted by the words 'may be eaten though stale' is only the eatability of food mixed with oils; so that the epithet 'mixed with oils' is part of the Subject, and not of the Predicate. Nor do we find it referred to by the pronoun 'tat', 'that', by any such form of expression as 'what is stale, that may be eaten mixed with oils' (which would make the epithet part of the Predicate).
The answer to this is that there is still some ground for doubt; as (according to the explanation just suggested) there would be no point in the separate mention of the 'remnants of sacrificial offering', which are stale and not mixed with oils (the latter being implied by their being mentioned apart from 'food mixed with oils'); because there is no chance of these remnants being 'mixed with oils' and becoming 'stale'. Consequently the separate mention of these can have some sense only if in their case it were not considered necessary to mix oils at the time of eating. So that the separate mention of these becomes justified only if, in the case of these Remnants, it be not necessary to mix oils at the time of eating (which is considered necessary in the case of the other articles of food.)

But, even so, there need not be any doubt. For in that case, it would be only right to take the epithet 'mixed with oils' as part of the Predicate, for the purpose of justifying the separate mention of the 'Remnants of sacrificial offerings'. [So that thus also, the meaning would be quite clear, though different from what we had explained before.]

In answer to this it is argued that there is only this ground for doubt that in view of the fact that the direct construction of the words as they stand is always to be preferred to any other roundabout constructions,—would it be right to regard the mention of the 'sacrificial remnants' as merely reiterative (and not injunctive) [ in which case it may well be left pointless ]? Or that, in order to guard against the mention being pointless, the words should be construed to mean that whatever is stale should be mixed with oils at the time of eating?

On this point there is no doubt; rather than allow the words of the text to be regarded as pointless, it is far more reasonable to have recourse to the indirect method of construction. The real decision however depends entirely upon usage.

'Oils.'—This term stands for butter, 'oil, fat and bone-marrow—(24).
VERSE XXV.—LAWFUL AND FORBIDDEN FOOD

VERSE (25).

All that is made of barley and wheat, as also all preparations of milk, may be eaten by twice-born men, without being mixed with oils, even though they may have been kept long—(25).

Bhāṣya

‘Kept long’—i.e. kept for two nights.

The term ‘even though’ implies that those ‘mixed with oils’ are also meant to be included.

Even though unmixed with oils, such things as fried flour and cakes, etc. as are made of barley and wheat.

Also ‘preparations of milk,’—such as curd, skimmed milk and the like.—(25).
SECTION (6)

Lawful and Forbidden Meat.

VERSE (26)

Thus has been described in full what is fit and what unfit to be eaten by twice-born men. Next I am going to explain the rule regarding the eating and avoiding of meat.—(26)

Bhāṣya

The first half of the verse cuts off the preceding section; and what is implied by this cutting off of the section is that the section that has gone before pertains to the twice-born castes only, not to Shūdras, while what follows applies to Shūdras also. It is for this reason that several methods of eating meat shall be described, and the reward resulting from the giving up of meat-eating shall accrue to the Shūdra also. If this were not so, then, in the matter of eating meat also, the Shūdra would be free to do what he likes; just as he is in regard to the eating of garlic and other things that has been forbidden for ‘twice-born persons’ only, in verses 5 etc. etc. above.

‘If it is as you say, then there is the following difficulty:—In verse 32 below, the Text is going to declare the eatability of the meat left from the worship of the Gods:—viz. ‘One does not become contaminated by sin if he eats meat after having worshipped the Gods and the Pitrīs’;—now the ‘worship of the gods’ etc. can be done only with such meat as is sacred; and those beasts and birds that have been forbidden for twice-born people (in the next section) are not sacred; hence, the worshipping of Gods etc. with the meat of these beasts and birds being impossible,—and what does not form the ‘remnant of worship’ being unfit to be eaten,—these other beasts and birds also, mentioned in a different context, become forbidden for the twice-born people; and the
prohibition of these could be made to apply to the Shūdra also by some such other method (of reasoning). So that there is no point in the dividing of the sections (simply for making the prohibitions of the next section applicable to Shūdras also). And as for the prohibition of garlic and such things (that have been forbidden specially for twice-born persons), it is not applicable to Shūdras at all."

There is this useful purpose served by the dividing of the two sections, that the prohibition of garlic and other things ceases to be applicable to the Shūdra. As regards meat also, in as much as the Householder only is entitled to do the worshipping of Gods, it is a matter purely optional for such Shūdras as are not 'householders'.

"As a matter of fact, Shūdras also are entitled to the performance of sacrifices with cooked food; the eating of food has also been prescribed for Householders; but no 'sacrifices with cooked food' are ever offered with garlic and such other things. So that these things may be eaten, or not, by Shūdras, entirely according to their option.—'Why'? What would be the harm?' In that case the mention of 'twiceborn persons' (in connection with the forbidding of garlic, etc.) would have no point at all."

This has been already answered by the explanation that one who is not a Householder, or who is travelling away from home, may do what he likes. Nor is it necessary that the Householder shall not eat what has not been offered in oblations; the meaning of the declaration 'one shall live on remnants' being that 'he shall not eat until he has made the offering to the Vishdevas.' Now, that substance alone is 'sacred', and can be offered as oblation, which has been prescribed as to be offered at, and thus helping the fulfilment of, a sacrifice. Some people fetch food from somewhere, at the time of eating, and eat it in their own house; and in this case even though the food may not be the 'remnant of a sacrifice', it would not be forbidden. As regards meat however, we have the restriction directly imposed, that 'it shall never be eaten unless it has been offered to the Gods.'
“If this is applicable to all the four castes, then there is no point in what is going to be said (under 5.57) in connection with purifications.”

The use of that we shall explain at that place.

“In view of the mention of twice-born people in the foregoing section, it follows that dog’s meat and such things also are fit to be eaten by Shūdras.”

Under Discourse XI we shall show that there are indications to the effect that ‘the village-pig’, the ass, the camel, and other animals mentioned in the three verses (157 ect.) are ‘unfit to be eaten’ for the Shūdra also.—(26).

VERSE (27)

He may eat meat that has been consecrated; also at the wish of Brāhmaṇas; and when invited according to law; and when his life is in danger.—(27)

Bhāṣya

The remnant of the meat of the animal sacrificed at the Agniṣṭoma is figuratively called ‘consecrated’.

“The term ‘prokṣita’ literally means sprinkled with water, being derived from the root ‘ukṣa,’ ‘to sprinkle,’; and it is, in this sense that the word has been used in all such expressions as ‘bring the prokṣanā water-vessels,’ ‘butter is the prokṣana, the sprinkling-material,’ ‘prokṣanībhīḥ udevējītāḥ,’ ‘bothered by sprinklings,’ and so forth. Thus then, if the word literally means ‘what is done by sprinkling,’ then why should such terms as are expressive of certain consecrations prescribed in the Veda, (such as sprinkling with water and the like), be taken as indirectly indicating the animal (sacrificed) and its meat? Why should the direct signification of the word be abandoned in favour of an indirect indication? For these reasons it is better to take the text to mean ‘meat sprinkled with water and such liquids.’”

What is urged would be quite true, if there were no other texts and commensatory passages bearing upon the matter; such as
we have in the shape of such texts as ‘Unconsecrated meat etc.’ (Verse), ‘Animals not consecrated with sacred texts etc.’ (36). A careful examination of all these texts leads to the conclusion that the meaning of the word is as we have explained it.

“If so, then what is said here being already mentioned in the texts quoted, what would be the use of the present text?”

Some people say that the present verse is purely re-iterative. It cannot be an injunction of eating meat when one wishes to do so. Because the man who is hungry and wishes to eat meat can take to it through his desire to relieve his hunger (and he does not need an injunction for that). That is called an ‘Injunction’ which points to such activity of the agent as would not be possible under the influence of any ordinary visible motive; such injunctions, for instance, as ‘one shall perform the Agnihotra throughout his life;’ and on such a matter, the scripture is the sole source of knowledge (and authority) available. We need not seek for scriptural authority in the case of the acts in connection with which we have the positive and negative notions to the effect that—‘if it is done, such and such a reward shall follow—and if it is not done, such and such an evil shall befall us.’ And it is only when there is no such source of knowledge available, and the matter is knowable by means of scriptures alone, that it becomes a case of ‘Injunction.’ As regards the case in question, even infants at the breast know, without being told, that eating brings strength and removes pain. [So that the present text cannot be regarded as an Injunction]. Nor again can it be taken as a Restrictive Injunction, for the simple reason that no such sense of restriction is recognised (as conveyed by the words). (a) For instance, if the restriction were in the form ‘one must eat what has been consecrated,’—then, since no time is specified the due observance of this injunction would disturb the entire routine of food and rest, and the man may have to be eating constantly; so that an impossible act will have been enjoined in this case. It has been said that—‘one who eats not at Shraddhas etc.’—and again ‘the day on which he is remiss etc.’ Then again, the author of the Mahābhāṣya has declared
that a Restriction is always supplementary to an Injunction; so that when there is no Injunction, how can there be any Restriction? What has been ‘consecrated’ by one man cannot be obtained by another man; so that every man will have to eat all the meat that he consecrates, and this would entail a great calamity. (b) If, on the other hand, the restriction be taken to be in the form of preclusion—‘one shall eat only what is consecrated,’ and not what is not consecrated,—on the ground of its fulfilling the condition of ‘Preclusion,’ that hunger cannot be alleviated except by the eating of both consecrated and unconsecrated food, either simultaneously or one after the other;—even so this would be already implied by what has been said above regarding ‘consecrated meat’ (in verse 7). (So that in this case also there would be no point in taking the present text as an Injunction.)

Others however find the following fault in the above view:—If all unconsecrated meat were forbidden, birds would fall in the category of ‘forbidden food’; specially as there is no authority for any such restricted view that those alone are forbidden in their unconsecrated form, in connection with which consecration has been enjoined (and no consecration has been enjoined regarding birds).

Some people regard this view as improper. Because even so, the text cannot but be regarded as implying (if not directly asserting) the prohibition of (unconsecrated) birds also.

For these reasons, in as much as every Restriction is subservient to some enjoined act, it appears better to regard the present text as purely re-iterative of the eatability of consecrated meat. Just as at sacrifices, one must eat the consecrated meat, and omitting to eat it involves disobedience of the scriptural Injunction, so would it be in connection with all other occasions (on which meat is consecrated). And when the text is purely reiterative, it may also imply a preclusion (as shown above). The rule that ‘one shall not eat the unconsecrated meat of the cow, the sheep and the goat’ would only be a reiteration of the uneatability of ‘unconsecrated meat’ (mentioned in verse 7);—this reiteration in the present verse serving the purpose of permitting the eating of
unconsecrated meat also, 'at the wish of Brāhmaṇas', and under certain other circumstances (specified in the present verse).

Others again have taken the following view.—Under 4:213 we have the mention of 'needlessly prepared meat,' and the present verse serves the purpose of explaining what the 'needlessly prepared meat' is; as in the absence of this it could not be known what is 'needlessly prepared meat'.

Or, it may be that in one verse we have the rule for the eater (who does the consecration himself), while what the other means is that other persons, guests and others, shall not eat the meat belonging to (and offered by) a person who has not performed the worship of the Gods, etc. (and consecrated the meat at it). In the event of the householder being somehow not entitled to worship the Gods, his guests and other persons would be justified in doing that worship for him; and if the meat has been consecrated at such a worship, then they may eat it. The second prohibition (of unconsecrated meat)—'one incurs no sin by eating meat after having worshipped the Gods and the Pitṛs' (Verse 32)—is meant for those persons who are capable of performing the worship at their own house and have not performed it. What is stated in verse 36—'animals not consecrated by sacred texts etc.'—is meant to be explanatory of what is meant by the term 'consecration'.

Thus we have shown that all the five prohibitive passages have five distinct meanings and serve distinctly useful purposas.

'At the wish of the Brāhmaṇas'—'Brāhmaṇāṅcha kāmyayā'—'. kāmyā' is kāmanā, 'wish'; the form 'kāmyā' being a Vedic anachronism.

"If this text permits the eating of unconsecrated meat at the wish of the Brāhmaṇas, then what is the sense of this restriction? Does it mean that if one omits to eat at their wish, he incurs the sin of disobeying the scriptures? Or, does the present section set forth only a counter-exception? If it is a mere counter-exception, then such counter-exception, setting aside the force of the prohibition, would be available also in the shape of such assertions as 'meat may be eaten at marriages'."
The text does not mean that one must eat meat under the circumstances; all that is meant is that if the Brahmaṇas are very superior persons, then the disobeying of their wish would not be right.

Others again construe the term 'of Brahmaṇas' with verse 32 also, and take the present text as an Injunction for the eating of meat of the hare and other animals also; the sense being that—at sacrifices and marriages, or at other large dinner-parties, if the Brahmaṇas request one to eat meat, then the meat of such animals should not be regarded as forbidden, as they are, by their very nature, consecrated to the 'Gods'; and it is only under special circumstances that consecration and worship of the Gods etc. may be performed. In fact it is only those kinds of meat that have been forbidden under certain circumstances whose eating is sanctioned, at the wish of Brahmaṇas; and the sanction does not apply to the eating of 'carnivorous birds' and the rest, or to the case of a man who has resolved to give up meat in view of 'ceasing to eat meat being conducive to highest results,'—irrespective of the fact of the meat being either 'consecrated' or 'unconsecrated,' or 'offered' or 'not offered.'

'When invited according to law, and when his life is in danger.'—When invited, at the Madhuparka offering, or at a Shrāddha, one may eat the meat even without consecration. This is what is meant by being 'invited according to law'; the rules to be observed by inviters at Shrāddhas have been described before (under 3·100); so that having promised to dine at the Shrāddha, no one can say 'I shall not eat such and such a thing,' barring of course anything that may be either unfit to be eaten, or unclean or unwholesome; specially as the food offered at Shrāddhas is generally such as is fit for offering to Gods, and also agreeable to the guests. (Thus then, there being no possibility of one refusing to eat, the meat offered at the Shrāddha.) what is said here must pertain to the Madhuparka offering only.

"But there is no invitation for the Madhuparka offering."
All that is meant by the present text is that the man who is entitled to receive the Madhuparka offering shall eat the unconsecrated meat that may be offered to him; and it does not contain an injunction of offering the Madhuparka. The person meant here as the recipient of the Madhuparka is the Guest, and not the king and other honoured persons; just as we find it laid down for the Householder that 'the guest shall not dwell in his house without eating.' From this it would follow that nothing shall be offered to the guest against his desire. As for the notion that one may do what he likes in the matter of receiving an honoured guest and in feeding him,—if this idea were acted up to, then those acts would not have been done 'for the sake of the guest.'

"But the position of the guest also is uncertain."

True; but it has been found that the performance of the act brings spiritual merit by producing pleasure in the recipient's mind. Hence it is that by way of a rule it has been laid down for the giver, in accordance with the practice by which the calf is offered, that 'there can be no Madhuparka without meat.'

"What is herein laid down may be regarded as pertaining to the case of priests officiating at one's sacrifice."

In that case, this also, like the preceding clause, may be only reiterative of what pertains to the officiating priest and to Shrûddhas.

"But in connection with the work of the priests, the eating of the Iḍā and such other materials has been prescribed; and the restrictions bearing upon that pertains to the Sacrifice, and not to the priests."

True; but if the priests do not eat, they are censured, and also become beset with transcendental evil. Even if they eat, they do not become related to the result following from the act. Servants employed on wages (such as the priests are) perform the details prescribed in the scriptures; and it has been prescribed that 'the priests along with the sacrificer as the fifth eat the Iḍā cake,' so that it is incumbent upon those who have accepted the priestly office to do that eating. And in that case it is only right that this eating should be reiterated. There is however nothing 'scriptual'
in the eating done by persons eating at Shrāddhas or by the priests. So that the reiteration is of the eating done by the sacrificer.—It may be asked—"For what purpose is this reiteration?"—But reiteration does not always need a purpose. All that is done is that it reiterates what has been enjoined elsewhere. Similarly in the case in question also, if the owner of the cow has promised to honour the guest with the killing of the cow, then the guest must eat it; for he accepts the offering of Madhuprka as a favour to the offerer; so that it is necessary that he should accomplish the act preceding the offering. Otherwise, in the event of the Madhuprka not being accepted, the said favour would not be bestowed; consequently in the matter of the eating of forbidden meat, it is necessary for the man at the very outset to accept the Madhuprka and the duties of the priest;—similarly in the matter of feeding the Brāhmaṇas. As regards the Student, since certain strict observances have been prescribed for him, meat should be regarded as altogether 'unfit to be eaten.'

'When his life is in danger'.—From the context it follows that what is meant is that—'in the event of his not eating meat without worshipping the gods, and no other food being available, if there be a fear of his losing his life, either though disease or through hunger, one may eat the cow, the sheep and the goat.' This rule is based upon the Vedic declaration that 'one shall protect himself from everything.' So that under the circumstances, if one omits to eat meat, he becomes his own murderer; and suicide has been forbidden by such text as—(a) 'One shall protect himself from everything'; (b) 'Hence the man, expecting to live to the fullest extent of human life, shall never kill himself with a desire to proceed to heaven; as such an act would make him unfit for heaven';—all which shows that by eating even forbidden meat to save his life, one does not incur sin. Says the Mantra also (Ishopanisad 3)—'Those who kill themselves go, after death, to those regions that are covered by blind darkness and are fit only for demons.'

When there is danger to life, even the Student may eat meat; and for him his young age would necessitate the performance of the expiatory rite as prescribed in the text—'If the Student ever
eats meat and honey, etc.' (11.158). Vyāsa has declared that when there is fear of losing one's life through hunger, one may eat even forbidden meat; and by the instance of the 'dog's thigh' (eaten by Vishvāmitra) it is indicated that such meat may be eaten, but once only.

From this it follows that in the case of serious developments of diseases, where one cannot be sure that the man will certainly recover by eating meat, one shall not eat forbidden meat, such as that of the village-cock and the like; though it is permitted to eat such meat as has been consecrated or offered to the gods.

In the case of disease also one shall not eat meat for the purpose of recovering from a disease that may have just set in; but in the case of men who have become enfeebled and emaciated through disease, the eating of meat is always permitted; as asserted in the verse—'Persons daily addicted to wine and women, consumptives, those emaciated through fatigue and disease, as also enfeebled patients, live upon the juices of meat.' It is necessary for these persons to worship the gods in the case of the meat of unconsecrated gout; there would however be no harm, if on some day this be not found possible.—(27).

VERSE (28).

PRAJĀPATI CREATED ALL THIS AS FOOD FOR THE VITAL SPIRIT; AND ALL THAT IS MOVABLE OR IMMOVABLE IS THE FOOD OF THE VITAL SPIRIT (28).

Bhāṣya.

'Vital spirit,'—the breath within the body, the very seed of life. For the sustenance of this breath, as functioning in the five-fold form of 'Uḍāna' and the rest,—and for its maintenance in the body,—'Prajāpati created all this'—world—as food.

Having indicated the world in a general way, by means of the pronoun 'this', the author proceeds to specify it in details—
all that is movable or immovable'. All this, on account of what is said in the first half, is the 'food of the vital spirit'. The second 'all' is not redundant, since it is added with a view to indicate the various kinds of beings,—beasts, birds, men, reptiles, etc.

Since Prajāpati has ordained all this to be 'food' in times of distress, all of it is the food of the vital spirit. This is also what we read in the dialogue of the Vital Breath contained in the Upaniṣads—'He asked—what shall be my food?—Whatever exists, down to the dogs and, down to the insects and worms'—(28).

VERSE (29).

THE IMMOBILE IS THE FOOD OF THE MOBILE; THOSE DEVOID OF FANGS ARE THE FOOD OF THOSE ENDOWED WITH FANGS; THOSE WITHOUT HANDS ARE THE FOOD OF THOSE WITH HANDS; AND COWARDS ARE THE FOOD OF THE BRAVE.—(29).

Bhāṣya

'Mobile',—those that are capable of walking and flying and are courageous and active; e.g. the kite, the mongoose and the rest.—Of those the 'immobile'—lethargic animals, such as the pigeon, the serpent and the like—are 'the food.'

Similarly 'of those endowed with fangs,'—i.e. of the lion, the tiger, etc.,—'those devoid of fangs'—the Ruru, the Prśat and the other kinds of deer—are the 'food.'

'Those without hands,'—i.e., serpents, fish and the like—are the food of 'those with hands,'—of the mongoose and the fisherman, etc.

'Of the brave'—of those that are endowed with great courage—'cowards'—those who are over-fond of life—are the food.

'The meaning is that those possessed of inferior strength are killed for food—(29).
VERSE (30).

The eater incurs no sin by eating, even daily, such animals as are eatable; since the eater as well as the eaten animals have been created by the creator himself—(30).

Bhāṣya.

'Eater'—one who eats.

'Eat'able'—which are capable of being eaten. He incurs no sin even by eating them daily.

By the 'Creator'—Prajāpāti—himself—have been created both the eater and the eaten.

For this reason when there is danger to life, meat must be eaten. This is the sense of the three verses, which are purely comemendstory—(30).

VERSE (31)

'The eating of meat for sacrifices'—this is declared to be the divine law; but behaviour contrary to this is described as 'demoniacal practice'—(31).

Bhāṣya

'The eating of meat'—in the form of offerings and oblations—'for sacrifices.'

'This is the divine law';—this is what has been ordained by the Gods.

'Behaviour contrary to this,'—i.e. eating meat for the fattening of the body—is 'the demoniacal practice'; it is only demons that eat meat in this fashion. This is said in depreciation of the practice.—(31)

VERSE (32)

Having bought it, or having obtained it himself, or having it presented by others,—if one eats meat after having worshipped the Gods and the Pitrs, he does not incur sin—(32)

Bhāṣya

The law here laid down refers to the meat of deer and birds. The meaning is that there is no sin incurred in
eating the meat of the Ruru, the Prśat and other kinds of
deer, or the partridge and other birds, if it is done after
having worshipped the Gods and the Pitrś.

In the case of the offering to the Vishvēdēvas, when
there is no preparation for it in the house, one may eat rice and
other things, even without making the offering; but not so
meat; it is with a view to emphasise this that the text
repeats—'having worshipped the Gods and the Pitrś etc.' If
mere sanction to eat after worship were meant, this has
already been accorded before.

What is meant by the 'worshipping of the Gods' here is
the offering of the meat on a clean spot with the words
'this is for the Gods'; or that 'the worship of the Gods'
should be done in such terms as—'this to Agni, to Vāyu,
to Surya, to Jātavedas.' That this must be the meaning of
the 'worship' is proved by the fact that 'offering of oblations
into the fire' (which could be the other meaning 'worshipping the
Gods') is not possible for persons other than Agnihotris; nor can
there be any offering made to the Gods without oblations having
been poured into the fire; specially as it has been already shown
that the two are distinct actions and involve distinct methods
of procedure. This matter may rest here for the present.

Others have explained the 'worship' of the Pitrś to
mean Shrāddha; and in Shrāddhas we do find worshipping being
done. It is the Pitrś again that are spoken of as the 'deities'
of the Shrāddha. Hence it is that in connection with the
Pitrś, all writers on Smṛti have prescribed the Shrāddha only,
and no other act.

"How can the buying of meat be permissible? The meat
obtained from the market becomes 'Sauna', 'butcher's meat'
(which has been forbidden); and as for the meat of animals
dying of themselves, and not killed by the butcher, this
is 'unfit for eating', on the ground of its causing disease."

Our answer to the above is that one can always 'buy'
the meat brought by fowlers and bird-catchers; and these are
known as 'butchers'; and they wander about from house to house, carrying meat for sale, when it is possible to buy it; and it does not become 'butcher's meat.'

'Having obtained it himself,'—the Brāhmaṇa by begging it' and the Kṣatriya by hunting.—(32)

VERSE (33)

In normal times the twice-born man conversant with the law shall not eat meat unlawfully; having eaten it unlawfully, he shall, after death, be devoured by them helplessly. (33)

Bhāṣya

That is called 'unlawful' which is done apart from the above-sanctioned occasions—of the worshipping of the Gods, the wish of the Brāhmaṇas and so forth; and in this 'unlawful' manner one shall not eat meat.

This is only a reiteration of what has been said before.

'In normal times'.—In abnormal times of distress, when one's life is in danger, he need not wait for the worship of the Gods etc.

"Danger to life has already been sanctioned as one of the occasions on which meat may be eaten; so that such eating would be quite lawful, not unlawful."

True; but what has been said on the previous occasion was in connection with the consecrated meat of the cow, the sheep and the goat; and in the present text the phrase 'in normal times' has been added with a view to extend the sanction to the meat of the hares and other animals also.

It is not the mere knowor of the law that is called 'conversant with the law' but one who, in practice acts up to the law. In connection with ordinary worldly acts also the term 'know,' 'be conversant with,' is used in this sense;
when it is said of a man 'he knows this', what is meant is that 'he acts up to it'.

When the question arises regarding the effect of the act in question, the text says—'Having eaten meat unlawfully,'—i.e. in a manner not prescribed in the scriptures—'he shall, on death, be devoured', by those animals. All that is meant—is that when a man eats meat in an unlawful manner, he suffers various kinds of pain. If these were not meant by the passage (and if it were taken in its literal sense),—then, in as much as it is the meat of the goat that is commonly eaten by people, and the goat is a not carnivorous animal [how could it 'devour' its eater?]

Or, the meaning may be that the eater, by virtue of the sin of that act, comes to be devoured by carnivorous animals; and as this would be the result of his having eaten the goat, he would be described as being devoured by the goat.—(33)

VERSE (34)

The sin of the man who kills animals for gain is not so great, after death, as that of the man who eats needlessly-prepared meat.—(34)

Bhāsyā

The meaning of this verse is well known.—(34).

VERSE (35)

But when invited according to law, if a man does not eat meat, he becomes, after death, a beast, during twenty-one births.—(35)

Bhāsyā

'Sambhava' stands for janma, birth.

Except when there is danger to life through hunger, if a man does not worship the Gods, and yet eats meat, he certainly incurs sin.—(35)
VERSE XXXVII:—LAWFUL AND FORBIDDEN MEAT

VERSE (36)

The Brāhmaṇa shall never eat animals that have not been consecrated with sacred texts; but those that have been consecrated with sacred texts, he shall eat, taking his stand upon the eternal law.—(36)

Bhāṣya

In connection with animals-sacrifice, 'sprinkling with water' and other consecrations have been laid down as to be done with sacred texts; and one shall eat the meat of those animals for whom all these have been performed, and which (thus) are the 'remnants of sacrifices' prescribed in the Vedas. But in the case of the 'Sitā-yajña' and other sacrifices that are performed solely on the strength of usage (and for which there is no injunction in the Veda),—even though the meat would be the 'remnant of sacrifice', yet, since there would be no 'consecration with sacred texts', it would be 'unfit for eating'.

'Eternal'—Vedic.

'Taking his stand'—dependent.—(36)

VERSE (37)

If there is occasion, he shall make an animal of clarified butter, or an animal of flour; but he shall never seek to kill an animal needlessly.—(37)

Bhāṣya

People are likely to entertain such ideas as the following—"at the Sitā-yajña the Khaṇjikā-yāga, the Chandikā-yāga and the like, which are performed, on the authority of usage only, it is right for the man desiring a certain result to kill animals; for it has been found that one obtains a rich harvest by offering sacrifices at which animals are killed."

With a view to set aside such notions the text says—"If there is occasion,"—if necessity arises for the offering of an animal in sacrifice,—'he shall make an animal of
clarified butter'; i.e. he shall make clarified butter the sacrificial animal; that is, it being necessary to offer an animal to the Gods, he shall offer, in its place, clarified butter; which is as good a 'sacrificial material'.

'Or, he shall make an animal of flour'; i.e. he shall make the figure of an animal with flour, and offer that figure to the Gods; or, it may be taken to mean that 'instead of the animal he shall offer cakes and other things made of flour'.

"Why is this called needless animal-slaughter, when it is sanctioned by the usage of civilized people?"

Since women, and Šudras are ignorant of the Veda, such sacrifices as those mentioned cannot be assumed to have any sanction in the Veda; specially as people have recourse to these sacrifices for the purpose of propitiating the Gods, and no Vedic act is done for the propitiating of Gods; for the simple reason that in connection with Vedic rites, Gods have been mentioned as subordinate factors. In fact, what they urge in support of the performance of the sacrifices in question is the argument based upon negative and positive induction, from the experience that there is rich harvest when Gods are propitiated with the sacrifice of animals. For these reasons, these sacrifices cannot be regarded as having the sanction of the Veda. As for the positive and negative induction that also is entirely mistaken.

From all this it is clear that the present verse only reiterates what is already indicated as the right course by all kinds of reasons; and it has been put forward by the author through feelings of friendly kindliness.—(37)

VERSE (38)

As many hairs there are on the body of the animal, so many times after dying does its needless killer suffer violent death, birth after birth.—(38.)

Beśṣya

For so many lives does he suffer violent death.
VERSE XI.—LAWFUL AND FORBIDDEN MEAT

'Needless killer of the animal',—one who kills the animal in a way not prescribed in the Shruti or the Smrti; from the context it is clear that this refers to that animal-sacrifice which ordinary people perform on the Mahanavami.

The term 'pushvagha' is a Vedic form formed with the affix 'ka'.—(38).

VERSE (39)

Animals have been created by the Self-born God himself for the purpose of sacrifice; sacrifice is conducive to the well-being of all this world; hence killing at a sacrifice is no 'killing' at all.—(39).

Bhāṣya.

The evil just described does not pertain to the killing of animals at the rites prescribed by Shruti and Smrti.

That 'killing' which forms part of sacrifices,—for the due fulfilment of that were animals 'created'—produced, brought into existence,—'by the self-born God'—Prajñāpati himself.'

This is a purely commendatory passage.

'Sacrifice'—in the form of the Jyotistoma and the rest—'is conducive to the well-being'—prosperity, development, advancement —'of all this'—world.

For this reason the killing that is done at a sacrifice should be regarded as no killing at all. What this means is that it does not involve the sin of 'killing' animals.—(39)

VERSE (40)

Here, animals, trees, beasts and birds, reaching death for the sake of sacrifices, attain advancements.—(40)

Bhāṣya.

"How is it known that killing at sacrifices involves no sin?"

The answer is as follows:—'killing' is the greatest injury that can befall the being killed; because it involves such great evil as the loss of life, involving separation from wife, children.
and riches, and all the attendant evil consequences; and also because it carries the entities nearer to the fruition of their sins in the form of hell and the like. But when an animal is killed at a sacrifice, this killing becomes a great benefit conferred upon it, and it is not an injury; because it does not lead it to hell or any such undesirable conditions. That this is so follows from the fact that those 'reaching death'—destruction—at a sacrifice—'attain advance-ments'—higher positions, in regard to caste and so forth;—being born as a God or a Gandharva, or as men born in better countries or continents—such as the Uttaraburu and the like.

The whole of this is a purely commendatory description. We do not find here any Injunction; the verb 'attain' being in the simple Present tense. Nor is there any justification for deducing an Injunction from the commendatory description,—as is done in the case of the passage 'Pratitiṣṭhanti etc.' (vide, Mīmāṃsā-Sūtra, 4. 3. 17: et seq); because in the present case neither there is, nor is there any possibility of, any other Injunction (apart from those already set forth in the text).

The whole of this descriptive section is supplementary to the prohibition of the eating of unlawful meat; and the upshot of the prohibition contained in these verses is that 'one should never seek to kill animals needlessly.' (verse 37) As for the sanction (of killing) implied in the statement—'animals have been created for the purpose of sacrifices' (39),—all this is understood as involving the prohibition of eating, which is going to be distinctly emphasised below in verse 48.

Nor can any Injunction (such as 'desiring advancement, the animal shall die at a sacrifice') be deduced from the text. Because such an Injunction could not be intended for the animals; for the simple reason that they would not understand it. And those for whom the Injunction is not intended cannot be the agent; and unless one is an agent, he cannot obtain any reward declared in the scriptures. Specially as in the present case, the result spoken of does not proceed in any perceptible manner from the nature of the thing involved; as there is, for instance, in the
case of the poison, which produces its results even on ignorant persons who take it. There is no such thing in the case of things spoken of in the Veda.

Further, since the herbs and other things spoken of here are unconscious beings, the 'principle of the priests' cannot apply to their case. That is to say, it is found that in the case of sacrificial performances, results are spoken of as accruing to one person (the sacrificer) from the acts that are actually done by others,—i.e. the priests officiating for him; e.g. in the case of the passage—'he desires one to become worse etc.' In the case of such passages we admit of an Injunction, because what is there stated is not capable of being taken as supplementary to any other Injunction, and secondly because the indication of the Injunction is quite clear, and lastly, because the Injunction indicated is found to be one that pertains to human beings.

In the case of all scriptural statements, we are entitled to deduce just as much as may be reasonably deduced from the actual words of the text. For instance, it has been declared that the Brāhmaṇa joining in the sacrificial bath of other people should have to perform an expiatory rite [and we have to accept this, even though we fail to see any reason for it]. In the present case, however, there is no possibility of any Injunction being addressed to the beings concerned (all of which are inanimate).

'Herbs,'—grass and the like.

'Animals,'—the goat and other beasts (which are mentioned as fit for being offered at sacrifices).

'Trees,'—such as are objects of worship.

'Beasts,'—those which, though not ordinarily regarded as fit for sacrificing, happen to be mentioned, in some passages, as to be offered; e.g. 'one shall kill partridges.' Though at the Vājāpeya and similar sacrifices, the calves are used only for the purpose of carrying loads, yet they are called 'beasts,' and even though these do not suffer actual death, yet the term 'death' in their case stands for all the sufferings that they undergo.
'Birds,'—the Kapinijala and the rest; even though these are sometimes spoken of as ‘animals,’ yet, as a rule, they are not known by that name; for in such passages as ‘there are seven tame animals and seven wild animals,’ the animals meant are the cow and the rest, which are not birds; in fact the term ‘pashu,’ ‘animals, denotes quadrupeds;’ or the difference between ‘animals’ and ‘birds’ may be regarded as similar to that between the ‘go’ and the ‘balivarda’ (the former term being wider than the latter) (40).

VERSEŚ (41—42.)

AT THE MADHUPARKA OFFERING, AT SACRIFICES, AND AT THE RITES IN HONOUR OF THE PîTRS,—AT THESE ALONE SHOULD ANIMALS BE KILLED, AND NOWHERE ELSE; THUS HAS MANU DECLARED.—(14)

THE TWICE-BORN PERSON, KNOWING THE REAL IMPORT OF THE VEDÀ, KILLING ANIMALS ON THESE OCCASIONS, CARRIES HIMSELF AND THE ANIMAL TO THE MOST EXCELLENT STATE.—(42).

Bhāṣya.

The present text sums up in brief those occasions on which the killing of animals is sanctioned by the scriptures.

'Madhuparka'—has been already described. At this the killing of the calf has been enjoined.

'Sacrifice'—such as the Jyotiṣṭoma and the like; the eleventh stage of which consists of the animal-sacrifice; as also the Pushubandha, at which the sacrificing of the animal forms a sacrifice by itself.

'Rites in honour of the Pîtrs,'—i.e., those of which the Pîtrs are the ‘deities;’ what are meant are the Aṣṭakā and other offerings of the kind, and not Shrāddhas; because these latter are laid down as to be performed with cooked meat, (for which the meat could be obtained otherwise than by actually killing the animal at the rite itself); and in connection with this the killing of animals has not been enjoined; nor will it be right to regard this (injunction regarding the offering of cooked meat)
as implying the killing of animals; because the original injunction of the Shrāddha does not lay down such killing. Further, the present verse also does not clearly enjoin it; specially as what is here mentioned is capable of being taken as pertaining to the Astaka offerings. If the present verse were an injunction, it would involve the necessity of seeking for its basis (in some Vedic text); while, as we shall explain later on, it is capable of being construed as supplementary to another Injunction.

Some people explain the term 'pitṛdaivatakarma' as standing for the rites performed in honour of the gods and the Pitr i.e., the Great Sacrifices (daily).

Animals are to be killed by Brāhmaṇas for the 'support of their dependents,' and the killing of animals is also permitted at times of distress, when life may be in danger.—(41—42).

VERSE (43).

Living in his house, or with his teacher, or in the forest, the self-controlled twice-born person shall not, even in times of distress, do that killing which is not sanctioned by the Veda.—(43).

Bhāṣya.

This verse forbids such killing as is not sanctioned by the Veda, it is not meant to sanction that which is already sanctioned by it.

As a matter of fact, no other killing (save what is sanctioned) is possible in the case of the Student 'living with his teacher,' or of the man performing austerities 'in the forest'; even though some sort of killing may be possible for the incontinent Student, yet for the Hermit in the forest it is not possible in any case. Even for the Student, an absolute indifference to life (and livelihood) is not considered desirable. Hence the present verse should be treated as the Injunction of killing at Shrāddhas; and the men-
tion of the 'house' is a mere reiteration ( Shrāddhas being performed only by the Householder).

Some people argue here as follows:—"If this were such an Injunction, what would be the meaning of the terms 'in the forest' and 'in times of distress'? For the Recluse in the forest, even though keeping up his Fire, there are no animal-sacrifices; as we shall show under 6·11."

Our Teacher however gives the following explanation:—What is urged may be true of the Student; as regards the Recluse, even 'self-abandonment' has been enjoined by such texts as 'having recourse to the Aparājitā, etc. etc.' So that for him there can be no killing for saving his life; all this we shall clearly explain under 6·31.

"The present verse puts forward the prohibition of killing even in times of distress; how then is it that you take it to mean the permission of it at such times?"

True; but otherwise (if the text were not taken as permitting killing as sanctioned by the Veda), it would be useless. It might be argued that it could serve the purposes of a commenda-
tory text. But even for a commendatory text, some sort of basis (some injunctive text to which it is supplementary) will have to be sought out. Hence we conclude that the prohibition contained in the verse relates to normal times—other than those of distress; and there is nothing incongruous in its being sanctioned in connection with abnormal times of distress. Further, there are various degrees of 'distress'; and under the lesser forms of it, if one would take to 'killing' animals for food under the consideration that his food-supply was sufficient only for a month or a fortnight (after which he will have nothing to eat),—then such killing (even though at an abnormal time of distress) would be what is forbidden by the present text; on the other hand, if the man fears that he would die now if he did not kill for food,—or if a desperado with uplifted weapon were attacking him,—then the killing has to be done; and it is this killing in abnormal times of distress that is permitted by the text.
In this manner the Vedic text 'one should protect himself from all things' also becomes reconciled. (43).

VERSE (44).

That killing which is sanctioned by the Veda has been eternal in this world of mobile and immobile beings; it is to be regarded as no killing at all; since it was 'out of the Veda that the Law shone forth'—(44).

_Bhāsya._

The killing of creatures which has been prescribed in the Veda, 'has been eternal'—without beginning—'in this world of mobile and immobile beings,' on the other hand, that which is laid down in the Tantra and other works is modern, and based upon mistaken induction. Hence it is only the former that is to be regarded as 'no killing at all'; and this for the reason that it does not involve any sin in reference to the other world. When this killing is called 'no killing,' it is only in view of its effects, and not in view of its form (which of course is that of killing).

"Since both acts would be equally killing; how can there be any difference in their effects?"

The answer to this is—'because it was out of the Veda that the Law shone forth';—the promulgation of what is 'lawful (right) and what is unlawful (wrong) proceeded from the Veda; human authorities not being at all trustworthy. And as a matter of fact, the Veda is found to declare that in certain cases, killing is conducive to welfare. Nor is there an absolute identity of form (between the two kinds of killing); because firstly there is the difference that, while one is done for the sake of accomplishing a sacrifice, the other is done for entirely personal motives; and secondly there is difference in the intention also; that is, ordinary killing is done either by one who desires to eat meat, or by one who hates the creature (killed), while the Vedic killing is done because the man thinks that 'it is enjoined by the scriptures'. 
'Shone forth'—Shone fully; i.e., became manifested.—(44).

VERSE (45).

He, who kills harmless creatures for the sake of his own pleasure, never attains happiness, living or dead.—(45).

Bhāṣya

A half-syllable—'a'—should be understood to be present (between 'yo' and 'himsakam'). The prohibition regarding 'harmless creatures' indicates that there is no prohibition regarding dangerous animals, such as serpents, tigers and the like.—(45).

VERSE (46).

He, who does not seek to inflict sufferings of capture and death on living beings, is the well-wisher of all, and obtains perfect happiness.—(46).

Bhāṣya

"Capture" and 'death' are the 'sufferings' meant; or 'sufferings' may be taken separately, as standing for 'doing pecuniary harm' etc.

He who seeks to do all this,—i.e., who not only desists from such acts, but who never has any desire to do it;—such a person does not merely cease to do harm to others, he actually becomes their 'well-wisher',—he is anxious to do good to them; and 'he obtains perfect happiness.'—(46).

VERSE (47.)

He who does not injure anything obtains, without effort, what he thinks of, what he undertakes, and what he fixes his heart upon.—(47),

Bhāṣya.

'What he thinks of',—in the shape of profit and honour, &c.
VERSE XLVIII:—LAWFUL AND FORBIDDEN MEAT

"What he fixes his heart upon,"—whatever desirable thing he has longing for;—all this 'he obtains without effort.'

'What he undertakes.'—whatever act he does, the reward of that he obtains, without and difficulty, immediately after the accomplishment of that act.—(47)

VERSE (48)

MEAT IS NEVER OBTAINED WITHOUT HAVING ENCOMPASSED THE KILLING OF ANIMALS; AND THE KILLING OF ANIMALS DOES NOT LEAD TO HEAVEN; HENCE ONE SHOULD AVOID MEAT.—(48)

Bhāṣya

This verse shows that all the verses forbidding the killing of animals are auxiliary to the prohibition of meat-eating.

As a matter of fact, until animals have been killed, meat cannot be obtained; and killing is very painful. Hence one should avoid meat.

"Meat can be obtained from animals that die of themselves; how is it then that it is said that it cannot be obtained without encompassing the death of animals?"

The verse is a purely commendatory exaggeration. Further, there can be no idea of any one eating the meat of animals dying of themselves, for the simple reason that such meat is the source of disease. Meat is never eaten without being offered, and what is a source of disease can never be offered as gift.

'Utpadyate';—the meat is brought about by killing; hence the nominative of killing and of obtaining may be regarded as one and the same; so that there is nothing incongruous in the expression 'nākṛtvā utpadyate'. Or, 'utpadyate' may be construed along with 'does not lead to heaven.' What is meant is, not only that it does not lead to heaven, but also that it leads to hell and other evils.—(48)
VERSE (49)

Having duly pondered over the origin of meat, and over the fettering and killing of living beings, one should abstain from the eating of all meat. — (49)

Bhāṣya

The foetus grows in the womb, which is an unclean place; and it is produced from semen and ovule, both unclean things.

‘Fettering and killing’—involved in the obtaining of meat.

‘Having duly pondered over’—carefully considered with an alert mind;—‘all this,—one shall abstain from the eating of all meat’—i.e. also of that which is not forbidden; what to say of what is actually forbidden?

The present text is a commendatory exaggeration; it is not meant that meat should be always regarded as unclean; the sentence does not mean to lay down that all meat is actually unclean. — (49)

VERSE (50)

He who does not eat meat like a fiend, disregarding the proper method, becomes popular among men and is not afflicted by disease. — (50.)

Bhāṣya.

‘Proper method’—i.e. of worshipping the Gods and so forth; if one does not eat meat, regardless of this manner, but eats it only in the right manner,—‘he becomes popular’—loved by the people; he becomes dear to all.

‘He is not afflicted by disease.’—Diseases are produced if a man eats the flesh of lean and enfeebled animals. For this reason also one should eat meat only in the right manner; and by eating it thus, he ‘is not afflicted by disease.’ By eating meat in any other way, he is always afflicted by disease.
'Like a fiend.'—The term 'fiend' stands for a species of lower animals, which eat flesh always in the wrong manner; hence every one who eats it in the wrong manner becomes like a fiend;—this is the sense of the deprecatory simile.—(50).

VERSE (51.)


Bhāṣya.

When some one is killing an animal, if another person should come, and for his own selfish purposes show his approbation, by such words as 'he is doing well in thus killing the animal,'—this latter man is called the 'approver'.

'He who cuts.'—he who quarters the dead body.

'He who serves'—places it before persons eating.

'He who eats it'.
All these are 'slayers'.

What is meant by attributing the character of the 'slayer' to those who do not actually slay, but do the other acts of eating, preparing, selling, &c., is the deprecation of all these acts; all these persons do not actually become 'slayers.' The ordinary act of 'slaying' is that which results in loss of life; so that it is only one who does this act that is the 'slayer.' In accordance with the rule that 'the nominative agent of an act is one who does it independently by himself,' that person alone is called the 'slayer' who deprives living beings of their life; those who do the acts of buying, selling, etc., are other than that person.

"But the statement that the approver and the rest also are slayers also emanates from the Smṛti (and as such must be accepted as true)."
The authority of this Smṛti does not extend to the subject of words and their denotations; it is confined to the subject of right and wrong,—what is lawful and what unlawful. More authoritative on the subject of words and their meanings is the revered Pāṇini. In fact Manu and other writers on Smṛti only make use of words in accordance with ordinary usage, and they do not lay down rules bearing upon words and their meanings; they use the words, they do not regulate them.

"But as a matter of fact, we do find these writers making such assertions as 'such and such a person is called a Preceptor' and so forth (which lay down the denotation of words)."

True; but in such cases there is no inconsistency between what the Smṛti says and what we learn from the treatises bearing upon the subject. Nor again is there any other useful purpose found to be served by those passages (that explain the meaning of the term 'preceptor' (for instance). In the present case, however the passage is capable of serving an auxiliary purpose by being taken as a commendatory statement; so that it is not possible, on the strength of the present text alone, to regard all these persons as 'slayers.'

Some people argue as follows:—"If there is no one to eat, there would be no one to kill; so that the killing is really prompted by the eating; and the prompter of an act also has been regarded as its doer; so that the eater is the slayer, even in the direct sense of this term; and it is only right that the eater should have to perform the same Expiatory Rite as the slayer."

This, we say, is not right; because as a matter of fact, a different expiatory rite has been prescribed, under Discourse xi for the taster of the meat of the animals killed (by others).

What has been stated above regarding the prompter being the doer, that also is not true. The prompting agent has been thus defined—'He who by means of direction and request, prompts the independent agent, is also an auxiliary agent, the other being the principal one.' And as a matter of fact when the slayer kills the animal, he is not ordered to do so by the eater;
he does it as a means of living, with the motive that he shall live by selling the flesh.

If *prompting* means *abetting,—i.e. if it be held that when a man proceeds to do a certain act, if another person abets him and co-operates with him, the latter is to be regarded as the *prompter*—then, this definition also is not applicable to the present case. In the act of *killing*, the 'abetting' would consist in such acts as—(a) collecting the weapons, etc. (b) the sharpening of the blunted axe, (c) the bringing up of the sword, and so forth; as without these the act of *killing* could not be accomplished, [and none of these acts is done by the *eater*].

If, however, the *prompter* be defined as 'that person for whose sake the work is done,'—then, in the case of the 'teaching of the boy,' the boy would have to be regarded as the *prompting agent* in the act of 'teaching'; and yet 'teaching' does not mean 'reading' (which is what the boy actually does).

Then again, when the slayer does the *killing*, he does not do so for the benefit of any particular person, by virtue of which the latter's action of *eating* could be regarded as sinful. In fact, all these persons undertake these acts for their own benefit; and not one of them is troubled by the idea of benefitting any other person.

"Even when the man undertakes the killing for his own benefit, such action would be absolutely useless if there were no *eater*: it is only when there is an *eater*, that the man's action is fruitful; and the *fruit* of an act is the motive, the *prompting force*; and as this depends upon the eater, the eater also is an indirect prompter."

If this be so, then, when a person is murdered on account of enmity, since the enemy would be the prompter of the act of killing, the murdered man could become the murderer! For without enmity, the act of murder would not be possible. Similarly when in the case of Brahma-murder, the murderer (in course of the Expiatory Rite) gives away his entire property, the act of giving will have been prompted by the *murder*: and as
there could be no recipient without the giver, it is not only the re-
chastity, but the giver also that would become tainted with the sin.
Similarly a beautiful woman would incur sin by guarding her
chastity against the lover who has his heart burning with the
arrows of love and who has expressed his longing for her.

From all this it follows that what has been suggested cannot
be the definition of the prompter.

As a matter of fact, both the slayer and the eater do their res-
pective acts for their own special benefit; but they become helpful
to one another in the manner of two persons one of whom has lost
his horse and another his cart; and there can be no question of
one being the prompter of the other.

This has been fully discussed under 8.104.—(51).

VERSE (52).

If a man, without worshipping the gods and Pitrs, seeks to
increase his own flesh by the flesh of others,—there
is no sinner greater than that person.—(52).

Bhāṣya.

This deprecates the man who eats meat for the purpose of
fattening himself, and not one who does it for averting disease.
That this is so is clear from the words of the text ‘he who seeks
to increase.’ In him also, only if he does it ‘without worshipping
the Gods and Pitrs.’ But if the man is ill, and recovery is not
possible without eating meat, then there would be no harm, even
if the said worshipping were not done.—(52).

VERSE (53.)

If a man performs the Ashvamedha sacrifice every year, for
a hundred years,—and another does not eat meat,—the
merit and reward of both these are the same.—(53.)

Bhāṣya.

The eating of the meat of the Hare and other animals,—in
the form of remnants of the worship of Gods and Pitrs—has been
sanctioned. If one abstains from this eating, he obtains the fruits of the Ashvamedha sacrifice; and the fruits of this sacrifice have been described in the words 'he obtains all desires, etc., etc.'

In this connection it would not be right to urge the following objection:—"How can mere abstaining from meat be equal to a sacrifice involving tremendous labour and much expense?"—Because the said abstention also is extremely difficult. Further, the principle enunciated in the Śūtra.—'The particular result would follow from development as in the ordinary world'—is operative here also. Hence there can be no objection against the asserting of results or fruits of actions.

Our answer however is as follows:—What is said in the text is a purely commendatory exaggeration; specially because the statement of the sacrifice being performed 'every year for one hundred years' can be regarded only as such an exaggeration; for it is not possible for the Ashvamedha to be performed every year; nor can it be performed 'for a hundred years,' as no performer would live so long.

'Punyaphalam' is a copulative compound, it being impossible to take it as a Genitive Tātpurusa.—(53).

VERSE (54).

By subsisting upon sacred fruits and roots, and by eating the food of hermits, one does not obtain that reward which he does by abstaining from meat—(54).

Bhāṣya.

'Sacred'—fit for Gods.

'Food of hermits'—i.e., such grains as are got without cultivation; e.g., the Nīvāra and the like.

This verse also is a purely commendatory exaggeration—(54).
VERSE (55).

'Me he (māṃsa) will devour in the next world, whose meat I eat in this'—This is the 'meatness' (māṃsatva) of the 'meat' (māṃsa), as the wise ones declare.—(55).

Bhāṣya.

This explanation of the name is a commendatory description. 'Māṃ sa bhakṣayitā,—'He will eat me.'—The general pronoun 'saḥ,' 'he,' has its particular character pointed out by what follows—'whose meat I eat here.'—(55).

VERSE (56.)

There is no sin in the eating of meat, nor in wine, nor in sexual intercourse. Such is the natural way of living beings; but abstention is conducive to great rewards.—(56).

Bhāṣya.

From verse 28 to this we have a series of purely commendatory texts; there are only two or three verses that are injunctive in their character.

'There is no sin in the eating of meat.' This assertion stands on the same footing as verse 32 above. What we learn from the present verse (in addition to what we know already) is that 'abstention is conducive to great rewards.' By various deprecatory texts the impression has been produced that 'no meat should be eaten.' But by way of providing a means of living for living beings it has been asserted that 'there is no sin in the eating of meat'; which means that there is no sin if one eats such meat as is the remnant of the worship of Gods, etc., or what is eaten at the wish of Brāhmaṇas, and under such similar circumstances specified above; but this only if he wish to eat it.

'Abstention'—taking the resolve not to eat meat and then to abstain from it—this is 'conducive to great rewards.' In the absence of the mention of any particular reward, Heaven is to be regarded as the reward. So say the Mīmāṃsakas.
Similarly in regard to ‘wine’, for the Kṣattriyas,—and to ‘sexual intercourse’, for all castes; but apart from that which may be alone (a) ‘during the day’ or (b) ‘with women in their courses’, or ‘on sacred days’, (in connection with all of which sexual intercourse has been forbidden).

The three things mentioned here, in their very restricted forms, constitute the ‘natural way of living beings’, sanctioned by the scriptures with a view to the maintenance of the body. Says the author of the Science of Medicine (Ayurveda)—‘Food, continence, and sleep—these three, intoxicants and women, tend to prolong life.’

If, however, one can manage to live without these, for him ‘abstention is conducive to great rewards.’ This is said merely by way of illustration: same being the case with all ‘abstentions’ from such things as are neither prescribed nor forbidden. Where however a certain act is definitely prescribed, there is nothing reprehensible in the man’s doing it, even if it be done only for the sake of the pleasure that it affords him; in fact abstention from such an act would itself be reprehensible, as done with a view to ‘great rewards’; e.g. the eating of honey, having a full meal, wearing a woolen garment and so forth. Such also is the practice of cultured people; the revered Vyāsā also says the same. Those acts, on the other hand, to which people have recourse only through desire,—even though these be neither permitted nor forbidden,—e.g. laughing, scratching of the body and so forth,—abstention from these would be conducive to great rewards.—(56)
SECTION (7)*

Impurity due to Death.

VERSE (57)

I AM GOING TO DESCRIBE, IN DUE ORDER, PURIFICATION ON DEATH, AS
ALSO PURIFICATION OF SUBSTANCES, AS PRESCRIBED FOR ALL THE
FOUR CASTES.—(57)

Bhāṣya.

‘For all the four castes’.—This is meant to imply that the
duties of the Shūdra, generally laid down only in a vague form,
could not be known without special effort.

‘Pratishuddhi’,—the purification of the living after the death
of other persons. This compound is according to the general
rule ‘A noun with a declensional ending is compounded with another
noun with a declensional ending’.

Though the author announces that he is going to describe the
purification, yet, in as much ‘purification is dependent upon, and
relative to, impurity’, and as it is the function of the treatise
to provide information regarding both, the author is going to
describe first the occasions of ‘Impurity’.—(57).

VERSE (58)

WHEN A CHILD DIES THAT HAS TEETHED, OR ONE YOUNGER THAN IT
WHEN ITS TONGUE HAS BEEN PERFORMED, ALL ITS RELATIVES
ARE ‘IMPURE’. THE SAME IS DECLARED TO BE THE CASE WITH
BIRTHS ALSO.—(58).

Bhāṣya.

Anujāta’—is taken to mean younger than the child that has
teethed.
The present verse mentions the several stages only by way of illustration, and much emphasis is not meant to be laid on them; since the exact period of 'impurity' in regard to the various stages is going to be prescribed later on; e.g., in another Smrti-text we read—(a) 'Till the appearance of teeth etc.'—(b) 'When a child dies in a foreign country, etc., etc.' (5.77),—there is 'immediate impurity';—where the term 'child' is to be understood as standing for one that has not teethed. Thus too it is that what the text (5.67) says regarding the 'one night's impurity' in connection with the death of 'persons whose tonsure has not been performed etc.' is taken to be applicable also to one who has teethed. It is in this way that the rules laid down by the two Smrti-texts in connection with the 'child' become reconciled. In fact the 'one night's impurity' pertains only to children till the performance of the Tonsure; since in connection with those whose Tonsure has been performed, the period of impurity is going to be prescribed as to last for three days; and this applies to the case of boys before their Initiatory Ceremony; after which the period would be ten days and so forth, as laid down in the text—'The Brāhmaṇa is purified in ten days, etc.' (5.83).

Some people interpret the several alternative rules laid down in verses 5.59 et seq—'Impurity due to death lasts for ten days' etc., etc.,—as pertaining to the different ages (of the dying person), and construe them differently from their natural order—on the strength of usage and of other Smrti texts; by which (a) the impurity in connection with the Initiated child lasts for ten days, (b) in connection with the uninitiated for four days, (c) in connection with one whose Tonsure has been performed, three days, (d) in connection with one who has teethed, one day, and (e) in connection with younger children, it is to be only 'immediate'; and so forth. In this way there would be an option between 'three' and 'four' days, in connection with one whose Tonsure has been performed.

But in accordance with these views, there would be no notice taken of the rule that has been prescribed in another Smrti-text,
in connection with the death of the boy who has completed his Vedic Study. All this we shall explain later on.

A person is called ‘dead’ when all his functions have ceased, and the root ‘sthā’ with the preposition ‘sam,’ denotes cessation of functions, [Hence ‘samsthita’ means dead].

‘Relations’,—i.e., Sapindas (sharers in the ball-offering) and Samanodakas (‘Sharers in the water-offering’).

‘Jātaka’ is the birth of a son, etc.

‘The same is declared to be the case’; i.e., all relations are impure.

Question: “Whence is any notion of age obtained, by which the text is interpreted as applying to one whose tonsure has been performed, and thus referring to a particular sacramental rite? In a later text, the connection of the Initiatory Rite has been directly mentioned. But we do not find it anywhere stated upto what age a child may be called ‘tonsured.”

Our answer to the above is as follows: By reason of its having been mentioned along with ‘one who has teethed,’ the term ‘tonsure’ is understood as indicating a definite age; and this age is to be taken as extending upto the third or the fourth year.

It has been argued that—“Since there is the option of performing the Tonsure during the first year, if one adopts this option, the present rule (which extends the ‘impurity’ in the case of the ‘tonsured’ child to one day) would be contrary to the rule that ‘upto the period of teething, the impurity is only immediate.’”

This is not right. As a matter of fact, what is the extent of the ‘tonsured’ age we learn from the juxtaposition of the epithets ‘tonsure’ and ‘initiated’, which indicates that the new name becomes applicable only upon the performance of the next sacramental rite [so that the boy could be regarded as ‘tonsured’ only till the performance of the Initiatory Rite]. In this way, the
present text would become reconciled with such texts as 'Till
tooth, impurity is to be immediate.' Similarly in the Smṛti-
text—'Till the ceremony of Initiation it is to be for three
days'—the Initiatory ceremony is mentioned only as indicative of a
particular age. It might be argued that—'there would, in this
case be no age specified for the Shūdra, in the way in which it is
for the Brāhmaṇa, the Ksattriya and the Vaishya, in connection
with whom, the Initiation has been more or less strictly prescribed,
as being the eighth year and so forth.'—But in this case also, the
age would be understood as when the period of 'childhood' is
passed; in accordance with the law that 'for all there is a full
period of impurity.' Thus then, after the eighth year, in case of
all the four castes, the period of impurity would be the 'full
term', and this age is applicable to the case of the Shūdra also.
In accordance with the view by which the 'Initiation' in the
present context is taken as indicating the eleventh (and twelfth)
year in the case of the Ksattriya and the Vaishya,—there would
be no age mentioned in connection with the Shūdra. Though in
his case also the period of impurity extends to the full time,
in the case of one who has passed his childhood; before which the
period extends to three days only; and the passing of childhood
has been defined in another Smṛti-text, which says—'Upto the
eighth year one is called a child', while others declare that 'one is a
child till his sixteenth year.' Those who hold that 'childhood' ceases
after the sixteenth year,—according to those also purification takes place only after a month (the full term). It has also
been declared that 'after six years, the purification of the Shūdra
comes after a month'; and in another text—'one month in the
case of the eight-year-old child'.

Objection—'The rules regarding the several ages are obtained
from the verses that follow; why then should the 'teething', etc.,
have been specified in the present verse?'

Answer—True; but it has been answered here also for the
purpose of making the rules more intelligible.
VERSE (59).

Among 'Sapindas', the period of impurity due to death is ordained to last for ten days; or till the collecting of the bones, or for three days, or for one day only—(59).

Bhāṣya.

The qualifications of the 'Sapinda' shall be described later on.

'Till the collecting of the bones';—this is meant to indicate the period of four days;—since there is the text—'The bone-collecting of one who has set up the fire shall be done on the fourth day'.

The alternatives here laid down are in consideration of the man's character and Vedic learning, or of his character only; as says another Smṛti-text,—'The Brāhmaṇa who is equipped with the Veda only, in three days, and he who has no qualifications, in ten days.' The period of 'one day' is meant for the man who knows three Vedas and has set up the Fire; that of 'three days' far one who knows one Veda only; and that of ten days, for one who has no such qualifications.

Gautama (14:44) has spoken of 'immediate purity.' But this is for a special purpose; all that is meant it that Vedic Study shall not cease. During the period of Impurity, several acts are discontinued,—e. g. for ten days, the food of the two families is not eaten; the making of gifts, the receiving of them, the offering of oblations and Vedic Study are discontinued; so that ordinarily all these acts would cease during the period; but so far as the Student of, several Vedas is concerned, if he were not to repeat them regularly, he would forget them; hence in his case Vedic Study shall not cease.

Similarly it is only right that an alternative should be provided, in consideration of the mourner's livelihood. For instance, for the man who lives by the 'six acts' (of giving and receiving gifts, of sacrificing and officiating at sacrifices, and Reading and Teaching), the impurity lasts for ten days; for him who lives by the
VERSE LIX:—IMPURITY DUE TO DEATH

‘three acts’ (of receiving gifts, officiating at Sacrifices and Teaching), it lasts for four days, and for him who lives by ‘two acts,’ it lasts for three days. If, for all these, the Impurity were to last for ten days, then, as the man would not be entitled to receive gifts and officiate at sacrifices, his living would become extremely difficult for him.

Some people hold that—“there are four age-stages, and four periods of Impurity; so that each of the latter is to be taken along with each of the former.”

But according to this view, there would be ten days’ impurity in the case of the child that has teether, while in the case of the death of the initiated boy, it would be for a single day only; and this would be contrary to usage and other Smṛti-texts.

In order to avoid this incongruity, the connection may be made in the reverse order; i.e., the death of the initiated boy—entailing ten days, and that of the tonsured child four days, the teething child three days, and a still younger child only one day.

Even so in view of the incompatibility (of this view) with the Smṛti-text, that—‘in the case of the tonsured child, the impurity lasts for three days’—it would be necessary to regard the two (three and four days) as optional alternatives; specially as the term ‘sua’ refers to ‘three days,’ and the period of ‘four days’ would apply to the particular livelihood of the mourner, or to the particular day on which the bones are collected. In this manner all this becomes reconciled with the other Smṛti-texts, which speaks of ‘one day, &c.’ If, on the other hand, the option were explained as based upon the diversity of age,—then, with what would Manu’s declaration regarding ‘conduct’ and ‘study’ be taken as optional?

From all this it follows that on the strength of Gautama’s assertion, there is to be ‘immediate purification,’ only so far as Vedic Study is concerned—for the man who, like the person possessing a ‘granary’, has other means of living than the receiving of gifts, and who is very much learned in the Vedas. In the case of the other alternatives, of ‘three days’ and the rest, the purification is meant simply to qualify the man for the receiving of gifts.
for purposes of a living. This is according to the view of
Gautama. If this were not his meaning, then, he would have said
simply—‘for the Brāhmaṇa learning the Veda,’—and not ‘for the
purpose of avoiding discontinuance of study.’

Thus, though purification has been laid down in a general
way, as to be accomplished in a single day,—yet it should be
understood as pertaining to certain special acts only. So that the
ordinary period for the Brāhmaṇa being ‘ten days’ (according to
5.83), there is no need for saying anything else; from which
it is clear that the option should be admitted in the manner de-
scribed above. In the case however of ‘purity’ being immediate, in
the case of newborn infants, and the period of impurity lasting for
‘three days’ in the case of tonsured children,—since there is no
option, the purity must pertain to all acts.—(59).
SECTION (8)

Sapinda—relationship as bearing on 'impurity'.

VERSE (60.)

The 'Sapinda-relationship' ceases with the person in the seventh-degree and the 'Samānodaka-relationship,' when the origin and the name become unrecognisable—(60).

Bhāṣya.

Inasmuch as the present context is meant to provide information regarding the exact signification of the term 'anvaya', 'family',—and as the term 'bāndhana', 'relation' (of the preceding verses) is meant to be construed with the present text also,—the meaning of the present verse is that persons born of the same family are called 'Sapindas' upto the person in the seventh grade. In view of the assertion—'the son shall make offerings to those to whom his fathers make them',—which lays down offerings to be made also by a person whose father is living, six persons become recognised as 'Sapindas' (the seventh being the offerer himself).

Further, according to the statement—'offerings are made to forefathers, counting one's own self as the seventh'—the grandfather, the great-grand-father and other ancestors are called 'Sapindas'; and yet, while the six ancestors are called 'Sapindas,' the six descendants, beginning with the son, are also called 'Sapindas.' Because the 'offering of the ball' is a single act, upon which, and in connection with which, the title 'Sapinda' becomes applicable,—the 'son' and other descendants also become associated with this 'act as performed by the grandson, and other descendants respectively; consequently the person to whom one makes the offering, and along with whom he becomes the recipient of the offering—all these come to be called 'Sapinda; and the reason for this lies in the fact that the 'ball-offering' is the only indicative in the present case; just as in the case of the
assertion 'you should come at conch-time (gun-time)' the 'conch' is the only indicative of the time that is meant. Thus it comes to this that all descendants up to the seventh grade of the great-grandfather of one's great-grandfather are his 'Sapinda'; and similarly the descending line of one's descendants, and the descendants of his father, grand-father and the rest. The degrees are to be counted from that person from whom the two lines bifurcate. For instance, among persons who have a common grandfather, the seven degrees should be counted from that grandfather, and persons falling within those seven degrees would be the 'Sapinda'. Similarly in all cases.

In dealing with the question of 'Sapinda', all that the text speaks of is 'person born of the same family,' and no mention of the caste is made; consequently persons belonging to the Ksatriya and other castes also become 'Sapinda' of the Brhma. It is for this reason that on the birth of such persons also the Brhma remains 'impure' for ten days; while in their own case the period lasts for twelve days (for the Ksatriya), thirteen for the Vaishya and so forth. Thus then, in the case of the birth or death of the person of a different caste, or in that of the Sapinda of a different caste, the purification is governed by the period prescribed for the caste of the person concerned.

In the case of the Ksatriya and other castes, their 'Sapinda' relationship to the Brhma extends to three degrees only; as says Shankha—'If of one person there are born several persons, of different mothers and diverse castes, these are 'Sapindas', with varying periods of purification; but the ball-offering extends over three degrees only.' In this passage the term 'of different mothers' means 'born of mothers of different castes'; the term 'of diverse castes' has also been added in view of the fact that persons born of mothers of the same caste also are 'born of different mothers'.—These are 'Ekapinda', i.e., Sapinda; but 'with varying periods of purification'; i.e., the purification of each person is in accordance with his own caste; for instance, for the Brhma in the case of the birth, etc., of his Sapinda of the Ksatriya and
other castes, the purification takes ten days; while for the Ksattriya, in the case of the birth, &c. of his Brähmana Sapinda, it takes twelve days;—there is the further peculiarity in this case that ‘the ball-offering extends over three degrees only’; i.e., it is offered to persons within three degrees only.

Within the pale of their own castes however, for the Ksattriya and other castes also the ‘Sapinda-relationship’ extends over seven degrees, exactly as for Brähmanas; specially as in the words of Shankha justed quoted, we find the qualifying terms ‘born of one person from different mothers’—it is only in relation to other castes that their ‘Sapinda-relationship can be understood to extend over three degrees only. This same fact is still more clearly stated in the following Smrti—text—‘In the case of impurity due to the death of those relations of the Brähmana who are descendants from the Ksattriya, the Vaishya and the Shūdra, the purification of the Brähmana comes after ten days, upt to six, three and one stage respectively.’

In the case of the wives of different castes, if the husband is alive, the purification is determined by the time laid down for the husband. To this end it is said—‘In the case of birth and death among slaves, and among one’s wives of lower castes, the purification would be similar to that of the master or husband, but if the husband is not living, it shall be similar to that of their fathers.’

In place of the first quarter of the text (instead of the words ‘sūte mṛte tu dāsānām’—‘in the case of birth and death among slaves’) some people read ‘asavarnāsutānām’ (‘of sons born of other castes’). If such be the reading, then such Shūdra-sons as live in the house of the Brähmana-father would be controlled entirely by the ways of the father, and hence their time of purification would be ten days in consideration of their father’s caste.

The term ‘dāsa,’ ‘slave,’ in the text just quoted are meant to be those that have been hired; because for born slaves we have another rule,—viz:—‘Artisans, mechanics, female and male slaves, and king’s officers have been declared to be capable of immediate
purification'. But this 'purification' should be understood to consist only in their touchability, and not as entitling them to the acts of offering gifts, feeding Brāhmaṇas and so forth; and the reason for this lies in the fact that all the names here mentioned are such as are based upon professions; which gives rise to the following questions—(a) Is the purification here hid down subversive of all the rules that have been laid down before?—Or (b) does it entitle the man to all acts?—Or (c) does it entitle him to a few of these only? And the conclusion that suggests itself is that the man is entitled to just those acts that may be necessary for the proper carrying out of the 'King's business. Such also is the usage.

Objection.—"In the present context we do not find any prohibition of touching [how then can the text just quoted be taken as pertaining to touchability alone]?"

But in another Smṛti-text we read—'The touching of the body is permitted after the bones have been collected;' and also elsewhere—'The Brāhmaṇas become touchable in three or four days; while at birth or death, purification comes in eleven days; in the case of the Kṣattriya there is touchability on the sixth or seventh day, and their food becomes pure in twelve days; in the case of the Vaishya, touchability comes on the eighth or ninth day, but their food is pure in a fortnight; the Śhūdra becomes touchable on the eleventh or twelfth day and the purification of his food comes about in a month.' So says Hārīta; and yet another text also—'The touchability of the different castes comes about in three, four, five and six days respectively; the food of the Brāhmaṇa becomes eatable in ten days, and that of the other castes two, three and six days later.'

The several alternatives mentioned in the above texts are to be taken as based upon the exigencies of individual cases, as also upon the higher or lower qualifications of the persons concerned; e.g. the hired slaves of the Brāhmaṇa remain untouchable for three or four days, while their born slaves become touchable immediately. Similarly, in the case of the other castes also.

Wherever 'immediate purification' is mentioned, there should be bathing with all the clothes on.
As regards the purification of material substances,—all details are going to be explained later on.

Among girls also, the ‘Sapinda-relationship’ extends to three degrees. As says Vashistha—‘For women who have got sons it is known to extend to three degrees.’ This limited ‘sapinda-relationship’ in the case of women however refers only to Impurity; as regards marriage what its extent should be has been already indicated before.

The final conclusion thus is that the seventh degree is the limit, and the persons up to and including the sixth degree are ‘Sapindas’. This is what is meant by the words —‘it ceases with the person in the seventh degree’.

‘The Samanodaka’ relationship—i.e. the name ‘Samanodaka’—‘when the origin and the name become unrecognisable.’—‘Origin’—‘such a person is born in my own family’;—‘name’—‘he is descended from the father named so and so, and the grandfather named so & so’;—when both these are ‘unrecognisable.’ That is, when either of these happens to be unknown, then also, the name in question is not applicable.

In the case of persons within the limits of ‘Samanodaka-relationship,’ all that people should do is to enter a river or some other water-reservoir, till the water reaches up to the navel,—they should face the south and, having offered water with the right hand upward, without looking back, should return home.—(60)

VERSE (61.)

Thus also should it be at a birth; but the parturient disability attaches to the parents only; or, the parturient disability would attach to the mother alone, and the father would become purified by bathing.—(61.)

Bhasya.

The same rule holds good regarding ‘birth’ among Sapindas. Just as in connection with death, several alternative periods of
impurity have been laid down, in consideration of one’s livelihood depending upon the six acts (of giving and receiving gifts and so forth), and also upon the vastness or purity of one’s Vedic learning,—exactly the same holds good regarding cases of birth also; all that is meant to be applicable to the case of birth is impurity pure and simple, without any qualification of time; so that no specifications being found to be indicated here, the case of birth, through its own inherent aptitude, becomes connected with all that has been said (in the way of qualifications and limitations) in connection with death. On the other hand, if the words of the text were taken to indicate the application, to the case of birth, of impurity as specially limited by a particular period of time, then it would be connected only with the period of ten days, which is the principal alternative laid down; and in that case this same period would apply to the case of Vedic Study &c. also. Or, by the closer proximity of the mention of the alternative of the single-day-period, the case of birth would become connected with this latter period only; and thus having its wants supplied by this, it would have no connection with the other alternative periods of ‘three days’ and the rest. And in that case, even in the face of the limitations and restrictions due to livelihood and study, the present text would lay down the same single alternative in connection with both death and birth, and would, irrespective of all qualifications of the person concerned, become conditioned by their caste only, and thus become incongruous and opposed to usage.

"Under this explanation, the alternative periods of three days’ and the rest would become applicable also to the women that have been delivered; and this would be contrary to all usage."

The answer to this is as follows:—This would be the case only if what is laid down in the present verse (regarding the delivered woman) were an optional alternative. As a matter of fact however, the rule laid down is absolutely fixed. It is only thus that the use of the term tu “but” becomes justified.

Then again, the term ‘sātaku’ used in the text does not directly denote impurity; it could only indirectly indicate the impu-
sity as related to parturition (which is what is directly expressed by the word). But, through indirect indication it would be far more reasonable to make it express untouchability, which is more nearly related to parturition. If all kinds of impurity were meant, then the author would have used the word ‘āshoucha’ ‘impurity’, itself; and the line would have read ‘āshaucham māturēva syēt.’ From all this it follows that another Smṛti-text having laid down three days (for both parents), and the present text making no mention of any such period, what is here said regarding the ‘parturient disability’ attaching ‘to the mother only’ is an optional alternative. So that between the father and the mother the option applies to the father only.

The father becomes pure after having bathed. This is only by way of a prefatory statement; from what follows in the next verse the father also remains untouchable for three days. (61).
SECTION—(9)

Other forms of Impurity.

VERSE (62)

The man, having emitted semen becomes pure by bathing; hence, on account of seminal filiation he should observe impurity for three days.—(62)

Bhāṣyā.

While laying down purification after three days, the author permits the purification by bathing, which has been spoken of above. If it be asked—“why should this be stated?”—the answer is that it is stated in the form an injunction; by way of a commendatory assertion, and not a regular injunction, just as in the case of the Vedic passage ‘jartilayanavāyā va juhuyāt.’

‘Having thrown out semen,—after emission during the act of sexual intercourse,—the man becomes pure by bathing.

‘Hence, on account of seminal filiation’;—‘Seminal’ means pertaining to the semen;—filiation means begetting of the child; and in the event of this, why should he not ‘observe’—keep up—‘the impurity for three days.’ The impurity due to child-birth is not of the same kind as that which attaches to the man who has emitted semen and has not taken a bath; in fact it lasts for three days. The period of ‘three days’ mentioned here is a reiteration of the same as occurring in the preceding verse. For this same reason
the 'upāsya-śhya' in the present verse is taken to mean bathing and not merely water-sipping; specially, in view of the assertion that 'snāna, 'bathing,' has been enjoined for the man who has had sexual intercourse.

Some people hold that when a son is born to a man, he becomes touchable on that same day. As says Shankha—At the birth of a boy, before the placenta has been severed, there is nothing wrong in the man receiving, on that same day, the gift of sugar, sesamum, gold, cloth, clothes, cows and grain,—so say some'; and again—'for this reason that day is sacred, enhancing as it does the pleasure of the forefathers; and because it reminds one of his ancestors, there is no impurity attaching to that day.' In fact some people even go to the length of performing śrāddhas on that day. From this it follows that in such cases there is no impurity attaching to the father at all.

In fact the two Smṛti-texts just quoted are to be taken as providing optional alternatives, in consideration of the man having, or not having, means of living (other than the receiving of gifts).—(62).

VERSE (63).

THOSE WHO TOUCH THE CORPSE BECOME PURE AFTER ONE DAY AND ONE DAY ALONG WITH THREE THREE-DAY PERIODS; THOSE WHO OFFER WATER, AFTER THREE DAYS.—(63).

Bhāṣya.

'Three three-day periods'—i. e. nine days;—along with one day and one night,—make up ten days. The period has been mentioned in this fashion in view of metrical exigencies.

'Those who touch the corpse'—i. e. those who wash and adorn the dead body. Mere bathing is going to be laid down later on, for the other persons touching the body, as also for those who carry it; as will be made clear from the next verse.

All this refers to the Samaṇadaka relations as also to those who carry the body for wages received. In regard to the carrying of the dead of helpless and forlorn persons, we have another Smṛti-text, which says—'For such persons who do the excellent
deed (of carrying the dead body of a helpless man), there is nothing wrong, nor is there any impurity involved, for them it has been ordained that they are immediately purified by bathing in water.'

As regards the assertion of the text under 5. 100—'He who carries the dead body of a Brâhmana, who is not his Suciṇḍa-relation, becomes purified in three days'—what this means we shall explain under that verse.

'Those who offer water'—i.e. the 'Samānoda' relations. In connection with these, 'immediate purification' also is going to be laid down under verse 77. Hence the two should be regarded as optional alternatives.

What is said here is in connection with 'suciṇḍa' relations and refers to persons not engaged in Vedic study.—(63)

VERSE (64)

The pupil performing the 'Pitṛmēdha for his dead Teacher becomes purified in ten days: just as those who carry the dead body.—(64)

Bhāṣya.

'Pitṛmēdha'—i.e. the final sacrificial offering; others hold that the term stands for the entire procedure (of the Shrāddha);—performing this, the pupil becomes purified in ten days. This same rule applies to the Student also.

'Just as those who carry the dead body';—for those who take out the dead body, the period is ten days; and so it is for the pupil also.—(64).

VERSE (65).

In the case of miscarriage, the woman becomes pure in so many days as there have been months; and the woman in her courses becomes fit by bathing after the ceasing of the menstrual flow.—(65)

Bhāṣya.

In the case of miscarriage, the purification, that comes after as many days as the months of pregnancy, can pertain only to
the woman: as it is the woman that is directly spoken of in the verse. The rule for the purification, in this case, of her Sapinda-relation has to be sought from other Smritis and from usage. Vashistha (4. 34) however has laid down the period of three days for all Sapindas—‘In the case of the death of a child less than two years old, and also in the case of miscarriage, the impurity lasts for three days.’

It is regarded as a case of ‘miscarriage,’ when it happens after three months and before the tenth month; others hold that it is to be so regarded when it happens before the ninth month. What is called ‘srava’ (lit. flowing out) here is discharge before the right time, and not necessarily the flowing out of a liquid substance.

In connection with miscarriage, Gautama also has declared that ‘the period lasts for as many days as there have been months’ (14-15).

As a matter of fact, children born in the seventh month live; hence if miscarriage takes place in the seventh month, the period of impurity is full (ten days). But this is so only if the child is born alive; otherwise it is to be as many days as there have been months.

For the woman in her courses it has been ordained that she is purified by bathing after the flow has ceased; while another Smriti text says that she becomes pure in three days. On this point the final conclusion is as follows: ‘Before three days, even though the flow may cease, she is not pure; while after three days she becomes pure even though the flow may not have ceased.’ In the text however, though the term used first is ‘becomes pure’, we find word ‘fit’ (sadhvi) used in connection with the menstruating woman; and this means that so long as the flow has not ceased, she is not fit for participating in the Vedic rites; and it does not mean that she is untouchable; as it has been declared that ‘the first four days have been condemned.’ The construction thus is—‘The woman in her courses, on the ceasing of the flow, by bathing, becomes fit’—i.e., fit for participating in religious rites.
The term 'woman' has been used with a view to include women of all castes; the foregoing verses having been explained as applying to the Brāhmaṇa. The text has used the term 'woman' in this verse with a view to guard against the idea that what is here laid down also applies to the Brāhmaṇa only. In the following verses also, where there is nothing to indicate the restriction of a rule to any particular caste, it is to be understood as applying to all castes; as for instance, the next verse which speaks of 'persons whose tonsure has not been performed.'—(65).

VERSE (66).

In the case of persons whose tonsure has not been performed purification has been declared to come after a night; but in the case of those whose tonsure has been performed, purification is held to come after three days.—(66).

RÅśya.

The genitive endings in this verse some people explain as having the sense of the Nominative, according to Pāṇini's Sūtra 2,3, 65; and in that case the meaning would be—'the person whose tonsure has not been performed is purified in one day;' and it has already been explained that some options in this connection are also based upon the age and condition of the person observing the impurity; and the present verse lays down specific rules in accordance with the general principle there enunciated.

Others, however, explain the genitive ending as denoting relationship; and in this case they have to supply some words; the meaning being—'the Sapinda relation of persons whose tonsure has not been performed etc., etc.'

This latter view is what is in keeping with usage.

Another Smṛti text has declared immediate purification; and the same text has laid down the exact scope of that rule—'Till the appearance of teeth, it is immediate; till the performance of the Tonsure, it comes after one day; and in the case of those whose Tonsure has been performed, it lasts for three days.'—(66)
VERSE (67)

The child that dies while less than two years old, the relations should, after having decked it, place outside, under the ground that is clean and not defiled by heaps of bones.—(67)

Bhāṣya

The child whose sacramental rites have not been performed, and since whose birth less than two years have elapsed, is called 'less than two years old'. Such a child, when it dies, 'the relations should place outside'—the village—'under the ground,' that has been dug out.

Another Smṛti-text contains the word 'nākhane', should bury.'

'Having decked'—with ornaments befitting the dead. The 'decking', mentioned here in connection with the child 'less than two years old', should be understood, on the strength of usage, to apply to those also whose sacramental rites have been performed.

'Clean'—where there are no bones. That is, the ground that is clean by reason of the absence of heaps of bones,—under such a ground should the child be placed. As a rule, the crematorium abounds in heaps of bones; hence what the present text means is that the child should be buried in a place other than the crematorium: and it does not mean that in this case the rite of 'bone-collecting' shall not be performed; because this later fact is already implied by the absence of burning in the case.—(67)

VERSE (68)

For this child no sanctification by fire shall be performed; nor shall water-offering be made to it; having left it like a log of wood, in the forest, one shall keep aloof for three days.—(68)

Bhāṣya

'Like a log of wood;'—this signifies absence of attachment, indifference.
The meaning is that in this case no Shrāddha, nor any water, is to be offered; the prohibition of ‘water-offering’ implying that of the Shrāddha also, through the relation of whole and part. It is thus that we have to get at the omission of Shrāddha, which is in accordance with usage.

Others explain this to mean the prohibition of burial laid down in other Smṛti-texts. And in this case there would be option.

‘Keep aloof’—abstain from all religious acts prescribed in the scriptures.—(68)

VERSE (69)

For the child up to three years of age, the relations shall not make water-offerings; but for one whose teeth had appeared, or whose naming had been done, it may be done optionally.—(69)

Bhāṣya

‘Upto three years of age’;—this prohibition applies till the end of the third year; and not from the fourth year upwards. It is in this sense that some people read an ‘ādi’, the line being read as—‘trinārśadvā kartavyā’. Such also is the ordinary usage.

‘For one whose teeth had appeared it may be done optionally.’—By association with the ‘water-offering’, burning by fire also becomes permitted.

Objection—‘When there is option, one may do what he likes; under the circumstances, who would ever have recourse to that alternative which involves much effort and expenditure of wealth? Thus then, the laying down of such a course of action is absolutely useless.’

The answer to this is as follows:—What is mentioned here is for the parents, as distinguished from all other persons; the offerings that are made are for the benefit of the deceased; and being of the nature of an ‘occasional duty’, it is one that must be done, as we have explained before. So that the option mentioned
in the present verse is clearly understood as containing, on the one hand, the prohibition of a necessary duty; while, on the other, it permits its performance on the ground of its being beneficial to the deceased. So that if one omits the act, it does not involve the transgression of an injunction; while by performing it, one confers a benefit upon the deceased; so that there is no incompatibility between the Injunction and the Prohibition.—(69)

VERSE (70)

On the death of a fellow-student, the impurity has been declared to last for one day. In the case of a birth, the purity of the 'Samānodaka' relations is held to come after three days.—(70)

Bhāṣya

'Fellow-student'—professing the same Vedic Rescension.

'Samānodaka relations'—those meant here are to be counted from the point where the 'Sapinda-relationship' ceases. Among these, when there is a birth, the impurity lasts for three days.

The option of 'immediate purity' is also laid down in another Smyti-text, for 'Samānodaka' relations.—(70)

VERSE (71).

In the case of women whose sacramentary rite has not been performed, the marital relations become pure after three days; and their paternal relations also become pure according to the rule prescribed before.—(71)

Bhāṣya.

'Whose sacramentary rite has been performed;'—i.e., those who have been accepted verbally, but have not been actually married; at the death of such women, their 'marital relations'—on her husband's side, &c., &c.

'Their paternal relations'—on the father's side—are purified 'according to the rule prescribed before'—in verse 66; i.e., in
three days; this rule being laid down with reference to a particular caste.

Others have explained the second half as referring to the rule that 'uterine brothers and sisters are purified in ten days' (the word 'सनाष्री' being taken to mean 'uterine'). The view of these persons is as follows:—It has been laid down that a girl should be given away in her eighth year; so that one who has been given away is not spoken of as 'one whose tonsure has been performed';—just as the 'initiated boy' is not so spoken of; and in as much as no other rule has been laid down, the only right course to adopt is to observe the impurity for ten days.

Others again have read (the second half) as—'हस्तददत्तकण्यासु बलसु चा विशददनम'; and people have explained this to mean that, even in the case of a girl that remains unmarried till she is nearly fifteen years old, the impurity shall last for one day only; and this on the ground that there is no justification for rejecting the direct injunction and observing a longer period of impurity.

Our answer to this is as follows:—What is the use of the expression 'बलसु चा', when it has been already asserted that 'upto the appearance of teeth, the purity is immediate'? It is not right to have this assertion set aside by the present later declaration: because the present declaration is a general one, while the former is more specialised. Hence the 'one day' rule, even though laid down, can only be taken as referring to children till the performance of their Tonsure: specially as a general statement is always dependent upon (and controlled by) particular ones. For these reasons the suggested reading of the second half of the verse must be rejected as not emanating from the sage. But it may be taken as referring to touchability. There is untouchability due to the birth or death of a child, exactly as in the case of grown up men; and it is only with reference to this that there could be the assertion that—there is purity (i.e., touchability) after one day in the case of unmarried girls and young children, (i.e., these become touchable in one day); and it is in this sense that the Locative ending (in 'बलसु' and 'कण्यासु') be-
VERSE LXXII:—OTHER FORMS OF IMPURITY

comes justified as being the correct one; since it is a regular case-ending. If the words were taken in any other sense (e.g., meaning ‘at the death of girls and boys, &c.’), it would be necessary to have elliptical construction and to take the Locative ending in the ‘absolute’ sense:—‘girls and boys having died, the purity of those living comes about after one day’; and we could not get at the sense that the impurity spoken of results from the touching of the dead; specially as the former (the sense obtained by construing the line as Locative Absolute) has its sphere of application elsewhere, in the case of burial under-ground; and no touching is possible in the case of the body being placed under the ground.

“Since the assertion is a general one, wherefore is it restricted to a particular case.”?

As a matter of fact, we find a rule regarding the sipping of water in the same connection; and in connection with this, it is only the said kind of touch that is possible. It is for this reason that people do not consider it desirable to touch the child that has touched a menstruating woman; and this may be regarded as the qualifying factor in the present case; as has been declared by Gautama in his Smṛti; it is only right for such a person to set up the fire; hence it is only right that it should be taken as pointing to the time of setting up the fire.—(71).

VERSE (72.)

FOR THREE DAYS THEY SHOULD EAT FOOD FREE FROM SALINES AND SALTS, SHOULD BATHE, SHOULD NOT EAT MEAT-FOOD AND SHOULD SLEEP APART ON THE GROUND.—(72).

Bhāṣya.

‘Salines and salts.’—The term ‘salines’ stands for nitrate of potash and such substances, and ‘salts’ for rock-salt and other salts. These they should not eat.
Or, the term 'saline', 'ksāra', may be taken as qualifying, lavana', 'salt.' In that case the prohibition (applying to only saline salts) would not apply to rock-salt.

The 'bathing' laid down is to be done in a river or a tank or such other reservoirs of water as are not regarded as specially 'sacred'; and it is to be done without scrubbing the body.

'Meat-food'—is prohibited during the period of impurity, on the basis of other Smṛti texts; where we read—'They shall not have recourse to women, they shall not scrub their body and they shall not eat meat.' The Gṛhyaśūtra however says—'For three days they shall remain without food, or still live upon food obtained by purchase.'

'Should sleep'—upon the bare platform, without company.

Another Smṛti-text has prescribed abstention from sexual intercourse during impurity due to births also.—(72).

VERSE (73).

THIS RULE REGARDING IMPURITY DUE TO DEATH HAS BEEN DESCRIBED IN REFERENCE TO CASES WHERE THE PARTIES ARE NEAR ONE ANOTHER. IN REFERENCE TO CASES WHERE THEY ARE NOT NEAR, KINSMEN AND RELATIONS SHOULD OBSERVE THE FOLLOWING RULE.—(73).

Bhāṣya.

'Near'—i.e., when the relations are close by the place where their kinsman has died.

Others have explained the text to mean that the rule applies to those who were near the man at the time of his death.

'Kinsmen'—i.e., Samāpodakas;—'bāndhava'—Sapindas.

Others have explained this 'non-nearness' to stand for men who may be living in another village or town.

In the case of these, we have the following rules.—(73).
VERSE (74).

HE WHO HEARS, WITHIN TEN DAYS, OF A RELATION RESIDENT IN A FOREIGN LAND HAVING DIED, SHALL REMAIN IMPURE FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE PERIOD OF TEN DAYS.—(74).

Bhāṣya.

‘Foreign country’—means another village, &c., as before.
‘Vigatam’—dead.
‘Within ten days’.—This is only by way of illustration; what is meant is the period of impurity that has been prescribed in each case;—the remainder of that period would be the period to be observed in the special case mentioned. The repeated mention of ‘ten days’ is for the purpose of filling up the metre.

The period of impurity due to birth and death is determined by their origin; so that the periods of ‘ten days’ and the rest are to be counted from the day on which the birth or the death may have taken place, and not from the day on which it may become known to the relations. As a result of this, if the guest happen to know of the birth, &c., having occurred in the house, he should not take his food in that house, even though the master of that house himself may still be ignorant of it. Thus in both cases (of death and birth) the counting is to be done from the day of origination.

Thus those who are subject to impurity for ‘ten days’ shall remain impure for the remainder of that period; and for those who are subject to a period of ‘three days’, purification is obtained immediately, by bathing along with all the clothing that may be on them.—(74).

VERSE (75).

IF THE PERIOD OF TEN DAYS HAS ELAPSED, HE SHALL REMAIN IMPURE FOR THREE DAYS; BUT WHEN A YEAR HAS ELAPSED, HE BECOMES PURE BY MERELY TOUCHING WATER.—(75).

Bhāṣya.

In cases where the period of impurity ordained lasts for ten days or more,—if this period has elapsed, the impurity shall last for
three days. But in cases where the period ordained lasts for three
days, or one day, or less,—if this period has elapsed, one has
simply to bathe along with his clothes; as is "going to be laid
down later—(Verse 77.)

'When a year has elapsed'—one becomes pure 'by touching
water',—i.e., by bathing. From what has been said elsewhere
regarding 'touching water with the hands and feet &c., &c.', it is
clear that the whole body is to touch water: and this is what
constitutes 'bathing'.—(75).

VERSE (76).

HEARING OF THE DEATH OF A KINSMAN, OR OF THE BIRTH OF A SON,
AFTER THE TEN DAYS HAVE ELAPSED, THE MAN BECOMES PURE
BY PLUNGING INTO WATER WITH HIS CLOTHES—(76).

Bhāṣya.

This rule refers to Samānodaka relations; and also to Sapindā
ones, but only when the option of three or one day is
accepted.

'With clothes'—along with his garments.

'Plunging into water'—bathing.—(76),

VERSE (77).

IN THE EVENT OF A CHILD, RESIDENT IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY, WHO IS
A NON-SAPIŃDA RELATION, DYING,—ONE BECOMES PURE IMMEDIATELY, BY PLUNGING INTO WATER WITH HIS CLOTHES ON.—(77).

Bhāṣya

'Child'—i.e. a son that has not yet teethered;—'resident in
a foreign country'—'who is a non-sapińda relation'—'dying',—
all these terms are in apposition:

'Non-Sapińda'—i.e. Samānodaka.

When such a person dies while residing in a foreign country,
the purification is 'immediate.'
VERSE LXXVIII:—OTHER FORMS OF IMPURITY

When such a person dies near at hand, then the purification comes after 'three days'—as declared in verse 63 above—(77).

VERSE (78).

If, within ten days, another birth or death happen to befall, the Brāhmaṇa shall remain impure until that period of ten days shall have elapsed.—(78).

Bhāṣya

Here also the mention of 'ten days' is meant to stand for the period of impurity ordained in each individual case. The meaning thus is that—'before the expiry of the period of impurity ordained for a particular case, if another cause of impurity should come about, then purification comes with the lapse of the remainder of that period; and the second period of impurity is not to be counted from the day on which the cause shall have arisen.' Says Gautama (14:5)—'If an impurity should occur again during the interval, the purification comes with the remainder of the former.'

'Birth and Death' being mentioned in a compound,—and it being not easy to find out in which order of sequence these are to be taken,—and intervention being possible by unlike causes of impurity also,—it is to be understood, on the authority of usage, that what is meant is intervention by a like cause of impurity (i.e. of impurity due to death by another due to death and so forth). It is in this sense that the use of the term 'another' becomes more justifiably significant.

The term 'Brāhmaṇa' also is meant to stand for persons observing the impurity.

In another Smṛti-text it has been laid down that—'if it happens at the close of the night, then it is in two days; and if it happens at dawn, then three days'; and having begun with the statement—'when the Brāhmaṇa dies, the impurity lasts for ten days',—it goes on to say—'if no one dies or is born
in the interval, he becomes pure after the remaining days." And this takes no account of any distinction between like and unlike sources of impurity.—(78).

VERSE (79).

ON THE DEATH OF THE TEACHER, THEY DECLARE THE IMPURITY TO LAST FOR THREE DAYS; ON THE DEATH OF HIS SON OR WIFE, IT LASTS FOR ONE DAY AND NIGHT; SUCH IS THE LAW.—(79).

Bhāṣya

'Teacher', 'Achārya', here stands for the Initiator;—on his death—the impurity of the pupil lasts for three days.

On the death of the Teacher's son or wife,—it lasts for one day and night.—(79).

VERSE (80).

IN THE CASE OF A LEARNED COMPANION, ONE SHALL REMAIN IMPURE FOR THREE DAYS; IN THE CASE OF A MATERNAL UNCLE, A PUPIL, AN OFFICIATING PRIEST AND RELATION, FOR A NIGHT ALONG WITH THE TWO DAYS (PRECEDED BY AND FOLLOWING IT).—(80).

Bhāṣya

'Learned'—Who has studied the Vedic text.

'Companion'—who, through friendship, has been living with one. Or 'upasampanna' may mean endowed with good character.

What has been said before (Verse 70) regarding the case of 'fellow-students' pertains to those who have not yet got up the entire Veda.

In lexicons the term 'upasampanna' appears as a synonym for 'dead'; but in view of the long period of impurity laid down (which would not be compatible with the case of a stranger), the former explanation is the better of the two.
Others construe the text otherwise—explaining it to mean that 'the impurity lasts for three days in the case of the learned maternal uncle,' and 'for a night along with the two days in the case of the pupil, etc.'

The term 'relation' stands for the wife's brother, the son of the maternal aunt and so forth.

When we connect the 'maternal uncle' with 'the night along with the two days,'—then, since this period would be already applicable to the case of the maternal uncle by reason of his being a 'relation,' the separate mention of him should be taken as making the rule compulsory in his case; and this would mean that in the case of other relations, it would be discretionary.—(80)

VERSE (81).

On the death of the King in whose realm he lives, it lasts till the light; in the case of a non-learned teacher, for the whole day; as also in the case of the (ordinary) teacher.—(81).

Bhāṣya.

The name 'rājun' is really applied indirectly to the man of a particular caste as endowed with the qualifications of anointment and the rest; that it is so is clear from the clause 'in whose realm he lives.' In fact when the word signifies the lord of a country belonging to a particular caste, it does so only by indirect indication, and not by direct denotation.

'Till the light'—i.e., it continues along with the light. That is, if the death occurs during the day, the impurity lasts during the day only, and it does not go on into the night; similarly if the death occurs at night, it lasts during the night only, and does not extend to the day. The fact that the text has used this peculiar expression—'cājitīth,' 'till the light'—in the present context (when only day, and only night are meant),—is indicative of the fact that whenever the term 'day' or 'night' is used, it
means both day and night; e.g., in verses 5.66 and 5.59. In 5.64 also, where the term 'night' is used in addition to the term 'day', it is added only for the purpose of filling up the metre.

At night, the 'light' is that of fire, as we read in the Brāhmaṇa-text bearing upon the Agnihotra—'The night becomes resplendent with the light of fire, not with the light of the Sun.'

In the case of the 'non-learned'—who does not study the Veda—'teacher'—it lasts during the whole day; it does not extend to the night, even when the cause of impurity happens during the night.

"How can a 'non-learned' man be a 'teacher'? In fact it is only one who has learnt the Veda along with its subsidiary sciences that is entitled to do the work of teaching."

True; but a mere expounder is also called a 'teacher.' Hence what is meant is that 'in the case of the person who has, somehow, learnt the subsidiary sciences (without learning the Veda) and expounds them, the impurity lasts during the day.' That this must be the meaning is indicated by the fact that there is a distinct rule in reference to the Teacher who is properly qualified, or to the Initiating Preceptor, who is the principal object of reverence.

Some people connect the negative prefix in 'non-learned' with the term 'teacher'; and explain the rule laid down as referring to 'the learned man who is the teacher of other persons, and bears no relation to the person concerned'.—(81).

VERSE (82).

The Brāhmaṇa becomes pure in ten days, the Kṣattriya in twelve days, the Vaishya in fifteen days and the Śeудra in a month.—(82).

Bhāṣya

The alternative rules—limiting the period of impurity to 'three days', 'four days' &c.,—have been laid down above, in consideration of the character and learning of the persons concerned;
VERSE LXXXII:—OTHER FORMS OF IMPURITY

and the present verse is added with a view to preclude those alternatives from the Kṣattriya and other castes. The mention of 'ten days' in regard to the Brāhmaṇa however is a mere reiteration.

In this connection the following question is likely to arise—“What is the text that restricts the period of impurity for the Kṣattriya to twelve days (or of the Vaiśya to fifteen days, and so forth) compulsorily, on the strength whereof the present verse is taken as precluding the other alternatives from them?”

This present text itself serves to indicate the time mentioned as applying to those castes. And in the face of this text, the other periods of 'ten' days and so forth, wherever mentioned, are understood to be merely indicative of the period specified for each caste. As a matter of fact, however, even in the presence of the present verse, the mention of 'ten days' need not be taken to be indicative (as just stated). For even though the section as a whole may pertain to all four castes, yet the alternatives mentioned can pertain only to that caste for whom the period of 'ten days' has been laid down. In another Śruti-text it is with special reference to the Brāhmaṇa that it has been asserted that—'the Brāhmaṇa may resume Vedic study after one day'; and it is to this that all the other alternatives mentioned in other Śruti texts have to be taken as optional. In any case, on the eleventh day there is no impurity at all.

The author of the Vivarana says that in the present verse special significance is meant to be attached to the use of the term 'day' (and it is the day that is meant, as distinguished from the night); so that there is no impurity on the tenth night; and hence it is only right and proper that invitations to the shrāddha on the eleventh day should be issued on the previous day. When a person is going to set up the Fire, the impurity shall be wiped off by the vigil kept during the previous night.

This however is not right. If the term 'day' meant the day only, then on the other days also there would be no impurity during the nights. It might be argued that those intervening nights...
would fall within the period of impurity by virtue of the general rule that ‘impurity due to death lasts for ten days’ (5.59). But what is the authority for denying a similar significance to the term ‘day’ in this context also?

It is for these reasons that we have explained that throughout this context the word ‘day’ stands for the day and night. It is for this reason that in the preceding verse, where the day only is meant, we have the epithet ‘whole’, ‘krtsnam’ added to it.—(82).

VERSE (83).

One should not prolong the days of impurity; nor should he interrupt the rites performed in the fires; because ‘he who performs those rites, even if he be a Sapiṇḍa, would never be impure.—(83.)

Bhāṣya.

Some people may entertain the following notion:—‘The various alternatives that have been laid down regarding the period of impurity extending to three days, &c., all stand on an equal footing with the alternative of ‘ten days,’ and their adoption is not regulated by considerations of character and study, etc.; so that the observing of the longer period being open to me, why should I have recourse to the alternative of ‘one day’, which would entail the trouble of resuming my studies sooner? I shall have recourse to the alternative of ‘ten days’, and shall enjoy the pleasure of having nothing to do for a longer period.’

It is for the benefit of such a person that the author, moved by sympathy, makes it clear that the optional alternatives are regulated by other considerations; and that they do not all stand on the same footing. In what way they are regulated has been already shown by us.

If this be not the meaning of the present advice, and if it mean something else,—what possibility would there be of any
prolongation of the period that has been specifically fixed for each individual? And it is only with such a possibility that there could be room for the advice contained in the present verse. What harm could there be in the author making still clearer what he has already said before (regarding the regulation of the optional alternatives)?

Some people hold that—even after the prescribed number of days have elapsed, purification is not accomplished until bathing and other rites have been performed; as it is going to be asserted that 'the Brāhmaṇa becomes pure after touching water, etc.' (Verse 98); and some one may think that so long as he remains impure he would not incur any sin by the omission of religious duties, and hence he may not proceed to take the bath or other rites;—and it is in view of such cases that we have the injunction that 'one should not prolong the days of impurity,'—the meaning being that the stipulated days having elapsed, one should not delay the external purifications.

As regards the assertion that—"the use of the term day implies that there is no impurity on the night of the tenth day,"—it has already been pointed out that this view is not correct. Says Gautama (14.6)—'If during one impurity another source of impurity should arise, there is purification after the remainder of the former'; and having said this, he thought that people might be led to think that if the second impurity should arise about the end of the last night, there would be purification after that night, and in order to guard against this he has added—'if it happens about the end of the night, then after two nights' (14.7) [From which it is clear that the last night also falls within the period of impurity].

'Nor should he interrupt the rites performed in the fires.'—This is said in view of the fact by reason of impurity all the rites prescribed in the Shruti and the Smrīti become precluded. The meaning is that the rites that are performed in the fires,—such as the Evening-libation and the rest—should not be interrupted,—i.e., shall not be omitted. 'Interruption' means omission, non-performance.
But this does not mean that the impure-man should himself perform the rites; since it is added—‘he who performs the rites, even if he be a Sapiṇḍa, would never be “impure”;’ which means that ‘even a Sapiṇḍa-relation would not be impure, to say nothing of other persons’; says the Gṛhyaśūtra also—‘They should perform in the house-fire the obligatory rites, with the exception of the Vaitāna-rite;’ and then—‘others would perform these.’ This does not refer to the mere offering of libations that is done in connection with the setting up of the fires, but to the performance of the rite in all its details; since it is only for these that the employment of other agents is possible, since the principal libation itself, which consists in offering certain substances, can be offered by the householder himself. Hence the rites that are precluded (during impurity) are those of the Vaishvadēva-offering and the Darśa-Pūrṇamāsa and other sacrifices. Of other acts, such as the telling of beads, the saying of Twilight Prayers and so forth,—the preclusion of these has nowhere been indicated; and all these are obligatory. Hence what the present text does is to permit the performance of other acts; specially as another Smṛti text has prohibited such acts as ‘the offering of libations and Vedic study.’ Thus then, the distinction (as to what acts are precluded and what not) is based upon the obligatory or voluntary character of the acts themselves; specially as the voluntary act tending to the accomplishment of desired ends should never be done, since impurity deprives the man of the title to perform all such acts.

“But the impure man cannot be entitled to the performance of the obligatory acts either.”

As a matter of fact, purity does not constitute an essential factor in the rites; and though an obligatory act may be done even in a slightly deficient form (due to the lack of purity, for instance), such is not permissible in the case of voluntary acts done with a view to definite ends. It might be argued that they also might be performed, on the strength of the present text itself. But this would not be right; for all that the present text permits is getting certain rites performed by proxy; and as this in itself would be a
deficiency, it would be admissible in the case of the obligatory rites only, and not in that of voluntary ones.

With regard to the Vaishvadēna offering however, there is a difference of opinion. Some people quote the following Śruti-text—‘At a birth or a death, one shall not pour libations into fire, even with dry grains or fruits, nor should he perform any sacrificial rites.’

From all this it follows that one should offer the following:—the Twilight-libations, the Dūrsha-Pūrṇamāsa sacrifices, the Annual Shrāddha, the Shrāddha offered in the month of Āshvina and so forth. As for the Upākarma, its performance depends upon the lunar asterism and it need not be done on the full-moon-day.—(83.)

VERSE (84).

After having touched the Chāndāla, the menstruating woman, the outcast, the woman in child-bed, the dead body, or toucher thereof—one becomes pure by bathing.—(84).

Bhāṣya.

The ‘divākirti’ is the chāndāla; that it is so is clear from the fact that he is mentioned along with the worst untouchables, and also from the use of the name in the Mahābhārata, in course of a conversation between the Cat and the Mouse—‘at that time the Divākirti became oppressed with fear’ (where it is the chāndāla that is clearly meant). It cannot stand for the barber here; for the barber is among the touchables, and also because he is one whose food may be eaten (by the Brāhmaṇa). As for the rule laying down the necessity of bathing after a shave, this cannot be put forward in the present context, as the bathing in this case is necessitated by the consideration that, while one is shaving hairs are bound to fall on the body, and as, on falling from the body, they are unclean, it is necessary that one should bathe.

‘Tatsprśtinam’, ‘the toucher thereof.’—This compound is to be expounded as—‘tasya sṛṣṭam, tadasyaśti’. The men who touch those mentioned above have also got to bathe.
Some people argue that, as the persons mentioned are not all in equal proximity to the term ‘taspṛśṭinam’, ‘the toucher thereof’, this refers to the ‘dead body’ only, and not to the ‘Chāṇḍāla’ and the rest. But others hold that since all are mentioned in the same sentence, and since the term occurs at the end of all the other persons mentioned, all these are present before the mind, and hence referred to by the pronoun ‘thereof’; so that the construction intended is that all the terms up to ‘shavam’, ‘the dead body’, form one copulative compound, and then compounded with ‘sprśṭinam’, ‘toucher’; and hence when the term ‘the toucher thereof’ comes up, all the things spoken of by all the members of the copulative compound come to the mind. There is, on the other hand, nothing to indicate that the term ‘toucher’ is to be connected with the ‘dead body’ only; for the simple reason that it is equally connected with the ‘outcast’ and the rest also. In fact, all that is clearly indicated is that the term ‘toucher’ is connected with some other term that has gone before; in a copulative compound however, each term is regarded as denoting all the things spoken of; and hence all these latter are equally closely related to the term ‘toucher’. Another construction that might be suggested is to construe the term ‘toucher thereof’ with the term ‘dead body’, and then with the other terms. But in this case, there would be nothing to justify the connection of the term ‘toucher’ with the ‘outcast’ and the rest.

From all this it follows that it is only on the strength of usage that a right conclusion can be arrived at.—(84)

VERSE (85).

On seeing unclean things, the man, after having stepped water, shall always attentively recite the Solar Mantras according to his inclination, as also the Pāva- mānī verses, according to his capacity.—(85).

Bhāṣya.

‘Unclean things’.—Those just mentioned are to be understood as meant here, because of their proximity.
VERSE LXXXVI—OTHER FORMS OF IMPURITY

Those mantras that are addressed to the Sun are called ‘Solar’ and the mantras meant are ‘udātyam jātavēdasam, &c. &c.’

The Pāvamāṇī verses.—The verses ‘svādiṣṭayē, &c. &c.’ occurring in the ninth mandala of the Rgveda.

‘According to his inclination’ and ‘according to his capacity’ mean the same thing; two words have been used for the purposes of metre.

In as much as the ‘mantras’ and ‘verses’ are mentioned in the plural, at least three verses should be recited; and as regards more, they may be recited only if other and more important duties do not suffer thereby. Then again, since the text speaks of ‘mantras,’ and the term ‘Pāvamāṇī’ also refers to verses, purification is brought about as soon as one has gone beyond three verses, even though the hymn may not be completed.

The dog also has to be included among the ‘unclean things’; as it also is unclean. In the present context Gautama has declared—‘Of the dog also; whatever it might pollute, say some’ (14:29—30).

‘Attentively’;—without allowing his mind to wander about; he should fix it upon contemplating the deity. Or, ‘Prayataḥ’ may mean that ‘at a time when one is busy with worshipping deities, if he should happen to touch an unclean thing, he should do what is here laid down,—and not otherwise’.—(85).

VERSE (86).

Having touched a fatty human bone, the Brāhmaṇa becomes pure by bathing, but if it be free from fat, then, by sipping water and touching a cow, or looking at the Sun—(86).

Bhāṣya.

‘Nāra,’ ‘human,’—belonging to man.

‘Fatty’—i.e. Besmeared with flesh; marrow &c.

‘Alabhya’ means touching.

The touching of the cow and looking at the sun are meant to be optional alternatives.—(86).
VERSE (87).

The person under instruction shall not make water-offerings till the completion of his pupilage; at its completion, he becomes pure in three days, after having made the water-offerings.

Bhāṣya.

‘Adiṣṭa’ means ‘ādēśa’, ‘instruction’; and the term ‘person under instruction’ denotes the Student, by reason of his connection with the instruction that he receives regarding his observances. The present text prohibits the making of water-offerings by one who is still in the state of the Student, to such Sapinda relations as may happen to die during that period. As for those that have died before, the offering of water to the forefathers and Gods has already been prescribed for the Student also.

‘Till the completion of his pupilage;—i.e. till the performance of the ‘Samāvartana’ ceremony; and it does not mean any forced completion of the stage in the interval.

On returning after having finished his observances, he shall make a water-offering to each of the dead relations on one day; and he should observe ‘impurity’ for three days.

As regards the making of water-offering to his mother, this is necessary for the Student also; and such an offering does not interfere with the proper fulfilment of his observances. In support of this they quote another Smṛti-text—viz. ‘The person undergoing instruction does not commit a wrong in making a water-offering.’—(87).

VERSE (88).

The water-offering is withdrawn from those born in vain and from intermixture, from those who are addicted to asceticism and from those who have abandoned themselves.—(88).

Bhāṣya.

The term ‘born’ is to be construed separately with each of the two terms with which it is compounded. He is said to be
"born in vain" who does not worship Gods, Pitris or Men; i. e. he who does not lead the life proper for any of the four stages of life, even though he is capable of doing so; one who is excluded from all offerings and invitations. Having referred to the man 'who for one year does not lead the life proper for any stage,' the scriptures speak of a great sin attaching to persons doing this for any length of time. This is so because with the exception of the Student and the Renunciates, all the others have to cook food for other people; and it is only cooking for one's own self alone that has been prohibited.

'Born of intermixture;' i. e. the 'Ayogava' and other persons born of an improper and inverse mixture of the several castes; that the issue of improper mixtures is meant is indicated by its association with those 'born in vain,' which implies lowness of birth. As regards the issue of legal mixtures, even though these also are 'born of intermixtures,' yet these are not meant here, because they belong definitely to their mother's caste and are entitled to all that pertains thereto. Further, in ordinary usage children of legal mixtures are not spoken of as being of 'mixed origin'; e.g. in 10.25, where the issues of 'mixed origin' are described. The term also includes (a) the children of such widows as have not been 'permitted' to beget children, born of the intercourse of several men, and (b) the children of prostitutes; the children of women begotten by a person other than their husbands are not included in this category, if there has not been intercourse with several men.

Some people hold that this prohibition refers to Sapinda relations who are as described, and not to their sons; while in the case of those who have 'abandoned themselves,' it applies to their sons also.

This however is not right; as the text makes no distinction among those mentioned.

Asceticisms; i. e., of heretics, such as the 'Bhagala,' the 'Raktapata' and the rest. That these are meant is indicated by the plural number and by the fact that it is the heterodox heretic alone.
that is excluded. These are regarded as 'heterodox' by reason of their observances &c., being different from those of the orthodox ascetics.

'Those who have abandoned themselves;'—i.e. those who, even before their life's span has been run out, give up their bodies (by committing suicide). [It is only such suicide that is reprehensible]. It is considered quite desirable in the case of old men suffering from incurable diseases given up by the physicians; as has been thus declared:—'If an old man,—incapable of purification and memory, who has passed beyond the reach of the physician's art,—kills himself by falling down from a precipice, or entering into fire, or by fasting, or by drowning in water,—in his case there is impurity for three days; his bones being collected on the second day, on the third day the water offering—should be made, and on the fourth day the Shrāddha should be performed.' Suicide is regarded as desirable also in the case of persons suffering from leprosy and such other diseases; as has been said in connection with men who, though still in the Householder's state, have lost all energy,—'Bent upon entering the Great Path, they do not wish to live on uselessly.' That man is called 'devoid of energy' who is incapable of doing purificatory acts, as also saying the Twilight Prayers &c. Then again, in texts deprecating suicide, the words used are—'if one whose body has not been emaciated, or who has not lost all energy, should kill himself &c. &c.;' which implies that it is permitted for those who are not such as here described.

Other Śruti-texts prohibit the water-offering for other persons also. It has been thus declared—'Those killed by kings, those killed by horned or fanged animals, or by serpents, and those who have abandoned themselves,—to these no Shrāddha is to be offered; and water, ball-offerings and other offerings that are made to the dead, all this does not reach them, it becomes lost in the intervening regions. Through fear of popular blame, one should make the Nārāyana offering; and for the sake of these also food-grains, along with the additional fee, shall be given,'
Elsewhere again—

'Sinful men meet death from the Chāṇḍāla, from water, from serpents, from Brāhmaṇas, from lightning and from fanged animals.'

It is also laid down that—

'For incendiaries, for keepers of baths and makers of ornaments and for professional mourners, there is purification after the performance of two Taptakṛchhṛa penances. Hence for these no after-death rites shall be performed by others; even the name of such persons, or of their family, should not be pronounced. For truly fearful is the uttering of the name of such a great sinner, who has gone to the worst hells.'

It is in connection with the acts mentioned here that Samvarta has prescribed the 'Sāntapana' penance; and Parāśāra has laid down the 'Taptakṛchhṛa'; and Vasiṣṭha has prescribed the 'Chāṇḍrayana' along with the 'Taptakṛchhṛa'. But these differences may be ignored.

With reference to what has been said above regarding 'the death of sinners' resulting from 'the Chāṇḍāla, from water &c. &c.,' there arises the following question—'Does this rule, regarding the non-performance of the Shraddha and the performance of penance, pertain to the Chāṇḍāla who kills himself intentionally?—or to one who is killed through carelessness, without intention?'

Why should this question arise?

(A) Well, Gautama (14-12) has said—'In the case of those dying from hunger, by a weapon, by fire, by poison, in water, in prison, or from a precipice,—it is only when it is unintentional.' While in the verse just quoted it is said simply, without any qualification 'Those dying at the hands of the Chāṇḍāla &c.' And on account of the necessity of reconciling this with what has been said in the other Smṛti text regarding the case of 'dying in water' &c., it must be 'intentional death' that is meant. And the idea
arises that by reason of 'association,' the same should be the case with the others also.

(B) On the other hand, the verse quoted uses the term 'sinful'; and all sinful act has been prohibited; he who does what is prohibited is called 'sinful.' And a man becomes the 'doer' of an act through his own initiative, as also through the urging of another person. Now, death 'from lightning, and the fanged and horned animals' could never belong to the former category (i.e. this could never be intentional); and no one is ever urged by others to such death; nor are these means of dying employed by suicides, as holes, water and sword etc., are, and it is only if these were so, and the man were to kill himself by having recourse to these, that he could be the 'self-sufficient agett,' of the act of 'dying.' The truth therefore is that the man who comes by such death is understood to have been sinful in his previous life,—as is learnt from the scriptures; just as the possession of 'black teeth' and the rest. If it be asked—'what is the use of this fact of the man's having been sinful in the past being indicated?' But in the case of persons with deficient limbs etc., their previous connection with sin is clearly indicated; and the expiatory rite to be performed in the case has been laid down by Vashiśtha, as consisting, in the case of some men, of the performance of two Kṛchchhāras, and in that of others, of something more.

(C) In reality however, the suicide having died, can have nothing to do with the performance of any rites. Or, if he be regarded as having committed a grievous sin, then, any person who may have entered into any kind of relationship with him—marital, or friendly, or sacrificial,—would also have to be regarded as sinful. But such is not the usage of cultured men. For
as a matter of fact, people having relationship with suicides are not looked down upon in any way; nor do they perform any expiatory rites.

From this it follows that what is meant is intentional death.

(D) Some people, having read, in another Smṛti text, the words—'those killed by cows and Brāhmaṇas etc.'—read the words 'those who have abandoned themselves' apart by themselves, and seem to take up an entirely different position.

From all this (A, B, C and D) there arises the above-mentioned doubt—as to what is the right view.

The right view is that intentional suicides are what are meant;—why?—because of their being spoken of as 'sinful.' The man who intentionally proceeds to set into activity the causes leading to his own death, wilfully disobeys the law that 'no man shall by his own desire, cut off his life-span;' and it is only right that such a transgressor should be spoken of as 'sinful.'

"But it has been said and pointed out above that the causes of death spoken of do not resemble the sword and other things used by suicides; so that the intentional killing of oneself could not be meant."

Our answer to this is as follows:—If a man does not guard himself against a danger, he is regarded to be as good as having brought it upon himself. So that if a man wanders about alone in a forest infested with chāṇḍālas and robbers,—even though he may not have the wish that they should kill him, yet—there is disobedience of scriptures on his part, since he acts in a way that invites danger, and he does nothing to avert that danger. Similarly with the man who goes to swim in the river, or enters a boat of doubtful capacity rowed by incompetent boatmen. Under such circumstances, if by the loss of vigour, or by the turning over of the boat, the man should happen to die, it would be only right to regard him as having committed a sin.
On the contrary, if persons were to bathe in water, whose depth they have duly ascertained by means of sticks etc., and of the presence wherein of alligators and other animals they are ignorant,—and were to be carried away by any such animals, no blame would attach to them. Similarly if one gets into a boat, which is well-fastened, and rowed by capable rowers, and proceeds to cross a swift stream,—if, on the sudden rising of a strong wind, the boat happen to be tossed on a whirl-pool and capsize, and the man become drowned,—he would not have transgressed the scriptures at all. Similarly again, if one did not carefully avoid places known to be infested with snakes, and being bitten by a snake were to die, he would have acted sinfully; not otherwise. Similarly if one does not run to a safe distance, on seeing a sharp-horned cow or an elephant, and become killed, he is rightly regarded as sinful. Similarly again if, when it is raining heavily and lightning is flashing, if one wanders about in desolate places and does not take shelter in a village or town,—his action is reprehensible. While if the lightning should, by chance, happen to fall upon a man who is in the village, there would be nothing sinful on the part of the man. For these reasons it is always right and proper that the man should do all that has been laid down (for his safety).

The prohibiting of ‘water-offerings’ should be taken as applicable to all kinds of after-death rites; for such is the view propounded in another Smṛti-text.-(88)

VERSE (89).

Also from women, who have joined a heretic, who behave too freely, who have injured a child in their womb or their husband, and those who drink wine—(89).

Bhasya.

One who has renounced the scriptures and has taken to wearing such things as the human skull, red garments and so forth, on the basis of heterodox theories of life and morals, is a ‘heretic’. Those women who have ‘joined’, such a person,—i.e.
VERSE LXXXIX:—OTHER FORMS OF IMPURITY

who have adopted his distinguishing marks and are under his control.

'Those who behave too freely.'—When a woman renounces the customs and usages of her family, and allowing free scope to her desires, has recourse to one as well as several men,—her behaviour is called 'free.'

The 'injury' to the husband consists in giving him poison etc.; and that to the child in the womb consists in abortion.

'Those who drink wine;—i.e. those who drink what is prohibited.

On this subject some one makes the following observations:

"The prohibition of wine-drinking is found in the words 'brāhmaṇo na pibet surām', ('the Brāhmaṇa shall not drink wine'); and though the words apply to all members of the caste, yet the particular gender used is indicative of the fact that the prohibition applies to males only, and not to females. Though both the male and the female belong to the same caste, yet there is a distinct difference between the masculine and feminine genders. So that when the text uses the masculine form 'brāhmaṇah', what possibility is there of the prohibition applying to the female, who is not mentioned at all? For instance, when it is said that 'for the sake of a son one should make the Brāhmaṇi drink' a certain substance, it is not understood to mean that the male Brāhmaṇa should be made to drink it. In the same manner when a text makes use of the masculine form, what it asserts cannot be predicated of females. It is true that in some cases, significance is not meant to be attached to the particular gender used;—e.g., in the text 'the Brāhmaṇa should not be killed', where the prohibition is understood to apply to the killing of the female Brāhmaṇa also. But what happens in this latter case is that the direct signification of the Accusative case-ending marks out the 'Brāhmaṇa' to be the predominant factor by reason of his being what is most intended to be 'got at' by the predicate; and as a rule in the case of the predominant factor no
significance is attached to the gender, or the number or any other factor, except what is expressed by the basic noun itself. *E.g.*, the injunction 'wash the cup' is not taken to mean the washing of only one cup. In the case under discussion, however, the prohibitive text is in the form 'Brāhmaṇaṇa sura na pēyā' ('wine shall not be drunk by the Brāhmaṇa'), where the 'Brāhmaṇa' appears as the Nominative, and as such, an accessary in the fulfilment of the act denoted; so that in the case of the prohibition in the form—'The Brāhmaṇa shall not drink wine'—also, the nominative being denoted by the verb (with its conjunctional ending), is expressed by the basic noun ('brahmaṇa') and comes to be taken as something conducive to the fulfilment of the act denoted by the verb; so that the nominative ending in this text is to be construed on the same lines as the Instrumental in the preceding text; and it has to be taken as a subordinate factor. And in connection with a subordinate factor, all that is expressed by the word has to be taken as significant; for instance, in the case of the text 'pashunā yajēta', ('sacrifice with an animal'), it is the *male* animal that is always sacrificed (and this on account of the Instrumental ending marking out the *animal* as the subordinate factor).

Our answer to the above is as follows:—In such cases as the one under consideration whether a certain thing form the predominant or the subordinate factor is not determined by the Accusative or Instrumental case-ending, but upon its being or not being already known. That is to say, what is not already known, that alone can form the subject of the Injunction, and this is to which due significance is meant to be attached; and this for the simple reason that it is denoted by a word which can have no other denotation; while what is already known from other sources, and is mentioned for the sake of the Injunction, has to be taken as subserving the purposes of the Injunction in exactly the same form in which it has been denoted by the previous word. In the sentence 'the Brāhmaṇa should not be killed', all that the Injunction directly signifies is the prohibition of the act of killing, and everything else (mentioned in the sentence) is such as is already
known from other sources. Even so however, due significance has to be attached to what is expressed by the basic nouns (in the sentence), as otherwise, their very use would come to be meaningless. But the gender, the number and other elements, which are denoted by the case-endings,—it is just possible that these are used simply because they are invariable concomitants of basic nouns (which cannot be used by themselves without a case-ending); and hence sometimes these latter are meant to be significant, sometimes not. As regards the killing of the Brahmana, no man requires to be urged to do it by an Injunction; as he is urged to it by his own hatred of the man he kills; and all men are, by their very nature, prone to do this act. But as regards the prohibition of it, unless it were directly enjoined, it could not be got at by any means; specially as it could not be obtained from any other source. So that, since it is not in any way conducive to the fulfilment of an act, nor is it the qualification of anything so conducive, hence, even though it were to be included under the nature of man, it could not be connected with the context. Consequently, for the purpose of connecting it with the context it is necessary to attribute to it the character of the topic; and when the prohibition in question has been made the topic of the Injunction, it is no longer necessary to make the denotation of the verb the topic. Thus then, the topical character having been wrested by the Prohibition, what is denoted by the verb naturally loses that character. The performance of the act (denoted by the verb) is such that its performance is secured through ordinary tendencies (of men); so that for its own accomplishment it does not stand in need of being embraced by any Injunction; and all that it needs is the capacity (and desire) of the man to do the act; and this, act of killing, being got at by other means of knowledge, establishes the man's capacity for doing the act; so that it is through a qualification of the man that it becomes correlated with the sentence. Thus it is quite in keeping with the theory of words denoting only correlated entities. The act, along with its qualification, thus not forming the topic of this Injunction, man's tendency to it has to be explained as being due to ordinary wordly
causes. As a matter of fact, in the case of killing, such tendency and motive power is present, in the form of the man's passion; and certainly no restrictions of gender or number pertain to passion; or the activity might be due to the man's hatred.

From all this it follows that the word, whose denotation does not form the topic of the Injunction, on the ground that it is already known, renounces its denotative power and indicates a sense that is determined by other means of knowledge. And in as much as gender and number are not, even by import, signified by the word, how can any significance be attached to them? It being necessary to speak of what is denoted by the basic noun, it has to be spoken of with the help of some number and it cannot be used entirely by itself; and it is for this reason that gender and number are added.

On the point at issue thus the conclusion is as follows:

The man, who has determined to take upon himself the character of the agent of the act of killing, is urged (by the prohibition) to what is signified by the negative word. So that in a prohibitive sentence, no significance need attach to the use of the Accusative ending, which therefore may be ignored. Even sentences where we find the Instrumental Ending, or even the Nominative—e.g., 'wine shall not be drunk by the Brāhmaṇa', or 'the Brāhmaṇa shall not drink wine'—what is denoted by them being already got at from other sources, they do not form topics of the Injunction; and hence they are taken as spoken of only by way of reference. In the case where the Accusative comes in as a qualification of the motive, the Nominative and the Instrumental endings are always taken along with the Accusative. Even when the Accusative is directly used, that which is not already known from other sources forms part of the enjoined (predicate), and, as such, is regarded as duly significant; for example in the case of such texts as 'bhāryāṁ upagachchhēt' ('one should have recourse to his wife'), 'apatayam utpādayēt' ('one should beget a child') [where due significance attaches to the
singular number in 'wife' and 'child'). The 'wife' is not a thing acquired in the ordinary worldly manner; as she can be acquired only by means of the marriage-rites. Nor is it a thing that has been definitively described in an Injunction, which would strictly restrict it to what is enjoined therein; as there is in the case of such texts as — 'āśvinam graḥnāṭi' ('holds the cup dedicated to the Ashvins'), 'maitrāvaruṇam graḥnāṭi ('holds the cup dedicated to Mitra-Varuṇa'), and 'dāshaitānadhvayur-graḥnāṭi' ('the Adhvaryu holds these then') [where the exact character of the cups has been prescribed by the texts laying down the dedication], and the cups taken up are of the precise number mentioned in the texts; consequently, their number being known, they become connected with the injunction of the washing, in sequential accordance with that number. Now in this case, there being no other sentence, and the sentence in question itself being the originative injunction, there are no grounds for rejecting the directly expressed number; so that any rejection of what is expressed by the self-sufficient denotive power of words could proceed only from the mind of man. Similarly in the case of the text 'pashuṇā yajēta' ('one should sacrifice with an animal'), the Injunction pertains to the sacrifice, which is of the nature of something to be accomplished; so that when we proceed to seek for the means by which it could be accomplished, all that is mentioned in the injunctive text, qualification and all, comes to be regarded as the object of the Injunction; specially because the function of the Injunction cannot be regarded as having been fully fulfilled only by the laying down of what is signified by the root 'yajē', 'to sacrifice'; why, then, should not the words be taken in the sense that is indicated by their own denotation as helped by the denotation of other words connected with them?

Persons versed in the science of 'Pramāṇas' however regard the text as a self-sufficient Injunction; and in this they only repeat what has been said by other people. What we have said is easily understandable; and it does not demand any very keen acumen to grasp it. It is the very essence of things. The
science is useful only so far as the Injunction is concerned; anything more than that is a mere show of learning, a purely exaggerated description. Such description is of use only in a case where the Injunction does not supply all the information needed; as for instance, in the case of the injunction regarding the "laying of pebbles", there being several articles such as butter, oil, salt and the like, that are helpful towards wetting,—it being doubtful as to which of these is to be used in the wetting of the pebbles, it is the description (of Butter as 'longevity itself') which leads to the conclusion that Butter should be used. Or again, in the case of the 'Ratri-sattra', the performance of sacrificial rites during the night being unheard of anywhere else, the subsequent description of the 'men obtaining honour' helps to indicate the propriety of such performance by one who is desirous of acquiring honour or fame. In the case in question however the sentence (which in Adh. 11, verses 92 etc. prohibits wine for the Brähmana) is complete in all respects, at the mention of 'Brähmanas'; so that all needs having been fulfilled, the only purpose served by the description is 'commendation.' It might be argued that what is said under 11-96 is treated on the same footing as the assertion that 'the sinful man comes by accomplished happiness',—so that the prohibition of wine-drinking comes to have a footing, though a partial one, as referring to the male only. But there would be no force in this; because females also are entitled to partake of the butter and other substances, which have been left after the offerings to the Gods have been made; and they are permitted to recite Vedic texts also at the Darsha-pūrṇamāsa and other sacrifices; such texts, for instance, as 'vidēyakarmāsi, &c., &c.' Even such Injunctions as 'one should make the performer of Shrāddhas drink wine' indicate that wine is permitted for women.

Nor is any such distinction (between male and female) made in the case of 'Brähmana-killing.' So that upon the question here raised, the final conclusion is that the prohibition of wine-drinking pertains to the whole caste—'(89).
VERSE (90).

The Student, caring his own dead Teacher, or Tutor, or Father, or Mother, or Monitor,—does not suffer in his observances.—(90).

Bhāṣya.

Some people think that the term 'his own' qualifies the 'Teacher' only; and it serves to exclude the Teacher's Teacher, would be thought of as deserving the same treatment, according to what has been said above under 2.205.

Others again explain 'his own' as standing for one's relations.

But in this latter case, it would seem unnecessary to mention the 'father' and the 'mother.' But it may be explained as emphasising the obligatory character of the rule as regards these particular relations.

'Monitor', 'Guru',—is one who has been described in 2.149.
There is no harm done to his observances by carrying the dead body of these persons; and what the text means by this specification is that there is interference in the observances by the carrying of the dead bodies of persons other than these—(90).

VERSE (91).

One should carry the dead Shūdra by the southern gate of the city; but the twice-born persons by the western, northern and eastern gates respectively—(91).

Bhāṣya.

The term 'City' stands for the village &c. also.

This rule applies to those places where there are several gates; the advice pertaining to such persons as may be capable of following it.

The Shūdra has been mentioned first, because it is an inauspicious subject. And this reversal of the order indicates that the term 'respectively' indicates that the Vaishya should be
carried by the western, the *Kṣattriya* by the northern and the *Brāhmaṇa* by the Eastern gate.—(91).

**VERSE (92).**

The taint of uncleanliness does not attach to Kings, or to those keeping a vow, or to the performers of sacrificial sessions; because they occupy the position of sovereigns and are ever of the nature of Brahman. — (92).

*Bhāṣya.*

Though the term ‘rājan’, ‘king’, is denotative of the *Kṣattriya-caste*, yet, on account of the reason being stated in the words that ‘they occupy the position of sovereigns’, it follows that it indicates the ruler of countries. This we shall explain fully under the next verse.

‘Those who are keeping a vow;’—i.e., those who are observing a vow, and undergoing such penances as those of the ‘Chāndrāyaṇa’ and the like.

*Performers of sacrificial sessions;*—i.e. those who are performing the ‘Gavāmayana’ sacrifice, or those who have been initiated for the other sacrifices also. Says Gautama (14:1)—‘For sacrificial priests, for one who has been initiated and for the Student.’

In support of this we have the laudatory statement (in the second line). ‘Position of Sovereigns;’—i.e., the kings—‘occupy,’—maintain,—the ‘position’—place—‘of sovereigns’—of rulers of men; and the other two—the keepers of vows and performers of sacrificial sessions—have attained the character of Brahman.

‘Taint of uncleanliness;’—i.e. impurity.

‘Others have explained the term ‘Sattrināḥ’ to mean persons who are constantly making gifts. But in its primary denotation, the term refers to a particular form of sacrifice.—(92).
VERSE XCVI.—OTHER FORMS OF IMPURITY

VERSE (93).

IMMEDIATE PURIFICATION HAS BEEN ORDAINED FOR THE KING ON THE MAJESTIC THRONE; AND THE REASON FOR THIS LIES IN HIS OCCUPYING THAT POSITION FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE PEOPLE.—(93).

Bhasya.

"Majestic"—i.e. that seat whose character is grand, glorious; this 'majesty' consists in the fact that it is seated upon this throne that the man is enable to carry on the work of protecting the people; and herein lies his sovereignty over men. This is what is meant by the clause—'and the reason for this lies in his occupying that position'; and what this means is that mere caste does not entitle the man to the consideration that the rule implies; what entitles him to it is his work of protecting the people. The term 'āsana', 'position,' also does not mean here a seat or a couch; it stands for the duties incumbent upon one who takes his seat upon it. It is for this reason that the older writers have explained the present rule to mean that there is no impurity in the case of any person who is capable of protecting the people, even if he be a non-Kṣattriya by caste.

"For the purpose of protecting the people."—The meaning of this is that all the observances relating to impurity are not to cease, but only those that would be incompatible with the proper fulfilment of his duty of protecting the people; for example, the giving of food-grains out of his granary during times of scarcity, and so forth, the performance of rites for the allaying of celestial, atmospheric and terrestrial portents. Further, it becomes incumbent upon the king to attend to such business as may be brought up suddenly by gentlemen; or, when it becomes necessary for him to speak out for the purpose of settling disputes and religious doubts that may arise among twice-born persons in the higher stages of life.—(93).
VERSE (94.)

Also in the case of those killed in a riot or battle or by lightning or by the king; and of those who have died for the sake of cows and Brahmans; as also for the person for whom the king desires it.—(94).

Bhashya.

‘Dīmba’, ‘Riot’, is fighting done by many people, without weapons; ‘Āhava’ is battle.

In the case of persons killed in these, there is immediate purification.

‘Lightning’—This has been already explained.

‘Pārthiva’—the lord of the Earth, who may belong to any of the four castes.

Also in the case of one who, even apart from battle, has been killed in water, or by tusked animals,—for the sake of cows and Brahmans.

‘Also for the person for whom the King desires it’;—i.e. the person who has been deputed by him to do a definite work.

Question:—“Why should this be so? In the case of the king himself, immediate purification has been ordained only in reference to his work of protecting the people; how then could the impurity of any and every person, without any restriction, cease merely by the king’s desire?”

[The answer to this is supplied by the next two verses].—(94).

VERSE (95).

The King holds in himself the body of the eight guardian deities of the world, of the Moon, the Fire, the Sun, the Wind, Indra, the Lord of Wealth, the Lord of Water, and of Yama.—(95).

Bhashya.

‘Body’ here stands for a portion of their effulgence.
VERSE XCVI:—OTHER FORMS OF IMPURITY

‘Lord of Wealth’—Vaishravana, Kubëra.
‘Lord of Water’—Varuna.

To the same end we have also a second laudatory declaration in the next verse.—(95).

VERSE (96).

THE KING IS POSSESSED BY THE LORDS OF THE WORLD; NO IMPURITY, THEREFORE, HAS BEEN ORDAINED FOR HIM; FOR THE IMPURITY AND IMPURITY AFFECT MORTALS AND HAVE THEIR ORIGIN AND END IN THE WORLDLY REGIONS.—(96).

Bhàṣya.

The king is possessed by the said Lords of the World; for him there is no purity or impurity; because the effect of these is only upon mortals; and their origin and end proceed from the world; hence they affect mortals, and not the Lords of the World.—(96).

VERSE (97).

FOR ONE WHO IS KILLED IN BATTLE WITH BRANDISHED WEAPONS, IN THE MANNER BEFitting THE Kṣattriya, SACRIFICIAL PERFORMANCES BECOME INSTANTLY COMPLETED; AND SO ALSO IS THE IMPURITY; SUCH IS THE ESTABLISHED LAW.—(97).

Bhàṣya.

‘Shastra’, ‘weapon’, is that by which people are slain, killed; hence by the present rule, also for the man who is killed by pieces of stone or a club or such other things, sacrificial performances become completed.

‘Ahava’, ‘Battle’, is so called because in this men are challenged (āhāyantē) to fight, through mutual rivalry.

‘Manner befitting the Kṣattriya;—i.e. never turning his back,—fighting in the defence of his people, or under orders from his master.
Sacrificial performances'—such as the Jyotistoma and the rest;—'become instantly completed'—finished. That is, the man becomes endowed with the merit proceeding from the due performance of the sacrifices.

Impurity also in their case is the same; i.e. it ceases immediately.

Some people construe the term 'sadyah', 'instantly', with the word 'killed'; and according to this what is said here would apply to the case of only that man who actually dies on this battle-field, and not to one who is moved away from there and dies on some other day.

This point however is open to question.—(97).
SECTION. (10)

Means of Purification.

VERSE (98).

The Brāhmaṇa becomes purified by touching water; the Kṣattriya by touching his conveyance and weapons; the Vaishya by touching either the goad or the leading-strings; and the Shūdra by touching the stick,—after he has performed the rite—(98).

Bhāṣya.

After the completion of the prescribed period of impurity—of ten days, &c.—there is something more that has got to be done. 'Touching Water' stands for bathing, as we have already explained before.

'After he has performed the rite.'—This goes with the Kṣattriya and the other two that follow; and the 'rite' meant is only bathing, no other being found to have been prescribed. The meaning thus is that, 'having bathed, they should touch the conveyance and other things.'

Others however explain the term 'rite' as standing for the Shrāddha ceremonies; the meaning being that all become pure after having performed the Shrāddha-ceremonies, but the Brāhmaṇa after he has 'touched water', and the Kṣattriya and the rest after touching the conveyance and other things.—(98).
SECTION. (11)

Impurity in the case of persons beyond the pale of Sapinda relationship.

VERSE (99).

O Best of Brahmanas, thus has been described to you the purification necessary in the case of 'Sapinda-relations.'—(99).

Bhāṣya.

The two halves of this verse are meant to serve respectively the purpose of recapitulating what has gone before and introducing what is to come.—(99).

VERSE (100).

A Brahmana, having carried, like a relation, a dead Brahmana who is not his 'Sapinda' relation,—or the near relatives of his mother,—becomes pure in three days.—(100).

Bhāṣya.

'Like a relative',—i.e., from a religious motive, and not on payment of wages.

'Near relatives of his mother':—the term 'near' is meant to include such close relations as the maternal uncle and the like. From this it appears that the term 'non-sapiṇḍa' here stands for those who are not 'samānodaka',—and not only for all except sapiṇḍa-relations.—(100).

VERSE (101).

But if he eats their food, he becomes pure in ten days; if however he does not eat their food, he is purified in one day, if he does not dwell in that house.—(101).

Bhāṣya.

If he does not eat food, but dwells in the house, then the impurity lasts for three days, as already laid down before. But if
he does not eat food, nor dwells in the house, then it lasts for one day only; while if he eats the food, as well as lives in the house, then it lasts for ten days.—(101).

VERSE (102).

HAVING VOLUNTARILY FOLLOWED A DEAD PERSON, WHETHER HE BE A RELATION OR NOT, HE BECOMES PURE BY BATHING WITH HIS CLOTHES ON, TOUCHING FIRE AND EATING CLARIFIED BUTTER.—(102).

Bhasya.

'Following'—going after, intentionally. If he happen to follow it by chance, then he need not bathe with clothes on.

Bathing, Touching of fire and Eating of clarified butter,—all these collectively are the means of purification.—(102).

VERSE (103).

ONE SHOULD NOT HAVE A DEAD BRÄHMAṆA CARRIED BY A SHÜDRA, WHILE HIS OWN PEOPLE ARE THERE. FOR IT WOULD BE AN OBLATION INTO FIRE, DEFILED BY THE TOUCH OF THE SHÜDRA, AND AS SUCH NOT CONducIVE TO HEAVEN.—(103).

Bhasya.

'Have carried'—have taken out.

'While his own people are there'—i.e., men of the same caste.

The use of the term 'oblation into fire' implies that the body should not also be burnt by the Shuddra.

The specification of the 'Brähmana' is not emphasised; for the Kṣattriya and the Vaishya also the Shuddra's touch is defiling; hence what the supplementary statement indicates is that the prohibition applies to the case of these two also.—(103).
SECTION: (12).

Means of Purification for Corporeal Beings.

VERSE (104).

Wisdom, austerity, fire, food, clay, mind, water, smearing, wind, action, the sun and time are means of purification for corporeal beings.—(104).

ḥāṣya.

‘Wisdom’ and the rest are mentioned only by way of illustrating the purification by lapse of time; the sense being—‘just as these are the means of purification within their own spheres, so is Time also, and the efficacy of this latter should not be doubted.’

Of the several things mentioned here, what is efficacious under what circumstances shall be explained in the present context itself; and the efficacy of other things shall be described in particular places.

‘Wisdom’—spiritual knowledge; such as is taught by the Sāṅkhya-Yoga. This serves to set aside Ignorance, and removes attachment and other impediments, whereupon wisdom becomes free from all defects. This is what is going to be described under 108, where it is said—‘Intelect becomes purified by wisdom.’

‘Austerity’;—the Ḍṛṣṭhikṣa, the Chāndrāyaṇa and the rest. This serves to remove the taint of major and minor sins.

‘Fire’—is the means of purification of earthen-ware vessels and such other things as have been mentioned as being ‘purified by re-baking’ (121).

‘Food’;—i.e., the eating of such pure things as milk and roots. This also serves to purify in the same manner as Austerity.
The fact of 'clay' and 'water' being the means of purification is well-known. That of the 'mind' is going to be described under 108.

'Smearing'—i.e. cleaning and whitewashing with such things as cowdung, lime and the like.

'Wind'—purifies pieces of grass and wood lying on the roads, which happen to be touched by the chāndāla and such others.

'Actions';—e.g., the saying of Twilight Prayers and such other rites. It has been declared under 2-102 that 'one should stand saying the morning prayers, thus he removes the sin committed during the night';—what this means we have explained under Discourse II.

Though 'Austerity' also is an 'action', it has been mentioned separately for the purpose of emphasising its importance. In fact, in the scriptures 'Austerity' is generally mentioned separately; e.g., in Yājñavalkya, Achāru 221—'Karmaniṣṭhāstapaniṣṭhāḥ'—(104)

VERSE (105)

AMONG ALL MODES OF PURIFICATION, PURITY IN REGARD TO WEALTH HAS BEEN ORDAINED TO BE THE MOST IMPORTANT; FOR HE WHO IS PURE IN REGARD TO WEALTH IS REALLY PURE, AND HE IS NOT PURE WHO IS MERELY PURIFIED BY CLAY AND WATER.—(105).

Bhāṣya.

"What is the connection of this in the present context?"

What is meant is that—'just as one who, after having paid the calls of nature, immediately betakes himself by clay and water,—so whenever through carelessness and mistake, one happens to steal what belongs to others, or to do any such act,—he should immediately betake to the necessary expiatory rites, for the purpose of purifying himself'—as is going to be explained under Discourse 11.—(105).
VERSE (106).

LEARNED MEN BECOME PURE BY TOLERANCE; BY LIBERALITY THOSE WHO HAVE DONE WHAT SHOULD NOT BE DONE; SECRET SINNERS BY THE REPEATING OF SACRED TEXTS; AND BY AUSTERITY THOSE WHO ARE WELL-VERSED IN THE VEDA.—(106).

Bhāṣya.

Those who are learned are purified by tolerance; they are never affected by hatred, jealousy or ill-will; hence even when sin is rampant, they remain ever pure. ‘Tolerance’ is the property of the Mind which consists in having the same consideration for all.

Of ‘liberality’ also the efficacy in removing the sin of doing what sought not to be done has been described under 11.139, where it is declared that ‘murder is wiped off by charity’.

In the section dealing with ‘secret sins’ also it has been declared that for the expiation of secret sins, one should repeat the sacred texts.

For persons well-versed in the Veda, ‘austerity’; which, in their case, consists in repeating the Vedic texts and also cultivating knowledge; as it has been declared that—‘for the Brāhmaṇa, learning is the real austerity’ (11.235). As regards the ‘krchchhra’ and other penances, they are means of purification for all men, not only for those versed in the Veda.—(106).

VERSE (107).

WHAT NEEDS PURIFICATION IS PURIFIED BY CLAY AND WATER; THE RIVER IS PURIFIED BY ITS CURRENT; THE WOMAN OF UNCLEAN MIND BY MENSTRUATION; AND BRĀHMAṆAS BY RENUNCIATION.—(107).

Bhāṣya.

When the banks of a river with water shallowed down becomes defiled by unclean things, its water becomes purified by the current of the same river, when it has regained its current strong
enough to demolish its sides. The banks of rivers are not purified in the manner in which other ground is purified “by means of five things” (Verse 123).

Or, it may be that the text has declared that ‘the river is purified by its current’ in view of the idea that people may have in regard to the river having become defiled on account of unclean things flowing along its current; and the meaning is that it should not be thought that, inasmuch as the river has become contaminated by the flowing along of unclean things coming from all sides, it can never become pure.

The woman who has not been found to have had carnal intercourse with any man, but continues to think of the beauty and good qualities of other men, is regarded as ‘of unclean mind’, and such a woman becomes purified by ‘menstruation’; i.e., by the flow of blood during her courses.

‘Renunciation’ shall be described in Discourse VI, and by this are Brāhmaṇas purified. And no mere mental process removes the sin that they, in their ignorance, may have committed in the shape of having entertained thoughts for the killing of small insects and so forth.—(107).

VERSE (108).

THE LIMBS ARE PURIFIED BY WATER; THE MIND IS PURIFIED BY TRUTHFULNESS; THE SOUL PROPER BY LEARNING AND AUSTERITY; AND COGNITION IS PURIFIED BY KNOWLEDGE.—(108).

Bhasya.

The ‘personality’ entitled to the performance of acts consists of the following factors—(1) The person himself, i.e., the Inner Soul, (2) the Internal Organ, i.e., the mind, (3) the Intellect and (4) the Body, the receptacle of experiences. The Sense-Organs being material, do not constitute a separate factor. Of these factors some are purified by one thing, and some by other; the statement that ‘Time purifies everything’ being purely valedictory.
'Limbs,' standing for the parts, indicate the whole, the body; the sense being that 'by water'—i.e., by bathing—'the body becomes purified.'

The 'mind'—described (in Discourse I) as consisting of 'the existent and the non-existent'—becomes contaminated by evil intentions; and it becomes pure by 'truthfulness'—i.e., by good intentions. In a previous verse (104) the mind has been spoken of as a 'means of purification'; but that has to be taken in an indirect sense; and the present text can not mean that 'words' (truthful) are the means of purifying the mind; and the Shruti also speaks of 'the word being prompted by the Mind, whence the word uttered by one who is absent-minded becomes fit for demons and not for the gods.'

'Learning'—produced by the proper study of the Sāṅkhya and the Vedānta;—and 'austerity'—in the form of the Kṛchchhāra and the rest;—when endowed by these the 'soul proper' becomes purified. The term—'bhūta' (in the compound 'bhūt-ātma') means proper, real; i.e., that which is really the soul, the object of the notion of the 'ego' as free from the notion of 'I', and not the material entity consisting of the body.

'Buddhi' is 'cognition'—which is regarded as contaminated when it appears in the form of a thing that is non-existent, or when it does not take any account of the distinction between the real form of the thing cognised and the apparent form in which it is cognised when, during dreams and such conditions, it is obsessed by wrong notions of things;—or 'Buddhi' may stand for that faculty of the personality which is the product of the unexpiated portions of his past misdeeds, and which may, by virtue of each single sin committed in the past, reset that personality in the form of Ignorance, appearing in the shape of the notion of diversity, or in the shape of the non-discrimination between the Soul and the material attributes, which operates in the form of attachment to children, wealth and such things, and becomes the source of extreme longings.—This 'Buddhi' becomes pure by 'knowledge'—i.e., proper understanding of the means of cognition as
indicating the self-luminous character of all cognitions. Cognition is distinct from the Object cognised, by reason of the latter having a shape, and it being impossible for the former to become modified into that shape; and hence it becomes purified by the conviction that it is, by its very nature, unmodifiable.

The term 'learning' in the previous clause stands for the knowledge of what is taught by the Veda; and its capacity for purification is of the same kind as described under 11.246—'as the fire, in one moment, etc.'

Being purified in the above manner, the person reaches the regions of Brahman. Such is the four-fold purification. And what is intended to be expressed is eulogy of such purification as leading to the fulfilment of the highest ends of man in the matter of his births and other circumstances.—(108).
SECTION—13.

Purification of Substances.

VERSE (109).

Thus has been explained to you the rule regarding bodily purification; listen now to the rule regarding the purification of various substances.—(109.)

'Bhāṣya.

'Of various things';—i.e., of substances that are used by man, in the form of products that are igneous, earthy, liquid, solid, isolated, compact.

This verse points out the difference of what is going to be described from the purification described above. In the foregoing Section the most important purification was shown to be that of the Soul, that of substances deserving attention only because of their being used by the personality; while in the present section the reverse is the case.

'Listen to the rule'. This verse is meant to avoid the two sections being confounded.—(109).

VERSE (110)

Of igneous substances, of gems and of everything made of stone,—the purification has been ordained to be accomplished by means of ash, by water and by clay.—(110)

'Bhāṣya.

The name 'Igneous substances' is applied to all those substances that melt at the contact of fire; e.g., silver, gold, copper, iron, lead, zinc and so forth.

'Gems'—things of the nature of the rock-crystal.

'Ashma' is stone; and what is made of it is called 'ashmamaya'.

'Sarvasya,' 'of everything.'—This has been added for filling up the metre; the justification for it being found in there being two kinds of stone—that quarried from mountains and that obtained from river-beds.

'By ash';—since both ash and clay serve the same purpose, they are to be regarded as optional alternatives; while 'water' is meant to be used along with each of these two.

“What is the use of these?”

The removing of stains and smells. It has been declared that—'the purification of the unclean thing consists in the removal of its stains and smell';—and again 'so long as from the object besmeared with an unclean substance, the odour and stain do not pass off &c. &c.'

Both ash and clay are, by their very nature, non-greasy; hence purification is brought about by these in the case of oily effects.

The 'purification' of the 'impure' thing consists in making it fit for use by removing its defects.

"If this is so, then it should be necessary to describe in detail the impurity attaching to things—in some such form as 'such and such a substance becomes impure when in contact with such and such a substance'.—'But these are worldly things; and all this would be known from ordinary usage.'—Not so; because from ordinary usage, the thing is known only in a vague general form. Further' in ordinary usage what is called 'impure' is only what has become disgusting by being contaminated by urine, ordure and blood; while what is meant by 'impure' in the present context is that which is unfit for touching &c.; and it is only from the scriptures that it could be learnt whence this unfitness arises. Then again; a man is called pure when he does not fall into a mistake in regard to what belongs to others. From all this it is clear that no useful purpose can be served from what is thus known, from ordinary usage, regarding the signification of the term in question. Though it is generally known that what has been contaminated is impure, yet it cannot be known by what particular thing a certain thing becomes contaminated.—'But
how can the exact signification of a term be ascertained from scriptures, when, as a matter of fact, what the scriptures provide is the knowledge of what should be done, and not the meaning of a certain word, which latter is what is done by the work of Pāṇini; that this is so follows from the fact that the Smṛtis of Manu and others are based upon the Veda (which deals only with the Duties of Man).—Our answer to this is as follows:—In the case in question, we do infer an injunction in the form—'one should not make use of a substance that has become contaminated by such and such a substance'; and there would be nothing incongruous in the notion that the substance by whose contact the thing becomes unfit for use is the cause of contamination. Similarly as regards purification also, we can recognise its basis in some such injunction as—'when a thing has become contaminated, it may be used after it has gone through the prescribed process of washing &c.'; and yet such an injunction would not mean that 'purification should be done'. For if it did this, then, he who would not do it would incur sin. What happens is that in the case of ordinary secular acts, it being possible for the man in need to make use of any kind of vessels, pure or otherwise,—the Scripture lays down the restriction that 'if need arises, one should make use of such vessels, and not of others'.—'If it is to be treated as a restriction, then it would be incumbent upon only one who seeks prosperity; and every other man would be free to do as he chose; just as in connection with the question of the correct forms of words, though the correct and incorrect forms are both equally expressive, yet there is the restriction which indicates that the use of the correct form brings merit, while that of the incorrect form is sinful [and this means that only people seeking merit need use the correct form].'—This would be true only if there were no text prohibiting the use of unclean vessels. But when there is such a prohibition, how could anyone make use of the vessel that has not been purified? As for the rules regarding purification, these only represent exceptions (to the prohibition of unclean vessels, the meaning being that if the unclean vessel has been purified, it may be used). How then could there be any
prosperity arising from what is a mere exception? Since all that it means is that if one acts according to the exception, he does not incur the sin of transgressing the prohibition.

"Or again, the Śrauta may be taken as dealing with the explanation of the meanings of words,—resembling the Śrauta that deals with the correct and incorrect forms of words. As for the notion that 'the works of Manu and others have their basis in such Vedic texts as deal with the subject of what ought to be done', we ask—who has said that this is so? As a matter of fact, our presumption of the basis for the assertions of Manu and others depends upon the merit of each individual case. For instance, in the case of the Āṣṭāṅga, which is of the nature of a rite, we presume its basis in the form of a Vedic text enjoining what ought to be done; but in a case where the assertion deals with things as they really exist, the corresponding basic text also must be of the same kind, dealing with an accomplished entity. As regards the subject of the exact meanings of words, the idea regarding the priority of a particular denotation may always be derived from usage; as in this matter there is no question of anything to be done. In the case in question however (where there is a question of something to be done), it is not possible to derive any knowledge from mere usage. Specially because purification being something that can be brought about only by means of Vedic texts, how could it ever be made dependent upon usage? If it were, then all injunctions on the subject would be absolutely futile.—but we have such injunctions as that of Pāṇini, to the effect that one should make use of correct, and not incorrect, forms of words' (where also there is no act to be done, nothing to be brought into existence).—This is not Pāṇini's injunction at all; all that his rule says is 'this is correct, not that'; though it is true there is a rule like what has been quoted in the works of the authors of the Dharmasūtras all this may be learnt in detail from the Abhidhānāsūrasa.—In this Śrauta itself we find such injunctions as that—(1) claimants to property shall divide it in such and such a manner, or that (2) the eldest brother shall take four shares (9.153), or that (3) the eldest brother shall take &c.
The proper denotation of the injunction has been declared to extend to directing and other factors also. In fact the denotations of the words are in the form of injunctions and direction, and other factors are only supplementary to the injunctions; for in all these cases the notion derived from the words is in the form of urging to activity (towards a certain end).—But what sort of urging could there be in the case (1) of causes and effects, or (2) of the pronouncing of blessings, or (3) of opportunity (all which are sometimes expressed by the injunctive affix)? Nor could the taking (of the four shares, mentioned in the texts just quoted) form the object of an injunction; since it is what is liable to be done by reason of the eldest brother being desirous of taking all he can.—But the desire of the eldest brother would lead him to take his own as well as the other brothers' shares, and hence the said injunction serves to restrict what should be taken by each.—As a matter of fact however, there being no possibility perceptible of any one demanding more than his prescribed share, there is no room for any restrictive injunction.—Well, on account of the prohibition, the text may be taken as a preclusive injunction.—This would be all right; but in that case, if at the time of division itself, any of the brothers were to take something in excess of his prescribed share, with the acquiescence of his brothers, he would be incurring sin, even though the permission of the brothers would be there. Nor could the text be taken as indicating the man's ownership over a certain share of the thing concerned; because the coming into existence of ownership has been already mentioned in the injunction of receiving one's share; and what the prohibition does is to point out that over everything else, apart from the prescribed share, the man has no rights of ownership. But even so, if one were to transgress this prohibition and take possession of an excessive share, his ownership would certainly come into existence. It is for these same reasons that ownership has been held to be produced even by stealing and such acts. And for the time, apart from possession, no such idea is entertained as that this man has no ownership over the thing.
"Thus then, it being found that the text in question cannot be taken either as an Injunction, or a Restriction, or a Preclusion, all that the dividing means is the apportionment of the shares — so much is the share of this person and so much of that. Consequently the injunctive in 'vibhaj'ran', 'should divide', must indicate opportunity; and that the term 'should take' only refers to what actually happens in ordinary worldly practice; just as in the injunction 'the hungry man should eat', or 'for the sake of the acquisition and safe-guarding of his property one shall seek the help of the king.' Gautama has distinctly enumerated (in 10:39) the sources of ownership as—'Inheritance, purchase, &c., &c.'

"Thus then, since we have such direct Smṛti-injunctions as those of the Aṣṭākā and the like (which are something to be done and hence fit subjects for injunction), what is said in them regarding Impurity and Purity can only be taken as laying down something that is entirely of a sanctificatory character; and since this also has its basis in a (Vedic) Injunction, it may be regarded as prescribed by that injunction itself. So that it is only from the scriptures that it can be determined what is impurity and what is purity. For this reason it is necessary that the nature of impurity also should be fully explained."

Our answer to the above is as follows:—This has been explained under 135 below, where 'fat, semen, &c.,' of men have been mentioned as constituting 'impurities'; and the specifying of 'men' is only illustrative, as is clear from other Smṛti-texts, of all such animals as the dog, the cat, the ass, the camel, the monkey, the crow, the village-hog, the village-cock, the rat, the jackal and other carnivorous animals and birds, also nailed animals and the mongoose; and 'fat' and the other things include also the flesh and the hair.

What is meant by the declaration of 'purification' (in the present verse) is that whenever the substances mentioned become contaminated by urine and such things they have to be sanctified in the manner cited down; and this need not be done when they are to be used in their natural condition. Because gold and other
things are not *impure* by their nature,—when alone they could need purification whenever they would be used.

Or, the verse may be taken as laying down the purification in connection with a visible act, but with a view to an invisible (trancedental) result: just like the laying down of the rule that 'one should eat facing the East.'

In this latter case however, the mention of 'purification' would be incongruous.

As for the ordinary clearing and washing of vessels before eating: those are done on account of usage, and not by virtue of the Smṛti-rule regarding purification (which pertains to only such articles as have become defiled by the touch of the unclean thing).

As regards the other things that are 'untouchable' by man—such, for instance, as the *Chāndāla* and the like—or garlic, onion, wine, mfeat and so forth,—these also are sources of defilement of substances.

What particular form of purification shall be used in the case of the contamination by what unclean thing,—for this it is necessary to look out for usage and other Smṛti-texts. Details on this point have been supplied by Hārīta, Apastamba, Parāśara and other sages; but all these passages we have not quoted here, for fear of having to write too much, in the manner of the philosophical writer Chandragomin.—(110).

**VERSE (111).**

_A golden vessel, free from stains, becomes pure by water alone; so also what is produced in water, what is made of stone and what is made of silver, if it is not encheased (or very much defiled)._—(111).

*Bhāṣya.*

This rule applies to two particular metals, gold and silver, when they are free from stains; as for other metals, copper and the rest, their cleansing is to be done with washing with powdered
bricks and such things, just as in the case of their being defiled by leavings of food. There is no stain in a vessel in which milk or water has been drunk. As regards the case where parts of the vessel become stained by the leavings of meat, butter, milk and such things, the author is going to lay down distinct means of cleansing—‘By that from which they sprang &c.’ (113). Then again, since the text has spoken of the removal of ‘smells and stains’, we should make use of such cleansing substances as may be capable of removing a particular stain; and it is not necessary to make use of ash and water in all cases. Harita mentions several such cleansing substances, as ‘powdered wheat, rice, peas, barley, kidney-bean and lentil’; and he proceeds to say—‘even when gold and silver vessels are not stained, if they have been touched by a Chandala, or by a menstruating woman, they should be cleaned with ash twenty-one times.’

Shankha however has declared thus—‘Of metal vessels defiled by a dead body or blood or semen or urine or ordure, there should be either alteration or scrubbing or washing twenty-one times with ash’. There should be ‘alteration’ in the case of vessels long immersed in urine &c.; ‘alteration’ means the destruction of the original name and form and the bringing about of another shape and name;—‘scrubbing’ means scratching with a sharp weapon or with stone.

Another Smrti-text has prescribed ‘(1) melting, (2) heating and (3) hammering.’—When the vessel has been put into the melting-pot by the goldsmith, it becomes pure;—‘burning’, i.e., being put into fire by goldsmiths;—‘hammering’, i.e., heating and then placing on the anvil and hammering, in the melting-pot;—it being declared that ‘all mines are pure.’

‘What is produced out of water’—the conch-shell, the rock-crystal and the like. For the stained conch-shell there is purification by the paste of white mustard, or by cow’s-urine and water, or by milk. We read in another ‘Smrti’—‘The conch-shell is purified by water; if it is defiled and oily, then by milk and water, and by the paste of white mustard.’
'Anupaskram' 'enchased', i.e., the chasings in which are not filled (with unclean things), not very much defiled. This goes with every one of the things mentioned; hence in the case of every one of these being defiled with the touch of dry unclean things or of the chaṇḍāla and the like,—even though there be no stain,—the purification is to be as described before, in accordance with other Smṛti-texts.—(111).

VERSE (112.)

Gold and silver sprang out of the union of water and fire;
for these reasons the purification of these two is best done by means of their source.—(112.)

Bhāṣya.

This is a purely commendatory description.

In the series of commendatory passages beginning with the words 'agnirvaī varuṇam' and ending with 'abhyākāmyata', the origin of gold and silver has been described; the meaning of which is that—'Agni approached Varuṇa, i.e., water, in the manner of a male approaching a female, and had sexual intercourse with it, and out of this sprang gold and silver.'

For this reason the purification of these is done by means of their 'source'; i.e., by fire when there is much defilement, and also by water.

Another reading is 'ṣaṃṣṣayati'; in which case the meaning is 'by that which has the same source as themselves', i.e., by ash. And in accordance with this view cleansing by means of clay is also sometimes permitted.

The 'purification is best done'.—(112).

VERSE (113).

Of copper, iron, brass, pewter and tin, the purification should be done, according to suitability, by means of alkaline substances, of liquid acids and of water.—(113).

Bhāṣya.

According to suitability'.—According to what may be suitable
to a particular thing; i.e., that substance should be used for cleaning which is best fitted to remove the dirt from the object to be cleaned. It is for this reason that in another Smṛti we find it stated that—'things made of tin and lead are to be cleansed by means of cow-dung and chaff.' Similarly—'Brass-articles smelt by the cow, or defiled by the food-leavings of the Shūdra, or defiled by dogs and cows become cleansed by means of alkaline substances.' It is with a view to this that we have the various varieties of alkalines, such as those prepared out of gruel, or of pomegranates and so forth.—(113).

VERSE (114).

For all liquids, purification has been declared to consist in throwing out a little; for solids, in sprinkling; and for wooden articles, in scraping.—(114).

Bhāṣya.

'Liquids.'—Substances that have the tendency to flow; e.g., clarified butter, oil, gruel and so forth; when small quantities of these,—not more than a seer—are defiled by the cow and other things,—their purification is done by means of 'utraṇa,'—i.e., the removal or throwing away, of a portion of the original contents. In another Smṛti-text it has been declared as follows:—'Utraṇa is done by means of two blades of Kusha, with the hymn—'paṇa-śusva-śau-maṇah, &c.' Others have explained 'utraṇa' to mean 'make to overflow'; the meaning being that another similar substance is to be poured into the defiled liquid till the vessel becomes filled to overflowing and a portion of the liquid flows out.

What is here prescribed is to be done in the case of direct contamination.

In the case of small quantities, the liquid has to be thrown away.

When, on the other hand, it is the vessel that is contaminated—and there is no direct defilement of the liquid itself—it should be removed into another vessel. In the case of liquids becoming
contaminated by the contact of food-leavings, it has been declared ‘clarified butter should be placed in water and Vedic mantras recited’; and it is clear that the things have to be poured into another vessel, which latter is to be placed in water; for if the oil itself were placed in water, it would not remain fit for use. Similarly in the case of clarified butter also.

The said ‘upavāna’ is meant for liquids. But when liquids come into contact with urine and other unclean things, to this extent that their own odour and colour cease to be perceptible,—they have to be thrown away.

As regards such liquids as have been boiled, Śaṅkha has prescribed re-boiling also.

This same purification pertains to even urine and other unclean liquids, when they are to be used by the Śūdra and others. But in this case ‘upavāna’ would mean only ‘overflowing’. As Vasiṣṭha has said—‘for things on the ground it is like water’.

‘Solids’—hard substances; such as cooled clarified butter, curds, sugar-candy, cakes and the like. In the case of these, if the portion that is defiled is thrown away, the remainder becomes purified. Śaṅkha has declared—‘In the case of dry substances, by the removal of contamination’.

Or, the term ‘samhataḥ’ may stand for things composed of several components; such as, couch, seat, bed and the like, which are composites, composed of homogeneous as well as heterogeneous constituents.

But in all cases, purification is obtained by the removal of contamination.

In the case of contact with a dead body, or with unclean things that have dried up, that part which has come into direct contact with such things is to be washed and the rest of the thing is to be sprinkled with water.

In the case of wooden articles—i.e., things made of wood
only, such as a seat, a board and the like made of wood—if these are contaminated by the touch of a dead body, or a chaṅḍāla or Shūdra,—there should be scraping.

Others hold that scraping is to be done only when the thing touches Ordure; in which case, the stain and the smell have got to be removed by scraping, and the rest of the thing is to be washed and sponged with clay and water. On contamination by a dog and such things, there should be washing, as in the case of ordure.

In the case of the wooden bed and such things made up of wood and ropes &c. (and not of wood only), purification is secured as in the case of 'solids' or 'composites'.—114).

VERSES (115—116.)

During Sacrificial Performance there Should be Cleaning of the Sacrificial Vessels; the Purification of Spoons and Cups is accomplished by Washing;—(115)
The purification of the 'Charu', the 'Srūk' and the 'Srūva' is done by means of hot water; as also of the 'Śphya', the winnowing basket, the cart, the pestle and the mortar.—(116).

Bhāṣya.

These two verses are to be taken as citing examples in illustration of what has been laid down in the Shruti.

When the cups, the spoons and other sacrificial vessels have been used in one performance, they become smeared with clarified butter and other offering-materials employed at that performance; and with a view to avoid the contamination of the fresh performance by such stains and smearings, these have to be removed by means of hot water; and this cleansing has to be done in the manner prescribed for each case: sometimes by hand, sometimes by kusha-grass, sometimes by the threads at the end of one's garment, and so on.

The purification here mentioned is in connection with sacrificial performances; in the event of the vessels becoming defiled
with food-leavings etc., the cleaning is to be done in the same manner as in the case of ordinary vessels. In as much as we have the Vedic declaration—‘they do not become unclean by Soma’,—it is understood that in the case of other defilements, the ordinary purification is to be done.

The exact shapes of the ‘graha’ the ‘chhumasa’ and the ‘sphya’ are to be ascertained from persons versed in sacrificial lore.—(115–116).

VERSE (117).

OF GRAINS AND CLOTH, IN LARGE QUANTITIES, THERE IS SPRINKLING WITH WATER; AND IN SMALL QUANTITIES, THEIR PURIFICATION HAS BEEN ORDAINED TO BE SECURED BY MEANS OF WASHING WITH WATER.—(117).

Bhāṣya.

Grains are declared as to be regarded to be ‘in large quantities’ when they are more than one ‘drona’ in weight (about thirty-two seers). Others hold that they are to be regarded as ‘much’ in relation to particular men and to particular time and place; e.g., for one who is in a poor condition, even a ‘kudava’ (a quarter seer) may be ‘much’; similarly under certain conditions, grain is regarded as ‘much’, only when there is a large accumulation. Says Baudhāyana (Dharmasūtra 1.5.47)—‘One shall employ the method of purification after having duly considered the place, time, the man himself, the substance, the use to which it is going to be put, its origin and condition.’

Some people would apply the same rule to cloth also.

Though things have been declared to be ‘many’ when they are three and more, yet, since the text has used the plural number in the term ‘alpāndm’, ‘those in small quantities’, we take it that up to (and including three), they are to be regarded as of ‘small quantity’.

‘With water’ (in the second time)—This is purely illustrative; hence the cloth is to be washed with that liquid which may be able to remove the contamination that has defiled it. This has
been already explained before. The term ‘sprinkling’ has been used for the purpose of emphasising the use of water, the sense being that ‘the sprinkling is to be done with water only.’ It is on account of this difference that the term ‘with water’ has been used twice.

If even by washing the stain in the cloth does not go, then that much of it should be cut off, or the whole should be cut off,—as laid down by Gautama (1—33).—(117).

VERSE (118).

THE METHOD OF PURIFYING LEATHER AND TREE-BARKS IS SIMILAR TO THAT OF CLOTHES; AND FOR VEGETABLES, ROOTS AND FRUITS, THE PURIFICATION IS LIKE THAT OF GRAINS.—(118).

Bhāṣya.

‘Leather’, —i.e., goat-skins and such other skins as are touchable; and not the skin of the dog, the jackal or such animals as are by their nature unclean.

The same rule holds good regarding also things made of the said leather, in the shape of shoes, armour and the like.

In the present context, wherever the original constituent cause is mentioned, it includes the product also; and vice versa. So that the rule laid down in connection with ‘wooden articles’ is applicable to wood also. Vasishṭha, having described the purification of wooden articles, proceeds to speak of ‘wood, bone and earth’; and if the cause did not include its product, how could the author apply the purification (prescribed for wooden articles, and not for wood) to the wood? In fact the inclusion of the product by the cause is only right, since the notion of the latter does not certainly cease in regard to the former.

‘Vaidala’ stands for the bark of trees and other like things.

In another Smṛti-text this same purification in laid down for feathers, kusha, skins, chowries, grass, cane, hair, and tree-bark. Here ‘feather’ stands for the peacock’s feathers, and things made of them, such as umbrellas, hair ornaments and so forth;—the term ‘pavitra’ stands for kusha, and also for cloth made of
kusha;—the term ‘grass’ stands for palm-leaves; according to the assertion that the palm is known as the king among plants; and the part of the wood (i.e., ‘tyra’, which is part of ‘tynaraja’) denotes the whole, like the term ‘deva’ denoting the name ‘Devadatta’;—‘hairs’—i.e., of the cow, the horse and the goat, not of man; as the latter, when fallen from the body, are untouchable; for in the present context all the purification mentioned pertains to cases where a thing has been defiled by the touch of another substance, and not where the thing is unclean by its very nature; that this is so is indicated by the fact that exactly the same purification has been laid down for cloth and grain.

Vegetables have to be dealt with in the same manner as grains. That is just as sprinkling and washing are the means of purifying grains, while they are still in the form of grains, and have not undergone embellishment by means of thumping and the like acts,—so also are they for the purifying of vegetables also. Hence the present rule pertains to uncooked vegetables only. As for cooked vegetables, even though they are spoken of as ‘vegetables’, yet some other method of purification has to be found for them; as it has been said—‘by clean water and by the flame of fire’ and so forth. For vegetables taken out of large heaps, as also for gruel, cow’s milk and the rest, sprinkling and heating on fire have been specially laid down by Hārīta;—and similarly, for all grains in pods, scrubbing and pounding and so forth.

All this is for the purpose of removing all doubts in the event of their being touched by foot, as it has been said that ‘all things in large quantities are pure.’—(118).

VERSE (119).

Of silken and woolen stuffs, by means of saline earth; of blankets by soap-berrys; of ‘amshu-patta,’ by the bel-fruit; and of linen by white mustard.—(119).

‘Bhāṣya.

‘Usā’ is saline earth.
VERSE CXXI:—PURIFICATION OF SUBSTANCES.

The 'soap-berry' and other things mentioned are well-known. When the stuffs spoken of are stained by an oily substance, they have to be rubbed over with the powder of the things mentioned, and then washed.

'Silken-stuff,' 'kausheya,' is a particular kind of cloth; so also the 'amsha-patta'; the 'dvika,' is woolen stuff. In connection with this latter Hañita has declared that 'woolen articles are purified by the sun.' But this should be understood as pertaining to such stuffs as are constantly worn, and hence come into contact with the bodies of several persons; and not when they have become defiled by foreign contamination.

By reason of all these being 'cloth,' it might be thought that 'sprinkling and washing' would be the means of purifying them; and the present text prescribes the methods for moving the stains of oil, &c.

'Kshama,' 'Linen,' includes 'wet stuff also.' (119).

VERSE (120).

THE LEARNED MAN SHOULD PURIFY CONCH-SHELLS, HORN AND THINGS MADE OF BONE AND TUSK, LIKE LINEN; AND BY COW'S URINE OR WATER. (120).

Bhasya.

The 'bone,' 'horn' and 'tusk' meant are those of the touchable animals,—the cow, the sheep and the elephant,—and not of such animals as the dog, the ass and the like.

'Water' and 'cow's urine' are optional alternatives; while the use of 'white mustard' is to be combined with either of these.—(120).

VERSE (121).

GRASS AND WOOD AND STRAW BECOME PURE BY SPRINKLING; THE HOUSE BY SWEEPING AND SPRINKLING; AND AN EARTHEN POT BY RE-BAKING.—(121).

Bhasya.

'Palala,' 'straw,' is the name applied to corn-stalks used in the making of mats and such other things.
Grass', i.e., kusha, ordinary grass, and so forth.

"In connection with the mention of 'wooden articles '(114), it has been remarked that the mention of 'product implies the cause also; under the circumstances, why should 'wood' be mentioned in the present verse?"

It is mentioned for the purpose of emphasising the fact that sprinkling alone is what should be done. And it is in virtue of this that until the cause contamination is very serious, people do not have recourse to scraping the wood. In the event of its being touched by the Chāṇḍala and such unclean persons, the purification is brought about 'by means of the rays of the sun, of the moon and wind'; but in the case of things made of wood,—such as the ladle and the like,—if the contamination is slight, people desirous of using them in connection with food &c., should have recourse to sprinkling and scraping.

'Sweeping'—is the clearing of the house, which consists in removing of the stains of smoke and such things.

'Smearing'—i.e., rubbing the floor with cow-dung, lime or some such thing.

All this should be understood to be necessary in the case of the whole wall of the house becoming defiled by the touch of a dead body, a chāṇḍala, a menstruating woman and such persons; while in the case of only a portion of the wall being defiled, only that part should be smeared. But in the case of defilement by a dead body falling on the roof, walls should be scraped, rays of the sun should be made to enter the house, and the inside should be exposed to flames of fire; and in some cases re-building also has been laid down. All this comes under the term 'clearing'.

Of earthen articles, there should be 're-baking'. That is, when it has been touched by a man with unwashed mouth, it shall be heated on fire; actual rebaking is to be done only in the case of its being defiled by such unclean things as a wine-keg and the like. When however it is touched by the wine itself, it should be thrown away. This is what has been thus declared by Vasiṣṭha (3—59)—'An earthen article is not purified by re-
baking; if it has been touched by wine, urine, ordure, spittings, pus and blood.'—(121).

VERSE (122),

BY CLEANING AND SMEARING, BY SPRINKLING AND BY SCRAPING, AND BY THE LODGING OF COWS—BY THESE FIVE LAND BECOMES PURIFIED.—(122).

Bhāṣya.

Sprinkling—with cow’s urine or water; or by milk, as laid down in some books.

‘Scraping.’—Scratching with some weapon and then throwing away the scraped earth, according to Gautama’s direction that ‘of land there should be throwing away’ (1.32).

‘By these fire.’—This re-iteration is with a view to indicate that the methods may be used singly or collectively. ‘Smearing’, without ‘cleaning’, is a means of purifying a spot which is not supplied with a dust-bin. If the ground is stained with urine or ordure, there should be scraping and sweeping. In the case of river-banks and forests, there should be sprinkling with water.

‘Lodging of cows’—making the land a cow-pen for a single day.

All this should be done in the case of land lying near the cremation-ground. In the case of land containing bones and skull, a portion of the earth should be taken out and thrown away to another place; also where all these may not be visible, but where their existence and subsequent appearance may be suspected.—(122).

VERSE (123).

WHAT HAS BEEN EATEN BY A BIRD, WHAT HAS BEEN SMELT BY A COW, BLOWN UPON, OR SNEEZED AT, OR DEFILED BY HAIR AND INSECTS, BECOMES PURE BY SCATTERING EARTH.—(123).

Bhāṣya.

The use of the term ‘eaten’ indicates that the text pertains to food.
By birds'—i.e., parrots and other birds that are eatible—what has been eaten out of (rendered a 'leaving'). This does not apply to what may have been eaten by the crow, the vulture and other such birds; as in connection with this extensive expiatory rites have been prescribed under the text 'what has been licked by a bird &c., &c.,' which lays down the expiration to be performed in the case of food which, by itself, is quite pure. Thus it is that there is no purification for food that has been eaten out of by the cow, in connection with the eating of which a similar elaborate expiation has been laid down. Though such may be the law, yet it is necessary to find out other Smṛti-texts and usage bearing upon the subject. As a matter of fact, when food, larger in quantity than ten cupfulls, has been defiled by the crow and other such birds, what cultured people do is to throw away just that portion of it that has been touched, and make use of the remainder after having purified it; but if it is less than ten cupfulls, they throw it away. Here also the peculiar circumstances of each case have to be taken into consideration.

In another Smṛti-text, food defiled by the black birds has also been prohibited.

'Blown upon'—with breath from the mouth, or over which a piece of cloth has been shaken for the purpose of being dusted.

'Sneezed at'—that food on which some one has sneezed.

'Hair'—of men from their heads. 'Insects'—small organisms; some of these, born out of moisture in the house, if they fall upon the food while living, they do not defile the food; just as is the case with flies. The present purification is laid down for the case where dead insects fall on the food. Those insects, on the other hand, that are born out of impure sources, or which live upon dirt, they defile the food, even when living. Says Gautama (17:89)—'What is defiled by hair and insects is ever uneatable.' When the food happens to be covered by a large number of these, the whole of it should be thrown away.

In the case of large heaps of food, if a small portion of it happen to be contaminated by impure insects, that much alone of
the food has to be thrown away and the remainder is purified.

In the case of contamination by hair, another Smṛti has laid down that the food shall be touched by vessels of gold, silver, kusha and gems, along with water. In certain works heating also has been prescribed.

Some people have taken this verse as laying down a rule for the purification of land. But they go against—(a) other Smṛti-texts, (b) usage and (c) the direct meaning of the text.—(124).

VERSE (125).

FROM AN OBJECT TAINTED BY AN UNEFFECTIVE SUBSTANCE, AS LONG AS THE SMELL AND THE STAIN CAUSED BY IT DO NOT DISAPPEAR, SO LONG SHOULD EARTH AND WATER BE APPLIED TO IT,—IN ALL CASES OF THE PURIFICATION OF THINGS.—(125).

Bhāṣya.

'Unclean'—Untouchable.

'If that be so, then what is not eatable by the person concerned, that alone will be a source of contamination for him; e.g., wine and spirit would be 'unclean' for the Brihmana, but not for the Shūdra.'

This is not right; because substances intended as offering-materials at a sacrifice are 'not eatable', before the offerings have been made; and yet they are not 'untouchable'. As for wines and spirits, even the touching of these has been prohibited for the Brāhmaṇa. So that that thing may be regarded as a source of contamination for a man the touching of which has been prohibited for him. So that what is true is, not 'what is not eatable is untouchable,' but that 'what is untouchable is not eatable.'

'Tainted'—besmeared; contaminated.

'So long';—this prescribes repetition of the act.

'Earth and water'—all this to be is used only if there is need for it; and the need would consist in the removing of the smell and stain. So that in the case of the touch of such unclean things as are dry, or in the case of the contamination having
taken place long ago,—since the smell and stain would have been removed by the lapse of time,—washing with earth and water should have to be done once only.

"The use of earth and water is for a visible purpose,—since it is only by their use that the stain is removed and the thing is purified; what then is the use of the phrase 'as long as &c.'?"

The explanation is as follows:—The qualifying phrase has been added with a view to exceeding the restricted number of applications, specifically laid down in such texts as—'once to the urinary organ, thrice to the anus &c. &c.' (3:448); the sense being that if the removal of the stain &c., of the excretions be found to be impossible by the restricted number of applications, the said restrictions are to be ignored and more applications used. All that the mention of the exact number of applications means is that even if the smell and stain be removed by a less number of applications, the prescribed number must be made up.

'Earth and water' have been mentioned only as indicating things that may be used as a means of purification. Hence even though the contaminating substance may have been washed off by water, yet it should be rubbed with saline substances, so that not a trace of the substance may be visible.

'Disappear'—go off, cease.

'Caused by it'—caused by the unclean substance. Hence there would be no contamination if the smell of such substances as musk and the like did not disappear from clothing &c. But in the case of a thing painted with kunkuma and such substances, if any portion of it should happen to be contaminated by an unclean thing, then the kunkuma also has to be removed from that portion; and this for the simple reason that the kunkuma also is in contact with the unclean thing; specially there also the 'smell and taint' are present. If however the colour of kunkuma happens to be attached to one's body, and it cannot be removed by rubbing, then purification may be attained (even by the use of earth and water).—(125).
VERSE CXXVI:—PURIFICATION OF SUBSTANCES

VERSE (126).

THE GODS ORDAINED THREE THINGS PURE FOR THE BRĀHMAṆAS:
WHAT IS NOT SEEN, WHAT IS WASHED WITH WATER AND WHAT IS
COMMENDED BY WORD.—(126).

Bhāṣya.

Pavitraṁ’—pure.

The mention of the gods is by way of commendation.
The term ‘Brāhmaṇa’ includes, according to usage, all castes.

‘What is not seen’; a thing that, though lying in an un-
protected place, is yet not actually seen to have been contaminated
by the touch of the dog, the crow or such other things. The
mere presence of such animals should not be the ground
for suspecting actual defilement, until it is actually perceived.
Similarly there can be no harm in a man partaking of food
prepared in the kitchen by cooks and others who may have done
the cooking without having themselves undergone a cleansing
process [if anything unclean is not actually perceived].

In this connection, no one should entertain the idea that—
‘there would be nothing wrong in the partaking of food if the
defilement were entirely unknown.’ As this would be contrary to
what has been declared (in 5-20) regarding the sinfulness of
eating certain things unintentionally.

Thus the conclusion is that a thing is to be regarded as pure in
connection with which no contamination is known by any of the
recognised means of knowledge. But when, even in the absence
of definite proof, there be even the slightest and most far-fetched
suspicion regarding contamination, the thing concerned should be
washed with water. E.g. when from among a large number of
dishes and cups lying in the same place, if even one has been seen
to be contaminated by the touch of the dog or some such thing,
all the rest of them also should be washed with water.

To this same category (of ‘what is not seen’) belongs also ‘what
is commended by word.’ That is cultured men should be made to
pronounce the thing to be pure. They say that things become pure by the Brahmana’s word. The present tense in ‘prashasyate’, ‘is commended’, has the force of the Injunctive.

Some people explain the ‘commendation’ here spoken of as follows:—“When the person going to make use of a certain thing has seen it being defiled, even if he does not himself see it being purified, he should believe it to have been purified if cultured people assure him that it has undergone purification.”

This however is not right. Since the assertion of a trustworthy person has nowhere been spoken of as being unreliable, to assert it here would be a needless repetition.

Others have explained the term ‘what is washed with water’ as meant to be an example,—and the ‘unseen’ and the ‘commended by word’ as the two whose purity is here enjoined ; the sense being—‘Just as what is washed with water is pure, so also should be regarded what is not seen and what is commended by word.’

“If everything is pure, in which no contamination is cognised by either Perception or Inference or Verbal Authority,—then why should the Chândrayana have been prescribed (under 5.21) as to be performed for the expiation of the sin of having partaken of defiled food, without knowledge?”

What has been said under 5.21 is in connection with what is fit for being eaten ; while the present text deals with purification in general. Or, a distinction may be drawn between the two declarations, either on the ground of one referring to cases of more serious defilement than the other, or on the ground of one referring to times of distress and the other to normal times.—(126)

VERSE (127).

**Water collected on the ground is pure, if it is sufficient to allay the thirst of the cow; but only if it is not contaminated by any unclean thing, becoming affected by with its smell, colour and taste.”—(127)**

*Bhāṣya.*

The ‘ground’ is mentioned only by way of illustration; so that water in canals is also pure. Water on the ground, as also in the
atmosphere, is, by its very nature, pure; but the ground, being in contact with unclean substances, is slightly impure; hence when water is collected on the ground, it imbibes impurity by contact; and the present text proceeds to point out what quantity of water thus collected is to be regarded as pure:—‘Sufficient to allay the thirst of the cow’;—‘vaitṛṣṇyam’ means freedom from thirst. This is meant to indicate a particular quantity; this explanation having been adopted by the ancients on the strength of the words of the Veda—‘so that the dawlap of the cow dapples in water &c. &c.’ Thus the quantity meant is that in which the cow’s dewlap becomes submerged, or which allays her thirst.

Water collected on pure ground is pure, even in small quantities.

“How is it to be known that water has been ‘contaminated by an unclean thing’?”

In answer to this we have the phrase—‘becoming affected by its smell, colour and taste.’ The Instrumental ending in ‘amedhyena’, ‘by an unclean thing’, has to be changed here into the genitive; the meaning being—‘when the water imbibes the smell, colour and taste of the unclean thing, then it is to be regarded as contaminated by it.’ According to this construction, if in a tank, an unclean thing be found in one part, while in another part the water be found to be free from its smell &c., then this latter is to be regarded as pure—(127).

VERSE (128).

The artisan’s hand is always pure; so also is merchandise spread out for sale; the food begged and held by the student is ever sacred; such is the established rule—(128).

Bhāṣya

‘Kāru’ is artisan; such as the cook; the dye, the weaver and so forth;—the hand of these people is ‘always pure.’ It is for this reason that they are touchable even during periods of impurity
caused by birth or death. But it does not mean that their hand is to be regarded as pure even when found to be actually bearing the stains of ordure or such unclean things.

What is stated here is on the same footing with what as been asserted before regarding certain people being ‘immediately purified.’ Nor is there any superfluous repetition; as ‘no such purification has been declared anywhere else in the Institutes of Manu. Then the present text contemplates another case also, e.g. weavers, as a rule, weave cloth without bathing;—for separating the yarns from the pillars they make use of dough and gruel &c.;—they place the vessels containing these things at random;—the ‘impurity’ involved in all this is what is negatived by the present text; and it is not meant that people who are impure by their very nature are to be regarded as ‘touchable’ by taking to the work of artisans; because such work has not been ordained for them.

This, same reasoning holds good regarding the view that things touched by Mlechchhas are not impure. In connection with these, sprinkling and washing have to be done, as laid down by Shankha, who reads—‘The artisan’s hand is pure, and so also are substances in a heap.’

‘Merchandise;—the substance that is sold for money, or is exchanged for some other substance, is called ‘merchandise’; and when this is ‘spread out’ in the market-place, it is pure. That is, it does not become defiled by such contaminations as being handled by several purchasers, being spread out on unwashed ground and so forth, even though one may perceive such contaminations again and again. Since the text speaks of its being ‘spread out,’ it follows that so long as the thing is stored within a room, it is not pure, even though it is in the market-place. As regards cooked substances, such as fried flour, cakes and the like,—though these also are ‘pure’ (when spread out in the market-place), yet they are not fit for eating; as declared by Shankha—‘things exposed in the market-place are not fit for eating’.

‘Held by the student’.—By reason of the ‘purity’ being spoken of in this verse along with this term, it is to be regarded as pertaining
to such contamination as the following—(a) treading along the public road in course of begging (b) the sight of unclean objects, (c) spitting and sneezing, (d) the dropping of one hand on the food obtained and so forth,—all which are probable.

'Sacred;'—this is meant to imply purity—(128).

VERSE (129).

The mouth of women is always pure; as also the bird in the dropping of fruits; the calf is pure in causing the flow (of milk); and the dog is pure in the catching of deer—(129).

Bhāṣya.

The mouth of all women is 'pure'—for the purposes of kissing &c. 'Women during sexual intercourse etc.'—says another Smṛti-text. What is said here applies only to such women with whom sexual intercourse is possible, and not to the mother, sister and such women. This should not be understood to be the denial of the impurity attaching to the mouth until it is washed after food. Because even though the wife is a woman with whom sexual intercourse is possible, yet it has been declared in discourse IV that 'one should not eat with his wife'.

The addition of the term 'always' implies that the mouth is pure, not only at the time of the actual intercourse, but also during the acts that lead up to it.

'The bird in the dropping of fruits'.—Though the term "śakuni", 'bird', denotes all kinds of birds, yet by usage, what is said here is not applicable to the crow, the vulture or other such birds as feed upon unclean things.

Since the text uses the term 'dropping', the present rule applies only to fruits on the tree.

'In causing the flow'.—When the cow is being milked, the calf is made to touch the teats for the purpose of making the milk to flow; and yet, it has been declared that 'cows are pure except in their mouths'; so that the touch of the calf's mouth might be
regarded as a source of impurity; it is with a view to preclude this notion that we have the present text.

The dog itself is not pure; but it is to be regarded as pure when in the course of hunting, it catches the deer—(129).

VERSE (130).

THE FLESH OF THE ANIMAL KILLED BY DOGS MANU HAS DECLARED TO BE PURE; AS ALSO THAT OF THE ANIMAL KILLED BY OTHER CARNIVOROUS ANIMALS AND BY THE CHÅNDÅLA AND OTHER LOW CASTES.—(130).

Bhâsyā.

In the preceding verse—'the dog is pure in the catching of deer'—all that was meant was that in the act of catching deer, the dog is pure; while the present verse goes into further details and declares the purity of what has been killed by the dog, as also of that killed by others with the stroke of sticks &c. Hence it is only the latter part of the verse that lays down something new.

'Carnivorous animals'—the kite, the jackal and the rest.
'Chåndåla and others';—'and others' is meant to include the Shvåpada and people of that class.
'Low castes';—the Nisåda, the Vyådha and others, who live by killing animals.—(130).

VERSE (131).

THE CAVITIES THAT ARE ABOVE THE NAVAL ARE ALL PURE; THOSE THAT ARE BELOW IT ARE IMPURE; AS ALSO ARE ALL EXCRETIONS DROPPED FROM THE BODY.—(131).

Bhâsyā.

The term 'kha' stands for 'organ'; hence the organs of action also become included; and thus taking the two feet, the plural number becomes justified in the phrase 'those that are below it are impure.'
This explanation (by which the lower organs are all made impure) is not right; as it is contrary to what has gone in the first half. Therein it has been declared that the purity of those above the navel is of a higher grade and superior; and this could have a meaning only if the lower ones also were pure; for what is white cannot be called more black.

Further, the term 'kha' does not signify the organ, it only signifies the cavity or hole. It is for this reason that the organs have been spoken of as 'saptashirshanyāḥ', 'having seven seats' (the cavities of the two ears, two eyes, two nostrils and the mouth). There are two 'cavities' below the navel; but the plural number has been used on account of the male and female generative organs being regarded as distinct.

According to this, there would be no uncleanness of the hand involved in touching the inside of the mouth;—but only if it does not come into contact with the phlegm or other things that may be there. So, that if the hand does become contaminated with some such defiling substance, the mouth shall not be touched by it—(131).

VERSE (132).

Flies, water-drops, shadow, the cow, the horse, the sun's rays, dust, earth, air and fire—should be regarded as pure to the touch.—(132).

Bhasya.

'Flies'.—all sweat-born insects.
The 'cow' includes the goat and sheep.
The 'horse' includes the elephant and the mule.
The 'sun' includes all luminous bodies.

'Vipruṣah', 'water-drops'—such drops of water as are invisible and can be felt only by touch.

'Shadow'—of the Chāṇḍāla and other unclean things.

'Earth'—in contact with, or walked over by, the Chāṇḍāla and the like—is pure. In other cases its sweeping has been prescribed.
The flies &c. mentioned here, even though coming into contact with ordure and other unclean things, do not become sources of defilement.

Another Smṛti-text says—"Goats and horses are pure in their mouths; cows are pure except in their mouths; cats and mongoose are touchable,—as also other auspicious birds and animals."—(132).

VERSE (133).


Bhāṣya.

The impurity of the bodily excretions having been asserted in 131, the present verse proceeds to lay down directions for their cleansing.

"Ejectors of urine and fæces"—i.e. the organs by which these are passed,—i.e. the Anus &c.—for the cleansing of these—one should "use earth and water, as much as may be necessary"; i.e. not minding any restrictions as to the number (of washings and rubblings), one should go on taking up as much water and earth as may be necessary for the total removal of smells and stains.

"Bodily"—proceeding from the body,—"excretions"—which are sources of impurity. In connection with the purifications necessitated by these also, earth and water are to be used as much as may be necessary. In another Smṛti we read—"In the case of the former six excretions both earth and water should be used; in the case of the latter six one is purified even by the use of water only."

In connection with phlegm &c. it is thus declared in another Smṛti—"The viscid excretion from the nose is called Phlegm; and since this occurs among the latter group of six, for cleansing it earth need not be used at all."—(133).
VERSE CXXXIV:—PURIFICATION OF SUBSTANCES

VERSE (134).

Fat, semen, blood, marrow, urine, ordure, nasal excretion, earwax, phlegm, tears, rheum of the eyes and perspiration,—these twelve are the ‘excretions’ of human beings. —(134).

Bhāṣya.

The twelve ‘excretions’ or ‘impurities’ are here indicated. ‘Human beings’ includes all five-nailed animals. As regards dogs and jackals, their excretions are impure by reason of their own untouchability.

‘Urine and ordure’—of all animals, except those of the goat, the sheep, the cow and the horse.—(134).

VERSE (135).

One who desires cleanliness should apply earth—once to the urinary organ, thrice to the anus, ten times to one hand and seven times to both hands.—(135).

Bhāṣya.

After the passing of urine and faces, for the cleansing of the urinary organ, earth should be applied to it once.

In another Smṛti it has been laid down that one should take as much earth mixed with water as can be contained in one hand. What I assert is that in view of what has been said regarding the using of as much earth and water as may be necessary, the proper quantity would be what is stated in the present text. Some people quote, in this connection, the following saying—‘The hand being filled up, the first (and largest) measure of it is called Prasṛti, the second is half of it; and the third part of it is called mṛttikā.’ But this measure applies to the case of anus-cleansing only. In all other cases, as much is to be used as may be necessary.
In the case of a single evacuation also, the number of applications is to be as here prescribed; and what is prescribed is the repetition of the act (of rubbing and washing).

There is a distinction among the various kinds of 'earth', just as there is among the various kinds of the 'cow' and other things. In present connection, for instance, it has been declared that 'earth should be got from a place far removed from an ant-hill, as also from the stables' and so forth. No account need be taken however of the distinction into 'white', 'black', 'red' and so forth.

"Who desires"—who wishes.—(135).

VERSE (136).

Such is the purification for householders; double of this for students, treble for hermits, and quadruple for renunciates.—(136).

Bhāsyā.

The rules regarding Purification vary with the stages of life. For those who do not belong to any of these stages, the only rule is that as much earth and water shall be used as may be necessary. The same holds good for the Shudra also, who is entitled to observe the rules regarding the stage of the Householder; so that he also has to observe the same number of applications.—(136).

VERSE (137).

Having passed urine or faeces, and sipped water, one should touch with water the cavities; also when he may be going to read the Vedas, and always when going to take food.—(137).

Bhāsyā.

Having 'passed'—i.e., cleansed away according to the aforesaid directions,—all taint of urine &c., from the urinary organ,
VERSE CXXXVIII:—PURIFICATION OF SUBSTANCES

etc.;—‘and sipped water,’—‘one should touch with water the cavities’.

‘Also when he may be going to read the Veda’—i.e., according to the course of Vedic study prescribed in Discourse II.

In accordance with its primary signification, the word ‘krtvā’, ‘having passed’, appears to mean ‘having evacuated’; and the meaning is that—‘after having passed urine and faeces and washed the anus and the urinary organ, one should sip water’.

‘Also when going to read the Veda’;—the sipping of water has been prescribed as a necessary duty in connection with the course of Vedic study, under 2:70. What is prescribed here is meant for all sorts of reading of the Veda—either by one who is teaching it, or reading it. In other cases, people are said to be ‘reciting’ the Veda (udhāranantah). The meaning is that after having done other secular acts, one should not pronounce the words of the Veda, without having sipped water.

‘Also when going to take food.’ (137).

VERSE (138).

Describing bodily purification, one should sip water thrice; then he should twice wipe his mouth; but the woman and the Shūdra should each do it once only.—(138).

Bhāṣya.

This is the reiteration (of a former injunction), for the purpose of enjoining what is necessary for the woman and the Shūdra. Though what is said here has been already declared before, yet it is repeated here for the sake of women and Shūdras.

Some people explain this text as follows:—According to the rule that ‘the Shūdra is purified by touching water’, all that the ordinary Shūdra is to do is to touch water; hence washing and touching of the ear, etc., that are understood as applying to the
Shūdra, are regarded as pertaining to the better class of Shūdras. As regards women,—the general rule being that ‘the Brāhmaṇa is purified by water reaching the heart &c., &c.’ (2. 62), where the different castes are specified, it would seem as if all that is prescribed for males is to be done by females also; and it is with a view to preclude this notion that we have the present text.

‘Desiring bodily purification’;—this indicates that if one is quite clean when going to read or to take food, he need not necessarily repeat the acts thrice; nor need there be washing;—all that need be done is the sipping of some quantity of water, and the touching of the organs; and not all the details that have been laid down in connection with the ‘sipping of water’ prescribed among the duties of the Student.—(138).

VERSE (139).

By Shūdras living according to law, shaving should be done every month; their manner of purification should be like that of the Vaishya; and their food shall consist of the leavings of twice-born men.—(139).

Bhāṣya

A general rule of conduct is here laid down for the better class of Shūdras.

‘Living according to law’;—i.e. attending on twice-born men and performing the great sacrifices. By these ‘shaving’—of the head—shall be done ‘every month’. The Genitive in Shūdrāṇām has the sense of the Instrumental. Or, in as much as Shūdras are entirely dependent upon Brāhmaṇas their shaving shall be got done by these latter; and in this case the root ‘Kr,’ which has several meanings, is to be taken in the sense of advising.

The details of the manner of purification—in connection with births, deaths and the rest—should be like those of the Vaishya.

‘Their food shall consist of the leavings of twice-born men.’—This has been already explained before.—(139).
VERSE (140).

Drops from the mouth, if they do not reach the body, do not make one impure; nor the hairs of the beard that enter the mouth; nor what adheres to the teeth.—(140).

Bhashya.

In the text—‘on having spat and on having told a lie &c.’ (5.144)—it has been laid down that on spitting one should sip water; which indicates that until one has sipped water, he remains impure. Drops issuing from the mouth would also be a form of ‘spitting’; so that the issuing of drops of water from the mouth standing on the same footing as the spitting of phlegm, it might be thought that it should necessitate the sipping of water. With a view to this contingency, the author has added the present verse.

‘Mukhyah’—produced in, or issuing from, the mouth;—such ‘drops’ do not make one impure, if they do not fall upon the body.

“But it has been already declared that drops are pure (5.132).”

But that was with reference to things other than bodily excretions. That this was meant there is clearly indicated by the present verse; which makes it clear that all kinds of drops were not meant when they were declared to be pure.

‘Shmashrani’—hairs of the beard,—‘that enter the mouth’—do not make one impure; this has to be construed with the present phrase; so that they do become the cause of some slight evil effects (even though they do not make the man impure).

So also ‘what adheres to the teeth.’ In connection with this we have greater details in another Smrti text—‘What adheres to the teeth is like the teeth, except what is touched by the tongue;—some say that this is so before it falls off from the teeth;—what falls off is to be treated as saliva;—the man becomes pure by swallowing it.’ (Gautama 1.38 to 40.) ‘Those that fall off’—i.e. without being touched by the tongue: since the touch of the tongue has been declared to be not pure.—(140).
MANU-SMRTI: DISCOURSE V

VERSE (141).

The drops that touch the feet of one who is helping others to wash should be regarded as on the same footing as those on the ground; and he is not rendered impure by them.—(141)

Bhāṣya.

‘Helping others to wash,’—i.e. offering water to other persons.

The meaning is as follows:—When one is pouring water for another person and the latter begins to sip water, if drops of water flowing out from between the fingers of that person happen to fall on the ground and rising from it, touch the feet of the man who is offering the water,—that man is not made impure by them.

‘Those on the ground’.—The drops of water falling from the hand of the washing person, though unclean, should be regarded to be as clean as small quantities of water collected on clean ground.

‘By them,’—touched, the man does not become impure.—(141)

VERSE (142).

He who, with some substance in hand, happens to be touched by an unclean object, becomes pure by washing, without laying down that substance.—(142)

Bhāṣya

The man who has committed something necessitating ‘washing’ is called ‘unclean’. For instance, one who has passed urine or evacuated his bowels, and has not performed the purificatory ablutions; or when he has been defiled by the contamination of some unclean thing.
VERSE CXLIII:—Purification of Substances

‘With some substance in hand;’—the person who is holding in his hand some thing to be eaten or some metal or cloth, &c., is called 'dravyahastah', the use of the compound being similar to such compounds as 'khaḍyahastah'.

If such a person happens to be touched, then 'without laying down'—without setting aside—'that substance'—he should wash.

"How can the man wash, when he has a substance in his hand? The procedure of washing has been described as 'washing the hand unto the wrists and so forth.'"

In answer to this some people offer the following explanation:—What is meant by the man being 'with some substance in hand' is that he should have the substance somewhere on his body, not necessarily in his hands. Similarly in the case of impurity also if the man become defiled, the contamination affects substances that may be lying on his shoulders also. Similarly purification is obtained by washing. Hence the man should perform the washing by removing the substance from his hand and keeping it on his fore-arm, in his lap or in some other part of his body. The meaning is that just as the impurity of the man makes the substance impure so also the purification of the man renders the substance pure.

Gautama has declared that—'The man with a substance in hand, happening to become unclean, should wash after having kept away the substance' (1.28). This they explain as follows: Though both (washing and keeping away) are spoken of together, yet it is the keeping away that is meant to be enjoined by this text, otherwise all that would be necessary in the circumstances would be the purifying of both himself and the substance; and where would there be any necessity for the keeping away of the substance? Hence, since, in the absence of the text quoted, there would be no possibility of the keeping away, this text must be taken as meant only for enjoining this latter. "How then would the substance be purified?" It would be purified by being held by the pure person,—or by the 'washing' prescribed by another Smṛti-text: viz: 'while dealing with foods and drinks
if one happens to touch an unclean thing, he should wash the article and then sip water; in this manner it does not become defiled.

"In the present verse nothing is said regarding the necessity of having to keep away the substance, and yet if it were to be taken as implied, the phrase 'without laying down' would be absolutely futile."

As a matter of fact, the same purpose runs through all Smītis; and yet from the direct words of the texts in the present instance we understand that there is a clear difference of opinion (between Manu and Gautama). So that the two should be regarded as optional alternatives; and the rule determining the option would be that—(a) if the substance is a heavy one it shall be laid aside, otherwise it may be kept on the body,—or (b) when the man himself eats the food (carried), or he touches a large quantity of unclean things, or is touched by a person who should have washed but has not yet washed,—in all these cases the touching of the substance would be a source of uncleanness (142)

VERSE (143).

HAVING VOMITTED OR PURGED, ONE SHOULD BATHE AND THEN EAT CLARIFIED BUTTER. AFTER HAVING EATEN HIS FOOD, HE SHOULD ONLY SIP WATER. FOR ONE WHO HAS COPULATED BATHING HAS BEEN ORDAINED.—(143).

Bhāsyā.

'Vomiting' and 'purging' are wellknown. The man who throws out the food that he has eaten is said to have 'vomitted'. The man the number of whose motions has gone beyond the number eight,—either through disease, or through his having taken Haritaki or some such purgative—is said to have 'purged'.

These two persons should first of all bathe.

Then, they should eat clarified butter and then any other kind of food; and the injunction of eating clarified butter is meant to be a
prohibition of other kinds of food. Just as in the case of expiatory rites, ashes and water are regarded as means of purification, so in the case in question, is the eating of clarified butter.

"After having taken food he should only sip water."—After he has taken his food, if he happen to vomit or purge on the same day, then he should do the sipping of water only, and not bathing and eating of clarified butter.

Others have taken this independently by itself, to mean that "after having taken his food he should sip water,"—this being a reiteration of the water-sipping that has already been prescribed as to be done after meals.

"One who has copulated,"—i.e., one who has had sexual intercourse with a woman,—becomes pure by bathing. (143).

VERSE (144).

ONE SHOULD SIP WATER AFTER HAVING SLEPT, AFTER HAVING SNEEZED, AFTER HAVING EATEN, AFTER HAVING SPAT, AFTER HAVING TOLD A LIE, AFTER HAVING DRUNK WATER, AND WHEN GOING TO READ THE VEDA, EVEN THOUGH HE MAY BE QUITE PURE.—(144).

Bhāṣya.

"After having sneezed,"—after having done sneezing, which is the name given to the sound that emanates involuntarily from the nostrils of a man moved by internal wind.

"Even though he may be quite pure."—This is to be construed only with the phrase "when going to read the Veda"; the meaning being that, even though he be quite pure, he should, when going to read the Veda, read if after having sipped water; i.e., the water sipping—should be done as part of the procedure laid down in connection with Vedic study; while after sleep &c., the water-sipping—shall be done once only.
As for the following declaration—'Having slept, having sneezed, having eaten, having drunk water, the wise man shall sip water and then again sip water; as also after having spat and told lies',—this has to be construed to mean that 'having sipped water, he should eat and then sip water again.' In a case however where it is clearly stated that 'one should sip water twice, the act has to be repeated consecutively.' (144)